Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting 1996

Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting_1996

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Afternoon Session - 1996 Meeting

BerkshireHathaway

Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger discuss why they think portfolio diversiﬁcation is a "protection against ignorance," explain why they're fearful of change, and argue that people rewarded by capitalism have an obligation to help people who don't do as well.

1. Investing with "the two wealthiest guys" 1.投资“两个最富有的人”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, if we've got a monitor over in zone 1, we're ready to start. WARREN BUFFETT：好的，如果我们在第1区有一台显示器，我们已准备好开始了。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes.Thank you very much.My name is Maria Nicholas Kelly (PH).I'm from Tacoma, Washington. 听众会员：是的。非常感谢你。我叫Maria Nicholas Kelly（PH）。我来自华盛顿州的塔科马。

And my husband and I have rather different investment approaches.And in 1988, he bought me one share of Berkshire, so that I could learn something about investing.We both started about that same time. 而我丈夫和我有不同的投资方式。 1988年，他给我买了伯克希尔的一份股票，这样我就能学到一些关于投资的知识。我们都是在同一时间开始的。

And he has chosen to invest in, let's say, about 40 different stocks and buying and selling, and doing rather well for us, frankly. 他坦言，他已经选择投资，约40 种不同的股票和买卖，并为我们做得相当好。

My approach is more simple.And basically, I ﬁnally ﬁgured out last year that I should invest in the companies of the two wealthiest men in the world. 我的方法更简单。基本上，我终于在去年想到我应该投资世界上最富有的两个人的公司。

So — (laughter) — I decided we should buy, monthly, more Berkshire and Microsoft.So, then this year — and so, we've been able to do that. 所以 - （笑声） - 我决定每月购买更多伯克希尔和微软。所以，今年 - 所以，我们已经能够做到这一点。 This year, we read in your report that Berkshire is selling "at a price at which Charlie and I would not consider buying it," so my husband has challenged my investment strategy.(Laughter) 今年，我们在你的报告中读到，伯克希尔正以“查理和我不会考虑购买它的价格”出售，所以我丈夫挑战了我的投资策略。（笑声）

I know that you are an honest man.And while you may not — (laughter) — you may not recommend to "my partner, Charlie," to buy more Berkshire at this time, do you recommend that I continue — (Buffett laughs) — my rather automatic investment buying of Berkshire? 我知道你是一个诚实的人。虽然你可能没有 - （笑） - 你可能不建议“我的伴侣查理”在这个时候买更多的伯克希尔，你建议我继续 - （巴菲特笑） - 我相当自动的投资购买伯克希尔？

And I wanted — I think I know the answer.But I wanted my husband to hear it from the horse's mouth.(Laughter) 我想 - 我想我知道答案。但我希望我的丈夫从马的嘴里听到它。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I think you're using me here.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：我想你在这里用我。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: But — 观众：但是 -

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I — we don't recommend selling it, but we don't recommend buying it, either.We are neutral on that subject. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我 - 我们不建议卖它，但我们也不建议买它。我们对这个问题持中立态度。

And I hope you continue to be in with the two wealthiest guys.I like the other fellow, too.(Laughter) 我希望你继续和两个最富有的人在一起。我也喜欢另一个人。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. 听众会员：谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。

2. American Express has "slipped" in credit cards 美国运通在信用卡上“滑倒”了

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2? WARREN BUFFETT：2区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, I am Harriet Morton from the Emerald City [Seattle], the same area, the land of Microsoft.And I have a couple small questions. 听众：巴菲特先生，我是来自翡翠城[西雅图]的哈丽特莫顿，同一地区，微软的土地。我有几个小问题。

The ﬁrst one is, recognizing your lack of interest in technology or sense of familiarity with it, I'm wondering if you'd give a few comments on Bill Gates as a manager. 第一个是，认识到你对技术缺乏兴趣或对它的熟悉感，我想知道你是否会对比尔盖茨作为经理发表评论。

But the second one, dealing with a business that you're familiar with, has to do with American Express. 但是，第二个涉及您熟悉的业务，与美国运通有关。 Would you comment on American Express' strategy to deal with their declining market share in the credit card industry and the rising importance of debit cards?Thank you. 您是否会评论美国运通应对信用卡行业市场份额下降的策略以及借记卡的重要性？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: I'm not sure I got that entirely, Charlie.Did you?I mean, I got the part about American — WARREN BUFFETT ：我不确定我是否完全得到了，查理。你是否？我的意思是，我得到了关于美国人的部分 -

CHARLIE MUNGER: She wanted you to comment on Gates as a manager and American Express as — with the problems in declining in market share. CHARLIE MUNGER：她希望你评论盖茨作为经理和美国运通的问题 - 以及市场份额下降的问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the ﬁrst part is very easy.You know, Bill Gates is, you know, one of the great managers of all time and is an exceptional business talent who loves his business. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，第一部分非常简单。你知道，比尔盖茨是有史以来最杰出的经理之一，也是一位热爱自己事业的杰出商业人才。

And when you get that combination and a high energy level and, now, an heir to leave it to, I don't think you do much better than that. 当你得到那种组合和高能量水平，而现在，作为继承人，我认为你没有做得更好。

American Express has, you know — has slipped over from where they were 20 years ago, obviously, in the credit card business.And I think they may have taken their customer a little bit for granted for a while. 你知道，美国运通已经从20年前的地方滑落，显然，在信用卡业务方面。而且我认为他们可能会在一段时间内将他们的客户视为理所当然。

I think [CEO] Harvey Golub is very focused on correcting that and has made some progress.But the credit card business is a very different competitive struggle now than it was 20 or 25 years ago. 我认为[CEO] Harvey Golub非常注重纠正这一点并取得了一些进展。但信用卡业务现在是一个与 20 或25年前不同的竞争斗争。

Interestingly enough, American Express, itself, backed into the business.Because they were worried about what was going to happen to their traveler's check business, originally. 有趣的是，美国运通本身也支持这项业务。因为他们最初担心他们的旅行支票业务会发生什么。

And they saw Diners Club come along.A fellow named Ralph Schneider and — started it.And they saw the inroads that were being made.So, the credit card was a reactive move.And for a while, they really dominated the ﬁeld.And of course, they still dominate the travel and entertainment part of it. 他们看到了大来俱乐部的到来。一位名叫Ralph Schneider的人开始了。他们看到了正在取得的进展。因此，信用卡是一种被动的举动。有一段时间，他们确实在这个领域占主导地位。当然，他们仍然主导着它的旅游和娱乐部分。

But credit cards are going to be a very competitive business over time.And you need to establish — American Express needs to establish — special value for its card in some way, or it gets more commodity-like. 但随着时间的推移，信用卡将成为一项竞争激烈的业务。而且你需要建立 - 美国运通需要建立 - 以某种方式为其卡片设置特殊价值，或者它变得更像商品。

It's not an easy business.But their franchise — they've got a strong franchise.It is not what it was 20 years ago, relative to the competition. 这不是一件容易的事。但他们的特许经营权 - 他们拥有强大的特许经营权。与竞争对手相比，这不是 20年前的情况。 3. "A lot of mediocrity" among CEOs 3.首席执行官中“很多平庸”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3? WARREN BUFFETT：3区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon.My name is John Weaver.I'm a shareholder from Bellingham, Washington. 听众会员：下午好。我叫John Weaver。我是华盛顿贝灵厄姆的股东。

You have discussed what a wonderful business is.One of the criterias in your acquisition, page 23 of your annual report, is management. 您已经讨论了一项出色的业务。您的年度报告第23页的收购标准之一是管理层。

Could you discuss how you decide what good management is and how you decide whether you have a good manager? 您能否讨论一下如何确定良好的管理水平以及您如何确定自己是否拥有优秀的经理？

WARREN BUFFETT: The really great business is one that doesn't require good management.I mean, that is a terriﬁc business.And the poor business is one that can only succeed, or even survive, with great management.And — WARREN BUFFETT：真正伟大的企业是一个不需要良好管理的企业。我的意思是，这是一项非常棒的业务。而糟糕的企业只有通过卓越的管理才能成功，甚至生存。而且 -

But we look for people that know their businesses, love their businesses, love their shareholders, want to treat them as partners.And we still look to the underlying business, though.We — 但我们寻找那些了解自己的业务，热爱自己的企业，热爱股东，希望将其视为合作伙伴的人。不过，我们仍然关注基础业务。我们 -

If we have somebody that we think is extraordinary, but they're locked into one of those terrible businesses, because we've been in some terrible businesses, and you know, the best thing you can do, probably, is get out of itand get into something else. 如果我们有一个我们认为非凡的人，但他们被锁定在那些可怕的企业之一，因为我们经历过一些可怕的业务，你知道，你可以做的最好的事情就是摆脱它并进入别的东西。

But there's an enormous difference, frankly — there’s an enormous difference in the talent of American business managers. 但坦率地说，这是一个巨大的差异 - 美国业务经理的才能存在巨大差异。

The CEOs of the Fortune 500 are not selected like 500 members of the American Olympic track and ﬁeld team.And it is not the same process.And you do not have the uniformity of top quality that you get with the American Olympic team in any sport.You do not get that in top management in American business. “财富”500强企业的首席执行官不像美国奥运会田径队的500名成员那样被选中。这不是同一个过程。而且你在任何运动中都没有与美国奥运代表队一致的高质量统一。在美国企业中，你没有得到高层管理人员的支持。

You get some very able people, some terriﬁc people, like a Bill Gates, that we just mentioned.But you get a lot of mediocrity, too. 你得到了一些非常能干的人，一些了不起的人，比如我们刚才提到的比尔盖茨。但是你也会得到很多平庸。

And the test — I think, in some cases, that it's fairly identiﬁable, who has done an extraordinary job.And we like people that have batted .350 or .360, in terms of predicting that they're going to bat over .300 in the future.

测试 - 我认为，在某些情况下，它是相当可识别的，谁做了非凡的工作。而且我们喜欢打击.350 或.360的人，预测他们将来会击败.300。

And some guy says, you know, "I batted .127 last year. But I've got a new bat or a new batting coach," you know, some management consultant has come in and told them how to do it, supposedly. 有些人说，你知道，“我去年打了.127。但是我有一个新球棒或一个新的击球教练，”你知道，一些管理顾问进来告诉他们该怎么做，据说。

We're very suspicious of that.So we don't like banjo hitters who suddenly proclaim that they can become power hitters. 我们对此非常怀疑。因此，我们不喜欢班卓琴击球手，他们突然宣称自己可以成为强力击球手。

And then we try to ﬁgure out what their attitude is toward shareholders.And that isn't uniform, either, throughout corporate America.It's far from uniform. 然后我们试图弄清楚他们对股东的态度。在整个美国企业中，这也不是统一的。它远非统一。

We still want them to be in a good business, though.I would emphasize that. 不过，我们仍然希望他们能够做得很好。我会强调这一点。

We feel that — I mean, I gave the illustration of Tom Murphy in the annual report. 我们觉得 - 我的意思是，我在年度报告中给出了Tom Murphy的插图。

I mean, no one had either the ability — no one could top his ability or integrity, in terms of the way he ran Cap Cities for decades.I mean, and you could see it in 50 different ways. 我的意思是，在他管理Cap Cities几十年的方式方面，没有人能够拥有这种能力 - 没有人能够超越自己的能力或完整性。我的意思是，你可以用50种不同的方式看到它。

I mean, he was thinking about the shareholders.And he not only thought about them, he knew what to do to forward their interests, and — 我的意思是，他在想股东。而且他不仅想到了他们，他知道如何改善他们的兴趣，并且 -

In terms of building the business, he only built it when it made sense, not when it did something for his ego or to make it larger alone.He did it when it was in his shareholders' interests. 在建立业务方面，他只有在有意义的时候才能建立它，而不是在为自己的自我做点什么或者单独做大的时候。他是在符合股东利益的情况下做到的。

And they're not all Tom Murphys.But when you ﬁnd them, and they're in a decent business, you want to bet very heavily and not make the same mistake I made by selling out once or twice, too. (Laughter) 而且他们不都是Tom Murphys。但是当你找到它们，并且它们处于一个体面的生意中时，你想要非常重视并且不会因为卖出一两次而犯同样的错误。（笑声）

4. "Diversiﬁcation is a protection against ignorance" “多样化是一种防止无知的保护”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone — was that zone 3 or —?Yeah, zone 4. WARREN BUFFETT：区域 - 是区域3还是 - ？是的，4区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, my name is Mark Hake (PH).I'm from Scottsdale, Arizona. 观众：是的，我的名字是Mark Hake（PH）。我来自亚利桑那州的斯科茨代尔。

And I am very interested in your policies on diversiﬁcation and also how you concentrate your investments. 我对您的多元化政策以及您如何集中投资非常感兴趣。 And I've studied your annual reports going back a good number of years, and there's been years where you had a lot of stocks in your marketable, equitable securities portfolio.And there was one year where you only had three, in 1987. 我已经研究了你的年度报告可以追溯到很多年了，而且你已经有多年在你的有市场，公平的证券投资组合中拥有大量股票。有一年，你在1987年只有三个。

So, I have two questions.Given the number of stocks that you have in the portfolio now, what does that imply about your view of the market in terms of, is it fairly valued, that kind of idea? 所以，我有两个问题。鉴于您现在在投资组合中拥有的股票数量，这对您对市场的看法意味着什么，它是否具有相当重要的价值，这种想法是什么？

And second of all, whenever you — it seems that, whenever you take a new investment, you never take less than about 5 percent and never more than about 10 percent of the total portfolio with that new position.And I wanted to see if I'm correct about that. 第二，无论什么时候 - 看起来，无论何时你采取新的投资，你都不会少于约5％，也不会超过总投资组合的10％。我想看看我是否正确。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.Well, on the second point, that really isn't correct. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。那么，在第二点，这真的是不正确的。

We have positions which you don't even see, because we only listed the ones above 600 million in the last report.And obviously, those are all smaller positions. 我们有你甚至看不到的职位，因为我们在上一份报告中只列出了6亿以上的职位。显然，这些都是较小的职位。

Sometimes, that's because they're smaller companies, and we couldn't get that much money in. Sometimes, it's because the prices moved up after we'd bought them.Sometimes, it's because we may be selling the position down, even.So there's nothing magic. 有时候，那是因为他们是小公司，我们无法获得那么多钱。有时，这是因为价格在我们购买之后价格上涨了。有时候，这是因为我们甚至可能会把这个职位卖掉。所以没有什么魔力。

We like to put a lot of money in things that we feel strongly about.And that gets back to the diversiﬁcation question. 我们喜欢在我们强烈关注的事情上投入大量资金。这又回到了多元化问题。

You know, we think diversiﬁcation is — as practiced generally — makes very little sense for anyone that knows what they're doing. 你知道，我们认为多样化 - 一般来说 - 对任何知道自己在做什么的人来说都没什么意义。

Diversiﬁcation is a protection against ignorance. 多样化是一种防止无知的保护。

I mean, if you want to make sure — (laughter) — that nothing bad happens to you relative to the market, you own everything.There's nothing wrong with that.I mean, that is a perfectly sound approach for somebody who does not feel they know how to analyze businesses. 我的意思是，如果你想确定 - （笑声） - 你相对于市场没有任何不好的事情，你拥有一切。这没什么不对。我的意思是，对于那些不知道如何分析业务的人来说，这是一个非常合理的方法。

If you know how to analyze businesses and value businesses, it's crazy to own 50 stocks or 40 stocks or 30 stocks, probably, because there aren't that many wonderful businesses that are understandable to a single human being, in all likelihood. 如果你知道如何分析企业和价值企业，那么拥有50只股票或 40只股票或30种股票可能是疯狂的，因为没有那么多可以理解单一人类的奇妙企业。

And to have some super-wonderful business and then put money in number 30 or 35 on your list of attractiveness and forego putting more money into number one, just strikes Charlie and me as madness. 为了获得一些非常精彩的业务，然后将30或35号的钱放在你的吸引力清单上并放弃将更多的钱投入到第一名中，就让查理和我疯狂地罢工。

And it's conventional practice, and it may — you know, if you all you have to achieve is average, it may preserve your job.But it's a confession, in our view, that you don't really understand the businesses that you own. 这是传统的做法，它可能 - 你知道，如果你所要达到的只是平均水平，它可能会保留你的工作。但在我们看来，这是一个坦白，你并不真正理解你所拥有的业务。

You know, I base — on a personal portfolio basis — you know, I own one stock.But it's a business I know.And it leaves me very comfortable.(Laughter) 你知道，我基于个人投资组合 - 你知道，我拥有一只股票。但这是我所知道的事情。它让我很舒服。（笑声）

So you know, do I need to own 28 stocks, you know, to have proper diversiﬁcation, you know?It'd be nonsense. 所以你知道，我知道，我需要拥有28只股票才能实现适当的多样化吗？这是无稽之谈。

And within Berkshire, I could pick out three of our businesses.And I would be very happy if they were the only businesses we owned, and I had all my money in Berkshire. 在伯克希尔，我可以选择我们的三个业务。如果他们是我们拥有的唯一企业，我将非常高兴，而且我在伯克希尔拥有所有资金。

Now, I love it — the fact that we can ﬁnd more than that, and that we keep adding to it.But three wonderful businesses is more than you need in this life to do very well. 现在，我喜欢它 - 事实上我们可以找到更多，而且我们不断添加它。但是，在这一生中，三个出色的企业比你需要的更好。

And the average person isn't going to run into that.I mean, if you look at how the fortunes were built in this country, they weren't built out of a portfolio of 50 companies.They were built by someone who identiﬁed with a wonderful business.Coca-Cola's a great example.A lot of fortunes have been built on that. 普通人不会遇到这种情况。我的意思是，如果你看看这个国家的财富是如何建立起来的，它们并不是由50家公司组成的。他们是由一个有着良好业务的人建造的。可口可乐就是一个很好的例子。在此基础上已经建立了很多财富。

And there aren't 50 Coca-Colas.You know, there aren't 20. If there were, it'd be ﬁne.We could all go out and diversify like crazy among that group and get results that would be equal to owning the really wonderful one. 并且没有50个可口可乐。你知道，有20个。如果有，那就没事了。我们都可以在这个群体中疯狂地走出去并且变得多样化，并获得相当于拥有真正精彩的结果的结果。

But you're not going to ﬁnd it.And the truth is, you don't need it.I mean, if you had — a really wonderful business is very well protected against the vicissitudes of the economy over time and the competition. 但你不会找到它。事实是，你不需要它。我的意思是，如果你有 - 一个非常好的企业可以很好地保护经济随时间和竞争的变化。

I mean, you know, we're talking about businesses that are resistant to effective competition.And three of those will be better than 100 average businesses. 我的意思是，你知道，我们谈论的是那些抵制有效竞争的企业。其中三个将优于100个普通企业。

And they'll be safer, incidentally.I mean, there is less risk in owning three easy-to-identify, wonderful businesses than there is in owning 50 well-known, big businesses.And it's amazing what has been taught, over the years, in ﬁnance classes about that. 顺便说一句，它们会更安全。我的意思是，与拥有50家知名大企业相比，拥有三个易于识别的精彩企业的风险较小。多年来，金融课程中教授的内容令人惊讶。

But I can assure you that I would rather pick — if I had to bet the next 30 years on the fortunes of my family that would be dependent upon the income from a given group of businesses, I would rather pick three businesses from those we ownthan own a diversiﬁed group of 50. 但我可以向你保证，我宁愿选择 - 如果我不得不在接下来的30年里打赌我的家庭财富将取决于一组特定企业的收入，我宁愿选择我们拥有的三家企业比拥有一个多元化的50人组。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, what he's saying is that much of what is taught in modern corporate ﬁnance courses is twaddle.(Laughter and applause) CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，他所说的是现代企业融资课程教授的大部分内容都是琐碎的。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: You want to elaborate on that, Charlie?(Laughter) 沃伦·巴菲特：你想详细说明，查理？（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: You cannot believe this stuff.I mean, it’s modern portfolio theory and — yeah, it’s — CHARLIE MUNGER：你不能相信这些东西。我的意思是，它是现代投资组合理论 - 是的，它是 -

WARREN BUFFETT: It has no utility.But you know, it will tell you how to do average.But, you know, I think anybody can figure out how to do average in fifth grade.I mean, it's just not that difficult, and — WARREN BUFFETT：它没有用处。但是你知道，它会告诉你如何做到平均水平。但是，你知道，我认为任何人都可以弄清楚如何在五年级做平均水平。我的意思是，这并不困难，而且 -

It's elaborate.And you know, there's lots of little Greek letters and all kinds of things to make you feel that you're in the big leagues.But it — (laughter) — there is no value added.(Laughs) 它精心制作。而且你知道，有许多小希腊字母和各种各样的东西让你觉得你在大联盟。但它 - （笑声） - 没有增值。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I have great difﬁculty with it because I am something of a student of dementia — (laughter) — and I have — CHARLIE MUNGER：我很难解决这个问题因为我是痴呆症的学生 - （笑声） - 我有 -

WARREN BUFFETT: And we hang around a lot together.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：我们在一起闲逛。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: And I get ordinarily — classiﬁed dementia, you know, on some theory, structure of models.But the modern portfolio theory, it involves a type of dementia I just can't even classify.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER ：在一些理论，模型结构方面，我得到了通常的 - 分类痴呆症。但是现代投资组合理论，它涉及一种我甚至无法分类的痴呆症。（笑声）

Something very strange is going on.(Buffett laughs) 一些非常奇怪的事情正在发生。（巴菲特笑）

WARREN BUFFETT: If you ﬁnd three wonderful businesses in your life, you'll get very rich.And if you understand them — bad things aren't going to happen to those three.I mean, that's the characteristic of it.

WARREN BUFFETT：如果你在生活中找到三个奇妙的企业，你会变得非常富有。如果你理解他们 - 这三个人不会发生坏事。我的意思是，这就是它的特点。

CHARLIE MUNGER: By the way, maybe that's the reason there's so much dementia.If you believed what Warren said, you could teach the whole course in about a week.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：顺便说一下，也许这就是痴呆症的原因。如果你相信沃伦所说的话，你可以在大约一周内教授整个课程。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and the high priests wouldn't have any edge over the laypeople.And that never sells well.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：是的，大祭司不会对外行人有任何优势。而且从来没有卖得好。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Right. CHARLIE MUNGER：对。

5. Downsizing is sometimes needed to correct excessive hiring in the past 5.有时需要缩小规模来纠正过去的过度雇佣

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, zone — what, 5, are we over there? WARREN BUFFETT：好的，区域 - 5，我们在那边？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes.Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, board of directors. 听众会员：是的。下午好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生，董事会成员。

Wanted to ask, in looking ahead, do you see the trends of extensive outsizing, the offshoring, the downsizing, the expendable workforce, the rightsizing, the diminished commitment to company loyalty, and the greater emphasis on the short term, quick buck, bottomline versus your commitment to the long-term investment affecting your pool of investment possibilities and your decision processes? 想要问一下，展望未来，您是否看到了广泛的超大，离岸外包，缩减规模，消耗性劳动力，权利化，对公司忠诚度的承诺减少的趋势，以及对短期，快速降压，底部的更大重视与您对影响您的投资可能性和决策流程的长期投资的承诺相对应？

And do you possibly think of creating new companies on your own? 您是否可以考虑自己创建新公司？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think that the trends you talk about, and the attention devoted to them, could have some effect, just in terms of how the public and Congress may feel toward business. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我认为你所谈论的趋势以及对它们的关注可能会产生一些影响，仅仅是公众和国会对商业的看法。

Historically, you know, every industry, at all times, is interested in downsizing or becoming more efﬁcient. 从历史上看，您知道，每个行业在任何时候都对缩小规模或提高效率感兴趣。

Now, if the industry is growing, you can achieve efﬁciency by doing more work, or turning out more output, with the same people. 现在，如果行业在增长，你可以通过做同样的人来做更多的工作或者提高产量来实现效率。

But you know, if you go back 150 years and look at the percentage of people in farming, for example, farming has downsized from being a very appreciable percentage of the American workforce to a very small percentage.And essentially, that's released people to do other things. 但是你知道，如果你回到150年前看看农业人口的百分比，例如，农业从一个非常可观的美国劳动力比例缩减到很小的比例。基本上，这是让人们做其他事情。 So, it's in the interest of society to get as much output in anything as it can per unit of labor input.It's very difﬁcult on the individual involved. 因此，在每个单位的劳动投入中获得尽可能多的产出符合社会的利益。这涉及到的个人非常困难。

And you know, it’s no fun — I guess it's no fun being a horse when the tractor comes along, or a blacksmith, and when the car comes along.But the — 而且你知道，这没什么好玩的 - 我想当拖拉机出现时，或者是铁匠，当汽车出现时，骑马是没有意义的。但是 -

So, I don't quarrel with the activities.I quarrel, sometimes, with how it's done.And I do think there's been a certain lack of, in certain cases, some empathy or sensitivity in terms of the way it's being done. 所以，我不和活动争吵。我有时会和它如何完成争吵。而且我确实认为，在某些情况下，某些方面缺乏某种同理心或敏感性。

You should try to make your businesses more efﬁcient.We hope we're not in businesses that will require us to lay off people over time, because we hope that physical output grows, and that we become more productive and can keep the same number of people to get greater output. 您应该尝试提高您的业务效率。我们希望我们不会出现需要我们随着时间的推移裁员的业务，因为我们希望实际产出增长，并且我们变得更有成效并且能够保持相同数量的人才能获得更大的产出。

Dexter Shoe has done a great job of that over time.They've become more and more productive.But they've sold more shoes instead of selling the same number of shoes and letting people go.But sometimes, industry trends — 随着时间的推移，Dexter Shoe 做得很好。他们变得越来越有成效。但是他们卖掉了更多的鞋子，而不是出售相同数量的鞋子，让人们去。但有时，行业趋势 -

I mean, at World Book, we have fewer people than we had a year or two ago.And we didn’t — we don't have any answer to that. 我的意思是，在世界图书上，我们的人数比一两年前少。我们没有 - 我们没有任何答案。

Over time, we got out of the textile business.I wish we didn't have to.But we did not know how to run a textile company in New England and compete effectively. 随着时间的推移，我们走出了纺织业务。我希望我们没有必要。但我们不知道如何在新英格兰经营一家纺织公司并进行有效竞争。

Like I say, I would — I love avoiding those businesses.And to the extent we can, we will. 就像我说的那样，我会 - 我喜欢避开这些业务。我们将尽我们所能。

I mean, GEICO is going to add people over time.And I think Berkshire Hathaway's going to add people over time. 我的意思是，随着时间的推移，GEICO将会增加人数。而且我认为Berkshire Hathaway会随着时间的推移增加人数。

But I can’t — but it is in the interest of society to do jobs more effectively.It's also in the interest of society, it seems to me, to take care, in some way, of the people that are affected by that activity.And either — in some cases, it may be retraining. 但我不能 - 但更有效地完成工作符合社会的利益。在我看来，以某种方式照顾受该活动影响的人也符合社会的利益。而且 - 在某些情况下，它可能是再培训。

But in other cases, you know, it doesn't work so well if you're 55 years old, and you've been working in a textile mill all your life, and all of a sudden the guy that runs the place can't make any money out of selling your output.I mean, that's not the fellow's fault that's been working at the textile mill for 30 years. 但在其他情况下，你知道，如果你已经55岁了，它就不会那么好用，而且你一直在纺织厂工作，突然之间，经营这个地方的人可以'从出售你的产品赚钱。我的意思是，这不是那个在纺织厂工作了30 年的故事。

So, there's a balance in that.I think that the attention that's come about lately, I think there's — to some degree, it was a media fad based on some particularly dramatic examples at a couple of companies. 所以，这是平衡的。我认为最近引起的关注，我认为 - 在某种程度上，这是一种媒体时尚，基于一些公司的一些特别引人注目的例子。

I don't think there is more displacement going on now, as a percentage of the labor force, annually, than there was 10 years ago, in terms of reconstituting what people do.But it's gotten a lot of attention lately. 我不认为现在有更多的流离失所现象，每年的劳动力比例在10年前，就重组人们的行为而言。但它最近得到了很多关注。

There could be a backlash on that, in terms of corporate tax rates or a number of things.And we might feel it in that direction. 就公司税率或许多事情而言，可能存在强烈反对。我们可能会在那个方向感受到它。

We want, at Berkshire, to do everything as efﬁciently as we can.Part of that, in a big way, is not taking on a lot of people we don't need. 我们希望伯克希尔尽可能高效地完成所有工作。从很大程度上说，部分原因并不是吸引了很多我们不需要的人。

A lot of the mistakes that are being corrected now are because people got very fat.And their businesses got very fat in the past and took on all kinds of people they don't need.We see that in a lot of businesses that we're exposed to. 现在纠正的很多错误都是因为人们非常胖。他们的生意过去非常肥胖，并且接受了他们不需要的各种各样的人。我们看到，在我们接触过的很多业务中。

And as long as they're very prosperous, really, no one does very much about it.And then when the time comes, they all of a sudden ﬁnd out they can get way more output. 只要它们非常繁荣，真的，没有人会对它做很多。然后当时机成熟时，他们突然发现他们可以获得更多输出。

The oil companies are a classic example.You know, the people, probably, actually needed to produce, reﬁne, and market oil probably hasn't changed that much.But if you look at the employment relative to barrels produced, reﬁned, and marketed, it's gone down dramatically over 20 years ago. 石油公司就是一个典型的例子。你知道，人们可能实际上需要生产，提炼和推广石油可能并没有那么大的改变。但是，如果你看看相对于生产，精炼和销售的桶的就业情况，它在20多年前就已大幅下降。

To me, it just means that they weren't being run that well 20 years ago.And it never should've occurred in the ﬁrst place. 对我而言，这只意味着他们在20年前并没有那么好。它永远不应该首先发生。

We don't want to take on more people than we need in any of our businesses, because we don't want to lay people off, either. 我们不希望在我们的任何业务中接纳比我们需要更多的人，因为我们也不想让人们离开。

Charlie? 查理？ CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if you put it in reverse, you'd say, name a business that has been ruined because it was over-downsized.I cannot think of a single one. CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，如果你反过来说，你会说，一个已被破坏的企业，因为它过度缩小了。我想不出一个人。

But if you asked me to name businesses that were half-ruined, or ruined, by bloat, I mean, I could just rattle off name after name after name. 但是，如果你让我把那些被破坏或破坏的企业命名为膨胀，我的意思是，我可以在名字之后用名字来贬低名字。

It's gotten fashionable to assume that downsizing is wrong.Well, it may have been wrong to let the business get so fat that it eventually had to downsize. 假设缩小规模是错误的，它变得时髦。好吧，让企业变得如此肥胖以至于最终不得不缩小规模可能是错误的。

But if you've got way more people than are needed in the business, I see no social beneﬁt in having people sit around half employed or unemployed. 但是，如果你的人数超过了企业所需要的人数，我认为让人们坐在一半就业或失业的人身上都没有社会效益。

WARREN BUFFETT: You're very likely to compete against some guy, at some point, who doesn't have more people around than needed in the business, too.But it doesn't change.For the people involved, they've got real problems, and — 沃伦·巴菲特：你很可能在某些方面与一些人竞争，他们的业务人员周围的人数也不多。但它没有改变。对于涉及的人来说，他们遇到了真正的问题，而且 -

CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren, can you name one that has been ruined by over-downsizing?There must be one, but — CHARLIE MUNGER ：沃伦，你能说出一个因过度缩小而被破坏的人吗？必须有一个，但是 -

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it's like Eisenhower said about Nixon.Give me a week, and I'll come up with something.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：好吧，就像艾森豪威尔对尼克松说的那样。给我一个星期，我会想出一些东西。（笑声）

6. No layoffs at insurance operations due to reduced volume 6.由于数量减少，保险业务不会裁员

WARREN BUFFETT: How about zone 6? WARREN BUFFETT：第6区怎么样？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, I'm Walter Kaye of New York City. 听众：巴菲特先生，芒格先生，我是纽约市的沃尔特凯。

WARREN BUFFETT: We're glad to have you here, Walter. WARREN BUFFETT：我们很高兴你能来到这里，Walter。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: What? 听众会员：什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: We're glad to have you here.Walter's been a good friend of ours. WARREN BUFFETT：我们很高兴有你在这里。沃尔特一直是我们的好朋友。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you very, very much.You just make me more of an egomaniac, a humble egomaniac, by saying that.

观众成员：非常感谢你。你只是通过这样说，让我更像是一个自大狂，一个卑微的自大狂。

I don't know if Mr. Munger's wife is here and Mrs. Buffett is here, but back East, where I come from, in New York, they say, "When people — when men are successful, it's their wife's doing. Butif they're a failure, it's because they're lazy."(Laughter) 我不知道芒格先生的妻子是否在这里，而巴菲特夫人是否在这里，但我回到东方，在纽约，他们说：“当人们 - 当男人成功时，这是他们的妻子在做的事。但是如果他们失败了，那是因为他们很懒。“ （笑声）

But anyhow, I just wanted to, again, thank you very much.You've done such great things for our family.It's absolutely incredible. 但无论如何，我只想再次非常感谢你。你为我们的家人做了很多伟大的事情。这绝对令人难以置信。

And to those of you who don't know these two gentlemen, besides being ﬁnancial geniuses, and you all know Mr. Buffett and, somewhat, Mr. Munger, too, they're the ﬁnest human beings you'll ever meet.I mean, just the way they explained this downsizing is the most intelligent thing that I've ever heard. 对于那些不了解这两位绅士的人，除了是金融天才之外，你们都知道巴菲特先生，有些人也认识芒格先生，他们是你们见过的最优秀的人。我的意思是，他们解释这种缩小规模的方式是我听过的最聪明的事情。

And eventually, like, you know, these people eventually ﬁnd work.They have to be reeducated and everything like that. 最后，就像你知道的那样，这些人最终会找到工作。他们必须得到再教育，以及类似的一切。

But one point of business I'd like to ask you, if you don't mind.I have been noticing that there has been a tremendous amount of new capital going into reinsurance carriers. 但是，如果你不介意的话，我想问你一点。我一直注意到有大量新资金进入再保险公司。

And I was wondering if you could make a few comments about that, if you think that will affect the reinsurance business — have any effect on the insurance business in general, because, as you know better than I, we're still in a verysoft market. 我想知道你是否可以就此做出一些评论，如果你认为这将影响再保险业务 - 一般对保险业务有任何影响，因为，正如你比我更了解，我们仍然处于一个非常好的状态。软市场。

And there isn't a month that goes by that I don't hear of some new reinsurance carrier, whether in Bermuda or London or somewhere.Thank you. 而且没有一个月的时间我没有听说过一些新的再保险公司，无论是在百慕大还是伦敦或某个地方。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK.Walter knows more about insurance than I do.But I'll, nevertheless, comment on that. WARREN BUFFETT ：好的。沃尔特比我更了解保险。但是，我会对此发表评论。

There has been a fair amount of capital.And there was a rush of it about, I'd say, maybe three years ago into the reinsurance business. 有相当数量的资本。我想说，也许是三年前进入再保险业务的热潮。

But there has been capital come in, and that is negative for our business.I mean, because any capital that's brought in, basically, will get employed. 但是有资本进入，这对我们的业务是负面的。我的意思是，因为任何引入的资本基本上都会被雇用。

We are willing, at Berkshire — and we do it — we are willing to sit on the sidelines in the reinsurance business. 我们愿意在伯克郡 - 而且我们这样做 - 我们愿意在再保险业务中坐视不管。 We'll offer quotes.But somebody that — will cut those prices substantially, if they've got a lot of capital and want to keep busy.And if you've got a lot of capital in this business, or if you attracted a lot of capital, you will do something.You might like to do something smart, but if need be, you'll do something dumb. 我们会提供报价。但有人认为 - 如果他们拥有大量资金并且想要保持忙碌，他们会大幅削减这些价格。如果你在这项业务中获得了大量资金，或者如果你吸引了大量资金，你就会做点什么。你可能想做一些聪明的事情，但如果需要，你会做一些愚蠢的事情。

You'll rationalize it, so you think it's smart.But you will do it.You won't just sit there and write the shareholders at the end of the year and say, you know, "We asked you for $300 million last year. And we'd like to report that it's all safely in a bank account at Citicorp."It just doesn't work that way. 你会理性化它，所以你认为它很聪明。但你会做到的。你不会只是坐在那里并在年底写下股东，然后说，“我们去年就问过你们3亿美元。而且我们想在Citicorp的一个银行账户中安全地报告这一切。 “。它只是不起作用。

So they will go out and do something.People don't like to sit around all day and do nothing. 所以他们会出去做点什么。人们不喜欢整天坐着不做任何事。

And that means that prices will get cut under certain circumstances.And those circumstances — that's happening now. 这意味着在某些情况下价格会降低。那些情况 - 现在正在发生。

We will — at Berkshire, we do have a rule about downsizing on that.We have promised people, at all of our insurance operations, that we will never have layoffs because of a drop in volume.We do not want the people who run our insurance business to feel they have to write X dollars in order to keep everybody there. 我们将 - 在伯克希尔，我们确实有一个关于缩小规模的规则。在我们所有的保险业务中，我们已经向人们承诺，由于数量下降，我们永远不会裁员。我们不希望经营我们保险业务的人觉得他们必须写X 美元才能让每个人都在那里。

We can afford some overhead around that's costing us a little money for lack of using it at full capacity, because it isn't that much, relative to the size of our insurance operation. 我们可以承担一些开销，因为没有足够的时间使用它会花费我们一点钱，因为相对于我们的保险业务规模而言，这并不是那么多。

What we can't afford are people feeling some internal compulsion to keep writing business in order to keep their job.So, we have a strong policy on that. 我们无法承受的是人们感到内心强迫继续写作业以保住工作。所以，我们有一个强有力的政策。

And if the business falls away, in terms of price, we won't be doing business.But we will be around to do business in a big way when the circumstances reverse. 如果业务失败，就价格而言，我们将不会开展业务。但是，当环境逆转时，我们将以大的方式开展业务。

They reversed in the casualty business for a while in 1985 or thereabouts.And we did a terriﬁc amount of business. 他们在1985年左右在伤亡事故中逆转了一段时间。我们做了大量的业务。

They reversed in catastrophe reinsurance four or ﬁve years ago, and we became very active in that, and — 他们在四五年前的灾难再保险中逆转了，我们变得非常积极，并且 -

We will have times that are very good for us in insurance.It's a lot like investments.If you feel you have to invest every day, you're going to make a lot of mistakes.It just — it isn't that kind of a business.You have to wait until you get the fat pitch.

我们的保险时间对我们非常有益。这很像投资。如果你觉得你每天都要投资，那你就会犯很多错误。它只是 - 它不是那种业务。你必须等到你得到胖子。

And in insurance, it's similar.You do not — if we had a budget for premium volume for our insurance companies, it would be the dumbest thing we could do, because they would meet the budget. 在保险方面，情况类似。你不这样做 - 如果我们的保险公司有保费预算，这将是我们能做的最蠢的事情，因为他们会满足预算。

They could meet any budget I set out.I could tell some operation that wrote a hundred million last year to write 500 million this year, and they would meet it, you know, and I would be paying the bills for decades to come, so — 他们可以满足我提出的任何预算。我可以告诉一些去年写了一亿的手术，今年写了5亿，他们会遇到它，你知道，我会支付未来几十年的账单，所以 -

It's a very illogical way to try and plan 8 or 10 percent-a-year growth. 尝试计划每年8％或10％的增长是一种非常不合逻辑的方式。

Now, GEICO is a different story in that GEICO is a business that is the low-cost operator and can attract, from a huge pool, business at, I think, a very good rate of growth simply by letting people know what's available out there.So that is a business that I see growing under almost any circumstances. 现在，GEICO是一个不同的故事，因为GEICO是一家低成本运营商的企业，我认为，通过让人们知道那里的可用产品，我可以从巨大的资源池中吸引一个非常好的增长率。。所以这是我认为几乎在任何情况下都会增长的业务。

But our reinsurance business will swing around enormously, in terms of volume, based on what the competitor is doing.And what the competitors are doing depends, to a great extent, on how much money they've got burning a hole in their pocket. 但根据竞争对手的做法，我们的再保险业务将在数量方面大幅度增长。竞争对手正在做的事情在很大程度上取决于他们在口袋里烧了多少钱。

And right now, it's going one direction.But it will change, I mean, just like investment markets change, you know.I've been through at least a half a dozen periods where people think, you know, they're never going to get a chance to buy securities at intelligent prices.And it always changes. 而现在，它正朝着一个方向发展。但是，我知道，它会改变，就像投资市场发生变化一样。我已经经历了至少六个时期，人们认为，他们永远不会有机会以智能价格购买证券。它总是在变化。

In the insurance business, people that misprice their policies will pay the price for it.And the world will still need insurance.And we will still be there. 在保险业务中，错误定价政策的人会为此付出代价。世界仍然需要保险。我们仍然会在那里。

7. International expansion for GEICO would be dangerous distraction 7.对GEICO的国际扩张将是危险的分心

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 7?Oh, we don’t have any.I guess we have everybody in here now, so we'll go back to zone 1. WARREN BUFFETT：7 区？哦，我们没有。我想现在我们所有人都在这里，所以我们将回到1区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, salutations from Portugal.I am from Portugal.My name is Herculano Fortado (PH).I have been a shareholder of your company since it was traded on the NASDAQ. 观众：巴菲特先生，来自葡萄牙的致敬。我是从葡萄牙来的。我的名字是Herculano Fortado（PH）。自从在纳斯达克上市交易以来，我一直是贵公司的股东。 And I hold the shares and went on accumulating year after year, whenever funds were available and were at my disposal. 我持有股票，并且每当资金可用并且由我支配时，年复一年地继续累积。

Now, a little bit about my history.As a student, I am from India.I was born in India, of Indian parentage.And my parents were very modest and could not afford me higher education.I started my school — 现在，关于我的历史。作为一名学生，我来自印度。我出生在印度，是印度人的父母。我的父母非常谦虚，无法接受高等教育。我开始上学 -

WARREN BUFFETT: I think maybe you'd better just get to the question, though, if you will, please. WARREN BUFFETT：我想也许你最好回答这个问题，但是，如果你愿意的话，请。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes.And then started writing insurance, life insurance, for a company which was a subsidiary of American Life. 听众会员：是的。然后开始为一家公司（美国生活的子公司）编写保险，人寿保险。

My question now is this.I am now living in Portugal, and I see that the European market is developing and Berkshire Hathaway is having a very big slice of insurance investments. 我现在的问题是这个。我现在住在葡萄牙，我看到欧洲市场正在发展，伯克希尔哈撒韦公司正在进行大量的保险投资。

They don't seem to be operating in the new markets that are emerging in Europe, and as well as in countries like India or the Paciﬁc area, where the human — two-thirds of human beings are living. 他们似乎并没有在欧洲出现的新市场中运作，也没有在印度或太平洋地区等新兴市场开展业务，人类中有三分之二的人口居住在那里。

Is there a policy or a plan, on the part of Berkshire Hathaway, to diversify and internationalize their insurance business?This is my only question. 伯克希尔哈撒韦公司是否制定了保险业务多元化和国际化的政策或计划？这是我唯一的问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. WARREN BUFFETT：谢谢。

The reinsurance business of Berkshire Hathaway is totally international.I mean, we deal with risks all over the world.We deal with companies all over the world. 伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的再保险业务完全是国际化的。我的意思是，我们处理世界各地的风险。我们与世界各地的公司打交道。

And that's the nature of the reinsurance business, generally, although there might be some that would be more specialized to this country, but — 这是再保险业务的本质，一般来说，虽然可能会有一些更专业化的国家，但是 -

We are quite willing to take on risks around the world, although they have to be risks with a large premium.I mean, that's the nature of our reinsurance business.We're not in the retail end of the business. 我们非常愿意承担全球风险，尽管它们必须具有大量溢价的风险。我的意思是，这就是我们再保险业务的本质。我们不在零售业务中。

But we do that worldwide.And we'll continue to do that worldwide, because there are huge risks that exist for primary insurers around the world.And they need somebody to lay them off on. 但我们在全世界都这样做。我们将继续在全球范围内开展这项工作，因为世界各地的主要保险公司存在着巨大的风险。他们需要有人来解决它们。

Now, whether they will pay the proper price is another question.And it may be a little more difﬁcult, in a few jurisdictions, to do business than in others.But that's an international operation. 现在，他们是否会支付适当的价格是另一个问题。在少数司法管辖区，开展业务可能比在其他司法管辖区更难。但这是一项国际行动。

GEICO has two-and-a-fraction percent of the U.S. auto market.We have about 2 1/2 million policyholders.There are over a hundred million in the country. GEICO占美国汽车市场的两倍和一小部分。我们有大约2 250万保单持有人。这个国家有一亿多人。

And there is such an opportunity here that it would be diversionary to go into other countries with GEICO. 这里有这样一个机会，与GEICO一起进入其他国家将是一种转移。

There's been a ﬁrm that was very successful over in England that introduced a somewhat GEICO- like operation about 10 years ago.And they did very well.They are now encountering more competition.And their results are falling off somewhat, but — 在英格兰，有一家公司非常成功，大约10年前引入了类似GEICO 的运营。而且他们做得很好。他们现在正面临更多的竞争。他们的结果有所下降，但是 -

There's a huge potential for GEICO in this country.And I would not want the management of GEICO to be going off in other directions now, when there's so much to be done here. GEICO在这个国家有巨大的潜力。而且我不想让GEICO的管理层现在朝着其他方向发展，因为这里还有很多工作要做。

I mean, three percentage points on our growth rate here, for example, you know, would be 75 million or so of volume.And that, in turn, would keep compounding over time.Well that — there's too much to do here before we set up some startup operation around the world. 我的意思是，我们的增长率有三个百分点，例如，你知道，这个数字将是7500 万左右。而这反过来会随着时间的推移而不断变化。好吧 - 在我们在全球范围内建立一些启动操作之前，这里有太多事情要做。

And there are actually various problems in a lot of jurisdictions in — to run a GEICO-like operation — although I wouldn't say that that prevails every place.I mean, there could be opportunities.But the opportunity here in this country is huge.And the management of GEICO is focused. 并且在许多司法管辖区实际上存在各种问题 - 运行类似GEICO的操作 - 尽管我不会说这种情况占主导地位。我的意思是，可能有机会。但是这个国家的机会很大。 GEICO的管理重点突出。

I love focused management.The management of — if you read the Coca-Cola annual report, you will not get the idea that Roberto Goizueta is thinking about a whole lot of things other than Coca- Cola. 我喜欢专注的管理。管理 - 如果您阅读可口可乐年度报告，您将不会认为Roberto Goizueta正在考虑除可口可乐之外的许多其他事情。

And I have seen that work time after time.And when they lose that focus — as, actually, did Coke and Gillette both, at one point 20 to 30 years ago somewhat — it shows up. 我一次又一次地看到了工作。当他们失去焦点时 - 实际上，可口可乐和吉列都在20到30年前的某个时刻出现了 - 它显示出来了。

I mean, it — two great organizations were not hitting their potential 20 years ago.And then they became refocused.And what a difference it makes.It makes tens of billions of dollars' worth of difference, in terms of market value. 我的意思是，它 - 两个伟大的组织在 20年前没有发挥其潜力。然后他们变得重新聚焦。它有什么不同。就市场价值而言，它产生了数百亿美元的价值差异。

GEICO actually started — they started fooling around in a number of things in the early '80s, and they paid a price to do it.They paid a very big price.

