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The 2003 San Diego County Fire Siege Fire Safety Review 2 Use of Military Aviation Assets

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The 2003 San Diego County Fire Siege Fire Safety Review 2 Use of Military Aviation Assets TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Purpose .............................................................................................................5 II. Executive Summary ..........................................................................................6 III. Incident Events and Operations.......................................................................8 The San Diego County Fires........................................................................................... 8 Fire Weather and Climate Trends................................................................................... 8 Fuel Conditions............................................................................................................... 9 Fire Activity in Southern California ............................................................................... 9 The Cedar Fire .............................................................................................................. 10 Cedar Fire Initial Attack Chronology ....................................................................... 10 Fire Spread and Behavior Chronology ..................................................................... 13 Command and Operations on the Cedar Fire............................................................ 18 Planning and Logistics on the Cedar Fire ................................................................. 20 Evacuation on the Cedar Fire.................................................................................... 20 The Paradise Fire .......................................................................................................... 21 Initial Attack Chronology ......................................................................................... 21 October 26th.............................................................................................................. 21 Fire Spread and Behavior Chronology ..................................................................... 23 Suppression and Evacuation Operations................................................................... 23 October 27th.............................................................................................................. 24 The Otay Fire ................................................................................................................ 24 IV. Incident Safety...............................................................................................25 Summary....................................................................................................................... 25 Safety Findings ............................................................................................................. 26 Training and Qualifications ...................................................................................... 26 Evacuations ............................................................................................................... 27 Radio Communications............................................................................................. 28 Thirty Mile Abatement Plan ..................................................................................... 29 Work / Rest Ratios .................................................................................................... 29 Weather Forecasts..................................................................................................... 30 Airspace Management .............................................................................................. 30 Airbase Security........................................................................................................ 31 Safety Recommendations.............................................................................................. 31 Training and Qualifications ...................................................................................... 31 Evacuations ............................................................................................................... 32 Communications ....................................................................................................... 32 Airspace Management .............................................................................................. 32 V. Focused Areas of Review...............................................................................33 A. Wildland fire coordination policies and procedures such as the use of interagency aviation operations, qualifications, training, and certification procedures of the agencies involved.......................................................................................................... 34 Summary ................................................................................................................... 34 Findings..................................................................................................................... 34 Aviation Cutoff and Shutdown Policy.................................................................. 34 “No Divert” Policy................................................................................................ 35 The 2003 San Diego County Fire Siege Fire Safety Review 2 Use of Military Aviation Assets ........................................................................... 35 Sharing of Aviation Resources Among Incidents................................................. 37 Recommendations..................................................................................................... 37 B. Procedures, system and coordination with other organizations such as (but not limited to) South Zone Coordination Center, Riverside California, and the Southern California Multi-Agency Coordination Group ............................................................. 37 Summary ................................................................................................................... 37 Findings..................................................................................................................... 38 Interagency Coordination in San Diego County................................................... 38 Interagency Relationships..................................................................................... 38 Preseason Meetings and Exercises........................................................................ 38 Dispatch Procedures.............................................................................................. 38 Drawdown Levels ................................................................................................. 39 Briefings................................................................................................................ 39 County Emergency Operations Center ................................................................. 39 Interagency Coordination between San Diego County and South Zone Coordination Center and the Southern California MACS .................................... 40 Mutual Aid............................................................................................................ 40 Resource Ordering Systems.................................................................................. 40 Area Coordination................................................................................................. 41 Recommendations..................................................................................................... 41 C. Organizational management, leadership and the use of the Incident Management System model to address firefighter and public safety ................................................. 42 Summary ................................................................................................................... 42 Findings..................................................................................................................... 42 ICS Implementation.............................................................................................. 42 “Zoning” ............................................................................................................... 42 Air Operations....................................................................................................... 43 Recommendations..................................................................................................... 43 D. Pre-incident preparedness, including plans and agreements.................................... 44 Summary ................................................................................................................... 44 Findings..................................................................................................................... 45 Aviation Hazard Maps .......................................................................................... 45 Agreements and Procedures.................................................................................. 45 Planning ................................................................................................................ 45 Intelligence and Information Sharing ................................................................... 45 Recommendations..................................................................................................... 46 E. Environmental, biological and social conditions which may have contributed to the severity and effects of the fires, as well as those which may have prevented / mitigated fire’s effects. ................................................................................................................
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