DOCSLIB.ORG

The Philosophy of Logical Atomism Bertrand Russell the Monist 1918

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Philosophy of Logical Atomism Bertrand Russell the Monist 1918 The Philosophyof LogicalAtomism BertrandRussell TheMonist 1918, 1919 http://mon ist. buffalo. ed u/ BERTRAND RUSSELL o.M., F,R,S. Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridgc Logic and Knowledge ESSAYS r9or-r g5o EDITED BY ROBERT CHARLES MARSII I CAPRICORN BOOKS New York rgr8 THE PHILOSOPHYOF LOGICAL ATOMISM The following [is the text] of a couise of eight lectures delivered in [Gordon Square] London, in the first months of r9r8, [which] are very largely concernedwith explaining certain ideas which I learnt from my friend and former pupil Ludwig Wittgenstein. I h4ve had no oppor- tunity of knowing his views since August, rgr+, and I do not even know whether he is alive or dead.* He has therefore no responsibility for what is said in these lectures beyond that of having originally sup- plied many of the theories contained in them. CONTENTS I Facts and Propositions r78 II Partictrlans, Predicates, and Rehtions r89 III Atomic and Moleathr Propoitions 203 IV Propoitians and Factswith more than one Verb; Beliefs, etc. zt6 v Gmeral Propoitions and Eristence zz8 VI Desaiptions and Incomplete Symbols z4r VII The Theoryof Typesand Symbolism;Classes zS+ Ylll Ercursusinto Metaphysics:What ThereIs z69 preface publication ' flhis was written in r9r8 as a to in three consecutive issuesof The Monist. I have made four trivial editorial changesfor the present reprinting in an entirely different format,-R.C.M.] r77 r78 Locrc AND KNoWLEDGE THE PHTLOSOPHYOF LOGICAL ATOMISN{ r79 I. FACTS AND PROPOSITIONS inevitably from absolutely undeniable data. When I talk of 'undeni- able data' that is not to be regarded as synonymous with 'true THIs courseof lectureswhich I am now beginningI havecalled data',because 'undeniable' is a psychologicalterm and'true'is not. the Philosophy of Logical Atomism. Perhaps I had fuetterbegin When I say that something is 'undeniable', I mean that it is not by sayinga word or two as to what I understandby that title. the sort of thing that anybody is goipg to deny; it does not follow The kind of philosophy I that wish to advocate,which I call from that that it is true, though it does follow that we shall all Logical Atomism, is one which has forced itself upon me in the think it true-and that is as near to truth as we seem able to get. courseof thinking aboutthe philosophy of mathematics,although When you are considering any sort of theory of knowledge' you I should find it hard to say exactly how far there is a definite are more or less tied to a certain unavoidable subjectivity, because logicalconnexion between the two. The things I am going to say you are not concerned simply with the questioh what is true of the in theselectures are mainly my own personal opinionsand I do world, but 'What can I know of the world?' You always have to not claim that they are more than that. start any kind of argument from something which aPpearsto you As I have attempted to prove in The Principlesof Mathematics, to be true; if it appears to you to be true, there is no more to be when we analysemathematics we bring it all back to logic. It all done. You cannot go outside yourself and consider abstractly comesback to logic in the strictest and most formal sense.In the rvhether the things that appear to you to be true are true; you may present lectures,I shall try to set forth in a sort of outline, rather do this in a particular case, where one of your beliefs is changed briefly and rather unsatisfactorily, a kind of logical doctrine which in consequenceof others among your beliefs. seemsto me to result from philosophy the of mathematics-not The reasonthat I call my doctrine logical atomism is becausethe exactlylogically, but aswhat emergesas one reflects: a certainkind atoms that I wish to arrive at as the sort of last residue in analysis of logicaldoctrine, and on the basisof this a certainkind of meta- are logical atoms and not physical atoms. Some of them will be physic. The logic which I shall advocateis atomistic, as opposed what I call 'particulars'-such things as little patches of colour or to the monisticlogic of the peoplewho more or lessfollow Hegel. sounds, momentary things-and some of them will be predicates When I saythat my logicis atomistic,I mean