GEICO实际上已经开始了 - 他们在80年代早期开始在许多事情上鬼混，他们付出了代价。他们付出了很大的代价。

They paid a direct price, in terms of the cost of those things, because they almost all worked out badly.And then they paid an additional price in the loss of focus on the main business. 就这些东西的成本而言，他们付出了直接的代价，因为他们几乎都做得很糟糕。然后，他们为失去对主要业务的关注付出了额外的代价。

That will not happen with the present management.Tony Nicely thinks about nothing else but doing — carrying the GEICO message to people who — that 97 1/2 percent or so that are not policyholders.And that will work very well for us over time. 目前的管理层不会发生这种情况。 Tony Nicely除了做以外什么也不做其他事 - 将GEICO的信息带给那些97％左右不是保单持有人的人。随着时间的推移，这对我们来说非常有效。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: We are indirectly in all of these emerging markets through Coca-Cola and Gillette.So, it isn't true that we're totally absent. CHARLIE MUNGER：我们通过可口可乐和吉列间接地进入所有这些新兴市场。所以，我们完全缺席并不是真的。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. Well, at Coca-Cola the international markets are 80 percent of proﬁts — actually, a little more. WARREN BUFFETT：没有。在可口可乐公司，国际市场的利润是80％ - 实际上，更多一点。

Gillette, I think they're about 70 percent or so.So, the — we love the international aspects of the Coca-Cola or Gillette businesses.And that's a very major attraction. 吉列，我认为他们大约有70％左右。所以，我们喜欢可口可乐或吉列业务的国际方面。这是一个非常重要的吸引力。

But the management of those companies is focused on that.But they are doing — they have distribution systems, and they have recognition, and they've got a lot going for them over there.But the beauty of it is that they're maximizing what they do have going for them, which was not the case 20 years ago. 但这些公司的管理层专注于此。但他们正在做 - 他们有分销系统，他们有认可，他们在那里有很多需要他们。但它的美妙之处在于它们最大限度地发挥了它们的作用，而20年前并非如此。

They just sort of let it go more by default, and they started fooling around with a lot of diversiﬁcation.And you know, basically, that has not worked that well.So, we like focus.We love focus. 他们只是默认让它更多，他们开始愚弄多种多样化。你知道，基本上，这种方法效果不佳。所以，我们喜欢专注。我们喜欢专注。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, and doing it indirectly, as we've done, one can argue that we, thereby, do it a lot better.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，间接地做，正如我们所做的那样，人们可以争辩说，我们因此做得更好。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We won't explore the implications of that.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：我们不会探讨其含义。（笑声）

8. Shareholders boost Borsheims sales 8.股东促进了Borsheims的销售 WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2? WARREN BUFFETT：2区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name's George Olson (PH).I'm from Atlanta, Georgia.I have a couple quick questions for you. 听众：我的名字叫George Olson（PH）。我来自佐治亚州的亚特兰大。我有几个简单的问题要问你。

First of all, I'd like to have your comments on the USAir preferred that were — they're several quarters in arrears on. 首先，我希望你对USAir 的评论是优先考虑的 - 他们拖欠了几个季度。

And secondly, I was wondering about the Borsheims report from yesterday.You usually comment on that.(Laughter) 其次，我想知道昨天的Borsheims报告。你经常对此发表评论。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Susan Jacques, who runs Borsheims, called me this morning.And her voice was hoarse but happy, and — (Laughs) WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，经营Borsheims的Susan Jacques今天早上打电话给我。她的声音嘶哑但很开心，而且 - （笑）

Borsheims — that comparable day last year was the biggest day of the year.And it was about 60 percent up this year, so — I’m — you've done your part.(Applause) Borsheims - 去年的可比日子是一年中最大的一天。今年它增加了约 60％，所以 - 我 - 你已经完成了自己的工作。（掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: We are starting a new custom at Berkshire Hathaway's annual meetings.A shareholder came up to me and asked for my autograph on his sales slip from Borsheims — (laughter) — which was a $54,000 watch. CHARLIE MUNGER：我们正在Berkshire Hathaway的年会上开始新的习俗。一位股东来找我，并要求我在Borsheims的销售单上签名 - （笑声） - 这是一块价值54,000美元的手表。

Now, that is the kind of autographs we like to give.(Laughter and applause) 现在，这就是我们想要给出的那种签名。（笑声和掌声）

And so our message to you all is, "Go thou and do likewise."(Laughter) 所以我们给大家的信息是，“你去做同样的事。” （笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: It wasn't a member of Charlie's family, incidentally.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：顺便说一下，它不是查理家的成员。（笑声）

9. USAir investment has improved, but was still a mistake 9. USAir的投资有所改善，但仍然是一个错误

WARREN BUFFETT: The USAir preferred, as I mentioned in the annual report, it looks considerably better than it did 18 months ago or thereabouts. WARREN BUFFETT：正如我在年度报告中提到的那样，USAir 更喜欢它看起来比18个月前或之前的好多了。

But their fundamental problem — and Steve Wolf has said this — the new CEO of USAir — the fundamental problems are there.And they either address and correct those fundamental problems, or those problems will address and correct them.(Laughter) 但他们的根本问题 - 史蒂夫沃尔夫已经说过 - 这是美国新任首席执行官 - 基本问题就在那里。他们要么解决并纠正这些基本问题，要么这些问题将解决并纠正它们。（笑声） And the — you know, their costs are out of line.Their costs are those that are relics of a regulated, protected environment.And they are not in a regulated, protected environment.And so far, they have not had any great success in correcting the situation. 而且 - 你知道，他们的成本是不合时宜的。它们的成本是受监管的受保护环境的遗留物。而且他们不在受监管的受保护环境中。到目前为止，他们在纠正这种情况方面没有取得任何重大成功。

Knowing Mr. Wolf, I'm sure he is, you know, focused entirely on getting that changed.And he will need to get it changed.And he — his record has been pretty successful at that. 知道沃尔夫先生，我确信他完全专注于改变这一点。他需要改变它。而他 - 他的记录在那方面非常成功。

So, we're a lot better off with our US Air preferred than we were 18 months ago, but it still is a mistake I made. 因此，我们的美国航空优先选择比18个月前更好，但这仍然是我犯的错误。

And we would've been a lot better off if I'd just, as Charlie says, gone out to a bar that night instead. (Laughter) 如果我像Charlie 所说的那样，那个晚上我去了一家酒吧，我们会好多了。（笑声）

You got any comments, Charlie, on USAir?He doesn't want to comment.It may sound like it's his deal.(Laughter) 你在USAir上有任何评论吗，查理？他不想发表评论。这可能听起来像是他的交易。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: It's, plainly, worth a lot more than it was last year.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：显然，它比去年更值钱。（笑声）

10. Newspapers may evolve, but won't disappear entirely 10.报纸可能会发展，但不会完全消失

WARREN BUFFETT: And with that, we'll move to zone 3. (Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：有了这个，我们将搬到3区。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, David Winters, Mountain Lakes, New Jersey. 听众：嗨，大卫温特斯，新泽西州高山湖区。

Without ruining my fun, can you give me a few hints about how I should think about calculating the intrinsic value — (Buffett laughs) — of the insurance businesses? 在不破坏我的乐趣的情况下，你能给我一些关于如何考虑计算内在价值的提示 - （巴菲特笑） - 保险业务？

And secondly, I'm wondering about, not that you can foretell the future, either one of you, but with regards to newspapers, is there any concern that it goes the way of the printed World Book and Blue Chip Stamps? 其次，我想知道，不是你可以预见未来，不管是你们中的哪一个，而是关于报纸，是否有任何关注印刷世界图书和蓝筹邮票的方式？

WARREN BUFFETT: It could — I think it’s very — I'll answer the second part ﬁrst. WARREN BUFFETT：它可以 - 我认为非常 - 我将首先回答第二部分。

I think it's very unlikely — very, very unlikely, you know, down to a few percentage points, that newspapers will go the way of Blue Chip Stamps. 我认为这是非常不可能的 - 非常，非常不可能，只有几个百分点，报纸将会采用蓝筹邮票的方式。

World Book is a different story.World Book has got — they have a reasonable shot at a decent future.But it's not automatic.

世界图书是一个不同的故事。世界图书已经得到了 - 他们在一个体面的未来有合理的机会。但这不是自动的。

But the newspaper, it may be conﬁgured somewhat differently.It may get a different percentage of its revenue from circulation and advertising than it does.I mean, there may be some evolutionary- type changes in it.But it's still a bargain. 但报纸上，它可能配置有所不同。它可能从流通和广告中获得不同比例的收入。我的意思是，它可能会有一些进化类型的变化。但它仍然是一个讨价还价。

It is a bargain to anybody that is interested in their community.It's still a bargain to a great many advertisers. 对任何对他们的社区感兴趣的人都很划算。它仍然是很多广告商的讨价还价。

We spend a lot of money advertising in newspapers in our various businesses.And we feel we are getting our money's worth, obviously.And it works. 我们在各种业务中花了很多钱在报纸上做广告。而且我们觉得我们的钱很明显。它有效。

But it just doesn't have the lock that it used to have on the business. 但它只是没有它曾经对业务的锁定。

11. Why $7B of insurance ﬂoat is better than $7B of cash 11.为什么$ 7B的保险浮动优于$ 7B现金

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, what was the other question about? WARREN BUFFETT：现在，另一个问题是什么？

Did you want to repeat the ﬁrst one? 你想重复第一个吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Inaudible) 听众:(听不清）

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, yeah, the question about the insurance business, the intrinsic value. WARREN BUFFETT：哦，是的，关于保险业务的问题，内在价值。

I would say this.We have — I'm not going to give you a precise answer, but I will tell you this. 我会说这个。我们 - 我不打算给你一个确切的答案，但我会告诉你这个。

We have 7 billion, presently, of ﬂoat.That's the money we're holding that belongs to someone else but that we have the use of. 我们目前拥有70亿浮动资产。这是我们持有的属于别人的钱，但我们有使用。

Now, if I were asked, would I trade that for $7 billion and not have to pay tax on the gain that would result if I did that, but I would then have to stay out of the insurance business forever — total forever non-competeclause of any kind in insurance — would I accept that?And the answer is no. 现在，如果我被问到，我是否会以70亿美元的价格进行交易而不必为如果我这样做而获得的收益纳税，但我将不得不永远地离开保险业务 - 总是永远不竞争保险中的任何条款 - 我会接受吗？答案是否定的。

Now, that is not because I would rather have 7 billion of ﬂoat than 7 billion of net proceeds of free money.It's because I expect the 7 billion to grow. 现在，这不是因为我宁愿拥有70亿美元的浮动资金而不是70亿美元的免费资金净收益。这是因为我预计这70亿增长。

And if I'd made that trade — that I'm just suggesting now — if I'd made that 27 years ago and said, "Will you take 17 million for the ﬂoat you have, no tax to be paid, the ﬂoat forwhich you just paid 8- million-7 when we bought the companies, and gotten out of the insurance business," I might've said yes in those days, but it would've — 如果我做了那笔交易 - 我现在只是建议 - 如果我在27年前做出来并且说，“你会花1700万你的浮动，没有税收，浮动的当我们买下这些公司时，你刚刚支付了800万-7，并且退出了保险业务，“那时我可能会说是，但它会 -

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, you would've? CHARLIE MUNGER：哦，你会的？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.(Laughter) Yeah. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。（笑声）是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, he keeps learning.That's one of his tricks.(Laughter and applause) CHARLIE MUNGER：不，他一直在学习。这是他的一招。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: That's probably true in this case.I'm not sure about other cases. WARREN BUFFETT：在这种情况下可能就是这样。我不确定其他情况。

But it would've been a terrible mistake.It would've been a mistake to do it 10 or 12 years ago with 300 million. 但这将是一个可怕的错误。 10年或12年前用3亿人做这件事是错误的。

It is not worth $7 billion to us to forego being in the insurance business forever at Berkshire Hathaway. 我们在伯克希尔哈撒韦公司永远放弃保险业务并不值得70亿美元。

Even though it would all be, you know, it would be — if it were nontaxed proﬁts, so we got the full 7 billion, pure addition to equity — we would not take it.And we wouldn't even think about it very long.So as Charlie says, that is not the answer that we would've given some time back.But it's a very valuable business. 即使这一切都是，你知道，如果它是非固定利润，那么我们得到了全部70亿美元，纯粹的股权增加 - 我们不会接受它。我们甚至都不会考虑它。正如查理所说，这不是我们给予回忆的答案。但这是一项非常有价值的业务。

It has to be run right.I mean, GEICO has to be run right.The reinsurance business has to be run right, National Indemnity, the Homestate Company.They all have to be run right.And it's not automatic. 它必须正确运行。我的意思是，GEICO必须正确运行。再保险业务必须正确运营，National Indemnity，Homestate Company。他们都必须正确运行。而且这不是自动的。

But they have the people, the distribution structure, the reputation, the capital strength, the competitive advantages.They have those in place.And if nurtured, you know, they can become more valuable as time goes by. 但他们有人，分配结构，声誉，资本实力，竞争优势。他们有那些。如果受到培养，你知道，随着时间的推移，它们会变得更有价值。

12. Keeping more mortgages has increased Freddie Mac's risk a "tiny bit" 12.保持更多抵押贷款增加了房地美的风险“一点点”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4? WARREN BUFFETT：第4区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes.I'd like to ask the chairman and Mr. Munger about Freddie Mac. 听众会员：是的。我想问主席和芒格先生有关弗雷迪麦克的问题。 A few years ago, I think they were earning most of their money from the guarantee fees and the ﬂoat.Now, they've got the huge balance sheet, a lot of short-term liabilities. 几年前，我认为他们的大部分资金来自担保费和浮动费。现在，他们拥有庞大的资产负债表，很多短期负债。

Do you think that's a more risky business now and that the spread might go away in some, you know, less-than-foreseen event? 您是否认为现在这是一个风险更高的业务，并且在某些事件中，这种传播可能会消失，您知道吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, I think he aimed that one at you.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：查理，我认为他是针对你的。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: It's probably slightly more risky, but I don't think they're taking horrible risks.It's still a very good business. CHARLIE MUNGER：风险可能略高，但我认为他们不会承担可怕的风险。这仍然是一项非常好的业务。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, what the question referred to is that, formerly, Freddie Mac emphasized, normally, just the guarantee of credit and then passed all interest rate risk onto the market. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，提到的问题是，以前，Freddie Mac通常只强调信贷担保，然后将所有利率风险转嫁到市场上。

Now, they've retained, for their portfolio, a greater percentage of the mortgages that come through their hands. 现在，他们为他们的投资组合保留了更多的抵押贷款。

I think they've structured the liabilities quite intelligently to handle what they call in the investment world "the convexity problem," but — which is that the borrower has the option of calling off the deal tomorrow or retaining it for 30 years.And that is a very disadvantageous contract to enter into, if you lend money. 我认为他们已经非常智能地构建了负债，以处理他们在投资领域所谓的“凸性问题”，但是 - 借款人可以选择明天取消交易或保留30年。如果你借钱，这是一个非常不利的合同。

They have done quite an intelligent job of attacking that by callable debt and various things.But you can't address a problem like that totally.There is no way to set up some model that satisﬁes that entire risk. 通过可赎回的债务和各种各样的事情，他们做了相当聪明的工作来攻击它。但你无法完全解决这样的问题。没有办法建立一个满足整个风险的模型。

They've done a good job.But as Charlie says, the larger the portfolio, as compared to guarantee fees — because you've still got the — you got the credit risk on the portfolio, and you've added a little interest rate risk at the extremes. 他们做得很好。但正如查理所说，与担保费相比，投资组合越大 - 因为你仍然得到了 - 你在投资组合中获得了信用风险，并且你在极端情况下增加了一点利率风险。

And it doesn't keep us up nights, but it's a tiny bit riskier than it used to be. 而且它并没有让我们过夜，但它比以前有点风险。

13. Don't wait for downturn to buy a great company 13.不要等到经济低迷才能买到一家好公司

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5? WARREN BUFFETT：5区？ AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Inaudible) — I’m the guy who asked you my question, my family last year — (inaudible) — my mom.This guy said ﬁne, so I — (inaudible) — (laughter). 观众:(听不清） - 我是那个问我问题的人，去年我的家人 - （听不清楚） - 我的妈妈。这家伙说得好，所以我 - （听不清楚） - （笑）。

I know you said do what you want.I just wanted to let you know that — 我知道你说做你想做的事。我只是想让你知道 -

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you did what you wanted.I mean, you followed my advice.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，你做了你想做的事。我的意思是，你遵循我的建议。（笑声）

I'm batting 1.000.We'll see what you're batting next year.(Laughter) 我击球了1.000。我们明年会看到你在打什么。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I had one quick question — (inaudible) — you said, if you have three great companies, wonderful businesses, they could last you a lifetime. 观众：我有一个简单的问题 - （听不清楚） - 你说过，如果你有三家伟大的公司，那些精彩的企业，它们可以为你留下一生。

And I have — one thing that struck me in a way that — (inaudible) — great businesses get pounded down.And then you bet big on them, like American Express and Disney at one time. 我有一件事让我印象深刻 - （听不清） - 伟大的企业被打倒了。然后你就会对美国运通和迪斯尼同时打赌。

And my question is, I have capital to invest, but I haven't yet invested it.I have three great companies, which I've identiﬁed: Coca-Cola, Gillette, and McDonald's. 我的问题是，我有资金进行投资，但我尚未投资。我有三家伟大的公司，我已经确定了这些公司：可口可乐，吉列和麦当劳。

And my question is, if I have a lifetime ahead of me, where I want to keep an investment for more than 20 or 30 years, is it better to wait a year or two to see if one of those companies stumble, or to getin now and just stay with it over a long time horizon? 而我的问题是，如果我有一辈子领先于我，我想要投资超过20或30年，最好等一两年，看看其中一家公司是否跌跌撞撞，或者获得在现在，只是在很长一段时间内坚持下去？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.Well, I won't comment on the three companies that you've named. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。好吧，我不会对你命名的三家公司发表评论。

But in general terms, unless you ﬁnd the prices of a great company really offensive, if you feel you've identiﬁed it — 但总的来说，除非你发现一家伟大公司的价格真的令人反感，如果你觉得你已经认定它 -

And by deﬁnition, a great company is one that's going to remain great for 30 years.If it's going to be a great company for three years, you know, it ain't a great company.I mean, it — (Laughter) 根据定义，一个伟大的公司将是一个将保持伟大30年的公司。如果它将成为一家伟大的公司三年，你知道，它不是一个伟大的公司。我的意思是， - （笑声）

So, you really want to go along with the idea of something that, if you were going to take a trip for 20 years, you wouldn't feel bad leaving the money in with no orders with your broker and no power of attorney or anything, and you just go on the trip.And you know you come back, and it's going to be a terribly strong company. 所以，你真的想要了解一些事情的想法，如果你要去旅行20年，你不会感觉不好，没有与你的经纪人订单，没有授权书或任何东西留下钱，你只是去旅行。而且你知道你回来了，它将成为一个非常强大的公司。 I think it's better just to own them.I mean, you know, we could attempt to buy and sell some of the things that we own that we think are ﬁne businesses.But they're too hard to ﬁnd. 我认为拥有它们会更好。我的意思是，你知道，我们可以尝试买卖一些我们认为是优质企业的东西。但他们很难找到。

I mean, we found See's Candy in 1972, or we ﬁnd, here and there, we get the opportunity to do something.But they're too hard to ﬁnd. 我的意思是，我们在1972年找到了See's Candy，或者我们发现，在这里和那里，我们有机会做某事。但他们很难找到。

So, to sit there and hope that you buy them in the throes of some panic, you know, that you sort of take the attitude of a mortician, you know, waiting for a ﬂu epidemic or something, I mean — (laughter) —it — I'm not sure that will be a great technique. 所以，坐在那里，希望你在恐慌的痛苦中购买它们，你知道，你有点采取殡仪师的态度，你知道，等待流感疫情或其他什么，我的意思是 - （笑声） - 它 - 我不确定这将是一项伟大的技术。

I mean, it may be great if you inherit.You know, Paul Getty inherited the money at the bottom, in '32.I mean, he didn't inherit it exactly.He talked his mother out of it.But — (laughter) — it's true, actually. 我的意思是，如果你继承，那可能会很棒。你知道，保罗盖蒂在32年继承了底部的钱。我的意思是，他没有完全继承它。他说出了他的母亲。但是 - （笑） - 实际上这是真的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Close enough. CHARLIE MUNGER：足够近了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, close enough, right? WARREN BUFFETT：是的，足够接近吧？

But he beneﬁtted enormously by having access to a lot of cash in 19 — in the early '30s — that he didn't have access to in the late '20s.And so, you get some accidents like that. 但他在19世纪30年代早期获得了大量现金，并在20世纪20年代后期无法获得现金，从而使他受益匪浅。所以，你会遇到类似的事故。

But that's a lot to count on.And you know, if you start with the Dow at X, and you think it's too high, you know, when it goes to 90 percent of X, do you buy? 但这是值得信赖的。而且你知道，如果你从道琼斯开始，你觉得它太高了，你知道，当它达到X的 90％时，你会买吗？

Well, if it does, and it goes to 50 percent of X, it gets — you know, you never get the beneﬁts of those extremes anyway, unless you just come into some accidental sum of money at some time. 好吧，如果确实如此，并且它达到了X的50％，它就会 - 你知道，你永远不会从这些极端中获益，除非你在某个时候只是偶然得到一些钱。

So, I think the main thing to do is ﬁnd wonderful businesses. 所以，我认为要做的主要是寻找精彩的企业。

Is Phil Carret here?We’ve got the world —there's the hero of investing.Phil, would you stand up? Phil Carret在这儿吗？我们拥有世界 - 投资的英雄。菲尔，你会站起来吗？

Phil is 99. He wrote a book on investing in 1924 ["Buying a Bond"].(Applause) 菲尔是99岁。他写了一本关于1924年投资的书[“购买债券”]。（掌声）

Phil has done awfully well by ﬁnding businesses he likes, and sticking with them, and not worrying too much about what they do day to day. 菲尔通过找到自己喜欢的商业并坚持下去，并且不用太担心他们日常所做的事情，做得非常好。 There’s going to be — I think there's going to be an article in the Wall Street Journal about Phil on May 28th, and I advise you all to read it.And you'll probably learn a lot more than by coming to this meeting, but — 将会有 - 我认为 5月28日华尔街日报将有一篇关于菲尔的文章，我建议大家阅读。你可能会比参加这次会议学到更多东西，但是 -

It's that approach of buying businesses — I mean, let's just say there was no stock market.And the owner of the best business in whatever your hometown is came to you and said, "Look it, you know, my brother just died, and he owned 20 percent of the business. And I want somebody to go in with me to buythat 20 percent. 这是购买企业的方法 - 我的意思是，我们只是说没有股票市场。无论你的家乡最好的生意的老板来到你面前说：“看，你知道，我的兄弟刚刚去世，他拥有20％的生意。我希望有人和我一起去买那 20％。

"And the price looks a little high, maybe, but this is what I think I can get for it. You know, do you want to buy in?" “而且价格看起来有点高，也许，但这是我认为我能得到的。你知道，你想买进去吗？”

You know, I think, if you like the business, and you like the person that's coming to you, and the price sounds reasonable, and you really know the business, I think, probably, the thing to do is to take it and don't worry about how it's quoted.It won't be quoted tomorrow, or next week, or next month. 你知道，我想，如果你喜欢这个行业，你喜欢那个来找你的人，价格听起来合理，你真的了解这个行业，我想，可能，要做的就是接受它并且不要不要担心它是如何被引用的。它不会在明天，下周或下个月被引用。

You know, I think people's investment would be more intelligent, you know, if stocks were quoted about once a year.But it isn't going to happen that way, so — 你知道，我认为，如果股票每年被引用一次，那么人们的投资会更加聪明。但它不会那样发生，所以 -

And if you happen to come in to some added money at some time when something dramatic has happened — I mean, we did well back in 1964, because American Express ran into a crook. 如果你碰巧在某些时候发生了一些戏剧性的事情而增加了一些钱 - 我的意思是，我们在1964年做得很好，因为美国运通遇到了一个骗子。

You know, we did well in 1976, because GEICO's managers and auditors didn't know what their loss reserves should've been the previous couple of years. 你知道，我们在1976年做得很好，因为GEICO的经理和审计师不知道他们的亏损储备应该是前几年的。

So, we've had our share of ﬂu epidemics.But you don't want to spend your life — (laughs) — waiting around for them. 所以，我们已经分享了流感疫情。但你不想度过你的生活 - （笑） - 等待他们。

14. "Change is likely to work against us" 14.“改变很可能对我们不利”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6. WARREN BUFFETT：第6区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm Joe Condon (PH) from London. 听众：我是来自伦敦的Joe Condon（PH）。

Both Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger have addressed my question in annual reports and at previous meetings here.This is my ﬁrst time.It has to do with investment in a few great, high-technology stocks. 巴菲特先生和芒格先生都在年度报告和此前的会议上讨论了我的问题。这是我第一次。它与少数高科技股票的投资有关。

I know your answer has been that, if you don't understand it, and I can't, after this performance, can't really believe that both of you don't understand most of the high-technology questions.But I'm thinking about not only Microsoft but, say, Pﬁzer and J&J. 我知道你的答案是，如果你不理解它，我不能，在这次演出之后，我不能真正相信你们两个都不理解大多数高科技问题。但我不仅考虑微软，而且考虑辉瑞和强生。

All three companies, which have already proven that not only do they have a great product, proven management over 10 to 15 years, great market share positions, which are not easy to get into. 这三家公司已经证明，他们不仅拥有出色的产品，经过10至15年的成熟管理，还有很大的市场份额，这些都不容易进入。

And I, frankly, don't see a big difference in the P/E ratios, for example, you could say, Coca-Cola, or, you know, against Johnson & Johnson or Pﬁzer, which are very powerful companies.I wonder if either or both of you would address that question again. 坦率地说，我认为市盈率并没有太大差异，例如，你可以说，可口可乐，或者你知道，对强生公司或辉瑞公司来说都是非常强大的公司。我想知道你们中的一方或双方是否会再次提出这个问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, why don't you?(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：查理，你为什么不呢？（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: If you have something you think you understand that looks very attractive to you, we think it's smart to do what you understand.If — we've been unable to ﬁnd companies that ﬁt our slender talents. CHARLIE MUNGER ：如果你认为自己理解的东西对你很有吸引力，我们认为做你理解的事情很聪明。如果 - 我们一直无法找到适合我们苗条天赋的公司。

We well might have been in the Pﬁzers and Microsofts and so forth.But we've never had to revert to it. 我们可能一直在辉瑞和微软等等。但我们从来没有必要回归它。

We don't sneer at it.Other people with more talent have found that a wonderful course of action. 我们不嘲笑它。其他有更多才能的人发现了一个很棒的行动方案。

WARREN BUFFETT: We generally look at businesses — we feel change is likely to work against us.We do not have great ability — we do not think we have great ability to predict where change is going to lead. WARREN BUFFETT ：我们一般关注企业 - 我们认为变化可能会对我们起作用。我们没有很强的能力 - 我们认为我们没有很强的能力来预测变化将会带来什么。

We think we have some ability to ﬁnd businesses where we don't think change is going to be very important. 我们认为我们有能力找到我们认为变化不会非常重要的业务。

Now, at a Gillette, the product is going to be better 10 years from now than now, or 20 years from now than 10 years from now.You saw those earlier ads going back to the Blue Blade and all that.The Blue Blade seemed great at the time.But they keep — the shaving technology gets better and better. 现在，在吉列，从现在起10年后，或者从现在起20年后，产品将比10年后更好。你看到那些早期的广告又回到了蓝刀片上。蓝刀在当时看起来很棒。但他们坚持 - 剃须技术变得越来越好。

But you know that Gillette — although they had that little experience with Wilkinson in the early '60s — but you know that Gillette is basically going to be spending many multiples the money on developing better shaving systems than exist now, compared to anyone else. 但是你知道吉列 - 虽然他们在60年代早期对威尔金森有一点经验 - 但是你知道吉列基本上会花费很多钱来开发比现在更好的剃须系统，与其他人相比。

You know, they've got the distribution system.They've got the believability.If they bring out a product, and they say, "This is something that men ought to look at," men look at it. 你知道，他们有分销系统。他们有可信度。如果他们带出一件产品，并且他们说，“这是男人应该看的东西，”男人看着它。

And they found out here a few years ago that the same thing happened when they said to women to look at it in the shaving ﬁeld.They wouldn't have that same credibility someplace else.But in the shaving ﬁeld, they have it. 他们几年前在这里发现，当他们说女性在剃须场看它时会发生同样的事情。他们在其他地方不具备相同的可信度。但是在剃须领域，他们拥有它。

Those are assets that can't be built.And they're very hard to destroy. 这些是无法建立的资产。他们很难毁灭。

So change — we think we know, in a general way, what the soft drink industry or the shaving industry or the candy business is going to look like 10 or 20 years from now. 所以改变 - 我们认为，从一般情况来看，我们知道软饮料行业或剃须行业或糖果行业将从现在起10年或20年后看起来如何。

We think Microsoft is a sensational company run by the best of managers.But we don't have any idea what that world is going to look like in 10 or 20 years. 我们认为微软是一家由最优秀的经理人管理的耸人听闻的公司。但我们不知道这个世界在10年或20 年后会是什么样子。

Now, if you're going to bet on somebody that is going to see out and do what we can't do ourselves, I'd rather bet on Bill Gates than anybody else. 现在，如果你要打赌那些会看到并做我们自己无法做的事情的人，我宁愿赌比尔盖茨而不是其他任何人。

But that — I don't want to bet on anybody else.I mean, in the end, we want to understand, ourselves, where we think a business is going.And if somebody tells us the business is going to change a lot, in Wall Street, they love to tell you that, you know, that's great opportunity. 但那 - 我不想打赌任何人。我的意思是，最终，我们想要了解自己，我们认为企业的发展方向。如果有人告诉我们，华尔街的业务会发生很大的变化，他们很乐意告诉你，你知道，这是一个很好的机会。

They don't think it's a great opportunity when Wall Street itself is going to change a lot, incidentally. (Laughter) 他们并不认为这是一个很好的机会，当华尔街本身要改变很多时，顺便说一下。（笑声）

But they — you know, it's a great opportunity.We don't think it's an opportunity at all.I mean, we — it scares the hell out of us.Because we don't know how things are going to change. 但他们 - 你知道，这是一个很好的机会。我们认为这根本不是机会。我的意思是，我们 - 它吓坏了我们。因为我们不知道事情会如何变化。

We are looking, you know — when people are chewing chewing gum, we have a pretty good idea how they chewed it 20 years ago and how they'll chew it 20 years from now.And we don't really see a lot of technology going into the art of the chew, you know?(Laughter) So, that — 我们正在寻找，你知道 - 当人们咀嚼口香糖时，我们很清楚他们20年前是如何咀嚼它的，以及他们将在20年后如何咀嚼它。我们并没有真正看到很多技术进入咀嚼艺术，你知道吗？（笑声）那么，那 - And as long as we don't have to make those other decisions, why in the world should we?I mean, you know, if I — all kinds of things, we don't know.And so, why going around trying to bet on things we don't know, when we can bet on the simple things? 只要我们不必做出其他决定，为什么我们这个世界呢？我的意思是，你知道，如果我 - 各种各样的事情，我们都不知道。那么，为什么要在我们不知道的事情上下注，当我们可以赌这些简单的事情时？

Zone 1?(Applause) 1区？（掌声）

I can see the shareholders like us sticking with the simple ones.They understand us, yeah. 我可以看到像我们这样的股东坚持简单的股东。他们了解我们，是的。

15. We don't reveal more about our stocks than we have to 15.我们没有透露更多关于我们股票的信息

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Warren.Jerry Zucker (PH), Los Angeles, California. 听众：沃伦，下午好。 Jerry Zucker（PH），洛杉矶，加利福尼亚。

In the annual report, the second-largest holdings of unsecured securities are labeled, "Others." 在年度报告中，第二大持有的无担保证券被标记为“其他”。

Could you please expand on some of the holdings there?Like, do we still own PNC?And are we supposed to be buying Big Macs, as the press has reported? 你能否扩大一些在那里的持股？比如，我们还拥有PNC吗？据媒体报道，我们应该购买巨无霸吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, actually, it's a very descriptive title, "Others."(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：是的，实际上，这是一个非常具有描述性的标题，“其他人”。（笑声）

We do that for several reasons.But one is that we have no interest in people buying Berkshire or looking at the Berkshire report or anything else, in order to generate investment ideas for themselves.Some people may do it, but we are not in that business. 我们这样做有几个原因。但有一点是，我们对购买伯克希尔或查看伯克希尔报告或其他任何事情的人没有兴趣，以便为自己创造投资理念。有些人可能会这样做，但我们不参与那项业务。

Berkshire Hathaway shareholders are not being paid for that.There is no way it beneﬁts the owners of the company. Berkshire Hathaway 的股东没有因此获得报酬。这对公司的所有者没有任何好处。

So, we will not disclose, in the way of our security holdings, more than we feel we have to disclose in order to be fair about things that can be material to the company. 因此，我们不会以我们的证券持有方式披露超过我们认为必须披露的内容，以便公平对待对公司有重大影响的事情。

And we certainly have no interest in disclosing them to people who, essentially, want to use the information to try and ﬁgure out where our buying power may be, subsequently, or something of the sort. 我们当然没有兴趣将这些信息透露给那些基本上想要利用这些信息来试图找出我们的购买力可能在哪里，随后或某种类型的人。

So, we will keep raising the cutoff level.And you may see more and more in others. 因此，我们将继续提高截止水平。而你可能会在其他人身上看到越来越多。

And I will say this.There's a lot of speculation about what we do, in the press, and I'd say about half of it's accurate and about half of it's inaccurate. 我会说这个。在媒体上有很多关于我们做什么的猜测，我会说大约一半是准确的，大约一半是不准确的。 And again, we leave to you the fun of ﬁguring out which half is right.(Laughter) 再一次，我们给你留下了弄清楚哪一半是正确的乐趣。（笑声）

Yeah, we hope you get a lot for your money in buying a share of Berkshire.But we don't want to act as an investment advisory service. 是的，我们希望您在购买伯克希尔的股票时获得很多钱。但我们不想充当投资咨询服务。

16. Buffett isn't worrying about the Y2K computer problem 16.巴菲特并不担心Y2K计算机问题

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2? WARREN BUFFETT：2区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: David Coles, Appleton, Wisconsin. 观众：威斯康星州阿普尔顿的David Coles。

Earlier, you made reference to the vicissitudes of time.What are the plans to ensure that all the computer systems and companies in which Berkshire has an interest will function correctly with dates of January 1st of the year 2000 and beyond? 早些时候，你提到了时间的变迁。有哪些计划可以确保伯克希尔有兴趣的所有计算机系统和公司能够正确运行2000年1月1日及以后的日期？

And what will you do to reassure shareholders that we will not suffer serious business loss or failure due to incorrect handling of these dates by computer systems? 你会怎么做才能让股东放心，我们不会因计算机系统错误处理这些日期而遭受严重的商业损失或失败？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, actually, I've got a friend that's quite involved in the — (laughter) — question of — no, I'm serious about that — the 2000 question with computers.But that's the kind of thing I don't worry about. 沃伦巴菲特：嗯，实际上，我有一个朋友参与了 - （笑声） - 问题 - 不，我是认真的 - 2000年的问题与电脑有关。但那是我不担心的事情。

I mean, I will let the people who run the operating businesses work on that.And I'll work on capital allocation.And I have a feeling, one way or another, we'll get through it. 我的意思是，我会让经营业务的人员参与进来。我将致力于资本配置。而且我有一种感觉，不管怎样，我们都能度过难关。

But like I say, we have — there are a lot of things at Berkshire we don't — (applause) — we don't spend a lot of time on a lot of things at the headquarters that other companies have whole departments on. 但就像我说的那样，我们有 - 很多事情在伯克希尔我们没有 - （掌声） - 我们不会花太多时间在其他公司拥有整个部门的总部的很多事情上。

And our managers have not let us down.I mean, I must say that we've got a group at one business after another.And they focus on their business.And they mail the money to us in Omaha.And we're all happy.(Laughter) 我们的经理们并没有让我们失望。我的意思是，我必须说，我们已经在一个又一个的业务团队。他们专注于他们的业务。他们把钱寄给我们在奥马哈。我们都很开心。（笑声）

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I have the feeling that our people will be quite good at keeping the computer systems in order and with backups.I also have the feeling that few companies could handle a big computer snafu better than we could. CHARLIE MUNGER：我觉得我们的员工会非常善于保持计算机系统的有序和备份。我也觉得很少有公司能够比我们更好地处理大型计算机故障。

I have the feeling the Coca-Cola stock would be there.The Gillette stock would be there.The Nebraska Furniture Mart would be full of furniture and know the customers. 我觉得可口可乐股票会在那里。吉列股票将在那里。内布拉斯加州的家具市场将充满家具，了解客户。

I don't think a computer crash is going to do us in. 我认为计算机崩溃不会影响我们。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.You're correct, though, that that is a problem for the computer world.But as Charlie says, it'll hit other people a lot harder than it hits us. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。但是，你是对的，这对计算机世界来说是一个问题。但正如查理所说的那样，它会打击其他人比打击我们更难。

Most of the things — we try to be in businesses that are fairly simple and that can't get all messed up. 大多数事情 - 我们试图在相当简单的业务中，并且不能搞砸所有事情。

And by and large, I think that we've got an unusual portfolio of those.And when it gets to our investees, you know, they're going to worry about those problems themselves. 总的来说，我认为我们有一个不寻常的组合。当它到达我们的被投资者时，你知道，他们会自己担心这些问题。

We really worry about allocating money around Berkshire and having the right managers in place.That — if we can do those two right, everything else'll take care of itself. 我们真的担心在伯克希尔周围分配资金并拥有合适的管理人员。那 - 如果我们能做到这两件事，其他一切都会照顾好自己。

17. Berkshire businesses are "way easier to predict" 17.伯克希尔企业“更容易预测”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3? WARREN BUFFETT：3区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Peter Bevelin from Sweden. 观众：我的名字是来自瑞典的Peter Bevelin。

You have said that you like franchise companies, companies that have — that are castles surrounded by moats, companies that are possible to — you can have some prediction ﬁve, 10 years down the road. 你曾经说过，你喜欢特许经营公司，那些有护城河的公司，有可能成为公司的公司 - 你可以预测5 年，10年后的未来。

But aren't businesses like See's Candy, the furniture business, the jewelry business, the shoe business, businesses that are hard to predict the future, ﬁve, 10 years down the road? 但是，不是像See's Candy，家具业，珠宝业，鞋业，未来五年，十年这样难以预测的企业吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: What was that on the last part of that? WARREN BUFFETT：最后一部分是什么？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Aren't these businesses hard to predict ﬁve or 10 years down the road? CHARLIE MUNGER：未来五年或十年这些企业难以预测吗？ WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I think — WARREN BUFFETT：是的，我认为 -

CHARLIE MUNGER: Things like shoe business and — CHARLIE MUNGER：像鞋业这样的事情 -

WARREN BUFFETT: I think they're far easier to predict than most businesses.I think I can come closer to telling you the future of virtually all of the businesses we have, and not just because we have them — I mean, if they belonged to somebody else — than if I took the Dow 30, excluding the ones weown, or you know, the ﬁrst 100 companies alphabetically on the New York Stock Exchange. WARREN BUFFETT ：我认为他们比大多数企业更容易预测。我想我可以接近告诉你我们几乎所有业务的未来，而不仅仅是因为我们拥有它们 - 我的意思是，如果它们属于其他人 - 而不是因为我拿走了道指30，不包括那些我们拥有，或者你知道，纽约证券交易所按字母顺序排列前100家公司。

I think ours are way easier to predict.There are fair — they tend to be fundamental things, fairly simple.Rate of change is not fast, so I feel pretty comfortable. 我认为我们更容易预测。公平 - 它们往往是基本的东西，相当简单。变化速度不快，所以我觉得很舒服。

I think, when you look at Berkshire ﬁve years from now, the businesses we have now will be performing pretty much as we've anticipated at this time. 我想，当你从现在起五年后看伯克希尔时，我们现在所拥有的业务将会像我们此时预期的那样表现得非常好。

I hope there are some new ones, and I hope they're big ones.But I don't think that we'll have had lots of surprises in the present ones. 我希望有一些新的，我希望它们是大的。但我不认为我们现在会有很多惊喜。

My guess is we'll have had one surprise.I don't know what it'll be.But I mean, you know, that happens in life.But there won't be a series of them. 我的猜测是我们会有一个惊喜。我不知道它会是什么。但我的意思是，你知道，这发生在生活中。但是不会有一系列的。

Whereas, if you — if we were to buy — if we owned a base metals business or many retailing businesses I can think of, or an auto business, I'm not sure I'd know where we would stand in the competitive pecking orderﬁve or 10 years from now. 然而，如果你 - 如果我们要购买 - 如果我们拥有一家基本金属公司或许多我能想到的零售业务，或者一家汽车公司，我不确定我会知道我们在竞争激烈的订单中的立场五年或十年后。

I would not want to try and come in and displace See's Candies, for example, in the business it does, or the Furniture Mart.It's not an easy job. 我不想尝试进入并取代See's Candies，例如，它的业务，或家具市场。这不是一件容易的事。

So, I don't think you'll get lots of surprises with the present businesses of Berkshire, but the key is developing more of them. 因此，我不认为你会对伯克希尔目前的业务感到惊讶，但关键是要开发更多这些业务。

18. Eisner is "most important factor" in Disney's success 18.艾斯纳是迪士尼成功的“最重要因素”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4? WARREN BUFFETT：第4区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Stafford Ordahl.I'm from Morris, New York. 听众：我的名字是Stafford Ordahl。我来自纽约的莫里斯。 I was just wondering if the surprise could be coming from Disney.Because it seems to me they've been coasting, up until very recently, on the efforts of a person that's no longer with the company, [Jeffrey] Katzenberg, who is one of those rare geniuses, like [ﬁlmmaker Steven] Spielberg, thathas his ﬁnger on the pulse of the American people. 我只是想知道这个惊喜是否会来自迪士尼。因为在我看来他们一直在滑行，直到最近，在一个不再与公司合作的人的努力下，[杰弗里]卡森伯格，他是那些罕见的天才之一，如[电影制片人史蒂文]斯皮尔伯格，他的手指是美国人民的脉搏。

And that — they don't come along every day, even in Hollywood. 而且 - 即使在好莱坞，它们也不会每天都出现。

They might be a very different company now that all of his efforts are, so to speak, out of the pipeline. 他们可能是一个非常不同的公司，因为他的所有努力都可以说是脱离了管道。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.Have you ﬁnished, or —? WARREN BUFFETT：是的。你完成了，还是 - ？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. 听众会员：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I — Katzenberg is a real talent.I would say that, by far, I mean, by far, the most important person at Disney in the last 12 years, or whatever it's been, has been [CEO] Michael Eisner. WARREN BUFFETT ：是的，我 - Katzenberg是一个真正的人才。我想说，到目前为止，我的意思是，到目前为止，迪士尼在过去12年中最重要的人，或者其他任何人，都是[首席执行官]迈克尔艾斯纳。

I mean, if you know him and what he has done in the business, there’s no one — [former President and Chief Operating Ofﬁcer] Frank Wells did a terriﬁc job in conjunction with Eisner. 我的意思是，如果你了解他以及他在这项业务中做了什么，那就没有人 - [前任总裁兼首席运营官]弗兰克威尔斯与艾斯纳共同完成了一项非常棒的工作。

But Eisner has been the "Walt Disney," in effect, of his tenure.He knows the business.He loves the business.You know, he eats and lives and breathes it.And he has been, in my view, by far, the most important factor in Disney's success. 但艾斯纳在任职期间一直是“沃尔特迪斯尼”。他了解这项业务。他热爱这项业务。你知道，他吃，生活，呼吸它。在我看来，他一直是迪士尼成功的最重要因素。

Now, they face competition.The money is in — you know, the big money is in the animated ﬁlms and everything that revolves around that, because you go from ﬁlms to parks to character merchandising and back.And I mean, it's a circular sort of thing, which feeds on itself.There's going to be plenty of competition in that. 现在，他们面临竞争。这笔钱是 - 你知道，动画电影中的大笔资金以及围绕着这一切的所有东西，因为你从电影到公园再到人物推销和回归。我的意思是，这是一种循环的东西，它以自身为食。这方面会有很多竞争。

I mean, they’ve — you know, you've seen what MCA and Universal's going to do in the parks in Florida.And you know what DreamWorks is going to do in animation.And now, you've got new technology in animation, you know, through [Pixar CEO Steve Jobs.] And there's a lot of things going on in that ﬁeld. 我的意思是，他们 - 你知道，你已经看到了MCA和环球公司将在佛罗里达州的公园里做些什么。你知道梦工厂将在动画中做些什么。现在，你已经通过[皮克斯首席执行官史蒂夫乔布斯]获得动画新技术了。而且这个领域还有很多事情要发生。 So the question is, 10 years from now, what place in the mind — because it's a share of mind.You know, they call it share of market, but it starts with share of mind — and what place in the mind of billions of children around the world, and their parents, does Disney itself have, and their characters, relative to that owned byother organizations and other characters? 所以问题是，从现在起10年后，心中的位置 - 因为它是心灵的一部分。你知道，他们把它称之为市场份额，但它始于心灵的共享 - 以及世界上数十亿儿童和他们的父母在迪士尼本身拥有的东西，以及他们的角色相对于拥有者其他组织和其他角色？

And it's a competitive world, so there will be people ﬁghting for that.But I would rather start with Disney's hand than anyone else's, by some margin.And I would rather start with Michael Eisner running the place than with anyone else, by some margin. 这是一个竞争激烈的世界，所以会有人为之奋斗。但我宁愿从迪士尼的手开始，也不愿以其他人的方式开始。而且我宁愿从迈克尔艾斯纳那里开始，而不是与其他任何人一起跑步。

So that does not mean that it can't become a much more competitive business.Because people look at the video releases of a "Lion King," and they salivate. 所以这并不意味着它不能成为一个更具竞争力的业务。因为人们看着“狮子王”的视频版本，他们垂涎三尺。

You know, you sell 30 million copies of something at whatever it may be, 16 or $17, and you can ﬁgure out the manufacturing cost.And you know, it gets your attention.And it gets your competitors' attention. 你知道，你可以卖掉3000万份的东西，无论是16或17美元，你都可以计算出制造成本。你知道，这会引起你的注意。它会引起竞争对手的注意。

But going back, if I had to — if I thought the children of the world were going to want to be entertained 10 or 20 years from now, and I had my choice of betting on who is going to have a special place, if anyonehas a special place, in the minds of those kids and their parents, I think I would probably rather bet on Disney. 但回去，如果我不得不 - 如果我认为世界上的孩子们想要从现在起10年或20年后才能被娱乐，我可以选择投注谁会有一个特殊的地方，如果有的话在这些孩子和他们的父母的心目中有一个特殊的地方，我想我可能宁可打赌迪士尼。

And I would feel particularly good about betting on them, if I had the guy who has done what Eisner has done over those years presiding in the future. 如果我有那个曾经做过艾斯纳在未来主持的那些年里做过的人，我会觉得投注他们特别好。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think it helps to do the simple arithmetic.Suppose you have a billion children of low-middle income 20 years from now.And suppose you could make $10 per year per child, after taxes, from your position.It gets into very large numbers. CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我觉得做简单算术很有帮助。假设从现在起20年后你有10亿中低收入儿童。并且假设你可以从你的位置每个孩子每年10美元，税后。它变得非常大。

And — (laughter) — I don't know about your children and grandchildren, but mine want to see Disney.And they want to see it — (applause) — over and over and over again.They don't want to see Katzenberg.(Laughter) 并且 - （笑） - 我不知道你的孩子和孙子，但我想看迪士尼。他们希望看到它 - （掌声） - 一遍又一遍。他们不想看Katzenberg。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well I — 沃伦巴菲特：嗯，我 - CHARLIE MUNGER: I mean, in terms of the trade name.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：我的意思是，就商品名而言。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: It's a pretty good trade name.I mean, when you think about names around the world, it's interesting that, you know, it's very hard to beat the name Coca-Cola.But Disney's got a — it's very, very big name. WARREN BUFFETT：这是一个非常好的商品名。我的意思是，当你想到世界各地的名字时，有趣的是，你知道，很难打败可口可乐这个名字。但迪斯尼有一个 - 它非常非常大的名字。

And Charlie's point that they want to see them over and over again, and it's kind of nice to be able to recycle Snow White every seven or eight years.You hit a different crowd. 而查理的观点是，他们想要一遍又一遍地看到它们，而且能够每隔七八年回收一次白雪公主真是太好了。你遇到了不同的人群。

And — (laughter) — it's kind of like having an oil ﬁeld, you know, where you pump out all the oil and sell it.And then it all seeps back in over seven or eight years.(Laughter) 并且 - （笑声） - 这就像有一块油田，你知道，在哪里抽出所有的油并将其卖掉。然后这一切都在七八年后出现了。（笑声）

19. Why Wall Street businesses are "tough" to manage 19.为什么华尔街企业“难以”管理

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5? WARREN BUFFETT：5区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm Randall Bellows (PH) from Chicago.Thank you for this marathon question-and-answer period. 观众：我是来自芝加哥的Randall Bellows（PH）。感谢您参加这个马拉松式的问答环节。

WARREN BUFFETT: We enjoy it.Thanks. WARREN BUFFETT：我们很享受。谢谢。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you.My question is on the security business, Wall Street ﬁrms, in general, and speciﬁcally, what you feel about Salomon at this time.Thank you. 听众会员：谢谢。我的问题是关于安全业务，华尔街公司，特别是你对萨洛蒙的看法。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we know more about the security business than we knew 10 years ago. (Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我们比10年前更了解安全业务。（笑声）

And it, you know, it is a tough business to manage. 而且，它知道，管理是一项艰巨的任务。

There's a lot of money made in the business and then — throughout Wall Street, I'm talking about.There's, you know, there's very big sums of money made.And then the question is, how does it get divided up between the institution and the people there? 这项业务有很多钱，然后 - 在整个华尔街，我都在谈论。你知道，这里有很多钱。然后问题是，它如何在机构和那里的人之间分配？

And you get to this question — I've often used the analogy of, you know, would you rather — if you're an investor, and you get a chance to buy the Mayo Clinic, you know, that is one sort of aninvestment.And if you get a chance to buy the local brain surgeon, that's another one. 而你得到了这个问题 - 我经常使用类比，你知道，你愿意 - 如果你是投资者，你有机会购买梅奥诊所，你知道，这是一种投资。如果你有机会购买当地的脑外科医生，那就是另一个。 You buy the local brain surgeon and his practice for X millions of dollars.And the next day, you know, what do you own? 你买了当地的脑外科医生和他的X训练数百万美元。第二天，你知道，你拥有什么？

And if you're buying the local brain surgeon, you would not pay any real multiple of earnings because he's going to have this revelation, several days later, that it's really him and not you there, with your little stock certiﬁcate, that's producing theearnings.And it's his reputation.And he doesn't care. 如果你正在购买当地的脑外科医生，你就不会支付任何真正的收入倍数，因为几天后他会得到这个启示，这真的是他，而不是你那里，你的小股票证书，那就产生了收益。这是他的声誉。他并不在意。

Can you imagine Berkshire Hathaway advertising brain surgery, you know, how much business we would do? 你能想象伯克希尔哈撒韦广告脑手术吗，你知道，我们会做多少生意？

So — (laughter) — he owns the business, even though you've got the stock certiﬁcate. 所以 - （笑声） - 他拥有这项业务，即使你已经获得了股票证书。

Now, if you go to the Mayo Clinic, no one can name the name of anybody at the Mayo Clinic, unless you live within 10 miles of Rochester [Minnesota]. 现在，如果你去梅奥诊所，没有人可以在梅奥诊所命名任何人的名字，除非你住在离罗切斯特[明尼苏达州] 10英里的地方。

