Chief Constables' Council

Return to Agenda

Chief Constables’ Council

Serious Error Reduction within the Acquisition and use of Communications Data

16 January 2019 / Agenda Item: Regional

Security Classification OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE Papers cannot be accepted without a security classification in compliance with the Government Security Classification (GSC) Policy (Protective Marking has no relevance to FOI): Freedom of information (FOI)

This document (including attachments and appendices) may be subject to an FOI request and the NPCC FOI Officer & Decision Maker will consult with you on receipt of a request prior to any disclosure. Author: ACC Richard Berry & CC Simon Bailey Force/Organisation: Gloucestershire Constabulary Date Created: 19/11/2018 Coordination Committee: Crime Operations Coordination Committee Attachments @ para Annex A Information Governance & Security

In compliance with the Government’s Security Policy Framework’s (SPF) mandatory requirements, please ensure any onsite printing is supervised and storage and security of papers are in compliance with the SPF. Dissemination or further distribution of this paper is strictly on a need to know basis and in compliance with other security controls and legislative obligations. If you require any advice, please contact [email protected]

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management

1. INTRODUCTION/PURPOSE

1.1. This paper seeks to highlight to Chief Constables the importance of reducing the levels of serious errors in communications data acquisition. It recommends that rigorous action is taken to mitigate risks to forces, individuals and the police service.

2. BACKGROUND

2.1. Serious errors are defined by the communications data (CD) statutory codes of practice. They are reported to and investigated by the new body formed under the 2016 Investigatory Powers Act, the Investigatory Powers Commissioners Office (IPCO). The Head of IPCO is the Rt. Hon. Lord Justice, Sir Adrian Fulford.

2.2. The category of serious errors concerning this paper concerns innocent people who are arrested and their houses searched due to inadequate and ineffective digital investigative practice. This has included cases where the use by police of specialist software to detect sharing of child abuse imagery has produced results which have not been correctly interpreted by the users.

2.3. It is understood that after the 2016 IOCCO (Interception of Communications Commissioners Office, the predecessor of IPCO) ********S31(1)(a)(b)********

2.4. ********S31(1)(a)(b)********

2.5. The police service has previously been subject to a review commissioned by the Prime Minister relating to the legality, processes and procedures for the acquisition of CD for journalistic sources. A number of Chief Constables were then subject to Investigatory Powers Tribunal considerations.

2.6. The IP Act remains under significant legal challenge. ********S31(1)(a)(b)********. Litigation against a force or a finding of an Investigatory Powers Tribunal could fuel further claims that policing is unable to manage the new powers provided in the IP Act.

2.7. Section 11 of the IP Act contains an offence of unlawfully obtaining communications data. It remains to be tested if neglectful processes, which lead to a serious error, could render police employees liable for this criminal offence.

2.8. In 2017 a joint effort by the NPCC Data Communications Group (DCG) and industry produced guidance which had a dramatically positive impact on reducing errors within the CD acquisition process. ********S31(1)(a)(b)******** ********S31(1)(a)(b)******** ********S31(1)(a)(b)******** ********S31(1)(a)(b)******** ********S31(1)(a)(b)******** ********S31(1)(a)(b)******** ********S31(1)(a)(b)******** ********S31(1)(a)(b)********. Low knowledge and skill levels of investigators consequently result in inadequate assurance taking place. The wrong data is then acted upon with devastating results. These errors are in the digital investigation process and where it interfaces with CD acquisition.

2.9. In 2018 DCG commissioned further work, jointly with IPCO, through the CD Professional Oversight Board. This resulted in a search for further benchmarks to assure data. Police Scotland were found to have significantly enhanced data audit processes and were ‘best practice’. A subsequent first version of Error Reduction Strategy guidance for each force was produced and in November 2018, this was shared on Chiefs’net. It is an expectation by IPCO that each force will have an Error Reduction Strategy in place for inspections. Each force CD Senior Responsible Officer (SRO) will be required to oversee their strategy. It is based upon the ‘three Rs’; Recognition, Recording, and Reduction.

2.10. Serious error cases are always discussed between IPCO, the NPCC lead (the author) and the CD Professional Oversight Board. Recent cases have caused particular concern about the anecdotal quality of investigative and intelligence practice.

2.11. ********S31(1)(a)(b)********

2.12. To further mitigate some of the risks, DCG has commissioned a nationally accredited independent organisation to deliver further training on network data in 2019. This will be funded through the National Communications Data Service.

3. PROPOSAL

3.1. It is recommended that Chiefs note the content of this report and take action concerning the implementation of Error Reduction Strategies in their forces.

1 ********S31(1)(a)(b)********

National Police Chiefs’ Council 3.2. It is further recommended that Chiefs ensure that staff who are involved in investigations concerning IP addresses are sufficiently skilled to handle the data and send all SPOCs who acquire internet CD to the above mentioned network data training and testing.

4. APPROVAL OF THE COORDINATION COMMITTEEE

4.1 This paper was written out of the NCOCC cycle but with the strong endorsement of the Vulnerability lead CC Simon Bailey as the co-sponsor.

5. RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS

5.1 The training course in interpreting network data has been funded.

6. DECISIONS REQUIRED

6.1 It is recommended that Chiefs acknowledge the risks and issues contained within this report and take appropriate action.

Richard Berry, Communications Data Lead ACC Serious Organised Crime – Crime Operations Coordination Committee

National Police Chiefs’ Council This page is intended to be blank for printing Return to Agenda

National Police Chiefs’ Council

Responding to Online Child Abuse Activists

16 January 2019 / Agenda Item: Regional

This document (including attachments and appendices) may be subject to an FOI request and the NPCC FOI Officer & Decision Maker will consult with you on receipt of a request prior to any disclosure. Author: ACC Dan Vajzovic Force/Organisation: Cambridgeshire Constabulary Date Created: 19/11/2018 Coordination Committee: Crime Operations Coordination Committee Portfolio: Violence and Public Protection Attachments @ para App A and App B Information Governance & Security

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management

1. INTRODUCTION/PURPOSE

1.1 The purpose of this paper is to request endorsement of the proposed NPCC strategic position statement in respect of Online CSA/E Activist Groups (OCAGs). This area of business was previously considered at Council in July 2018. In the intervening period further dialogue has taken place to assuage concerns expressed by Council. All points previously raised have been addressed to the satisfaction of the parties raising issues for consideration.

2. BACKGROUND

2.1 For brevity this paper will not rehearse arguments which Council have previously considered. Reference should be made to the paper presented to Council in July (Appendix A). Policing continues to prioritise activity to tackle CSA/E and grooming. This is likely to remain the case for the foreseeable future. Child abuse activism has continued unabated. Law enforcement data is incomplete but extrapolation of existing data indicated incidents remain at levels of the order of 100/month across the UK.

2.2 Analysis of incidents of activism has revealed a mixed picture. Some activist groups have amended their mode of operation such that they pass packages of information to the police without having real world contact with the person suspected of offending behaviour. Whilst this is a positive development many groups continue to insist on carrying out a physical intervention and only notify the police post or concurrent to the event. This is less desirable for reasons that have been previously articulated. There is an increased prevalence of direct criminality where purported activists have no intention to notify the police but use the opportunity of an encounter to extort or rob.

2.3 The complex, nuanced and often overlapping nature of activism and volunteering make it difficult to be prescriptive as to the approach to be taken. It is not legally practicable for policing to develop memoranda of understanding or protocols of operation with activists without risking claims of abuse of

2 Official-Sensitive

process. Where the state is seen to circumvent statutory regulation by sub-contracting work to public volunteers it is highly likely that criminal prosecution will be stayed.

2.4 Given this analysis, a four point typology of operation within this sphere is proposed. This typology is imprecise and the boundaries between categories are blurred. Notwithstanding this point, it is hoped that this categorisation will assist in articulating the Law Enforcement community’s response to OCAGs:

 Type 1: Law Enforcement – This describes people and organisations include Citizens in Policing who engage in policing activities with appropriate training, safeguards and control measures. All Law Enforcement agencies and volunteers will continue to cooperate as we currently do in the fight to tackle CSA/E and grooming.  Type 2: Passive Partners – This describes organisations and people who gather information passively. They do not undertake proactive activity akin to UCOL but may be engaged in open source research. It is reasonable for Law Enforcement agencies to continue to build MOUs and actively engage with this group of partners as they are not engaging in undercover work. The passive nature of these partners creates no risk of Law Enforcement agencies being seen to bypass statutory regulations governing covert and intrusive tactics. This typology is included to recognise the fact that we will continue to actively work with organisations such as the Internet Watch Foundation amongst others.  Type 3: E-Activists – OCAGs that engage in undercover tactics but which pass enforcement material to law enforcement agencies prior to any real world contact. Policing can’t develop relationships with these groups. We can’t direct activity or provide advice in respect of trade craft or priorities. Since their activity stops short of real world contact it is less likely that this activity will be unhelpful to policing.  Type 4: Real World Activists – OCAGs that engage in real world contact with suspected perpetrators. The motivation of these groups should be questioned since there is no positive advantage to policing and yet such activism increases risk to potential victims, the suspect and to the efficiency and effectiveness of criminal justice processes.

3. PROPOSAL

3.1 It is proposed that NPCC endorse a four point strategic position with respect to OCAGs:

 Tackling CSA/E and grooming is a high priority for policing. We need to highlight all the work that is underway within law enforcement in order to build public confidence that the police and our partners are appropriately addressing the threat.  The public can assist in tackling CSA/E. We will highlight mechanisms which are helpful in this regard and encourage Citizens to be involved in Policing through these pathways.  OCAG contribution to policing is mixed and often unhelpful. Whilst some activity produces positive outcomes there are a range of factors relating to OCAGs which are a cause for concern. We have put forward six grounds upon which we build this argument.  We will not proactively engage with OCAGs. Where OCAG activity occurs we will respond positively to investigate offences and safeguard individuals involved.

3.2 It is suggested that this position statement applies equally to both type 3 and type 4 activists. The differentiated typology will assist in nuanced communication. The majority of instances where OCAG activity is unhelpful will be found in type 4 OCAG activity. The reasons why OCAG activity may be unhelpful are:

1) Untargeted: OCAG’s activity is not targeted. Total threat exceeds capacity – we must focus upon the highest threats. OCAG activity is does not consider the severity of harm and may divert activity from higher priority towards unassessed threat. 2) Inefficiency: Response to OCAG activity is inefficient. Building prosecution cases from practice that is unregulated is less efficient than starting from a base of good operational practice. CJ partners are likely to require additional activity to remedy issues of disclosure and fairness. 3 Official-Sensitive

3) Criminality: Some OCAG activity may mask underlying activist criminality and it is difficult to discern this without effort. That effort (vetting or monitoring) is a diversion of resource in itself. 4) Lacking Safeguards: OCAG activity does not routinely consider wider safeguarding and HRA issues relating to further uncontrolled offending post challenge; offenders may become vulnerable to self-harm or secondary abuse and extortion. As public bodies Law Enforcement agencies can’t condone this. 5) Loss of Evidence: OCAG activity risks loss of evidence where offenders are not effectively controlled post challenge. Poor disclosure and controls may jeopardize prosecutions. 6) Impeding LE Activity: Poor trade craft has rendered some OCAG’s visible to offenders. The lack of engagement has resulted in some OCAG’s entrapping vulnerable adults who would not otherwise have engaged in inappropriate behaviour.

3.3 A communications strategy has been developed to support the position articulated above. A copy of this is attached as appendix B.

4. CONCLUSION

4.1 The current police response to OCAG activity is inconsistent. Our advice to partner agencies varies and some key stakeholders are actively endorsing an approach which may be untenable and increase safeguarding risk. It is necessary for NPCC to agree a strategic approach and a communication strategy.

4.2 Further work is required to provide detailed operational guidance on issues such as seizure of digital media and disclosure in OCAG cases. This work can only be effectively finalised once a strategic position is agreed.

4.3 Work will continue both within Law Enforcement and through the engagement of academic partners to better understand the extent, typology and impact of OCAGs. Where evidence emerges this will be used to influence the development of the strategic position and operational guidance.

5. DECISIONS REQUIRED

5.1. That NPCC endorse the use of the term “Online child abuse activist groups” (OCAGs) in preference to terms such as “paedophile hunter” or “vigilante”. Where communication with the media or public necessitate more accessible language the term “activist” is suggested.

5.2. That NPCC endorse the four point strategic positon statement as set out at point 3.1 above.

5.3 That NPCC endorse the use of the typology described at section 2.4 above as a means to articulate and explain our approach to OCAGs

5.4 That NPCC consider that attached communication strategy and offer any feedback prior to its circulation and use by the OCAG working group.

5.5 That NPCC note the intention of the working group to develop operational guidance for practitioners responding to OCAG activity

Name: Dan Vajzovic Title: Assistant Chief Constable Lead Area: Violence and Public Protection – Crime Operations Coordination Committee This page is intended to be blank for printing Return to Agenda

National Police Chiefs’ Council

Learning Leaders Update

16 January 2019 / Agenda Item: Regional

Security Classification OFFICIAL Papers cannot be accepted without a security classification in compliance with the Government Security Classification (GSC) Policy (Protective Marking has no relevance to FOI): Freedom of information (FOI)

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. In July 2017 Chief Constables’ Council agreed an action plan aimed at achieving a better balance between personal accountability and a bureaucratic fear of making mistakes. This followed a discussion on the same subject at Council in April 2017.

1.2. The action plan set out a four-strand approach under the following headings:  Building a learning culture  Performance and misconduct  Peer review and support development  Organisational learning and development

1.3. A senior steering group was established in late 2017, comprising chief constables and relevant representatives from outside the service to provide oversight of progress and to help develop thinking in this and related areas.

1.4. This paper now provides an update to Council on progress towards achieving the aim set out in the action plan. That update is provided under each of the four headings.

2. BUILDING A LEARNING CULTURE

Development of a confident and empowered workforce

2.1. The College of Policing is developing and supporting the implementation of a wide range of initiatives aimed at building a learning culture in police forces across England to help ensure there is a confident and empowered workforce of autonomous policing professionals, ready to meet the challenges of 21st century policing. Specifically:

2 Official

2.2. The College has introduced new initial learning programmes for the role of police constable to ensure that all those joining have the right expertise to do the job. Whilst officers don’t need a degree to join, they will be developed to that level before they are confirmed in the role.

2.3. The College’s professional development platform provides individuals and their managers with information on performance management, self-development and career progression accessible online. The available material includes a set of nationally-agreed professional profiles, appropriate professional assessment and recognition of competence, and a professional development model for special constables. This area of work is also supported by a PTF-funded project involving direct engagement with forces to understand the gaps, barriers and opportunities to developing a learning culture, before delivering a range of national and force-specific products to improve force capability and capacity in this area from March 2019.

Engaged Leadership – recommendation 6 of the Leadership Review

2.4. The Leadership Review highlighted the need to equip people across policing with approaches and skills to manage wider spans of command, with less supervision, and that this must include business capabilities. In response a new model of leadership, management training and development is being made accessible to all within policing. By the end of 2018, in order to achieve this end, the College will have launched two major initiatives;

 Leadership Pathways - a range of guidance, tools, activities and programmes that enable police forces, officers and staff at all levels to increase leadership and management capability and capacity and develop a learning culture. An interactive tool will help enable officers and staff to identify the leadership and management development opportunities that are right for them.  The Senior Leaders Hub will be an online focal point where all those that wish to progress to the most senior ranks in the service are able to access the support they require, which in turn will have a positive impact upon the numbers applying, and their diversity.

2.5. The Leadership Review made a clear recommendation to allow for professional development and recognition of expertise other than through rank progression, and separate the role of command from the principle of leadership. An Advanced Practitioner (AP) scheme has been piloted across seven police forces. APs undertake their primary policing role at an enhanced level in a specific field of practice, support and develop others and contribute to the furthering of police practice both within and beyond their force. While the pilot evaluation has yet to be published, the evidence suggests the approach can function in policing, and its connections to pay reform are now being carefully considered.

2.6. A series of steps have been taken under Recommendation 6 of the Leadership Review to create a new model of leadership training and development which is accessible to all within policing. Principles for leadership delivery have been developed alongside a set of guiding principles for organisational leadership. The Senior Police National Assessment Centre (SPNAC) and Strategic Command Course (SCC) have both been reviewed and a new Senior Leadership Development Programme (SLDP) including Organisational Leadership, Personal Leadership & Command Skills modules. The College is also delivering career development workshops and a pilot development centre for underrepresented groups. The College has launched a ‘Leadership Learning’ two-year pilot on the Virtual Learning Environment that includes generic, internationally recognised leadership and management qualifications at level 6, 7 and 8 at award, certificate and diploma, together with level 5 certificate in coaching.

Feedback loops between the frontline and the executive

2.7. CC Andy Rhodes is now the NPCC representative on the Front Line Review (FLR) and is supporting a range of staff engagement activities within the scope of the programme. The review is a ministerial 3 Official

initiative which invites police officers and staff in operational roles across England and Wales to share their ideas for change and improvement in policing.

2.8. The FLR is working with the Office of National Statistics (ONS) to conduct 28 face-to-face frontline workshops using their methodology for qualitative research which started in early November. CC Rhodes will update on the ONS findings and will then convene an NPCC task and finish group to take forward any relevant actions.

2.9. CC Rhodes is collaborating with a Government-supported engagement organisation (engage4success). They have recently finalised some research into police-specific engagement in MPS and are looking to expand this across a few other forces. This is an opportunity for policing to compare how it engages and listens with the private sector.

2.10. As part of the National Wellbeing Service (NPWS) four outreach vehicles have been purchased, the first of which is being road tested in Lancashire. The vehicles present opportunities for undiluted feedback from the heart of the frontline and their use has been suggested to the FLR group. As the vans grow in number opportunities to sense check what those officers and staff are thinking and how they are feeling whilst they are working is a huge opportunity.

2.11. As part of the NPWS a recommendation is being considered for national level data sets to assess staff engagement levels and wellbeing. There is also close working with HMICFRS to build on the findings from the PEEL inspections and first cuts of FMS. Policing would however benefit from a nationally mandated annual staff survey similar to those in the Civil Service and the NHS. The current situation does not allow the service to assess how effective feedback loops are between forces which hinders learning.

The de-stigmatisation of failure in policing

2.12. There is overlap in this area with the proposed changes to the misconduct landscape dealt with in section 3 that seek to prioritise learning opportunities from mistakes.