that I sharethe com- or relations and so on. The point is that the atom I wish to arrive mon-sensebelief that there are many separate things; I do not re- at is the atom of logical analysis, not the atom of physical analysis. gard the apparent multiplicity of the world as consisting merely It is a rather curious fact in philosophy that the data which are in phasesand unreal divisionsof a single indivisible Reality. It undeniable to start with are always rather vague and ambiguous. results from that, that a considerablepart of what one would have You can, for instance, sayt 'There are a number of people in this to do to justify the sort of philosophy I wish to advocatewould room at this moment.' That is obviously in some senseundeniable. consistin justifying the processof analysis. One is often told that But when you come to try and define what this room is, and what the processof analysisis falsification, that when you analyseany it is for a person to be in a room, and how you are going to dis- given concretewhole you falsify it and that the results of analysis tinguish one person from another, and so forth, you find that what arenot true. I do not think that is a right view. I do not meanto say, you have said is most fearfully vague and that you really do not of course,and nobody would maintain,that when you haveana- know what you meant. That is a rather singular fact, that every- lysed you keep everything that you had before you analysed.If thing you are really sure of, right off is something that you do not you did, you would never attain anything in analysing.I do not know the meaning of, and the moment you get a precise statement proposeto meet the viewsthat I disagreewith by controversy,by you will not be sure whether it is true or false, at least right off. arguingagainst those views,-but rather by positively settingio-rtir The processof sound philosophizing, to my mind, consists mainly what I believeto be the truth aboutthe matter,and endeavour-ing in passing from those obvious, vague' ambiguous things, that we all the way through to make the views that I advocateresuli feel quite sure of, to something precise, clear, definite, which by I8O LOGIC AND KNOWLEDGE THE pHrr,osopny oF LocrcAL AToMIsM r8r reflection and analysiswe find is involved in the vague thing that monkey,and that anything whatsoeverthat you seemto know-but we staft from, and is, so to speak,the real truth of which that vague that the psychologistrecognizes as being the product of previous thing is a sort of shadow.I should like, if time were longerand if thought and analysisand reflection on your part-cannot really be I knew more than I do, to spenda whole lecture on the conception taken as a premissin your own knowledge.That, I say,is a theory of vagueness.I think vaguenessis very much more important in which is very widely held and which is used againstthat kind of the theory of knowledgethan you would judge it to be from the analytic outlook which I wish to urge. ft seemsto me that when writingsof mostpeople. Everything is vagueto a degreeyou do not your object is, not simply to study the history or developmentof realizetill you havetried to make it precise,and everything precise mind, but to ascertainthe nature of the world, you do not want to is so remote from everything that we normally think, that you can- go any further back than you are Uready yourself. You do not not for a moment supposethat is what we really mean when we say want to go back to the vaguenessof the child or monkey, because what we think. you will find that quite sufficient difficulty is raised by your own When you passfrom the vagueto the preciseby the method of vagueness.But there one is confronted by one of those difficulties analysisand reflection that I am speaking of, you always run a that occur constantly in philosoph!, where you have two ultimate certain risk of error. If I start with the statementthat there are so prejudices conflicting and where argument ceases.There is the and so many peoplein this room, and then set to work to makethat type of mind which considersthat what is called primitive experi- statement precise, I shall run a great many risks and it will be encemust be a better guide to wisdom than the experienceof re- extremely likely that any precise statementI make will be some- flective persons,and there is the type of mind which takesexactly thing not true at all. So you cannot very easily or simply get from the oppositeview. On that point I cannot seeany argument what- these vague undeniable things to precise things which are going soever.It is quite clear that a highly educatedperson sees,hears, to retain the undeniability of the starting-point. The precisepro- feels, does everything in a very different way from a young child positions that you arrive at may be hgically premissesto the sys- or animal, and that this whole manner of experiencingthe world tem that you build up upon the basis of them, but they are not and of thinking about the world is very much more analytic than premissesfor the theory of knowledge.