And there, the institution has the power.Now, it has to keep quality up and do all the things that an institution has to do.But whoever owns the Mayo Clinic has an asset that is independent of the attitude of any one person in the place the next day. 在那里，该机构拥有权力。现在，它必须保持质量并完成机构必须做的所有事情。但是，拥有梅奥诊所的人拥有的资产与第二天任何一个人的态度无关。

Wall Street has a mix of both.And there are some businesses that are more — where the value resides more in the institution.And there are some where the value resides more in the individuals. 华尔街有两者兼而有之。还有一些企业更多 - 价值更多地存在于机构中。并且有些地方的价值更多地存在于个人身上。

We've got a couple of sensational people running Salomon.And they wrestle with this problem as they go along.And they seem to be wrestling considerably more successfully currently than was the case close to a year ago. 我们有几个耸人听闻的人在运行萨洛蒙。他们一起努力解决这个问题。而且他们似乎比一年前的情况更成功地摔跤。

But it is not an easy business to run.And it's not an easy business to predict, unless you have a business that's very institutional in character, and there aren't many of those in Wall Street. 但这不是一件容易的事。除非你的企业具有非常体制性的特点，华尔街的企业并不多，否则预测并不容易。

20. Not important if part of the market is "kind of screwy" 20.如果市场的一部分是“有点疯狂”，那就不重要了

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6? WARREN BUFFETT：6区？

Sorry we got a — the microphone’s over here. 对不起，我们有一个 - 麦克风在这里。

CHARLIE MUNGER: (Inaudible) CHARLIE MUNGER :(听不清楚） WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.Just raise your hand and the monitor will supply the microphone. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。只需举手，显示器就会提供麦克风。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you.Howard Winston (PH) from Cincinnati, Ohio. 听众会员：谢谢。 Howard Winston（PH）来自俄亥俄州辛辛那提市。

One question.Are you concerned about the rising valuations on the NASDAQ market, where companies trade at multiples of revenues instead of multiples of earnings? 一个问题。您是否担心纳斯达克市场的估值上升，公司以收入的倍数而非收益倍数进行交易？

WARREN BUFFETT: The rising value of what, did you say? WARREN BUFFETT：你说什么的价值上升？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: The NASDAQ market — 观众：纳斯达克市场 -

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh. WARREN BUFFETT：哦。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — where they trade at 10 times revenues or more, 30 times revenues, instead of 10 times earnings? 观众成员： - 他们以10倍或更多的收入进行交易，收入是收入的30倍，而不是收益的10倍？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.Well, we don't pay much attention to that.Because throughout the careers Charlie and I have had in investing, there have always been hundreds of cases, or thousands of cases, of things that are ridiculously priced, and phony stock promotions, and the gullible being led in to believe in things that just can't come true. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。好吧，我们对此并不太重视。因为在查理和我投资的整个职业生涯中，总有数百个案例，或数千个案例，这些案例价格高得离谱，虚假的股票促销活动，以及容易相信可以做到的事情。没有实现。

So that's always gone on.It always will go on.And it doesn't make any difference to us. 所以这一直都在继续。它总会继续下去。它对我们没有任何影响。

I mean, we are not trying to predict markets.We never will try and predict markets.We're trying to ﬁnd wonderful businesses.And the fact that a part of the market is kind of screwy, you know, that's unimportant to us. 我的意思是，我们不是在试图预测市场。我们永远不会尝试和预测市场。我们正在努力寻找精彩的企业。事实上，市场的一部分有点棘手，你知道，这对我们来说并不重要。

We tried, a few times, shorting some of those things in our innocence of youth.And it's very tough to make money shorting even the obvious frauds.And there are some obvious frauds. 我们曾几次尝试在我们无罪的年轻人中做出一些简短的事情。即使是明显的欺诈行为也很难赚钱。还有一些明显的欺诈行为。

It really is — it's not tough — it’s not so tough to ﬁnd the obvious frauds, and it's not tough to be right over 10 years.But it's very tough to make money being short them, although we tried a few times way back. 它确实是 - 它并不难 - 找到明显的欺诈行为并不是那么困难，并且要做到10年之后并不难。但是，虽然我们已经尝试了几次，但是赚钱却很难实现。

It’s — we don't look at indicia from stocks in general, or from P/Es, or price-sales ratios, or what other things are doing. 它是 - 我们不会从一般股票，P / E，或价格销售比率，或其他事情正在做什么看标记。 We really just focus on businesses.We don't care if there's a stock market.I mean, would we want to own Coca-Cola, the 8 percent we own of Coca-Cola, or the 11 percent or Gillette, if they said, you know, "We're just going to delist the stock and we'renever — you know, we'll open it again in 20 years?" 我们真的只关注业务。我们不关心是否有股票市场。我的意思是，我们想要拥有可口可乐，我们拥有可口可乐的8％，或11％或吉列，如果他们说，你知道，“我们只是要将股票退市，我们就是从来没有 - 你知道，我们会在20年内再次开放吗？“

It's ﬁne with us, you know.And if it goes down on the news, we'll buy more of it.So we care about what the business does.Yeah. 你知道，这对我们没问题。如果它消息不足，我们会购买更多。所以我们关心业务的作用。是啊。

21. A business is more important than where it's based 21.企业比它的基础更重要

WARREN BUFFETT: Norton, did — why don't you give him the microphone there? WARREN BUFFETT：Norton，你做了 - 你为什么不给他那里的麦克风？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you, Warren, for including me — (Buffett laughs) — out of order. 观众成员：谢谢你，沃伦，包括我 - （巴菲特笑） - 出了问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: It's good to have you here.Norton [Dodge] represents a family that came in nineteen-ﬁfty — WARREN BUFFETT ：很高兴你能来到这里。诺顿[道奇]代表一个家庭，在1955年 -

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Six. 观众：六人。

WARREN BUFFETT: Six!Yeah, that joined up with the partnership and has been with us ever since. (Applause) WARREN BUFFETT ：六个！是的，这与合作伙伴关系密切合作，从此一直与我们在一起。（掌声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: A very, very fortunate connection.(Laughter) 观众成员：一个非常非常幸运的联系。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Both ways, Norton, both ways. WARREN BUFFETT：两种方式，诺顿，两种方式。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: And — 观众：和 -

CHARLIE MUNGER: Careful, Norton.We don't want you mobbed on the way out.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：小心，诺顿。我们不希望你在出路的时候围攻。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: But I might say that it all began with my father [Homer Dodge] discovering — thanks to a professor of ﬁnance that was also at the University of Oklahoma — Ben Graham, back in 1940. 听众会员：但我可能会说这一切都始于我的父亲[荷马道奇]发现 - 感谢1945年在俄克拉荷马大学的本· 格雷厄姆大学的金融学教授。

And then later, when Ben Graham was about to retire, we were trying to ﬁnd his protégé.And clearly, that was Warren.And so he belongs to that long tradition. 然后，当本格雷厄姆即将退休时，我们试图找到他的门徒。显然，那是沃伦。所以他属于那个悠久的传统。 But the question I wanted to ask was, you've mentioned the very strong companies that Berkshire has that are really international companies, like Coca-Cola and the — Gillette. 但我想问的问题是，你已经提到伯克希尔拥有的非常强大的公司，这些公司真的是国际公司，比如可口可乐和吉列。

But are you considering, or have you ever thought of considering, the foreign companies that are undervalued?Or have you, for some reason, not included that in your universe of companies to consider? 但是你在考虑，或者你有没有考虑过考虑过被低估的外国公司？或者，出于某种原因，您是否还没有将您的公司纳入考虑范围？

WARREN BUFFETT: We've looked at companies domiciled in other countries.And we continue to look at companies domiciled in other countries. WARREN BUFFETT：我们看过其他国家的公司。我们继续关注其他国家的公司。

We wouldn’t — you know, we're happy for the U.S. and for Atlanta that Coca-Cola's domiciled in Atlanta.But would we pass on it if it happened to be domiciled in England?No, we'd love it, if it were domiciled in England, too. 我们不会 - 你知道，我们很高兴美国和亚特兰大可口可乐公司在亚特兰大定居。但是，如果碰巧在英格兰定居，我们会将它传递给它吗？不，我们也喜欢它，如果它也是在英国定居的话。

And we feel that the important thing is the business, not the domicile.Although, it’s — A, we're more familiar, in a general way, with domestic companies that are domiciled here, although they make — they may make their money internationally. 我们觉得重要的是业务，而不是住所。虽然，它是 - A，但我们对这里定居的国内公司更为熟悉，尽管他们制造 - 他们可能在国际上赚钱。

And we feel a tiny bit more comfortable, just a tiny bit, in terms of understanding the nuances of taxes, and politics, and shareholder governance, and all of that in something where we've been reading and thinking about it daily than someplace wherewe've had a little less experience. 在了解税收，政治和股东治理的细微差别方面，我们感觉更舒适一点，所有这一切都在我们每天阅读和思考它的地方而不是某些地方。我们的经验少了一点。

But we would love to ﬁnd a wonderful business that is domiciled in any one of 30 or so countries around the world. 但我们希望找到一个位于全球30个左右的国家的精彩企业。

We look some.We don't look as hard as we look at domestic companies.We're not as familiar with them. 我们看一些。我们看起来并不像看国内公司那么难。我们对它们并不熟悉。

But I have read hundreds of annual reports of companies spread around the world.And we've owned a few, just a couple. 但我已经阅读了数百份关于遍布全球的公司的年度报告。我们拥有一些，只有几个。

They're usually not as big, so just getting the kind of money in, in many cases, is more of a problem.But some of them are big. 它们通常没有那么大，所以在很多情况下，只要获得这种钱，就更有问题了。但其中一些很重要。

And we do not have such a surplus of ideas that we can afford to ignore any possibilities.And if we can ﬁnd something with a market cap, probably, of at least $5 billion or greater, that strikes us as having our kind of qualities, and the price is right and everything, we will buy. 而且我们没有足够多的想法可以忽略任何可能性。如果我们能够找到市值至少达到50亿美元或更高的市值，那就会让我们感受到我们的品质，价格是正确的，我们会购买。 22. We never reach "for an extra eight of a percent" 22.我们永远不会达到“额外的八分之一”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1? WARREN BUFFETT：第1区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett.I'm Nelson Coburn (PH) from Silver Spring, Maryland.I have one question I want to ask that hasn't come up here yet. 观众：巴菲特先生，下午好。我是来自马里兰州Silver Spring的Nelson Coburn （PH）。我有一个问题，我想问一下，还没有提到这里。

Where does the money sit that comes in, say, from dividends and whatever other income that comes into Berkshire, that you're waiting to invest someplace else?Is it get — someplace where it's taking in a proﬁt?Or is it just sitting, gathering dust?(Laughter) 例如，从股息和进入伯克希尔的其他收入中获得的资金来自哪里，您还在等待在其他地方投资？它得到了 - 它在哪里获利？还是只是坐着，收集灰尘？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we only have about four or ﬁve commercial paper names we accept.We're very picky about where we put — the money all gets invested.We do not have anything sitting around in a safe or anyplace else.So it's all invested. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我们只接受四到五个商业票据名称。我们非常挑剔我们放的地方 - 所有的钱都投入了。我们在保险箱或其他任何地方都没有任何东西。所有投资都是如此。

But we do not get venturesome, in the least, in terms of where our short-term money goes.So we only have, like I say, maybe four or ﬁve approved names on commercial paper, all of which I approve.I mean, if anything ever goes haywire on this, it's my fault. 但就我们的短期资金流向而言，我们至少不会冒险。因此，就像我说的那样，我们在商业票据上只有四五个批准的名称，我赞同所有这些。我的意思是，如果有什么事情在这上面乱了，这是我的错。

Right now, we have, maybe, a billion and something in relatively short-term Treasurys.And we have a little extra in some commercial paper, maybe. 现在，我们可能有十亿美元和一些相对短期的国债。也许，我们在一些商业报纸上还有一些额外的东西。

But you will never see us reaching for an extra eighth of a percent on short-term yields. 但是你永远不会看到我们在短期收益率上达到额外的八分之一。

Some of you may remember the ﬁasco in the — in Penn Central, in the commercial paper market.And Penn Central, around 1970 or thereabouts, was paying a quarter of a point, as I remember, more than other commercial paper issuers. 你们中的一些人可能还记得在宾夕法尼亚州中部商业票据市场的惨败。据我记得，在1970年左右，宾夕法尼亚中心大约支付了四分之一，比其他商业票据发行人更多。

And of course, they, one day, despite showing a positive net worth, I think, of a billion and a half or so, they said they had a lot of net worth but no cash.Turned out cash was more important.And so they defaulted. 当然，有一天，他们尽管显示出一个十亿美元左右的正净值，但他们说他们有很多净资产但没有现金。原来现金更重要。所以他们违约了。

Now, the interesting thing about doing that is, if you're getting a quarter of a point extra, and you came over on the Mayﬂower, and you landed, and you said, "Well, I'm going to apply myself to gettinga quarter of a point extra on short-term money," and you didn't make any mistake until you got to Penn Central, you would — aside from the compounding aspect — you would be behind at that point. 现在，关于这样做的有趣之处在于，如果你得到额外的四分之一点数，然后你来到了五月花号，然后你降落了，你说，“好吧，我会适应自己短期资金增加了四分之一，“除非你到了宾夕法尼亚中心，否则你没有犯任何错误，你会 - 除了复合方面 - 你会落后于此。

And I don't like a business that you can do right for 300 years and then make one mistake and — (laughter) — be behind. 而且我不喜欢你可以做300 年的事情，然后犯一个错误 - （笑声） - 落后。

So we are very picky about short-term paper.But it is all invested.And when it's large amounts, it probably will be in Treasurys.A couple ﬁrms' commercial paper, we take. 所以我们对短期论文非常挑剔。但这都是投资。当它数量很大时，可能会出现在美国国债市场。我们采取了几家公司的商业票据。

23. Volatile earnings to be expected at Salomon 23.所罗门的预期收益波动

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2, please? WARREN BUFFETT：第2区，好吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is George Gotti (PH) from Zurich, Switzerland.I've got a question with respect to Salomon. 听众：我的名字是来自瑞士苏黎世的George Gotti（PH）。我对萨洛蒙有一个问题。

Salomon experienced quite a large volatility in proﬁts and even revenues in the past years.What are your views on how this will develop in the future with respect to volatility in proﬁts and revenues? 过去几年，所罗门的利润甚至收入都出现了相当大的波动。关于利润和收入的波动性，您对未来的发展有何看法？

WARREN BUFFETT: I didn't get a hundred percent of that, Charlie.Want to —? 沃伦巴菲特：查理，我没有得到百分之百的报酬。想要 -？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, well — CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，嗯 -

WARREN BUFFETT: I can see, he can hear.We make a great combination.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：我可以看到，他可以听到。我们做了很好的组合。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you can see we aren't wasting much around the joint.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，你可以看到我们并没有在关节周围浪费太多。（笑声）

Salomon's earnings have always been volatile, at least all the time I've been around the place.And I don't think that that volatility will — is likely to disappear. 所罗门的收入一直很不稳定，至少我一直都在这个地方。而且我认为这种波动不会 - 很可能会消失。

All that said, we very much like the people at Salomon.And they've done a ton of business with Berkshire over the years and in a whole lot of different capacities.And they've done it very well. 所有这一切，我们非常喜欢所罗门的人。多年来，他们与伯克希尔公司进行了大量业务，并且拥有许多不同的能力。而且他们做得非常好。

So we're high on the ﬁrm, as a customer.And the ﬁrms we like, as a customer, we think, maybe, other people will like, as a customer.And generally, we love it, volatile or no. 因此，作为客户，我们在公司中处于领先地位。作为客户，我们认为，作为客户，我们认为，其他人可能会喜欢这些公司。一般来说，我们喜欢它，不稳定或不喜欢。

WARREN BUFFETT: If you — at Salomon, as well as other ﬁrms of that type, they mark their securities to market.And so the changes in those marks go through earnings daily, actually, but you see them quarterly. WARREN BUFFETT ：如果您 - 在Salomon以及其他类型的公司，他们将他们的证券标记到市场。所以这些商标的变化实际上是每天都有收益，但你会每季度看到它们。

Interestingly, if you took Berkshire over the last 30 years, and marked to market, as we do now for balance sheet purposes, but not for income statement purposes, because the rules are different in that case — if you did that, you would seeenormous volatility, quarter to quarter, in Berkshire's ﬁgures. 有趣的是，如果你在过去的30年里把伯克希尔带到了市场，就像我们现在用于资产负债表目的一样，但不是出于损益表的目的，因为在这种情况下规则是不同的 - 如果你这样做，你会看到伯克希尔的数据显示，季度到季度的波动幅度很大。

You would — I don't think you'd necessarily have seen any down year.But you would've seen swings between a few percent and, perhaps, 50 percent or something. 你会 - 我认为你不一定会看到任何下降的一年。但你会看到几个百分点之间的波动，也许是50％或者其他东西。

And if you looked quarterly, you'd have seen a number of quarters of losses.And you would've seen some great upsurges, too. 如果你看季度，你会看到几个季度的损失。你也会看到一些伟大的热潮。

The volatility would be extreme, if it had all been run through the income account.But accounting convention does not call for running it through the income account, in the case of Berkshire.And it does, in the case of Salomon. 如果全部通过收入账户进行，那么波动性将是极端的。但就伯克希尔而言，会计惯例并不要求通过收入账户运行它。就所罗门而言，确实如此。

But the nature of their business is volatile earnings.The nature of most Wall Street businesses is going to be volatile earnings.Some may follow policies that tend to make it look a little less volatile than it might actually be, even. 但他们的业务性质是收益波动。大多数华尔街企业的性质将是收益波动。有些人可能会遵循这样的政策，这些政策往往会使其看起来不像实际情况那样波动，甚至。

The real thing that counts is two things, really.I mean, it's running it so that the volatility never kills you in any way, and the second is having a decent return on equity over time.And I think that the people at the top of Salomon are very focused on that. 真正重要的是两件事，真的。我的意思是，它正在运行它以便波动性永远不会以任何方式杀死你，第二个是随着时间的推移而获得不错的股本回报。而且我认为所罗门顶级人物非常关注这一点。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think it's illogical for the credit rating agencies to mark down Salomon as much as they do because the earnings are volatile.But they're in a style business.And it's their game. CHARLIE MUNGER：我认为信用评级机构尽可能多地记下所罗门是不合逻辑的，因为收益波动很大。但他们是一个时尚企业。这是他们的比赛。

24. Very little interaction between Berkshire subsidiaries 24.伯克希尔子公司之间的互动很少

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone — what are we?Zone 3 now?Yeah, zone 3. WARREN BUFFETT：区域 - 我们是什么？ 3区现在？是的，3区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes.I have three quick questions. 听众会员：是的。我有三个简单的问题。 Do you have any formal or informal way where the managements — I know that you don't interfere with the managements of the holdings — but where they can cross-pollinate ideas, for instance, you know, selling World Book through the GEICO channel orsomething like that? 您是否有正式或非正式的管理方式 - 我知道您不会干扰馆藏的管理 - 但他们可以交叉授粉的想法，例如，您知道，通过GEICO渠道销售World Book或这样的事情？

WARREN BUFFETT: I'll answer that right now.There's very, very, very little of that, I — you know, maybe once in two or three years, maybe some idea might strike me as worth passing along.But I — they're doing ﬁne running their own operations. WARREN BUFFETT：我现在就回答。非常，非常非常少，我 - 你知道，也许在两三年内，也许一些想法可能会让我觉得值得传递。但是我 - 他们做自己的运作很好。

We don't do it within Berkshire, either.They really go their own way. 我们也不会在伯克希尔这样做。他们真的走自己的路。

Now, they know what businesses we're in. And so they can always go directly to somebody else.But they don't need me to communicate. 现在，他们知道我们在做什么业务。所以他们总是可以直接去找别人。但他们不需要我沟通。

25. Lloyd's of London reputation problems have helped Berkshire 25.劳埃德的伦敦声誉问题帮助了伯克希尔

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4? WARREN BUFFETT：第4区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Mike Macey (PH) from Las Vegas, Nevada. 观众：我的名字是来自内华达州拉斯维加斯的Mike Macey（PH）。

My question is this.There have been some recent news articles on the problems at Lloyd's.What effect, if any, do you see the problems at Lloyd's having on an increase in the Berkshire insurance or reinsurance business? 我的问题是这个。最近有一些关于劳合社问题的新闻文章。如果有的话，您认为劳合社在伯克希尔保险或再保险业务上的增加有什么影响？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think, probably, I think it's fair to say that the problems of Lloyd's have helped us because Lloyd's had a terriﬁc reputation.It was the ﬁrst stop and, usually, the last stop for all kinds of unusual risks and large risks 20 years ago. 沃伦巴菲特：嗯，我想，我认为可以说劳埃德的问题对我们有所帮助，因为劳埃德有着极好的声誉。这是20年前各种不寻常风险和巨大风险的第一站，通常是最后一站。

And the fact that they have lost some of their luster in that period has helped us.And, you know, we didn't do anything to contribute to it, but it obviously beneﬁts us, as a competitor, when questions develop about an organization which has been a premier player in the industry. 他们在那个时期失去了一些光彩这一事实对我们有所帮助。并且，你知道，我们没有做任何贡献，但作为一个竞争对手，当问题发展成为一个行业中的主要参与者的组织时，它显然有益于我们。

So, Berkshire probably possesses more capital than all of Lloyd's put together, and it has established a reputation for being willing to quote on very large risks very quickly and to do exactly what it says.And it might very well be that, in many cases, we would get a call before they would get the call now. 因此，伯克希尔可能拥有的资金超过劳埃德所有的资本，并且它已经建立了一个声誉，因为它愿意非常迅速地引用非常大的风险并完全按照它所说的去做。很可能在很多情况下，我们会在他们现在接到电话之前接听电话。

So we've been a beneﬁciary and, probably, in a fairly good-sized way, from their problems.And it's more difﬁcult for them to make inroads on us now than would've been the case 10 years ago. 所以我们一直是他们的问题的受益者，而且可能是一个相当大的方式。现在，他们比10年前的情况更难以侵入我们。

We have a — I don't like to lay it on too strong — but we do have a preeminent position in a certain area of really large-scale reinsurance that will be difﬁcult for anyone else to replicate. 我们有一个 - 我不喜欢把它放得太强 - 但我们确实在一个真正大规模再保险的某个领域拥有一个卓越的地位，其他任何人都难以复制。

Now, they may not like our prices.There may not be demand for some of the things we can do.But if there is demand, we are very likely to get some very signiﬁcant business out of that position.And we've seen it some in recent years.And we'll see it more in the future. 现在，他们可能不喜欢我们的价格。对我们可以做的一些事情可能没有要求。但如果有需求，我们很可能会从这个位置获得一些非常重要的业务。我们近年来已经看到了一些。而且我们将来会看到更多。

26. "We assume we'll be around forever" “我们假设我们将永远存在”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5? WARREN BUFFETT：5区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mike Assail (PH) from New York City with a question for Charlie about the hundred or so models we ought to have in our head — 观众成员：来自纽约市的Mike Assail（PH）向Charlie提出了一个问题，关于我们应该拥有的大约一百个模型 -

WARREN BUFFETT: Here we go. 沃伦巴菲特：我们走了。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — mentioned at the end of the excellent "Worldly Wisdom" speech. 观众成员： - 在出色的“世俗智慧”演讲结束时提到。

I'd like to know the most useful models on industry consolidation, on product extension, on vertical integration, and any models which explain the special cases when it makes sense to invest in retailing stocks.And if Warren has anything to add or subtract, I'd love to hear it.Thank you very much. 我想知道最有用的行业整合模型，产品扩展，垂直整合，以及解释投资零售库存时的特殊情况的任何模型。如果沃伦有任何可以增加或减少的东西，我很乐意听到它。非常感谢你。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I'm glad to answer such a modest question.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我很高兴回答这么温和的问题。（笑声）

I spoke about having a hundred models in your head.But those are all great, big models of considerable generality that are useful over and over again. 我谈到你脑子里有一百个模特。但这些都是伟大的，具有相当普遍性的大型模型，一遍又一遍地有用。

Now, you're down into very complex sub-modeling when you get into a separate model for what's going to happen in industrial consolidations and retail and so on, and I'm not up to all those sub- models.(Laughter) 现在，当你进入一个单独的模型来讨论工业整合和零售等将会发生什么时，你就会陷入非常复杂的子模型，而我并不是所有这些子模型。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: The truth is, you know, we're up to a few.But we take the general models and, you know, plug them in. And sometimes, the light goes on.And sometimes, it doesn't.But if it does, they could be quite useful. WARREN BUFFETT：事实是，你知道，我们有几个。但是我们采用一般模型，你知道，插入它们。有时候，灯光还在继续。有时，它没有。但如果确实如此，它们可能非常有用。

If you focus, you do see repetition of certain business patterns and business behavior.And Wall Street tends to ignore those, incidentally.I mean, Wall Street really doesn't seem to learn, for very long, business lessons. 如果您专注，您确实会看到某些业务模式和业务行为的重复。顺便说一句，华尔街倾向于忽视这些。我的意思是，在很长一段时间里，华尔街似乎并没有学到很多商业课程。

It may not be to their advantage to learn it.Charlie would — that would probably plug right in to Charlie's model.It’s — 学习它可能对他们有利。查理会 - 这可能会插入查理的模型。它的 -

CHARLIE MUNGER: You bet. CHARLIE MUNGER：你打赌。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.It's better, if you're out selling the future, it may be better to forget the past, if you're getting paid on selling it and not on betting your life on it in some way. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。更好的是，如果你出售未来，最好忘记过去，如果你通过出售而获得报酬，而不是以某种方式投入你的生活。

One situation at Berkshire that really is somewhat different than many companies: we assume, and unfortunately, it's in error, but we assume we'll be around forever. 伯克希尔的一种情况确实与许多公司有所不同：我们假设，不幸的是，这是错误的，但我们假设我们将永远存在。

So when we — in our insurance business, we assume we're going to be here to pay every claim.And we're not going to retire at 65 and hand over something to someone else.And there wouldn't be any sense paying games on accounting because it would catch up with us later on. 因此，当我们 - 在我们的保险业务中，我们假设我们将在这里支付每一项索赔。而且我们不会在65 岁退休并将某些东西交给其他人。在会计方面支付游戏没有任何意义，因为它会在以后赶上我们。

And whereas, in many businesses, I don't think they have quite the same horizon on things.They do at a Coca-Cola, or they do at a Gillette. 然而，在许多企业中，我认为他们对事物的看法并不相同。他们在可口可乐公司做，或者在吉列做。

But many companies are thinking about what kind of — I think, I'm afraid that, more than you'd like — are thinking about what little pictures they can paint for the next four quarters or so.And that's easy to do. 但是很多公司都在考虑什么样的 - 我认为，我担心，比你想要的更多 - 正在思考他们可以在接下来的四个季度左右绘制的小图片。这很容易做到。

But our problem is we're going to be around a lot longer, we think, than four quarters, so that's not an option available to us.And we have to — we really run it as if, in the year 2050 or something, somebody's going to look and say, "Did — how'd it work out?" 但我们的问题是，我们认为，与四个季度相比，我们将会持续更长时间，所以这不是我们可以选择的选择。而且我们必须 - 我们真的运行它，好像在2050年或其他什么时候，有人会看起来并说，“有没有 - 它是如何运作的？”

27. Compensation plans must include cost of capital 27.补偿计划必须包括资本成本

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone, where are we, 5 or 6?Wherever the microphone is. WARREN BUFFETT：区域，我们在哪里，5或6？麦克风在哪里。 Zone 5, we got a mic over there?Maybe that was — 6!OK, we'll go to 6. 第5区，我们那边有一个麦克风？也许那是 - 6！好的，我们将去6。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: You state, in your letter — 听众：你在信中说：

WARREN BUFFETT: Could you have the microphone?Or do we have one in the — yeah.Want to bring him the microphone?Particularly for the people behind you, it’s a little difﬁcult. WARREN BUFFETT：你能拿麦克风吗？或者我们有一个 - 是的。想给他带麦克风吗？特别是对于你身后的人来说，这有点困难。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Glen Rollins (PH), Atlanta, Georgia. 听众：Glen Rollins（PH），佐治亚州亚特兰大市。

You state, in your letters to shareholders, that with your wholly owned companies, you reward them at a higher rate when they release capital to you.And you, likewise, charge them a higher rate when they need capital.Could you elaborate on that? 您在给股东的信中说明，与您的全资公司一起，当您向您发放资金时，您会以更高的利率奖励它们。同样，当他们需要资金时，你会向他们收取更高的费用。你能详细说明吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we — some of our businesses don't need capital at all, or need so little that it doesn't make sense to build it into a formula. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我们 - 我们的一些企业根本不需要资金，或者需要这么少，以至于将它构建成公式是没有意义的。

So we have certain businesses, those are the best businesses, incidentally, that take — to take, essentially, no capital because it means that, if you double the size of the business, you don't need any more capital.And those are really wonderful businesses.And we've got a few of those. 因此，我们拥有某些业务，顺便说一句，那些业务最好的业务基本上没有资本，因为这意味着，如果您将业务规模扩大一倍，则不需要更多资金。这些都是非常好的业务。而且我们有一些。

But where our businesses do produce capital, we could have all kinds of complicated systems and have capital budgeting groups at headquarters and do all kinds of things. 但是，在我们的企业生产资金的地方，我们可以拥有各种复杂的系统，并在总部设立资本预算组，并做各种事情。

But we just ﬁgure it's simpler to charge people a fair amount for the money and then let them ﬁgure out, you know, whether they really want to buy a new slitter or whatever it may be in their business. 但我们只是认为向人们收取相当数额的钱更简单，然后让他们弄清楚，他们是否真的想要购买新的分切机或其业务中的任何东西。

And it varies a little bit.It varies on the history of when we came in. It varies on interest rates that they — but we generally will be charging people something in the area of 15 percent, in terms of working out compensation arrangements for capital. 它有一点变化。它根据我们进入的历史而有所不同。它们的利率各不相同 - 但我们通常会向人们收取 15％的费用，用于制定资本补偿安排。

Now, 15 percent pretax, depending on state income taxes, is only 9 to 9 1/2 percent after-tax.So you can say that isn't even enough to charge people, but we ﬁnd that 15 percent gets their attention. 现在，15％的税前税，根据州所得税，税后只有9％到9个半税。所以你可以说这甚至不足以让人们收费，但我们发现有15％的人会引起他们的注意。

And it should get their attention, but it shouldn't be such a high-hurdle rate that things that we want to do don't get done.

它应该得到他们的关注，但它不应该是如此高的障碍率，我们想要做的事情没有完成。

Our managers expect to be running their businesses for a long, long time.So we don't worry about them doing something that works for them in the next year but doesn't work ﬁve years out or vice — you know, where they don't make longer plans, because they see themselves as part-owners ofthe business.But we want them to be owners with a cost attached to capital. 我们的经理希望长期运营他们的业务。因此，我们不担心他们会在明年做一些对他们有用的事情，但是五年后也不会工作或者他们知道，他们不会制定更长的计划，因为他们认为自己是部分所有者。这生意。但我们希望他们成为拥有资本成本的所有者。

We think it's awful, frankly, the way businesses reward executives with absolutely no regard for the cost of capital.I mean, a ﬁxed-price option for 10 years — you know, imagine giving somebody an interest-free loan for 10 years.You're not going to do it. 坦率地说，我们认为企业奖励高管的方式完全不考虑资本成本。我的意思是，10年的固定价格选择 - 你知道，想象一下给某人10年的无息贷款。你不打算这样做。

And if a company is retaining a signiﬁcant part of its earnings, and you give out a ﬁxed-price option for 10 years, you know, they can do nothing with it but put it in a savings account, and they'll make some moneyoff of it.So it — we like attaching a cost to the capital. 如果一家公司保留其收入的很大一部分，并且你给出10年的固定价格选项，你知道，他们可以做任何事情，但把它放在一个储蓄账户，他们会赚一些钱离开它。所以它 - 我们喜欢将成本附加到资本。

If we had options for me and Charlie at Berkshire, which would not — it’s not going to happen, but it would not be illogical.We have responsibility for the whole place. 如果我们和伯克希尔的查理有选择，那不会 - 这不会发生，但这不会是不合逻辑的。我们对整个地方负责。

You could have some kind of a compensation arrangement that worked in respect to how the whole enterprise fared, and it would make sense for the two of us. 您可以采取某种形式的补偿安排，这种安排对整个企业的运作方式起作用，对我们两个人来说是有意义的。

It wouldn't make sense for the rest of our managers because they work on speciﬁc units.And you should have compensation arrangements that apply to those units. 对其他经理来说没有意义，因为他们在特定单位工作。你应该有适用于这些单位的补偿安排。

But assuming you had it for the two of us — which we're not going to have, I want to assure you — but we would say the fair way to do that would be to have an option at not less than present intrinsic value. 但假设你为我们两个人 - 我们不会拥有它 - 我想向你保证 - 但我们会说，做到这一点的合理方式是选择不低于现有的内在价值。

Forget what the market price is.Because, believe me, it — the idea of having the more depressed your market price be, the better your option price be, does not make any sense. 忘记市场价格。因为，相信我，它 - 让你的市场价格更加低迷的想法，你的期权价格越高，没有任何意义。

So we would have it at not less than intrinsic value.And then we would have it step up yearly based on something relating to a cost to capital.Because we would say, "Why should we get free use of the shareholders' capital?"And we could work out a fair stock option. 所以我们会以不低于内在价值的方式获得它。然后我们会根据与资本成本相关的事情逐年加强。因为我们会说，“我们为什么要自由使用股东资本？”我们可以制定一个公平的股票期权。

That would be perfectly appropriate.We won't do it, but it'd be a perfectly appropriate way to have us compensated that involved an issuance, then an initial price of not less than intrinsic value, and involve carrying costs. 那是完全合适的。我们不会这样做，但它是一个非常合适的方式让我们补偿涉及发行，然后是不低于内在价值的初始价格，并涉及承担成本。

And then we would be in a position, still, not totally analogous to shareholders, because we wouldn't have a downside that you have, but we would at least have the carrying cost that you have of ownership. 然后我们将处于一个位置，仍然不是完全类似于股东，因为我们不会有你的缺点，但我们至少会拥有你拥有的持有成本。

And we work that through into our unit compensation plans by having a cost of capital that, like I say, tends to run about that 15 percent area. 我们通过制定资本成本来完成我们的单位薪酬计划，就像我说的那样，它往往会占据15％的面积。

And if people can give us money, we should be able to ﬁgure out a way to do something better than 15 percent pretax with it.That's part of our job, too.So we will pay them to give us back money. 如果人们可以给我们钱，我们应该能够找到一种方法来做比15％的税前更好的事情。这也是我们工作的一部分。所以我们会付钱给他们给我们钱。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we really invented a more extreme system.And that is the executives can buy Berkshire Hathaway stock in the market for cash. CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我们真的发明了一个更极端的系统。这就是高管们可以在市场上购买伯克希尔哈撒韦股票以换取现金。

This is a — (laughter) — very old-fashioned system, but most of them — it doesn't take any lawyers, or compensation consultants, or — and most of them have done it.And most of them have done very well with it.I don't know why it doesn't spread more.(Laughter) 这是一个 - （笑声） - 非常老式的系统，但大多数 - 它不需要任何律师，或补偿顾问，或 - 并且大多数人已经完成了。他们中的大多数人都做得很好。我不知道它为什么不传播更多。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: People say they want their management to think like shareholders.Management, you know, they're compensating them.We're going to have them think like shareholders.It's very easy to think like a shareholder.Become one, you know?(Laughter) 沃伦·巴菲特：人们说他们希望自己的管理层像股东一样思考。管理层，你知道，他们正在补偿他们。我们会让他们像股东一样思考。像股东一样思考很容易。成为一个，你知道吗？（笑声）

And you'll think exactly like a shareholder. 你会认为就像股东一样。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Right, right. CHARLIE MUNGER：对，对。

WARREN BUFFETT: It's not a great — it’s not a huge psychological hurdle to get over, if you actually write a check.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：这不是一件好事 - 如果你真的写了一张支票，这不是一个巨大的心理障碍。（笑声）

28. Unlike many movie companies, Disney makes money for shareholders 28.与许多电影公司不同，迪士尼为股东赚钱

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1? WARREN BUFFETT：第1区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: John Lichter from Boulder, Colorado. 听众：来自科罗拉多州博尔德的John Lichter。 Are there some worthwhile books that you could recommend to us? 您可以向我们推荐一些有价值的书籍吗？

And secondly, with respect to Eisner and Disney, how would you deﬁne Michael Eisner's circle of competence?And are you concerned that he might step outside it? 其次，关于艾斯纳和迪士尼，你如何定义迈克尔艾斯纳的能力范围？你担心他可能会走出它吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say that he has proven himself very good at understanding what Disney is really all about. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我会说他已经证明自己非常善于理解迪士尼的真正意义。

And you can look back to the predecessor management, between Walt and Eisner.And they didn't really do much with that, if you look at those years. 你可以回顾沃尔特和艾斯纳之间的前任管理层。如果你看那些年，他们并没有真正做很多事情。

What is special about Disney?And how do you make it more special?And how do you make it more special to more people?I mean, those are the things that you want to — and you've got wonderful ingredients to work with when you're working with something like Disney. 迪士尼有什么特别之处？你怎么让它更特别？你如何让更多人更特别？我的意思是，这些都是你想要的东西 - 当你和迪斯尼这样的东西合作时，你有很好的工作要素。

I mean, it — you know, one of the advantages — we were talking about the Mayo Clinic and brain surgeons.The nice thing about the mouse is that he doesn't have an agent, you know.I mean, the mouse is yours.(Laughs) 我的意思是，它 - 你知道，其中一个优点 - 我们谈论的是梅奥诊所和脑外科医生。关于鼠标的好处是他没有经纪人，你知道。我的意思是，鼠标是你的。（笑）

He is not in there renegotiating and, you know, every week or every month and saying, you know — (laughter) — "Just look at how much more famous I've become in China," you know, or something.(Laughter) 他不是在那里重新谈判，你知道，每个星期或每个月都说，你知道 - （笑声） - “看看我在中国变得多么有名，”你知道，或者别的什么。（笑声）

So if you own the mouse, you own the mouse.And Eisner understands all of that very well.I would say he's been very skillful, in terms of how he's thought about it. 因此，如果您拥有鼠标，则拥有鼠标。艾斯纳非常了解所有这些。就他如何思考而言，我会说他非常熟练。

I worry about any manager.It has nothing to do with Michael Eisner.But Charlie and I worry about ourselves in terms of getting out of our circle of competence. 我担心任何经理。这与Michael Eisner无关。但是查理和我在摆脱我们的能力范围方面担心自己。

And we've done it.It is very tempting.And it's probably part of the human condition, in terms of hubris or something, that if, you know, that if you've — as Charlie would say, if you've — you know, if you're a duck ﬂoating on apond, and it's been raining, and you're going up in the world, after a while, you think it's you and not the rain. 我们已经做到了。这很诱人。它可能是人类状况的一部分，就傲慢或某种东西而言，如果你知道，如果你 - 如查理所说，如果你 - 你知道，如果你是一只浮在水面上的鸭子池塘，它一直在下雨，你在世界上升，过了一会儿，你认为这是你而不是下雨。

You know, that there — that you're some duck.(Laughter) But — 你知道，那里 - 你是一个鸭子。（笑声）但是 -

CHARLIE MUNGER: Right, right. CHARLIE MUNGER：对，对。 WARREN BUFFETT: And we all succumb to that a little bit. WARREN BUFFETT：我们都屈服于那一点点。

But I think that Disney, Coca-Cola, Gillette — I think those companies are very focused.I think our operating units are very focused. 但我认为迪士尼，可口可乐，吉列 - 我认为这些公司非常专注。我认为我们的运营单位非常专注。

And I think that gives us a huge advantages over the managers that are getting a little bored and decide that they'd better fool around with this or that to show just how talented they really are. 而且我认为这给我们带来了巨大的优势，而这些经理们会感到有点无聊，并决定他们更好地利用这个或那个来表明他们真正有多么有才华。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.Eisner is quite creative.And he also distrusts projections.And that is a very good combination to have in the motion picture business.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。艾斯纳非常有创意。他也不信任预测。这是电影业务中非常好的组合。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Charlie was a lawyer for, what, 20th Century in the old — 沃伦巴菲特：是的，查理是一位律师，在20世纪以前是什么 -

CHARLIE: Yes. 查理：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: — days?Yeah, and he saw a little bit of how Hollywood operated.And it kept us out of buying any motion picture stocks for about 30 years.Every time I'd go near one, he'd regale me with a few stories of the past. WARREN BUFFETT： - 天？是的，他看到了一些好莱坞的运作方式。它让我们不再购买任何电影股约30年。每当我走近一个时，他都会用过去的几个故事告诉我。

So it's a business where people are — can trade other people's money for their own signiﬁcance in their world.And that is a dangerous combination, where if I can buy signiﬁcance in my world with your money, you know, there's no telling what I'll do.(Laughter) 所以这是一个人们的事业 - 可以将他人的钱换成他们自己在世界上的重要性。这是一个危险的组合，如果我能用你的钱在我的世界中购买意义，你知道，我不知道我会做什么。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Part of the business reminds me of an oil company in California.And it was controlled by one individual.And people used to say, about it, "If they ever do ﬁnd any oil, that old man will steal it."(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：部分业务让我想起加利福尼亚州的一家石油公司。它由一个人控制。人们常常说，“如果他们找到任何油，老人就会偷走它。” （笑声）

The motion picture business, it's only about half of it that has normal commercial morals. 电影业务，只有大约一半具有正常的商业道德。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we're not applying that to Disney. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，我们不会将其应用于迪士尼。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. CHARLIE MUNGER：没有。

WARREN BUFFETT: Disney is really — Disney's done an extraordinary job for the shareholders. WARREN BUFFETT：迪士尼真的是 - 迪士尼为股东做了非凡的工作。 And they make real money out of movies.Most movie companies have — they make money for everybody associated with it, but not a lot has stuck to the shareholders. 他们用电影赚钱。大多数电影公司都有 - 他们为与之相关的每个人赚钱，但对股东来说并不是很多。

Zone 2? 2区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I — 观众：我 -

29. Book recommendations 29.书籍建议

WARREN BUFFETT: What?Oh, the books!Charlie, what are you reading these days?(Laughs) 沃伦巴菲特：什么？哦，书！查理，这几天你在读什么？（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I'm almost ashamed to report because I've gone back and picked up the part of biology that I put up — should've picked up 10 or 15 years earlier.And if any of you haven't done it, it's a total circus, what they ﬁgured out over the last 20 or 30 years in biology. CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我几乎感到羞耻，因为我已经回去并且拿起了我提出的生物学部分 - 应该早在10年或15年前就已经拿到了。如果你们中的任何人都没有这样做，那么这就是他们在过去20或 30年的生物学中所发现的全部马戏团。

And I — if you take [evolutionary biologist Richard] Dawkins, "The Selﬁsh Gene" and "The Blind Watchmaker", I mean, these are marvelous books.And there are words in those books that are entering the English language that are going to be in the next Oxford Dictionary.I mean, these are powerful books.And they're a lot of fun. 我 - 如果你带着[进化生物学家理查德]道金斯，“自私的基因”和“盲人制表师”，我的意思是，这些都是精彩的书籍。这些书中有些词语正在进入下一部“牛津词典”中。我的意思是，这些都是强大的书籍。而且他们很有趣。

I had to read "The Selﬁsh Gene" twice before I fully understood it.And there were things I believed all my life that weren't so, and I think it's just wonderful, when you have those experiences.We always say, "It isn't the learning that's so hard. It's the unlearning." 在我完全理解它之前，我必须两次阅读“自私基因”。有些事情我认为我生命中并非如此，而且当你拥有这些经历时，我认为这很美妙。我们总是说，“学习不是那么难。这是学习的结果。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.I made the mistake of taking Charlie up to Microsoft in December.And he became friends with [Chief Technology Ofﬁcer] Nathan Myhrvold. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。我犯了错误，在12月将查理带到了微软。他与[首席技术官] Nathan Myhrvold成为了朋友。

And they are corresponding back and forth with increasing fervor and enthusiasm about mole rats.And they copy me on all these communications.So I'm getting to see this ﬂow back and forth on the habits of mole rats. 而且它们对鼹鼠的热情和热情来回相应。他们把我复制在所有这些通讯上。所以我要看到这种鼹鼠的习惯来回流动。

I really haven't found a way to apply it at Berkshire.But I'm sure Charlie — (laughs) — has got something he's working on, on that.He's gotten very interested in biology lately. 我真的没有办法在伯克希尔申请它。但我确信查理 - （笑） - 已经有了他正在研究的东西。他最近对生物学非常感兴趣。

I like — you know, I've always liked reading biography, but since the — the computer has changed my life.I now ﬁnd myself playing bridge on the computer about 10 hours a week.And unfortunately, I didn't want to give up sleep or eating or Berkshire.So the reading has been kind of light. 我喜欢 - 你知道，我一直都喜欢读传记，但自从 - 电脑改变了我的生活。我现在发现自己每周大约10 个小时在电脑上玩桥牌。不幸的是，我不想放弃睡觉或吃饭或伯克希尔。所以阅读有点轻松。

On investment books, if you're asking about that, I would recommend the ﬁrst two books that Phil Fisher wrote back around 1960, "Common Sense [Stocks] and Uncommon Proﬁts" and the second one ["Paths to Wealth Through Common Stocks"].They're very good books. 在投资书籍上，如果你问这个问题，我会推荐菲尔·费舍尔在1960年左右写回的前两本书，“常识[股票]和罕见利润”和第二本[“通过普通股票获取财富的途径” ]。他们是非常好的书。

You know, I obviously recommend, ﬁrst and foremost, [Benjamin Graham's] "The Intelligent Investor," with chapters eight and 20 are the ones that you really should read. 你知道，我显然首先推荐[本杰明格雷厄姆]的“智能投资者”，第8章和第20章是你真正应该阅读的。

Two of the — well, all of the important ideas in investing, really, are in that book, because there's only about three ideas.And those — two of them are emphasized in those two chapters. 实际上，投资中的所有重要思想中的两个都在那本书中，因为只有三个想法。那些 - 在这两章中强调了其中两个。

Actually, I think John Train's "Money Masters" is an interesting book. 实际上，我认为John Train的“Money Masters”是一本有趣的书。

I don't know.Can you think of any others, Charlie, that we want to tout?(Laughs) 我不知道。你能想到我们想要吹捧的其他人，查理吗？（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don't know.We have such a ﬁngers-and-toes style around Berkshire Hathaway.(Laughter) So you sort of count. CHARLIE MUNGER：我不知道。我们在伯克希尔哈撒韦周围有这样的手指和脚趾风格。（笑声）所以你算一算。

WARREN BUFFETT: The three — WARREN BUFFETT：三个 -

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve never seen — you know, Warren talks about these discounted cash ﬂows.I've never seen him do one.(Laughter and applause) CHARLIE MUNGER：我从未见过 - 你知道，沃伦谈论这些贴现现金流。我从未见过他做过一次。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: If it ever — CHARLIE MUNGER：如果有的话 -

WARREN BUFFETT: There are some things you only do in private, Charlie.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：有些事情你只能私下做，查理。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: If it isn't pluperfect obvious that it's going to work out well, if you do the calculation, he tends to go on to the next idea. CHARLIE MUNGER：如果不是很明显，它会很好地运作，如果你进行计算，他会倾向于继续下一个想法。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it’s sort of — it is true.You don't — if you have to actually do it on — with pencil and paper, it's too close to think about.I mean, it ought to just kind of scream at you that you've got this huge margin of safety.