2.13. Numerous forces have implemented initiatives aimed at developing policing culture to view mistakes as an opportunity for learning. One significant example is an action research project between the Metropolitan Police Service and the Open University which has ‘learning from success and failure’ as the first of its four stated objectives.

Establishment of reflexive mind-sets at the organisational level through debriefing to support service improvement

2.14. NPoCC have worked with the College of Policing to deliver structured debrief training and provide a coordination function for the delivery and facilitation of structured debriefs. A network of regional leads have been identified to coordinate the delivery of debriefs and capture the learning which is fed back into a national coordination meeting. This work is being further developed to ensure NPCC leads are made aware of the learning from the debrief process, to ensure themes and repeat issues are identified. The work is now part of the wider Learning Lessons Group, which has representatives from all areas of policing and from associated partners.

2.15. JESIP’s Joint Organisation Learning Hub on Resilience Direct continues to be developed. Through the structured debrief process forces, regions and multi-agency partners are actively being encouraged to share the learning on this database that ensures other emergency responders are also able to capture learning to support service improvement in all areas.

3. PERFORMANCE AND MISCONDUCT

3.1. A significant overhaul of the approach to dealing with underperformance and misconduct is underway, and the work is at an advanced stage. The focus of this work has been to move policing 4 Official

from being less a ‘blame culture’ and more a ‘learning organisation’. This will ultimately manifest in a change in secondary legislation and Police Regulations.

3.2. There has been previously been an underuse of the Police (Performance) Regulations 2012 in favour of using the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2012, largely due to a blurring of the lines between what constitutes a performance failure versus a low level breach of the standards of professional behaviour. Attempts have therefore been made to establish greater differentiation between a serious breach of the standards and a low level breach or what might better be described as sub- optimal performance, Ad in so doing move to a learning context and away from a punitive one.

3.3. The performance and misconduct landscape previously has been criticised for its reliance on an adversarial approach that reinforces defensiveness and an unwillingness to acknowledge shortcomings. This can lead to bureaucratic and time-consuming investigations with limited focus on learning and improving performance for the public good. In many cases there has been a perceived lack of legitimacy both amongst complainants and the officers or staff concerned.

3.4. A more proportionate and less adversarial approach has now been developed which changes the definitions and thresholds within the disciplinary system. Misconduct will now generally be reserved for serious breaches of the Standards of Professional Behaviour, those that if proven would warrant at least a written warning. Where there is underperformance or misconduct that falls short of being serious, a new categorisation will be introduced of ‘practice requiring improvement’. This is likely to cover low-level wrongdoing, mistakes & underperformance falling short of public expectations, and should be dealt with by line managers outside the disciplinary system.

3.5. A reflective practice review process will provide the setting for a non-adversarial exchange between a participating officer and the reviewer. The focus will be on a reasonable and proportionate fact finding exercise followed by a candid discussion that takes account of all the circumstances. The ensuing reflective review action report will explicitly cover any learning actions for the officer concerned and if these should be shared more widely for the benefit of others. Any account is not admissible if unforeseen disciplinary proceedings were to follow.

3.6. Other changes include the removal of Management Action / Advice as an outcome and the reinstatement of reduction in rank.

3.7. The Independent Office for Police Conduct under their new Chief Executive are also explicitly prioritising the importance of learning from mistakes and have released draft guidance for consultation that is consistent with the aims of the Learning Leaders action plan.

3.8. It is unlikely that the legislation required for the changes to regulations will be laid until the summer of 2019 due to the shortage of parliamentary time. There will then follow a six-month preparatory period before the changes take effect. The work has however been a coordinated effort between the service, staff associations, and the Home Office and as such it has wide-ranging support and very significant momentum.

4. PEER REVIEW AND SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT

Peer Review standards, development of capability and assurance model

4.1. Guidance on peer review methodology has been developed via the College of Policing (Transformation Framework). The College of Policing brought together academics and representatives from the NPCC working groups, HMIC, and the Home Office to consider police transformation and the international evidence around organisational transformation. The framework developed and published as a result of this initiative provides a standard approach to underpin strategic, organisational-level peer review, police force transformation and business change. The published framework provides a way of thinking about how organisations work and behave, and can be used in conjunction with other modelling tools to support transformation and business change. It 5 Official

provides a basis for a consistent standard to underpin peer review and peer support for forces seeking assistance in improving performance.

4.2. The College and the NPCC Lead have also worked together to run numerous peer review workshops to develop a community of professionals who have the knowledge to carry out reviews.

4.3. Oscar Kilo has peer review built into its functionality which follows on from completion of the Blue Light self-assessment framework endorsed by Public Health England. Forces are now being paired up to work together as peer review partners.

Peer support development post review

4.4. Peer support is thriving in a number of forces albeit without significant coordination.

5. ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING AND DEVELOPMENT

Landscape review of existing and emerging approaches to organisational learning

5.1. The College of Policing’s work in this area is largely focused on organisational transformation and development. The College has brought together academics and representatives from NPCC working groups, HMIC, the College of Policing and the Home Office to consider police transformation and the international evidence around organisational transformation.

5.2. A review of IT knowledge sharing platforms has been carried out, which is informing a Police Transformation Fund supported knowledge network project.

5.3. A piece of research exploring the optimum model for organisational learning is being carried out with the MPS by the OU’s Centre for Policing Research and Learning as part of the same significant initiative described at 2.13.

Development of Horizon Scanning Capability

5.4. The College have committed to carrying out a systematic assessment of how key trends and drivers of change might shape policing’s future operating environment out to 2040 (FOE 2040). By describing what this future environment might look like and what it might mean for police policy, strategy and capability now and in the future, the assessment will help policing to better anticipate and plan for future developments.

5.5. Work on FOE 2040 has already started. A number of meetings have been held exploring stakeholder requirements and considered different methodological approaches. The first tranche of interviews with senior police leaders, policymakers, academics and foresight practitioners, and workshops for the frontline and other groups, will commence between December ’18 and March ’19.

5.6. As part of its ongoing work to implement a ‘plan on a page’ the College will be further developing its own horizon scanning capabilities. A stronger focus on horizon scanning will enable the College to more effectively identify and prepare for the key challenges and demands facing the future policing workforce.

Establishment of an organisational learning methodology

5.7. The College of Policing Transformation Framework is supplemented with training and mentoring arrangements to provide CPD for College members and help build business change and organisational capabilities across policing. An updated version of a Continuous Improvement Self- Assessment Matrix (CISAM) has also been produced, enabling forces to effectively self-assess their level of maturity as an organisation and develop actions to improve to the next level. 6 Official

Development of a national knowledge-sharing network model

5.8. These objectives are being taken forward through development of a knowledge sharing network model, supported by a PRTB commissioned programme of work based on the knowledge-sharing building block. Funding for the work was agreed by the Home Office Policing Portfolio Board in October 2018 and the procurement process is underway to commission the resources required to deliver the work strands to the deadlines set out. The College is working with relevant stakeholders to progress the different aspects of the work including the PTF funded Problem Solving Project, the NCA and the Lessons Learned Working Group.

5.9. This work will look to fill gaps in four specific areas – timely sharing of untested local innovation; strategic intelligence and insight (building on the horizon scanning approach); a coherent mechanism to share lessons learned; and effective technology to share knowledge across the service.

6. CONCLUSIONS

6.1. A significant amount of work has been completed, and is underway, across the four strands the original action plan.

6.2. The Learning Leaders Oversight Group has provided advice and guidance on the objectives contained within the plan and on related topics, such as the potential duty of candour for policing.

7. DECISIONS REQUIRED

7.1. Council is invited to note the contents of the paper regarding progress made to date.

Name: Richard Cooper Title: NPCC Chief of Staff Return to Agenda

National Police Chiefs’ Council

Electronic Monitoring Update

16 January 2019 / Agenda Item: Regional

This document (including attachments and appendices) may be subject to an FOI request and the NPCC FOI Officer & Decision Maker will consult with you on receipt of a request prior to any disclosure. Author: DCC Jon Stratford Force/Organisation: Gloucestershire Constabulary Date Created: 19/11/2018 Coordination Committee: Criminal Justice Coordination Committee Portfolio: Electronic Monitoring Portfolio Attachments @ para App 1 and App 2 Information Governance & Security

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management

1. PURPOSE

1.1 This paper seeks to provide an update to members on a new statutory Electronic Monitoring (EM) service being introduced across England and Wales by the Ministry of Justice (MoJ). Colleagues will recall the previous discussion on this topic in October. At that time Council felt unable to support the MoJ plans given the lack of formal evaluation of the pilot areas and the potential implications inherent with enforcement of breaches of court imposed EM bail conditions.

2 STATUS UPDATE

2.1 Following Council’s decision in October, dialogue has taken place between CC Nick Ephgrave (Chair of the Criminal Justice Coordination Committee), myself as the NPCC Lead for EM, Richard Heaton (Permanent Secretary to the MoJ) and Adrian Scott (MoJ Director of EM). The following recommendations were made to the MoJ:

 Full evaluation of the pilot areas, to include projected demand and costs associated with it  A programme plan agreed by all stakeholders, based upon the findings of this evaluation  A revised rollout timescale that enables further learning to be captured in real time, and fed into future programme delivery  Provision of suitable project management and analytical support arrangements to support this  Multi-agency governance arrangements that enable stakeholders to be consulted on future decision making.

2.2 On 11 October 2018, CC Ephgrave circulated correspondence from MoJ colleagues that sought to address the issues and concerns highlighted by Council. A number of assurances were provided including the offer of formal review points in January and May 2019.

2 Official-Sensitive

2.3 In the light of these assurances, Forces were then invited to indicate their position with regard to supporting the programme. Currently, 13 forces have confirmed their support, 18 have declined to support, 3 indicate tentative support pending further detail and 10 have failed to respond. The position of each force is shown at Appendix 1.

2.4 Of note is the fact that the MoJ’s EM plans involve provision of GPS location and curfew monitoring services for both pre-conviction and post-conviction cases. Whilst policing support is required for pre- conviction cases (the response to breach of court imposed bail conditions) it is not required for post- conviction (Parole Board and Community Sentence) cases. Notification of any police action required in these cases will come through existing arrangements. Thus the MoJ have decided to go live as planned with post-conviction cohorts but only implement pre-conviction plans in those forces that have expressed support.

2.5 In the first tranche, only Leicestershire are supportive thus the court cohorts (Court Bail and Community Sentences) are live in this force alone. Post-conviction cohorts (Home Detention Curfew & Parole) went live across the 12 North West and Midlands forces on 30 November 2018 in accordance with MoJ plans.

2.6 To identify and address the wider implications of engagement between the agencies, Richard Heaton has commissioned Mr Steve Vine, Director of MoJ Projects, to make enquiries and report by Christmas 2018. I have reported the NPCC position into this review.

3. CLARIFYING THE IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICING

3.1 The MoJ anticipate there will be a slow build-up of cases and that overall demand will peak at 1000 cases across England and Wales. This is expected to be achieved in early 2020. The business case anticipates this figure will plateau at this level throughout the life of the programme (to April 2025). The figure is consistent with projections based on the demand seen in the last few months of pilot area operation. MoJ analysts estimate that pre-conviction bail will account for approximately 30-50% of this demand, (i.e. 300- 500 cases) across the 43 forces at any one time. Again this is consistent with experience from the pilot areas.

3.2 The MoJ has clarified that the fitting, monitoring and decommissioning of tags, along with the first response to tag and strap tampers and equipment issues will all be provided by the Electronic Monitoring Service (EMS) provider. They will also provide the first level of support to tagged subjects through their monitoring centre and field teams.

3.3 Forces will be responsible for considering breach information provided by EMS in the same way as they currently do for non-GPS breaches of court imposed and curfew conditions. This will include deciding on the appropriate response. Initial legal advice indicates there is no statutory duty to arrest. Each case must be assessed against threat, risk and potential harm. To enable this, MoJ have undertaken EMS will provide data to the police within defined timescales. Currently this is within 24 hours although discussions on this continue.

3.4 Given the absence of a real-time notification capability, agreement has been reached with the MoJ that these arrangements will not be used for high-risk cases. In recognition of the danger of decision makers breaching this agreement, the MoJ is including the following statement in guidance to decision makers (Magistrates) and to those advising them:

“As with all forms of monitoring, location monitoring does not remove the risk of non-compliance. If there is non-compliance (a “breach”), EMS will notify the responsible officer as quickly as possible, and within the timescales detailed below. You will note that these response timescales are not designed to provide an immediate response, so location monitoring would not be appropriate, for example, for cases where the impact of a breach would create a risk of serious harm”.

4. CURRENT CASELOAD 3 Official-Sensitive

4.1 The MoJ remain keen to engage with Policing on a structured assessment of benefits and impacts. However, the low level of participation in the first roll-out tranche of activity means that the proposed review in January will not have sufficient volume of data to support meaningful analysis.

4.2 Since the 30 November 2018, only one tag has been imposed for a court bail case in Leicestershire. The defendant was ordered to wear a tag until 3 January 2019 but quickly breached conditions. Appearing before Leicestershire Magistrates on 12 December 2018, he was remanded in custody.

5. PROGRESS

5.1 The MoJ has made progress on some of the issues raised by policing:

 GPS Pilot Evaluation; an embargoed copy of the evaluation was circulated to Chief Constables on 27 October 2018. The report is embargoed pending a decision from the MoJ as to when it will make a public announcement on the rollout of location monitoring (Appendix 2).  Data sharing; the MoJ has developed a data sharing framework that will permit forces to request location data. This will cover both where there is an immediate need (for example to assist with an arrest) and where data is needed retrospectively for investigative purposes. This information will be available via the portal once full roll out is achieved – currently planned for summer 2019.  Breach notifications; to support forces to make more efficient and informed decisions, EMS will now be providing a greater level of detail in the initial breach notification email, with a fuller breach pack provided. This will be iterated based on feedback from forces involved in the roll-out of location monitoring before it is finalised. Early experience is that EMS needs to improve the quality of these breach packs and MoJ are raising this with them at senior levels to ensure appropriate quality is provided.

6. NEXT STEPS AND PROPOSAL

6.1 The MoJ plan to continue the roll-out for post custody cohorts as per the original schedule based on National Probation Service regions as shown at Appendix 2.

6.2 Following the approach taken with Leicestershire, the MoJ plan to extend the capability to courts in live regions where forces are supportive. This will allow data and learning to be gathered to support the analysis of the impacts to policing, test process and support continuous improvement ahead of the planned full service release next summer.

6.3 I will continue to provide regular updates to Council via the CJCC and regional EM representatives through the NPCC EM Working Group. Chief Inspector David Cain (seconded to the MoJ) continues to represent policing within the MoJ planning team. I remain in regular contact with the Director of EM within the MoJ; Adrian Scott.

6.4 The MoJ are keen to engage direct with the forces involved in each phase of the roll out. Forces can expect this contact in accordance with the timescales shown in Appendix 2.

7. APPROVAL OF THE COORDINATION COMMITTEEE

7.1 This paper was agreed by the Chair of the Criminal Justice Coordination Committee on the 14 December 2018.

8. DECISIONS REQUIRED

8.1 Council are asked to:

 Note the current rollout position  Consider and keep under review their own force position in respect of this programme 4 Official-Sensitive

 Continue to communicate and raise issues with myself or the national secretary of the Electronic Monitoring Working Group, James Larner: [email protected]

Jon Stratford Deputy Chief Constable NPCC Electronic Monitoring Portfolio

Return to Agenda

National Police Chiefs’ Council

Practitioner Guidance Pre-Charge Bail and Suspects Released under Investigation

16 January 2019 / Agenda Item: Regional

This document (including attachments and appendices) may be subject to an FOI request and the NPCC FOI Officer & Decision Maker will consult with you on receipt of a request prior to any disclosure. Author: DCC Darren Martland Force/Organisation: Cheshire Constabulary Date Created: 19/11/2018 Coordination Committee: Criminal Justice Coordination Committee Portfolio: Bail Management Portfolio Attachments @ para App A Information Governance & Security

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management

1. PURPOSE

1.1 The purpose of this paper is to provide the NPCC with an update on the impact of the impact of the Policing & Crime Act 2017 (part 4), specifically relating to changes to the use of pre-charge police bail when the legislation was introduced on 3 April 2017.

2. BACKGROUND

2.1 The pre-charge bail provisions, contained in the Policing and Crime Act 2017, included the following amendments:

 Presumption that subject should be released, pre-charge, without bail.  When pre-charge police bail is imposed, it must be necessary and proportionate.  An authorisation process whereby; Inspectors must authorise bail up to 28 days, Superintendents must authorise extensions up to 3 months and thereafter applications of extensions will be considered at a Magistrates’ Courts.

2.2 In addition to existing disposals from custody i.e. charge, no-further action & bail, when the conditions outlined above are not met but investigation is incomplete, legislation introduced allowed for the option to release the suspect from police detention, whilst remaining under investigation, known as ‘release under investigation’ (RUI).

2 |

3. REVIEW OF THE WIDER IMPACT OF THE BAIL CHANGES

3.1 In October 2018 the NPCC conducted analysis of custody/case progression data from 2 forces, the data indicates:

 The forces have seen increases in recorded crimes, reductions arrests volumes and increases in Voluntary Attendance interviews between the review periods: 01/07/2015 – 31/03/2016 and 01/07/2017 – 31/03/2018.

 The use of Voluntary Attendance in relation to Harm offences is showing signs of a steady increase.

 Arrests leading to an interim disposal of pre-charge bail have fallen whilst the rate of arrests resulting in the detainee either being released under investigation or on pre-charge bail have increased.

 The data indicates that the forces have used pre-charge bail in a greater proportion of the harm offences when compared with volume crimes.

 Investigations of Harm offences are taking longer when the suspect is released under investigation (RUI) than when the suspect was released on pre-charge bail in 2015/16.

 The average number of days taken for either harm offences or volume crimes to be charged / issued a postal requisition has increased significantly.

 The larger increase in investigative time has been seen in relation to volume crimes. Similar increases have also been seen when we look at crimes resulting in a No Further Action decision.

 The data indicates there has been a reduction in the average number of days between a Harm offence being charged and the offender first appearance at court date whilst the average days for a volume crime, has increased.

4. IMPENDING CASES ON PNC

4.1 The Home Office Police and Public Protection Technology have reported a 100k increase in unresulted PNC records since implementation of the bail change, which is believed to be linked to the increased use of RUI as a disposal.

4.2 All PNC managers have been contacted by the Home Office, who are working to reduce the number of PNC impending cases.