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • A Companion to Analytic Philosophy
    A Companion to Analytic Philosophy Blackwell Companions to Philosophy This outstanding student reference series offers a comprehensive and authoritative survey of philosophy as a whole. Written by today’s leading philosophers, each volume provides lucid and engaging coverage of the key figures, terms, topics, and problems of the field. Taken together, the volumes provide the ideal basis for course use, represent- ing an unparalleled work of reference for students and specialists alike. Already published in the series 15. A Companion to Bioethics Edited by Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer 1. The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy Edited by Nicholas Bunnin and Eric 16. A Companion to the Philosophers Tsui-James Edited by Robert L. Arrington 2. A Companion to Ethics Edited by Peter Singer 17. A Companion to Business Ethics Edited by Robert E. Frederick 3. A Companion to Aesthetics Edited by David Cooper 18. A Companion to the Philosophy of 4. A Companion to Epistemology Science Edited by Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa Edited by W. H. Newton-Smith 5. A Companion to Contemporary Political 19. A Companion to Environmental Philosophy Philosophy Edited by Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit Edited by Dale Jamieson 6. A Companion to Philosophy of Mind 20. A Companion to Analytic Philosophy Edited by Samuel Guttenplan Edited by A. P. Martinich and David Sosa 7. A Companion to Metaphysics Edited by Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa Forthcoming 8. A Companion to Philosophy of Law and A Companion to Genethics Legal Theory Edited by John Harris and Justine Burley Edited by Dennis Patterson 9. A Companion to Philosophy of Religion A Companion to African-American Edited by Philip L.
    [Show full text]
  • " CONTENTS of VOLUME XXXVIII—1964 >•
    " CONTENTS OF VOLUME XXXVIII—1964 >• it ARTICLES: pAGE Anderson, James F., Was St. Thomas a Philosopher? 435 Boh, Ivan, An Examination of Some Proofs in Burleigh's Propo- sitional Logic 44 Brady, Jules M., St. Augustine's Theory of Seminal Reasons.. 141 Burns, J. Patout, Action in Suarez 453 Burrell, David B., Kant and Philosophical Knowledge 189 Chroust, Anton-Hermann, Some Reflections on the Origin of the Term " Philosopher " 423 Collins, James, The Work of Rudolf Allers 28 Fairbanks, Matthew J., C. S. Peirce and Logical Atomism 178 Grisez, Germain G., Sketch of a Future Metaphysics 310 O'Brien, Andrew J., Duns Scotus' Teaching on the Distinction between Essence and Existence 61 McWilliams, James A., The Concept as Villain 445 Pax, Clyde V., Philosophical Reflection: Gabriel Marcel 159 Smith, John E., The Relation of Thought and Being: Some Lessons from Hegel's Encyclopedia 22 Stokes, Walter E., Whitehead's Challenge to Theistic Realism. ... 1 Tallon, Andrew, Personal Immortality in Averroes' Tahafut Al- Tahafut 341 REVIEW ARTICLE : O'Neil, Charles J., Another Notable Study of Aristotle's Meta­ physics 509 ill iv Contents of Volume XXXVIII DEPARTMENTS : PAGE Book Brevities 551 Books Received 133, 274, 415, 557 Chronicles: The Husserl Archives and the Edition of Husserl's Works 473 International Congresses of Philosophy in Mexico City.. 278 Progress Report: Philosophy in the NCE 214 The Secretary's Chronicle 80, 218, 358, 483 BOOK REVIEWS: Anderson, James P., Natural Theology: The Metaphysics of God 265 Austin, J. L., Philosophical Papers 125 Capek, Milec, The Philosophical Impact of Contemporary Physics 248 Caturelli, Alberto, La fdosofiu en Argentina actual 403 Crocker, Lester G., Nature and Cidture: Ethical Thought in the French Englightement 539 Dufrenne, Mikel, Language and Philosophy, transl.