WARREN BUFFETT：是的，有点 - 这是真的。你没有 - 如果你必须用铅笔和纸做它，它太接近于思考了。我的意思是，你应该有点尖叫，你有这么大的安全边际。

I mentioned the three ideas.The three ideas, I should elaborate on.One is that — to think of yourself — to think of investing as owning a business and not buying something that wiggles around in price. 我提到了三个想法。这三个想法，我应该详细说明。一个是 - 想想你自己 - 把投资视为拥有一个企业，而不是购买那些在价格上徘徊的东西。

And the second one is your attitude, which ties in with that, the attitude toward the market, that's covered in chapter eight.And if you have the proper attitude toward market movements, it's an enormous help in securities. 第二个是你的态度，这与你对市场的态度有关，这在第八章中有所涉及。如果你对市场走势有正确的态度，这对证券来说是一个巨大的帮助。

And the ﬁnal chapter is on the margin of safety, which means, don't try and drive a 9,800-pound truck over a bridge that says it's, you know, "Capacity: 10,000 pounds."But go down the road a little bit and ﬁnd one that says, "Capacity: 15,000 pounds." 最后一章是关于安全边际的，这意味着，不要试图在一座桥上驾驶一辆重达9,800磅的卡车，据说它是“容量：10,000磅”。但是在路上走一点，找一个说“容量：15,000磅”。

30. We'll do more in insurance, but we don't know what 我们在保险方面做得更多，但我们不知道是什么

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2? WARREN BUFFETT：2区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, Chip Tucker (PH), Minneapolis. 观众成员：是的，明尼阿波利斯的Chip Tucker（PH）。

Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, what market share does Berkshire have in super-cat insurance business?And what's your outlook for both the market growth in that business and the potential market share growth with — from Berkshire? 巴菲特和芒格先生，伯克希尔在超级保险业务中的市场份额是多少？那么你对伯克希尔公司的市场增长和潜在的市场份额增长前景如何？

You answered a related question regarding GEICO's auto opportunities.Are there other insurance businesses potentially worth expanding into?Or is your focus on super-cat and autos opportunity enough? 您回答了有关GEICO汽车机会的相关问题。还有其他保险业务值得扩展吗？或者你是否足够关注超级猫和汽车的机会？

CHARLIE MUNGER: You know, Warren can answer that question a lot better than I can. CHARLIE MUNGER：你知道，Warren可以比我更好地回答这个问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: I — we don’t — there wouldn't be any good market share ﬁgures in something like super-cat. WARREN BUFFETT：我 - 我们没有 - 像超级猫这样的东西没有任何好的市场份额。

We know that, a couple years, and last year, I think, too, we had to be the biggest in terms of premium volume. 我们知道，在几年和去年，我认为，在保费数量方面，我们必须是最大的。

We simply take on so much more than anyone else will.And we were getting the calls on the big risks, you know, 400 million here or something of the sort.We had a quote we put out on a billion dollars on the New Madrid fault here a little while ago.Nobody else will be doing that. 我们只是承担了比其他人更多的事情。而且，我们接到了大风险的召唤，你知道，这里有4亿或者类似的东西。不久之前，我们在新马德里断层上发了十亿美元的报价。没有其他人会这样做。

So we got market share by our willingness to do large volume, by the fact that people knew we would pay subsequently, but we don’t — while we know we were the largest, we can't give you any precise ﬁgures. 因此我们愿意做大量的市场份额，因为人们知道我们会随后支付，但我们不会 - 虽然我们知道我们是最大的，但我们不能给你任何确切的数字。

We also know we're slipping in that now, but that makes no difference to us.We'd only be interested if we were slipping in proﬁtable markets. 我们也知道我们现在正在滑倒，但这对我们没有任何影响。如果我们在有利可图的市场中滑坡，我们才会感兴趣。

And what was the second part of the question on that, Charlie? 那个问题的第二部分是什么，查理？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: What other opportunities — 听众会员：还有哪些机会 -

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, what other opportunities in the insurance business? WARREN BUFFETT：哦，保险业务还有哪些其他机会？

We — just this year, we bought a very, very small company [Kansas Bankers Surety], the managers of whom are here, a very ﬁne insurance company.It has a little niche. 我们 - 就在今年，我们买了一家非常小的公司[Kansas Bankers Surety]，他们的经理都在这里，是一家非常优秀的保险公司。它有一点利基。

It — I mean, it will never be huge or anything of the sort, but it's the kind of business that we can understand.And we like the people that run it.And we like the position they've achieved in the market.So we're delighted to be in it. 它 - 我的意思是，它永远不会是巨大的或类似的东西，但它是我们可以理解的那种业务。我们喜欢运行它的人。我们喜欢他们在市场上取得的成就。所以我们很高兴参与其中。

We are willing to think about a whole variety of things to do in insurance.But most of them, we ﬁnd, make no sense.We'll be — we’ll do other things in insurance over the next 10 or 15 years.It's just bound to happen, but I can't tell you what they will speciﬁcally be. 我们愿意考虑保险中要做的各种事情。但我们发现，其中大部分都毫无意义。我们将 - 在接下来的10 年或15年内，我们将在保险方面做其他事情。它一定会发生，但我不能告诉你它们具体是什么。

The biggest single thing we will do in terms of value, though, probably, is grow GEICO.But we will do other things.And who knows what they might be? 不过，我们在价值方面做的最大的一件事就是成长GEICO 。但我们会做其他事情。谁知道他们会是什么？

We have expanded some in the — it's a small business — the structured settlement business, from when we talked a year or two ago.And we are the preferred provider of structured settlements.Those are annuities, essentially, that are payable to people who are usually the victims of a very bad accident. 从我们一两年前的谈话开始，我们已经扩展了一些 - 这是一个小型企业 - 结构化结算业务。我们是结构性结算的首选供应商。基本上，这些是年金，适用于通常是非常严重事故受害者的人。

So they're very severely injured people, with injuries that will probably last for life.And so we will be making payments to people who are incapable of earning a living, may incur substantial medical bills, for many decades, sometimes, 50 or 60 years.

所以他们是非常严重受伤的人，受伤可能会持续一生。因此，我们将向无法谋生的人支付款项，可能会产生大量的医疗费用，有时甚至是50年或60年。

Those annuities are provided by our companies to other insurance companies and to these injured people, usually, with the approval of the injured person's attorney. 这些年金由我们的公司提供给其他保险公司和这些受伤人员，通常是在受伤人员的批准下。

And when the advisors to the injured person think, "Who is going to be around in 50 years to pay money to this person who's been incapacitated," they frequently, and in our view, logically, think of Berkshire.So we have become much better known in that over the last couple of years. 当受伤人员的顾问认为，“谁会在50年左右向这个无行为能力的人付钱”，他们经常，而且我们认为，从逻辑上来说，想到伯克希尔。因此，在过去的几年里，我们已经变得更加知名。

It's not a big business.And it won't be a big business.But it's a perfectly decent business.And it's one where we have a competitive advantage over time. 这不是一件大事。这不会是一件大事。但这是一个非常体面的业务。这是我们随着时间的推移具有竞争优势的地方。

We don't obtain the competitive advantage by price.We obtain the competitive advantage from the peace of mind that the injured party obtains from knowing that that check will be in the mail 50 years from now. 我们没有通过价格获得竞争优势。我们通过知道该支票将在50年后的邮件中获得，从而获得了竞争优势。

And that's the kind of business where we have some edge.And we'll ﬁnd other things to do over time, but can’t — I can’t — 这就是我们有一些优势的业务。我们会随着时间的推移找到其他的事情，但不能 - 我不能 -

It isn't like we're looking at some speciﬁc area and saying, "We're focusing on this."We're aware, generally, of what's going on in the insurance business.And we're very ready to move when the time comes, so that we can do something intelligent. 这不像我们正在看某个特定的领域，并说，“我们专注于此。”一般来说，我们都知道保险业务正在发生什么。而且我们已经准备好在时机成熟时采取行动，以便我们能够做一些聪明的事情。

31. People rewarded by capitalism need to help those who aren't 被资本主义奖励的人需要帮助那些没有资本主义的人

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3? WARREN BUFFETT：3区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, my family's been associated with Berkshire since 1968. So I ask this question with a great deal of respect for your integrity and your wisdom. 听众：巴菲特先生和芒格先生，我的家人自1968年以来一直与伯克希尔有关。所以我非常尊重你的诚信和智慧。

I work as an inner-city schoolteacher, where there is a rising and pervasive sense of hopelessness. 我是一名市中心的教师，在那里有一种不断上升和无处不在的无望感。

When I ask my students, "What would make you happy?"their predominant response is, "A million dollars."As some of the richest men in the world, I wonder what your response to them might be. 当我问我的学生时，“什么会让你开心？”他们的主要反应是“一百万美元”。作为世界上一些最富有的人，我想知道你对他们的回应是什么。

And as a second part of this question, the philosophical underpinnings of capitalism have largely ignored a systemic perspective involving issues of ongoing depletion of limited global resources exploited to sustain a market economy, widening gaps between the very wealthy and the severely impoverished, and an internationalview of America as a country whose primary values are greed and imperialism. 作为这个问题的第二部分，资本主义的哲学基础在很大程度上忽略了一个系统性的观点，涉及持续耗尽有限的全球资源以维持市场经济，扩大富裕国家和严重贫困国家之间的差距以及国际美国是一个主要价值观是贪婪和帝国主义的国家。

As we move into the 21st century, do you see a need to re-envision capitalist premises towards original notions of democracy, justice, and humanitarian concerns? 随着我们进入21世纪，你是否认为需要重新设想资本主义前提以实现民主，正义和人道主义关注的原始概念？

WARREN BUFFETT: I didn't get all of that. WARREN BUFFETT：我没有得到所有这些。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well — (laughter) — I will say this.I am higher on the existing social order than you are.(Applause) CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯 - （笑声） - 我会说这个。我现有的社会秩序比你高。（掌声）

I — there's always plenty wrong with a social order.And certainly, there are places where ours is a lot more broken than it used to be. 我 - 社会秩序总是有很多错误。当然，有些地方我们的地方比以前更加破碎。

I don't think Warren and I have any wonderful solution to all the problems of the world.But wishing for a million dollars instead of some more tangible short step is the wrong frame of mind.That isn't the way we got our million dollars. 我认为沃伦和我对世界上所有问题都没有任何出色的解决方案。但是，希望获得一百万美元而不是一些更有形的短步是错误的心态。这不是我们获得百万美元的方式。

WARREN BUFFETT: But I don't — (Applause) WARREN BUFFETT：但我没有 - （掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren might give a different answer, by the way.He’s a — CHARLIE MUNGER：顺便说一下，沃伦可能会给出不同的答案。他是个 -

WARREN BUFFETT: No, I would agree with the — I, you know — wishing for a job makes a lot of sense to me and ﬁguring out how to get one and then going from there.But it — WARREN BUFFETT：不，我同意 - 我，你知道 - 希望找到一份工作对我来说很有意义，并弄清楚如何得到一个然后从那里开始。但它 -

There is and always has been — that doesn't mean it always should be — but there is a tremendous amount of inequality. 一直存在 - 这并不意味着它应该始终存在 - 但存在着巨大的不平等。

What you don't want is an inequality of opportunity.There will be a lot of inequality in ability. 你不想要的是机会的不平等。能力会有很多不平等。

A market system, like we have, churns out what people want.If they want to watch a heavyweight ﬁght, and they want to watch Mike Tyson, they're going to pay him $25 million for getting in the ring for a few minutes. 像我们一样，市场体系可以产生人们想要的东西。如果他们想要观看重量级的比赛，并且他们想要观看迈克泰森，那么他们将花费2500万美元来获得他们几分钟的奖金。

And it produces what people like.And it produces it in abundance.And it's done very well in terms of production. 它产生了人们喜欢的东西。它产生了丰富的。而且它在生产方面做得非常好。 It is much better to be in the bottom 20 percent in this country now than it was 50 years ago.And it's better to be in the bottom 20 percent of this country than in any other country.But it still isn't very satisfactory. 与50年前相比，现在在这个国家最低的20％要好得多。最好是在这个国家的最低20％，而不是在任何其他国家。但它仍然不是很令人满意。

The market system does not reward — it does not reward teachers, does not reward nurses — I mean, it does not reward all kinds of people who do all kinds of useful things in any way comparable to how it will reward entertainers, or people whocan ﬁgure out the value of businesses, or athletes, or that sort of thing. 市场体系不奖励 - 它不奖励教师，也不奖励护士 - 我的意思是，它不会奖励各种各样有用的东西的人，无论如何奖励演艺人员或者奖励演艺人员的人。可以弄清楚企业，运动员或那类事物的价值。

A market system pays very big for something that will entertain them.People want to be entertained a good bit of the day.And it pays better for people that will entertain than educate. 市场体系对于能够娱乐他们的东西来说非常重要。人们希望享受一天的美好时光。对于那些会受教育而不是受教育的人来说，这样做会更好。

I think — I don't want to tinker with the market system.I don't think I should be telling people what they should want to do with their lives. 我想 - 我不想修补市场体系。我不认为我应该告诉人们他们应该怎样对待他们的生活。

But I do think that it's incumbent on the people that do very well under that system to be taxed in a manner that takes reasonable care of anybody that is not well adapted to that system, but that is a perfectly decent citizen in every other regard. 但我确实认为，在该制度下做得很好的人有责任以合理照顾任何不适合该制度的人的方式征税，但在其他方面，这是一个非常体面的公民。

And that is — you know, I don't want to start getting into comparable worth in terms of how I tax.But I do think that somebody like me, that happens to just ﬁt this system magniﬁcently, but wouldn't be worth a damn in Bangladesh or someplace, you know, because what I have wouldn't pay off there — their system would not rewardthat. 那就是 - 你知道，我不想开始就我的税收方式获得可比价值。但我确实认为有人喜欢我，恰好适合这个系统，但在孟加拉国或某个地方不值得该死，你知道，因为我所拥有的不会得到回报 - 他们的系统不会奖励那。

I think that we get from society — society provides me — this society provides me — with enormous rewards for what I bring to the game.And it does the same with Mike Tyson.And it does the same with some guy whose adenoids are right for singing or whatever it may be. 我认为我们从社会中获得 - 社会为我提供了 - 这个社会为我提供了 - 为我带来的游戏带来了巨大的回报。迈克泰森也是如此。对于那些腺样体适合唱歌的人或其他任何人来说，它也是如此。

And I don't want to tamper with that.But I do think those people who are getting all kinds of claim checks on the rest of society from that — I think there should be a system that people — where people who are not well adapted to that system, but that are perfectly decent citizens inevery other respect, do not really, you know, fall through the slats on that. 而且我不想篡改它。但我确实认为那些正在从社会其他方面获得各种索赔检查的人 - 我认为应该有一个人民系统 - 那些不适应那个系统的人，但是那些人是完全正派的公民。所有其他方面，不要真的，你知道，通过那个板条。

And I think progress has been made on that over the last 50 years.But I think we're far from a perfect society in that respect.And I hope, you know, more progress is made in the next 50 years. 我认为在过去的50年里，这方面取得了进展。但我认为在这方面我们远非一个完美的社会。我希望，在接下来的50年里，我会取得更多进展。 I don't think the wishing for the million dollars, though — you know, it doesn't work that way.I think — 我不认为希望获得百万美元，但是 - 你知道，它并不是那么有效。我认为 -

But if you are lucky enough to have something that the market system rewards, you do very well here.And if you're unlucky enough to have something it doesn't reward, you do better now than you would've 30 or 40 years ago.And you do better than in other countries. 但如果你有幸拥有市场体系所带来的东西，那么你在这里做得非常好。如果你不幸得到一些它没有奖励的东西，你现在比30或40年前做得更好。你做得比其他国家好。

But I can see where it seems very unjust to look at somebody else who has just a little different mix of talents that can achieve claim checks in a way that keeps them and the next ﬁve generations of their family in a position where they don'thave to do very much. 但是，我可以看到看起来非常不公平的人看起来只是有一点不同的人才组合，可以通过一种方式来实现索赔检查，让他们和他们家庭的下一代五代人不在必须做很多事情。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I would say that I like a certain amount of social intervention that takes some of the inequality out of results in capitalism. CHARLIE MUNGER：我想说，我喜欢一定程度的社会干预，从资本主义的结果中获取一些不平等。

But I hate, with a passion, rewarding anything that can be easily faked.Because I think then people lie, and lying works, and the lying spreads.And I think your whole civilization deteriorates. 但我讨厌，充满激情，奖励任何可以轻易伪造的东西。因为我认为那时人们撒谎，撒谎，谎言蔓延。我认为你的整个文明都在恶化。

If I were running the world, the compensation for stress under workman's compensation would be zero, not because there isn't real stress.Because there's no way to keep the fakery out, if you reward stress at all. 如果我在经营这个世界，工人赔偿下的压力补偿将为零，而不是因为没有真正的压力。因为没有办法保持伪造，如果你奖励压力。

WARREN BUFFETT: There was a great article, and this applies — (applause) — to an earlier question. WARREN BUFFETT：有一篇很棒的文章，这适用于（掌声） - 以前的问题。

There was a very good article in Forbes about one issue ago that showed the occupational proﬁle of the U.S. at a couple of different intervals, going back to 1900. 福布斯有一篇关于一个问题的文章非常好，它以几个不同的时间间隔显示了美国的职业概况，可追溯到1900年。

And one problem you can see, just by looking at that proﬁle, is that, if you assume 20 percent of the — the bottom 20 percent — however you measure it, in terms of employability — whether it's measured by IQ, or interest in working, or energy level, or whatever you want to do — they ﬁt, very well, most of the jobs that were available a hundred years ago. 你可以看到的一个问题，就是通过查看该概况，如果你假设20％ - 最低的20％ - 然而你在就业能力方面衡量它 - 无论是用智商衡量，还是对工作感兴趣，或能量水平，或任何你想做的事情 - 它们非常适合一百年前可用的大部分工作。

In other words, you could do most of the jobs, of which there were many, with relatively unimpressive mental abilities.And as jobs have changed, the proﬁle of people hasn't changed.So there are more people that end up on the short end. 换句话说，你可以完成大部分工作，其中有许多工作，具有相对不起眼的心智能力。随着工作岗位的变化，人们的形象没有改变。因此，有更多的人最终在短端。 Now, the good part of that is the society produces so much more that it can take care of those people, one way or another.Now, the trick is to take care of them and make them not only feel, but be productive and be part of the act, and — 现在，其中很大一部分就是社会产生了更多，以至于可以用这种或那种方式照顾这些人。现在，诀窍是照顾他们，让他们不仅感觉到，而且要富有成效并成为行为的一部分，并且 -

We've got enough product to do that.But the country turns out way more output than 50 or a hundred years ago. 我们有足够的产品来做到这一点。但是这个国家的产出比50年或100年前更多。

We don’t have — we’re not perfect at figuring out how to make the bottom 20 or 30 percent, in terms of abilities, fit a new, changing job profile. 我们没有 - 我们并不完美地确定如何在能力方面做出最低20％或30％，以适应新的，不断变化的工作档案。

I really recommend you look at that Forbes magazine.Because if you think through the implications of those charts, I think you'll see what social problems have to be attacked. 我真的建议你看看福布斯杂志。因为如果你仔细思考这些图表的含义，我想你会看到必须攻击哪些社会问题。

32. "No magic" to running a bank — just don't do "something foolish" 32.“没有魔力”来经营银行 - 只是不要做“愚蠢的事情”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4? WARREN BUFFETT：第4区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Edward Barr, Lexington, Kentucky. 听众：爱德华巴尔，列克星敦，肯塔基州。

Earlier, you led us through a discussion of the competitive position of Disney.And you also discussed share repurchase. 早些时候，您带领我们讨论了迪士尼的竞争地位。你还讨论了股票回购。

I wondered if you could also lead us through a discussion of the competitive position of Wells Fargo, since they just effected such a large combination [with First Interstate], in addition with, perhaps, some discussion of their share repurchase, which is probably aslarge, in percentage terms, as any company I can think of at the present time. 我想知道你是否也可以引导我们讨论富国银行的竞争地位，因为他们只是[与第一州际公司]实现了如此大的组合，此外，或许还有一些关于他们的股票回购的讨论，这可能是在百分比方面，就像我现在能想到的任何公司一样。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Wells should repurchase their shares, if they feel that they're repurchasing them below intrinsic business value.And that's a calculation that they make. WARREN BUFFETT：好吧，如果Wells认为他们正在回购低于其固有的商业价值，他们应该回购他们的股票。这是他们的计算。

And you should — have to ask the question of them what their calculus is of that.But that will determine whether that share repurchase program makes good sense or not. 你应该 - 不得不问他们的问题是什么。但这将决定该股票回购计划是否合理。

The advantages of an in-market merger are — can be dramatic.Sometimes, it just causes a bank to do what they should've done anyway. 市场合并的优势是 - 可以是戏剧性的。有时候，它只会让银行做他们应该做的事情。

I mean, I'm not so — I’m not always as convinced that the economies come about through — totally through scale, as they are just from taking a hard look at how they run their business. 我的意思是，我不是这样 - 我并不总是相信经济能够实现 - 完全通过规模，因为他们只是仔细考虑他们如何经营自己的业务。

We may have in the audience today — he was here earlier — the CEO of the Bank of Granite, which is in Granite, North Carolina.And that bank earned 2.58 percent on assets, I believe, in the most recent quarter, annualized, and had a 33 percent efﬁciency ratio. 今天我们可能会有观众 - 他早些时候在这里 - 是位于北卡罗来纳州Granite 的Granite银行的首席执行官。我认为，该银行在最近一个季度的资产收益率为2.58％，年化率为33％，效率为33％。

Now, that bank is 400 million or 500 million of assets.You know, it doesn't need to be 5 billion in order to get more efﬁcient or anything of the sort. 现在，该银行拥有4亿或5亿资产。你知道，为了获得更高效率或任何类型的东西，它不需要50亿。

It's got — it’s so much more efﬁcient than any of those larger banks that had to be put together to get those ratios that it makes you kind of wonder about the underlying rationale. 它有 - 它比任何那些大银行，必须予以放在一起得到它让你有种想知道的基本原理的比例，这样更有效。

But I'm sure that Mr. [John] Forlines, who runs that bank, just focuses on — and he's been focusing on it for a lot of years — just doing the right things day after day.And it didn't take any in-market merger or anything of the sort to cause him to do that. 但我确信经营该银行的[John] Forlines先生只关注 - 并且他多年来一直关注它 - 只是日复一日地做正确的事情。并没有采取任何市场合并或任何类似的东西导致他这样做。

I recommend any of you in the banking business to get his report because there is nothing magic about the community of Granite, North Carolina. 我建议您在银行业务中的任何人获取他的报告，因为北卡罗来纳州Granite社区没有任何魔力。

Nor does he work under laws that are way different than the rest of bankers or anything of the sort.He just gets a record that — achieves a record — that makes all the rest of the records look silly. 他也不是根据与其他银行家或其他类似的法律不同的法律工作。他只是得到了一张记录 - 达到了记录 - 这使得所有其他记录看起来都很愚蠢。

We had a fellow over in Rockford, Illinois, in the bank we owned back in the '70s, Gene Abegg, whose brother is going to be 104. There was a fellow from Rockford here that got me to sign a note to Ed Abegg,who will be 104 soon.I wish Gene had lived to 104. 我们在伊利诺伊州罗克福德的一家公司，我们在70年代拥有的银行，Gene Abegg，他的兄弟将会是 104岁。这里有一位来自罗克福德的老乡让我给Ed Abegg签了一张便条，谁将很快成为104。我希望 Gene活到104岁。

But Gene ran a bank in Rockford that, when banks — the best banks were earning one percent on assets, he earned two percent on assets.And he did it with way less leverage than anyone else and lower loan losses and big investment portfolio. 但吉恩在罗克福德开了一家银行，当银行 - 最好的银行赚取1％的资产收益时，他的资产收益率为 2％。而且他的杠杆率低于其他任何人，贷款损失和投资组合也较低。

And there wasn't any magic about it.He just didn't do anything that didn't make sense. 并没有任何魔术。他只是没有做任何没有意义的事情。

And there's a lot of room for improvement in the banking business with or without mergers. 无论合并与否，银行业务都有很大的改进空间。

But I would say that Wells, on the record, has done an exceptionally good job of running their bank compared to other big banks.And I would say that those two operations put together will be run a whole lot more efﬁciently than if First Interstate had been run by — run on its own. 但我会说，与其他大银行相比，韦尔斯在记录方面做得非常出色。而且我会说，这两个操作组合在一起运行的效率会比第一个州际公路的运行效率高得多 - 自己运行。

It's a business that can be a very good business, when run right, as the Bank of Granite or Illinois National Bank in Rockford proved.There's no magic to it.You just have to stay away from doing something foolish. 正如罗克福德的花岗岩银行或伊利诺斯国家银行所证明的那样，这项业务可以是一项非常好的业务。这没有什么神奇之处。你只需要远离做一些愚蠢的事情。

It's a little like investing.You know, you don't have to do anything very smart.You just have to avoid doing things that are ungodly dumb when looked at about a year later and — you know, airlines and that sort of thing.(Laughter) 这有点像投资。你知道，你不必做任何非常聪明的事情。大约一年后，你只需要避免做一些不敬虔的事情 - 你知道，航空公司等等。（笑声）

And you know, that's the trick.It is not some great crystal ball game where you look into the future and see all these things that other people can't possibly see.I mean, what's complicated about Coca-Cola or Gillette or Wells Fargo, for that matter? 你知道，这就是诀窍。这不是一个伟大的水晶球游戏，你展望未来，看到其他人不可能看到的所有这些东西。我的意思是，关于可口可乐，吉列或富国银行，有什么问题呢？

And that’s — we like businesses like banking, if we've got somebody in charge of them that is going to run them right.We’ve got a — I don't know whether Bob Wilmers is here.But he runs First Empire, which we have a good-sized investment in. Bob just runs it right, you know? 那就是 - 我们喜欢像银行业这样的企业，如果我们有一个负责他们的人就会运行它们。我们有一个 - 我不知道Bob Wilmers是否在这里。但是他经营着First Empire，我们有一个很好的投资.Bob只是运行它，你知道吗？

I do not worry about surprises from Bob or First Empire.And he’ll do things — if he can grow, and it's logical, he'll grow.And if it isn't logical to do something, he'll pass.He has no ego compulsions forcing him into some sort of action.And he runs a terriﬁc bank. 我不担心鲍勃或第一帝国的惊喜。他会做的事情 - 如果他能够成长，这是合乎逻辑的，他会成长。如果做某事不合逻辑，他就会过去。他没有自我强迫迫使他采取某种行动。他经营着一家很棒的银行。

Charlie? 查理？

33. We do "whatever comes along that makes sense" 我们做“任何有意义的事情”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK.Zone 5. WARREN BUFFETT：好的。 5区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Dorothy Craig (PH) from Seattle. 听众：来自西雅图的Dorothy Craig（PH）。

And I noticed, in the annual report, that your recent acquisitions doubled the revenue for Berkshire Hathaway.And it seemed astounding for me.I'm wondering how that's possible. 我在年度报告中注意到，您最近的收购使伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的收入增加了一倍。这对我来说似乎令人震惊。我想知道这是怎么回事。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s — for one thing, we started from kind of a small base.The — but we — the GEICO acquisition, you know, added 3 billion or so of revenues, and — actually more than that, a little more than that, but not much more.And RC Willey and Helzberg’s probably added 600 million or so in the current year. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，这是 - 首先，我们从一个小基地开始。 - 但是我们 - 收购的GEICO，增加了30亿左右的收入，而且 - 实际上比这更多，但不止一点，但不多。 RC Willey和Helzberg可能在今年增加了6亿左右。

And since we were working off a base of 3 1/2 or so billion, those three acquisitions did double the revenues.We won't have many years when that happens.It's not any goal of ours to double the revenues or increase them 20 percent, even, or anything. 而且由于我们在3 1/2亿左右的基础上工作，这三次收购确实使收入增加了一倍。发生这种情况时，我们不会有多少年。我们的任何目标都不是将收入增加一倍或将其增加20％，甚至是任何东西。

We just — we try to do whatever comes along that makes sense.And if there's a lot that comes along in one year that makes sense, we'll do a lot.And if there's nothing that comes along that makes sense, we'll do nothing. 我们只是 - 我们尝试做任何有意义的事情。如果在一年内出现了很多有意义的事情，我们会做很多事情。如果没有什么是合理的，我们什么都不做。

So it’s — there's a lot of accident in it.But last year, you know, a fair amount happened.And I'd love to see a lot happen next year.But we don't know at this point. 所以它 - 它有很多意外。但是去年，你知道，发生了相当多的事情。而且我很想看到明年会发生很多事情。但是我们现在还不知道。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing. CHARLIE MUNGER：没什么。

34. GEICO's Lou Simpson has more investing options now 34. GEICO的Lou Simpson现在有更多的投资选择

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6. WARREN BUFFETT：第6区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Oh me?Yes, my name is Victor Lapuma (PH).And I'm from the Virgin Islands.And my question is on the GEICO asset side. 观众：哦，我？是的，我叫Victor Lapuma（PH）。我来自维尔京群岛。我的问题是在GEICO资产方面。

One of the things that makes Berkshire unique is the high percentage in equity as opposed to ﬁxed assets.And GEICO, as of the end of the year, looked like a typical insurance company with four times the ﬁxed assets as equity assets. 使伯克希尔独一无二的因素之一是股权比例高于固定资产。截至今年年底，GEICO看起来像一家典型的保险公司，其固定资产是股票资产的四倍。

And my question is, over time, will they have the same composite as Berkshire on the asset side? 我的问题是，随着时间的推移，他们是否会在资产方面拥有与伯克希尔相同的综合体？

And the second part of that question is, how are the asset allocations decisions being made at GEICO after the merger as compared to before the merger? 问题的第二部分是，与合并之前相比，合并后GEICO的资产配置决策是如何做出的？

WARREN BUFFETT: The decisions at GEICO, which, as you say, is about 5 billion of marketable securities, have been made, and are being made, and will be made, by Lou Simpson.Lou has done a fabulous job of running the investments of GEICO since about 1979. And we're lucky to have him.

WARREN BUFFETT：GEICO的决定，正如你所说，约有50亿有价证券，由Lou Simpson制作并正在制作和制作。自1979年以来，Lou在GEICO的投资方面做得非常出色。我们很幸运能拥有他。

There are very few people that I will let run money running businesses that we have control over.But we're delighted, in the case of Lou.I mean, that's one in a thousand or something.But Lou has done a terriﬁc job, will do a good job. 很少有人会让我们运行我们可以控制的业务。但是对于Lou来说，我们很高兴。我的意思是，这是千分之一。但是娄做得非常好，会做得很好。

And the one thing we offer him, he has the ability to do whatever he wants to do with those assets now.He did not have that ability before GEICO became part of Berkshire.Because at that time, there were certain ratios that were necessary for — which were understandably necessary, that made sense. 而我们为他提供的一件事就是，他现在有能力做任何他想做的事情。在GEICO成为伯克希尔的一部分之前，他没有这种能力。因为在那个时候，某些比例是必要的 - 这是可以理解的必要的，这是有道理的。

With GEICO as a standalone entity, with its own net worth of a billion and a half or 2 billion, and doing 3 billion of business, it would've been inappropriate for him to take on a different conﬁguration, beyond a certain point, inequities. 由于GEICO作为一个独立的实体，拥有自己的净资产十亿半或二十亿，并且做了30亿美元的业务，因此他不适合采用不同的配置，超过某一点，股票。

So he was constrained by the nature of the business he was in and its capitalization.That constraint no longer applies.So he, with that 5 billion, can do whatever he wants. 所以他受到了他所从事业务的性质和资本化的限制。该约束不再适用。因此，他有50亿，可以做任何他想做的事情。

Now, if he does certain things, we would need to provide backup to GEICO, so that their policyholders would be protected under the most adverse of circumstances.But that's no problem for us. 现在，如果他做了某些事情，我们需要向GEICO提供备份，以便他们的保单持有人在最不利的情况下受到保护。但这对我们来说没问题。

We could do it by quota share reinsurance.We could do a lot of things.We could just guarantee their obligations.And we are in a position to do that. 我们可以通过配额份额再保险来做到这一点。我们可以做很多事情。我们可以保证他们的义务。我们能够做到这一点。

We haven't done it yet because it’s not — hasn't been necessary yet.But if it made sense — if Lou wanted to be 5 billion in equities and it made sense, we would arrange things so that the GEICO policyholders would be every bit as secure as under the most conservative of investment portfolios. 我们还没有这样做，因为它不是 - 尚未必要。但如果它有意义 - 如果Lou想要50亿美元的股票并且它是有意义的，我们会安排一些事情，以便GEICO保单持有人能够像最保守的投资组合一样安全。

So Lou has another string to his bow now.And there may be a time when it gets used.He's been great under the old system.And he may be better under this system. 所以娄现在还有另一根弦。并且可能有一段时间它被使用。在旧制度下，他一直都很棒。在这个系统下他可能会更好。

CHARLIE MUNGER: That's a very shrewd question.You're to be complimented. CHARLIE MUNGER：这是一个非常精明的问题。你会得到称赞。

WARREN BUFFETT: That means it's something we thought about — (laughs) — before, but you are to be complimented, right. WARREN BUFFETT：这意味着它是我们想到的 - （笑） - 以前，但是你要称赞，对吧。

35. "Permanent holdings" probably won't be sold even if market overvalues them 35.即使市场高估，“永久持股”也可能不会被出售

WARREN BUFFETT: Let's see.Zone 1? WARREN BUFFETT：我们来看看。 1区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Neil McMahon (PH), New York City. 观众成员：纽约市的Neil McMahon（PH）。

Berkshire owns several companies — stock in several companies — which are called permanent holdings. 伯克希尔拥有几家公司 - 几家公司的股票 - 被称为永久持股。

In the early '70s, we had a two-tier market, the one-decision stocks, high P/Es — 50, 60 times earnings. 在70年代早期，我们有一个双层市场，一个决策股票，高P / ES - 50，60倍的收益。

If that were to reappear again, would Berkshire's companies still be permanent?Or is there a price for everything? 如果再次出现，伯克希尔的公司仍然是永久性的吗？或者一切都有价格吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, there are things that we think there's no price for.And we've been tested sometimes and haven't sold them, but — WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，有些东西我们认为没有价格。我们有时已经过测试，但没有卖掉它们，但是 -

You know, my friend, Bill Gates, says, you know, it has to be illogical at some point.The numbers have — at some price, you have to be willing to sell something that's a marketable security, forgetting about a controlled business. 你知道，我的朋友比尔盖茨说，你知道，在某些时候它必须是不合逻辑的。这些数字 - 以某种代价，您必须愿意出售具有市场安全性的东西，忘记受控制的业务。

But I doubt if we ever get tested on — there's only a couple of them in that category. 但是我怀疑我们是否曾经接受过测试 - 在这个类别中只有几个。

Actually, there — you know — I won't comment on that.(Laughs) 实际上，那里 - 你知道 - 我不会对此发表评论。（笑）

We really have a great reluctance to sell businesses where we like both the business and the people.So I don't think I'd count on seeing many sales.But if you ever attend a meeting here, and there are 60 or 70 times earnings, keep an eye on me.(Laughs) 我们真的很不愿意出售我们喜欢商业和人民的企业。所以我认为我不会指望看到很多销量。但是如果你在这里参加会议，并且有60或70倍的收入，请留意我。（笑）

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: The so-called two-tier market created difficulties, I would say, primarily because a lot of people or companies were called tier one when they really weren't.They just had been, at some time, a tier one.If you're right about the companies, you can hold them at pretty high values. CHARLIE MUNGER：我想说，所谓的双层市场造成了困难，主要是因为许多人或公司在他们真的没有时被称为第一级。他们在某个时候曾经是一级的。如果你对这些公司是正确的，那么你可以保持相当高的价值。 WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, you can really hold them at extraordinary levels if you’ve got — it's too hard to find.You're not going to find businesses that are as good. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，如果你有的话，你可以把它们保持在非常高的水平 - 它太难找了。你不会找到同样好的企业。

So then you have to say, "Am I going to get a chance to buy back the same business at a lot lower price? Or am I going to buy something that's almost as good at a lot lower price?" 那么你必须说，“我是否有机会以更低的价格回购同样的业务？或者我会以更低的价格买到几乎同样好的东西？”

We don't think we're very good at doing that.We'd rather just sit and hold the business and pretend the stock market doesn't exist. 我们认为我们并不擅长这样做。我们宁愿坐下来抓住业务，假装股市不存在。

That actually has worked out way better for us than I would've predicted 20 years ago.I mean, that mindset is — or 25 years ago — that mindset is — there's been a fair amount of good fortune that's ﬂowed out of that that I really wouldn't have predicted. 对我们来说，这实际上比我20年前预测的更好。我的意思是，那种心态是 - 或者说25年前 - 心态是 - 有相当多的好运从我真正无法预测的那里流出来。

CHARLIE MUNGER: But there, you're demonstrating your trick again, you know?Still learning.A lot of people regard that as cheating.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：但是那里，你再次展示你的伎俩，你知道吗？仍在学习。很多人都认为这是作弊行为。（笑声）

36. Buffett doesn't expect Gates will join Berkshire's board 巴菲特并不指望盖茨会加入伯克希尔董事会

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2. WARREN BUFFETT：第2区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, Alan Rank, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 听众：是的，Alan Rank，宾夕法尼亚州匹兹堡。

Knowing your aversion to technology but your close afﬁliation with Bill Gates, Microsoft, have you ever considered either inviting him to be part of the Berkshire through the board, or being involved to maybe solve some of the problems with World Book and taking it to thenew technology and expanding it? 知道你对技术的厌恶，但你与微软的比尔盖茨有密切关系，你有没有考虑邀请他通过董事会成为伯克希尔的一员，或参与解决世界图书的一些问题并将其带入新技术并扩大它？

And on the other end, you also love insurance and the ﬂoat.Have you considered the other businesses that would have that similarity, such as cemeteries and funeral homes with their pre- need and their large cash reserves? 而在另一端，你也喜欢保险和漂浮。您是否考虑过具有相似性的其他业务，例如墓地和殡仪馆的预先需求及其庞大的现金储备？

WARREN BUFFETT: The — Bill and I talked about the encyclopedia business some years ago.But he was pretty far down the line at Encarta, quite far down the line at Encarta, actually, before I even met him.So it wasn’t — my guess is, if we had met earlier, that there might have been something evolve in that. WARREN BUFFETT ：比尔和我几年前谈到了百科全书业务。但是，就在Encarta的路线上，他在相当远的地方，实际上，在我遇见他之前。所以它不是 - 我的猜测是，如果我们早些时候相遇，那可能会有一些进展。 But he had put a lot of chips on Encarta and had done a good job with it.So it really wasn't — it wasn’t a real option to work with him on World Book. 但他已经在Encarta上投入了大量筹码并且已经做得很好。所以事实并非如此 - 在世界图书上与他合作并不是一个真正的选择。

Bill also is very focused on his business.And I believe he's on the board of some biotech company in which he's got a signiﬁcant investment. 比尔也非常关注他的业务。而且我相信他是一家生物技术公司的董事会成员，他在那里获得了大笔投资。

But you will not see him on the boards of, at least I don't believe that you will, of American corporations — I think, if you look at the boards in the, say, up in the Paciﬁc Northwest, where he had alot of friends and knows the companies well and maybe grew up with some of the people. 但你不会在美国公司的董事会上看到他，至少我不相信你会这么做 - 我想，如果你看看太平洋西北地区的董事会，他在那里有一个很多朋友，很了解公司，也许和一些人一起长大。

But I don't think you'll see him on anything which really doesn’t — which is just a business that doesn't grab him intellectually on something.I do think there's one biotech company that he's involved in that way.And you know, he'd be a terriﬁc asset. 但是我认为你不会在任何真正没有的东西上看到他 - 这只是一个在某些事情上并没有从理智上抓住他的事情。我确实认为有一家生物技术公司以这种方式参与其中。你知道，他将是一个了不起的资产。

But he really focuses on Microsoft.He has his board meetings, as I remember, on Saturday.They last, you know, all day.And then he goes after the business that way.He’s not — 但他真的专注于微软。星期六，我记得他举行了董事会会议。你知道，他们一整天。然后他以这种方式追求业务。他不是 -

I don't think he'd be interested on being on a bank board or an insurance company board because he just ﬁgures he's got other things to do with his time.And I think he's probably right.(Laughs) 我不认为他会对银行董事会或保险公司董事会感兴趣，因为他只是觉得他还有其他与他的时间有关的事情。我认为他可能是对的。（笑）

37. Not all "ﬂoat" businesses are attractive 37.并非所有“浮动”业务都具有吸引力

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?Oh, the question was about other kinds. WARREN BUFFETT：3区？哦，问题是其他种类。

We've always had an interest in ﬂoat businesses of one sort or another, but — 我们一直对某种浮动业务感兴趣，但是 -

You know, Blue Chip Stamps was such a business, until it disappeared — (laughs) — one day, and we couldn't ﬁnd it.We went — looked in the closet.We looked everywhere, out in the backyard. (Laughs) Where was it? 你知道，Blue Chip Stamps 就是这样一个企业，直到它消失 - （笑） - 有一天，我们找不到它。我们走了 - 看着壁橱里。我们到处看，在后院。（笑）它在哪里？

So we like that sort of business.But most of the float businesses, the costs are pretty explicit.And like I say, we don't like most insurance companies as float businesses.We are not interested in buying the typical insurance business, because we think the float will end up costing us too much. 所以我们喜欢那种生意。但大多数浮动业务的成本非常明显。就像我说的那样，我们不喜欢大多数保险公司作为浮动业务。我们对购买典型的保险业务不感兴趣，因为我们认为浮动将最终导致我们付出太多代价。 We'd rather borrow money with an explicit cost attached to it rather than have the implicit costs of an underwriting loss with most companies. 我们宁愿以明确的成本借钱，而不是承担大多数公司承保损失的隐性成本。

But we’re always — we are interested in businesses that provide cash rather than use up cash.We're willing to have them use cash, if the — if what they use will produce high enough returns.But we've got this bias toward things that throw off cash. 但我们总是 - 我们对提供现金而不是用尽现金的企业感兴趣。我们愿意让他们使用现金，如果他们使用的话会产生足够高的回报。但是我们对那些甩掉现金的东西有这种偏见。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if we go into the pre-need funeral home business, that'll be the day. (Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER ：嗯，如果我们进入需要殡仪馆的家庭生意，那将是一天。（笑声）

38. Expect a "better" market for Class A than Class B 38.期望A级市场比B级市场“更好”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3. (Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：第3区（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Charlie is a difﬁcult act to follow.I'm Robert Keeley (PH) from Washington, D.C. 观众成员：查理是一个难以理解的行为。我是来自华盛顿特区的Robert Keeley（PH）。

I have a brief comment and a brief question.The comment is that I think you may be considerably underestimating the interest there will be in purchases of Class B stock later this week and next week. 我有一个简短的评论和一个简短的问题。评论是，我认为你可能会大大低估本周和下周晚些时候购买 B类股票的兴趣。

I have at least 10 friends in Washington who are aware that I'm a Berkshire shareholder and that I was coming to this meeting.And they've insisted that I report back to them tomorrow on just what happened with the Class B stock because they're very interested in buying some of it. 我在华盛顿至少有10个朋友，他们知道我是伯克希尔的股东，而且我正在参加这次会议。并且他们坚持要我明天向他们报告B级股票发生的事情，因为他们非常有兴趣购买部分股票。

Now, that's anecdotal, to be sure.But if you take that ratio of 10 people to even the shareholders who are present here today, you're talking about tens of thousands of people who are going to be in that market. 现在，这是轶事，可以肯定。但如果你把10人的比例带到今天在场的股东那里，你就会谈到将要进入这个市场的成千上万的人。

And my question relates to liquidity.On page 18 of your annual report, you say, and I quote, "The prospect that most shareholders will stick to the A stock suggests that it will enjoy a somewhat more liquid market than the B." 我的问题与流动性有关。在你的年度报告的第18页，你说，我引用，“大多数股东将坚持A股的前景表明，它将享有比B更具流动性的市场。”

Could you explain that?It seems to me that if most shareholders keep their A stock, do not convert it or sell it, that the B stock will be much more liquid.Maybe I don't understand liquidity. 你能解释一下吗？在我看来，如果大多数股东保留他们的A股，不转换它或卖掉它，那么 B股将更具流动性。也许我不了解流动性。 WARREN BUFFETT: No, I think you do.You understand it.And I'll elaborate just a bit. 沃伦巴菲特：不，我想你做到了。你了解它。我会详细说明一下。

The — certainly, in the ﬁrst week, I would expect the B stock to trade far more, although I hope it doesn't trade like most new issues trade in relation to the amount sold. - 当然，在第一周，我预计B股的交易量会大得多，但我希望它不会像大多数新发行的交易那样进行交易。

It's just the nature of a new offering that there's usually — there’s always some ﬂurry of activity.Sometimes, I think it's quite excessive.And I don't think it will be with Berkshire.But there will be some ﬂurry of activity. 这通常是新产品的本质 - 总是有一些活动。有时候，我觉得这太过分了。而且我认为伯克希尔不会这样。但是会有一些活动。

But longer range, let's just assume that there's $400 million worth of B stock.There will be 40 billion of A. 但是更长的范围，让我们假设有价值4亿美元的B股。 A将有400亿。

Now, admittedly, you know, I'm not going to do anything with my stock.And many people in this room have a very low tax basis and, except under very unusual circumstances, have no intention of doing anything with their stock. 现在，诚然，你知道，我不会对我的股票做任何事情。这个房间里的很多人都有非常低的税基，除非在非常特殊的情况下，他们无意对他们的股票做任何事情。

So of that 40 billion, there's a very signiﬁcant percentage that you might say is almost inoculated against reaction to market changes. 因此，在这400亿美元中，您可能会说非常重要的百分比几乎是针对市场变化的反应而接种的。

But there still is a very signiﬁcant dollar value.There's a fair amount held by funds, for example. 但仍有非常重要的美元价值。例如，资金持有相当数额。

And so the market value of what I would call the potentially tradeable A is likely to far exceed the market value of the potentially tradeable B. Now, it may be that all of the B is potentially tradeable, whereas, only a small portion of theA is. 因此，我称之为潜在可交易A的市场价值很可能远远超过潜在可交易B的市场价值。现在，可能所有B 都可能具有可交易性，而只有一小部分是可交易的。 A是。

But that 40-billion-to-400-million ratio, I think, almost ensures that, after the initial ﬂurry, that the better market — and when I say, "better market," I mean the ability to move large dollar amounts inboth directions with minimal movement of price — the better market — not by a huge margin — but the better market is likely to be in the A. And frankly, we hope that it is.We still hope there's a good market in the B, obviously. 但是，我认为，这个400亿到4亿的比率几乎可以确保，在最初的骚动之后，更好的市场 - 当我说“更好的市场”时，我的意思是能够移动大量的金额。价格变动最小的两个方向 - 更好的市场 - 而不是一个巨大的差距 - 但更好的市场可能在A中。坦率地说，我们希望它是。我们仍然希望B中有一个很好的市场。

But if you're talking 10 shares of the A, which is a $300,000 or so investment, I think that, two months from now — that it's likely to be that buying or selling $300,000 worth of A will have slightly less of a percentage impactthan buying or selling $300,000 worth of B, but not by a signiﬁcant amount. 但是，如果你正在谈论A的10股，这是一笔30万美元左右的投资，我认为，从现在起两个月后，购买或出售价值30万美元的A可能会略微减少一个百分比的影响。比购买或出售价值30万美元的B，但不是很大。 But that's what I meant by that comment of having a slightly better market in the A than the B. And that's important from our standpoint because, if that situation became reversed and the B became the better market, then people would have a real incentive toconvert from A to B over time, and eventually the B market would dominate. 但这就是我所说的A的市场略好于B的评论。从我们的观点来看这很重要，因为如果这种情况发生逆转而B成为更好的市场，那么人们就会有真正的激励随着时间的推移从A转换为B，最终B市场将占主导地位。

We don't anticipate that happening.And I think the way we've arranged it, it won't happen.But it could happen. 我们预计不会发生这种情况。我认为我们安排它的方式不会发生。但它可能会发生。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, well, I think we've also created arrangements in the way we've written the prospectus and rewarded the selling brokers that tend to dampen demand, both individual and institutional.And we sometimes accomplish what we try to do.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，我认为我们也已经按照我们撰写招股说明书的方式制定了安排，并奖励那些倾向于抑制个人和机构需求的销售经纪人。我们有时会完成我们尝试做的事情。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4?Don't ask us for a list of those, what we've accomplished.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：第4区？不要问我们列出那些，我们已经完成了什么。（笑声）

39. Corporate return on equity will probably drop 39.公司股本回报率可能会下降

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Dan Pecaut, Sioux City, Iowa. 听众：爱荷华州Sioux市Dan Pecaut。

In the mid-'70s, you wrote an article on how inﬂation swindles the equity investor and that the average return on equity for corporate America would be like 12 or 13 percent. 在70年代中期，你写了一篇关于通货膨胀欺骗股权投资者的文章，美国企业的平均股本回报率将是 12％或13％。

Last year, the average was more like 20. Have the laws of economics been repealed or modiﬁed? Or if not, what sort of calamities might occur as we revert to the mean? 去年，平均值更像是20个。经济法则被废除或修改了吗？或者如果不是，当我们恢复到平均值时，可能会发生什么样的灾难？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I have been surprised by returns on equity.There was a good article in Fortune about two issues ago.Well, it was in the "Fortune 500" issue, whenever that was.And it discussed the question of return on equity. 沃伦巴菲特：嗯，我对股票回报感到惊讶。 “财富”杂志上有一篇关于两个问题的文章。嗯，这是在“财富500强”问题上，无论如何。它讨论了股本回报问题。

And it made some good points about how the introduction of putting post-retirement health beneﬁts on the balance sheet tends to swell equity returns subsequently.In other words, it moves down the denominator in terms of total equity employed. 并且它提出了一些关于如何在资产负债表上引入退休后健康福利往往会随后增加股权回报的一些好处。换句话说，就所使用的总权益而言，它在分母中向下移动。

And there's been a lot of big-bath accounting, where there have been write-offs, so that counting that, I don't think it has gotten to 20 percent.But it's higher than — it’s certainly higher than I anticipated when I wrote that article.