4.3 Forces are encouraged to review their impending cases on PNC and ensure they have processes in place to ensure ongoing validity of impending prosecution records generated following a suspect being ‘Released Under Investigation’.

5. NEXT STEPS

5.1 The College of Policing is currently developing a NCALT Animation to assist operational officers in their decision making in relation to the use of pre-charge bail.

5.2 The NPCC has developed operational guidance for pre-charge bail / RUI which is attached as Appendix A.

6. DECISIONS REQUIRED

6.1 Council is invited to endorse the guidance document as attached at Appendix A, prior to circulation to forces.

Appendix A

Operational Guidance for Pre-Charge Bail and Released under Investigation

1. Introduction

This document has been produced by NPCC Bail portfolio to provide additional guidance to police forces following the changes to pre-charge bail through the Policing and Crime Act 2017. As the document describes, the impact of these changes was an unprecedented reduction in the use of bail, with suspects being released under investigation. The broader impacts of this fundamental change in our management of suspects are still being explored, but the following document is intended as an interim response to reinforce the message that in the right circumstances, the use of pre-charge bail is still a legitimate investigative and safeguarding tool.

2. Background

The Policing and Crime Act 2017 introduced a presumption in favour of release without bail unless bail is deemed both ‘necessary and proportionate in all the circumstances.’ The act also introduced statutory time limits and judicial oversight of extensions of bail beyond three months. Concerns have been raised that the new legislation presents a greater risk for vulnerable victims due to the unrestricted nature of being ‘released under investigation. There is currently insufficient evidence to support or refute this fear, but irrespective of that, the consideration of whether or not to apply bail must take into account all the circumstances of the case, including the necessity to support and protect victims and witnesses (especially those who are identified as vulnerable and at risk of high harm), and ensure public safety. This advice sets out to assist police officers and staff in making clear and effective risk based decisions in relation to suspects, victims and witnesses when using Pre-Charge Bail (PCB) or Released Under Investigation (RUI) during their investigations.

3. Pre-Charge bail

Pre-charge bail must not be used punitively and investigators should endeavour to complete enquires within the first period of detention. Bail managers must ensure that the necessity and proportionality for bail is met and that the decision process is transparent and open ensuring the need for bail is commensurate with the developing investigative plan.

Necessity

Authorisation may be considered necessary by the authorising officer, if it is:

 For preventing that person from failing to surrender to custody or committing further offences.  Preventing that person from interfering with witnesses or otherwise obstructing the course of justice, whether in relation to himself or any other person.  For that person’s own protection or, if he is a child or young person, for his own welfare or in his own interests.

Proportionality

Authorisation may be considered proportionate if the condition is not used unfairly and is limited to the minimum of what is required to achieve a legitimate policing purpose. Any restriction must be proportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued.

Applicable Bail Period (ABP)

The police can authorise three main applicable bail periods.  Initial applicable bail period for 28 days authorised by an Inspector.  Extension to the initial ABP to three calendar months from the bail start date authorised by a Superintendent.  Further extension to the APB of three calendar months for cases designated as being exceptionally complex, authorised by an Assistant Chief Constable or Commander.

All further extensions to the applicable bail period have to be authorised by a magistrates’ court and when authorising bail, the suspect and/or legal representative must be allowed to make representations.

When making applications to a magistrate forces should use the most up to date forms (Dec. 2017) as poor quality submissions result in a third being returned to sources.

Officers should quality assure the forms paying particular attention to the below points:  Correct regional court hub is selected;  Accurate dates throughout the application (including bail start date, current applicable bail period end date, new bail period end date, senior officer extension date, section 37(7)(a) bail date and application service date);  Ensure the applicable bail period as extended by the senior officer is accurate and not confused with the date the person has been scheduled to answer to their bail where, due to shifts patterns, the person is answering to their bail a few days before the end of the applicable bail period;  All service details completed;  That a full chronology of work done is provided including dates when matters outstanding are likely to conclude;

Officers should also note the requirement to provide instructions to the court where any application to withhold information from the defendant is refused as the substantive application to extend pre-charge bail must either be withdrawn by the applicant or determined by the court once the information has been served on the suspect.

Conditions to satisfy before extending an applicable bail period

The bail decision maker must consider the below requirements before authorising an extension to bail:  Have reasonable grounds for suspecting the person is guilty of the relevant offence.  Have reasonable grounds for believing that further time is needed to make a police charging decision or that further investigation is needed in connection with the relevant offence.  Have reasonable grounds for believing that either the police charging decision or the police investigation is being conducted diligently and expeditiously.  Have reasonable grounds for believing that bail is both necessary and proportionate. This decision should have particular regard to any conditions being imposed. The decision maker should record their rationale. Setting different bail return dates

The bail return date will normally fall on the same date as the applicable bail period end date, but an earlier time and date can be set for the following reasons:

To align with another bail return date if the person is already on bail for another offence (PACE 47ZA (3)) or if a custody officer feels an earlier charging decision is likely (PACE 47ZA (4)).

Under section 47(4A) to (4D) PACE - the bail return date can be varied to an earlier date to accommodate any requests from the suspect or their legal representative or to accommodate any policing requirements such as demands on shift patterns or bail diaries. We can use short ‘turnaround’ bail (i.e. return the next day) to avoid young people being kept in custody overnight.

Whenever a new time or date is set for the suspect to answer bail the custody officer must provide the suspect with a written notice informing them of the use of section 47(4A) PACE to do this. Bailing a suspect for a Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) charging decision

If the custody officer determines that they have sufficient evidence to charge, their only options under section 37(7)(a) PACE are to either release the arrested person on bail or keep them in police detention to enable a CPS charging decision. The presumption to release without bail does not apply. The custody officer should set a bail return date to reflect a realistic time to allow the CPS to make their decision.

If CPS request further work before they can make their charging decision, a 28-day applicable bail period will start the day the CPS make their request. Conditions should be proportionate, legitimate and necessary to manage the risks posed by the suspect. Whenever the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) is considering a case, the ABP is suspended. The day the file is sent to CPS does not count as an ABP day. This would be in cases, for example, where a person was initially released on bail for further enquiries then, during the ABP, the case was sent to the CPS for a charging decision. Regardless of how much time remains of the ABP, the custody officer can set a new bail return date to reflect the time needed for the CPS to make a charging decision. This time could be beyond the existing ABP end date.

If the CPS request further work the ABP clock resumes. In these circumstances, as the original bail date for the suspect may be beyond the ABP end date, care needs to be taken to ensure that a revised ABP is calculated to ensure that an ABP does not lapse. The suspect will need to be notified in writing of a revised bail date using section 47(4A).

This date cannot be after the end of the ABP.

Revised ABP = ABP + Days with CPS (total number of days between day sent to CPS and the day before file returned).

If on the day the CPS request further work, there are less than seven days remaining of the revised ABP, the ABP will be suspended automatically to ensure a minimum of seven days ABP. During this time, police need to make decisions as to how best to progress the required work. If an ABP expires without being extended, the suspect automatically defaults to a position of being RUI. Similarly, where bail has been granted and where alternative safeguarding measures have been put in place, bail may be cancelled without the case being NFA’d. In these circumstances, the suspect will revert to RUI status. Roles and Responsibilities

Investigating Officer

The investigating officer has responsibility to ensure that investigations are timely and within realistic timeframes. They will liaise with a Sergeant to determine whether they would impose bail.

They would then approach an Inspector to seek authority or request a Superintendent’s extension to ABP in the case whereby a suspect has been released on bail.

Custody Officer

Custody officer and/or Supervisor will ensure that there is an effective risk management strategy for the suspect and assist the investigating officer in determining whether bail should be imposed. They will also assist the Investigating Officer in risk assessing the suspect and ensure there is an investigation plan in place when the suspect is released from custody. For Bail cases - In the event of a Charge/NFA decision the Custody Sergeant will update and close the custody record.

Supervising Officer

They are responsible for the supervision of investigations and ensuring enquiries are completed expeditiously. Supervisors must ensure their officers inform custody of the case disposal.

4. Released Under Investigation (RUI)

Investigating Officers should aim to finalise investigations during the first period of detention wherever possible. However, it will often be necessary to release suspects without bail, whilst the investigation continues.

The RUI process, like that of pre-charge bail, must be capable of withstanding scrutiny, having due regard to proportionality and necessity in the circumstances. A key consideration, however, must always be the need to protect victims and witnesses, and ensure public safety.

Roles and Responsibilities

Investigating Officer

It is best practise for investigators to ensure all reasonable lines of enquiry have been completed prior to arresting the suspect as this reduces the need for RUI and allows a more expedient investigation. However, It is recognised that often this may not be practical due to the nature of the crimes we investigate and investigators will often find it is necessary to arrest the suspect at a much earlier stage in the investigation.

Following the in-custody investigation process, the investigating officer should liaise with the custody officer to determine the type of release (Bail or RUI). They will assist the custody officer to document a risk assessment and detail the action(s) to ensure vulnerable people linked to the case are protected. When a suspect is RUI’d it should be assessed in line with existing bail assessment processes to ensure the welfare of the suspect is considered and documented on the custody record. Onward suspect management and welfare assessment will be the responsibility of the Investigating Officer with oversight from their supervisor.

Once released the investigator will ensure that the suspect is issued with a ‘Released Under Investigation’ notice. If they are of No Fixed Abode (NFA), the investigator should endeavour to identify a relevant service address for the service of a PCR. For those individuals who are genuinely NFA, enquiries should be made into the availability of personal service on the individual. In exceptional circumstances, for example where the suspect lives out of force / genuine service address cannot be ascertained / limited knowledge of the suspect / intelligence is known that the person is a flight risk, the use of Pre-Charge Bail should be considered.

Domestic Abuse (DA) and high harm cases – if a suspect has been arrested in connection with an offence involving vulnerable people or domestic abuse, there should be documented decision-making why pre-charge bail has not been used and serious consideration given to the imposition of bail with conditions in order to safeguard the victim. It is advisable to consult a detective inspector before a DA or high harm offence suspect is ‘Released Under Investigation’. The investigator must updated victims and witnesses in respect to a suspect being RUI’d. They must be provided with the necessary advice to remain safe and details of the processes to follow if they feel they are subject to criminal actions by or linked to the suspect.

Custody Officer

If the custody officer is not satisfied that Pre-Charge Bail is necessary and proportionate, they must release the suspect without bail (RUI). Prior to the release of the suspect, a documented risk assessment must take place to manage the risk to victims, witnesses. It will be the responsibility of the Custody Sergeant to document the suspect’s referral to appropriate in-custody or external support pathways.

All persons released from custody without bail will be deemed ‘Released under Investigation’, unless a NFA disposal has been documented. The RUI will be authorised by the custody officer. The custody officer can request and record the observations of detective inspector in domestic assault and high harm cases. All rationale should be documented of the custody record and/or investigation log.

In some forces the investigating officer’s supervisor may support the completion of these assessments. The threat, risk or harm associated with the investigation must be proportionately managed, taking into consideration the safeguarding of all persons linked to the investigation.

In the event that the suspect is RUI they should be informed of the following:-

 Any further interviews may be carried out on a voluntary basis. If they fail to return on request for a voluntary interview, or commit further offences whilst RUI’d, they risk being arrested again.  They will not have a set date/time to return to custody or any conditions but the Investigating Officer will contact them to keep them updated on the investigation.  They should inform the Police of any changes of address or contact methods.

Where the individual is of No Fixed Abode, the custody officer must ensure, with the assistance of the Investigating Officer, that a suitable postal address has been recorded.

Expected Finish Date

Investigations which suspects are on RUI must be conducted expeditiously to ensure all parties are not subject to long delays which can be stressful and lead to witnesses’ issues at future court trials. Custody officers should endorse the investigation log and detention log with an initial Expected Finish Date (EFD). This date must take into consideration the investigation plan including forensic and digital evidence submissions which are deemed necessary. Custody officers must ensure that investigating officers have an effective investigation plan in place and they should be fully engaged in discussions surrounding RUI and the impact on investigation timeliness.  Custody officers should make it explicit to individuals RUI that they are reminded of the offences of witness intimidation, perverting the course of justice or harassment and that they will be liable to arrest should these offences by committed against the victims/witnesses in the case.  In ALL cases where a youth is involved, the Custody Sergeant must liaise with the Youth Offending Service (YOS) prior to releasing on bail or RUI.

RUI Review – Suggested good practice

Once a suspect has been released, investigations must have a documented supervisory review at least every 30 days until the investigation has been completed and a disposal actioned. The supervisor will be responsible for reviewing and setting the post custody investigation EFD’s. (High priority where safeguarding may be an issue - Sgt review every 10 days)

At each review the Investigating Officer must ensure the victim, suspect and their legal advisor where applicable is provided with an update on the progress of the investigation.

Subsequent reviews by an Inspector at 3 months and Superintendent at 6 months will ensure RUI suspects will be subject to appropriate review and management supervision. Inspectors and Superintendents will need to satisfy themselves that RUI cases are being managed expeditiously and is further investigation is appropriate.

Disposal

At the end of an investigation, an appropriate disposal will be documented. The investigating officer must update the victim and suspect on the disposal, and ensure the investigation and PNC is updated with the outcome. (e.g., no further action, out of court disposal, postal charge requisition.)

5. Postal Charge and Requisitions (PCR)

The Criminal Justice Act 2003 created the Written Charge and Requisition (Postal Charge and Requisition – PCR). Following the introduction of the changes detailed in the Policing and Crime Act 2017, the number of suspects charged following Pre Charge bail has decreased. The changes resulted in increased numbers of suspects being investigated with RUI status or following a Voluntary Attendance (VA) interview.

Following an investigation involving an arrest or VA interview the outcome is either:

 A Postal Charge and Requisition instructing them to attend a specific court.  An out of court disposal.  No further action

The increased use of RUI and VA has led to an increased number of suspects being required to attend court following the issue of a PCR. As a result, HMCTS feedback has identified an increase in failure to appear rates and a reduction in early guilty pleas combined with suspects attending court without early legal advice. To ensure an expeditious court process, the following points should be noted:-

 Summary only offences must have a postal charge raised within 6 months of the crime being committed due to the 6-month statute of limitations for summary only offences. Care should be taken in cases where one charge may be substituted for a lesser charge during proceedings, for example an ABH becoming a Common Assault. Failure to adhere to the statutory time limit would mean that the offence could not be prosecuted. The impact of out of time or failed prosecutions, on victims and witnesses, and the wider public confidence is significant.  Investigators should recognise the importance of obtaining and confirming accurate and up-to-date address details for subjects to ensure the prompt service of PCR’s.

It is a nationally identified concern that the issuing of PCR’s to some individuals can be problematic when attempting to serve, often resulting in the person failing to appear at court. For those individuals who are genuinely of No Fixed Abode, officers should give consideration to the feasibility of personal service on the individual before contemplating the use of bail.

In exceptional circumstances, e.g. suspect lives out of force / genuine PR service address cannot be ascertained / limited knowledge of the suspect / intelligence is known that the person is a flight risk, the use of pre-charge bail may be appropriate. (Each police force should review their own PCR processes to ensure that there are no inherent, unnecessary or and avoidable delays within the Criminal Justice process.)

Once a PCR has been authorised officers can assist in ensuring the best outcome is achieved at court for victims and witnesses by:  Updating Victims and witnesses when a PCR has been issued.  Complete a quality file that complies with the National File Standards.  Ensure the PCR provides clear information for the suspect, to ensure they understand matters they need to consider such as how to seek legal advice, the consequences of not attending court and how to obtain advice from the court if required.  Ensure PCRs are processed and served in a timely manner.

In some forces, local initiatives are being piloted to improve the attendance of certain categories of defendants at Court including hand delivering PCR’s relating to indictable offences and the use of text messaging / email’s to remind suspects to attend court. The impact of these pilots is unknown at present, however good practice would include the investigator taking reasonable steps to ensure suspects attend court. Return to Agenda

National Police Chiefs’ Council

Operation Hydrant Update

16 January 2019 / Agenda Item: Regional

This document (including attachments and appendices) may be subject to an FOI request and the NPCC FOI Officer & Decision Maker will consult with you on receipt of a request prior to any disclosure. Author: CC Simon Bailey Force/Organisation: Norfolk Constabulary Date Created: 19/11/2018 Coordination Committee: Crime Operations Coordination Committee Portfolio: Violence and Public Protection Attachments @ para N.A Information Governance & Security

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management

1. INTRODUCTION/PURPOSE

1.1 The purpose of this paper is to update Chief Officers about the progress of Operation Hydrant, to apprise them of the demand profile now being met by forces dealing with non-recent child sexual abuse and similarly the work of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA) in so far as it impacts on the police service.

1.2 Chief Officers are also asked to note the update on the Child Sexual Abuse Review Panel (CSARP) and determine whether a communications campaign should be developed on behalf of the service.

2. BACKGROUND

2.1 Operation Hydrant was established in August 2014. Its primary role remains that of providing operational coordination for and de-confliction of non-recent child sexual abuse investigations involving persons of public prominence and where offending took place within an institution. It is also the conduit through which any work on behalf of the IICSA is undertaken. In May 2016 the operation assumed responsibility for the administration of the CSARP.

2.3 The operation continues to be funded jointly through a Home Office Special Policing Grant and directly by IICSA. The Home Office have agreed in principle to continue this funding until 2020. This coincides with the plan by IICSA to cease receiving evidence as part of its Public Hearing Project. However, IICSA’s final report is unlikely to be published for some time afterwards and the future of the Truth Project is yet to be determined and may continue beyond this date. In short, planning to extend Operation Hydrant beyond 2020 is underway.

3. THE SCALE OF DEMAND

2 Official-Sensitive

3.1 The data gathered now allows for a more mature assessment of the demand facing forces dealing with non-recent child sexual abuse. Whilst demand has seen no indication of reducing the nature of the demand has changed.

3.2 Up to the period September 2018, the number of suspects on the database has increased by 17% when compared to the same period last year, to a total of 5572. Of these 15% (849) are deceased. Over the past year there has been a constant downward trend in the number of suspects who are considered persons of public prominence and they amount to only 5% of the total. The number of suspects that fit this category and are the subject of live investigation has fallen month on month; a trend which continues. This should be considered a positive factor given the significant and additional challenge these type of investigations present.

3.3 7162 victims had reported non-recent abuse to the police, either directly or via third parties. This is a 32% increase on the same period last year. This supports the belief that victims are more confident now than ever before to report sexual abuse.