    [Show full text]
  • John P. Burgess Department of Philosophy Princeton University Princeton, NJ 08544-1006, USA [email protected]
    John P. Burgess Department of Philosophy Princeton University Princeton, NJ 08544-1006, USA [email protected] LOGIC & PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY Introduction For present purposes “logic” will be understood to mean the subject whose development is described in Kneale & Kneale [1961] and of which a concise history is given in Scholz [1961]. As the terminological discussion at the beginning of the latter reference makes clear, this subject has at different times been known by different names, “analytics” and “organon” and “dialectic”, while inversely the name “logic” has at different times been applied much more broadly and loosely than it will be here. At certain times and in certain places — perhaps especially in Germany from the days of Kant through the days of Hegel — the label has come to be used so very broadly and loosely as to threaten to take in nearly the whole of metaphysics and epistemology. Logic in our sense has often been distinguished from “logic” in other, sometimes unmanageably broad and loose, senses by adding the adjectives “formal” or “deductive”. The scope of the art and science of logic, once one gets beyond elementary logic of the kind covered in introductory textbooks, is indicated by two other standard references, the Handbooks of mathematical and philosophical logic, Barwise [1977] and Gabbay & Guenthner [1983-89], though the latter includes also parts that are identified as applications of logic rather than logic proper. The term “philosophical logic” as currently used, for instance, in the Journal of Philosophical Logic, is a near-synonym for “nonclassical logic”. There is an older use of the term as a near-synonym for “philosophy of language”.
    [Show full text]
  • Generalized Molecular Formulas in Logical Atomism
    Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy An Argument for Completely General Facts: Volume 9, Number 7 Generalized Molecular Formulas in Logical Editor in Chief Atomism Audrey Yap, University of Victoria Landon D. C. Elkind Editorial Board Annalisa Coliva, UC Irvine In his 1918 logical atomism lectures, Russell argued that there are Vera Flocke, Indiana University, Bloomington no molecular facts. But he posed a problem for anyone wanting Henry Jackman, York University to avoid molecular facts: we need truth-makers for generaliza- Frederique Janssen-Lauret, University of Manchester tions of molecular formulas, but such truth-makers seem to be Kevin C. Klement, University of Massachusetts both unavoidable and to have an abominably molecular charac- Consuelo Preti, The College of New Jersey ter. Call this the problem of generalized molecular formulas. I clarify Marcus Rossberg, University of Connecticut the problem here by distinguishing two kinds of generalized Anthony Skelton, Western University molecular formula: incompletely generalized molecular formulas Mark Textor, King’s College London and completely generalized molecular formulas. I next argue that, if empty worlds are logically possible, then the model-theoretic Editors for Special Issues and truth-functional considerations that are usually given ad- Sandra Lapointe, McMaster University dress the problem posed by the first kind of formula, but not the Alexander Klein, McMaster University problem posed by the second kind. I then show that Russell’s Review Editors commitments in 1918 provide an answer to the problem of com- Sean Morris, Metropolitan State University of Denver pletely generalized molecular formulas: some truth-makers will Sanford Shieh, Wesleyan University be non-atomic facts that have no constituents.
