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Behavioural Reactions of Managers Towards Airline Operations Performance in Times Of Behavioural Reactions of Managers Towards Airline Operations Performance In Times of Crisis and Growth David Llewelyn Parry A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Bournemouth University for the degree of Doctor of Business Administration February 2011 Bournemouth University COPYRIGHT STATEMENT This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with its author and due acknowledgement must always be made of the use of any material contained in, or derived from, this thesis. 2 ABSTRACT David Llewelyn Parry Behavioural Reactions of Managers Towards Airline Operations Performance In Times of Crisis and Growth This research was undertaken in the United States within two different regional airlines and examines the attitudes and behaviours of managers to operations performance measurement and review (PMR) systems during separate periods of crisis and growth. The aim and objectives were to examine whether managers would consciously adopt the necessary attitudes and behaviours that are required to positively interact with a PMR system and to further examine what these behaviours should be. A secondary aim was to understand whether the prevailing business state of crisis or growth affected the attitudes and behaviours of managers as they used the PMR system. The research spanned seven years and was conducted over four iterative cycles within an Action Research paradigm and used semi-structured interviews and repertory grids to examine individual personal construct systems. The research is essentially qualitative but draws on quantitative techniques where appropriate. The research has shown that people do not automatically adopt the behaviours necessary to achieve performance goals. Unless there is structure, support and an inherent commitment to training managers on how to, correctly, interpret operations performance data then there is likely to be an uncommitted and uninformed response to the PMR system. The research has confirmed that both business states of crisis and growth can have a positive impact on some people and encourage them to adopt performance-driven behaviour. 3 LIST OF CONTENTS COPYRIGHT STATEMENT ................................................................................................. 2 ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................ 3 LIST OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................................... 4 LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ 9 LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... 11 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................. 13 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH STRUCTURE ........................................ 14 1.1 Background ................................................................................. 14 1.2 Research Overview ..................................................................... 20 1.3 Justification ................................................................................. 24 1.4 Scope ......................................................................................... 25 1.5 Aims and Objectives ................................................................... 27 1.6 Thesis Structure .......................................................................... 29 1.7 Footnote ..................................................................................... 30 1.8 Summary .................................................................................... 31 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................... 32 2.1 Introduction ................................................................................. 32 2.2 Defining and Positioning Performance Measurement .................. 33 2.3 Performance Measurement in the Present Context ..................... 36 2.4 Communicating Strategy through PMR Systems ........................ 41 4 2.5 Performance Measurement System Design ................................ 44 2.6 PMR System Implementation Within the Scope of the BSC ........ 49 2.7 Impact of Service Quality on Airline Operations Performance ..... 51 2.8 The Human Factor ...................................................................... 54 2.9 Tying It All Together .................................................................... 61 2.10 Summary .................................................................................... 65 CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ................................................................. 66 3.1 Selecting a Methodology ............................................................. 66 3.2 Introduction to Action Research .................................................. 73 3.3 Justification for Selecting Action research ................................... 74 3.4 Research Design ........................................................................ 76 3.5 Data Collection Process .............................................................. 79 3.6 Process for Data Analysis ........................................................... 84 3.7 Diagram of the Research Process .............................................. 94 3.8 Summary .................................................................................... 96 CHAPTER 4. CYCLE 1: CRISIS AT ALLEGHENY AIRLINES ........................................... 97 4.1 Introduction ................................................................................. 97 4.2 The Research Situation............................................................... 98 4.3 Purpose and Objectives of the First Cycle of Research............. 104 4.4 Design of the PMR System (Planning Action) ........................... 106 4.5 Implementation of the PMR System (Taking Action) ................. 115 4.6 Understanding Performance Measurement at Allegheny .......... 119 5 4.7 Summary of Findings ................................................................ 169 4.8 Personal Reflections on the First Cycle ..................................... 179 4.9 Summary .................................................................................. 181 CHAPTER 5. CYCLE 2: ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOURS AT ALLEGHENY AIRLINES ....... 182 5.1 Introduction ............................................................................... 182 5.2 Purpose and Objectives ............................................................ 183 5.3 Modifying the PMR System ....................................................... 185 5.4 Adopting Repertory Grids .......................................................... 186 5.5 Descriptive Analysis .................................................................. 189 5.6 Relationship Analysis ................................................................ 202 5.7 Findings from the individual Grids ............................................. 204 5.8 Content Analysis – Bootstrapping ............................................. 205 5.9 Findings from the Combined Grids ............................................ 211 5.10 Summary of Findings ................................................................ 212 5.11 Reflection .................................................................................. 216 5.12 Summary .................................................................................. 219 CHAPTER 6. CYCLE 3: ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOURS AT PINNACLE AIRLINES .......... 220 6.1 Introduction ............................................................................... 220 6.2 The Research Situation............................................................. 220 6.3 Purpose and Objectives ............................................................ 222 6.4 Designing a PMR System for the SOC ...................................... 224 6.5 Implementation of a PMR System in SOC................................. 227 6 6.6 Understanding Performance Measurement in the SOC ............ 236 6.7 Content Analysis of Combined Grids......................................... 242 6.8 Summary of Findings ................................................................ 250 6.9 Personal Reflections on the Third Cycle ................................... 253 6.10 Summary .................................................................................. 254 CHAPTER 7. CYCLE 4: CROSS-DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS PERFORMANCE REVIEW 255 7.1 Introduction ............................................................................... 255 7.2 Purpose and Objectives ............................................................ 256 7.3 Design of Daily Operations Briefing .......................................... 257 7.4 Implementation of the 0930 Daily Operations Briefing ............... 259 7.5 The Structural and Behavioural Aspects of the PMR System .... 264 7.6 Summary of Findings ................................................................ 300 7.7 Reflection .................................................................................. 301 7.8 Summary .................................................................................. 303 CHAPTER 8. DISCUSSION OF OVERALL FINDINGS (CYCLES 1- 4) ............................. 304 8.1 Summary .................................................................................
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