3.4 Whilst the number of investigations into persons of public prominence is decreasing institutional based offending continues to rise. 2927 different institutions have been the subject of investigations a 24% increase on the same period last year. Schools, children’s homes and religious institutions remain the most commonly investigated institution.

3.6 Referrals into Operation Hydrant from other agencies and IICSA have shown an upward trend over the twelve month period to September 2018. There were a total of 1538 referrals from all agencies. The most notable increase has resulted from the IICSA Truth Project. Over 60% of referrals received by Operation Hydrant are identified to have a potential live safeguarding risk.

3.7 A proportion of referrals contain allegations against police officers and police staff, serving and retired, that amount to complaint, misconduct or criminality. In these circumstances an assessment is made by Operation Hydrant and the matter is passed for the attention of the appropriate authority in the force concerned. Throughout the duration of Operation Hydrant 565 such referrals have been made.

3.7 These statistics demonstrate that the demand faced by police forces continues to increase, with the exception of investigations relating to persons of public prominence. Many victims and survivors are still coming forward to report abuse that has taken place within an institutional setting.

4. OPERATIONAL COORDINATION

4.1 The core function of Operation Hydrant is the national coordination of investigations. Since the commencement of Operation Hydrant up to September 2018, there have been just short of one thousand pieces of intelligence that have been de-conflicted, where Operation Hydrant identifies that the named perpetrator is subject to allegations reported to more than one force. Such links are being made on a weekly basis.

4.2 Operation Hydrant continues to support forces dealing with more complex investigations. In the last year, five formal peer reviews or peer support events have taken place, a further two have been commissioned. Informal advice is afforded to Senior Investigating Officers, Gold Commanders and their teams on a daily basis. A cadre of experienced Senior Investigating Officers is maintained and is a source of established support and empirical advice accessible to all SIOs.

4.3 Learning and effective practice is captured as part of this process and this serves to develop the Operation Hydrant SIO Advice which is written jointly with the College of Policing; the most recent being published at the end of 2018. In addition, a number of short briefing documents were developed during 2018 which deal with issues that have challenged SIO’s historically.

5. ATTRITION RATES 3 Official-Sensitive

5.1 Over the past year work has been undertaken to understand attrition rates of non-recent investigations. Outcomes for all cases are reported to Operation Hydrant, which thus facilitates more detailed analysis. Details are set out in the table below.

NFA Police 2808 59% NFA CPS 608 13% Convicted 986 21% Acquitted 319 7% Total Suspect Outcomes Recorded 4724 100%

5.2 The number of suspect outcomes recorded relates to allegations reported. A single suspect may have multiple allegations made against them for which there is an outcome for each.

5.3 NFA outcomes are further analysed to understand the broad reason for the decision. 83% of NFA decisions are made by police, the remainder by CPS.

5.4 31% of all NFA decisions are made as a consequence of evidential issues. 14% because the victim is unwilling to support a prosecution and significantly, 37% because the suspect is deceased. It could therefore be argued that for non-recent cases, attrition rates are more positive than for other reported sexual offending.

6. THE INDEPENDENT INQUIRY INTO CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE

6.1 IICSA has now entered its third year as a statutory Inquiry and under the chair of Professor Alexis Jay since August 2016. Following a challenging start, the Inquiry is now well established and gathering evidence through its three project areas, Truth, Research and Public Hearings. The latter is causing most demand for forces.

6.2 In total thirteen investigations have now been announced, three have published reports, the remainder are yet to be concluded or have hearing dates set for 2019 and 2020. The Inquiry has held 37 days of Preliminary Hearings (administrative) and 66 days of Public Hearing (evidence). It is anticipated that a small number of additional investigations will be announced later to be completed by the end of 2020. Policing has contributed material to every Public Hearing investigation.

6.3 15 police forces have Core Participant Status across 9 investigations. The NPCC has Core Participant status in the Internet Investigation and at the time of writing has applied to be Core Participants in four of the ongoing hearings. This following agreement of the need to do so by Chief Constable’s Council in October 2018.

6.4 231 Rule 9 requests have been sent to forces or the NPCC requesting information, specific material or statements of evidence. This has caused significant demand for some forces, most notably the Metropolitan Police Service, Greater Manchester, Leicestershire and Nottinghamshire.

6.5 Operation Hydrant continues to support all forces that are engaged with the Inquiry and provides advice on a daily basis.

6.6 IICSA have made 3096 referrals into policing since January 2016. The majority now come from Truth Project sessions in which victims are given the opportunity to provide an account of their experience of child abuse and how it was dealt with. The Truth Project is fully established and operating not only from five established centres, but also within prisons and has been mobilised to a number of different areas across the country. A national advertising campaign has been used to raise awareness and encourage victims and survivors to take part. As a consequence referrals into policing have almost 4 Official-Sensitive

doubled in the last year. Of note 60% of referrals still carry a potential safeguarding risk. Wider television advertising is likely to take place next year.

6.7 In April 2018, the Inquiry published its interim report. Two recommendations were made which have a direct impact on policing.

6.8 Recommendation 13 stated that ‘any police officer (or staff equivalent) who wants to progress to the Chief Officer cadre must first be required to have operational policing experience in preventing and responding to child sexual abuse, and achieve accreditation in the role of the police service in preventing and responding to child sexual abuse. The Home Office should amend entry requirements using its powers under the Police Regulations 2003 to achieve this. The Chair and Panel recommend that the College of Policing develops the training content and accreditation arrangements.’

6.9 This recommendation is being taken forward jointly by the College of Policing and the Home Office. A number of options are being considered and an update will be forthcoming in due course

6.10 Recommendation 16 stated ‘that the Chair and Panel recommend that the National Police Chiefs’ Council ensures that complaints relating to child sexual abuse are no longer ‘disapplied’ by police forces on the grounds that the incident involved took place more than 12 months before the complaint was submitted.’

6.11 This recommendation was accepted and soon after the Interim Report was published Chief Constable Craig Guildford (NPCC lead for Complaints and Misconduct) wrote to all Chief Officers advising them of a need to change their approach to disapplication as it was inconsistent with the cotemporary policing approach to non-recent child sexual abuse reports. The Independent Office of Police Complaint will amend its statutory guidance accordingly and as part of a re-publication in 2019.

7. THE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE REVIEW PANEL

7.1 Operation Hydrant assumed responsibility for the CSARP in May 2016. CSARP was established as a joint panel of senior police officers and crown prosecutors to consider appeals from victims whose cases had been subject to NFA decisions prior to the introduction of the victims’ right to review. It was established in response to the Savile scandal which identified many victims who had not had their cases investigated correctly in the past, or an incorrect charging decision had been made.

7.2 In total the Panel has reviewed 240 cases, as a consequence may are reinvestigated or the charging decision re-visited. There are a number of cases, some high profile, which, had it not been for the Panel, would have resulted in dangerous offenders escaping justice.

7.3 Whilst the number of reports of non-recent sexual abuse remains high, the number of appeals to the panel has reduced significantly over the last year. This could be for three reasons, a readiness by police forces to re-investigate cases without recourse to the panel, police forces proactively identifying cases that are worthy of reinvestigation whether or not they have had contact with a victim and thirdly, a lack of knowledge amongst the public of the existence of the Panel.

7.4 If the first two reasons are correct, then it may signal that the Panel has served its purpose and is no longer required. However, other than at its launch in June 2013 there has been no proactive marketing of the Panel’s existence and purpose. It would be remiss of the NPCC not to take steps to ensure the public are fully aware of the Panel before it chose to end its work. To that end, it is recommended that a limited external communications campaign is launched in 2019. If this does not increase the Panel’s work, the NPCC should consider disbanding the Panel. This decision would have to be made jointly with the CPS.

7.5 Recommendation 5 Official-Sensitive

The NPCC, through Operation Hydrant, develop a communications campaign to promote the work of the Child Sexual Abuse Review Panel.

8. CONCLUSION

8.1 Investigative demand on all police forces has continued to increase and there is no sign that this will level off in the near future. This is evident across all areas with the exception of suspects that are considered to have public prominence.

8.2 IICSA is now operating to full capacity with significant evidence being provided to the Public Hearings project by police forces and the NPCC. Referrals from IICSA’s Truth Project have doubled in the last 12 months.

8.3 Referrals to the CSARP for the review of cases that have previously been subject of NFA decisions has reduced. It is unlikely that such cases have been exhausted and a limited communications campaign is recommended.

9. DECISIONS REQUIRED

9.1 Chief Officers are invited to note the contents of the paper.

9.2 Chief Officers are asked to support the recommendation at paragraph 7.5.

Name Simon Bailey

Rank, Force Chief Constable, Norfolk Constabulary

Coordination Committee/Portfolio Crime Operations/Violence and Public Protection (Child Protection and Abuse Investigation) This page is intended to be blank for printing Return to Agenda

National Police Chiefs’ Council

NPCC Guidance for Forces – Sex Working and Prostitution

16 January 2019 / Agenda Item: Regional

This document (including attachments and appendices) may be subject to an FOI request and the NPCC FOI Officer & Decision Maker will consult with you on receipt of a request prior to any disclosure. Author: ACC Dan Vajzovic Force/Organisation: Cambrdigeshire Constabulary Date Created: 19/11/2018 Coordination Committee: Crime Operations Coordination Committee Portfolio: Violence and Public Protection Portfolio Attachments @ para App A Information Governance & Security

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management

1. INTRODUCTION/PURPOSE

1.1 The purpose of this paper is to request ratification from Chief Officers of the refreshed advice/ guidance on sex working.

2. BACKGROUND

2.1 The previous iteration of sex working guidance was developed by ACC Nikki Holland as previous NPCC lead for this area. It was approved by in December 2015 and has been part of a scheduled refresh throughout 2018 under the new NPCC lead, ACC Dan Vajzovic.

3. PROPOSAL

3.1 The current NPCC Sex Working Guidance (2015) has been re written (see attachment). A link has been established with the College of Policing and a virtual task and finish group established with force SPOCS. The guiding principles that were previously agreed by VPP have been used to further develop the guidance

3.2 The principles have been established to act as anchor points underpinning the development of the guidance. These principles have been developed in consultation with national partners from across law enforcement, academics and partners in both the statutory and voluntary sectors, and from those directly involved in sex work and prostitution:

2 Official-Sensitive

1. The sex industry is complex, often stigmatised, and has many evolving typologies. It is often hidden from the wider public. We recognise this environment is conducive to the abuse or exploitation of those selling sex.

2. Policing starts from a position that seeks to address vulnerability and exploitation. We will engage with those involved in order to build mutual trust and confidence and encourage the sharing of information to improve safety.

3. The police should use engagement and intelligence to develop a better understanding of the typologies and extent of prostitution. We will work with partners to develop an approach that tackles the issues associated with sex work and prostitution by engaging a wide group of stakeholders.

4. The role of policing is not to make moral judgements. The police focus will be on reducing vulnerability and criminality. We will seek to maximise safety and increase trust and confidence. This will encourage those in the sex industry to report crimes and abuse. This approach will shift the focus onto safeguarding those being harmed in the sex industry. Intelligence and information should be shared between forces and relevant partners to maximise safety and target those who exploit or cause harm.

5. An evidence-based ‘what works’ approach will be used to enhance awareness of officers and partners dealing with this complex environment. It will ensure the focus is on vulnerability and safety and a consistent approach across the country.

3.3 This advice/ guidance offers practical advice to those dealing with sex work related issues. It recognises the need to address community concerns but also stresses as a priority the duty that police services have to enhance the safety of sex workers and to find practical ways to address crimes against, and exploitation of, those connected to prostitution.

3.4 The advice / guidance will be a ‘parent’ document and work is ongoing with the College of Policing to further enhance it by using infographics / video interviews with key people and case studies to build upon the theme of what works in this complex area.

4. APPROVAL OF THE COORDINATION COMMITTEE

4.1 The guidance and paper were agreed by the NPCC Crime Operations Coordination Committee on 5 December 2018

5. STATEMENT/DETAILS OF COST OR RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS

5.1 There are no funding streams to support this work. Costs for each force will vary depending on their investment.

6. CONCLUSION

6.1 Guidance produced by the NPCC should be used by Chief Officers to shape police responses to ensure that the general public experience consistent levels of service. The operational implementation of all guidance will require operational choices to be made at local level in order to achieve the appropriate police response and this document should be used in conjunction with any relevant Authorised Professional Practice (APP) produced by the College of Policing.

6.2 If ratified, this document will be launched and discussed at the sex working SPOC conference at the end of January 2019. This will include representatives from each force as well as academic partners, and NGO’s.

7. DECISIONS REQUIRED

1. Ratification of the sex working advice/ guidance by Chief Constables’ Council. 3 Official-Sensitive

Dan Vajzovic Assistant Chief Constable Violence Public Prosecution 1 | N a t i o n a l P o l i c i n g S e x W o r k a n d P r o s t i t u t i o n G u i d a n c e

National Policing Sex Work and Prostitution Guidance

The National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) with the College of Policing have agreed to the circulation and adoption of this updated guidance to police forces in England, Wales & Northern Ireland.

In view of legal differences, this guidance relates to England and Wales only, although its principles and recommendations may be used in the other constituent countries of the United Kingdom, if desired, by those responsible for police policy.

It is NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED under the Government Protective Marking Scheme and any requests for advice and rationale in relation to Freedom of Information Act disclosure should be made to the NPCC Central Referral Unit at [email protected].

Document information

Protective marking: NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Author: ACC Dan VAJZOVIC Force/Organisation: Cambridgeshire Police NPCC Coordination Committee Area: Violence and Public Protection APP/Reference Material Reference Material Contact details: Superintendent Mark GREENHALGH Review date: TBA Version: 2 – Draft prepared for CCC Dec 2018

2 | N a t i o n a l P o l i c i n g S e x W o r k a n d P r o s t i t u t i o n G u i d a n c e

Contents Page

1 Foreword 3

2 Introduction 4

3 Overview 5

4 Guidance for Community Managers 7

5 Guidance for Front Line Police Officers and Staff 9

6 Guidance for Investigators 12

7 Guidance for Scanning ASWs 13

8 Conclusions 15

9 Glossary 17

3 | N a t i o n a l P o l i c i n g S e x W o r k a n d P r o s t i t u t i o n G u i d a n c e

1 Foreword

1.1 The last National Policing guidance looking at Prostitution was issued in December 2015. Since that time the growth of the e-facilitated sex industry has continued unabated. The proliferation of off-street sex work sometimes labelled “pop-up brothels” in the media and commensurate reduction in the street market has received much public attention.

1.2 Societal views of prostitution remain emotive; the issue can polarise opinion and prompt passionate debate. Some people argue that prostitution is an inherently exploitative activity and should be challenged at every level and demand a zero tolerance approach; others have a position that engaging in sex work is a matter of personal choice for individuals who need to be protected and respected by the Police Service and wider society. A significant proportion of the public hold views which are nuanced and reflect aspects of the different ends of the debate.

1.3 It is therefore unsurprising that legislative arrangements in some of our close neighbours are contested, have changed or are in flux. Our domestic legislature has reviewed evidence and considered the necessity for reform. The Home Affairs Committee published a report in 20161 and more recently an All Party Parliamentary Group reported2 calling for legislative change. At this stage the evidence base available is equivocal. The police focus remains to work within the existing legislative arrangements, focusing upon increasing the safety of sex workers, reducing vulnerability and targeting those who exploit or cause harm.

1.4 This guidance offers practical advice to those dealing with sex work related issues. It recognises the need to address community concerns but also stresses as a priority the duty that police services have to enhance the safety of sex workers and to find practical ways to address crimes against, and exploitation of, those connected to prostitution.

1.5 This guidance recognises that many sex workers are marginalised and can be vulnerable. Street sex workers can be especially vulnerable, with addiction and mental health issues prevalent. Police responses must be careful not to inadvertently increase vulnerability.

1.6 This guidance highlights indicators of sexual exploitation and the presence of organised criminal activity. The presence of organised criminal activity within the sex industry is unquestionable and causes great harm to individuals and communities. Where such criminal activity is identified, it is our responsibility to robustly investigate and bring to justice those involved. I hope that you find this guidance of use in your efforts improve our communities, enhance the safety of sex workers and to target those who seek to exploit the vulnerable.

ACC Dan Vajzovic, Chair of the NPCC Working Group on Sex Working and Prostitution

1 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/26/26.pdf

2 Behind Closed Doors – APPG on Prostitution 4 | N a t i o n a l P o l i c i n g S e x W o r k a n d P r o s t i t u t i o n G u i d a n c e

2 Introduction Who is this Guidance for? 2.1 The guidance has been produced with operational police officers and staff in mind. There are four sections within the guidance each aimed at different roles within policing which have daily interaction with sex workers.

What does the Guidance aim to achieve? 2.2 Recognising the complex nature of sex work and prostitution this guidance does not attempt to give definitive direction for every circumstance police professionals will be faced with. Instead, the guidance advocates principles which will guide the police approach. It is hoped that application of this guidance will result in a more consistent police approach to engagement with sex workers and to the resolution of criminal offences and neighbourhood issues. Throughout the guidance officers and staff are encouraged to focus upon addressing the safety of sex workers and targeting those who seek to victimise and exploit.

What underpins the Guidance? 2.3 5 guiding statements, have been established to act as anchor points underpinning the development of this guidance. These principles have been developed in consultation with national partners from across law enforcement, academics and partners in both the statutory and voluntary sectors, and also feedback from those directly involved in sex work and prostitution.

1. “The sex industry is complex, often stigmatised, and has many evolving typologies. It is often hidden from the wider public. We recognise this environment is conducive to the abuse or exploitation of those selling sex.” 2. “Policing starts from a position that seeks to address vulnerability and exploitation. We will engage with those involved in order to build mutual trust and confidence and encourage the sharing of information to improve safety.” 3. “The police should use engagement and intelligence to develop a better understanding of the typologies and extent of prostitution. We will work with partners to develop an approach that tackles the issues associated with sex work and prostitution by engaging a wide group of stakeholders.” 4. “The role of policing is not to make moral judgements. The police focus will be on reducing vulnerability and criminality. We will seek to maximise safety and increase trust and confidence. This will encourage those in the sex industry to report crimes and abuse. This approach will shift the focus onto safeguarding those being harmed in the sex industry. Intelligence and information should be shared between forces and relevant partners to maximise safety and target those who exploit or cause harm.” 5. “An evidence-based ‘what works’ approach will be used to enhance awareness of officers and partners dealing with this complex environment. It will ensure the focus is on vulnerability and safety and a consistent approach across the country.”