    [Show full text]
  • Concrete Possible Worlds (Final)
    CONCRETE POSSIBLE WORLDS Phillip Bricker 1. INTRODUCTION. Open a book or article of contemporary analytic philosophy, and you are likely to find talk of possible worlds therein. This applies not only to analytic metaphysics, but to areas as diverse as philosophy of language, philosophy of science, epistemology, and ethics. Philosophers agree, for the most part, that possible worlds talk is extremely useful for explicating concepts and formulating theories. They disagree, however, over its proper interpretation. In this chapter, I discuss the view, championed by David Lewis, that philosophers’ talk of possible worlds is the literal truth.1 There exists a plurality of worlds. One of these is our world, the actual world, the physical universe that contains us and all our surroundings. The others are merely possible worlds containing merely possible beings, such as flying pigs and talking donkeys. But the other worlds are no less real or concrete for being merely possible. Fantastic? Yes! What could motivate a philosopher to believe such a tale? I start, as is customary, with modality.2 Truths about the world divide into two sorts: categorical and modal. Categorical truths describe how things are, what is actually the case. Modal truths describe how things could or must be, what is possibly or 1 The fullest statement of Lewis’s theory of possible worlds is contained in his magnum opus, Lewis (1986), On the Plurality of Worlds. Lewis’s view is sometimes called “modal realism.” 2 Historically, it was the attempt to provide semantics for modal logic that catapulted possible worlds to the forefront of analytic philosophy.
    [Show full text]
  • David Lewis's Place in Analytic Philosophy Scott Soames by The
    David Lewis’s Place in Analytic Philosophy Scott Soames By the early 1970s, and continuing through 2001, David Lewis and Saul Kripke had taken over W.V.O. Quine’s leadership in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophical logic in the English-speaking world. Quine, in turn, had inherited his position in the early 1950s from Rudolf Carnap, who had been the leading logical positivist -- first in Europe, and, after 1935, in America. A renegade positivist himself, Quine eschewed apriority, necessity, and analyticity, while (for a time) adopting a holistic version of verificationism. Like Carnap, he placed philosophical logic and the philosophy of science at the center of philosophy. While not entirely avoiding metaphysics and epistemology, he tried to “naturalize” both. By contrast, Lewis and Kripke embraced the modalities Quine rejected.1 They also had no sympathy for his early verificationism, or his twin flights from intension and intention. As for philosophy of science, it was transforming itself into specialized philosophies of the several sciences, and did not lend itself to unified treatment. Although Lewis had deep interests in scientific issues, and was commendably realist about science in general, science itself was not the center of own distinctive approach to philosophy. Despite similarities in their opposition to Quine, the differences between Lewis and Kripke were large – especially in the semantics and metaphysics of modality. They also had different philosophical styles. Whereas Lewis was a wide-ranging thinker who pieced together a systematic philosophical world view, Kripke gave little thought to system, focusing instead on a few central topics. There is, therefore, no conflict between the two on many of the issues on which Kripke was silent.
    [Show full text]
  • Topics in Philosophical Logic
    Topics in Philosophical Logic The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Litland, Jon. 2012. Topics in Philosophical Logic. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University. Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:9527318 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA © Jon Litland All rights reserved. Warren Goldfarb Jon Litland Topics in Philosophical Logic Abstract In “Proof-Theoretic Justification of Logic”, building on work by Dummett and Prawitz, I show how to construct use-based meaning-theories for the logical constants. The assertability-conditional meaning-theory takes the meaning of the logical constants to be given by their introduction rules; the consequence-conditional meaning-theory takes the meaning of the log- ical constants to be given by their elimination rules. I then consider the question: given a set of introduction (elimination) rules , what are the R strongest elimination (introduction) rules that are validated by an assertabil- ity (consequence) conditional meaning-theory based on ? I prove that the R intuitionistic introduction (elimination) rules are the strongest rules that are validated by the intuitionistic elimination (introduction) rules. I then prove that intuitionistic logic is the strongest logic that can be given either an assertability-conditional or consequence-conditional meaning-theory. In “Grounding Grounding” I discuss the notion of grounding. My discus- sion revolves around the problem of iterated grounding-claims.
