Chief Constables' Council
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Return to Agenda Chief Constables’ Council Serious Error Reduction within the Acquisition and use of Communications Data 16 January 2019 / Agenda Item: Regional Security Classification OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE Papers cannot be accepted without a security classification in compliance with the Government Security Classification (GSC) Policy (Protective Marking has no relevance to FOI): Freedom of information (FOI) This document (including attachments and appendices) may be subject to an FOI request and the NPCC FOI Officer & Decision Maker will consult with you on receipt of a request prior to any disclosure. Author: ACC Richard Berry & CC Simon Bailey Force/Organisation: Gloucestershire Constabulary Date Created: 19/11/2018 Coordination Committee: Crime Operations Coordination Committee Attachments @ para Annex A Information Governance & Security In compliance with the Government’s Security Policy Framework’s (SPF) mandatory requirements, please ensure any onsite printing is supervised and storage and security of papers are in compliance with the SPF. Dissemination or further distribution of this paper is strictly on a need to know basis and in compliance with other security controls and legislative obligations. If you require any advice, please contact [email protected] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management 1. INTRODUCTION/PURPOSE 1.1. This paper seeks to highlight to Chief Constables the importance of reducing the levels of serious errors in communications data acquisition. It recommends that rigorous action is taken to mitigate risks to forces, individuals and the police service. 2. BACKGROUND 2.1. Serious errors are defined by the communications data (CD) statutory codes of practice. They are reported to and investigated by the new body formed under the 2016 Investigatory Powers Act, the Investigatory Powers Commissioners Office (IPCO). The Head of IPCO is the Rt. Hon. Lord Justice, Sir Adrian Fulford. 2.2. The category of serious errors concerning this paper concerns innocent people who are arrested and their houses searched due to inadequate and ineffective digital investigative practice. This has included cases where the use by police of specialist software to detect sharing of child abuse imagery has produced results which have not been correctly interpreted by the users. 2.3. It is understood that after the 2016 IOCCO (Interception of Communications Commissioners Office, the predecessor of IPCO) ********S31(1)(a)(b)******** 2.4. ********S31(1)(a)(b)******** 2.5. The police service has previously been subject to a review commissioned by the Prime Minister relating to the legality, processes and procedures for the acquisition of CD for journalistic sources. A number of Chief Constables were then subject to Investigatory Powers Tribunal considerations. 2.6. The IP Act remains under significant legal challenge. ********S31(1)(a)(b)********. Litigation against a force or a finding of an Investigatory Powers Tribunal could fuel further claims that policing is unable to manage the new powers provided in the IP Act. 2.7. Section 11 of the IP Act contains an offence of unlawfully obtaining communications data. It remains to be tested if neglectful processes, which lead to a serious error, could render police employees liable for this criminal offence. 2.8. In 2017 a joint effort by the NPCC Data Communications Group (DCG) and industry produced guidance which had a dramatically positive impact on reducing errors within the CD acquisition process. ********S31(1)(a)(b)******** ********S31(1)(a)(b)******** ********S31(1)(a)(b)******** ********S31(1)(a)(b)******** ********S31(1)(a)(b)******** ********S31(1)(a)(b)******** ********S31(1)(a)(b)******** ********S31(1)(a)(b)********. Low knowledge and skill levels of investigators consequently result in inadequate assurance taking place. The wrong data is then acted upon with devastating results. These errors are in the digital investigation process and where it interfaces with CD acquisition. 2.9. In 2018 DCG commissioned further work, jointly with IPCO, through the CD Professional Oversight Board. This resulted in a search for further benchmarks to assure data. Police Scotland were found to have significantly enhanced data audit processes and were ‘best practice’. A subsequent first version of Error Reduction Strategy guidance for each force was produced and in November 2018, this was shared on Chiefs’net. It is an expectation by IPCO that each force will have an Error Reduction Strategy in place for inspections. Each force CD Senior Responsible Officer (SRO) will be required to oversee their strategy. It is based upon the ‘three Rs’; Recognition, Recording, and Reduction. 