并且有很多大浴会计，其中有注销，所以这个，我认为它没有达到20％。但它高于 - 它肯定比我写这篇文章时预期的要高。

And I would say that it would seem very extreme to me, in a world of — like we're living in now — to have equity cap — returns on equity — close to the 20 — average close to the 20 percent rate over time.But it has surprised me, how high returns have been. 而且我会说，对于我来说，这似乎是非常极端的 - 在我们现在生活的世界中 - 拥有股权上限 - 股本回报率 - 接近20的平均值接近20％的时间。但令我感到惊讶的是，收益有多高。

Now, you have had situations like at Coke, for example, where 25 years ago, they would not have repurchased stock.And so, they'd have piled up more equity in the business.And Coke's return on equity, if it had been following the policies of 1970 or '75, would be far less than it is now. 现在，你有像可口可乐这样的情况，例如25年前他们就没有回购股票。因此，他们已经在业务中积累了更多的股权。如果可口可乐遵循1970年或75年的政策，那么可口可乐的股本回报率将远远低于现在的水平。

Coke really doesn't need equity.And so, it can earn extraordinary returns and very large dollar sums.To the extent that impacts the ﬁgures, that has some impact on them. 可口可乐真的不需要公平。因此，它可以获得非凡的回报和非常大的美元金额。在某种程度上影响数字，这对他们有一些影响。

To the extent that General Motors sets up many, many billions of a reserve for post-retirement health beneﬁts, that tends to make the returns on GM look a lot better than it did in the past, when it wasn't even recognizing those costsand, therefore, had an equity that really was much larger than the true equity. 如果通用汽车为退休后健康福利设立了数十亿美元的储备金，这往往会使通用汽车的回报看起来比以往更好，甚至没有认识到这些成本因此，股权实际上远远大于真实股权。

So there have been some things happen like that.But all in all, I don't think, under any system of accounting, the 20 percent returns for American industry are in the cards. 所以有一些事情就是这样发生的。但总而言之，我认为，在任何会计制度下，美国工业的20％回报率都在下降。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree.And I think that this business of having way more consolidation and the successful companies, like Wells Fargo, buying in stock, I think that's had a huge effect, too. CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我同意。而且我认为这项业务有更多的整合和成功的公司，如富国银行，购买股票，我认为这也产生了巨大的影响。

I don't think it's actually gotten that much — obviously, we had a long period of real growth and so on.And I think that, on average, business has earned higher returns on equity.But I think a whole lot of things have combined to goose the results.And I don't see how it could go much farther. 我认为它实际上并没有那么多 - 显然，我们有很长一段时间的实际增长，等等。我认为，平均而言，企业的股本回报率更高。但我认为很多事情已经结合起来。我不知道它会如何变得更远。

40. Buffett's investment doesn't reﬂect any real estate insights 40.巴菲特的投资并未反映任何房地产的见解

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5? WARREN BUFFETT：5区？ AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes.My name is Ted Elliott (PH) from Connecticut. 听众会员：是的。我叫康涅狄格州的Ted Elliott（PH）。

The press reported a recent investment you made in the real estate business.And I wondered if you would comment as to your outlook for that business. 媒体报道了您最近对房地产业务的投资。我想知道你是否会评论你对该业务的展望。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that's just sort of an asterisk.I've got virtually everything in Berkshire, and I own a few municipal bonds outside and a few other things, but I don't want to buy anything that Berkshire's involved in. It just complicates life.And all the best things I like — (laughs) — are in Berkshire. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，这只是一个星号。我几乎拥有伯克希尔的所有东西，我在外面拥有一些市政债券和其他一些东西，但我不想买伯克希尔所涉及的任何东西。这只会使生活复杂化。我喜欢的所有最好的东西 - （笑） - 都在伯克希尔。

So every now and then, some little thing happens to hit the radar screen that is too small, really, for Berkshire.And I'd bought a hundred shares of that company back when I — it's called Property Capital Trust — I'd bought 100 shares of that back when we owned NHP, which had done a couple of deals with them.So I — my policy of reading every annual report in sight that can further my knowledge about anything, I bought 100 shares. 因此，对于伯克希尔来说，偶尔会发生一些小东西碰到太小的雷达屏幕。当我被称为Property Capital Trust时，我买回了该公司的一百股股票 - 当我们拥有NHP时，我已经购买了100股股票，后者与他们做了几笔交易。所以我 - 我阅读每份年度报告的政策，可以进一步了解任何事情，我买了 100股。

And then I happened to see a year or so ago, where they said they were going to liquidate.So having some money around, I bought that.But it's not based on any feeling about the real estate business, any sophisticated analysis of the company, or anything else.It's a minor personal investment. 然后我偶然发现大约一年前，他们说他们要清算。所以有一些钱，我买了。但它不是基于对房地产业务的任何感觉，对公司的任何复杂分析，或其他任何事情。这是一笔不小的个人投资。

I have no insights whatsoever.We've done a few things in real estate at Berkshire.But they've been large things.And there was a brief period when there were a couple things that were intelligent to do. 我没有任何见解。我们在伯克郡的房地产业做了一些事情。但他们一直都是大事。还有一段时间，有一些事情是聪明的。

If we'd started a little earlier, there might've been a lot more things.But we started a little late.So we're doing nothing now.But we listen to things, occasionally. 如果我们早一点开始，可能会有更多的东西。但是我们开始有点晚了。所以我们现在什么都不做。但我们偶尔会听一些事情。

But we're looking.We're basically looking for big things at Berkshire.And we haven't found anything in real estate in a long time.And we may never. 但我们正在寻找。我们基本上都在寻找伯克希尔的大事。而且我们很长一段时间没有在房地产中找到任何东西。我们可能永远不会。

But who can tell?I mean, we've got our oar in the water.And the couple things we're in are working out ﬁne.But they're not signiﬁcant relative to Berkshire's size. 但谁能说出来？我的意思是，我们在水中有桨。而我们所处的几件事情正在发挥作用。但相对伯克希尔的规模而言，它们并不重要。

41. Berkshire's past growth not a yardstick for new investments 41.伯克希尔过去的增长不是新投资的标准 WARREN BUFFETT: We'll go to zone 6. And this is the last question because it's going to be 3 o'clock.And let's have zone 6. WARREN BUFFETT：我们将进入6区。这是最后一个问题，因为它将是3点钟。让我们有6区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name's Mike Nolan from New Jersey.My wife and I have been shareholders since 1984, and happy ones.Thank you both.Two questions today. 听众：嗨，我的名字来自新泽西州的Mike Nolan。我和我的妻子自1984年以来一直是股东，也是幸福的股东。谢谢你们俩。今天有两个问题。

In the retail store industry, in light of Berkshire's outstanding 23 percent annual growth in book value per share and the industry's roughly 8 to 9 percent growth in equity over the last several years, we wonder, why would Berkshire exchange stock for securities such as these, when the growth and the net worth of the acquired companies, if they're anywhere near the industry average that you've acquired this year, are one-third or less? 在零售店行业，鉴于伯克希尔在过去几年中每股账面价值每年增长23％，而且该行业的股本增长率约为8％至9％，我们想知道为什么伯克希尔会为这些证券交换股票。当被收购公司的增长和净值，如果它们接近你今年收购的行业平均水平，是三分之一还是更少？

To quote Barnett Helzberg from the annual report, "The diamond business is a very competitive industry." 从年度报告中引用Barnett Helzberg的话说，“钻石业务是一个非常有竞争力的行业。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, all retail is competitive.And both of those companies have averaged a lot better returns on equity than the numbers you cite for the industry. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，所有零售都很有竞争力。这两家公司的平均回报率均高于您所引用行业的数字。

And the second point, you know, we have no way of making 23.6 percent in the future.So we do not use our historical — if we used our historical average as a yardstick for new investments, we would make no new investments because we don't know how to make 23.6 percent in the future. 第二点，你知道，我们未来无法获得23.6％的收益。因此，我们不使用我们的历史 - 如果我们使用历史平均值作为新投资的标准，我们将不会进行任何新投资，因为我们不知道将来如何赚取23.6％。

But we like — we regard the retail business as a very tough business.We like the records of those companies, their market positions, and their managements.And when we ﬁnd a business like that, and we feel very comfortable with the people running it, we will make the deal. 但我们喜欢 - 我们认为零售业务是一项非常艰难的业务。我们喜欢这些公司的记录，他们的市场地位和他们的管理。当我们找到这样的业务，并且我们对运行它的人感到非常满意时，我们会做出这笔交易。

But we won't expect to make 23.6 percent on our money over time doing that. 但是，随着时间的推移，我们不会期望能够赚到23.6％的资金。

I'd like to thank everybody for coming.You’ve, you know — (Applause) 我要感谢大家的到来。你知道吗 - （掌声）

Mon, May 6 1996 • 1:00 PM

Morning Session - 1996 Meeting BerkshireHathaway

Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger discuss in detail why Berkshire created its lower-priced B shares and answer a number of questions about the new stock class. They also explain why the company isn't a "one-man show."

1. Welcome 1.欢迎

WARREN BUFFETT: Just a little early, but I think everyone's had a chance to take their seats. WARREN BUFFETT：早一点，但我想每个人都有机会坐下来。

I must say, this is the ﬁrst time I've seen this program.They told me they'd surprise me, and they certainly did.(Laughter) 我必须说，这是我第一次见到这个节目。他们告诉我他们会让我感到惊讶，他们肯定会这样做。（笑声）

Marc Hamburg, our chief financial officer, who is now known around the office as CB, was in charge of putting all this together.And we — I want you to know, we have no multimedia (inaudible). (Applause) 我们的首席财务官马克·汉堡（Marc Hamburg）现在在办公室被称为CB，他负责将所有这些放在一起。我们 - 我想让你知道，我们没有多媒体（听不见）。（掌声）

This entire meeting is handled by a regular staff.We have no public relations department, or investor relations, or multimedia department, or anything of the sort.So, everybody just pitches in. And Marc will, forevermore, be in charge of the pregame ceremonies.(Laughter) 整个会议由常规工作人员处理。我们没有公关部门，投资者关系部门，多媒体部门或类似的任何部门。因此，每个人都只是投球。而马克将永远负责赛前的仪式。（笑声）

We have a very large crowd today.I hope everybody has found a seat, either in this main room or in the three overﬂow rooms.I think we can handle around 5,400.And historically, 62 percent or just about exactly 62 percent, every year, of the people who request tickets have come to the meeting. 我们今天有很多人。我希望每个人都能找到一个座位，无论是在这个主要房间还是在三个溢出的房间里。我想我们可以处理大约5,400。从历史上看，每年申请门票的人中有62％或者仅约62％的人来参加会议。

And if that percentage holds true today, we have just ﬁlled the rooms.And we will have a problem in the future, which we haven't ﬁgured out the answer to yet.But we've got another year. 如果这个百分比在今天成立，我们刚刚填满了房间。我们将来会遇到一个问题，我们还没有找到答案。但我们还有一年。

The way we'll run the meeting is that we'll get the business out of way — out of the way — at the start.And we'll talk about the Class B issuance, then, too.So, it'll take a little longer than historically has been the case.

我们开展会议的方式是，我们将在开始时让业务完全脱离。我们也会讨论B类发行。因此，它需要比历史上更长的时间。

And, then, we'll have Q & A for — until about noon.We'll have a short break at noon.There'll be sandwiches outside, which you can buy.(Laughter) 然后，我们将进行问答 - 直到大约中午。我们中午会休息一下。外面会有三明治，你可以买。（笑声）

And Charlie and I will have a couple of sandwiches up here at the podium. 查理和我将在讲台上有几个三明治。

And, then, we will stay around until about 3 o'clock to answer more questions.And at that time, after noon, I'm sure everybody in the overﬂow rooms will be able to ﬁnd a seat here in the main room. 然后，我们将一直待到3点左右才能回答更多问题。那时，中午之后，我确信溢出房间里的每个人都能在主房间找到座位。

But people have come from great distances to attend this meeting.So, we really want to get a — give everyone a chance to get their questions asked.And Charlie and I are delighted to — but we'll have to break it up at three, no matter what.But we'll be delighted to stick around. 但人们已经远道而来参加这次会议。所以，我们真的想得到一个 - 让每个人都有机会提出他们的问题。查理和我很高兴 - 但不管怎样，我们必须在三点分手。但我们很乐意坚持下去。

You can leave anytime, obviously.As I've explained in the past, it's much better form to leave while Charlie is talking.(Laughter) 显然，你可以随时离开。正如我过去所解释的那样，在查理谈话时离开会更好。（笑声）

But the — feel free to do that.And then at noon you'll get a chance to do it en masse. 但是 - 随意做到这一点。然后在中午你将有机会集体做到这一点。

We have buses available to take you to — if you have any money left at all after yesterday — to take you to other business establishments of Berkshire, locally. 我们有公共汽车可以带你去 - 如果你昨天之后还剩下任何钱 - 带你去当地伯克希尔的其他商业机构。

So that will be the plan.I hope everyone does get their questions answered. 那将是计划。我希望每个人都能回答他们的问题。

We've got a system where we break this room into six zones.And we have a couple of zones in other rooms.And then this afternoon, everybody will be able to be here in the main room.So, that is the procedure. 我们有一个系统，我们将这个房间分成六个区域。我们在其他房间有几个区域。然后今天下午，每个人都可以在主房间。那就是程序。

I'm sure you recognize Charlie Munger, the vice chairman of Berkshire Hathaway, who also had not seen that movie before.(Laughs) 我相信你会认出伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的副主席查理芒格，他之前也没看过这部电影。（笑）

And showed — we were — I think Marc was afraid to show it to us.But in any event — (laughter) — we will go on. 并表明 - 我们是 - 我认为Marc害怕向我们展示。但无论如何 - （笑声） - 我们会继续。

I thought you might be interested.This is a list of people that came in for tickets.And we had, in addition to 99 from Canada and, of course, the U.S., we had Australia, the Channel Islands, England, Greece, Hong Kong, Israel, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Singapore, Sweden, and Switzerland. 我以为你可能会感兴趣这是进入门票的人员列表。除了来自加拿大的99个，当然还有美国，我们还有澳大利亚，海峡群岛，英格兰，希腊，香港，以色列，葡萄牙，波多黎各，新加坡，瑞典和瑞士。 I'm not sure all of those people are with us today.But they did send for tickets.And I've met a number that did come in from a distance. 我不确定今天所有这些人都和我们在一起。但他们确实派人去买票。我遇到了一个从远处进来的号码。

2. Election of directors 2.选举董事

WARREN BUFFETT: So, with that introduction, I will call the meeting to order. WARREN BUFFETT：所以，有了这个介绍，我会打电话给会议。

I'm Warren Buffett, chairman of the board of the directors.And I do welcome you to this meeting.I hope everybody has a good time this weekend. 我是董事会主席沃伦巴菲特。我欢迎你参加这次会议。我希望大家周末玩得愉快。

And I'd like to introduce the directors, in addition to myself and to Charlie. 除了我自己和查理之外，我想介绍一下导演。

Now, you don't get quite your money's worth this year from our directors.They’ve — collectively, they've lost 100 pounds since last — our last meeting.I think they've been trying to live on the director's fees.(Laughter) 现在，你今年从我们的董事那里得不到你的钱。他们 - 总的来说，他们自上次以来已经减掉了100磅 - 我们的最后一次会议。我认为他们一直在努力争取导演的费用。（笑声）

We have with us Howard Buffett — let's stand.(Applause) 我们和霍华德巴菲特在一起 - 让我们站起来吧。（掌声）

Susan T. Buffett.(Applause) 苏珊巴菲特。（掌声）

Malcolm G. Chace III.(Applause) Malcolm G. Chace III。（掌声）

And Walter Scott Jr. (Applause) 和小沃尔特斯科特（掌声）

Along with us today are partners in the ﬁrm of Deloitte & Touche, our auditors, Mr. Ron Burgess and Mr. Craig Christiansen (PH).They're available to respond to appropriate questions you might have concerning their ﬁrm's audit of the accounts of Berkshire. 今天与我们一起是Deloitte＆Touche公司的合伙人，我们的审计师Ron Burgess先生和Craig Christiansen先生（PH）。他们可以回答您对公司审计伯克希尔账户的适当问题。

Mr. Forrest Krutter is secretary of Berkshire.He will make a written record of the proceedings. Forrest Krutter先生是伯克希尔的秘书。他将以书面形式记录诉讼程序。

Mr. Robert M. Fitzsimmons has been appointed inspector of elections at this meeting.He will certify to the count of votes cast in the election for directors. Robert M. Fitzsimmons先生在本次会议上被任命为选举检查员。他将证明在董事选举中投票的票数。

The named proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott Jr. and Marc D. Hamburg.Proxy cards have been returned through last Friday representing, it says “number to come.” (Laughter) 本次会议的指定代理人是Walter Scott Jr.和Marc D. Hamburg。代理卡已经在上周五返回代表，它说“要来的号码。”（笑声） VOICE: There’s another script. 声音：还有另一个剧本。

WARREN BUFFETT: Ah, OK, there’s another — oh, yeah.Here's the script on that one: 1,041,567 Berkshire shares to be voted by the proxy holders, as indicated on the cards.That number of shares represents a quorum.And we will therefore proceed — directly proceed — with the meeting. WARREN BUFFETT：啊，好吧，还有另一个 - 哦，是的。这是关于那个的脚本：1,041,567伯克希尔股票将由代理持有人投票，如卡片上所示。该数量的股票代表法定人数。因此，我们将继续 - 直接进行 - 参加会议。

We will conduct the business of the meeting, then adjourn the formal meeting.After that, we will entertain questions that you may have. 我们将开展会议的业务，然后休会正式会议。在那之后，我们将接受您可能遇到的问题。

First order of business will be a reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders.I recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr. who will place a motion before the meeting. 第一项业务是阅读上次股东大会的会议记录。我承认将在会议前提出议案的沃尔特斯科特先生。

WALTER SCOTT JR.: I move that the reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders be dispensed with. WALTER SCOTT JR：我提议不要阅读上次股东大会的会议记录。

WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second? WARREN BUFFETT：我听到第二个吗？

VOICE: I second the motion. 声音：我赞成议案。

WARREN BUFFETT: The motion has been moved and seconded.Are there any comments or questions?We will vote on this motion by voice vote.All those in favor say, “Aye.” WARREN BUFFETT：动议已被移动并借调。有任何意见或问题吗？我们将通过声音投票对这项动议进行投票。所有赞成的人都说，“是的。”

VOICES: Aye. 声音：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Opposed?Motion's carried. WARREN BUFFETT：反对？动作随身携带。

Does the secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding, entitled to vote, and represented at the meeting? 秘书是否有一份关于伯克希尔有限公司股票数量的报告，有权投票并出席会议？

ROBERT M. FITZSIMMONS: Yes.I do.As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting that was sent by ﬁrst-class mail to all shareholders of record on March 8, 1996, being the record date for this meeting, there were 1,193,512 shares of Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstandingwith each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting. ROBERT M. FITZSIMMONS：是的。我做。正如本次会议通知所附的代理声明中所述，该会议通知是1996年3月8日（即本次会议的记录日期）以一等邮件发送给所有记录股东，其中有1193,512股伯克希尔哈撒韦普通股股票。每份股票有权就会议上审议的议案进行一票表决。

Of that number, 1,041,567 shares are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through last Friday. 在这个数字中，上周五返回的代理人在本次会议上有1,041,567股股票。 WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.If a shareholder is present who wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in and vote in person on the two items of business provided for in the proxy statement, he or she may do so. WARREN BUFFETT：谢谢。如果股东在场，希望撤回之前发送的代理人并亲自对代理声明中规定的两项业务进行投票，则他或她可以这样做。

Also, if any shareholder that's present has not turned in a proxy and desires a ballot in order to vote in person on those two items, you may do so. 此外，如果在场的任何股东没有提交代理并且希望投票以便亲自对这两个项目进行投票，您可以这样做。

If you wish to do this, please identify yourself to meeting ofﬁcials in the aisles who will furnish two ballots to you, one for each item. 如果您希望这样做，请与过道的官员会面，并向您提供两张选票，每件一件。

Will those persons desiring ballots please identify themselves, so that we may distribute them? 那些想要选票的人是否应该表明身份，以便我们分发？

First item of business at this meeting is to elect directors.And I'll recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr. to place a motion before the meeting, with respect to election of directors. 本次会议的第一项业务是选举董事。我会认可Walter Scott Jr.先生在会议前提出有关董事选举的议案。

WALTER SCOTT JR.: I move that Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chace III, Charles T. Munger, and Walter Scott Jr. be elected as directors. WALTER SCOTT JR：我谨此选举Warren E. Buffett，Susan T. Buffett，Howard G. Buffett， Malcolm G. Chace III，Charles T. Munger和Walter Scott Jr.担任董事。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second? WARREN BUFFETT：还有一秒吗？

VOICE: I second the motion. 声音：我赞成议案。

WARREN BUFFETT: Are there any other nominations?Is there any discussion? WARREN BUFFETT：还有其他提名吗？有没有讨论？

I learned a lot in China.We did so — (Laughter) 我在中国学到了很多东西。我们这样做了 - （笑声）

The nominations are ready to be acted upon.If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballots on the election of directors and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of elections. 提名已准备就绪。如果有任何股东亲自投票，他们现在应该在选举董事上进行选票，并允许将选票交给选举检查员。

Will the proxy holders please also submit to the inspector of elections a ballot on the election of directors, voting the proxies in accordance with the instructions they have received? 请代理人还请向选举检查员提交关于选举董事的投票，并按照他们收到的指示投票代理人吗？

Mr. Fitzsimmons, when you're ready, you may give your report. Fitzsimmons先生，当你准备好了，你可以给你报告。

ROBERT M. FITZSIMMONS: My report is ready.The ballot of the proxy holders received through last Friday cast not less than 1,040,667 votes for each nominee.That number far exceeds the majority of the number of all shares outstanding. ROBERT M. FITZSIMMONS：我的报告准备好了。上周五收到的代理人持票人数不少于每名被提名人的1,040,667票。这个数字远远超过所有已发行股票的大部分。

The certiﬁcation required by Delaware law regarding the precise count of the votes, including the votes cast in person at this meeting, will be given to the secretary to be placed in the minutes of this meeting. 特拉华州法律要求关于准确计票的证明，包括亲自参加本次会议的投票，将提交给秘书，以便在本次会议的会议记录中进行。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Mr. Fitzsimmons. WARREN BUFFETT：谢谢Fitzsimmons先生。

Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcom G. Chace III, Charles T. Munger, and Walter Scott Jr. have been elected as directors. Warren E. Buffett，Susan T. Buffett，Howard G. Buf fett，Malcom G. Chace III，Charles T. Munger 和Walter Scott Jr.当选为董事。

3. Why Class B shares were created 3.为什么要创建B类股票

WARREN BUFFETT: The second item of business of this meeting is to consider the recommendation of the board of directors to amend the company's restated certiﬁcate of incorporation. WARREN BUFFETT ：本次会议的第二项业务是考虑董事会的建议，修改公司重新注册的公司注册证书。

The proposed amendment would add a provision to the restated certiﬁcate of incorporation authorizing the board of directors to issue up to 50 million shares of a new Class B common stock, with each Class B share having economic rights equivalent to 1/30th of a share ofthe current common stock, and with 1/200th of the vote, and to re-designate the company's current common stock as Class A common stock and to make each share of Class A common stock convertible into 30 shares of the new Class B stock atthe option of the holder. 拟议修正案将对重述的公司注册证书增加一项规定，授权董事会发行最多5000万股新的B类普通股，每股B类股票的经济权利相当于公司股份的1/30。当前的普通股，以及1/200的投票权，并将公司当前的普通股重新指定为A类普通股，并将每股A类普通股转换为30股新的B类股票，持有人的选择权。

I think, before we get into moving that motion — I think this would be a good time to have discussion and take your questions regarding the issuance of the Class B. And I should give you a little background. 我想，在我们提出动议之前 - 我认为现在是讨论的好时机，并就发布B类问题提出问题。我应该给你一些背景知识。

I think many of you know the background on this.But over the years, we've had probably half a dozen people, one time or another, propose that the creation of an all-Berkshire investment company or unit trust. 我想很多人都知道这方面的背景。但多年来，我们可能已经有六个人，不管怎样，提议创建一个全伯克希尔投资公司或单位信托。

In other words, an entity that would hold nothing but Berkshire stock, and then would parcel out its own shares in smaller denomination pieces to the public. 换句话说，一个只持有伯克希尔股票的实体，然后将以较小面额的部分向公众分配其自己的股份。

And we have generally discouraged that because we felt that there was considerable potential for abuse in such an arrangement.

我们一般都气馁，因为我们认为在这种安排中存在相当大的滥用可能性。

And our discouragement has been successful up until last fall, when there was one — there were two proposals — that went as far as submission to the SEC for clearance, that involved unit trusts. 我们的沮丧一直持续到去年秋天，当时有一个 - 有两个提案 - 就提交给美国证券交易委员会进行审批，涉及单位信托。

And these unit trusts would've owned nothing but Berkshire shares and, then, been sold to the public in small denominations, probably with a minimum investment of around a thousand dollars or so. 这些单位信托基金只拥有伯克希尔股票，然后以小面额出售给公众，最低投资额可能在1000美元左右。

And holders of those trusts would've bought into an entity that had a deﬁned life, but that had considerable, in the way of costs and some tax consequences, that they might not anticipate when they came in. 这些信托的持有者将会购买一个具有明确生命的实体，但在成本和税收后果方面，他们可能无法预料他们何时进入。

And Charlie and I were worried that a combination of Berkshire's past record — which cannot be repeated — and high sales commissions, and a low denomination, and a lot of publicity about Berkshire and myself, which, as you've seen this morning, weattempt to discourage (Laughter) — 查理和我担心伯克希尔过去的记录 - 不能重复 - 和高销售佣金，低面额，以及关于伯克希尔和我自己的大量宣传，正如你今天早上所见，我们试图劝阻（笑声） -

The — that the — a great many people would end up buying these unit trust holdings without any idea, really, of what they were buying, and with unrealistic expectations as to the future. - 很多人最终会在没有任何想法的情况下购买这些单位信托基金，他们购买的东西，以及对未来的不切实际的期望。

And that that would, in turn, create a considerable demand — because these unit trusts would go out and buy Berkshire shares — that would create a considerable demand against a ﬁxed supply, much of which is almost unavailable because people have a low tax basis andare reluctant to sell, and I hope they're reluctant to sell for other reasons. 反过来，这会产生相当大的需求 - 因为这些单位信托会出去购买伯克希尔的股票 - 这将对固定供应产生相当大的需求，其中大部分都几乎无法获得，因为人们税收基础较低，我不愿意出售，我希望他们不愿出于其他原因出售。

And that the very action of the creation of these, and that push on the demand, would — might very well create some speculative spurt in the stock, which in turn, would induce people who had been approached about the trust to feel they were missingeven more of a good thing by rushing in. 并且，创造这些产品的行动以及对需求的推动，很可能会在股票中产生一些投机性的冲击，这反过来又会诱使那些接触过信托的人感到他们失踪了。冲进来更是一件好事。

Rising prices in certain kinds of markets create their own kind of demand.It's not a sustained demand.And it's a demand that the reversal of which, later on, when people become disillusioned, can cause a lot of problems. 某些市场价格的上涨创造了他们自己的需求。这不是持续的需求。并且要求在人们失望之后逆转这种情况会导致很多问题。

But that potential was there with a ﬂood of buyers with unrealistic expectations, high commissions, and a ﬁxed supply.So, we attempted to dissuade both of the promoters. 但是，这种潜力随着大量购买者的不切实际的期望，高佣金和固定供应而存在。所以，我们试图劝阻两位发起人。 One backed away and then came out a few months later with something that was a combination of Berkshire and some other securities, which were at least thought to be in our portfolio. 一个人退了回来，几个月后又出现了一些伯克希尔和其他证券的组合，这些证券至少被认为是我们的投资组合。

And we started hearing from people that it was clear had no understanding of what they were buying, or the costs involved, or the potential tax implications, or anything of the sort. 我们开始听取人们的意见，很明显他们不了解他们购买的东西，或涉及的成本，或潜在的税务影响，或任何类似的东西。

So, at that time, we faced — we had to make a decision, and we had to make it rather quickly, as to what would be the best solution to this problem that, in turn, wouldn't create the same sort of thingthat we felt had potential harm when being done by these promoters. 那么，当时，我们面临着 - 我们必须做出决定，我们必须相当迅速地做出决定，这个问题的最佳解决方案是什么，反过来，不会创造同样的东西我们认为这些推动者完成后可能会受到伤害。

Obviously, we considered a split of the stock.But we were worried that a split would send out signals to all kinds of people who want to believe in things that may not be too believable about future performance and that they would look at it as some grand chance to buy in at a lower price. 显然，我们考虑了股票的分割。但是我们担心分裂会向各种想要相信未来表现可能不太可信的事情的人发出信号，他们会把它看作是以较低价格买入的大好机会。

Of course, it wouldn't really be a lower price in relation to value.But it would be a lower denomination. 当然，与价值相比，它实际上并不是一个更低的价格。但这将是一个较低的面额。

And that, again, against a ﬁxed supply, might very well have created the same kind of problem, maybe even a greater problem, than would occur with the unit trusts. 而且，对于固定供应而言，可能很可能产生与单位信托相同的问题，甚至可能是更大的问题。

So, we came upon the idea of the Class B shares, which would create a supply that would match the demand for, in effect, split shares, and that would be offered in a way that did not create special inducements, or to create falseinducements to people thinking of buying. 因此，我们发现了B类股票的想法，这将创造一种能够满足实际需求，即分割份额，并且不会产生特殊诱因或创造虚假的方式提供的供应诱惑人们考虑购买。

And one of the things we did was we stuck a commission on it, on the issuance of the Class B shares, that was about as low as any I've ever seen in many years in Wall Street, because we did not want salespeople tohave a great inducement — we — to go out and sell the shares. 我们所做的其中一件事就是我们在发行B类股票时就收到了一笔佣金，这个数字与我在华尔街多年来所见过的一样低，因为我们不希望销售人员有一个很好的诱因 - 我们 - 出去卖股票。

We wanted anyone that was interested to read the prospectus, and think about it, and make their own decisions. 我们希望任何有兴趣的人阅读招股说明书，并考虑它，并做出自己的决定。

And we did another thing, which is quite counter to the normal commercial approach, which is that we said we would issue as many shares as people wanted to buy. 我们做了另一件事，这与正常的商业方法背道而驰，就是我们说我们会发行与人们想买的一样多的股票。

And, you know, you do much better in this world if you're selling something, to say "only one to a customer," and "you have to get in early," or "you have to know somebody in order to getshares."And many new issues are sold that way, and it's very effective.

并且，你知道，如果你在卖东西，说“只有一个给顾客”，“你必须早点进入”，或者“你必须认识一个人才能获得分享。”许多新问题以这种方式出售，而且非常有效。

I mean, you know, it's like those old stories in Russia where there'd be lines, and people would get in them without knowing what they were going to buy when they got to the front of the line. 我的意思是，你知道，这就像俄罗斯那些有线条的旧故事，当人们走到前线时，人们会不知道他们会买什么。

And that's a very effective selling tool.And it's one that Wall Street is not unfamiliar with. 这是一个非常有效的销售工具。这是华尔街并不陌生的一个。

But we decided that, to reduce any of that feeling that you have to get in early, or only the big guy's going to get it, or something of the sort, that we would announce loud and clearly that we would have shares available for everyonethat wanted. 但是我们决定，为了减少你必须提前进入的那种感觉，或者只有那个大家伙才会得到它，或者类似的东西，我们会大声宣布我们会为每个人提供共享那个想要的。

So, there was no reason to assume that — it couldn't be a hot stock, in effect.And we've done various other things. 因此，没有理由认为 - 它实际上不是热门股票。我们做了其他各种事情。

So, I — our hope is that the Class B shareholders that we attract are of the same quality as the people in this room, that they have an investment attitude where they feel they are buying into part of a business, that they expect to staywith it for the indeﬁnite future, maybe the rest of their lives. 所以，我 - 我们希望我们吸引的B级股东与这个房间里的人有相同的品质，他们有一种投资态度，他们觉得自己正在购买一部分业务，他们希望留下来用它来度过无限期的未来，也许是他们余生。

And they do not think of it as a little piece of paper that may be hot because it's a new issue or something of the sort. 而且他们并不认为它是一张可能很热的小纸片，因为它是一个新问题或类似的东西。

It lets the people who are happy with the present shares stay in exactly the same position, which is what I'm going to do, what Charlie will do. 它让那些对现有股票感到满意的人保持完全相同的位置，这就是我要做的，查理会做什么。

We have made the B very slightly disadvantageous, in two respects, to the A. It has a lower vote, and it will not participate in the shareholder contributions programs. 我们已经使B在两个方面对A有点不利。它的投票率较低，并且它不会参与股东捐款计划。

There were reasons for both of those, but in addition to the — the explicit reasons, there also is the desire that the B not be made fully — it's just a slight bit inferior —but it's not fully as attractive as the A, because wedid not want to do anything that pushed everybody into converting into the B. 这两者都有原因，但除了 - 明确的原因外，还有人希望B不能完全 - 它只是略微低劣 - 但它不像A那样充满吸引力，因为我们不想做任何让每个人都转变成B的事情。

If that started in a big way, the B would then enjoy the better market, and it would create its own dynamic where it made sense for everybody to do it. 如果从那个方面开始，那么B将会享受更好的市场，它将创造自己的动力，让每个人都能做到这一点。

So we have left it so there's no reason for you, if you own the A, to convert to the B, unless you wish to sell or give away some portion of your holding that would be less than a full A share. 所以我们已经离开了它，所以没有理由你，如果你拥有A，转换为B，除非你想出售或放弃你持有的一部分，而不是一个完整的A股。 And it will be convenient for that reason.But beyond that, there should be no incentive. 这个原因很方便。但除此之外，应该没有激励。

If the B should trade slightly above 1/30th of the price of the A, there will be arbitrage activity that will keep that from being anything other than a negligible amount. 如果B的交易价格略高于A价格的1/30，那么套利活动将使其不会超出可忽略不计的数额。

It, of course, could trade well below 1/30th because the B is not convertible into the A. 当然，它可以在低于1/30的情况下交易，因为B不能转换为A.

Charlie, would you like to add anything before we start taking questions on this?And I — 查理，在我们开始对此提出问题之前，您想添加任何内容吗？和我 -

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. (Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：不。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: — I encourage everyone to ask. WARREN BUFFETT： - 我鼓励大家提问。

Charlie, as you will note during the meeting, does not get paid by the word.(Laughter) 正如你在会议期间所指出的那样，查理没有得到这个词的报酬。（笑声）

But we — I encourage every — anyone to ask any question.There are no bad questions about this.I mean, it — last year, we talked about a preferred issue.And people had very valid questions. 但是我们 - 我鼓励每个人 - 任何人都可以提出任何问题。对此没有不好的问题。我的意思是，去年，我们谈到了一个首选问题。人们有非常有效的问题。

I might take those two points of difference between the A and B, just to start with, on the shareholder-designated contributions program, which was $12 a share last year. 在股东指定的捐款计划中，我可能会把A和B两者之间的两点差异放在一起，去年每股12美元。

In addition to wanting the A to have a very small edge over the B, which would be a reason for not having the B participate, it also would get very impractical, in terms of taking $12, and dividing it by 30, and soliciting thenames of charities and to designate contributions. 除了希望A在B上有一个非常小的优势之外，这也是没有B参与的原因，在获得12美元并将其除以30 之后，它也将变得非常不切实际，并且征求慈善机构的名称和指定捐款。

We can handle the present program fairly efﬁciently.But we would not want to be sending out checks for a dollar or two, and it would get very inefﬁcient. 我们可以相当有效地处理当前的计划。但是我们不想发一两美元的支票，而且效率会非常低。

So, we have told prospective B holders that that's not going to happen.And so, they're fully informed coming in. 所以，我们告诉未来的B持有者，这不会发生。因此，他们完全了解情况。

In connection with the vote, the issuance of the B does create more votes outstanding.So, absent any change in the situation, through the issuance of shares which we are not particularly eager to issue, the vote — my vote — will be diluted, somewhat, by this. 在投票方面，B的发行确实创造了更多未决票数。因此，如果情况没有任何变化，通过发行我们并不特别渴望发行的股票，投票 - 我的投票 - 将在某种程度上由此稀释。

And, frankly, I had no desire to create a lot more shares which would dilute the vote of the Buffett family.It will be diluted, somewhat, by this action because we will have all the present votes outstanding, plus some votes from the B. 而且，坦率地说，我不想创造更多可能会削弱巴菲特家族投票的股票。它将在某种程度上被这一行动所稀释，因为我们将获得所有现有的未决票数以及来自B的一些投票。 If there is a lot of conversion to the B, it is true that our holding will go up, percentage-wise.But I see no reason why people really should convert.So, I don't think that's likely.I think, in the end, it'll stay very much the same. 如果有很多转换到B，那么我们的控股确实会按百分比上升。但我认为没有理由为什么人们真的应该转换。所以，我认为这不太可能。我想，最终，它会保持不变。

And as I mentioned earlier, we want there to be a slight disadvantage to the B. 正如我之前提到的，我们希望B对它有一点点不利。

In all other respects, we will treat the B just as the A. We have a problem with numbers at this annual meeting.We're going to have to do something next year.And we haven't ﬁgured it out yet, either. 在所有其他方面，我们将B视为A.我们在本次年会上遇到数字问题。我们明年必须做点什么。我们还没有想出来。

But the suggestion was made by someone that maybe the B would get second-class seating or something.We're not going to have any of that.(Laughter) 但有人建议B可能会获得二等座位。我们不会有任何这样的。（笑声）

But from this point forward, with the point — with the exception of two things we put in the prospectus, the B shares will be treated, in every way, as equivalent to A. There — 但从这一点开始，有了这一点 - 除了我们在招股说明书中提出的两件事情外，B股将在各方面都被视为等同于A.

So, with that, and with Charlie's reluctance to elaborate, we have a six-zone system in here.And then we have another two zones in the overﬂow rooms. 所以，有了这个，而且查理不愿详细说明，我们在这里有一个六区系统。然后我们在溢出房间还有另外两个区域。

So, if there are any questions in zone 1, somebody — just raise your hand and somebody will bring a microphone. 所以，如果第1 区有任何问题，有人 - 只要举手，有人会带麦克风。

Zone 1 is over there.Two is back in the corner.Three, four, ﬁve, and six.So it just goes right around clockwise.Just raise your hand and somebody will bring a microphone to you. 1区就在那边。两个回到角落里。三，四，五，六。所以它顺时针方向转。只要举手，有人会给你带麦克风。

4. Class B IPO price is the same for everyone 4. B类IPO价格对每个人来说都是一样的

WARREN BUFFETT: We've got a question, I think, in zone 1. WARREN BUFFETT：我认为，我们在1区有一个问题。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning.I'm Marshall Patton (PH) from Bandera, Texas. 听众：早上好。我是来自德克萨斯州班德拉的Marshall Patton（PH）。

And when the price is struck on the Class B shares, those of us who buy our shares through computer programs, do we have assurance that, whoever we buy from, that that will be the price that we pay for these shares? 当B类股票，我们这些通过电脑程序购买股票的股票价格受到影响时，我们是否有保证，无论我们购买哪种股票，那将是我们为这些股票支付的价格？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the — well, the price — there'll be a price established, probably, Wednesday night or thereabouts of this week.And everybody will pay the same price.And a very high percentage of that price, incidentally, will come to Berkshire. 沃伦巴菲特：是的， - 好吧，价格 - 可能会有一个价格确定，可能是周三晚上或本周左右。每个人都会付出同样的代价。顺便提一下，这个价格的很高比例将来到伯克希尔。

I mean, there is a very, very low underwriting spread, compared to any other offering. 我的意思是，与任何其他产品相比，承销利差非常非常低。

Now, once the initial offering is — everybody will pay the same price: large institutions, the buyer of one share will pay the same price. 现在，一旦首次发行 - 每个人都将支付相同的价格：大型机构，一股的买家将支付相同的价格。

Subsequently, the stock will, we expect, will be listed on the New York Stock Exchange, probably, Thursday morning.And we have the world's greatest specialist here, I believe, Jimmy Maguire, who handles the trading, now, of the common and will handle the trading of both the A and B. 随后，我们预计该股票将于周四上午在纽约证券交易所上市。我相信，我们拥有世界上最伟大的专家 Jimmy Maguire，他现在处理交易，并将处理A和B的交易。

Jimmy, are you here?Do you want to stand up?Just so — there he is.The world's greatest specialist, Jimmy Maguire.(Applause) 吉米，你呢？你想站起来吗？就这样 - 他就在那里。世界上最伟大的专家吉米马奎尔。（掌声）

I think he leads the singing of “Wait 'Till the Sun Shines, Nellie,” too, annually.You can see him on CNBC occasionally, and the Nightly Business Report.I want to give equal time here.The — 我认为他每年都会带着“等待太阳照耀，Nellie”的歌声。你偶尔可以在CNBC和Nightly Business Report看到他。我想在这里给予平等的时间。 -

But Jimmy will be trading both classes of stock starting Thursday.As I say — as I said, the — it will be impossible, after the ﬁrst few days, it would be impossible for the B to sell much above 1/30th of the A, because people would buy the A and sell the B ifmore than a very small — with even the smallest of arbitrage differentials. 但吉米将从周四开始交易这两类股票。正如我所说的那样 - 正如我所说的那样 - 在最初的几天之后， B将不可能出售远远超过A的1/30，因为人们会购买A并卖掉B超过一个非常小 - 甚至最小的套利差异。

But there will be markets in two shares and — in two classes.They will both trade in 10-share lots.That will be the round lot — so-called round lot.Usually the round lot on the New York Stock Exchange is 100 shares.But in the case of both Berkshire shares, the round lot will be ten shares. 但是将有两股市场和 - 两类。他们将以10股的价格进行交易。这将是圆形的 - 所谓的圆形批次。通常纽约证券交易所的轮数为100股。但就两只伯克希尔股票而言，该轮数将为10股。

Now, I read one or two press accounts that said, therefore, the minimum purchase is ten shares.That's not true.The minimum purchase of each stock — each class of stock — is one share.I mean, you can buy one share or two shares.Or you can sell one share or two shares. 现在，我读了一两个新闻报道，因此，最低购买量是10股。这不是真的。每种股票的最低购买量 - 每类股票 - 是一份。我的意思是，你可以购买一股或两股。或者您可以出售一股或两股。

And you have an odd lot differential, just as you would if you were working with less than 100 shares of a company whose stock traded in 100 share round lots.But there's no minimum size in the case of either share. 而且你有一个奇怪的差异，就像你在一家公司股票交易量不足100股的股票交易100股时一样。但是在任何一个共享的情况下都没有最小尺寸。

And you will see, when they get mechanics straightened out, and they may have a little bit trouble with it, but you will see Berkshire A and Berkshire B in — quoted in the papers.And I think that you’re — that it'll be quite clear after Thursday what is going on, on that.

你会看到，当他们让机械师理顺时，他们可能会遇到一些麻烦，但你会看到伯克希尔A和伯克希尔B 在报纸中引用。而且我认为你是这样的 - 周四之后会发生什么事情。

I don't know about the computer purchases.But I don’t that — certainly, in terms of the initial offering, that will be through one of, I think, 137 people — or brokers — in the selling group.And it's the same, no matter who you deal with. 我不知道电脑购买。但我并不是这样 - 当然，就初始发行而言，我认为，销售集团中有137人或经纪人。无论你与谁打交道，它都是一样的。

5. Downside of Berkshire unit trusts 5.伯克希尔单位信托的下行

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2? WARREN BUFFETT：2区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is David Hendel (PH).I'm from Boca Raton, Florida. 听众：我的名字是David Hendel（PH）。我来自佛罗里达州博卡拉顿。

To your knowledge, will this program effectively discourage the unit trusts? 据您所知，该计划是否会有效地阻止单位信托？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it's certainly designed to.And I think the answer to that is yes, because I see no way that a unit trust — either in connection with the initial offering or with the subsequent trading — I see no way that the unit trust could offer people as an efﬁcient and inexpensive wayof participating in Berkshire as direct purchase of the B. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，它当然是为了设计的。我认为答案是肯定的，因为我认为单位信托无论是与初始发行还是后续交易有关 - 我认为单位信托无法以有效和廉价的方式为人们提供信任参加伯克希尔直接购买B.

Bear in mind, if a unit trust were established, it would have to buy Berkshire shares in the market.So, it would have the costs that people have in buying shares.And, then, on top of it, it would superimpose these other costs.And in addition to the initial commission, they even had a valuation fee. 请记住，如果建立单位信托，就必须在市场上购买伯克希尔股票。因此，它会有人们购买股票的成本。然后，在它之上，它会叠加这些其他成本。除了初始佣金，他们甚至还有估价费。

That was a job I wanted to have because every — (laughter) — three months or however often, maybe every day, somebody, their job was to evaluate this trust value which involved the great skill of being able to locate it alphabetically — (laughter) — in the newspaper. 这是我想要的工作，因为每一个 - （笑声） - 三个月或者经常，也许每天，某人，他们的工作就是评估这种信任价值，其中包括能够按字母顺序找到它的高超技巧 - （笑声）） - 在报纸上。

The ﬁgure was left blank as to what the evaluator's fee would be.But I had a feeling that it was one of the more cushy jobs available.(Laughter) 关于评估员的费用，这个数字是空白的。但我觉得这是一个比较轻松的工作。（笑声）

There was an added problem, too.I mean, if these unit trusts started and did not get off the ground very far, they could've become something in the way of orphans.And they certainly would've become expensive to operate. 还有一个问题。我的意思是，如果这些单位信托开始并且没有立即离开地面，它们可能会成为孤儿的方式。而且它们肯定会变得昂贵。

And, then, with Berkshire paying nothing in the way of dividends, but with the trust incurring expenses, including this evaluator's fee, among others — but with the trust incurring expenses, they would have to sell small amounts periodically to pay the expenses.And that would create tax consequences for every unit trust holder. 然后，由于伯克希尔不支付任何股息，但信托产生费用，包括评估者的费用等等 - 但由于信托产生费用，他们将不得不定期出售少量费用以支付费用。这会给每个单位信托持有人带来税务后果。

I mean, people would not know what — we felt they would not know what they were getting into. 我的意思是，人们不会知道什么 - 我们觉得他们不会知道他们进入了什么。

The more serious problem is that somebody would ﬂash our past record in front of them or show them some chart on Berkshire's stock price and say, "You know, this is your chance to do the same thing."And it, obviously, isn’t — wouldn't have been. 更严重的问题是，有人会在他们面前闪现我们过去的记录，或者向他们展示伯克希尔股票价格的一些图表并说：“你知道，这是你做同样事情的机会。”它显然不是 - 不会 - 不会。

And — but based on what we have seen, right now, we anticipate the offering being 350,000 shares.But the extent to which the number of tickets involved, that even seeking out informed purchasers only, there's very substantial demand. 而且 - 根据我们所看到的，现在，我们预计此次发行将达到350,000股。但是，涉及门票数量的程度，即使只是寻求知情购买者，也有非常大的需求。

So I think if you widen that circle to include uninformed, it might have been quite an experience. 所以我认为如果你扩大那个圈子以包含不知情的话，那可能是一种非常好的体验。

I think the answer is that we will not have a problem with the unit trusts in the future. 我认为答案是我们将来不会对单位信托产生任何问题。

6. No plans for Class B secondary offering 6.没有B类二级发售计划

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3? WARREN BUFFETT：3区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm Adam Ingle (PH) from Boulder, Colorado. 听众：我是来自科罗拉多州博尔德的Adam Ingle（PH）。

In terms of the number of shares that you're going to issue, B shares, do you plan to just look at the book on Wednesday and issue enough to totally satisfy the demand?And do you have any plans to do a secondary if it starts becoming a hot number? 就你要发行的股票数量而言，B股，你是否计划在周三看一下这本书并发表足以完全满足需求的书？如果它开始成为一个热门号码，你有没有计划做次要的？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.Well, I think what we plan is to tailor the size of the offering to ﬁt the demand that appears Tuesday night or Wednesday morning, or whenever the exact moment will be on that.But the offering will be designed to do that. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。好吧，我认为我们计划的是根据周二晚上或周三早上出现的需求量身定制产品的大小，或者在确切的时刻出现。但是这个产品的设计就是为了做到这一点。

Like most offerings, I would anticipate that the underwriter will — and this is a supposition at the moment — but I — it's frequently done — would sell some more shares than the initial offering with the intention of creating some short position in the security. 像大多数产品一样，我预计承销商会 - 而且这是目前的假设 - 但我 - 它经常做 - 会卖出比初始报价更多的股票，目的是在证券中创造一些空头头寸。

And, then, they have an option to take — from the company — for 30 days up to 15 percent of whatever we initially sell, which protects them on their short position.But the short position also helps in terms of having an orderly market in the stock, subsequently.