    [Show full text]
  • Redalyc.Logical Consequence for Nominalists
    THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia ISSN: 0495-4548 [email protected] Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea España ROSSBERG, Marcus; COHNITZ, Daniel Logical Consequence for Nominalists THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia, vol. 24, núm. 2, 2009, pp. 147- 168 Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea Donostia-San Sebastián, España Available in: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339730809003 How to cite Complete issue Scientific Information System More information about this article Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain and Portugal Journal's homepage in redalyc.org Non-profit academic project, developed under the open access initiative Logical Consequence for Nominalists Marcus ROSSBERG and Daniel COHNITZ BIBLID [0495-4548 (2009) 24: 65; pp. 147-168] ABSTRACT: It has repeatedly been argued that nominalistic programmes in the philosophy of mathematics fail, since they will at some point or other involve the notion of logical consequence which is unavailable to the nominalist. In this paper we will argue that this is not the case. Using an idea of Nelson Goodman and W.V.Quine's which they developed in Goodman and Quine (1947) and supplementing it with means that should be nominalistically acceptable, we present a way to explicate logical consequence in a nominalistically acceptable way. Keywords: Philosophy of mathematics, nominalism, logical consequence, inferentialism, Nelson Goodman, W.V. Quine. 1. The Argument from Logical Consequence We do not have any strong convictions concerning the question of the existence or non- existence of abstract objects. We do, however, believe that ontological fastidiousness is prima facie a good attitude to adopt.
    [Show full text]
  • Philosophy of Language in the Twentieth Century Jason Stanley Rutgers University
    Philosophy of Language in the Twentieth Century Jason Stanley Rutgers University In the Twentieth Century, Logic and Philosophy of Language are two of the few areas of philosophy in which philosophers made indisputable progress. For example, even now many of the foremost living ethicists present their theories as somewhat more explicit versions of the ideas of Kant, Mill, or Aristotle. In contrast, it would be patently absurd for a contemporary philosopher of language or logician to think of herself as working in the shadow of any figure who died before the Twentieth Century began. Advances in these disciplines make even the most unaccomplished of its practitioners vastly more sophisticated than Kant. There were previous periods in which the problems of language and logic were studied extensively (e.g. the medieval period). But from the perspective of the progress made in the last 120 years, previous work is at most a source of interesting data or occasional insight. All systematic theorizing about content that meets contemporary standards of rigor has been done subsequently. The advances Philosophy of Language has made in the Twentieth Century are of course the result of the remarkable progress made in logic. Few other philosophical disciplines gained as much from the developments in logic as the Philosophy of Language. In the course of presenting the first formal system in the Begriffsscrift , Gottlob Frege developed a formal language. Subsequently, logicians provided rigorous semantics for formal languages, in order to define truth in a model, and thereby characterize logical consequence. Such rigor was required in order to enable logicians to carry out semantic proofs about formal systems in a formal system, thereby providing semantics with the same benefits as increased formalization had provided for other branches of mathematics.
    [Show full text]
  • The Problem: the Theory of Ideas in Ancient Atomism and Gilles Deleuze
    Duquesne University Duquesne Scholarship Collection Electronic Theses and Dissertations 2013 The rP oblem: The Theory of Ideas in Ancient Atomism and Gilles Deleuze Ryan J. Johnson Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/etd Recommended Citation Johnson, R. (2013). The rP oblem: The Theory of Ideas in Ancient Atomism and Gilles Deleuze (Doctoral dissertation, Duquesne University). Retrieved from https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/706 This Immediate Access is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE PROBLEM: THE THEORY OF IDEAS IN ANCIENT ATOMISM AND GILLES DELEUZE A Dissertation Submitted to the McAnulty College & Graduate School of Liberal Arts Duquesne University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy By Ryan J. Johnson May 2014 Copyright by Ryan J. Johnson 2014 ii THE PROBLEM: THE THEORY OF IDEAS IN ANCIENT ATOMISM AND GILLES DELEUZE By Ryan J. Johnson Approved December 6, 2013 _______________________________ ______________________________ Daniel Selcer, Ph.D Kelly Arenson, Ph.D Associate Professor of Philosophy Assistant Professor of Philosophy (Committee Chair) (Committee Member) ______________________________ John Protevi, Ph.D Professor of Philosophy (Committee Member) ______________________________ ______________________________ James Swindal, Ph.D. Ronald Polansky, Ph.D. Dean, McAnulty College & Graduate Chair, Department of Philosophy School of Liberal Arts Professor of Philosophy Professor of Philosophy iii ABSTRACT THE PROBLEM: THE THEORY OF IDEAS IN ANCIENT ATOMISM AND GILLES DELEUZE By Ryan J. Johnson May 2014 Dissertation supervised by Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • 1. the Logical Atomism of Bertrand Russell Robert L
    Contemporary Civilization (Ideas and Institutions Section XXII: Philosophical Meaning of Western Man) 1958 1. The Logical Atomism of Bertrand Russell Robert L. Bloom Gettysburg College Basil L. Crapster Gettysburg College Harold L. Dunkelberger Gettysburg College See next page for additional authors Follow this and additional works at: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/contemporary_sec22 Part of the History of Philosophy Commons Share feedback about the accessibility of this item. Bloom, Robert L. et al. "1. The Logical Atomism of Bertrand Russell. Pt. XXII: Philosophical Meaning." Ideas and Institutions of Western Man (Gettysburg College, 1958), 6-14. This is the publisher's version of the work. This publication appears in Gettysburg College's institutional repository by permission of the copyright owner for personal use, not for redistribution. Cupola permanent link: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/ contemporary_sec22/2 This open access book chapter is brought to you by The uC pola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College. It has been accepted for inclusion by an authorized administrator of The uC pola. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 1. The Logical Atomism of Bertrand Russell Abstract As can easily be seen, the impact of these three schools of contemporary philosophy — the linguistic, the logical analytical, and the logical empiricist — has been largely negative, critical, and destructive, especially with regard to theological beliefs, metaphysical systems, and value judgment. Thus the particular growing edges of contemporary philosophy have contributed their full share to the shaking of the foundations of Western Civilization. But, during the last few decades they have presented less of a united front than before. The differences which have appeared have come largely from a rethinking of the status and role of value, and these differences have found expression in a large number of philosophers both in England and the United States.
    [Show full text]
  • The Ascent from Nominalism Philosophical Studies Series
    THE ASCENT FROM NOMINALISM PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES SERIES Editors: WILFRID SELLARS, University of Pittsburgh KEITH LEHRER, University of Arizona Board of Consulting Editors: J ON A THAN BENNETT, Syracuse University ALLAN GIBBARD, University of Michigan ROBERT STALNAKER, Cornell University ROBERT G. TURNBULL, Ohio State University VOLUME 37 TERR Y PENNER Department of Philosophy, The University of Wisconsin at Madison, U.S.A. THE ASCENT FROM NOMINALISM Some Existence Arguments in Plato's Middle Dialogues D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY ~~ A MEMBER OF THE KLUWER . ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS GROUP DORDRECHTj BOSTONj LANCASTERjTOKYO Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Penner, Terry, 1936- The ascent from nominalism. (Philosophical studies series; v. 37) Bibliography: p. Includes indexes. 1. Plato. 2. Aristotle. 3. Metaphysics-History. 4. Nominalism-History. I. Title. II. Series. B395.P347 1987 111'.2'0924 86·31641 ISBN-13: 978-94-010-8186-3 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-009-3791-8 DOl: 10.1007/978-94-009-3791-8 Published by D. Reidel Publishing Company, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, Holland. Sold and distributed in the U.S.A. and Canada by Kluwer Academic Publishers, 101 Philip Drive, Assinippi Park, Norwell, MA 02061, U.S.A. In all other countries, sold and distributed by Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, P.O. Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht, Holland. All Rights Reserved © 1987 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland Softcover reprint of the hardcover I 5t edition 1987 No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical induding photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Much of this work was conceived and executed between 1971 and 1975, though some of it was done much earlier, and a few bits are quite recent.
    [Show full text]