5 | N a t i o n a l P o l i c i n g S e x W o r k a n d P r o s t i t u t i o n G u i d a n c e

3 Overview

3.1 The sex industry is diverse and sex workers typically offer a wide variety of services. The movement of the industry over time, from street sex work to online, is well established. The online sex working community often advertise via legal adult services websites (ASWs). There are approximately 50 such platforms operating nationally in the UK3 with many more local sites. The transition from street to online sex work has had a number of key effects: the benefit to sex workers around safety, less public visibility of the sex working community and opportunities for organised criminals to profit from exploitation. At the higher harm end of the industry is sexual exploitation through modern slavery.

3.2 Voluntary sex workers and victims of sexual exploitation may be advertised side-by-side on ASWs. Indeed the experience of sex workers may be nuanced; voluntary arrangements may become exploitative and visa-versa. Sex workers may travel around the UK for business reasons and to maintain their anonymity. They may work independently or work together in groups for safety reasons.

3.3 Internet facilitated sex work has seen the significant emergence of the media coined phrase the media coined term ‘pop up brothels’. This catch-all term does not differentiate between sex workers working independently but moving of their own accord and those who are victims of sexual exploitation or human trafficking. It is important to keep an open mind if encountering such situations.

3.4 The police starting point should ensure that we do not start from a position that treats sex workers as criminals simply for being sex workers. The act of selling sex is not illegal per se. Whilst certain practices may amount to the commission of an offence, consideration should be given to the wider public interest. The focus of law enforcement activity should be to improve safety and to target those who exploit or cause harm. At the investigation stage it is relevant to consider the motivation behind the activity. For example, the fact that two independent sex workers are co-working due to safety concerns is a relevant public interest consideration.

3.5 Those involved in sex work often share their experiences on online platforms. Poor engagement between police and sex workers can adversely affect relationships beyond the local level.

3.6 A victim of a crime who is a sex worker should be approached as a victim who may require enhanced support. A recent survey of sex workers found that more than 80% had experienced at least one form of crime in the past 5 years4. In contrast only 23% stated they had ever reported incidents to the police5. Sex workers are likely to be victims of crimes and are less

3 Research by the National Crime Agency 4 Beyond the Gaze 5 Beyond the Gaze 6 | N a t i o n a l P o l i c i n g S e x W o r k a n d P r o s t i t u t i o n G u i d a n c e

likely to want to report those crimes. Male or transgender sex workers are even less likely to report incidents to the police. Post reporting, only 46.5%6 of sex workers reported positive satisfaction with how their investigation was handled.

3.7 Safety within the industry is an issue compared to other sectors: 180 sex workers were murdered in the UK between 1990 and 20167. 110 of these 180 homicides were directly work- related; the sex worker was killed either by a client, in a sex working workplace or last seen alive in a known street sex work area. Based on this data from 1991 to 2000, working as a sex worker in the UK carried the absolute greatest risk of occupational homicide for women. Five times as many female sex workers were murdered compared to female bar staff in the period. The proportion of homicide victims that were migrant sex workers has increased in recent years. In the 20 years between 1990 and 2009 only 6% of sex work occupational homicide victims (where nationality/migration status is known) were migrant sex workers compared to 94% who were British born. Since 2010 this proportion has dramatically increased to 50%. This may reflect changes in the overall makeup of the sex industry, with increasing numbers of migrant workers (Ward and Aral 2006) and/or suggest that offenders are specifically targeting migrants because of their potentially increased vulnerability8.

3.8 It is clear that some sex workers are targeted because of their occupation and these offences should be treated as hate crimes.

3.9 National Ugly Mugs (NUM) is a national charity which aims to end violence against sex workers. They are partly funded by contributions from police forces, demonstrating the police’s commitment to the safety of sex workers. NUM takes reports from sex workers and produces warnings to other sex workers and support projects. It shares intelligence with the police anonymously where consent is given to do so. NUM supports sex workers in making police reports, and also disseminates police information to sex workers to enhance safety. NUM is a key resource and has a reach of about 25,000 sex workers in the UK through direct contact and support projects.

6 Beyond the Gaze 7 National Ugly mugs database 8 Cunningham, S., Sanders, T., Platt, L., Grenfell, P., Macioti, PG (2018) Sex Work and Occupational Homicide: Analysis of a UK Murder Database, Homicide Studies 22 (3) 321-338 7 | N a t i o n a l P o l i c i n g S e x W o r k a n d P r o s t i t u t i o n G u i d a n c e

4 Guidance for Community Managers

Key Points:  Build Relationships and Understanding  Share information  Prioritise

Build Relationships and Understanding 4.1 The sex working community is present across the country, it can be mobile and transient. Engagement is not as simple as with some other more visible communities especially since many sex workers may not, initially, want to engage with the police. However, as a community, sex workers are more vulnerable to crime, some of which is targeted in a similar way to hate crime, and some of which is high harm.

4.2 It is important to understand the picture locally. Identifying and engaging with relevant partners and support services is an important step to building understanding and winning the trust of your local sex working community. National Ugly Mugs will be able to assist in identifying local support services. Some partners may be set up to concentrate on street sex working as the more visible aspect of the industry, but the online community is significant and hidden and should not be forgotten.

4.3 In addition to understanding the position of all partners and support services, visiting Adult Service Websites (ASW) via open source can give community managers an insight into the off street industry. Local advice should be sought to ensure adherence with your organisational policies and to follow good practice and legislative requirements in open source research.

Share Information 4.4 Not all of the solutions to community concerns sit with the police. It is desirable to share the local sex industry picture with relevant partners and support services. Consider the roles of partners within your community safety partnerships and seek support in adopting a problem solving approach to issues that have been identified.

4.5 Where possible offer third party reporting and intelligence sharing via partners to gain a better understanding of crimes against sex workers, which are possibly not being reported.

4.6 Ensure frontline officers and staff know about local support services in order to signpost so that when incidents are reported there is a greater chance of effective partnership problem solving.

8 | N a t i o n a l P o l i c i n g S e x W o r k a n d P r o s t i t u t i o n G u i d a n c e

Prioritise 4.7 Community concerns or complaints about the sex worker community can manifest in a number of ways. In all cases, prioritise addressing vulnerability and safety, targeting those who exploit and work in partnership to problem solve.

4.8 Street sex working is likely to cause the most community concern or complaints. Street sex workers are much more likely to become victims of crime, and to have complex vulnerabilities. Engagement with all parties, partners and support programmes is a good starting point. Displacement of street sex working should be avoided. A problem orientated partnership approach is preferred, focusing on welfare and vulnerability, environmental deficiencies, and education and exit from sex working support should be considered. In all cases suspected exploitation should be prioritised.

4.9 Off-street activity concerns are likely to more localised and generally less frequent, but a similar approach can be taken. Vulnerability needs to be assessed and addressed and exploitation, if suspected or discovered, prioritised.

In Summary

4.10 Identify partners and support services. Bring these partners together and add localised ASW research to gain an understanding of the local industry. Use this collaboration to address community concerns, build trust and share information. Remember that over reliance upon disproportionate enforcement where exploitation is absent is likely to undermine trust and the building of relationships.

9 | N a t i o n a l P o l i c i n g S e x W o r k a n d P r o s t i t u t i o n G u i d a n c e

5 Guidance for Frontline Officers and Staff

Key Points:  Build trust  Address safety  Recover evidence sensitively

Build Trust 5.1 It is likely a sex worker will fear that the police will criminalise them, publicise their occupation to others, not take complaints seriously (especially stalking and sexual offence crimes) and judge them. Reassurance at an early stage is important.

5.1 The individual needs of a victim, in addition to their specific requirements, are likely to be around discretion, therefore consider low key approaches, availability times and maintaining the confidentiality of the sex worker’s profession. This should be respected at all times within boundaries of legal obligations.

5.2 Some crimes against sex workers are specific to their occupation. Consider the extra steps in engaging with victims of hate crimes as a suggested way of supporting victims in these circumstances.

5.3 Don’t start from a position that treats sex workers as criminals simply for being sex workers or engaging in practices that have been undertaken to increase their own personal safety, such as, ‘managing or keeping brothels’ under S.33 of the 1956 Sexual Offences Act. Do focus on those exploiting sex workers or committing crimes against them.

5.4 The role of the police is not to encourage sex workers to exit the industry. There are agencies and support groups, such as Beyond the Streets, who can assist sex workers if the individual requests this support. The police should consider signposting advice that is likely to improve safety and reduce the risk of exploitation or other criminality. Further 10 | N a t i o n a l P o l i c i n g S e x W o r k a n d P r o s t i t u t i o n G u i d a n c e

details can be found in the sources of support section of this document. Address safety 5.5 Exploring vulnerability and addressing safeguarding issues with sex workers should be approached in a sensitive and supportive manner. Exposing those who abuse and exploit is important but information may not be volunteered, if indeed it exists. Establishing that the sex worker can edit their own Adult Services Website (ASW) profile suggests they are less likely to be exploited. It is right to explore a sex worker’s safety with them in a supportive and constructive manner. Police adopt risk assessments in many different areas and reviewing a sex worker’s own risk assessment would give a strong indication of how well thought out it is and how vulnerable they are. This should be done individually with sex workers, not in groups. If there is exploitation, dominant or complicit persons may overshadow and drown out those who are being exploited or coerced. This is made worse if there are language barriers and non-independent interpreters.

5.6 When considering whether or not a sex worker is being coerced or exploited the following circumstances (not exhaustive) may be considered and may indicate the sex worker has vulnerabilities or is subject to exploitation:

 Sex worker is unable to edit their own ASW advert. This may be owing to language issues or IT skills but also must be considered that it may be because the individual isn’t permitted to have a say. It may also be because what is being advertised and how it is done or is something they don’t have a say in.  Sex worker does not control their own contact number used by those buying sexual services. This can indicate they use a third party to assist them or their work is organised by a third party.  High risk services are offered, such as unprotected sex.  General working conditions and environment. It should be a minimum expectation that the sex worker using a property has the freedom and provisions to leave if they desire. Have access to fresh clothing, food and toiletries.  How the sex worker screens clients. There will be a variety of methods, the least safe would be a text-arranged meeting with no prior interaction. Alternatively, webcam meetings, on-line booking or phone calls might indicate a greater focus upon safety.  Has no knowledge of how to contact the police, support services or networks.  Unable to explain why they chose to come to the area interaction occurs in or they don’t actually know where they are.  Methods of travel may also raise questions if there is ambiguity around how they have travelled between locations.  The sex worker cannot talk about where their money goes. Clearly they may not wish to tell police this but it could also be a sign there is a third party benefiting from their work directly and they are scared to reveal this.

These broad areas should be explored through open discussions with sex workers not via formal questioning.

11 | N a t i o n a l P o l i c i n g S e x W o r k a n d P r o s t i t u t i o n G u i d a n c e

5.7 National Ugly Mugs (NUM) is a UK charity which works with the police and sex workers. It is a valuable resource for sex workers to increase their own safety, and will also assist police investigations and support victims. This link https://uknswp.org/um/safety/essential-safety- for-sex-workers/ has safety suggestions for sex workers. It is worth reading these suggestions prior to any pre-arranged engagement with a sex worker. Also consider sharing the link with the sex worker to assist them in managing their own safety. Sex workers can sign up to NUM, which offers a variety of support services, including a number and e-mail checker to reduce the likelihood of sex workers meeting with potentially dangerous clients.

5.8 Where exploitation is suspected but not evidenced sufficiently to take action, intelligence should be gathered and support offered to the sex worker. Exploitation does not necessarily mean modern slavery offences but it could be an indicator. Controlling prostitution for gain (S.53 Sexual Offences Act 2003) may be a more common explanation of what is occurring. Some sex workers work for, or have their business organised by, third parties such as agencies. This practice may fall into the S.53 offence, so in these circumstances the views and vulnerability of the sex worker should be a significant factor when considering the extent of any investigation. The collection of intelligence should still occur.

5.9 It is in the interest of exploiters to increase the fear of reporting issues to the police. Building trust increases the likelihood of offences being reported and improves safety.

5.10 If trafficking is suspected then the National Referral Mechanism and raising a crime is the correct approach, if the victim elects to engage. Should the victim chose not to support an investigation but modern slavery is still suspected then a crime should be recorded and MS1 submitted. Advice from force modern slavery SPOCS can be sought in these situations as evidence led prosecutions have occurred for modern slavery offences. Take advice but prioritise the safety of the individual: what will happen when you leave?

Recover Evidence Sensitively 5.11 Recovering evidence in any investigation is important. However, crimes against sex workers may be cyber-enabled and tracing offenders may have an online theme. Collecting details of the ASWs used by the sex workers and methods of contact from any suspect will clearly be key to tracing them. Again sensitivity is important in this process. The sex worker may fear their business will be affected by the evidential process.

In Summary 5.12 Offer reassurance, be discreet, and criminalise those who exploit or abuse. Assist in safeguarding and signpost to NUM. Keep an open mind, consider exploitation and modern slavery but don’t assume it is always present. Gather information and evidence.

12 | N a t i o n a l P o l i c i n g S e x W o r k a n d P r o s t i t u t i o n G u i d a n c e

6 Guidance for Investigators

Key points:  Understand Vulnerability  Target those who Exploit  Share Information

Understand Vulnerability 6.1 Sex workers perceive risks such as credibility, victimisation and loss of work when reporting crimes or engaging with the police. These factors contribute to under reporting and lead to some offenders specifically targeting sex workers. 40% of sex workers who had experienced crimes felt the perpetrator was motivated by their attitude towards sex workers9. Consider investigating crimes against sex workers as, or in a similar way to, hate crimes whenever there is a suggestion the crime is motivated or connected to the work of the victim.

6.2 Building trust with sex workers is key to gathering evidence and to understanding specific vulnerabilities, facilitating interpreters, intermediaries and support workers when planning interviews or court.

6.3 Consideration of special measures is important and will help to address vulnerabilities. The use of an ISVA or IDVA, depending on circumstances, should be considered in respect to the nature of the relationship between victim and suspect.

6.4 Common offences committed against sex workers include robbery and assault. Others require more specific legislative knowledge and it is not always obvious what offences may have been committed. For example, offences relating to the refusal or removal of condoms. Give consideration to consent issues around this activity from a rape perspective. ‘Doxing’ is the researching and broadcasting of private information. This can be considered as a form of harassment and the effects on the targeted sex worker can be significant, especially as many

9 Beyond the gaze 13 | N a t i o n a l P o l i c i n g S e x W o r k a n d P r o s t i t u t i o n G u i d a n c e

sex workers deliberately hide their true identities from clients, families, friends and neighbours. Target those who exploit 6.5 Exploitation and coercion of sex workers occurs across a range of offences. There is organised criminality within the sex industry and where uncovered it should be vigorously pursued. Some practices by sex workers may suggest exploitation or organised criminality but equally may be used for personal safety reasons (for example the use of drivers or working for an agency). The views and vulnerability of the sex worker should be as the forefront of considerations when determining the extent to which these circumstances are prioritised for investigation. Listen, Investigate, and decide.

6.6 Some of the offences likely to be encountered may require evidential recovery of data held on Adult Services Websites (ASWs) if services have been offered online. Sex workers may advertise or be advertised on more than one platform. Much of this can be done simply via open source. Different ASWs have different features but there is a large quantity of data that can be collected evidentially from these sites. Be aware that adverts on ASWs can be quickly taken down.

6.7 Hidden behind the profiles and adverts, the ASWs themselves hold a large amount of information which could be key evidence depending on the investigation type. This evidence includes payment details for adverts and revenue, IP addresses for profile editors, email addresses, phone numbers, verification photos and ID documents. Some ASWs also have customers who complete a registration process so information is often held which may identify them.

6.8 UK Law Enforcement will work with ASWs to reduce criminality and improve safety. If offences are found on ASWs linked to an advert or profile then engagement with the ASW may reveal other offences, victims and offer disruption tactics. Even if investigations involving ASWs do not reach fruition is it vital that intelligence is gathered and learning shared. Guidance and best practice for investigating human trafficking and exploitation can be found on POLKA.

Share information 6.9 National Ugly Mugs is a valuable resource for police and sex workers alike. It offers a reporting mechanism for sex workers to highlight dangers to other sex workers. It also assists sex worker victims in reporting to the police. As a resource to an investigating officer it can help build trust and safeguard. It can also alert sex workers to safeguarding concerns from the police assist in pleas for information and witnesses and identify suspects through its extensive network of sex workers and project membership. Provide information to community managers so this can be passed to local partnership groups and support services.

In Summary

14 | N a t i o n a l P o l i c i n g S e x W o r k a n d P r o s t i t u t i o n G u i d a n c e

6.11 Sex workers are likely to need enhanced witness or victim services. Vigorously pursue those who target sex workers. Approach ASWs for data and evidence to assist investigations. Share information for the safety of others.

7 Guidance for Intelligence Officers

Key points:  Scanning for vulnerability  Appropriate responses  Developing a picture of those who exploit

Scanning for Vulnerability 7.1 An increasing number of sexual services are advertised online. Sex workers use Adult Services Websites to advertise services and vet clients which can improve their safety. As ASWs are the largest marketplace for sexual services, they are also exploited by traffickers and organised criminals who seek to make profit from the exploitation of vulnerable victims by advertising people online and making it appear as voluntary sex workers. There are currently over 50 ASWs covering the UK, with many more regionally and also sites run by individual sex workers. The ASWs which currently have the largest share of the UK sexual services market are Adult work and Vivastreet.

7.2 Other platforms may also be used to sell sexual services, including social media. Some of these ASWs are only advertising sexual services whilst others also promote non-sexual adverts (items for sale for example).

7.3 Reviewing ASWs and linked online forums provides law enforcement with the opportunity to better understand the online sex worker community in each area, and to gather evidence against recorded crimes, or for proactive investigation into exploitation and abuse. However it is important that law enforcement is transparent about its work in this area to ensure that this builds trust and confidence of sex workers. The focus should be on building knowledge of the sex work marketplace and investigating those who abuse and exploit sex workers or victims of trafficking.

7.3 It is inherently difficult to scan ASWs and interpret what is occurring behind adverts. Forces are encouraged to access the NCA’s guide “National Model for Police Forces using/accessing Adult Services Website for Intelligence purposes and assisting investigations”, which offers advice on the signs of exploitation and vulnerability to look for whilst scanning ASWs. Adopting a scanning process may lead to more actionable intelligence against exploiters.