然后，他们可以选择从公司获取30天到最初卖出的15％，从而保护他们的空头头寸。但空头头寸也有助于股票市场的有序市场化。

But we will, essentially, tailor the size of the issue to the demand as it appears to us midweek. 但基本上，我们将根据需求量身定制问题的大小，就像我们在周中看到的那样。

We have no plans for any secondary offering.I think this has been sufﬁciently publicized.There's a large network of selling group members.So that people that are interested, but wanted to buy in a smaller denomination, will have had their chance. 我们没有计划进行任何二次发行。我认为这已经充分宣传了。有一个庞大的销售团队成员网络。所以那些有兴趣，但想以较小面额购买的人，将有机会。

I think there will be a — well, present indications, there'd be 350,000 shares out.There would be a fairly large — a large — number of holders based on what we're seeing. 我认为会有一个 - 好的，目前的迹象，有350,000股。会有一个相当大的 - 基于我们所看到的大量持有者。

So, the market should, starting Thursday morning on the exchange, there should be, in my opinion, a reasonable market based on that kind of quantity and the number of people buying.And so, I anticipate nothing subsequently. 因此，市场应该从周四上午开始在交易所开始，在我看来，基于这种数量和购买人数，应该有一个合理的市场。所以，我后来没有预料到。

7. We don't think Berkshire shares are "undervalued" 7.我们认为伯克希尔的股票“被低估”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4? WARREN BUFFETT：第4区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Can you hear me? 听众：你能听见我吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yep. 沃伦巴菲特：是的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name’s Tom Conrad (PH).I’m from McLean, Virginia, and I (inaudible) to this meeting and tell all my friends and family members to buy it last week.But I’ve been reading in some publications that you said that you would not advise your friends and family members to buy it at its current pricing. 听众：我的名字叫汤姆康拉德（PH）。我来自弗吉尼亚州麦克莱恩，我（听不清）参加这次会议，并告诉我所有的朋友和家人上周购买它。但我一直在阅读一些出版物，你说你不会建议你的朋友和家人以目前的价格购买它。

And I’m just concerned, if I go out and run and tell them why you’re saying — what your feeling would be, should I go tell my friends and family members?— (Laughter) 我只是担心，如果我出去跑去告诉他们你为什么说 - 你的感觉会怎样，我应该告诉我的朋友和家人吗？ - （笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I think I'll leave that one up to you.What I said — (laughter) — I said, at present prices, Charlie and I do not think Berkshire stock is undervalued.And that, now that is not what's gotten reported sometimes.I mean, sometimes people have said we thought it was overvalued. WARREN BUFFETT ：我想我会把那个留给你。我说的 - （笑声） - 我说，按照目前的价格，查理和我认为伯克希尔股票价值被低估了。而且，现在这不是有时报道的内容。我的意思是，有时人们说我们认为它被高估了。 We did not — if you look at the prospectus or if you look at the — if you look at the prospectus, you will see that what we said was we do not think it's undervalued. 我们没有 - 如果你看一下招股说明书或者你看一下 - 如果你看一下招股说明书，你会发现我们所说的是我们认为它没有被低估。

Now, I ﬁnd it somewhat entertaining that people regard that as kind of an amazing statement by somebody making a public offering. 现在，我发现人们认为这是一个有人公开募股的惊人声明，这有点令人愉快。

But if you think about it a bit, can you imagine a management that goes out and says to the world, "We are selling you something — in a new stock — and it's way undervalued." 但是，如果你仔细想一想，你能想象一个管理层走出去向全世界说：“我们正在向你推销一些东西 - 在一个新的股票中 - 它被低估了。”

What do you say to your present shareholders if you go out and say to the public, "We're selling you something that's worth a dollar, and we're going to sell it to you for 80 cents?"Now, that would leave me very unhappy. 如果你出去对公众说：“我们卖给你一些价值1美元的东西，我们会把它卖给你80美分？”你对你现在的股东怎么说？现在，这会让我非常不高兴。

So, I feel that any management that is talking about selling their stock and they say it's very undervalued, either doesn't know what's good for their present shareholders or they may have their tongue in cheek. 因此，我觉得任何管理层都在谈论出售他们的股票并且他们说它被低估了，或者不知道什么对他们现在的股东有利，或者他们可能有他们的舌头。

We would not be selling — we would not sell a part of your interest in Berkshire at a price which we did not feel was adequate for the present shareholders.It's that simple. 我们不会出售 - 我们不会以我们认为对现有股东不足的价格出售您在伯克希尔的部分利息。就这么简单。

If we sell 1 percent of the company, and 350,000 shares is close to that ﬁgure of B, we are selling 1 percent of your ownership in See's Candy.We're selling 1 percent of your ownership in GEICO.We're selling 1 percent of your ownership in The Buffalo News.Those are all valuable assets. 如果我们出售公司1％的股份，而350,000股股票接近B的数字，那么我们在See's Candy中卖出1％的股份。我们在GEICO销售了1％的所有权。我们在The Buffalo News中出售了1％的所有权。这些都是有价值的资产。

We have no intention of selling 1 percent, or 10 percent, or the hundred percent of any of those entities at a price that is not fair to present shareholders. 我们无意以对现有股东不公平的价格出售任何这些实体的 1％，或10％或百分之百。

That doesn't mean it's unfair to new shareholders, but we’re not going to — we would not be selling the stock if we thought it was undervalued. 这并不意味着它对新股东不公平，但我们不会 - 如果我们认为它被低估了，我们就不会出售股票。

I'm not sure what we would've done if we'd had that position when the unit trust came along.But we have — and put in the prospectus — but we are not selling any of our shares.Frequently, on a new offering you see present holders.But, you know, I have very close to 100 percent of my net worth in Berkshire and it leaves me quite happy. 如果我们在单位信托出现时有这个位置，我不确定我们会做什么。但我们已经 - 并且在招股说明书中加入 - 但我们并没有出售任何股票。通常，在新的产品上你会看到现在的持有者。但是，你知道，我在伯克希尔的净资产非常接近100％，这让我很开心。 I've got a trust I run set up in 1964. I'm the sole trustee.I can do anything in that trust I want.And I'm freed by the person who set up the trust of responsibility for a concentration of investments.And I have some members of my family who are beneﬁciaries of that trust. 我有一个信任，我在1964年成立。我是唯一的受托人。我可以做任何我想要的信任。我为那些建立投资集中责任的人所释放。我有一些家庭成员是这种信任的受益者。

That trust owns nothing but Berkshire Hathaway stock.That doesn't bother me at all.That — I'm not recommending purchase.But I'm perfectly happy owning Berkshire. 伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的股票只有这种信任。这根本不会打扰我。那 - 我不推荐购买。但我非常高兴拥有伯克希尔。

But we do not want — (applause) — we do not want people to think, when they buy into Berkshire, that they're buying something that's undervalued, because it's not. 但我们不想 - （掌声） - 我们不希望人们在购买伯克希尔时想到他们买的东西被低估了，因为事实并非如此。

And we say in that fourth caveat on the prospectus that we want people to buy it only if they expect to be holders for a very long time. 我们在招股说明书的第四个警告中说，我们希望人们只有在他们期望长期持有的情况下才能购买它。

Charlie and I expect to be holders for a very long time.And, in fact, you may see us up here sometime where we don't know who the guy next to us is.(Laughter) 查理和我希望很长一段时间都能成为持有者。事实上，你可能会在某个时候看到我们，我们不知道我们旁边的人是谁。（笑声）

But we'll put on an act, though.(Laughter) The — we — 但是我们会采取行动。（笑声） - 我们 -

You know, that is our attitude toward Berkshire.We do not want people to come in who think it's going to be a hot stock or selling for more a year from now, because we don't have the faintest idea whether it's going to be selling for more or less a year from now.Never have had. 你知道，这是我们对伯克希尔的态度。我们不希望人们进入谁认为它将成为热门股票或从现在开始销售更多一年，因为我们不知道它是否将从现在起或多或少一年销售。从未有过。

We do think that to the extent that Berkshire attracts a special class of shareholder that really looks at themselves as owning a part interest in a business, like they'd own a part of a farm or part of an apartment house, and they expect tohold it, really, for the rest of their lives, we think that it's a perfectly sensible thing to do because we're doing it ourselves.But we don't want to go beyond that. 我们确实认为，伯克希尔吸引了一类特殊的股东，他们真正将自己视为拥有企业的一部分利益，比如他们拥有农场的一部分或公寓的一部分，他们希望坚持下去，真的，在他们的余生中，我们认为这是一件非常明智的事情，因为我们自己这样做。但我们不想超越这一点。

8. No plans for the Class B proceeds 8.没有B类计划的计划

WARREN BUFFETT: I'm not sure whether we got zone 4. Can we go back there? WARREN BUFFETT：我不确定我们是否有4区。我们可以回去吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Gordon Shepherd (PH) from Montreal. 听众：我的名字是来自蒙特利尔的Gordon Shepherd（PH）。

I wondered whether you had any plans for what to do with the money?(Laughter) 我想知道你是否有任何计划如何处理这笔钱？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer to that is in the prospectus, but the — we have no immediate plans for the money.But we’ve faced that situation a number of times. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，答案是在招股说明书中，但是 - 我们没有立即计划这笔钱。但我们已经多次面对这种情况。

I mean, the money — the inﬂow of money and outﬂow of money should not be, in our view, attempted to be matched too carefully in this world, because you get investment and business opportunities at times that differ from the times that funds come in. 我的意思是，在我们看来，货币的流入和资金的流出不应该在这个世界上过于谨慎地进行，因为你有时会获得投资和商业机会，而不是资金流入的时间。。

And one of the most important disciplines in running a business or managing investments is that — is to not get your — not to try to coordinate your actions simply with the availability of cash. 管理企业或管理投资最重要的一个原则是 - 不要让你 - 不要试图仅仅通过现金来协调你的行动。

Over time, we found a way to use money.It's much tougher for us to run 17 billion than it was when we had 20 million in the business.There's no question about that.And we pointed that out many times.And it'll get tougher still if we get larger, which I hope we do. 随着时间的推移，我们找到了一种使用钱的方法。对于我们来说，运营170亿比我们拥有2000万的业务要困难得多。毫无疑问。我们多次指出了这一点。如果我们变得更大，它将变得更加艰难，我希望我们这样做。

But the fact that, if 400 million comes in on this offering or whatever, that's really no different than 400 million coming in in some other manner. 但事实是，如果有4亿人参与这项服务或其他任何事情，这与其他4亿人的情况完全没有什么不同。

And when our ﬂoat grows, we take in more money.When our earnings are retained, we take in more money.When we have — I forget what the check would've been on the Cap Cities transaction, but it was certainly well over a billion dollars that came in on a single day. 当我们的浮动增长时，我们会收入更多的钱。当我们的收入保留时，我们会收取更多的钱。当我们有 - 我忘记了Cap Cities交易的支票是什么，但它肯定超过十亿美元，在一天内进来。

So, money's fungible, and we have to keep looking for bigger and bigger things as we go along.And that's what we do focus on. 因此，金钱是可替代的，我们必须继续寻找越来越大的东西。这就是我们关注的重点。

But it doesn't bother me to take it.It wouldn't bother me if we weren't taking it.It wouldn't bother me if we took in three times as much.It doesn't make a lot of difference. 但它并没有让我感到烦恼。如果我们不接受它，它不会打扰我。如果我们接受三倍的话就不会打扰我。它没有太大的区别。

And we will have — we — the constant challenge for Charlie and me is to allocate capital is we go along.And it's a nice challenge.(Laughter) 我们将 - 我们 - 对查理的持续挑战，我就是在我们继续分配资本。这是一个很好的挑战。（笑声）

9. Discouraging buyers with unreasonable expectations 9.以不合理的期望劝阻买家

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5? WARREN BUFFETT：5区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi there.Lee Debroff (PH), long-time shareholder, I think, going back a number of years now to when it was a little more intimate affair.Not quite sure whether I should look at you in the TV here or in real life, on stage.But anyway, I'm on the very right of you. 观众：你好。我认为，长期股东Lee Debroff（PH）现在可以追溯到现在的几年，当时这是一个更亲密的事情。不太确定我是否应该在这里或在现实生活中，在舞台上看电视。但无论如何，我就在你的右边。 And I see all the guards around you, and I see all the security and that sort of thing.And then, I see this offering of the Class B. And I sort of wonder whether, from your perspective, you feel you might be in the same boat that the pope and the president are? 我看到你周围的所有守卫，我看到所有的安全和那种事情。然后，我看到了B级的这个提供。我有点想知道，从你的角度来看，你是否觉得你可能和教皇和总统在同一条船上？

And I mean this absolutely sincerely, because I don't think that you have, perhaps, as good a handle as some of us do on the renown that you carry outside of Omaha, Nebraska.People who have no idea what investments are about are fully aware of who you are. 我的意思绝对是真诚的，因为我认为你可能没有像我们中的一些人那样对你在内布拉斯加州奥马哈市外的名声做出的表现。不知道投资是什么的人完全了解你是谁。

And when they see this offering, I think you may ﬁnd that there are substantially more people who are interested in just having a piece of you for the sake of saying they have a piece of you than having absolutely any idea what they're doing. 当他们看到这个产品时，我想你可能会发现有更多的人只是因为说你有一块你而不是完全知道他们在做什么而对你有一块感兴趣。

And I notice that on — I try to read the ﬁne print here — on page 14, ﬁrst paragraph, second line, that you indicate some 50 million shares of Class B common stock may be offered. 我注意到 - 我试着在这里阅读细则 - 第14页，第一段，第二行，你表明可能会提供约 5000万股B类普通股。

And so, I'd like you to comment on this situation that you ﬁnd yourself in, where you may be, perhaps, out of touch with the popularity that you have. 所以，我希望你对这种情况发表评论，你可能会发现自己处于这种情况，或许与你所拥有的人气脱节。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, my ﬁrst reaction: maybe I should tell my barber we could save the clippings and sell them.(Laughter) 沃伦巴菲特：嗯，我的第一反应：也许我应该告诉我的理发师我们可以保存剪报然后卖掉它们。（笑声）

The — I don't think it's quite as extreme as you say. - 我认为这并不像你说的那么极端。

But, you know, I — in relation to the 50 million ﬁrst, we have to authorize enough shares, because we are going to allow every share of class A — or present common stock — but the class A, to convert to B. 但是，你知道，我 - 相对于5000万首先，我们必须授权足够的股票，因为我们将允许A类的每一股 - 或者存在普通股 - 但是A类，转换为B.

So we have to have the shares authorized to take care of 30 times the present one point almost two million shares.So, 36 million shares, in effect, are reserved for the present common stock.And, as long as we were authorizing it — 因此，我们必须获得授权的股票，以现在的一个点近30万股来处理。因此，实际上有3600万股用于现有普通股。并且，只要我们授权它 -

Well, we need that much, or we wouldn't have the shares actually available if everybody came around to convert.That's not going to happen.But we still have to be prepared for it. 好吧，我们需要这么多，或者如果每个人都来转换我们就不会有实际可用的股票。这不会发生。但是我们仍然需要做好准备。

We have no plans to issue a lot of shares.The — but the point you mention, which I think you stressed a little more than I would've, but the — that is what we were worried about, in terms of the unit trusts. 我们没有计划发行大量股票。 - 但是你提到的这一点，我认为你强调的比我想的要多一点，但是就单位信托来说，这就是我们所担心的。

There are people that think that it can all happen again from this kind of a base which, you know, is mathematically a joke.And Charlie and I would settle for one whole lot less, you know, right today. 有些人认为它可以从这种基础中再次发生，你知道，这种基础在数学上是一个笑话。你知道，今天查理和我会少花一大笔钱。

And we have done everything we can — I mean, if we hadn't done this, the unit trusts would've moved forward.And I think they would've cashed in on that phenomenon you suggested. 我们已尽我们所能 - 我的意思是，如果我们没有这样做，那么单位信托就会向前发展。而且我认为他们会兑现你建议的这种现象。

And in a few years, you know, it would not — I would've been in a somewhat different position because people can get very disillusioned if they have hopes that aren't realized. 而且，在几年内，你知道，它不会 - 我会处于一个有点不同的位置，因为如果他们有希望没有实现，人们会非常失望。

And we have done everything possible, I think, to ﬁlter out those who might have an unrealistic belief. 我认为，我们已尽一切可能过滤掉那些可能有不切实际信念的人。

And everyone should read a prospectus before they buy shares, and — 每个人都应该在购买股票前阅读招股说明书，并且 -

I think we have tailored — we’ve designed what we're doing about as well as we can to moderate that phenomenon you’re talking about.There may be a few come in but not too many. 我认为我们已经量身定制了 - 我们已经设计了我们正在做的事情以及我们可以调节您正在谈论的那种现象。可能有一些进来但不是太多。

Charlie, do you have any thoughts on that? 查理，你有什么想法吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if we only issue the amount we're now talking about, it's sort of a non- event around Berkshire.It’d be 1 percent — CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，如果我们只发出我们现在谈论的金额，那就是伯克希尔周围的非事件。它是1％ -

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.It's 1 percent. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。这是1％。

CHARLIE MUNGER: — or something like that of the — CHARLIE MUNGER： - 或类似的东西 -

It solves the problem of these disreputable followers — (laughter) — and 1 percent, what does it matter?(Applause) 它解决了这些声名狼借的追随者的问题 - （笑声） - 和1％，这有什么关系？（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Wait, you heard that remark, referring to Charlie earlier, about all I want to know is where I'm going to die, so I'll never go there.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：等等，你听到这句话，早些时候提到查理，关于我想知道的就是我将要死的地方，所以我永远不会去那里。（笑声） Well, we think about that, in terms — we believe in reverse engineering. 好吧，我们考虑到这一点 - 我们相信逆向工程。

And how do we keep people from buying it, who really are going to be unhappy, you know, a few years later? 我们如何阻止人们购买它，几年之后谁会真的不开心呢？

You know, it's a little like singing country songs.You all — you should sing them backwards.That way, you get your home back and your auto back and — (laughter) — your wife back, and — 你知道，这有点像唱乡村歌曲。你们所有人 - 你们应该向后唱歌。这样，你就可以回到你家了，你的汽车回来了 - （笑声） - 你的妻子回来了， -

10. Almost like buying direct from Berkshire 10.几乎就像直接从伯克希尔购买

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6?Have we got —? WARREN BUFFETT：6区？我们有吗 -？

VOICE: There was a hand over here, wasn’t there?Here.Right here. 声音：这里有一只手，不在吗？这里。就在这儿。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning.I'm Rena Lowie (PH) from Chicago, proud to be here.At mic — 听众：早上好。我是来自芝加哥的Rena Lowie（PH），很自豪能够来到这里。在麦克风 -

WARREN BUFFETT: Where are we?Oh, over here.OK. WARREN BUFFETT：我们在哪儿？哦，在这里。好。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I have a question that's been asked me, and I really don't know.Several people wanted to know if they could buy directly from the company. 观众：我有一个问题，我被问过，我真的不知道。有几个人想知道他们是否可以直接从公司购买。

WARREN BUFFETT: The answer to that is no.But Salomon Brothers is the underwriter of the issue.They have a hundred and, I think, 37-or-something broker-dealers, all — virtually all — the major ones in the country, in the selling group. WARREN BUFFETT：答案是否定的。但所罗门兄弟是该问题的承销商。他们有一百个，我认为， 37个或者几个经纪人经销商，几乎都是 - 全国的主要经纪人 - 销售集团。

The cost to the company of doing this are really very, very low compared to any issue I've seen.When AT&T had their spinoff — or sale of Lucent — which was close to a $3 billion deal — you know, their percentage costs were more than double what our costs will be, for example, on this offering of Berkshire. 与我见过的任何问题相比，公司这样做的成本非常非常低。当AT＆T分拆 - 或者销售朗讯 - 这笔交易接近30亿美元时 - 你知道，他们的成本是我们成本的两倍多，例如，伯克希尔的这一产品。

So, it's almost as if you’re buying it — a Class B holder — is buying it from us, in terms of the, what I would call the frictional costs involved of getting the issue done.In fact, if we handled it ourselves, it might cost more. 因此，几乎就像你正在购买它 - 一个B级持有者 - 从我们那里购买它，就我所说的所谓摩擦成本来说。事实上，如果我们自己处理它，它可能会花费更多。

But the company, itself, is not a broker-dealer.And it’s — it would require a whole group of different hoops to jump through in order to have a direct issue.It will be sold only through broker-dealers. 但该公司本身并不是经纪自营商。它是 - 它需要一组不同的箍来跳过才能有一个直接的问题。它只能通过经纪自营商销售。 11. All-Berkshire mutual fund for retirement plans? 11.全伯克希尔退休计划共同基金？

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 7? WARREN BUFFETT：7区？

This will come in from another room.Here we are. 这将来自另一个房间。我们到了。

VOICE: There aren't any questions in zone 7. 声音：7区没有任何问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: No questions in zone 7. Zone 8? WARREN BUFFETT：7区没有问题吗？

VOICE: No questions from zone 8. 声音：8区没有问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK.Then, we'll go back to zone 1. WARREN BUFFETT：好的。然后，我们将回到1区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mike Rocker (PH) from Flint, Michigan, God's country. 听众会员：Mike Rocker（PH）来自密歇根州弗林特，上帝的国家。

I noticed in the press, when this issue of the unit trust was going on, that there apparently also were some people trying to form mutual funds to carry Berkshire stock, which I kind of thought was a good idea, because there's one potential class ofBerkshire owners that could only own Berkshire stock via either an open-end mutual fund or a closed-end mutual fund. 我在新闻界注意到，当这个单位信托问题正在发生时，显然还有一些人试图组建共同基金以运载伯克希尔股票，我认为这是一个好主意，因为有一个潜在的类别伯克希尔的所有者只能通过开放式共同基金或封闭式共同基金拥有伯克希尔股票。

And that is those thousands of teachers and hospital employees whose future retirement money is in 403(b) plans that are limited to investing in mutual funds only.And so, I wonder if, ﬁrst of all, if you were aware of that?And if so, if you considered that?And if not, if you might? 这就是成千上万的教师和医院员工，他们未来的退休金是403（b）计划，仅限于投资共同基金。所以，我想知道，首先，如果你意识到这一点？如果是这样，如果你考虑过那个？如果没有，如果可能的话？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer is I wasn't aware of that.So it wasn't considered. 沃伦巴菲特：嗯，答案是我没有意识到这一点。所以没有考虑。

There are, of course, some mutual funds that own Berkshire shares.But there's no all-Berkshire fund, outstanding. 当然，有一些拥有伯克希尔股票的共同基金。但是没有全部的伯克希尔基金，非常出色。

I would say this: that if the law was set up to, in some way, to restrict investments of this group you're talking about to options that involve mutual funds but that don't involve individual stocks, I would think it might evenbe regarded as a way around it, if a fund owned nothing but one stock. 我会这样说：如果法律是以某种方式设立的，以限制这个群体的投资，你谈的是涉及共同基金但不涉及个股的选择，我认为它甚至可能如果一只基金只拥有一只股票，那么它就被认为是一种方式。

Because, if you can't buy General Motors directly under, I assume, the relevant rules or statutes on that, it would seem that a fund that owned nothing but General Motors might be regarded as a way of getting around that.

因为，如果你不能直接购买通用汽车，我认为，相关的规则或法规，似乎只有通用汽车公司所拥有的基金可能被视为解决这个问题的一种方式。

But the answer is that it was not considered.I don't know where the rules are derived, whether there — whether they can be changed by some organization or they're part of some statute. 但答案是没有考虑到它。我不知道规则的来源，是否存在 - 是否可以由某个组织更改或者它们是某些法规的一部分。

But if they're part of some organization, by a vote of their directors, they might be able to allow purchase of individual stocks within those plans that you describe.But if not, it does seem to me that an all one-stock fund is — might be regarded as simply a way around the rules. 但如果他们是某个组织的一部分，通过他们的董事投票，他们可能允许在您描述的那些计划中购买个人股票。但如果没有，在我看来，所有单一股票基金 - 可能被视为一种绕过规则的方式。

12. Suggestion for Class B symbol 12.对B类符号的建议

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2? WARREN BUFFETT：2区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Alan Rank, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 听众：宾夕法尼亚州匹兹堡的Alan Rank。

Have you determined what the symbol will be for the Class B? 你确定了B级符号是什么吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: The symbol?No, we haven't. WARREN BUFFETT：符号？不，我们没有。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: May I make a suggestion?As a broker, the stocks that have come out and given theirselves Class A and Class B cause massive confusion. 听众：我可以提一个建议吗？作为经纪人，已经出现并给予他们自己的A级和B级的股票引起了巨大的混乱。

If there'd be any way to make symbol something like BRB and just keep it a simple, three-letter symbol, it aids people both in following it on the tape on CNBC.As brokers, four-letter symbols on the New York restrict a lot of things we can do as far as punching them in. 如果有任何方法可以使符号像BRB一样，只需保留一个简单的三字母符号，它就可以帮助人们在 CNBC的录像带上跟随它。作为经纪人，纽约的四个字母符号限制了我们可以做的很多事情，只要它们可以进行打击。

If there's any way you could keep the symbol for the B a simple one, two or three-letter symbol, it would be greatly appreciated. 如果有任何方法你可以保持B的符号是一个简单的一个，两个或三个字母的符号，我将不胜感激。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, thanks for the suggestion.Now, the exchange has generally been exceptionally cooperative in trying to work with us.I mean, a 10-share trading unit is no piece of cake for them. WARREN BUFFETT ：好的，谢谢你的建议。现在，在与我们合作时，交易所一般都非常合作。我的意思是，一个10股的交易单位对他们来说没什么好蛋糕。

And I'm sure, at times, that they have wished we were a little more like some of the other companies that list on the exchange.But they've been very cooperative and helpful.And we are — they’ll — they listen to things we suggest.We listen to things they suggest.

而且我确信，有时他们希望我们更像是在交易所上市的其他公司。但他们非常合作，乐于助人。而且我们 - 他们会 - 他们听我们建议的事情。我们倾听他们建议的事情。

So, we will try to do whatever facilitates things at the exchange and the reporting of prices.And it's nothing we will try to impose on them, believe me. 因此，我们将尝试在交易所和价格报告方面做任何有利的事情。相信我，我们不会试图强加给他们。

I have no favorite name that I'm looking for.So, we'll see what they — what ideas they have.And we'll include that suggestion. 我没有喜欢的名字，我正在寻找。所以，我们会看到他们 - 他们有什么想法。我们将包含该建议。

13. Not expecting big change in Class B offering size 13.预计B级发售规模不会发生重大变化

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3? WARREN BUFFETT：3区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Paula Finster (PH) from Tulsa, Oklahoma.Very glad to be here.I'm one of those few second generation, ﬁnally ﬁnagled a ticket out of my dad.(Clears throat) 观众成员：来自俄克拉荷马州塔尔萨的Paula Finster（PH）。很高兴来到这里。我是少数第二代之一，终于从我父亲那里找到了一张票。（清嗓子）

Three years ago — 三年前 -

WARREN BUFFETT: Her dad has a soda fountain, incidentally.If you're ever in Tulsa, be sure to see him.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT ：顺便说一下，她爸爸有一个汽水喷泉。如果你曾经在塔尔萨，一定要见到他。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: He certainly does.And you're certainly invited to come back.(Laughter) 观众：他当然可以。你当然会被邀请回来。（笑声）

I was here three years ago for the movie theater.And considering the growth — I know you won't leave your beloved Omaha — but maybe you could build a stadium with — that's covered — (laughter) — considering the growth — (Buffett laughs) — with adequate parking.(Laughter) 三年前我在这里看电影院。考虑到增长 - 我知道你不会离开你心爱的奥马哈 - 但也许你可以建造一个体育场 - 覆盖 - （笑声） - 考虑到增长 - （巴菲特笑） - 有充足的停车位。（笑声）

Here's my question.You said there's going to be unlimited offering, as much as they want.This question is not designed to get a rise out of Mr. Munger, however — 这是我的问题。你说他们想要无限量供应。然而，这个问题并非旨在让芒格先生崛起 -

WARREN BUFFETT: That's not easy to do.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：这不容易做到。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Understood, considering the bridge game of yesterday. 观众：理解，考虑到昨天的桥牌比赛。

Anyway, my question is, you're authorizing up to 1 percent.What happens if it goes bananas, as zone 5 suggested, and it goes greater? 无论如何，我的问题是，你授权高达1％。如果它是香蕉，如第5区建议的那样会发生什么呢？它变得更大了？

You said this 1 percent is yours.Is the next 1 percent yours?Is the next 1 percent ours?Do — I know we are limited partners.And you're a controlling partner.But how far does this ballgame go? 你说这1％是你的。你的下一个百分比是你的吗？我们的下一个百分比是？做 - 我知道我们是有限合伙人。而且你是一个控制伙伴。但这场球赛到底有多远？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, in terms of the size of the offering, it — whatever the size of the offering, it affects everybody economically the same.I mean, our shares are no different than the ones than the people in this room. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，就产品的规模而言，无论产品的大小如何，它在经济上都会影响到每个人。我的意思是，我们的股票与这个房间里的人没有什么不同。

So, we do not care, from an economic standpoint, whether the issue turns out to be approximately 1 percent or whether it was 1 1/2 or 3/4 of 1 percent. 因此，从经济角度来看，我们并不关心问题是大约1％还是1％的1 1/2或3/4。

It simply — as long as we're not selling the stock below its true value, we are not going to be hurt by it.So, that —it's inconsequential to us.We're not going to be helped in any signiﬁcant way by a large sale. 它只是 - 只要我们不卖出低于其真实价值的股票，我们就不会受到它的伤害。所以，这对我们来说无关紧要。我们不会通过大型销售以任何重要方式得到帮助。

The — it would appear, to me —we're just a few days away from the offering, and it's been out there awhile. 对我来说 - 它似乎 - 我们距离祭品只有几天了，它已经出现了一段时间。

So, I would doubt if there's huge changes.But I don't know the answer to that.I mean, that could depend on what happens in the general stock market. 所以，我怀疑是否有巨大的变化。但我不知道答案。我的意思是，这可能取决于一般股票市场的情况。

But I don't think you'll see any huge change in the offering.If there were a big change, we, obviously, would very promptly let the SEC know.The SEC has wanted us, as we have seen changes in demand as we've gone along, promptly change the size of the offering.And the covering page gets modiﬁed. 但我不认为你会看到任何巨大的变化。如果发生重大变化，我们显然会非常迅速地让美国证券交易委员会知道。美国证券交易委员会希望我们，因为我们已经看到随着需求的变化，及时改变了发行的规模。并且覆盖页面被修改。

And we’ve done that.Every day as indications come along, we've tried to be responsive to their instructions on that.And the 350,000 shares is our best estimate, as of last Friday, and — 我们已经做到了。每天都有迹象表明，我们已经尝试回应他们的指示。截至上周五，350,000 股是我们的最佳估计，并且 -

We'll look at it the next day or two.But I don't think it's going to change dramatically.I don't know, though.I don’t want to — I'm giving you a deﬁnitive answer on that.But it's just my — it’s a strong impression.Thank you. 我们会在第二天或第二天看一下。但我认为它不会发生巨大变化。但我不知道。我不想 - 我正在给你一个明确的答案。但这只是我的 - 这是一个强烈的印象。谢谢。

14. Only Class B questions 14.只有B级问题

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4? WARREN BUFFETT：第4区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mike Assail (PH) from New York City with a question for Charlie — 听众：来自纽约市的Mike Assail（PH）向Charlie提问 - WARREN BUFFETT: Good. WARREN BUFFETT：好的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — about his investment models. 观众： - 关于他的投资模式。

I'd like to know the most useful models on industry consolidation, vertical integration, and models which explain the special cases when it makes sense to invest in retailing stocks — 我想知道有关行业整合，垂直整合和模型的最有用的模型，这些模型解释了在投资零售股票时有意义的特殊情况 -

WARREN BUFFETT: Ah, well, I think — WARREN BUFFETT：啊，好吧，我想 -

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — and if — 观众成员： - 如果 -

WARREN BUFFETT: — I don't want to interrupt you now, but I think we'll save those to the general question and answer.This is only on the issuance of the Class B right now. WARREN BUFFETT： - 我现在不想打扰你，但我想我们会将这些保存到一般问题和答案中。这仅限于现在发行B类。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Oh.Sorry, sorry. 听众会员：哦。实在抱歉。

WARREN BUFFETT: But we're glad to have that question later on. WARREN BUFFETT：但我们很高兴以后再提出这个问题。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Sorry. 听众会员：对不起。

WARREN BUFFETT: It'll give Charlie time to ﬁgure out the answer for one thing.(Laughter and applause) 沃伦·巴菲特：这将让查理有时间找出答案。（笑声和掌声）

We'll go through all of the questions regarding the Class B. And, then, we'll have a vote on the class —authorization of the Class B. And, then, we'll get into general questions and answers. 我们将讨论关于B类的所有问题。然后，我们将对B类的授权进行投票。然后，我们将进入一般问题和答案。

15. Do B shares penalize Class A shareholders? 15. B股是否会对A类股东进行处罚？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Sir — 观众：先生 -

WARREN BUFFETT: Somebody over there — we'll take another one from zone 4 if there's somebody — monitor. WARREN BUFFETT：那边有人 - 如果有人的话，我们会从第4区拿另一个 - 监视器。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mark Findidi (PH) from Connecticut.I'll apologize ahead.This isn't meant to be an impudent question or — in any way, shape, or form. 听众：来自康涅狄格州的Mark Findidi（PH）。我会向前道歉。这并不意味着是一个无礼的问题，或者 - 无论如何，形状或形式。 Do you think that the issuance of the B, in any way, might — in an effort to protect the folks who might be out there suckered in by the trust, if you will — in any way penalizes the A shareholders, either, one —or might penalize them — either, one, ﬁnancially or, two, philosophically in the BRK experience? 你是否认为以任何方式发布B可能是为了保护那些可能会被信托所吸引的人，如果你愿意的话 - 以任何方式惩罚A股股东，一个 - 或者可能会对他们进行惩罚 - 无论是一个，经济上，还是两个，在BRK 经历中是哲学上的？

I don't mean that in any kind of elitist fashion, because I don't think you've ever propagated that.BRK doesn't propagate that.But clearly, there's a room full of people — or rooms full of people — who have made a commitment ﬁnancially to show that their philosophy is with you.Does that get diminished? 我并不是说任何一种精英主义的方式，因为我认为你没有传播过它。 BRK不传播那个。但显然，这里有一个满是人的房间 - 或者是满是人的房间 - 他们在经济上做出了承诺，表明他们的理念与你同在。这会减少吗？

The other part of the question is the trusts, as you portrayed them, didn't sound terribly attractive.In a longer term, would they, perhaps, have ultimately failed as folks realize that they hadn't gotten into what they thought? 问题的另一部分是信任，正如你所描绘的那样，听起来并不十分吸引人。从长远来看，他们或许最终会失败，因为人们意识到他们没有进入他们的想法？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, they might've.But I think the rub off would've been on us rather than the promoters of the trust — might've been on the promoters, too.But in terms of the failure of the trust, I don't mean failure in an absolute sense, but in terms of disappointing their investors. 沃伦巴菲特：嗯，他们可能会。但是我认为，对我们而言，不仅仅是信任的推动者，也可能是推动者。但就信托失败而言，我并不是指绝对意义上的失败，而是让投资者失望。

I really think if tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of people had come into something that was sold as being an all-Berkshire-type trust, if people came away disappointed in some years, I think they would tend to project that disappointment upon Berkshirefully as much as the promoter who sold the trust, who they might not even be able to ﬁnd at that time. 我真的认为，如果数万或数十万人成为一个被出售为全伯克郡式信托的东西，如果人们在几年内失望，我认为他们会倾向于对伯克希尔表示失望完全和出售信托的发起人一样多，他们当时甚至都找不到。

The ﬁrst question, you know, this — I don’t think — we wouldn't be doing this if we thought it would hurt present shareholders, we — as much as we might detest something else that was going on.And we designed it so it — we felt that it wouldn't hurt present shareholders. 第一个问题，你知道，这 - 我不认为 - 如果我们认为这会伤害现有的股东，我们就不会这样做 - 尽管我们可能会讨厌正在发生的事情。我们设计它就是这样 - 我们认为它不会伤害现有的股东。

In terms of them having a philosophy — the new shareholders having a philosophy similar to the present ones — we've tried to ﬁlter those out coming in. 就他们的理念而言 - 新股东的理念与现在的理念相似 - 我们试图过滤那些进入的理念。

But I intend, after the offering, to send out a booklet, you know, kind of like freshmen at college, you know, orientation, greetings to Siwash U. 但是，在发行之后，我打算发一本小册子，你知道，有点像大学新生，你知道，方向，问候Siwash U.

And we'll send it to everybody, new shareholders and the old shareholders, explaining our philosophy, just as an orientation course on the company.And we'll get that out, probably, in a month or so after the offering settles down.

我们将把它发送给每个人，新股东和老股东，解释我们的理念，就像公司的定向课程一样。我们可能会在发售结束后的一个月左右的时间内解决这个问题。

I don’t see any reason that — you know, Berkshire has evolved over a long period of time.We had 12 shareholders at the annual meeting 15 years ago.And it — we seem to be able to retain the same class and group of shareholders, in terms of people who really understand the business.It's a different group than you ﬁnd at other companies. 我没有看到任何理由 - 你知道，伯克希尔已经发展了很长一段时间。我们在15年前的年会上有12位股东。而且 - 就真正了解业务的人而言，我们似乎能够保留同一类别和一组股东。这是一个与其他公司不同的群体。

And I think we can — as long as we've had this ﬁlter in effect, operating as new people join us, I think we can keep it. 而且我认为我们可以 - 只要我们已经有了这个过滤器，当新人加入我们时，我认为我们可以保留它。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.If the offering went wild and you issued 3 percent of the company, new, you're also taking in a billion-odd dollars.It is a — it's a non-event for us.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。如果这个产品很疯狂，并且您发行了3％的新产品，那么您也需要花费 10亿多美元。这是一个 - 对我们来说这不是一个事件。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: He's very excitable.Don’t say anything to him.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：他非常兴奋。不要对他说什么。（笑声）

16. Berkshire can't match previous gains 16.伯克希尔无法与之前的收益相提并论

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5. WARREN BUFFETT：第5区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Ed Johnson (PH) from Park City, Utah. 听众：来自犹他州帕克城的Ed Johnson（PH）。

As you receive the proceeds of the Class B sale and generate other cash, are you seeing opportunities out in the marketplace to continue to provide the kinds of returns that we've been fortunate enough to experience in the past? 当您收到B类销售的收益并产生其他现金时，您是否看到市场上有机会继续提供我们过去有幸体验过的各种回报？

WARREN BUFFETT: With or without the sale of the B, we don't see things to do that can maintain anything close to the average returns of the past.We've tried to convey that. WARREN BUFFETT：无论是否出售B，我们都认为无法做到可以保持与过去平均回报相近的任何事情。我们试图传达这一点。

And it becomes a mathematical absurdity.Money just won't compound at that rate in this world, absent extraordinary inﬂation.It certainly won't compound in real terms. 它变成了数学上的荒谬。在没有特别的通货膨胀的情况下，货币在这个世界上不会以这种速度复合。它肯定不会以实际价值复合。

So, absent the issue of the B, we are not looking at them.We're not seeing things.We're not hoping to ﬁnd things that match some of the things that we have found in the past, relative to the capital base we've had in the past.

因此，如果没有B的问题，我们就不会关注它们。我们没有看到事情。相对于我们过去的资本基础，我们并不希望找到与我们过去发现的一些东西相匹配的东西。

But we have that problem with or without the B. And it has not changed in any, even very minor degree, by the issuance of the B. 但是无论有没有B，我们都有这个问题。而且，由于B的发行，它没有任何变化，甚至很小的变化。

We are looking for things all of the time.Anytime we ﬁnd anything that makes sense to us, we will do it. 我们一直在寻找东西。任何时候我们发现任何对我们有意义的事情，我们都会这样做。

The harder part is to make sure that we don't do something when we don't ﬁnd something that makes sense.I mean, that's the bigger worry. 更难的部分是确保当我们找不到有意义的东西时我们不做某事。我的意思是，这是更大的担忧。

And when we ﬁnd them, you know, they'll come along.And you never have — you never know when it's going to happen. 当我们发现它们时，你知道，它们会出现。你从来没有 - 你永远不知道什么时候会发生。

We run into businesses — I described a little bit of that in the annual report — almost by accident that we've had — contracted to make one purchase this year.The people who run it are here today.And it came about because I was attending a birthday party.And, you know, I'll go to more in the future.(Laughter) 我们遇到了一些企业 - 我在年度报告中描述了一些 - 几乎是偶然的事情 - 我们已经签约今年购买一次。经营它的人今天在这里。它的出现是因为我参加了一个生日聚会。而且，你知道，我将来会更多。（笑声）

So, things have not ended around here.We'll ﬁnd interesting things to do over time.But they can't remotely be as proﬁtable as the things we've found in the past, simply because of the large capital base. 所以，事情并没有在这里结束。随着时间的推移，我们会发现有趣的事情要做。但它们不能像我们过去发现的东西一样有利可图，仅仅因为资本基础庞大。

17. Not expecting volume spike for B shares 17.预计B股股价不会飙升

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6? WARREN BUFFETT：6区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi.I'm Matt Zuckerman from Miami. 观众：嗨。我是来自迈阿密的Matt Zuckerman。

I don't know, I think Charlie is the same class as Ev Dirksen.You know, $3 billion, we'll soon be talking about real money.(Laughter) 我不知道，我认为查理和Ev Dirksen 是同一个班级。你知道，30亿美元，我们很快就会谈论真钱。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: The two questions I have, basically, are, one — number one, referring to the gentleman over here before who commented on your popularity, which will deﬁnitely affect the stock, don’t you think —? 听众：基本上，我有两个问题，一个是头号，指的是之前评论过你的人气的绅士，这肯定会影响股票，你不觉得 - ？ And the second part of that is that even my wife's beautician has put in for some shares of this stock, and he represents a small tip of a large group who are probably doing the same thing on the one hand, so that there's going to bea large popular demand for the stock, which probably is not reﬂected in the numbers that the selling brokers are getting from institutions. 而第二部分就是即使是我妻子的美容师已经投入了一些这股股票的股票，他代表了一大群人的一小部分，他们一方面可能做同样的事情，所以这将是对股票的普遍需求很大，这可能并没有反映出销售经纪人从机构获得的数字。

And number two, mutual funds themselves, in order to lend some panache or glamour or whatever to their portfolios will certainly be sucking up Berkshire stock after this. 第二，共同基金本身，为了给他们的投资组合带来一些华丽或魅力或任何东西，肯定会在此之后吸收伯克希尔股票。

And have you taken all of this into consideration when you decided upon the number of shares to go — that you're sending out, number one? 当你决定要去的股票数量时，你是否已经考虑了所有这些 - 你要发出的第一个？

And number two, that the reaction, at least in the ﬁrst 14 days, of the public to the shares, which will probably be in the range of $1,100, might not send the B shares up high enough to make a very, very interesting spikein the price of the A stock. 第二，至少在前14天，公众对股票的反应（可能在1,100美元范围内）可能不会让B股上涨到足以形成一个非常非常有趣的峰值在A股的价格。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I — we've considered what you're talking about.I think that the issue has been well enough publicized that the demand will largely be reﬂected on the books of the underwriter in a day or two. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我 - 我们已经考虑过你在谈论什么了。我认为这个问题已经得到了很好的宣传，需求将在一两天内大量反映在承销商的账簿上。

And I see no reason at all for a spike in the stock.I mean, the way we've designed it should really prevent that.We — and we tell people not to expect it. 我认为没有任何理由可以飙升股票。我的意思是，我们设计它的方式应该真的可以防止这种情况发生。我们 - 我们告诉人们不要期待它。

If any institution wants to buy it, if any individual wants to buy it, they're going to have a chance to do it. 如果任何机构想要购买它，如果任何人想购买它，他们将有机会这样做。

And I don't see any reason why there should be some huge inﬂux of people immediately subsequent to the offering that didn't hear about it during the offering period. 而且我认为没有任何理由说明为什么在发售期间应该立即有大量涌入的人在发售期间没有听到。

It's interesting.I think most of the demand will be retail and smaller holdings, not so much institutional. 这真有趣。我认为大部分需求将是零售和较小的持股，而不是机构。

The — most new offerings are done in a manner where the idea is to have far more demand than supply, and therefore cause people to, maybe, order stock they didn't even want, and just on the idea that this restricted supply will causea big jump the first day, whether, you know — you've seen Yahoo or a number of other offerings. - 大多数新产品都是以这样一种方式完成的，即产品需求远远大于供应，因此可能导致人们订购他们甚至不想要的库存，而且只是认为这种限制供应会导致第一天是一个大跳跃，无论如何，你知道 - 你已经看过雅虎或其他一些产品。 I think — I don't personally like that sort of distribution arrangement because you'll find that 30 to 40 percent of the issue will, perhaps, trade the first day.Well, I think — and, perhaps, at a lot higher price. 我想 - 我个人并不喜欢那种分销安排，因为你会发现30％到40％的问题可能会在第一天进行交易。嗯，我认为 - 也许，价格要高得多。

I think there's something a little wrong with that kind of an offering, because the company obviously isn't getting the proceeds that are equivalent to what people are willing to pay.And favored customers get the chance to ﬂip the stock and really are getting paid an exorbitant underwriting fee themselves, even though they're called purchasers, because they sell it the ﬁrst day. 我认为这种产品有点不对劲，因为该公司显然没有获得相当于人们愿意支付的收益。并且受青睐的客户有机会翻转股票并且真正获得高额的承销费用，即使他们被称为购买者，因为他们在第一天出售它。

We will be very interested in seeing the volume in the B stock the ﬁrst couple of days, relative to the amount of the issuance. 我们将非常有兴趣在相对于发行量的前几天看到B股的成交量。

And I will be disappointed and I'll be surprised if the trading volume in the B stock the ﬁrst couple days, related to whatever the size of the issue is, turns out to be anywhere near as high as with most new issues. 而且我会感到失望，如果B股的前几天的交易量与问题的大小有关，那么我会感到惊讶，结果就像大多数新问题一样高。

I think that we will have a better success in ﬁnding people who really want to own it and who did not buy it to ﬂip it, I think, by this method of distribution.But we'll have a test of that.We will see what happens in trading volume. 我认为，通过这种分销方式，我们会更好地找到真正想拥有它的人，而不是买它来翻转它。但我们会对此进行测试。我们将看到交易量会发生什么。

And I invite you to look at the volume and compare it to the amount we issue and, then, look at that relative to other new issues this year and just see how successful we were in ﬁnding real investors rather than people who were buying it tosell it to somebody else the next day. 我邀请您查看数量并将其与我们发布的金额进行比较，然后再看看今年与其他新问题的相关性，看看我们在寻找真正的投资者方面取得的成功，而不是那些购买它的人第二天把它卖给别人。

18. Buffett's visibility and safety concerns 18.巴菲特的知名度和安全问题

WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s see, was that zone 6?I guess we go to zone 1. WARREN BUFFETT：让我们看看，是6区吗？我想我们去1区。

(Long pause) （长时间停顿）

CHARLIE MUNGER (quietly to Buffett): Maybe we can vote. CHARLIE MUNGER（悄然来到巴菲特）：也许我们可以投票。

WARREN BUFFETT (quietly to Munger): Yeah, but I don’t want to cut off — WARREN BUFFETT（悄悄地向Munger）：是的，但我不想切断 -

VOICE: Uh — 声音：呃 -

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie says maybe we can vote, but I do — I want people to have their questions — (Applause) WARREN BUFFETT：查理说也许我们可以投票，但我这样做 - 我希望人们有他们的问题 - （掌声）

It just encourages him when you do that.(Laughter) 当你这样做时，它只是鼓励他。（笑声）

I want to be sure people get their questions answered on this.I don’t want to prolong it beyond — 我想确保人们对此问题有所回答。我不想延长它 -

If you feel your question has been 95 percent answered by an earlier question, I hope you'll skip asking it. 如果你觉得你的问题在之前的一个问题中得到了95％的答案，我希望你不要再问了。

But we do want to have people that have questions about it answered, because I can tell by commentary and letters I've received that some people have genuine concerns.Yes? 但我们确实希望让有人对此有疑问的人得到回答，因为我可以通过评论和来信告诉我，有些人有真正的担忧。是？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My concern — oh, my name is Jan Anglin (PH).I'm from Southern Indiana.And this is my ﬁrst Berkshire meeting. 听众：我的担心 - 哦，我叫Jan Anglin（PH）。我来自印第安纳州南部。这是我第一次伯克希尔会议。

WARREN BUFFETT: Good. WARREN BUFFETT：好的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I did have a concern about the B shares that's less business and more — I guess it would be concerned with your and Mr. Munger's personal safety. 观众成员：我确实对B股的关注不太重要 - 我猜它会关注你和芒格先生的人身安全。

I often see your picture in the newspaper.And I certainly don't mind seeing it on ﬁnancial magazines, but now, it's kind of, like, proliferating.I don't like the idea that you are so visible. (Laughter) 我经常在报纸上看到你的照片。我当然不介意在金融杂志上看到它，但现在，它有点像，正在激增。我不喜欢你这么明显的想法。（笑声）

That bothers me.It’s — I mean, do you understand what I'm saying? 这困扰我。这是 - 我的意思是，你明白我在说什么吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: No. I understand exactly. WARREN BUFFETT：不，我完全理解。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: This isn’t — 听众会员：这不是 -

WARREN BUFFETT: It's occurred to me.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：我想到了。（笑声）

I appreciate that, and I — but the answer is there's no other way, I mean, if — 我很欣赏，而且我 - 但答案是没有其他办法，我的意思是，如果 -

AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK. 听众会员：好的。

WARREN BUFFETT: — over time WARREN BUFFETT： - 随着时间的推移 AUDIENCE MEMBER: But can — 听众会员：但可以 -

WARREN BUFFETT: — in terms of what happens.And — WARREN BUFFETT： - 就发生的事情而言。而且 -

AUDIENCE MEMBER: So — 听众会员：所以 -

WARREN BUFFETT: — as it grows, you get more visible, basically. WARREN BUFFETT： - 随着它的发展，基本上你会更加明显。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Oh, I know.But along with the B shares and things, can you, kind of, like, be quotable but less available for photos?(Laughter) 观众：哦，我知道。但是除了B股和东西之外，你是否可以引用但是可用于拍照？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I normally am.I — if you've noticed, in terms of interviews or anything of the sort, I do not do them.I've been invited to go on all of the news shows.And I, basically, don't do it. 沃伦巴菲特：嗯，我通常是。我 - 如果你注意到，就采访或任何类型而言，我都不会这样做。我被邀请参加所有的新闻节目。我基本上不这样做。

Frankly, with the shareholders, I feel differently about this group.I'm delighted to see everybody come here.And I enjoy getting together with the shareholders.(Applause) 坦率地说，与股东一起，我对这个群体有不同的看法。我很高兴看到每个人都来到这里。我喜欢与股东一起聚会。（掌声）

I think the real protection is, if we'd done something that had caused the stock to balloon way up and then come way down, I might have had to be a little more careful.(Laughter) 我认为真正的保护是，如果我们做了一些导致股票上涨然后下跌的事情，我可能不得不更加谨慎。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think she has a very good idea.Having seen that acting — (Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：我认为她有个好主意。看过那个表演 - （笑声）

I think hereafter, maybe you should be the voice of Mickey Mouse.(Laughter) 我想以后，也许你应该成为米老鼠的声音。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I do appreciate the sentiment out of everybody.And there is a — it is unavoidable, to a fair degree.Although, Charlie may have thought I wasn't pushed into those acting jobs. WARREN BUFFETT：我非常感谢所有人的感情。并且有一个 - 在不同程度上是不可避免的。虽然，查理可能以为我没有被推到那些表演工作。

19. Class A "forever" convertible to Class B 19. A级“永远”可转换为B级

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2. WARREN BUFFETT：第2区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: This Joe Greer (PH) from Omaha, Nebraska of all places.(Laughter) 听众：来自所有地方内布拉斯加州奥马哈的Joe Greer（PH）。（笑声）

Regarding the conversion privilege, is there a time limit on the converting from the A to a B? 关于转换权限，从A转换为B是否有时间限制？ WARREN BUFFETT: No. That's a good — I'm glad you asked that question. WARREN BUFFETT：不，这很好 - 我很高兴你问这个问题。

The ﬁrst ﬁve days or so after issuance — business days — there's no conversion.But after that, you'll be able to convert until judgment day.It's forever convertible from A to B. But it's not convertible from B to A. 发行后的前五天左右 - 工作日 - 没有转换。但在那之后，你将能够转换到判断日。它永远可以从A转换为B.但它不能从B转换为A.