2.10. Serious error cases are always discussed between IPCO, the NPCC lead (the author) and the CD Professional Oversight Board. Recent cases have caused particular concern about the anecdotal quality of investigative and intelligence practice. 2.11. ********S31(1)(a)(b)******** 2.12. To further mitigate some of the risks, DCG has commissioned a nationally accredited independent organisation to deliver further training on network data in 2019. This will be funded through the National Communications Data Service. 3. PROPOSAL 3.1. It is recommended that Chiefs note the content of this report and take action concerning the implementation of Error Reduction Strategies in their forces. 1 ********S31(1)(a)(b)******** National Police Chiefs’ Council 3.2. It is further recommended that Chiefs ensure that staff who are involved in investigations concerning IP addresses are sufficiently skilled to handle the data and send all SPOCs who acquire internet CD to the above mentioned network data training and testing. 4. APPROVAL OF THE COORDINATION COMMITTEEE 4.1 This paper was written out of the NCOCC cycle but with the strong endorsement of the Vulnerability lead CC Simon Bailey as the co-sponsor. 5. RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS 5.1 The training course in interpreting network data has been funded. 6. DECISIONS REQUIRED 6.1 It is recommended that Chiefs acknowledge the risks and issues contained within this report and take appropriate action. Richard Berry, Communications Data Lead ACC Serious Organised Crime – Crime Operations Coordination Committee National Police Chiefs’ Council This page is intended to be blank for printing Return to Agenda National Police Chiefs’ Council Responding to Online Child Abuse Activists 16 January 2019 / Agenda Item: Regional Security Classification OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE Papers cannot be accepted without a security classification in compliance with the Government Security Classification (GSC) Policy (Protective Marking has no relevance to FOI): Freedom of information (FOI) This document (including attachments and appendices) may be subject to an FOI request and the NPCC FOI Officer & Decision Maker will consult with you on receipt of a request prior to any disclosure. Author: ACC Dan Vajzovic Force/Organisation: Cambridgeshire Constabulary Date Created: 19/11/2018 Coordination Committee: Crime Operations Coordination Committee Portfolio: Violence and Public Protection Attachments @ para App A and App B Information Governance & Security In compliance with the Government’s Security Policy Framework’s (SPF) mandatory requirements, please ensure any onsite printing is supervised and storage and security of papers are in compliance with the SPF. Dissemination or further distribution of this paper is strictly on a need to know basis and in compliance with other security controls and legislative obligations. If you require any advice, please contact [email protected] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management 1. INTRODUCTION/PURPOSE 1.1 The purpose of this paper is to request endorsement of the proposed NPCC strategic position statement in respect of Online CSA/E Activist Groups (OCAGs). This area of business was previously considered at Council in July 2018. In the intervening period further dialogue has taken place to assuage concerns expressed by Council. All points previously raised have been addressed to the satisfaction of the parties raising issues for consideration. 2. BACKGROUND 2.1 For brevity this paper will not rehearse arguments which Council have previously considered. Reference should be made to the paper presented to Council in July (Appendix A). Policing continues to prioritise activity to tackle CSA/E and grooming. This is likely to remain the case for the foreseeable future. Child abuse activism has continued unabated. Law enforcement data is incomplete but extrapolation of existing data indicated incidents remain at levels of the order of 100/month across the UK. 2.2 Analysis of incidents of activism has revealed a mixed picture. Some activist groups have amended their mode of operation such that they pass packages of information to the police without having real world contact with the person suspected of offending behaviour. Whilst this is a positive development many groups continue to insist on carrying out a physical intervention and only notify the police post or concurrent to the event. This is less desirable for reasons that have been previously articulated. There is an increased prevalence of direct criminality where purported activists have no intention to notify the police but use the opportunity of an encounter to extort or rob. 2.3 The complex, nuanced and often overlapping nature of activism and volunteering