15 | N a t i o n a l P o l i c i n g S e x W o r k a n d P r o s t i t u t i o n G u i d a n c e

Appropriate response 7.4 It should be remembered that the vast majority of services advertised on ASWs are by independent sex workers and these should not be the focus of police activity. However, given the difficulty in distinguishing between independently advertised services and those which have been coerced or controlled, it is likely that there will be engagement with those who are not being exploited and where this happens the focus must be on building trust and increasing safety. Signposting support agencies and local sexual health provisions for example.

7.5 Excessive scanning and proactive engagement can lead to unwanted interaction with non- vulnerable sex workers and erode trust. Joint working and advice from partners prior to this activity should be considered. Training from NUM may be also be available.

7.6 Interaction, whilst facilitated by intelligence units, may be better carried out neighbourhood officers under the local partnership leadership of community managers.

7.7 Any visits to locations used for sex work should be low key. Use of sensitive phraseology should be carefully considered. Media interaction should be avoided during visits. Officers need to be cognisant to the welfare needs and dignity of those encountered. Please refer to the guidance for front line officers and staff.

Developing a picture of those who exploit 7.8 There will be visits and situations which require further development work to understand fully the extent of possible exploitation behind what has been discovered. It may not always be clear that exploitation is occurring but when suspected intelligence development may be required.

7.9 Mentioned within the guidance to investigators, the ASWs hold data on those taking out and paying for adverts. These ASWs will cooperate in providing information to UK law enforcement. The data provided may include the IP addresses of locations used to take out the advert, payment details, the names given to take out adverts and contact details.

7.10 Rental agreements and booking details for premises used for exploitation of sex workers could also reveal an audit trail. Clearly with hotels this will be easily achieved but other properties may require open source or land registry checks.

7.11 Exploiter’s bank accounts may also reveal expenditure on ASW adverts, other property bookings and possibly travel. Early use of a financial investigator will greatly assist development investigations. Traditional telecommunications development work should also be considered. This is key when a possible exploited sex worker does not control their own phone advertised on ASWs.

In Summary

16 | N a t i o n a l P o l i c i n g S e x W o r k a n d P r o s t i t u t i o n G u i d a n c e

7.13 Scanning ASWs and responding appropriately and sensitively to vulnerability is a correct approach to safeguarding. Intelligence development should be focused on those who exploit.

8 Conclusion

8.1 Partnership working at all levels is key to understanding and providing the best service to the sex working community.

8.2 Police interaction with sex workers will influence future relationships. It starts from a position of mistrust and extra effort is required, but working within the guidelines and being consistent is the best way to build trust.

8.3 Exploitation of sex workers can be linked to organised and international crime. However, the police need to deal with individuals while pursuing exploiters.

8.4 Other agencies, partners and support groups may understand what is occurring better than police officers and communication is key.

8.5 Some crime in the industry is cyber-enabled and understanding of the online nature of the sex industry is required.

17 | N a t i o n a l P o l i c i n g S e x W o r k a n d P r o s t i t u t i o n G u i d a n c e

Glossary of terms

All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) - All-Party Parliamentary Groups (APPGs) are informal cross- party groups that have no official status within Parliament. They are run by and for Members of the Commons and Lords, though many choose to involve individuals and organizations from outside Parliament in their administration and activities.

Adult Services Websites (ASWs) - These are websites, accessible via the internet to anyone declaring they are at least 18 years old, that advertise sexual services to customers either as a segment of their business or as their sole business.

Beyond the Gaze - Beyond the Gaze was a project funded by the Economic and Social Research Council which ran from September 2015 to 2018. It examined, amongst other issues, how the internet shaped the adult commercial sex industry in the UK. It contains a lot of valuable material to assist law enforcement and engagement.

Beyond the Streets - Beyond the Streets is a UK charity who see the possibility of life beyond sexual exploitation. They work to see women safe from coercion, violence and abuse.

Community Managers – The definition here defines post holders, within the police, who are able to bring together partners to address and solve problems within geographical areas of responsibility.

Doxing - Doxing is the Internet-based practice of researching and broadcasting private or identifiable information (especially personally identifiable information) about an individual.

Exploiters – Exploitation is accepted as a very wide term. It, of course, is used in conjunction with Modern Slavery but can also be considered in more simplistic forms such as a person or persons taking advantage of someone’s work unfairly.

Home Affairs Committee – This is one of the departmental select committees which review subjects by examining written and oral evidence from a wide range of relevant groups and individuals. Its members are Members of Parliament.

ISVA - Independent Sexual Violence Advisors or Advocates

18 | N a t i o n a l P o l i c i n g S e x W o r k a n d P r o s t i t u t i o n G u i d a n c e

IDVA - Independent Domestic Violence Advisors

MS1 – This is a notification of potential victim of Modern slavery form. This should be completed when an adult victim does not consent to enter the NRM (National referral mechanism)

National Referral Mechanism (NRM) - The National Referral Mechanism (NRM) is a framework for identifying victims of human trafficking or modern slavery and ensuring they receive the appropriate support. The NRM is also the mechanism through which the Modern Slavery Human Trafficking Unit (MSHTU) collect data about victims.

National Ugly Mugs (NUM) - National Ugly Mugs (NUM) is a pioneering, national organization which provides greater access to justice and protection for sex workers who are often targeted by dangerous individuals but are frequently reluctant to report these incidents to the police.

NCA – National Crime Agency (NCA)

Off street sex work - A phrase referring to a sex worker who works from a premises.

Online Forums – Online Forums, internet forums or message boards are online discussion sites where people can hold conversations in form of posted messages.

Pop up Brothels - Pop up brothels is a media reference to locations used temporarily by sex workers.

This page is intended to be blank for printing Return to Agenda

National Police Chiefs’ Council

Management of Risk in Law Enforcement Programme (MoRiLE) – Request for Support

16 January 2019 / Agenda Item: Regional

This document (including attachments and appendices) may be subject to an FOI request and the NPCC FOI Officer & Decision Maker will consult with you on receipt of a request prior to any disclosure. Author: ACC Jonathan Drake & DI Chris Dowen Force/Organisation: South Wales Police Date Created: 13/12/2018 Coordination Committee: Crime Operations Coordination Committee Portfolio: Intelligence Portfolio Attachments @ para N/A Information Governance & Security

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management

1. INTRODUCTION/PURPOSE

1.1 The committee are requested to approve the recommendation in relation to the protection of the Intellectual Property and Trademark pertaining to the Management of Risk in Law Enforcement programme

2. BACKGROUND

2.1 The Management of Risk in Law Enforcement (MoRiLE) project is governed through the Intelligence Innovation Group. ACC Jon Drake (Intelligence Portfolio Group chair) is the NPCC lead and DI Chris Dowen (West Midlands Police) is the programme lead.

2.2 Created in 2014, the aim of the project is to develop a bespoke range of interconnected business intelligence models and practices for law enforcement and our partners.

2.3 The project is currently delivered at no cost to the NPCC. The programme lead role is delivered alongside DI Dowens core role, and the project leads roles are undertaken by a broad range of police, wider law enforcement and partner representatives on a part time basis. A bid is currently being developed to create a central MoRiLE team through the Specialist Capabilities programme that would allow the programme to significantly increase the pace of developments, delivering a positive impact for policing and our partners

3. ISSUE – MoRiLE Intellectual Property and Trademark

2 Official-Sensitive

3.1 The MoRiLE models has been designed in house specifically for law enforcement and our partners, and is unique from traditional risk models in that it includes a confidence assessment and wider organisational considerations such as capacity and capability assessments.

3.2 Formal advice has been sought from the Government Intellectual property office (Birmingham Branch) in relation to protection of the MoRiLE Intellectual Property and branding. The advice given is that NPCC should copyright the model(s), and trademark the branding in order to protect the integrity of the approach, and the reputation of the NPCC. Informal advice has also been sought from two other sources in relation to the Intellectual Property, and the intimation is that there are elements of the methodology that would constitute Intellectual property that should be formally considered by NPCC in terms of how this is protected.

3.3 The need to take action is supported by the current interest in the model by IT companies who currently have no restrictions on them taking the information available and delivering their own solutions, potentially causing damage to the reputation of the MoRiLE Programme and the NPCC. 3.4 The anticipated cost if specialists are instructed is £5,000-£6,000. This however would be reduced if internal solicitors were instructed.

3.5 Recommendation/Proposal – The NPCC appoint a solicitor to complete the work with the project lead to finalise Intellectual Property, copyright and trademark applications.

4. CONCLUSION

4.1 The MoRiLE project has been in existence for approximately 4 years. During this time it has created an approach that is used extensively across policing, wider law enforcement, and our partners.

4.2 There is significant interest from these organisations to develop the full suite of products that can be used to make nuanced decisions in relation to threat, risk, harm and demand.

4.3 There are risks to the project and NPCC if the Intellectual Property, copyright and trademark are not protected.

4.4 It is therefore recommended that the proposal identified is implemented.

4. APPROVAL OF THE COORDINATION COMMITTEEE

4.1 This paper was agreed by the Crime Operations Coordination Committee on the 5 December.

5. DECISIONS REQUIRED

5.1 The committee is requested to approve the proposal and request NPCC appoint a solicitor to undertake the work outlined

ACC Jonathan Drake South Wales Police Intelligence Portfolio Return to Agenda

National Police Chiefs’ Council

Forensic Portfolio Update – Human Tissue

16 January 2019 / Agenda Item: Regional

This document (including attachments and appendices) may be subject to an FOI request and the NPCC FOI Officer & Decision Maker will consult with you on receipt of a request prior to any disclosure. Author: CC James Vaughan Force/Organisation: Dorset Police Date Created: 19/11/2018 Coordination Committee: Crime Operations Coordination Committee Portfolio: Forensic Science Portfolio Attachments @ para N/A Information Governance & Security

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1. This paper seeks to update the NPCC on the current issues that have been raised regarding the Human Tissue Audit 2010-12 as a result of a question raised at Prime Minister’s Questions within the House of Commons. This document will summarise the issues and describe the ethical challenges which have surfaced as a consequence of differing practices amongst police forces. Finally this paper will provide national guidance on the management of Human Tissue seized by Police.

2. PRIME MINISTER’S QUESTION

2.1. On 12 September 2018, Chris Green MP for Bolton West, raised the following at Prime Minister’s Questions. ‘Leah Aldridge was killed by her father in 2002. After the coroner and Greater Manchester police finished their investigation, the body was returned to the family for the funeral. Last year, the police discovered that they had retained some of Leah’s body parts, and these were returned to the family for a second funeral. Only a few weeks ago, yet more body parts were discovered by the police and the family had to go through the ordeal of a third funeral. They have no confidence in Greater Manchester police or the police and crime commissioner, the Mayor of Greater Manchester that they now have finally allowed the family to lay their daughter Leah to rest. Will the Prime Minister hold an inquiry into this matter for the sake of Leah’s family and for other families across Greater Manchester?’

2.2. The Prime Minister responded with the following. ‘This is an absolutely terrible case. I am sure, as my hon. Friend will have felt from the reaction of Members across the House when they heard him set out the details that we all want to express our deepest sympathy to Leah’s family for the prolonged trauma they have had to endure as a result of the way that this has been handled. I understand that the deputy Mayor of Greater Manchester has been in touch with the Human Tissue Authority about the case. The authority is advising on ensuring that the establishment concerned does the necessary work to evaluate what went wrong in this case and put in place measures to minimise the chance that this can ever

2 Official-Sensitive

happen again. Officials in the Home Office will meet both the Greater Manchester police and the National Police Chiefs’ Council to further address the issue of historically held human tissue. I will ensure that the relevant Home Office Minister updates my hon. Friend on the outcome of those meetings.’

3. BACKGROUND

3.1. In the summer of 2009, the Human Tissue Authority (HTA) conducted a series of inspections at mortuary facilities which led to the temporary suspension of the post–mortem examination license at one major city hospital. One of the issues identified related to the significant quantity of tissue on site. Following a ‘Regulatory Alert’ to the post-mortem sector in December 2009, the HTA issued ‘Directions’ in April 2010 instructing licensed mortuary facilities in England, Wales and Northern Ireland to conduct an audit of tissue holdings. As part of the audit, mortuaries were required to check that tissue samples obtained after the commencement of the Human Tissue Act 2004 (in September 2006) were being held with appropriate authority, i.e. from the police or the coroner.

3.2. In 2010, it became apparent that human tissue from homicide and suspicious death cases, going back many years, had been retained in establishments under police powers following post mortem examinations. The location of this tissue was likely to be at police laboratories, forensic providers and Human Tissue Authority licenced establishments such as hospitals and mortuaries.

3.3. A national Gold Group oversaw the audit. The membership of the Gold Group included representatives from ACPO, NPIA, Coroners Society, Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), forensic pathologists, police, HTA and the Home Office. Forces were also urged to set up their own multi-agency Gold Groups. The Gold group used existing guidance developed in 2006 by the Home Office and updated in 2012 by the Forensic Science Regulator to categorise the material subject of the audit as follows:

 Category 1 - Material taken at the post-mortem examination which would not generally be considered part of the body (e.g. scrapings, fingernails, hair, stomach contents.)  Category 2 - Samples of human tissue which are not a significant part of the body (e.g. small tissue samples, blocks slides etc.); and  Category 3 - Samples of human tissue that incorporate a significant part of the body (e.g. organs, limbs etc.).

3.4. Early on during the audit process, it became clear that the enormity of the task of locating and dealing with all of the tissue was beyond the resources of police forces. In particular the sheer number of blocks and slides (referred to above) were estimated to be potentially up to a million items. As a result Category 2 material was also eliminated from the audit because of the large volume of blocks and slides, in particular, stored throughout the country going back many years. This decision was made by the Gold Group which considered that the volume of work entailed in recovering this material (time which is paid for from the public purse) outweighed the value to families of discovering miniscule samples of tissue relating to their loved ones.

3.5. It is worthy of note that specimens of human tissue taken during a person’s life, such as blood and biopsy material, similar to category 1 and 2 material, is retained by the NHS as part of the persons ‘medical record’ and retained indefinitely or up to 30 years, even beyond death. Human tissue taken under police powers cannot be retained as part of that person’s medical record due to issues of consent. However the fact that material is retained even after death in the health context, was a precedent to which the retention of tissue taken under police powers could be balanced.

3.6. Police forces were therefore requested to concentrate the audit on human tissue held in respect of the following criteria:

 Significant body parts including organs, limbs etc. (Category 3 samples) which were,  Taken during a post-mortem following a suspicious death/homicide, normally where a Home Office Registered pathologist is employed for the purposes of a police investigation – under police powers (not coroners cases); and 3 Official-Sensitive

 Items identified during the course of the audit as being no longer required for a criminal justice purpose.

3.7. The audit was comprehensive and forces expended a great deal of resource and time into its completion. A total of 492 category 3 samples were located and managed on an individual basis by each force.

3.8. A copy of the audit can be found at Appendix A, which is available on the internet as a public document.

3.9. The Human Tissue Authority, when conducting inspections, will highlight concerns regarding any police seized items to the Home Office. The Home Office will work with the institution and the relevant police station, in line with the published national guidance.

4. ETHICAL CHALLENGE

4.1. Each force was required to manage their own Gold Group to conduct an audit on any human tissue that was seized by their police force. Guidance was provided about the management and sensitive disposal of the human tissue. Each force managed the review of human tissue in different ways and each force responded with their conclusions. The results were collated by the Home Office.

4.2. As a result of the collapse of the Forensic Science Service in 2013, GMP made the decision to establish a dedicated team to audit any human tissue seized by GMP, which included an audit of category 2 material. The decision, in GMP, to audit category 2 material was agreed by a local ethics panel; this resulted in the location of human tissue seized during the investigation into the sad death of Leah Aldridge, as detailed above at Prime Minister’s Questions.

4.3. As a consequence of the issues raised in the House of Commons, members of parliament have identified that GMP have gone further than the guidance provided in the 2010-12 audit. This has also been reported in the press.

4.4. This decision to audit category 2 material caused an ethical debate, thus, on 12th October 2018, a national ethic committee was formed to review whether the decision taken in the 2010-12 audit, not to audit category 1 and 2 material, should be maintained and if not what should be done about it.

4.5. The ethics committee found that the original audit had considered the ethical implications and the potential impact that locating of human tissue would have on loved ones. The national Gold Group had the difficult task of balancing the use of public money and police officer resources, which could be used to prevent and detect crime, against the need to locate small pieces of human tissue, used for analysis under a microscope. The task in 2010-12 to locate and audit, potentially, up to a million small samples was considered to be a significant undertaking that would have had a considerable impact on local and national policing. The ethics committee believed the prioritising of category 3 material appeared to be the right thing to do.

4.6. The committee also considered the position in Scotland where human tissue retained after a post mortem was added to a person’s medical record and then sensitively disposed of. The ethics committee were informed that a paper had been provided to government, in 2014 suggesting that England and Wales mirror the position in Scotland; however there has been no update on this position.

4.7. The ethics committee found that the original audit had considered the ethical implications and the potential impact that locating of human tissue would have on loved ones. The national Gold Group had the difficult task of balancing the use of public money and police officer resources, which could be used to prevent and detect crime, against the need to locate small pieces of human tissue, used for analysis under a microscope. The task in 2010-12 to locate and audit, potentially, up to a million small samples was considered to be a significant undertaking that would have had a considerable impact on local and national policing. The committee referred to current process of taking and storing of human tissue taken from the living, such as blood samples and biopsy samples, which could be considered to be category 1 and 2 material. This material, obtained from the living, is currently stored on an individual’s medical record for up to 30 years, even after death. The committee also considered the legal position, regarding 4 Official-Sensitive

the storage of samples seized under PACE, which fall outside of the Human Tissue Authority. The ethics committee concluded that the decision in 2010-12 to prioritise category 3 material and not audit category 1 and 2, was ethically sound and appeared to be the right thing to do.

4.8. The ethics committee considered whether the use of categories of human tissue should still be used, when all of the three categories fell under the description of human tissue. The ethics committee did consider that the use of categories had a place in order to justifiably manage the volume of human tissue, including slides for examination under a microscope, that have been seized by police forces. However the committee highlighted that some category 2 material could make up a whole organ in some cases. The ethics committee suggested that the use of categories was sound and reasoned; however the Home office should review them to ensure they remain current.

4.9. The ethics committee advised that forces should consider reviewing any category 2 material that may indeed be a small organ and assess its retention or sensitive disposal on a case by case basis.