So there's no need to convert it until you have a reason to do so.It — and as I've pointed out, there's a very slight disadvantage in converting.And I wouldn't — until I had a need, I would not convert it. 因此，在您有理由这样做之前，无需进行转换。它 - 正如我已经指出的那样，在转换中存在一个非常小的缺点。我不会 - 在我有需要之前，我不会转换它。

20. How to convert Class A shares to B 20.如何将A类股转换为B.

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3? WARREN BUFFETT：3区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Scott Dowling from Redmond, Washington. 听众：来自华盛顿州雷德蒙德的斯科特道林。

Kind of related to this question, as an A shareholder, I can only see really two reasons to convert A shares into B shares, one of them being gifting reasons. 与此问题有关的是，作为A股股东，我只能看到将A股转换为B股的两个理由，其中一个是赠送理由。

In regard to that, how does one convert A shares into B? 关于这一点，如何将A股转换为B股？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.That — yeah, there are instructions on that in the proxy statement as to how that — I guess it's in the annual report, too, that it describes how to do it. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。那是 - 是的，在代理声明中有关于如何做的说明 - 我想在年度报告中它也描述了如何做到这一点。

But, basically, you get in touch with the Bank of Boston to do that and proceed from there.Or if you have your shares with a broker, you would instruct your broker to do it. 但是，基本上，你与波士顿银行取得联系，然后从那里开始。或者如果您拥有经纪人的股份，您将指示您的经纪人这样做。

21. Class B price meant to discourage unreasonable expectations 21. B类价格意味着阻止不合理的期望

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4? WARREN BUFFETT：第4区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning.I'm Ruth Owades from San Francisco. 听众：早上好。我是旧金山的Ruth Owades。

I wondered, how did you decide that the ratio of the Bs should be 30-to-1 instead of 300-to-1 or something in between? 我想知道，你是怎么决定 Bs的比例应该是30比1而不是300比1或两者之间的比例？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.We wanted to have something that was roughly — would trade, initially, at least, in the thousand-dollar range.

WARREN BUFFETT：是的。我们希望得到一些粗略的东西 - 最初，至少在千美元的范围内进行交易。

We thought it very unlikely that anyone would ﬁnd it commercially feasible to set up a trust that offered units that were denominated much below that. 我们认为，任何人都不太可能认为建立信托提供商业可行性，而信托提供的信用额度远低于此。

So, that's as low as we felt we had to go.And we did not want to signal, in any way, that, you know, some sort of last chance, or something like that, to get in for some very low sum for people that, you know, just had some wishes that they couldturn a hundred dollars into 100,000 or something. 所以，这就像我们认为的那样低。而且我们不想以任何方式发出信号，你知道，某种最后的机会，或类似的东西，为那些人提供一些非常低的金额，你知道，他们只是有一些愿望，他们可以将一百美元变成100,000或者其他东西。

I get letters from people that, you know, think that somehow that can be done.It can't be done. 我收到人们的来信，你知道，不知何故可以做到。它无法完成。

And we don't want to appeal subliminally or any other way to people who harbor those hopes. 而且我们不想暗中或以任何其他方式向那些抱有这些希望的人提出上诉。

I'm sympathetic with them.But we don't have the answer to that.So, we went down to the level to match the unit trusts. 我很同情他们。但我们没有答案。所以，我们下降到与单位信托相匹配的水平。

22. B shares will increase book value, but not intrinsic value 22. B股将增加账面价值，但不会增加内在价值

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5? WARREN BUFFETT：5区？

We'll try and do — we'll try to end the questions on the B fairly soon.But I don't want anybody that feels that they've got a — got some reservations about this — not to have a shot at asking their question. 我们会尝试做 - 我们会尽快结束关于B的问题。但我不希望任何人觉得他们有一个 - 对此有所保留 - 不要轻易提出他们的问题。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Bob McClure (PH).I live in Singapore. 听众：我的名字是Bob McClure（PH）。我住在新加坡。

And the way I ﬁgure it, the sale of the B shares at the price they will probably be sold, will give an immediate boost to the book value of Berkshire Hathaway.So, as far as I'm concerned, the more the merrier. 而我认为，以可能出售的价格出售B股，将立即提升伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的账面价值。所以，就我而言，越多越好。

Can you give us your thinking on that, the accounting treatment, how this will affect the book value of Berkshire? 你能否就这一点，会计处理，以及这将如何影响伯克希尔的账面价值给你我们的想法？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, any sell — shares we sell at the equivalent per A share of in the range of 33,000 or thereabouts, where the stock is selling now, will increase the book value per share. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我们以每股A股相当于33,000左右的价格出售的任何卖出股票，这些股票现在卖出，将增加每股账面价值。 But that does not mean it increases the intrinsic value per share. 但这并不意味着它增加了每股的内在价值。

I've said many times in the report, we use book value as a proxy in tracking movement of intrinsic value.But it does not represent anything like intrinsic value per share. 我在报告中多次说过，我们使用账面价值作为跟踪内在价值变动的代理。但它并不代表每股内在价值。

And the key is not what it does to book value per share, but what it does to intrinsic value per share.And, you know, we believe the intrinsic value is materially higher than the book value. 关键不在于它如何预测每股价值，而在于它对每股内在价值的作用。并且，您知道，我们认为内在价值实质上高于账面价值。

We don't spoil your fun by ever giving you a number.But — (laughter) — we do not regard the fact that it increases the book value per share as being any kind of a determinant in deciding to issue the shares. 我们不会给你一个数字，从而破坏你的乐趣。但是 - （笑声） - 我们不认为这会增加每股账面价值，因为它决定发行股票是一种决定因素。

But it will have that consequence mathematically.The key is the relation to intrinsic value. 但它会以数学方式产生这种结果。关键是与内在价值的关系。

23. "The facts are out on what we do" 23.“我们所做的事情已经存在”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6? WARREN BUFFETT：6区？

VOICE: I think there was a question over here. 声音：我认为这里有一个问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: Any questions in six? WARREN BUFFETT：有六个问题吗？

VOICE: Behind you. 声音：在你身后。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Your problem seems to be that you’ve attracted a fair number of potential shareholders that don't have a way of estimating intrinsic value or developing expectations about what Berkshire's future prospects are. 听众：您的问题似乎是您吸引了相当数量的潜在股东，这些股东没有办法估算内在价值或对伯克希尔的未来前景产生期望。

Now, do you have any suggestions about how they might do that, short of the general guidance that you can't continue to compound your intrinsic value at the same high rate that you have in the past because of your asset base, and that youdon't believe the share is undervalued? 现在，你有没有关于如何做到这一点的任何建议，除了一般的指导，你不能继续以你过去的资产基础，以及你的资产基础以同样高的速度复合你的内在价值不相信这份股票被低估了吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.Well, we'll probably talk more in the general question and answer period about our various businesses, but we simply try to give you all of the information about our businesses in a large, general way that Charlie and I consider important and that we wouldwant if our positions were reversed. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。好吧，我们可能会在关于我们各种业务的一般问答时间里多谈一谈，但我们只是试图以一种我认为很重要且我认为很重要的大型通用方式向您提供有关我们业务的所有信息。希望我们的立场能够扭转局面。

I can assure you that if all Charlie and I knew about our businesses, what we've publicly disclosed, it would not change our estimates from what they might be from being intimately involved with the businesses.The facts are out regarding what we do. 我可以向你们保证，如果查理和我都知道我们的业务，我们公开披露的内容，它不会改变我们对与业务密切相关的估计。关于我们的工作是事实。

So, you are in the same position to the extent that you have followed our kind of businesses and understand industry conditions and all of that. 因此，您处于相同的位置，以至于您遵循我们的业务并了解行业状况和所有这些。

And we'll continue to do that.We essentially regard you as our partners.And we tell — we try to tell you exactly what we, as partners, would want to know if you were running the place.And we'll continue to do that. 我们将继续这样做。我们基本上将您视为我们的合作伙伴而且我们告诉您 - 我们会尽力告诉您，作为合作伙伴，如果您在经营这个地方，我们会想知道什么。我们将继续这样做。

We won't tell you a number because we don't know the number.We have a range in our mind.Things change that range over time.And we'd probably get in all kinds of trouble if we tried to put out that range. 我们不会告诉你一个号码，因为我们不知道号码。我们有一个范围。随着时间的推移，事情会改变。如果我们试图推出那个范围，我们可能会遇到各种各样的麻烦。

And Charlie and I would not come up with exactly the same range.But they'd be pretty close.We'll talk more about that a little later. 查理和我不会提出完全相同的范围。但他们会非常接近。我们稍后会谈到更多。

24. Shareholders approve Class B shares 24.股东批准B类股票

WARREN BUFFETT: We do have questions now from zone 7 and 8 in the other room.So, we'll take on zone 7, please. WARREN BUFFETT ：我们现在对另一个房间的7区和8区有疑问。所以，我们将采取7区。

VOICE: I guess you've answered our questions in seven. 声音：我想你已经在七点回答了我们的问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, took care of zone 7. How about zone 8? WARREN BUFFETT：哦，照顾了7区.8区怎么样？

VOICE: No questions from zone 8. 声音：8区没有问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, OK.(Applause) WARREN BUFFETT：哦，好的。（掌声）

I think, at this point, we can move on to general questions after we have this vote. 我想，在这一点上，我们可以在进行这次投票后转向一般性问题。

And then, if you have another question or two that comes up during the general question and answer period, I’ll be glad to — we'll be glad to work those in at that time. 然后，如果你在一般的问答环节中出现了另外一两个问题，我会很高兴 - 我们很乐意在那个时候工作。 So, we are now at the point: is there a motion to adopt the board of directors’ recommendation? 那么，我们现在就是这样：是否有动议通过董事会的建议？

WALTER SCOTT JR.: I move the adoption of the amendment to the fourth article of the restated certiﬁcate of incorporation that's set forth in exhibit A of the company's proxy statement for this meeting. WALTER SCOTT JR。：我将修正案的通过移至公司的本次会议委托书陈述A中所述的重述公司注册证书的第四条。

VOICE: I second the motion. 声音：我赞成议案。

WARREN BUFFETT: The motion has been made and seconded to adopt the proposed amendment to the certiﬁcate of incorporation.It says here, “Is there any discussion?” but I'm not going to say that.We are ready to act upon the motion. WARREN BUFFETT：已提出动议，并借调通过对公司注册证书的拟议修订。它在这里说，“有没有讨论？”但我不会这么说。我们准备采取行动。

If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballot on the proposed amendment to the certiﬁcate of incorporation and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of elections. 如果有任何股东亲自投票，他们现在应该对公司注册证书的拟议修正案进行投票，并允许将选票交给选举检查员。

Would the proxy holders please also submit to the inspector of elections a ballot on the proposed amendment, voting the proxies in accordance with the instructions they have received? 请代理人还请向选举检查员提交有关拟议修正案的投票，并按照他们收到的指示投票给代理人吗？

Mr. Fitzsimmons, when you're ready, you may give your report. Fitzsimmons先生，当你准备好了，你可以给你报告。

ROBERT M. FITZSIMMONS: My report is ready.The ballot of the proxy holders received through last Friday cast not less than 970,495 votes in favor of the proposed amendment.That number far exceeds the majority of the number of all shares outstanding. ROBERT M. FITZSIMMONS：我的报告准备好了。通过上周五收到的代理人的投票不少于970,495 票赞成拟议的修正案。这个数字远远超过所有已发行股票的大部分。

The certiﬁcation required by Delaware law regarding the precise count of the votes, including the votes cast in person at this meeting, will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting. 特拉华州法律要求的关于准确计票的证明，包括亲自参加本次会议的投票，将由秘书提供，并附上本次会议的会议记录。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Mr. Fitzsimmons. WARREN BUFFETT：谢谢Fitzsimmons先生。

The amendment to the certiﬁcate of incorporation, as set forth in exhibit A to the proxy statement for this meeting, is approved. 公司注册证书的修订，如本次会议代理声明的A表所示，已获批准。

After adjournment of the business meeting, I will respond to questions that you may have that relate to the business Berkshire but do not call for any action at this meeting. 在休会后，我将回答您可能拥有的与伯克希尔公司有关的问题，但不会在本次会议上要求采取任何行动。 Anyone have any further business to come before this meeting before we adjourn?If not, I recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr. to place a motion before the meeting. 在我们休会之前，任何人还有更多的事情可以参加这次会议吗？如果没有，我会认出Walter Scott Jr. 先生在会议前提出议案。

WALTER SCOTT JR.: I move this meeting be adjourned. WALTER SCOTT JR：我推动这次会议休会。

VOICE: I second the motion. 声音：我赞成议案。

WARREN BUFFETT: The motion to adjourn has been made and seconded.We will vote by voice.Is there any discussion?If not, all in favor say, "Aye." WARREN BUFFETT：休会动议已经作出并借调。我们将通过声音投票。有没有讨论？如果没有，所有人都赞成说，“是的。”

VOICES: Aye. 声音：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: All opposed say, "No."The meeting's adjourned.(Applause) WARREN BUFFETT：所有人都反对说“不”。会议休会。（掌声）

25. Berkshire is more than its breakup value 25.伯克希尔不仅仅是其分手价值

WARREN BUFFETT: Now we'll to move to a — to general questions.And we'll do it by the same zone system. WARREN BUFFETT ：现在我们将转向一般问题。我们将通过相同的区域系统来完成。

As I said earlier, any of you are free, obviously, to leave at any time.We will break formally at noon and reconvene about 15 minutes later, after you've all had a chance to buy a sandwich, and you can — (Laughter). 正如我先前所说，显然，你们任何人都可以随时离开。我们将在中午正式休息并在大约15分钟后重新召开，之后你们都有机会买三明治，你可以 - （笑声）。

Those in the other rooms can come in here.And we will go from then until about 3 o'clock. 其他房间的客人可以进来。我们将从那时开始直到大约3点钟。

So, we'll start in with zone 1. 所以，我们将从1区开始。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm Will Jacks (PH) from Chicago.I'm sort of representing Benjamin Graham today, the question he might ask. 听众：我是来自芝加哥的杰克（PH ）。我今天有点代表本杰明格雷厄姆，他可能会问这个问题。

You talked earlier about how you — about the value of your shares, the A shares, let's say, because the B is tied to the A. 你之前谈过你如何 - 关于你的股票的价值，A股，让我们说，因为B与A有关。

But — and I know it — I don't expect a complete answer, but generally, how would you go about placing a value on the A shares? 但是 - 我知道 - 我不希望得到一个完整的答案，但一般来说，你会如何评价A股的价值？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.Well, that's obviously a key question.As I've said, we try to give you the information. WARREN BUFFETT ：是的。嗯，这显然是一个关键问题。正如我所说，我们试图向您提供信息。 But I think people, to the extent they've made a mistake in the past in valuing Berkshire — and they have made this mistake over time, including many commentators, including some institutions — is to look at it as simply a breakup value to ourbusinesses. 但我认为人们，他们过去在评估伯克希尔时犯了一个错误 - 他们随着时间的推移犯了这个错误，包括许多评论员，包括一些机构 - 都将其视为我们的分手价值商家。

I mean, you know, you can — you could do the same with General Electric, we — a magniﬁcently run operation by Jack Welch.But I don't think the way you should look at a business like General Electric is to think about what would happen if they sold each division today, paid the taxes, and then distributed the proceeds. 我的意思是，你知道，你可以 - 你可以对通用电气这样做，我们 - 杰克韦尔奇的一个辉煌的运行。但我不认为你应该像通用电气这样看待这样的企业的方式是考虑如果他们今天卖掉每个部门，支付税款，然后分配收益会发生什么。

And that has tended to be the case with many people looking at Berkshire, looking at it on a static basis.And that is not the way that Charlie and I have looked at it over time. 对于很多看伯克希尔的人来说，这种情况往往是这样的。这不是查理和我随着时间的推移看待它的方式。

It lends itself a little more to that kind of analysis because we have a lot of money in marketable securities.But we have a lot of money in other things, too. 它为这种分析提供了更多的帮助，因为我们在有价证券中有很多钱。但是我们在其他方面也有很多钱。

And the question of Berkshire, in valuing the intrinsic of any business, of course, is what is going to be the stream of cash over many years in the future — in fact, all of the years in the future, discounted back at an appropriateinterest rate.I've talked about that in the past in the annual report. 当然，伯克希尔在评估任何业务的内在性时的问题是未来多年的现金流 - 事实上，未来的所有年份，在适当的时候打折利率。我在过去的年度报告中已经谈过这个问题。

Berkshire is a collection of businesses.And some of which we own in their entirety, some of which we own part of.And some of those businesses have very interesting dynamics to them. 伯克希尔是一个企业集合。其中一些我们完全拥有，其中一些我们拥有的一部分。其中一些业务对他们来说非常有趣。

And they — the value of our insurance business, for example, if you go back 26 — what was it? Twenty-eight years or so since we — 29, I guess — since we bought it from Jack Ringwalt.We paid 8.7 million, I believe, 8.4 — 8.7 million for two companies that Jack controlled. 而且他们 - 例如，如果你回到26岁，我们的保险业务的价值 - 它是什么？自从我们从杰克林沃尔特（Jack Ringwalt）购买它以来我们29岁以后已经二十八年左右了。我认为，我们为杰克控制的两家公司支付了870万美元，即800-870万美元。

If you had the foresight at that time to — and I didn't, but — if you had the foresight at that time to see what that would develop out of that insurance business, you would've come to the conclusion that their value tous was going to be far, far greater than the value at which they were then carried on our balance sheet.They were part of a business which had enormous potential. 如果你当时有远见 - 而我没有，但是 - 如果你当时有先见之明，看看那保险业务会发展什么，你就会得出结论，他们的价值是我们将远远超过它们在资产负债表上的价值。他们是具有巨大潜力的企业的一部分。

And that's been, probably, the most signiﬁcant asset that's been developed at Berkshire.But right now, we have over seven — right at 7 billion — over 7 billion — of ﬂoat that's been developed from our insurance business.

这可能是伯克希尔最重要的资产。但是现在，我们拥有超过7个 - 正在70亿 - 超过70亿 - 从我们的保险业务开发的浮动。

We couldn't foresee that 25 or 30 years ago.But it would've been a big mistake to think in terms of the book value of that business being representative of its actual value to us over time, if it was run right. 我们无法预见25或30年前。但如果运作正确的话，考虑到该业务的账面价值会代表我们对它们的实际价值，那将是一个很大的错误。

And that situation probably prevails today. 而这种情况今天可能会占上风。

So, it’s a — Berkshire is a group of, on balance, very ﬁne businesses to which we hope to add. 所以，它是一个 - 伯克希尔是一组平衡的，非常好的企业，我们希望增加。

The intrinsic value will be affected by the job we do in allocating capital.It'll be affected by the job our managers do in running their businesses.It'll be affected by some items that we don't foresee now and, perhaps, have no control over. 内在价值将受到我们分配资金的工作的影响。它会受到我们的经理在经营业务时所做的工作的影响。它会受到我们现在没有预见到的一些项目的影响，也许无法控制。

But it is not measured, essentially, by what we could sell each separate business for and pay the tax on now.We haven't run it that way.We've run it so that we get the use of a lot of capital at very low cost. 但基本上，我们可以出售每个单独的业务并且现在支付税款。我们没有这样运行。我们运行它，以便以非常低的成本获得大量资金。

Between deferred taxes and our insurance ﬂoat, we have some 12 billion or so on the liability side that we think will be a very low cost.And that’s — doesn't show as an asset, but it can be quite valuable. 在递延税和我们的保险浮动之间，我们有大约120亿左右的负债方面，我们认为这将是一个非常低的成本。而且 - 这并不是一种资产，但它可能非常有价值。

Charlie, you want to —? 查理，你想 - ？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. I don't think I've got anything to add to that. CHARLIE MUNGER：不，我认为我没有任何补充。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh.I was all set to write it down, too.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：哦。我也准备把它写下来。（笑声）

26. Buybacks at what appear to be high stock prices 26.看似高股价的回购

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2, please. WARREN BUFFETT：请问第2区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, I'm Tim Medley from Jackson, Mississippi. 听众：巴菲特先生，芒格先生，我是来自密西西比州杰克逊的蒂姆梅德利。

My question is an allocation of capital one.You've indicated that one thing you like in companies is a willingness on the part of management to repurchase its own shares. 我的问题是资本分配问题。你已经表明，你喜欢公司的一件事是管理层愿意回购自己的股票。 I wonder if you would talk for a minute about your own frame of reference on repurchases when it appears that the current price of the stock is rich in relation to its intrinsic value. 我想知道，当股票的当前价格与其内在价值相关时，您是否会就自己的回购参考框架谈一会儿。

And some have said that, with the right company, ongoing repurchases of stock should be made, irrespective of the price. 有些人说，在合适的公司，无论价格如何，都应该继续进行股票回购。

So, would you speak for a moment, as to how you think it pencils out when the current price of the stock is rich in relation to its intrinsic value? 那么，您是否会说一下，当股票的当前价格与其内在价值相关时，您认为它是如何形成的？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.If you're repurchasing shares above a rationally calculated intrinsic value, you are harming your shareholders, just as if you issue shares beneath that ﬁgure, you are harming your shareholders. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。如果您回购的股票超过了合理计算的内在价值，那么您正在伤害您的股东，就像您在该数字下方发行股票一样，您正在伤害您的股东。

That's a truism.Now, the tough part of that, of course, is coming up with the intrinsic value. 这是一个老生常谈。现在，当然，其中最棘手的部分是提出内在价值。

And, for example — a good example might be Coca-Cola. 而且，例如 - 一个很好的例子可能是可口可乐。

I think a number of people might have thought Coca-Cola was repurchasing shares at a very high price, because they'll look at book value or P/E ratios.But there's a lot more to intrinsic value than book value and P/E ratios.And anytime anybody gives you some simpliﬁed formula for ﬁguring it out, forget it. 我想很多人可能认为可口可乐以非常高的价格回购股票，因为他们会考虑账面价值或市盈率。但是，与账面价值和市盈率相比，内在价值要高得多。任何时候任何人都会给你一些简化的公式来解决它，忘了它。

You have to understand the business.The people who understood that business well, the management, have understood and been very forthright about saying so over the years, that by repurchasing their shares, they are adding to the value per share for remaining shareholders. 你必须了解这项业务。多年来，那些了解业务的人，管理层，已经理解并且非常直率地说，通过回购他们的股票，他们增加了剩余股东的每股价值。

And like I say, people who didn't understand Coca-Cola, or who thought mechanistic methods of valuation could — should take precedence, really misjudged the value to the Coca-Cola Company of those repurchases. 就像我说的那样，那些不了解可口可乐的人，或者那些认为机械估价方法的人 - 应该优先考虑，真的误判了可口可乐公司对这些回购的价值。

So we favor — when you have a wonderful business — we favor using funds that are generated out of that business to make the business even more wonderful.And we favor repurchasing shares if those shares are below intrinsic value. 因此，我们倾向于 - 当您拥有一个出色的业务时 - 我们倾向于使用该业务产生的资金来使业务更加精彩。如果这些股票低于内在价值，我们赞成回购股票。

And I would say that if it's a really wonderful business, we probably come up with higher intrinsic values than most people do. 而且我会说，如果这是一项非常好的业务，我们可能会提出比大多数人更高的内在价值。

We have great respect, Charlie and I with — I think it's developed over the years — we have enormous respect for the power of a really outstanding business.And we recognize how scarce they are.And if a management wishes to further intensify our ownership by repurchasing shares, we applaud. 我们非常尊重，查理和我 - 我认为它是多年来发展起来的 - 我们非常尊重真正优秀企业的力量。我们认识到他们是多么稀缺。如果管理层希望通过回购股票进一步加强我们的所有权，我们鼓掌。

We own — we just went over 8 percent of the Coca-Cola Company, probably, in the last three or so months, by a very tiny fraction.But we had a second purchase one time. 我们拥有 - 在过去三个月左右，我们只占可口可乐公司8％以上的一小部分。但我们有一次第二次购买。

But our percentage interest in the Coca-Cola Company has gone up signiﬁcantly through their repurchases.And we are better off because they have bought those shares at what looked like, to some people, perhaps, high prices.And we thought they were wrong at the time, and I think now it's been indicated or proven. 但是，通过回购，我们对可口可乐公司的百分比兴趣大幅上升。而且我们生活得更好，因为他们已经购买了那些看起来像是某些人的股票，也许是高价。我们当时认为他们错了，我认为现在它已被证实或证明了。

So, I urge you, if you're trying to decide on the wisdom of repurchases, or of share issuances, that you don't think in terms of book value.You don't think in terms of speciﬁc P/Es.You don't think in terms of any little model. 所以，我敦促你，如果你试图决定回购或股票发行的智慧，你就不会考虑账面价值。您没有考虑具体的P / E。你不会考虑任何小模型。

But you think in terms of what would you really, A, pick businesses you can understand and, then, think what you really would pay to be in those businesses.And that's what counts over time, is whether the repurchases are made at a discount from that ﬁgure. 但是你会考虑到你真正会做什么，A，挑选你能理解的企业，然后想想你在这些企业中真正付出的代价。这是重要的，是回购是否是从该数字折扣。

And I would say with the companies that we own shares in, we — our interest in GEICO went from 33 or so percent to 50 percent over a 15-year or so period, simply through repurchases.And we beneﬁtted signiﬁcantly. 我会说，我们拥有股份的公司，我们 - 仅仅通过回购，我们对GEICO的兴趣在15年左右的时间内从 33％左右上升到50％。我们受益匪浅。

So, did every other shareholder, I might add, that stayed with the company.And we beneﬁted in no way disproportionate to them. 那么，我可能会补充说，其他所有股东都留在了公司。我们的利益绝不与他们不成比例。

But that was a very wise action on their part.And there too, they were all — usually buying that stock at at least double book value.And you could compare it to other insurance stocks and say, "Well, that's too much to pay." 但这对他们来说是一个非常明智的行动。而且，他们都是 - 通常以至少两倍的账面价值购买该股票。你可以将它与其他保险股进行比较，然后说：“嗯，付出太多了。”

But GEICO wasn't an insurance company that was comparable to other insurance companies.It was a very different sort of business.And they were very wise, in my view, to be following that course of action. 但是，GEICO并不是一家可与其他保险公司相媲美的保险公司。这是一种非常不同的业务。在我看来，他们非常明智地遵循这一行动方针。

Charlie?No? 查理？没有？ 27. B shares won't dilute value of A shares 27. B股不会稀释A股的价值

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3? WARREN BUFFETT：3区？

VOICE: That’s you. 声音：那就是你。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Oh, sorry.I'm Elaine Cohen (PH) from San Diego. 听众会员：哦，对不起。我是来自圣地亚哥的Elaine Cohen（PH）。

I'm a little confused about how the B shares are going to be moving if they're at 1/30th of the A shares when they get out on the market. 如果B股在他们上市时处于A股的1/30，我对B股将如何变动感到有些困惑。

Are they always going to be 1/30th of the A shares?And if they are, is that going to dilute the earnings of the A shares?Could you just explain that? 他们总是会成为A股的1/30吗？如果是的话，是否会削弱 A股的收益？你能解释一下吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.It won't dilute the earnings or value of the A shares as long as we use the money reasonably effectively that is produced. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。只要我们合理有效地使用所产生的资金，它就不会稀释A股的收益或价值。

As I mentioned earlier, if it happens to be 1 percent, you'll own 1 percent less of all these other things — on the other hand, will have close to $400 million more of cash.So, it will not — in our view, it will not dilute the value of the A. 正如我之前提到的，如果它恰好是1％，那么你将拥有所有这些其他东西的1％ - 另一方面，将有近4 亿美元的现金。所以，它不会 - 在我们看来，它不会稀释A的价值。

I expect, over time, that the B, a very large percentage of the time, will be selling very close to a 30th.But it could sell for less than that ratio.It can't sell for any signiﬁcant amount more than that ratio, or arbitrage will eat away at any slight premium.I think that takes care of that. 我预计，随着时间的推移，B（很大一部分时间）的售价将非常接近30。但它的售价可能会低于这个比例。它不能以超过该比率的价格出售，或者套利会以任何轻微的溢价消失。我认为这样可以解决这个问题。

28. No "secret formulas" for Wells Fargo 28.富国银行没有“秘密公式”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4. WARREN BUFFETT：第4区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is Hugh Stephenson.I'm a shareholder from Atlanta, Georgia. 听众：巴菲特先生，我叫休·斯蒂芬森。我是佐治亚州亚特兰大的股东。

My question involves the company's interest in Wells Fargo.As you know, Wells Fargo, like most banks, has a very expensive branch system for deposit-gathering and servicing their customers. 我的问题涉及公司对富国银行的兴趣。如您所知，富国银行与大多数银行一样，拥有非常昂贵的分行系统，用于存款收集和为客户提供服务。

As I guess you know, they also have moved more into branches in supermarkets and in online banking that seems to have the potential to very signiﬁcantly reduce their costs, relative to the branch system. 正如我猜你知道的那样，相对于分支系统，他们也更多地进入超市和网上银行的分支机构，这些分支机构似乎有可能极大地降低成本。

Would you comment on how you think that might play out and how signiﬁcant it might be? 你会评论你认为可能会发生什么以及它可能有多重要吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the question — you're right.Wells Fargo has been a leader in moving into supermarkets.They've got a couple different formats they've used.And they've been a — they’ve certainly been a leader in the online banking services. 沃伦巴菲特：嗯，问题 - 你是对的。富国银行一直是进入超市的领导者。他们使用了几种不同的格式。他们一直是 - 他们肯定是网上银行服务的领导者。

Unfortunately, in banking, you know, it's a little hard to have any secret formulas.Coca-Cola has 7X down there in the vaults of the, what used to be the Trust Company of Georgia, now SunTrust.But in the banking business, anything you do, your competitors can copy. 不幸的是，在银行业，你知道，拥有任何秘密公式有点困难。可口可乐公司在该公司的金库中占据了 7倍的市场份额，曾经是格鲁吉亚的信托公司，现在是SunTrust。但是在银行业务中，你做的任何事情，竞争对手都可以复制。

Nevertheless, there’s a — there is an advantage.And sometimes it can be a quite — a significant advantage in being first and learning more about different distribution methods.And I think Wells Fargo has done a terrific job in learning that. 然而，有一个 - 有一个优势。有时，它可以成为一个非常重要的优势，首先是了解不同的分配方法。而且我认为富国银行在学习这方面做得非常好。

I think they've got some advantages.They — but they aren't advantages that other people can't work at copying and chipping away at. 我认为他们有一些优势。他们 - 但他们不是其他人无法复制和削减工作的优势。

But it's a good management.They've done a very good job of seizing on that particular trend in supermarkets. 但这是一个很好的管理。他们在超市中抓住这一特定趋势方面做得非常好。

And as such, they are — they have the potential, perhaps, for having a relatively low-cost deposit- gathering operation.And every other bank in the world will be looking, noticing how that works, not only there but at other banks, to ﬁgure out whether they can copy it. 因此，它们是 - 它们可能具有相对低成本的存款收集操作的潜力。世界上所有其他银行都会关注，并注意到它是如何运作的，不仅在那里，而且在其他银行，以确定它们是否可以复制它。

Charlie?OK. 查理？好。

29. GEICO beneﬁts from being entirely owned by Berkshire 29. GEICO受益于伯克希尔全资拥有

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5. WARREN BUFFETT：第5区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name's Alan Parsow from Omaha. 观众：我的名字来自奥马哈的Alan Parsow。

Berkshire has increased the rate of growth in its insurance float in excess of 20 percent a year since 1967. 自1967年以来，伯克希尔的保险浮动增长率每年超过20％。 In regards to GEICO, its rate of growth, what is its historic rate of growth been in its insurance float?And what impact will it have on the rate of growth in the overall Berkshire insurance float? 关于GEICO，其增长率，其历史增长率在其保险浮动中是多少？它对伯克希尔整体保险浮动的增长率有何影响？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say that GEICO is a huge plus to Berkshire.Now, we owned 50 percent of it before.I mean, we’ve had a — we've beneﬁtted from our GEICO investment in a big way, ever since 1976. So, it's not entirely a new beneﬁt that's coming in. 沃伦巴菲特：嗯，我会说GEICO对伯克希尔来说是一个巨大的优势。现在，我们之前拥有它的 50％。我的意思是，自1976年以来，我们已经有了 - 我们从GEICO的大量投资中获益。因此，这并不是一个新的利益。

We paid a good price for GEICO, but it is a terriﬁc company.It has outstanding management.It has a low-cost method of distribution, which is very difﬁcult for people to — I mean, everybody wants to have that.But they — very few come close to it. 我们为GEICO付出了很好的代价，但它是一家了不起的公司。它有出色的管理。它有一种低成本的分发方法，这对人们来说非常困难 - 我的意思是，每个人都希望拥有它。但他们 - 很少接近它。

The management is focused on bringing costs down even further and widening that competitive moat. 管理层致力于进一步降低成本并扩大竞争力。

GEICO — I personally think that, just from what I see, that GEICO — I would think GEICO's growth rate is likely to be greater, at least, in the future, that I can see, over where it has been in the past.But it's been perfectly satisfactory in the past. GEICO - 我个人认为，就我所看到的那样，GEICO - 我认为GEICO的增长率可能会更高，至少在未来，我可以看到，过去的地方。但它在过去完全令人满意。

I think there are some advantages to it being part of Berkshire, in that there are costs attached to bringing new business on the books.And we care not at all about reported quarterly earnings. 我认为它作为伯克希尔的一部分有一些优势，因为在书上带来新业务需要成本。而且我们根本不关心报告的季度收益。

GEICO was relatively insensitive to those before.And that's a compliment when I say that.But they had some more pressure on them in respect to reported earnings than they will have, as part of Berkshire. GEICO对以前的人比较敏感。当我这么说时，这是一种恭维。但作为伯克希尔的一部分，他们在报告收益方面对他们施加了比他们更多的压力。

And I think there's some really big opportunities, in terms of what can be done with GEICO as part of Berkshire. 我认为，作为伯克希尔公司的一部分，GEICO可以做些什么，这是一个非常大的机会。

So, I think ﬁve years from now, you'll be very happy with the fact that we own a hundred percent of GEICO. 所以，我想五年之后，你会非常高兴我们拥有百分之百的GEICO。

And I think you will see that as marvelous a company as GEICO was independently — as an independent company — it will ﬂourish maybe even a bit more as being part of Berkshire. 而且我认为你会看到，像GEICO这样的公司是独立的 - 作为一家独立的公司 - 它将成为伯克希尔的一部分，甚至可能更加蓬勃发展。

Not because we bring anything to the party.I mean, the management will continue to run it autonomously.But there’s — there are some advantages for it in being part of a larger enterprise.

不是因为我们带来了任何东西。我的意思是，管理层将继续自主运行。但有一点 - 作为一个大企业的一部分，它有一些优势。

30. Berkshire businesses worth more than book value 30.伯克希尔的企业价值超过账面价值

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6. WARREN BUFFETT：第6区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is Steven Tuchner.I'm a shareholder from Toronto, Canada.And my question concerns the valuation of Berkshire shares. 听众：巴菲特先生，我的名字是史蒂文·图施纳。我是加拿大多伦多的股东。我的问题涉及伯克希尔股票的估值。

Given the large number and dollar size of the private businesses recorded at historic cost, which Berkshire owns, shouldn't the multiple to book that the stock trades at, essentially, expand over time to reﬂect the increases in intrinsic value of the private holdings? 鉴于伯克希尔拥有的以历史成本记录的私人企业的大量和美元规模，不应该预测股票交易的倍数，基本上是随着时间的推移而扩大，以反映私人持股的内在价值的增加？

And I cite Buffalo News on the books at, essentially, I think around zero.And even GEICO now will be on the books at, probably, between 3 and 4 billion — worth more than that — as examples of the disparity between intrinsic value and book value? 我在书上引用了布法罗新闻，基本上我认为是零。甚至 GEICO现在的账面价值可能在30到40亿之间 - 比这更值钱 - 作为内在价值和账面价值之间差异的例子？

WARREN BUFFETT: Most of the businesses that we own all of, or at least 80 percent of, are carried on the books at considerably less than they're now worth. WARREN BUFFETT：我们拥有的大部分业务，或者至少80％的业务，都以低于现在价值的价格出售。

And with some of them, it's dramatic, although it's not dramatic compared to a $40 billion total market valuation for Berkshire.It's dramatic relative to the carrying price. 对于其中一些而言，这是戏剧性的，尽管与伯克郡400亿美元的总市场估值相比并不显着。相对于运价而言，这是戏剧性的。

Because when we bought See's Candy for an effective $25 million in 1972, it was earning 4 million, pretax.It earned over 50 million, pretax, last year.When we bought the Buffalo News, it was making nothing.Paid 30 and a fraction million.And it's now earning, maybe, 45 million.And we've got a number of businesses.And GEICO's worth more than we carry it for because of the accounting peculiarities of the ﬁrst 50 percent. 因为当我们在1972年以2500万美元的价格购买了See's Candy时，它获得了400万美元的税前收入。它去年收入超过5000万，税前。当我们购买布法罗新闻时，它什么都没做。支付30和一万分之一。现在它的收入可能是4500万美元。我们有很多业务。由于前50％的会计特点，GEICO的价值高于我们的价值。

So, it is true that, overwhelmingly, our businesses are worth something more than intrinsic value — than book value — and, in many cases, very substantially more, although that's reﬂected in the market price of our stock. 因此，绝大多数情况下，我们的业务价值超过内在价值 - 而不是账面价值 - 而且，在很多情况下，实际上更多，尽管这反映在我们股票的市场价格上。

I don't think you can go from year to year and trace the intrinsic value precisely by changes in book value.We use changes in book value as a very rough guide as to movement, and sometimes I comment. 我不认为你可以每年都去，并通过账面价值的变化来精确追踪内在价值。我们使用账面价值的变化作为关于运动的非常粗略的指导，有时我评论。

There have been certain annual reports where I've said our intrinsic values grew more than the proportional change in book value, and there's been others where I've said I thought it was roughly the same. 有一些年度报告，我说我们的内在价值增长超过了账面价值的比例变化，还有其他地方，我说我认为它大致相同。

So, I don't think you can use it as a — stick some multiplier on it and come up with a precise guide — a precise number.But I do think it's a guide to movement. 所以，我不认为你可以把它作为一个 - 在它上面添加一些乘数并提出一个精确的指南 - 一个精确的数字。但我认为这是运动的指南。

Our insurance business, though, is the most dramatic case of dollar difference between book value and intrinsic value.I mean, the number has gotten very big over time there.I personally think it will tend to get bigger, because I think GEICO will grow, and I think our other businesses will do well. 不过，我们的保险业务是账面价值与内在价值之间美元差异最显着的情况。我的意思是，随着时间的推移，这个数字变得非常大。我个人认为它会变得更大，因为我认为GEICO会增长，我认为我们的其他业务会做得很好。

The trick, of course, is to take the new capital as it comes along — and not from the issuance of the B, because that's relatively small compared to the amount of capital we will just generate from operations. 当然，诀窍在于采用新资本 - 而不是从B的发行中获取资金，因为与我们将从运营中产生的资本数量相比，这相对较小。

Our float will grow from year to year.Our earnings will be retained.And we've got to go out and find things to do that three or five years from now that people say, "Well, that's worth more than the book value."And that's a job.It's a tougher job than it was.But it's kind of fun. 我们的浮动将逐年增长。我们的收入将保留。我们必须走出去找三年或五年后要做的事情，人们说，“嗯，这比书的价值还要多。”这是一份工作。这是一项比以往更艰难的工作。但它很有趣。

31. Not expecting B shares to affect price of A shares 31.预计B股不会影响A股价格

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 7? WARREN BUFFETT：7区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes.My name is Jim Elliot (PH).I'm from Minneapolis. 听众会员：是的。我叫Jim Elliot（PH）。我来自明尼阿波利斯。

I wonder if you could help me with an upside scenario where the B shares, after they're issued, are limited and there's not a signiﬁcant reissue afterwards.The A shareholders are somewhat reluctant to convert.And you have a run on the B shares where, let's say, it goes to $2,000 a share. 我想知道你是否可以帮我解决一个好处，即B股在发行后是有限的，之后没有重大的重新发行。 A股股东有点不愿意转换。而你在B股上跑了，比方说，每股收益2000美元。

Do we then have the tail wagging the dog, where the 2,000 command a $60,000 price on the A shares?And, you know, what — does the — this arbitrage take care of that?Or — 那么我们是否有尾巴摇着狗，2000指挥A股的价格为60,000美元？并且，你知道，这个套利是做什么的？要么 -

WARREN BUFFETT: Well — 沃伦巴菲特：嗯 - AUDIENCE MEMBER: — what do we do in that case? 听众会员： - 在这种情况下我们该怎么做？

WARREN BUFFETT: If there is demand for the B that pushes the price up somewhat, it will produce conversion from the A. I mean, the only way the B will be able to get — we'll just pick a ﬁgure — if it wereto get to $1,200 — there is no way that the A could be selling appreciably below 36,000. WARREN BUFFETT：如果需要B推动价格上涨，它将产生A的转换。我的意思是，B能够获得的唯一方式 - 我们只需选择一个数字 - 如果它是要达到1,200美元 - A没有办法可以低于36,000卖出。

And I don’t think — I think that introducing the B into the equation, may mean — it will mean — that there will be some people who like a lower denomination stock and come in. 而且我不认为 - 我认为将B引入等式可能意味着 - 这将意味着 - 会有一些人喜欢较低面额的股票并且进来。

But it takes a lot of that to, in an appreciable way, affect $40 billion worth of what is now A stock. 但是，以一种可观的方式，需要花费大量资金来影响价值400亿美元的A股。

So, you know, if there were incremental demand of a hundred million dollars a year or something like that, that's a little more than the demand that might otherwise go into the A. But I do not see it producing anything in the way of abig movement. 所以，你知道，如果每年增加一亿美元的需求或类似的东西，这比可能进入A的需求多一点。但我不认为它产生任何东西的方式。大运动。

But you're quite correct in that there's no way that the B stock can go up and not really force some conversion from the A. It’ll — I think it'll be minor. 但你是完全正确的，因为B股没有办法上涨而且没有真正强制从A转换。它会 - 我认为这将是次要的。

32. World Book Encyclopedia business won't be sold 32.世界图书百科全书业务不会被出售

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 8? WARREN BUFFETT：8区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello.This is Rick Merliof (PH) from Oakland, California. 听众：你好。这是来自加利福尼亚州奥克兰市的Rick Merliof（PH）。

I wanted to ask you about World Book Encyclopedia.World Book seems to me to be an example where Berkshire has invested in technology without necessarily intending to. 我想问你世界图书百科全书。在我看来，“世界图书”是伯克希尔投资技术而不一定打算投资的一个例子。

I would expect that in ﬁve or 10 years it's going to be real tough to sell a paper encyclopedia, because at that time, you'll probably be able to buy the computer and the electronic encyclopedia for less than the paper encyclopedia. 我希望在五年或十年内出售纸质百科全书真的很难，因为在那个时候，你可能能够以低于纸质百科全书的价格购买电脑和电子百科全书。

Up till now, I haven't had the impression that World Book has been as aggressive as its competitors in marketing and developing its electronic product. 到目前为止，我还没有给人的印象是，World Book在营销和开发电子产品方面一直和竞争对手一样具有攻击性。

It's been the highest price that I have seen of the competition.It’s — it asked at least — a year ago, its list price was 600 and the competition was 8,200. 这是我在比赛中看到的最高价格。这是 - 至少在一年前问过，它的定价是600，竞争对手是8,200。

You sold as low as a hundred on special promotions.But it — I don't think that was the list. 您在特价促销中卖得低至一百。但它 - 我认为这不是清单。

A year ago, you were still selling by direct sales.I have not yet seen it in a mass market software store.I've never seen it bundled with a computer. 一年前，你仍然通过直销销售。我还没有在大众市场的软件商店看到它。我从来没有见过它与电脑捆绑在一起。

And I have seen one newspaper review of electronic encyclopedias that mention the World Book print version but didn't seem to be aware that a World Book electronic version was available, which it was at that time. 我看过一篇关于电子百科全书的报纸评论，提到了世界图书的印刷版本，但似乎并没有意识到世界图书的电子版本是当时可用的。

In terms of the product itself, we have both the World Book and the Grolier's at our house.The Grolier's came with the computer.And both encyclopedias, in this last year, solicited us to buy an upgrade.World Book was asking $85.Grolier's was asking 30. 就产品本身而言，我们的家里都有World Book和Grolier。 Grolier 来自计算机。去年，这两个百科全书都要求我们购买升级产品。 World Book要价85美元。格罗利尔问30。

But in addition, I ended up buying only the Grolier's, because it addressed my biggest disappointment on the original version of both of them, which — it’s sort of a — in a way, a minor issue.But I thought it was relevant for kids doing school reports. 但另外，我最终只买了Grolier的，因为它解决了我对它们两者的原始版本最大的失望，这在某种程度上是一个小问题。但我认为这对孩子们做学校报告很重要。

Neither one allows you to print out a very big percentage of the pictures in the encyclopedia.They have a lot of pictures.But you can't print them.And you can get a color inkjet printer for under 200 bucks these days, so it's real practical to print things out. 两者都不允许你在百科全书中打印出很大比例的图片。他们有很多照片。但你不能打印它们。如今，你可以买到200美元以下的彩色喷墨打印机，因此打印出来是非常实用的。

The World Book made no mention of having any improvement in this area.The Grolier's said you can print out almost all the pictures.And I have found — since we got the upgrade — I found that to be true. 世界图书没有提到在这方面有任何改进。 Grolier说你可以打印出几乎所有的照片。而且我发现 - 自从我们升级后 - 我发现这是真的。

So, I'm concerned that — I'm not an expert on this, but I don't think World Book is as aggressive in either developing or marketing its electronic encyclopedia. 因此，我担心 - 我不是这方面的专家，但我不认为World Book 在开发或营销其电子百科全书方面具有攻击性。

So, my question is, do you plan to become aggressive in this area and a leader in the electronic technology?Or have you considered selling your electronic business and just getting out of it? 所以，我的问题是，你是否计划在这一领域积极进取并成为电子技术的领导者？或者您是否考虑过出售您的电子商务并且刚刚离开它？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.We won't sell the electronic business.That, I can tell you. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。我们不会出售电子商务。那，我可以告诉你。

You're quite correct.Some of the technical stuff I'm not very good at.I have a little trouble turning on the light switch.