5. APPROVAL OF THE COORDINATION COMMITTEE

5.1 The national guidance published in the Human Tissue Audit 2010-12 should be maintained.

5.2 The NPCC should not sanction a further human tissue audit; instead forces should review their current arrangements for the management of human tissue and provide written feedback as to their force’s position. During this review, each force should consider, on a case by case basis, whether any category 2 material represents the whole of an organ. Advice on this matter can be obtained from the Senior Forensic Pathology Manager ********S31(1)(a)(b)********

6. STATEMENT/DETAILS OF COST OR RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS

6.1 There are no funding streams to support this work. Costs for each force will vary depending on their investment in the original audit.

7. CONCLUSIONS

7.1 The decision taken by the Human Tissue Audit 2010-12 not to audit category 1 and 2 material was ethically sound.

7.2 A further audit of category 1 and 2 human tissue is not supported; instead, forces should review their existing human tissue management structures to ensure that they are in keeping with the national guidance, published within the Human Tissue Audit 2010-12. Advice can be obtained from the Senior Forensic Pathology Manager, Dean Jones, from the Home Office.

8. DECISIONS REQUIRED

8.1 To agree or reject the conclusions.

James Vaughan Chief Constable - Dorset Forensic Pathology Return to Agenda

National Police Chiefs’ Council

Consent for Digital Downloads during the Course of an Investigation

16 January 2019 / Agenda Item: Regional

This document (including attachments and appendices) may be subject to an FOI request and the NPCC FOI Officer & Decision Maker will consult with you on receipt of a request prior to any disclosure. Author: ACC Jeremy Burton Force/Organisation: Surrey Police Date Created: 19/11/2018 Coordination Committee: Criminal Justice Coordination Committee Portfolio: Disclosure Portfolio Attachments @ para App A Information Governance & Security

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 In March 2018, Privacy International published a report entitled, “Digital Stop and Search”. This focussed on the extraction of data by police from electronic devices of witnesses, complainants and suspects during the course of a criminal investigation. This organisation claimed that police processes were flawed, describing “a potentially unlawful regime operating within UK police forces, who are confused about the legal basis for the technology they are using.”. It went on to say “The police are acting without clear safeguards for the public and no independent oversight to identify abuse and misuse of sensitive personal information”.

1.2 Whilst the content of the Privacy International publication is less than complimentary in terms of policing practices, it is generally pragmatic in its approach and recommendations. Consequently, it highlights risks for investigative practice in policing.

1.3 CC James Vaughan, NPCC Forensic Science, convened a gold group to respond specifically to this report, but the broader issue remains concerning the legality and consistency of approach by police forces when downloading digital data. Therefore, under the NPCC Criminal Justice Coordination Committee (CJCC), a ‘Task and Finish’ working group was established consisting of colleagues from relevant areas (see table 1) to:

 Explore the legal framework available to investigators when seeking to download data from digital devices belonging to complainants and witnesses;  Establish whether consent is required for such a download and how that consent should be obtained, recorded and managed through the course of the investigation;  Recommend what information should be provided to a complainant or witness concerning how their

2 Official-Sensitive

data and third party material will be handled, stored and retained; and  Propose a standard approach to be introduced nationally to ensure consistency.

1.4 Following the initial scoping exercise by the working group, instructions from counsel have now been received providing advice on the powers available for the search, seizure and examination of devices. In summary, there is no statutory provision to seize, examine and download data on witnesses or complainant’s digital devices. The only method by which we can take possession of digital devices from complainants and witnesses and download their data is through informed and ongoing consent.

1.5 Forces have hitherto developed their own methods of obtaining and recording such consent, but the inconsistency in approach is unhelpful. The focus of the Task and Finish group has therefore been to develop a national methodology for obtaining and recording informed consent at various points in an investigative process and with regard to a range of material, including that held by third parties.

1.6 There is risk in this approach since it is not currently supported by legislation but in the absence of an alternative, what has been developed is a practical solution for investigators and does address many of Privacy International’s concerns, especially in relation to clear and transparent information. The following recommendations are proposed:

1. The reliance on Sec. 19 PACE 1984 is to cease in these circumstances, as it is not an appropriate use of the legislation 2. All forces to provide complainants and witnesses information about why devices and 3rd party material may be required during the course of an investigation. (Appendix A). 3. Consent for 1) above is to be recorded on the appropriate document (Appendix B) and forces are advised to use this attachment. 4. Appendices A and B, when completed, will be the subject of Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (CPIA) requirements. 5. The working group continues the development of these documents for possible inclusion in National File Standards. 6. The working group will continue to develop a national “Stafford Statement”* to address concerns raised by a number of victim support organisations.

2. INTENTION

2.1 This paper is to inform the Chief Constables’ of the work and associated recommendations to ensure consistency of approach when extracting digital data from the devices belonging to victims and witnesses during the course of an investigation.

3. BACKGROUND

3.1 Digital devices, including smart phones and tablets are continuing to evolve, with ever increasing capacity to store information. When combined with the developing potential for cloud storage, this modern reality poses an unprecedented challenge to policing in terms of investigations where such stored information may contain evidence relating to criminal offences. Enquiries into digital media which were once only employed in exceptional cases are now commonplace, substantially increasing the burden upon investigators, particularly when attempting to discharge their responsibilities under CPIA disclosure. As well as devices belonging to suspects, reasonable lines of enquiry now frequently extend into the devices of victims and witnesses particularly when parties are known to each other.

3.2 Policing practices have been adapted at local levels in an attempt to manage this developing situation, but as a consequence the approach has become divergent between individual forces. The scoping exercise by the working group has shown that there is a lack of clarity concerning the powers under which officers are seizing and interrogating these devices as well as a fragmented approach to informing complainants and witnesses how their personal data will be extracted, stored and managed. Forces also differ as to whether they request consent from those individuals concerned and, if obtained, how this consent is recorded, managed and ultimately disclosed throughout the course of an investigation. 3 Official-Sensitive

3.3 Third party material is acquired from a number of sources and can be vital in the pursuance of reasonable lines of enquiry. Recent CPS guidance highlights the process to be followed in this regard. Again, consent is needed when third party material is required. However, there is no formal process to do this.

3.4 Therefore, in both these cases there is a clear need to provide guidance for police investigators to ensure that the rights of individuals are proportionately balanced against the needs of the case. National clarity and consistency concerning these processes will help promote a fair and transparent judicial process with due regard for individual privacy and freedoms as enshrined in human rights legislation. The working group has identified four main areas of risk through its scoping work which are detailed as follows: *‘The reference to ‘Stafford statement documents’ arises from the case of R(B) v Stafford Crown Court (2007) which stated a complainant’s article 8 rights must be considered when it comes to disclosure. Complainants should be informed of any request from the defence for their records, and be given an opportunity to make representations at a hearing.

4. LEGALITY

4.1 Following advice from Counsel relying on Section 19 Police and Criminal Evidence Act, which allows a constable to seize items that may be evidence of an offence is unlawful in circumstances involving witnesses or complainants. It was confirmed also that there is no legal basis in which to seize or extract information. It order to take possession of a complainant or witnesses’ device the only credible solution is consent. However, it has been argued that consent cannot form any basis in which to extract that information as this is not true consent and there is only a very small window in which to withdraw that consent before any data is extracted, when there is no opportunity to withdraw it as the police are thereafter bound by the legal position of having to retain material in line with CPIA*.

4.2 The same can be said for 3rd party material and as such consent is the only basis in which we can gain access to such material.

4.3 It is accepted that this position carries a degree of risk, since it cannot rely on any current legislation and any direction through case law is likely to be in the long term. The focus now being brought to bear on our practice in this area has culminated in the critical need for police service to adopt a nationally consistent position, with the risk of inaction now outweighing any uncertainty concerning our proposed guidance.

5. CONSENT

5.1 It is vital that complainants and witnesses are clear as to what they are consenting to at the outset of an investigation and are kept up-to-date of any subsequent changes to how their data may be used during the course of that investigation. When information, data or material is to be disclosed to the defence, and the defendant before or during trial, the subject person of the information, data or material must be given early notice and given the opportunity to present to the court a reason why this data should not be disclosed.

5.2 Appendix A provides clear, unambiguous information on why the data is required, what we do with it and how we store and protect. Appendix B provides specific technical information and requires the complainant or witnesses signature.

6. DISCLOSURE

6.1 With varying practices being used by forces, it has become apparent that the processes, particularly involving those where consent by complainants is either given or refused, are not always being adequately disclosed as part of the police duty under the CPIA such as appropriate scheduling on the MG6 series of documents. Clearly this has the potential to undermine cases that proceed to court.

7. CONSISTENCY

7.1 The overarching risk to policing is that of an inconsistent approach through lack of guidance. Initial enquiries with all forces have identified that the practices around the country can vary greatly. Some 4 Official-Sensitive

forces seek blanket consent for downloading information, whereas others permit the complainant to exclude specific categories, e.g. photographs. Some forces issue a detailed notice to complainants and obtain signed consent, whilst others rely on that consent being captured within the body of a statement. Finally, some forces do not seek consent at all, opting instead to simply inform a complainant about what will happen.

7.2 Given the strategic drivers behind this piece of work and the current improvements being implemented under the National Disclosure Improvement Plan, this is not a situation that should be tacitly approved. Failure to disclose and potentially illegal or unethical process will cause grave issues for Policing. *All information recovered in the course of a criminal investigation must be handled and stored securely in accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 2018, CPIA1996 and the MoPI 2005.

8. RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 The working group have identified the best method, in the circumstances, to inform complainants and witnesses of the process that will be undertaken concerning their digital devices and the need to access 3rd party material. Following Counsel and Information Commissioner’s advice the working group advocate adopting an ethical approach and providing complainants and witnesses with comprehensive information in terms of how we extract, store, retain and ultimately disclose their data.

8.2 Two documents have been drafted which have been included as appendices. They consist of an information letter for complainants and witnesses and a digital processing notice. It is envisaged that, if agreed, a final version of these can potentially be developed to become part of the National File Standards.

9. APPROVAL OF THE COORDINATION COMMITTEEE

9.1 This paper was agreed by the Chair of the Criminal Justice Coordination Committee on the 14 December 2018.

10. DECISIONS

10.1 Chief Constables’ Council is asked to consider the following recommendations:

1. All forces to seek consent from complainants and witnesses after supplying supporting information (Appendix A) and conducting a two-part discussion for seeking 3rd party material, taking digital devices and extracting data.

2. The use of Sec 19 PACE to secure complainants and witnesses digital devices is to cease with immediate effect.

3. Consent to seize devices is to be recorded on the appropriate document (Appendix B) and Forces are directed to use this attachment and any adaptations are to be minor (use of Force logo/website etc.)

4. Appendices A and B when completed are to be subject of disclosure considerations in line with CPIA.

5. The working group continues with the development of these documents in collaboration with the College of Policing for inclusion in the National File Standards.

6. The working group will continue to develop a national “Stafford Statement”* to address concerns raised by a number of victim support organisations.

Assistant Chief Constable Jeremy Burton Surrey Police NPCC Lead for Disclosure Return to Agenda

National Police Chiefs’ Council

APP for Post Incident Procedures following Death or Serious Injury

16 January 2019 / Agenda Item: Regional

This document (including attachments and appendices) may be subject to an FOI request and the NPCC FOI Officer & Decision Maker will consult with you on receipt of a request prior to any disclosure. Author: Richard Bennett Force/Organisation: College of Policing Date Created: 19/11/2018 Coordination Committee: Operations Coordination Committee Portfolio: College of Policing – Uniformed Policing Faculty Attachments @ para App A & App B Information Governance & Security

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. The College of Policing has produced draft APP on the Post Incident Procedures (PIP) to be applied following Deaths or Serious Injury (DSI) during or after police contact.

1.2. The DSI-PIP APP has implications for forces in terms of the need to have sufficient Post Incident Managers in place to meet anticipated need and in terms of raising awareness of staff to ensure that the APP is implemented effectively. The College is committed to working with forces, the NPCC, staff associations, unions and the IPOC to develop an implementation plan to support the introduction of the APP. Chiefs are asked to consider the implications of the APP for their organisation and to provide feedback to the College to assist in the planning of implementation support

2. BACKGROUND

2.1. The inconsistency of UK police practice where a DSI following police contact occurs has repeatedly been subject of comment by the IOPC (and previously the IPCC) and others including in the Angiolini review of deaths in police custody.

2.2. APP for such incidents resulting from the discharge of police firearms and CED (Taser) has existed for many years and is now embedded and well understood by those implementing, managing and subject of the procedure. The current absence of clear guidance for non-firearms DSI incidents presents a significant vulnerability for the police service.

2.3. The draft DSI-PIP APP mirrors the procedural principles of armed policing APP, whilst recognising and accommodating the necessary operational and contextual differences. It provides guidance and direction

2 Official-Sensitive

intended to support the compliance of forces with legal and procedural requirements (including Article 2 ECHR obligations) describing the investigative considerations and obligations together with officer and staff welfare, responsibilities for key roles and the chronology and detail in respect of accounts. It supports organisational learning and provides a scaleable process which may be applied to any DSI circumstances and subsequent investigation, whether carried out by the force’s professional standards department or by the relevant independent investigative authority.

2.4. The College of Policing carried out a public consultation (via the public facing APP consultation site) on the draft guidance between 3 July & 14 August 2018. The following were specifically made aware of the consultation:

 Chief Officers (via Chiefs’ Net)  NPCC leads for those areas of practice to which DSI incidents are most often related (firearms, CED, RP, pursuits, custody, response, call handling, public order, self-defence and restraint, MH, suicide prevention and surveillance)  Home Office  PFEW, Superintendents’ association and unions  APCC  IOPC.

2.5. The Draft DSI-PIP went to the Professional Committee (PC) of the College on 12/12/18. PC were supportive of the aim of the DSI-PIP to bring greater consistency to the way in which non firearms DSI incidents are managed by forces to ensure that they are investigated in a defensible and transparent way and that officers and staff receive the appropriate support. However, they voiced a number of concerns. These included:

 Concerns that officers and staff who did not understand the process would find it stressful  Concerns that the process would not be proportionate to the investigation of all incidents that meet the strict definition of a DSI  Concerns that the implementation of the APP could result in increased costs for forces  Concerns that although Chiefs were included in the circulation for the consultation they may not all have been made aware of the draft APP and may not have had the opportunity to consider the implications

2.6. It was agreed at PC that the draft APP should be brought to the attention of Chiefs through the circulations of a regional paper so that Chiefs would have the opportunity to provide feedback to the College on implementation considerations of the APP and the likely costs involved for forces.

2.7. The introduction of DSI-PIP APP will require an associated programme of learning and awareness to ensure that all staff who may be subject of the procedure, or have specific responsibility within it, are fully aware of the implications.

3. DECISIONS REQUIRED

3.1 Chiefs are asked to consider the implications of the DSI-PIP APP and to provide feedback to the College to inform College plans to support it implementation.

3.2 Chiefs are also asked to consider the cost implications of the DSI-PIP APP and to provide this information to the College

Richard Bennett Faculty Lead Uniformed Policing: College of Policing Return to Agenda

National Police Chiefs’ Council

Digital Policing Portfolio Update

16 January 2019 / Agenda Item: Regional

This document (including attachments and appendices) may be subject to an FOI request and the NPCC FOI Officer & Decision Maker will consult with you on receipt of a request prior to any disclosure. Author: ACO Hacer Evans Force/Organisation: Digital Policing Portfolio Date Created: 19/11/2018 Portfolio: Digital Policing Portfolio Attachments @ para N/A Information Governance & Security

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management

1. INTRODUCTION/PURPOSE

1.1. The purpose of this paper is to update Chief Constables’ Council on the progress being made across the Digital Policing Portfolio (DPP) and its three programmes, Digital Public Contact (DPC), Digital Intelligence and Investigation (DII) and Digital First (DF). This is the first such update provided to Council.

1.2. This paper also provides Council with an overview of three new DPP funding bids recently submitted to the Police Transformation Fund.

1.3. Rest of document withheld in full ********S31(1)(a)(b), & S24(1)********

2. DECISIONS REQUIRED

7.1 Chiefs are to note the update.

ACO Hacer Evans Director, NPCC Digital Policing Portfolio This page is intended to be blank for printing

Return to Agenda

National Police Chiefs’ Council

Proposal for 2019/20 Charging for Police Services and Mutual Aid Guidelines

16 January 2019 / Agenda Item: Regional

This document (including attachments and appendices) may be subject to an FOI request and the NPCC FOI Officer & Decision Maker will consult with you on receipt of a request prior to any disclosure. Author: Linda Waters Force/Organisation: Thames Valley Police Date Created: 19/11/2018 Coordination Committee: Finance Coordination Committee Portfolio: Cost Recovery and Income Generation Attachments @ para Annex A & B (For copies of the 2019/20 Guidelines on Charging for Police Services and Mutual Aid Cost Recovery – with the Claim Forms you can download these on ChiefsNet separately) Information Governance & Security

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management

1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 The National Policing Guidelines on Charging for Police Services provides forces nationally with support for a common charging structure for Police Services to non- police customers, the intention being for forces to recover all associated costs. 1.2 The National Policing Guidelines on Charging for Police Services: Mutual Aid Cost Recovery provides forces nationally with a national charging structure for Mutual Aid between police forces. The aim is for forces to recover all additional costs i.e. all hours are assumed to be overtime. 1.3 This document proposes:  A change to the national Mutual Aid hourly rate calculations to remove base allowances (which are not part of the overtime calculation), include Bear Scotland cost and uplift Police Staff Pension contributions, (which are included in overtime calculation).  This document proposes the 2019/20 annual adjustment to Section 15 and Section 24 charges

2. BACKGROUND

2.1 Charging for Special Police Services are enabled by The Police Act 1996 Section 25 (as amended) and provision of Goods and Services via of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 Section 15.

1st Floor, 10 Victoria Street, London SW1H 0NN T 020 3276 3800

2.2 Charging for Mutual Aid is enabled by The Police Act 1996 Section 24 (as amended).

2.3 The annual charges for SPS and Mutual Aid were last approved by the 29th November 2017 meeting of the NPCC FCC for implementation on 1 April2018.

3. ACTIONS

Mutual Aid between Forces 3.1 Aligned with the uplift in Police Pay of 2% in September 2018, Mutual Aid charges are suggested to receive a 2% increase in national recommended rates. 3.2 Mutual Aid hourly rates are aligned with any changes in Police Pay and government levies / taxes, to reflect increases in individual force resource costs. 3.3 The existing 2018/19 NPCC FCC Mutual Aid Inspector, Sergeant and Constable hourly rates were as calculated as follows (excluding Bear Scotland):

Constable Sergeant Inspector Standard Deployment £ £ £ Basic Pay £32,810 £41,439 £51,257 Unsociable Hours £1,200 £1,500 £1,900 Allowances £703 £1,714 £2,845 Non-Pensionable Allowances £325 £410 £508 National Insurance £3,709 £5,092 £6,672 Employment Sub-Total £38,747 £50,155 £63,182 National Government Levies £194 £251 £316 Annual Employable Cost £38,941 £50,406 £63,498 Productive Days 207 207 207 Equivalent hourly rate £23.51 £30.44 £38.34

Grade 0 hourly rate (Base x 2) £47.03 £60.88 £47.93 Grade 1 hourly rate (Base x £35.27 £45.66 £47.93 1.5) Grade 2 hourly rate (Base x £31.27 £40.48 £47.93 1.33) 3.4 Bear Scotland is the Employment Appeal Tribunal where it was determined there is an Employer liability necessary to be satisfied in respect of periods of annual leave (4 weeks) and allowances/additional payments such as overtime

3.5 Bear Scotland can be generally calculated using 20/365.25ths of overtime and other allowances which would not otherwise be payable during periods of Annual Leave. The following table illustrates the proposed NPCC FCC Inspector, Sergeant and Constable 2019/20 hourly rates, with the addition of the Bear Scotland component:

2019/20 Mutual Aid Rates Constable Sergeant Inspector

Standard Deployment £ £ £ Basic Pay £33,267 £42,738 £52,986 Unsociable Hours £1,200 £1,500 £1,900 Holiday Pay Adjustment £1,887 £2,422 £3,005 National Insurance £3,826 £5,248 £6,798 Employment Sub-Total £40,180 £51,908 £64,689 National Government Levies £201 £260 £323 Annual Employable Cost £40,381 £52,168 £65,013

Grade 0 hourly rate £48.50 £62.75 £48.91 Grade 1 hourly rate £36.38 £47.06 £48.91 Grade 2 hourly rate £32.25 £41.73 £48.91

1st Floor, 10 Victoria Street, London SW1H 0NN T 020 3276 3800

3.6 With Police Staff deployments being a small percentage of resources procured through Mutual Aid and local government employer pension contributions varying, it is deemed appropriate to include Police Staff Pension costs at this time (Police Staff overtime is pensionable unlike Police Officer overtime which is not).

2019/20 Mutual Aid SCP 19 SCP 34 SCP 9 SCP 42 Rates e.g. e.g. PCS SOC O O Standard Deployment £ £ £ £ Basic Pay £17,261 £22,274 £34,612 £46,426 Unsociable Hours £4,524

Staff Pension £3,349 £5,199 £6,715 £9,007 National Insurance £1,191 £2,507 £3,585 £5,216 Employment Sub-Total £21,800 £34,503 £44,912 £60,649 National Government £92 £147 £191 £258 Levies Annual Employable £21,893 £34,650 £45,102 £60,907 Cost

Grade 0 hourly rate £27.84 £44.59 £58.65 £79.19 Grade 1 hourly rate £20.88 £33.45 £43.99 £59.39 Grade 2 hourly rate £20.88 £33.45 £43.99 £59.39 3.7 The resulting comparison of 2018/19 and 2019/20 Mutual aid rates for Police Officers is as follows:

2018/19 Mutual Aid Rates Constabl Sergeant Inspector Chief Supt Chie e Inspector f Sup t Grade 0 hourly rate £47.03 £60.88 £47.93 £51.36 £64.42 £75.32 Grade 1 hourly rate £35.27 £45.66 £47.93 £51.36 £64.42 £75.32 Grade 2 hourly rate £31.27 £40.48 £47.93 £51.36 £64.42 £75.32

Chief Chief 2019/20 Mutual Aid Rates Constable Sergeant Inspector Supt Inspector Supt

Grade 0 hourly rate £48.50 £62.75 £48.91 £52.34 £62.66 £72.66 Grade 1 hourly rate £36.38 £47.06 £48.91 £52.34 £62.66 £72.66 Grade 2 hourly rate £32.25 £41.73 £48.91 £52.34 £62.66 £72.66 3.8 In 2018/19 a new Mutual Aid Claim form and Usage document was successfully introduced to standardise the claims for Mutual Aid between forces. This form has current rates embedded, so a new release will be distributed on approval of the new national rates. (See Annex B – Mutual Aid Claim Form for an image.)

Special Police Services 3.9 In 2018/19 the majority of non-salary related Section 15 charges were increased in the 2018/19 NPCC FCC National Policing Guidelines on Charging for Police Services – Charge Rates for Common items (Appendix 3), at the inflation rate of 3.5%. 3.10 In 2018, a number of larger Section 15 items have been reviewed to determine the validity of their charged rates, including: (1) Request for Information, (2) Accident Reports, (3) Limited Particulars and (4) Self-Reporting. The results (when invoicing the customer) were generally within 5-10% of existing estimated average cost.

1st Floor, 10 Victoria Street, London SW1H 0NN T 020 3276 3800 3.11 As with 3.4 above, it is recommended that the SPS calculation is supplemented by the addition of a charge for Bear Scotland. 3.12 For 2018/19, it is recommended that charges are increased by 2.6%, to reflect current CPI and HM Treasury advice to the Home Office and MPS regarding OBR wage growth assumptions. (See Annex A of this document for individual recommendedrates.)

4. RECOMMENDATION

Mutual Aid and SPS Calculation Formula / Rate changes 4.1 Recommendation: Chief Constables’ Council agrees to the annual uplifts to Section 15 rates for 2019/20 (reproduced in Annex A – 2019/20 Section 15 Rates for implementation from 1st April 2019. 4.2 Recommendation: Chief Constables’ Council agrees to add the Bear Scotland adjustment into the national Mutual Aid and SPS formulae, remove the base allowances and uplift the Employer Police Staff Pension Contribution adjustment into the national Mutual Aid calculations for implementation from 1 April 2019. 4.3 Recommendation: Chief Constables’ Council agrees to the overall uplift in Section 24 Mutual Aid national rates from 1 April 2019, as reproduced below:

Chief Chief 2019/20 Mutual Aid Rates Constable Sergeant Inspector Supt Inspector Supt

Linda Waters Director of Finance NPCC Lead for Cost Recovery and Income Generation

Annex A – 2019/20 Section 15 Rates

Revised Revised 2018/19 2019/20 Requests for Disclosure of Information 87.40 Request for information (up to 2 hours work) 89.70 29.20 Hourly rate for work above 2 hours (including redaction) 30.00 ABI/Lloyds Disclosure of Information (ABI/Lloyds MOU) 29.20 Request (crime/lost property number, etc.) – MOU App D(a) 30.00 124.40 Request (In response to specific questions) – MOU App D(b) 127.60 138.90 Interview with Police Officer (per Officer) – MOU Para 4.5 142.50 Other common items 87.50 Crime Report 89.80 34.90 MG5 35.80 34.90 MG3 35.80 35.60 Incident Log 36.50 34.90 PNC Convictions 35.80 22.90 Caution Certificate 23.50 52.60 Domestic Violence Report 54.00 17.60 Occurrence Summary 18.10 17.60 Custody Record 18.10 GDPR / DPA 2018 Fees 10.00 DPA 2018 – Section 7 Subject Access Request N/A 50.00 DPA 2018 – Section 68 Health Records (Copy) N/A 10.00 DPA 2018 – Section 68 Health Records (View) N/A 50.00 DPA 2018 – Section 68 Health Records (View & then Copy) N/A Alarm URN Fees (Set by ACPO CPI) Alarm Registration (Intruder) Alarm Registration (Panic Alarm) Set by Police Set by Lone Worker Devices up to 10,000 CPI Police CPI Lone Workers Devices 10,001 – 50,000 Lone Workers Devices 50,001 and over Return to Agenda

Chief Constables’ Council

Workforce Data

16 January 2019 / Agenda Item: Regional

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Currently there is no national Workforce Data available to the NPCC other than the ADR data collected by the Home Office

1.2 ADR data is limited in value as it is only a snap shot in time (31 March each year) which is immediately out of date and is inflexible.

1.3 With ADR we can’t follow individual progress or monitor trends and the data cannot currently be manipulated to answer the questions we want to ask e.g. equality, progression and wellbeing questions

1.4 We currently have different organisations using different sources of workforce data e.g. ADR / Force management statements

1.5 Our aspiration is to have one source of meaningful data held in one place that all the relevant organisations can access and use to answer the workforce questions we each have.

2. PROGRESS

2.1 In August 2018 Chief Constable York set up a Workforce Data group to look at what workforce data currently exists, to explore what it tells us and to identify the parties that have a vested interest in workforce data and the workforce questions we would ideally like to be able to answer. The group has now met 3 times.

2.2 CC York wrote to all the Chairs of the NPCC Co-ordinating Committees to ask what workforce questions they would like to be able to answer and whether they would like to be represented on the workforce data group

2.3 Representation on the Workforce Data Group includes:

• NPCC Workforce Co-ordination Committee • Home Office • College of Policing • HMICFRS • Pay and conditions portfolio • Police Data Requirement Group • APCC • Finance Co-ordination Committee • Equality, Diversion and Inclusion Co-ordinating Committee • Armed Policing Business Area • Counter Terrorism Policing • Performance Management Co-ordination Committee

2.4 The workforce data group has learned that there is an alternative to the ADR which is the Workforce Census.

2.5 The Workforce Census collates record level data with each record having a unique identifier that can be used to track anonymised individuals year on year.

2.6 The Workforce census data is much more flexible than ADR data and the data can be cut in a number of different ways to answer much more meaningful questions e.g. how many females have been at the rank of sergeant for over 5 years

2.7 The long term aim would be for forces to establish a workforce census report that could be run at the click of a button to provide more regular or even live data

3. RECOMMENDATIONS

3.1 The Workforce Data group would like to submit the following recommendations for Council consideration and approval:

Recommendation 1 - The Home Office to collect and hold the workforce data for all policing organisations to access as the one agreed source of workforce data

Recommendation 2 - The Workforce Census to be the way forward for collecting meaningful and usable workforce data

Recommendation 3 - The Workforce Census to replace the ADR as the mandated means for forces to submit workforce data

Recommendation 4 - The Workforce Co-ordination committee to establish a work-stream and to identify the necessary resources to take this work forward

4. APPROVAL OF THE COORDINATION COMMITTEEE

4.1 The Workforce Coordination Committee is submitting this paper, as approved at the Committee meeting on 29 November 2018.

National Police Chiefs’ Council 5. STATEMENT/DETAILS OF COST OR RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS

5.1 There will be a resourcing impact in the first year of completing both ADR and Workforce Census but once the Home Office has confirmed the data is of sufficient quality to go live with the Census we would expect there to be a reduced resourcing / performance management burden on that force in future years.

5.2 Beyond the initial work to produce the first census return - some forces are reporting that it is quicker and easier to provide the data for workforce census than for the ADR

6. DECISIONS REQUIRED

6.1 Chief Constable’s Council are asked to support and agree that the Workforce Census is the way forward and to support the necessary action within force to ensure a timely go-live for the Workforce Census and switch from ADR to Census in future years

6.2 Chief Constables’ Council are asked to agree that the Workforce Census should be the agreed way forward for gathering meaningful and usable workforce data

6.3 That the statutory mandate for completion of workforce data should transfer from the ADR to the Workforce Census

6.4 Chief Constables from the forces that are not yet live for the Census to support the HR / Payroll and performance management teams within their Forces to move as quickly as possible to go live status for the Workforce Census so that completion of the ADR for workforce data can cease

Name CC Giles York Title NPCC Lead for Workforce Lead Area Workforce Co-ordination Committee

National Police Chiefs’ Council This page is intended to be blank for printing Return to Agenda

Chief Constables’ Council

Chief Officer Retention and Recruitment Update 16 January 2018/Agenda Item: Regional

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management

1. HEADING E.G. INTRODUCTION/PURPOSE

1.1. A roundtable discussion consisting of representatives from the NPCC, APCC and College of Policing met to address the issues affecting chief officer recruitment and retention.

1.2. The meeting centred on a paper co-authored by the three organisations which summarised the findings of four publications:

1.2.1. Chief Constable Preparation, Selection, Tenure and Retirement in the ‘New Landscape of Policing’, Tim Metcalf, (2018, unpublished)

1.2.2. Chief Officer Attitude Survey, Summary of Key Findings, NPCC and CPOSA, (January 2018)

1.2.3. Chief Officer Appointments Surveys, Results and Analysis, College of Policing, (2017)

1.2.4. Leadership Review, College of Policing, (2015)

2. Principle factors affecting recruitment and retention

2.1. The principle factors for retention and recruitment were agreed at the roundtable and four main areas that required specific focus were identified:

2.1.1. The personal impact (e.g. financial, family, relocation) on those taking up chief officer posts.

Official

2.1.2. Ways to support Chief Officer - PCC relationships.

2.1.3. Selection and continuing development for chief officers.

2.1.4. Developing policing leaders from all communities and backgrounds to progress to future senior roles.

3. Actions

3.1. The roundtable agreed to the following actions:

Action Lead Related Area 1 APCC, APACE and CPOSA to convene a discussion PCC Ron Hogg, APCC Personal impact on looking at the issues of DCC contracts and Workforce Lead, to individuals considering relocation framework, as well as pensions and tax, work with the APCC Chief Officer roles with a view to removing barriers that inhibit those and CPOSA considering Chief Officer roles. 2 Guidance to be produced supporting The APCC with Ways of supporting PCC accountability, governance, & relationship, involvement from the and Chief Officer between PCCs and Chief Constables. NPCC relationships 3 The APCC to consider developing advice for new The APCC Ways of supporting PCC candidates for the PCC 2020 elections. and Chief Officer relationships 4 The NPCC to pilot a workshop examining the Sara Thornton, NPCC Ways of supporting PCC policing protocol. Chair, with the support and Chief Officer of the APCC relationships 5 The College to continue to develop the Senior Jo Noakes, College Selection and continuing Leaders Hub to provide a platform to support Chief Lead for Leadership development for those Officer CPD and appointments and undertake a and Talent taking up chief officer range of activities to support the progression of roles underrepresented groups. It was agreed that PCCs would be invited to be involved in the development of the Senior Leaders Hub. 6 The College to continue to develop its programme Jo Noakes, College Developing policing targeted at the progression of under-represented Lead for Leadership leaders, from all groups, through the development of the Senior and Talent communities, and diverse Leaders Hub. This programme of activities includes backgrounds, to progress an annual Development Centre, Career towards future senior Development Workshops, visitor sessions on the roles SCC, a new leadership programme, coaching and mentoring.

3.2. The College is to arrange a follow up meeting in January to track the progress made by each organisation in carrying out their actions.

4. Action 4

4.1. A proposal for action 4 has been drafted. NPCC and APCC are to organise a workshop to share perspectives on the 2011 Policing Protocol, identify current best working practice, and highlight current areas that need improvement or are contentious. The workshop also seeks to identify any other issues relating to PCCs and their Chief Constables not already covered in the actions listed.

4.2. A full Terms of Reference for this action are attached at Annex A.

Name: Liam O’Brien Title: NPCC Policy Officer

National Police Chiefs’ Council Official Annex A

Proposal for a facilitated workshop to explore the 2011 Policing protocol in the light of experience gained over six years since the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners in November 2012

Background

Following the release earlier this year of a paper commissioned by the Chiefs’ Council, exploring the reasons why Chief Constables (CC) may be retiring sooner and there are fewer candidates for CC posts when advertised, a successful round-table chaired by CC Mike Cunningham between the NPCC and the APCC agreed six follow-up actions. The fourth of these actions, which this proposal develops, was ‘to pilot a workshop examining the 2011 Policing Protocol’ with the implicit intention of reaching a shared understanding of the intent of the protocol and how new CCs and PCCs might be assisted to reach that understanding.

The workshop will not address the issues covered in the other work-streams which are recorded in the attached letter dated 5 November from Mike Cunningham to roundtable attendees. For example s38 issues will be addressed under work-stream 2 which focusses on ‘Guidance supporting accountability, governance, & relationship between PCCs and Chief Constables’

Objectives.

This proposal, as a first step, is for a workshop with the following objectives:

1. To share perspectives on each element of the 2011 Policing Protocol. 2. To identify those elements that are working well with any necessary helpful commentary on why they have proved uncontentious and with examples of good practice. 3. To discuss areas of the Protocol that have been identified as potentially contentious, exploring and agreeing why they are so. 4. To identify any other similar and related major issues known to be problematic between PCCs and CCs, excluding issues covered by another work-stream; and again to explore and agree why they are problematic. 5. To identity and discuss options for addressing contention. These might include but are not limited to a. Producing explanatory notes that both the APCC and NPCC would endorse. b. Designing a structured ‘training’ package – or more likely a ‘briefing day’ that might be offered to Chief Constables or Police and Crime Commissioners.

National Police Chiefs’ Council Annex A Official

c. Developing relevant advice that might be offered to PCCs’ Monitoring Officers and Chief Executives d. Identifying further work that needs to be undertaken by others to address specific resolvable issues.

6. To recommend to the APCC and NPCC, and others if necessary a practical way forward identifying risks, issues and outline costs. Output

The outputs from the workshop would be:

1. a note recording the key points from the discussion 2. draft explanatory notes to the Protocol if these are agreed to be useful 3. a proposal for the content and form of a further seminar that might be offered to new PCCs and Chief Officers Participants

It is suggested that up to five PCCs (including at least two APCC Board members) and an equal number of Chief Constables or Deputy Chief Constables (including at least one CPOSA committee member) should be invited for a near full day workshop hosted by Anglia Ruskin University at a London venue to be agreed. The workshop would operate under the Chatham House rule.

Facilitation

Facilitation would be provided by Nicholas Alston, former PCC for Essex, now chair of the Policing Institute for the Eastern Region at Anglia Ruskin University, and Stephen Kavanagh, recently retired Chief Constable of Essex. Added insight and independent challenge would be offered by an academic with relevant experience from the ARU Business School.

Preparation

Attendees will be invited to re-read the original Policing Protocol, the paper prepared for the NPCC and Chief Constable Mike Cunningham’s summary of the CC and PCC roundtable which he chaired. They will also be invited to offer in advance reflections on the objectives and to suggest particular issues of concern to discuss under objective 4.

National Police Chiefs’ Council Return to Agenda

Item 5 Investigation Disclosure and File Quality Presentation from Max Hill QC DPP