你说的很对。我不太擅长的一些技术性的东西。我打开电灯开关有点麻烦。

But the — (laughter) — in terms of the bundled product, which is the encyclopedia that is offered with the purchase of a new computer, there's no question that that's become a large business in units. 但是 - （笑声） - 就捆绑产品而言，这是购买新计算机时提供的百科全书，毫无疑问，这将成为单位的大型企业。

It's not so large in terms of dollars, because those units, bundled with an original equipment sale, are very low.Actually, Encarta's probably — well I'm sure has sold, you know, many, many millions of units bundled with a new encyclopedia.It doesn't necessarily produce a lot of dollars.But it produces a lot of units out there. 它在美元方面并不是那么大，因为那些与原始设备销售捆绑在一起的单位非常低。实际上，Encarta 可能 - 我知道已经卖出了很多，数百万个单元捆绑了一本新的百科全书。它不一定产生很多美元。但它产生了很多单位。

We, at World Book — Encyclopedia — some of you may not have noticed, but Encyclopedia Britannica has, within the last couple of weeks, announced the cessation of direct distribution of the print product. 我们，在世界图书 - 百科全书 - 你们中的一些人可能没有注意到，但是在不久的几周内，不列颠百科全书宣布停止直接销售印刷品。

And unit sales of encyclopedias — print encyclopedias — in the country have gone down very signiﬁcantly in the last few years, as they have at World Book. 百科全书 - 印刷百科全书 - 的单位销售在过去几年中已经非常显着，正如他们在世界图书一样。

We changed the — we are in the process of changing, and have already changed in some parts of the country — the distribution system because we are going to see what can be made to work, if anything, in the direct distribution. 我们改变了 - 我们正在改变，并且已经在国家的某些地方改变了 - 分配系统，因为我们将看到在直接分配中可以做什么工作，如果有的话。

There are some indications that we may be able to make money in that business but with a different cost structure than before.And it — well, we'll know more about that.We're not that far along, because we changed the distribution within the last — or partially changed it — within the last few months. 有迹象表明，我们可以在该业务中赚钱，但成本结构与以前不同。而且 - 好吧，我们会更多地了解这一点。我们并没有那么远，因为我们在最后几个月内改变了最后的分布 - 或者部分改变了分布。

We — it's not easy to ﬁgure out how to make money in either the electronic or print encyclopedia end of the business.And we have some ideas in the electronic end that we'll know a lot more about in about six months or so, but I can’t really — I don't want to go into any detail on those at present. 我们 - 要弄清楚如何在电子或印刷百科全书中赚钱，这并不容易。我们在电子终端有一些想法，我们会在大约六个月左右的时间内了解更多，但我真的不能 - 我不想详细讨论目前的问题。

I've got the electronic product myself.It's a ﬁrst-class product.We’ve got ideas about how to make it an even better product.And we have taken a lot of costs out of the print end of the business.We'll be putting some of those into the electronic end.But we've taken a lot of costs out. 我自己有电子产品。这是一流的产品。我们已经有了如何使它成为更好的产品的想法。我们已经从业务的印刷结束中花费了很多成本。我们将把其中一些放入电子终端。但是我们花了很多钱。

It may well be that it'll be a workable business for us, even though it isn't for anybody else, but the jury's still out on that. 它可能对我们来说是一项可行的业务，即使它不是为了其他任何人，但陪审团仍然在那。 It is not the business it was ﬁve years ago.And I don't think it will be the business that it was ﬁve years ago, because the world is changed in some ways on that. 这不是五年前的事情。而且我认为这将是五年前的业务，因为世界在某种程度上已经改变了。

But we’re — we will not sell World Book.That I can just — I'll state that unequivocally.We will not sell electronic World Book.We are in the business to stay. 但我们 - 我们不会出售世界图书。我可以 - 我会毫不含糊地陈述。我们不会出售电子世界图书。我们留在这里。

But we are groping a bit in terms of figuring out a configuration that will produce decent profits for us and sell a lot of World Books in the process. 但是我们在摸索一个能够为我们带来不错的利润并在此过程中出售大量世界图书的配置方面有点摸索。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: We don't have any way of avoiding declines in some of our businesses some of the time. CHARLIE MUNGER ：我们无论如何都无法避免某些业务的下滑。

Blue Chip Stamps once sold stamps at the rate of $120 million year.Now, it's about $200,000 a year.So, we lose some.(Laughter) Blue Chip Stamps曾以每年1.2亿美元的价格出售邮票。现在，每年大约20万美元。所以，我们失去了一些。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We were in the windmill business many years ago.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：我们多年前从事风车业务。（笑声）

We try to make — you know, we think plenty about the problems.But there are industry problems. 我们试图做 - 你知道，我们认为很多问题。但是存在行业问题。

I was in anthracite coal at one time, too.Street railways.I've seen them all. 我也曾经在无烟煤中。街道铁路。我见过他们了。

But World Book is a ﬁrst-class product.It's a product I use, a product Charlie uses.And there is — through an electronic means, you can deliver information at costs far, far less than — I mean, unbelievably less — than was the case not that many years ago. 但World Book是一流的产品。这是我使用的产品，Charlie使用的产品。而且 - 通过电子方式，您可以以远远低于 - 我的意思，比许多年前的情况低得多的成本提供信息。

And the world, in many forms, will be adjusting to that, not just in encyclopedias.And it affects some of the businesses we're in. And it's something we think about.But it's very unlikely that Charlie and I are going to be smarter than the rest of the world, in terms of the electronic world. 而且，世界将以多种形式适应，而不仅仅是百科全书。它影响了我们所处的一些业务。这是我们想到的。但就电子世界而言，查理和我不太可能比世界其他地方更聪明。

I mean, we are looking at it as something where we’re looking for the obvious, and something that is within our capability of doing something about.But we're not trying to beat people at their own game, where we're not very good at the game. 我的意思是，我们将它视为我们正在寻找显而易见的东西，以及我们能够做某事的能力。但我们并没有试图在他们自己的比赛中击败人们，我们在比赛中并不擅长。

33. Protecting public shows "tremendous integrity" 33.保护公众节目“巨大的诚信” WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1? WARREN BUFFETT：第1区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, Richard Charlton from Canada.One of the highlights of — good afternoon, Mr. Munger, also.(Laughter) 听众：巴菲特先生，来自加拿大的理查德查尔顿。其中一个亮点 - 下午好，芒格先生也是。（笑声）

One of the highlights, for me, in coming to the annual meeting for the past seven or eight years was the way that you dealt with the question that was inevitably asked by a new shareholder as to why you will not split your shares. 对于我来说，参加过去七八年的年会的亮点之一就是你处理新股东不可避免地要求你为何不分割股票的问题。

I know how much it has meant to you to keep the shares trading in an exclusive way.And you have been my mentor for the last 17 years. 我知道对你来说，以独家方式交易股票意味着多少。在过去的17年里，你一直是我的导师。

And I think that what you're doing in splitting these shares in order to protect the public, and indirectly, Berkshire shareholders, but mostly to protect the public, is just another expression of your and Mr. Munger's tremendous integrity. 而且我认为，为了保护公众，间接地保护伯克希尔股东，你所做的就是分割这些股票，但主要是为了保护公众，这只是你和芒格先生的巨大诚信的另一种表现。

And you're setting a fantastic example for corporate America.And I salute you, sir.And I thank you very much.(Applause) 而你正在为美国企业树立一个梦幻般的榜样。先生，我向你致敬。我非常感谢你。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.Thank you. WARREN BUFFETT：谢谢。谢谢。

34. "The fairer, the better" for Berkshire's stock price 34.伯克希尔股票价格的“更公平，更好”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I hate to leave zone one after that, but we'll go on to zone 2. (Laughter) Thank you. WARREN BUFFETT ：嗯，我不想在那之后离开第一区，但是我们将继续进入第2区。（笑声）谢谢。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Wesley Jack from Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. 听众：来自俄克拉荷马州俄克拉荷马市的韦斯利杰克。

As a stock broker, I can say I deﬁnitely don't like UITs and I appreciate your plan for the B shares. 作为股票经纪人，我可以说我绝对不喜欢UIT，我很感激你对B股的计划。

But as long — with the rest of the shareholders, what we hope — that the shares go up in value in the future.Don't you see a problem with them coming back with this idea in the future? 但是，与其他股东一样，我们希望 - 这些股票在未来的价值上涨。难道你不觉得他们将来有这个想法回来的问题吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: On the unit — you mean on the issuance of unit trusts? WARREN BUFFETT：在单位上 - 你的意思是发行单位信托？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. 听众会员：是的。 WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, I don't see any problem because the B will be out there.And it is a superior product, whatever its absolute merits may be.On a relative basis, it is a superior product to anything that is going to carry a big commission to a salesperson and a lot of annual costs. WARREN BUFFETT：哦，我没有看到任何问题，因为B会在那里。无论其绝对优点如何，它都是一款卓越的产品。从相对的角度来看，它是一种优质的产品，可以为销售人员带来大笔佣金和大量的年度成本。

So, I think — my guess is we've taken care of that problem.I wish it hadn't come up, but it — I would think that it would be very difﬁcult for anyone to honestly offer a product — a derivative-type product — through a unit trust that would be superior to buying the product that will beavailable. 所以，我认为 - 我的猜测是我们已经解决了这个问题。我希望它没有出现，但它 - 我认为任何人都很难通过单位信托诚实地提供产品 - 衍生型产品 - 这将优于购买将要产品的产品可用。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think he's afraid that the B will go up to the place where the whole story comes again.And I must say that if that were to happen, we'd like it.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：我认为他担心B会再次走向整个故事的地方。我必须说，如果发生这种情况，我们会喜欢它。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we'd like it, only if it reﬂected underlying values, but — (Laughs) WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我们喜欢它，只有它反映了潜在的价值观，但是 - （笑）

CHARLIE: Yeah. 查理：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.We have a very strange attitude on that.I mean, most managements feel that the — on the price of their shares — that the higher, the better.And that's an understandable feeling.But the trouble is the game isn't over at any time. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。我们对此持非常奇怪的态度。我的意思是，大多数管理层认为 - 在他们的股票价格上 - 越高越好。这是一种可以理解的感觉。但问题是游戏在任何时候都没有结束。

We really feel the fairer, the better.Our goal is that every shareholder participates in the progress that Berkshire makes, during — as a business — during their holding period.In other words, we don't want one party getting wealthy off the other.We want them to share based on the gain in value of the business. 我们真的觉得更公平，更好。我们的目标是每个股东都参与伯克希尔在其持有期间作为企业的进展。换句话说，我们不希望一方变得富裕。我们希望他们根据业务价值的增长进行分享。

And to the extent that the stock got way overvalued or way undervalued, you know, that may make one party — in the ﬁrst case, the seller, in the second case, the buyer — very happy.But there's somebody on the other side of the transaction. 在某种程度上，股票被高估或低估，你知道，这可能使一方 - 在第一种情况下，卖方，在第二种情况下，买方 - 非常高兴。但是在交易的另一边有人。

In economics, you know, the most important question — maybe important beyond economics, too — but whenever somebody tells you something, you know, the ﬁrst question to ask yourself is, "And then what?"And we tend to do that around Berkshire. 在经济学中，你知道，最重要的问题 - 也许是经济学以外的重要问题 - 但每当有人告诉你某事时，你知道，问自己的第一个问题是，“然后是什么？”我们倾向于在伯克希尔周围这样做。

And so, the stock going up is not an end of itself, because it’s — the next question is, “And then what?” 因此，股票上涨并不是它本身的终结，因为它是 - 下一个问题是，“然后是什么？”

And to the extent that the stock goes up because the intrinsic value goes up, everyone is getting their fair share of the pie as they go along.

而且，由于内在价值上升，股票价格上涨，每个人都会随着时间的推移获得公平份额。

To the extent it exceeds that in some way, the selling shareholder gets a beneﬁt.But the entering shareholder is at a disadvantage.And we really like the idea of the price tracking intrinsic value over time. 如果超过某种程度，销售股东就会获益。但进入股东处于劣势。我们非常喜欢随着时间的推移价格跟踪内在价值的想法。

And we think that, by having the right kind of shareholders and by communicating with them properly and following the right kind of policies, that we can come as close to that as is attainable in a world where markets, essentially, are fairly volatile.And so far, I think it's worked out pretty well that way. 我们认为，通过拥有合适的股东并与他们进行适当的沟通并遵循正确的政策，我们可以接近在市场基本上相当不稳定的世界中可以实现的目标。到目前为止，我认为这样做非常好。

But the intention is to — and the goal — is to keep it that way. 但目的是 - 并且目标 - 是保持这种方式。

One thing to remember: in the end, the owners of businesses, in aggregate, cannot come out anyway better than the businesses come out. 需要记住的一件事是：最终，企业的所有者总体上无法比企业出来更好。

I mean, you can — the businesses are the — and not just our businesses, I'm talking about all American business — the proﬁtability of American business determines the proﬁtability of what the owners of American business have, and you can forget all about thelittle ticker symbols and everything else. 我的意思是，你可以 - 业务是 - 而不仅仅是我们的业务，我在谈论所有美国业务 - 美国业务的盈利能力决定了美国业务所有者的盈利能力，你可以忘记所有关于小股票代码和其他一切。

The owners suffer to the extent that they have some extra costs imposed in broker's commissions, fees, all kinds of things.That diminishes the return from the business.But no one has ﬁgured out yet how to perpetually have owners do better than their businesses. 业主在经纪人的佣金，费用和各种事情上都要承担一些额外的费用。这减少了业务的回报。但是，没有人想出如何永远让业主比他们的业务做得更好。

And our idea is to have them do it as they go long in proportion to the gain that occurs during their tenure as a shareholder.And that isn't easy to do.And it's not attained perfectly.But that's the goal as we go along. 我们的想法是让他们这样做，因为他们与他们在股东任职期间所获得的收益成比例。这并不容易。它并没有完美实现。但这就是我们前进的目标。

35. Insurance ﬂoat: "Above all, get it cheap" 35.保险浮动：“首先，让它便宜”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3? WARREN BUFFETT：3区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Maurus Spence.And I have a serious question and, then, a less serious question ﬁrst. 观众成员：Maurus Spence。我有一个严肃的问题，然后，首先是一个不太严肃的问题。

The less serious: you said that you and Charlie had lost, between you, a hundred pounds.I was curious who had lost more? 不太严肃：你说你和查理在你之间丢失了一百英镑。我很好奇谁失去了更多？ WARREN BUFFETT: No, no.I said the board had lost a hundred pounds.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：不，不。我说董事会已经损失了一百英镑。（笑声）

I have some members of the board who would take umbrage of the fact that they weren't included in that total.(Laughter) 我有一些董事会成员会对他们未被纳入该总数的事实感到不满。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK, Who lost —? 听众：好的，谁输了 - ？

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie and I, we're pretty close at the moment, aren't we?Modesty prevents — (Laughs) WARREN BUFFETT ：查理和我，我们现在非常接近，不是吗？谦虚阻止 - （笑）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I must say you're both looking very good, anyway. 观众：无论如何，我必须说你们看起来都很好。

WARREN BUFFETT: We’re feeling good. WARREN BUFFETT：我们感觉很好。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I was wondering who lost the most and what your diet secrets were. (Laughter) And, then, the more serious question was about ﬂoat. 听众：我想知道谁失去了最多，你的饮食秘密是什么。（笑声）然后，更严肃的问题是浮动。

You touched on this a little bit earlier.But you've often said that your insurance business is probably the most important business that you own. 你之前提到过这个问题。但是你经常说你的保险业务可能是你拥有的最重要的业务。

On page 12 of the annual report, you said, "We have beneﬁtted greatly to a degree that has not been generally understood, because our liabilities have cost us very little." 在年度报告的第12页，你说，“我们已经大大受益于一个尚未被普遍理解的程度，因为我们的负债花费了我们很少。”

I was wondering if you could describe this a little bit better so we can understand it. 我想知道你是否能够更好地描述这一点，以便我们能够理解它。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the — Charlie and I have lost about the same amount, at about 20 pounds each. WARREN BUFFETT ：是的， - 查理和我的损失大约相同，每个约20磅。

The insurance business provides us with ﬂoat.And ﬂoat is money that we hold that doesn't belong to us. 保险业务为我们提供浮动。浮动是我们持有的不属于我们的钱。

It's like a bank having deposits.A bank has deposits.The money doesn't belong to it.But it holds the money. 这就像一家有存款的银行。银行有存款。这笔钱不属于它。但它持有这笔钱。

Now, when a bank holds deposits, on everything except demand deposits, there's an explicit cost, an interest rate attached to it.And, then, there are the costs of running the system and gathering the money which is — also must be attributed both to demand and time deposit. 现在，当一家银行持有存款时，除了活期存款之外的一切，都有明确的成本，附加利率。然后，运行系统和收集资金的成本 - 也必须归因于需求和定期存款。

So there's a cost to getting what they would call deposits and we could call ﬂoat. 因此获得他们称之为存款的成本是有代价的，我们可以调用浮动。 In the insurance business, a similar phenomenon takes place in that policy holders give us their money at the start of the policy period.And therefore, we get the money paid in advance for the product. 在保险业务中，类似的现象发生在保单持有人在保单期开始时给我们钱。因此，我们获得了产品预付款。

And secondly, it takes time to settle losses, particularly in the liability area.If you bang up a fender on your car, you — it's going to get settled very quickly, so there’s — but if there's a complicated injury or something, it may take some years to settle.And during that period, we hold the money. 其次，需要时间来弥补损失，特别是在责任领域。如果你在你的车上撞上挡泥板，你 - 它会很快得到解决，所以有 - 但如果有一个复杂的伤害或其他什么，可能需要几年时间来解决。在那段时间里，我们拿着钱。

So, we have, in effect, something that is tantamount to the deposits of a bank.But whereas the deposits of a bank, it's quite easy to calculate the approximate cost, in the case of the ﬂoat that the insurance company has, you don't really know what the cost of that ﬂoat is until all your policies and losses — policieshave expired and your losses have all been settled.Well, that's forever, in some cases. 因此，我们实际上有一些相当于银行存款的东西。但是，对于银行的存款，很容易计算出大概的成本，就保险公司的浮动而言，在你的所有保单和损失之前，你真的不知道这个浮动的成本是什么 - 政策已过期，您的损失已全部结清。嗯，在某些情况下，这是永远的。

So, you're only making an estimate, as you go along, of what that ﬂoat is costing. 所以，你只是在计算那个浮动花费的成本。

To date with Berkshire, in the 29 years we've been in the business, it appears — never certain, because you don't know for sure what's going to happen — but it appears that our ﬂoat has not cost us anything, in —on average. 到目前为止伯克希尔，在我们从事这项业务的29年里，似乎 - 从来都不确定，因为你不确定会发生什么 - 但看来我们的浮动并没有花费我们任何成本，在 - 一般。

There's been years when we've had an underwriting loss when there's a cost.There's been years when we had an underwriting proﬁt.And so, we had a reverse cost. 多年来我们在有成本的情况下有承保损失。我们有多年的承保利润。因此，我们有相反的成本。

So we have obtained that ﬂoat on very advantageous terms over the years.Far more than — fully as important as that— it's important to get it at a low cost, in our case, no cost.But the other important thing is that we've grown it dramatically. 因此，多年来我们以非常有利的条件获得了浮动。远远超过 - 完全同样重要 - 以低成本获得它，在我们的情况下，没有成本。但另一个重要的事情是我们已经大大增加了它。

And so, we've gotten more and more money without having any cost attached to it.And if we still had our 16 — or 17 million, I guess — of ﬂoat that we had in 1967 and it was no cost, it would be very nice. 因此，我们已经获得了越来越多的资金而没有任何成本。如果我们仍然有16或1700万，我猜 - 我们在1967年拥有的浮动并且没有成本，那将是非常好的。

But 17 million of free money is worth something, but it's not worth a ton. 但是1700万的免费资金是值得的，但它不值一吨。

Having seven billion, if we can achieve that as free money, it's worth a lot of money.And that growth has not, probably, generally, been appreciated fully in connection with Berkshire nor has the interplay of how having zero-cost money, in terms of affecting our gain in value over time. 拥有70亿，如果我们能够以免费资金实现这一目标，那就值得花很多钱。而且，这种增长通常并未得到与伯克希尔有关的全面升值，也没有在影响我们的价值增长方面如何实现零成本资金的相互作用。

People have looked at — always looked at our asset side, but they haven't paid as much attention to the liability side.Charlie and I pay a lot of attention to that. 人们已经看过了 - 总是看着我们的资产方面，但他们并没有对责任方面给予足够的重视。查理和我非常关注这一点。

And, I mean, this — it's not entirely an accident that the business has developed in this manner.And we have intentions of trying to make it continue to develop in this manner, and in that manner, in the future.But we've got competitors out there, too. 而且，我的意思是，这一点 - 业务以这种方式发展并非完全是偶然的。我们有意努力使其以这种方式继续发展，并以此方式继续发展。但我们也有竞争对手。

Float, per se, is not a blessing.We can show you many insurance companies that thought it was wonderful to generate ﬂoat.And they have lost so much money in underwriting that they'd be better off if they'd never heard of the insurance business. 浮动本身并不是一种祝福。我们可以向您展示许多保险公司认为产生浮动很好。他们在承销方面损失了这么多钱，如果他们从未听说过保险业务，他们会变得更好。

But, you know, the job is to get it, get it in increasing quantities, but above all, get it cheap.And that's what we work at. 但是，你知道，工作就是获得它，增加数量，但最重要的是，要便宜。这就是我们的工作。

And you do that in the business through having some kind of competitive advantages.You won't do it just by having an ordinary insurance company.The ordinary insurance company is not a good business. 而且你通过拥有某种竞争优势来做到这一点。你不会只是拥有一家普通的保险公司。普通保险公司不是一个好生意。

We have it, in certain respects, because of our attitude toward the business.We have it because of our ﬁnancial strength gives us certain competitive advantages, and we have it in the case of GEICO, because of a very low-cost operation. 在某些方面，我们拥有它，因为我们对业务的态度。我们拥有它是因为我们的财务实力为我们带来了一定的竞争优势，而且我们在GEICO的情况下拥有它，因为它的运营成本非常低。

And it's us — up to us — to try and ﬁgure out ways to maximize each one of those competitive advantages over time. 我们 - 由我们决定 - 试图找出最大化这些竞争优势的方法。

We've built those advantages.I mean, in 1967, we were not looked at that way in the insurance business.We were — we've built a position of competitive strengths.And in the case of GEICO, they had it without us.But we have bought into it over time. 我们已经建立了这些优势。我的意思是，在1967年，我们在保险业务中没有这样看待。我们 - 我们已经建立了竞争优势的地位。就GEICO而言，他们没有我们。但随着时间的推移，我们已经收购了它。

It's a very important asset.And you ought to pay a lot of attention over the years as to what is happening in — with that asset as to both growth and costs.And that will aid you in calculating intrinsic value. 这是一项非常重要的资产。多年来你应该多加注意发生的事情 - 用这个资产来衡量增长和成本。这将有助于您计算内在价值。

Charlie? 查理？ CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add. CHARLIE MUNGER：没有什么可补充的。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. WARREN BUFFETT：好的。

36. Intrinsic value isn't above current stock price 36.内在价值不高于当前股价

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4 is the next. WARREN BUFFETT：第4区是下一个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Henry Neuhoff (PH), shareholder, Dallas, Texas. 观众成员：Henry Neuhoff（PH），股东，达拉斯，德克萨斯州。

My guess is that you consider the intrinsic value of the shares to be more than that represented by the price. 我的猜测是你认为股票的内在价值高于价格所代表的价值。

WARREN BUFFETT: By more than represented by what? WARREN BUFFETT：超过什么代表？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: More than represented by the current price of the shares. 受众成员：超过当前股票价格的代表。

If that be the case, what would be your thoughts about Berkshire repurchasing its own shares? 如果是这样的话，您对伯克希尔重新购买自己股票的看法是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, no.We have said we do not consider Berkshire undervalued at this price.We didn't say we thought it was overvalued.But we said we did not consider it undervalued. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，不。我们已经说过，我们不认为伯克希尔在此价格上被低估了。我们没有说我们认为它被高估了。但我们说我们并不认为它被低估了。

So, a repurchase based on our estimate would not be in the interests of shareholders. 因此，根据我们的估计进行的回购不符合股东的利益。

It's conceivable it could be at some time, but we do not think that's the case.We think intrinsic value far exceeds book value, but we do not think it exceeds present price. 可以想象它可能在某个时候，但我们认为不是这样。我们认为内在价值远远超过账面价值，但我们认为它不超过现在的价格。

We're not selling any shares, though, either.(Laughter) 不过，我们也不会出售任何股票。（笑声）

(Break in tape) （打破胶带）

37. Complications from "street name" shareholders 37.“街道名称”股东的并发症

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6? WARREN BUFFETT：6区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Carlos Lucera (PH).I'm from Idaho.And my question relates to street names. 观众：我叫Carlos Lucera（PH）。我来自爱达荷州。我的问题与街道名称有关。 Our stock at Berkshire Hathaway is in a family limited partnership.And in addition to that, it's in a street name. 我们在Berkshire Hathaway的股票是一个家庭有限合伙企业。除此之外，它还有一个街道名称。

Now, what is the reason, and the rationale behind the reason, for street name shares not being able to participate in the charitable contributions by Berkshire Hathaway? 现在，街头名称股票无法参与伯克希尔哈撒韦慈善捐款的原因和理由背后的理由是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.We submitted a request for ruling to the IRS — I don't know, 15 or so years ago, in connection with the shareholder-designated contribution program. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。我们向国税局提交了一份裁决请求 - 我不知道，大约 15年前，与股东指定的捐款计划有关。

And the ruling we received speciﬁes record holders and not street name holders.Now, that doesn't mean that a different ruling might not be obtained. 我们收到的裁决规定了记录持有人而非街道名称持有人。现在，这并不意味着可能无法获得不同的裁决。

But frankly, when we get into the multitude of indirect holdings and the problems we have with those indirect holdings in other respects, I think it would be a bit of a nightmare for us to attempt to get that program extended through — into street name holders. 但坦率地说，当我们进入大量的间接持股以及我们在其他方面对这些间接持股产生的问题时，我认为我们试图将该计划延伸到街道名称持有者将是一个噩梦。。

I think the costs would far exceed the beneﬁts.And I think that it is the situation, and anybody with it in street name can move it into their own name if they want to. 我认为成本远远超过了收益。而且我认为就是这种情况，如果他们愿意的话，任何拥有街道名称的人都可以将其移动到自己的名字中。

So I think, with very small amount of effort on the part of an individual shareholder, it would offset an enormous set of problems that we would encounter at Berkshire. 所以我认为，只要个人股东付出很少的努力，它就会抵消我们在伯克希尔遇到的一系列大问题。

We can handle the present system.We've got 12 people there.And they run the annual meeting.They make movies.They do all kinds of things.(Laughter) 我们可以处理现有的系统。我们那里有12个人。他们参加年会。他们制作电影。他们做各种各样的事情。（笑声）

And it would be — it would be very tough and — you know, if an extra 10,000 shares participated, it'd be $120,000 of contributions.I just don't think it would be worthwhile. 它会是 - 这将是非常艰难的 - 你知道，如果额外的10,000股参与，它将是 120,000美元的捐款。我只是觉得这不值得。

Our ruling doesn't presently cover the subject, in any event.It's something we've thought about. 无论如何，我们的裁决目前不包括这个主题。这是我们一直在考虑的事情。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.I think even if they changed the ruling, we wouldn't change the policy.It would be, administratively, very difﬁcult. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。我认为即使他们改变了裁决，我们也不会改变政策。从行政上讲，这将是非常困难的。

WARREN BUFFETT: We run into other problems, in terms of people getting their material — just the material on the annual meeting. WARREN BUFFETT：在人们获取材料方面遇到了其他问题 - 只是年度会议上的材料。

And we've heard from a number of shareholders that they can't get it from their broker, and they’re — they don't know what the B is all about because they didn't get their proxies.And it just — street name posed more problems. 我们从一些股东那里听说他们无法从他们的经纪人那里得到它，他们是 - 他们不知道B是什么，因为他们没有得到他们的代理人。它只是 - 街道名称带来了更多的问题。

Although, we have a — now we have — probably have more than — forget about the B. We have more than twice as many, I believe, holders in street name as in direct ownership.Although, the number of shares is far, far — I mean it’s — it'd be less than 20 percent of the shares.But it's probably double the number of holders. 虽然，我们有 - 现在我们 - 可能还有 - 忘记了B.我认为，拥有街道名称的人数是直接所有权的两倍多。虽然，股票的数量是远远的 - 我的意思是 - 它的份额不到20％。但这可能是持有人数量的两倍。

38. No "look-through earnings" in annual report 38.年度报告中没有“透视收入”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 7? WARREN BUFFETT：7区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon.My name is Bill Guerra (PH).I'm from the San Francisco Bay area.I've owned your shares for many years and appreciate the good job you've done. 听众会员：下午好。我叫Bill Guerra（PH）。我来自旧金山湾区。我已经拥有你的股票多年，并感谢你所做的好工作。

However, in this year's chairman's letter — you developed a concept a few years ago called look- through earnings. 然而，在今年的董事长致信中 - 几年前你开发了一个名为“透视收益”的概念。

WARREN BUFFETT: Right. 沃伦巴菲特：对。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: And I failed to see that this year.And I'm wondering if that no longer is a valid concept or why you refrained from showing the data? 观众：今年我没看到。我想知道这不再是一个有效的概念或为什么你不显示数据？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.That's a good question.I should have actually covered that in the annual report, in terms of mentioning — because I've talked about it, and we'll talk about it in the future. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。这是个好问题。实际上，我应该在年度报告中提到 - 因为我已经谈过它了，我们将来会讨论它。

And we do have a goal on look-through earnings of $2 billion in the year 2000. And that's going to be adjusted upward to allow for the fact there are more shares outstanding.It'll be the same basic goal. 而且我们的目标是在2000年实现20亿美元的透视收益。而且这一目标将会向上调整，以便有更多的股票流通。这将是相同的基本目标。

But there were two reasons that it was skipped this year.And like I said, I should've mentioned it. 但今年有两个原因被忽略了。就像我说的那样，我应该提到它。

One was it was the longest letter we've ever had.And having that section in there would've elongated it even a bit more.And that, coupled with the fact — and this is the important part of it — we had major changes in our — the composition of the company — immediately after the end of the year.

一个是我们有过的最长的一封信。在那里有那个部分将会延长它甚至更多。而且，再加上事实 - 这是其中的重要部分 - 我们在年底之后立即对我们 - 公司的组成 - 进行了重大改变。

So, our Capital City stock disappeared.At the time it disappeared, we didn't know whether it was going into cash, or all Disney stock, or a combination. 因此，我们的首都城市股票消失了。当它消失的时候，我们不知道它是现金还是所有迪士尼股票，还是一个组合。

We had the acquisition of the other half of GEICO where, even now, the accounting treatment isn't clear.And I felt that — 我们收购了GEICO的另一半，即使是现在，会计处理也不明确。我觉得 -

The look-through earnings last year were ﬁne.But I felt that, by the time I got through explaining all of the adjustments you would have to make for the transactions then pending, that adding it to the — to already the longest letter I've written, would've slowed things down alot and not been particularly helpful. 去年的透视收益很好。但是我觉得，当我通过解释你必须对那些待处理的交易进行的所有调整时，将它添加到 - 已经是我写过的最长的字母，这会减慢事情的速度。很多，并没有特别有帮助。

It will be back in this year, this upcoming report, and future reports, because it's a very important concept.And it's something that we're focused on. 它将在今年，即将发布的报告以及未来的报告中回归，因为它是一个非常重要的概念。这是我们关注的事情。

It's just that last year's number — it would've been a mess by the time I got through trying to explain it. 这只是去年的数字 - 当我试图解释它时，它会变得一团糟。

You know, I normally — the accounting stuff, I know, puts a lot of you to sleep.But believe me, it isn't so much fun writing it either.(Laughter) 你知道，我通常 - 会计的东西，我知道，让你很多人入睡。但是相信我，写它也不是那么有趣。（笑声）

So, I skipped it this year.We'll have it next year.And the number would've been OK last year, but there would've been a lot of asterisks attached. 所以，今年我跳过了它。我们明年会有。去年这个数字还算不错，但会有很多星号附上。

39. Discount rate for estimating intrinsic value 39.估算内在价值的贴现率

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 8, please. WARREN BUFFETT：请问8区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes.Mr. Buffett, good morning.My name's Ed Walzak (PH) from New York.I'm a student and an admirer of your investment philosophy.I have a question. 听众会员：是的。巴菲特先生，早上好。我的名字来自纽约的Ed Walzak（PH）。我是学生，也是您投资理念的崇拜者。我有个问题。

In determining a company's intrinsic value, you seem to write or indicate that you project out a company's owner earnings for a number of years, and then discount that back by prevailing rates. 在确定公司的内在价值时，您似乎写下或表明您将公司的所有者收益预测多年，然后按现行利率折扣。

My question is, how much of a premium, if any, to prevailing risk-free rates do you demand when you discount back the owner earnings of a company?

我的问题是，当您对公司的所有者收益进行折扣时，您需要多少溢价（如果有的话）到现行的无风险利率？

Or stated differently, for example, today, with loan rates at about 7 percent, if you did the same exercise with Coca-Cola, at what rate of interest would you discount back their owner earnings? 或者换句话说，例如，如今，如果您与可口可乐公司进行相同的工作，贷款利率约为7％，您会以什么利率折扣其所有者收益？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.We get asked that question a lot.And we've answered it to some extent in past annual reports about what discount rate to use. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。我们经常被问到这个问题。我们在过去的年度报告中已经在一定程度上回答了它的使用贴现率。

We basically think in terms of the long-term government rate. 我们基本上考虑长期政府利率。

And there may be times, when in a very — because we don't think we're any good at predicting interest rates, but probably in times of very — what would seem like very low rates — we might use a little higher rate. 有时可能会因为我们不认为我们在预测利率方面有任何好处，但可能在非常低的时候 - 看起来非常低的利率 - 我们可能会使用更高的利率。

But we don't put the risk factor in, per se, because essentially, the purity of the idea is that you're discounting future cash.And it doesn't make any difference whether cash comes from a risky business or a safe business — so-called safe business. 但我们并没有把风险因素本身放在原因上，因为基本上，这个想法的纯粹性在于你在贬低未来的现金。现金来自风险较高的业务或安全业务 - 所谓的安全业务也没有任何区别。

So, the value of the cash delivered by a water company, which is going to be around for a hundred years, is not different than the value of the cash derived from some high-tech company, if any, that — (laughter) —you might be looking at. 因此，自来水公司提供的现金价值将会持续一百年左右，与一些高科技公司的现金价值（如果有的话）不同 - （笑声） - 你可能会看。

It may be harder for you to make the estimate.And you may, therefore, want a bigger discount when you get all through with the calculation.But up to the point where you decide what you're willing to pay — you may decide you can't estimate it at all.I mean, that's what happens with us with most companies. 您可能难以进行估算。因此，当您完成计算时，您可能希望获得更大的折扣。但是到了你决定愿意付出什么的程度 - 你可能会认为你根本无法估计它。我的意思是，这就是我们与大多数公司一起发生的事情。

But we believe in using a government bond-type interest rate.We believe in trying to stick with businesses where we think we can see the future reasonably well — you never see it perfectly, obviously — but where we think we have a reasonable handle on it. 但我们相信使用政府债券型利率。我们相信努力坚持我们认为我们可以合理地看待未来的业务 - 显然你从未完美地看到它 - 但我们认为我们在这方面有合理的把握。

And we would differentiate to some extent.We don't want to go below a certain threshold of understanding.So, we want to stick with businesses we think we understand quite well, and not try to have the whole panoply with all different kinds of risk rates, because, frankly, we think that'd just be playing games with numbers. 我们会在某种程度上有所区别。我们不希望低于一定的理解门槛。因此，我们希望坚持我们认为我们理解得很好的业务，而不是试图让所有不同类型的风险率全面整体，因为坦率地说，我们认为只是玩数字游戏。 I mean, we — I don't think you can stick something — numbers on a highly speculative business, where the whole industry's going to change in ﬁve years, and have it mean anything when you get through. 我的意思是，我们 - 我认为你不能坚持一些东西 - 数字在一个高度投机的业务上，整个行业将在五年内发生变化，并且当你通过时它具有任何意义。

If you say I'm going to stick an extra 6 percent in on the interest rate to allow for the fact — I tend to think that's kind of nonsense.I mean, it may look mathematical.But it's mathematical gibberish in my view. 如果你说我会在利率上增加额外的6％来考虑这个事实 - 我倾向于认为那是胡说八道。我的意思是，它可能看起来像数学。但在我看来，这是数学上的胡言乱语。

You better just stick with businesses that you can understand, use the government bond rate.And when you can buy them — something you understand well — at a signiﬁcant discount, then, you should start getting excited. 您最好坚持使用政府债券利率来了解您能理解的业务。当你可以买到它们 - 你明白的东西 - 以很大的折扣，然后，你应该开始变得兴奋。

Charlie?(Laughter) 查理？（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.The discounts were once greater than we now see. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。折扣曾经比我们现在看到的更大。

WARREN BUFFETT: That's all you're going to get, folks.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：伙计们，这就是你要做的一切。（笑声）

40. See's Candies not going fat-free anytime soon 看到糖果不会很快变胖

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1? WARREN BUFFETT：第1区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi.Warren, it's Peter Newman, Nick and Racky's son.You can't see me because I'm on your hard left over here. 观众：嗨。 Warren，是Peter Newman， Nick和Racky的儿子。你看不到我，因为我在你身边留下了很难。

And by the way, Racky says to send her love to you — 顺便说一下，Racky说要把爱送给你 -

WARREN BUFFETT: Great. 沃伦巴菲特：太好了。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — and Susie. 听众： - 和苏西。

I'm going to take a cue from something that the guy who asked the questions about the World Book — 我将从提出有关世界图书问题的人那里得到一些启示 -

I know you're loathe to, normally, interfere in the running of your individual corporations, because they do so well on their own.And I am particularly fond of See's Candy and their products.And you may or may not know that we have a chocoholic in our family, as you do in yours. 我知道你不愿意，通常会干扰你们各个公司的运作，因为他们自己做得很好。我特别喜欢See's Candy及其产品。而你或许可能不知道我们家里有巧克力，就像你的家人一样。 WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.Makes good chocolate syrup, too.(Laughs) WARREN BUFFETT：是的。制作好的巧克力糖浆。（笑）

AUDIENC MEMBER: Yeah, I won't mention who. 听众会员：是的，我不会提及谁。

However, when I was in there this Christmas buying some gifts, I noted that, with the exception of the little candy canes, there's nothing in that store that is fat-free. 然而，当我在圣诞节那里购买一些礼物时，我注意到，除了小糖果手杖之外，那个商店里没有任何东西是无脂肪的。

And we are facing a trend — (laughter) — in the world, especially in dessert items and ice cream and candy items, of fat-freeness. 我们正面临一种趋势 - （笑声） - 世界上，特别是甜点，冰淇淋和糖果，无脂肪。

And I just thought that, perhaps, it would be a word — worth a word to management to consider expanding the hard candy line. 而我只是认为，或许，这将是一个词 - 值得管理层考虑扩大硬糖线。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we look at a lot of things.One of the problems, as you probably know, for example, in using aspartame is it doesn't interact well with heat.And so that's been sort of tough. 沃伦巴菲特：嗯，我们看了很多东西。正如您可能知道的那样，其中一个问题是，使用阿斯巴甜是因为它与热量不能很好地相互作用。所以这很艰难。

Now, Charlie and I have kept getting our regular boxes of candy during this weight loss- program.And we've — (laughter) — devoured them. 现在，查理和我在这个减肥计划期间不停地拿到我们常规的糖果盒。我们 - （笑） - 吞噬了他们。

And candy, you know, it may be, on average, a hundred and — depends on whether it’s a sugar product or not. 而且，糖果，平均而言，它可能是一百个 - 取决于它是否是糖产品。

But, take the lollipop, it'd be about 110 calories per ounce.But there’s — that's one and a half, or one and a quarter lollipops, or something like that. 但是，拿棒棒糖，每盎司约110卡路里。但是有 - 那是一个半，或一个四分之一棒棒糖，或类似的东西。

Most things are, you know, in that hundred per ounce to 150 per ounce range.So, candy is not a speciﬁc no-no. 大多数情况是，每盎司到每盎司150盎司。所以，糖果不是特定的禁忌。

If we can ﬁnd something that the customer likes, that makes them think they're getting skinnier by eating it — (laughter) — you know, that will be a breakthrough. 如果我们能找到顾客喜欢的东西，那就会让他们认为吃它们会变得更瘦 - （笑） - 你知道，这将是一个突破。

And we look forward — and we test everything that comes along.I can assure you.(Laughter) 我们期待 - 我们测试所有出现的东西。我可以向你保证。（笑声）

In fact, Charlie and I may be the main testers. 事实上，查理和我可能是主要的测试者。

Chuck Huggins is here today — and if you’ve got any ideas on it — who runs See's.Done a terriﬁc job of running See's ever since we took over in 1972. He'd appreciate ideas. Chuck Huggins今天来到这里 - 如果你有任何想法 - 谁运行See's。自从我们在 1972年接任以来，完成了一项非常棒的跑步工作。他很欣赏这些想法。 But we are looking for things that appeal to the consumer that taste good and that they'll go for.I mean, just as is, you know, the Coca-Cola Company, in terms of carbonated soft drinks.So, it's a constant subject. 但我们正在寻找对消费者有吸引力的东西，这些东西味道不错而且他们会选择。我的意思是，就碳酸软饮料而言，就像可口可乐公司一样。所以，这是一个不变的主题。

And, you know, there were high hopes on aspartame originally.But it just hasn't panned out in terms of candy.And I've read a few articles about the fat-free stuff. 而且，你知道，最初对阿斯巴甜寄予厚望。但就糖果而言，它还没有完全消失。我已经阅读了一些关于无脂肪的文章。

Well, it should be the fat substitute, which didn't get me too excited about trying it.But I'm not sure whether some of you read those articles or not.We'll keep looking, Peter, I appreciate it. 好吧，它应该是脂肪替代品，这并没有让我太兴奋尝试它。但我不确定你们中的一些人是否读过这些文章。我们会继续寻找，彼得，我很感激。

41. GEICO's price: "We gulped a few times and paid it." 41. GEICO的价格：“我们喝了几次并付了钱。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2. WARREN BUFFETT：第2区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. 听众：早上好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。

As an aspiring shareholder, I'm very happy and proud to be here.Maybe I can encourage Mr. Munger to respond to my question this morning. 作为一个有抱负的股东，我很高兴和自豪能够来到这里。也许我可以鼓励芒格先生今天早上回答我的问题。

In regards to your purchase of the other half of GEICO, would you comment on your reasoning behind paying the premium above market value and why you, instead, did not purchase shares in the open market? 关于您购买GEICO 的另一半，您是否会评价您支付溢价高于市场价值的原因以及您为何不在公开市场购买股票？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we couldn't have purchased very many shares in the open market at the quoted price.And the price we paid, with the large number of shares we got, we thought was a very satisfactory price. CHARLIE MUNGER ：嗯，我们不能以报价在公开市场上购买很多股票。而且我们付出的价格，我们得到的大量股票，我们认为是一个非常令人满意的价格。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.We — what Charlie said is a hundred percent right.We also had a restriction that we agreed to many, many years ago — almost 20 years ago — as to the number of shares we would own without the consent — of the directors and, I believe, the Insurance Department. WARREN BUFFETT ：是的。我们 - 查理所说的百分之百正确。我们也有一个限制，我们多年前 - 大约20年前 - 同意我们未经同意而拥有的股份数量 - 董事和我相信保险部门。

So, we actually had some special restrictions on us in the case of GEICO.But if we hadn't have had those restrictions, we'd have behaved in exactly the same manner. 因此，在GEICO的情况下，我们实际上对我们有一些特殊的限制。但如果我们没有这些限制，我们就会以完全相同的方式行事。 And we didn't think we could buy it any cheaper than that price.And we gulped a few times and paid it.And I think we will be happy that we did, as it's turning out. 我们认为我们不能以低于该价格的价格购买它。我们吞了几次并付了钱。而且我认为我们会很高兴，因为它已经结束了。

GEICO is doing very well.It — I mean, I knew it would do well.But I feel very good about it. GEICO做得很好。它 - 我的意思是，我知道它会做得很好。但我觉得非常好。

42. Newspaper business is still good, but not as good 报纸业务仍然不错，但不太好

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3. WARREN BUFFETT：第3区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is David Lowe (PH) from Ventura, California. 听众：巴菲特先生，我叫加利福尼亚州文图拉的David Lowe（PH）。

My first Berkshire meeting, and I want to mention that I'm very intrigued at the influence you have over the shareholders here.I note that the first beverage they ran out of in the lobby was Cherry Coke.(Laughter) 我第一次参加伯克希尔会议，我想提一下，我对你在这里对股东的影响非常感兴趣。我注意到他们在大厅里用完的第一种饮料是Cherry Coke。（笑声）

My question is about The Buffalo News.You say, in the letter for the '95 report, that the newspaper industry has lost another notch in its economic attractiveness.Can you elaborate on that? 我的问题是关于布法罗新闻。你在95年的报告中写道，报业在经济吸引力方面已经失去了另一个档次。你能详细说明吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.The — what you are seeing in newspapers is a circulation trend that has been prevalent for a long time, in terms of newspapers per household. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。你在报纸上看到的是一种流通趋势，长期以来，每户报纸都很普遍。

But that has been declining, and that — daily newspapers — and that I would say the trends of the last couple years are somewhat worse, in that respect. 但这种情况一直在下降，而日报也是如此 - 我想说过去几年的趋势在这方面会更糟糕。

I would say that the ability to price, both at the circulation and advertising level, is — has weakened a bit in recent years — not dramatically, but it's weakened a bit. 我会说，在流通和广告层面，价格的能力 - 近年来有所减弱 - 并没有显着减弱，但它有所减弱。

At one time, newspapers really — daily newspapers in single-newspaper towns were probably as attractive, economically, as any business you could ﬁnd.I mean, it — a large percentage of advertisers had very little choice, in terms of using them as an advertising medium. 有一次，真正的报纸 - 单一报纸城镇的日报在经济上可能与你能找到的任何商业一样具有吸引力。我的意思是，在将它们用作广告媒体方面，很大一部分广告客户没有多少选择。

People had less options, in the way of learning what was going on around them other than the daily newspaper.So, the — they started from a position of extraordinary strength. 除了日报之外，人们在学习周围发生的事情方面的选择较少。所以，他们从一个非凡的力量开始。

They still have a very strong position.And I've tried to emphasize that in the report.I mean, they're a bargain at the price they sell for.They give you all kinds of information with very low price.And they're a magniﬁcent way for most merchants to reach their customers. 他们仍然拥有非常强大的地位。我在报告中试图强调这一点。我的意思是，他们以他们卖的价格讨价还价。他们以极低的价格为您提供各种信息。对于大多数商家而言，它们是一种了解客户的绝佳方式。 But they are not — they do not have the exclusive advantages, in many cases, that they had 15 or 20 years ago. 但事实并非如此 - 在许多情况下，他们没有15或20年前的独家优势。

Third-class mail has become more of an option.People have more ways of obtaining information.As we talked earlier, information can be processed electronically and delivered at far lower cost than people dreamt of 20 years ago. 三等邮件已经成为一种选择。人们有更多获取信息的方式。正如我们之前谈到的那样，信息可以通过电子方式处理，并且成本远低于20年前人们梦寐以求的成本。

So, all of those things eat away a little bit.It's still a very ﬁne business.But those — I don't see anything that will reverse those trends.I don't think that they will necessarily accelerate. 所以，所有这些东西都会吃掉一点。它仍然是一个非常好的业务。但那些 - 我没有看到任何会扭转这些趋势的东西。我认为他们不一定会加速。

But I think that, if the only thing you owned in life was a daily newspaper in a single-newspaper town 20 years ago, you would feel slightly less secure today than you did at that time.But you'd still be a lot better off than owning virtually any other business. 但我认为，如果你在生活中拥有的唯一东西是20年前在一个单一报纸城镇的日报，那么你今天的安全感会比你当时略逊一筹。但是，与拥有几乎任何其他业务相比，你仍然要好得多。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add. CHARLIE MUNGER：没有什么可补充的。

43. "Outside information" in annual reports 43.年度报告中的“外部信息”

WARREN BUFFETT: How about zone 4? WARREN BUFFETT：第4区怎么样？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is Hutch Vernon.I'm from Baltimore, Maryland. 听众：巴菲特先生，我叫Hutch Vernon。我来自马里兰州的巴尔的摩。

I know that you read lots and lots of annual reports.And I'm curious what you are reading for, if you would share that with us. 我知道你读了很多年度报告。如果你愿与我们分享，我很好奇你在读什么。

But I'm more curious — because I think I know what you're reading for — if there are any disclosures — any further disclosures — that you would like to see companies make in their ﬁnancial reporting, or that the SEC require in ﬁnancial reportingor proxies or other communications with their shareholders?And that would be for both you and for Mr. Munger. 但我更好奇 - 因为我想我知道你在读什么 - 如果有任何披露 - 任何进一步的披露 - 你希望看到公司在他们的财务报告中做出，或者美国证券交易委员会在财务报告中要求或与其股东的代理人或其他通讯？那对你和芒格先生来说都是如此。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.The main thing that they can't mandate in annual reports: I really like to have — I like to know as much as I can about the person that's running it and how they think about the business and what's really going on in the business. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。他们不能在年度报告中强制要求的主要内容：我真的很想 - 我想尽可能多地了解正在运行它的人以及他们如何看待业务以及业务中发生的事情。

In other words, I would like to have a report that would be identical to what — if I owned half of a company but was away for a year, and I had a partner who owned the other half — when I came back, that hewould tell me about what had taken place during the past year and what he foresaw coming up and all of that. 换句话说，我想要一份与之相同的报告 - 如果我拥有公司的一半但离开了一年，我有一个合伙人谁拥有另一半 - 当我回来时，他会告诉我过去一年发生了什么以及他预见到了什么以及所有这些。

I — that is what I think the purpose of the report is.Now, the SEC mandates a lot of information, and — 我 - 这就是我认为报告的目的。现在，美国证券交易委员会要求提供大量信息，并且 -

VOICE: — side on? 声音： - 侧面？

WARREN BUFFETT: — some of that is helpful.But there's an intent behind the report.I mean, if it's a sales document I'm, you know, I'm less interested.I’m — and — WARREN BUFFETT： - 其中一些是有帮助的。但报告背后有一个意图。我的意思是，如果这是一份销售文件，我知道，我不太感兴趣。我 - 和 -

I don't see any way to mandate what I'm talking about.But that's the kind of report I'm looking for. 我认为没有办法强制要求我所说的。但那是我正在寻找的那种报道。

What I'm trying to do as I read reports, A, I like to understand just generally what's going on in all kinds of businesses. 我在阅读报告时想要做的事情，A，我只想了解各种业务中发生的事情。

If we own stock in a company and in an industry, and there are eight other companies that are in the same industry, I want to own or be on the mailing list for the reports for the other eight, because I can't understand howmy company is doing unless I understand what the other eight are doing. 如果我们拥有公司和行业中的股票，并且还有其他八家公司属于同一行业，我想拥有或者在其他八家公司的报告邮件列表中，因为我无法理解我的公司正在做，除非我理解其他八个人在做什么。

I want to have the perspective of, in terms of market share, what's going on in the business or their margins or the trend of margins, all kinds of things that I can’t get unless I know — 我希望从市场份额的角度来看待业务中发生的事情或利润率或利润率趋势，除非我知道，否则我无法获得各种各样的事情 -

I can't be an intelligent owner of a business unless I know what all the other businesses in that industry are doing.And so, I try to get that information out of a report. 除非我知道该行业的所有其他业务正在做什么，否则我不能成为业务的聪明所有者。所以，我试图从报告中获取这些信息。

If I'm thinking about investing in a speciﬁc company, I try to size up their business and the people that are running it. 如果我正在考虑投资某个特定的公司，我会尝试调整他们的业务和运营它的人。

And over the years, I have found reading a lot of reports to be quite useful in terms of making business decisions at Berkshire. 多年来，我发现阅读大量报告对于在伯克希尔做出商业决策非常有用。

If we own all of a business, I want to own shares in all of the competitors just to keep track of what's going on.And I want to be able to intelligently evaluate how our managers are doing that.And I can't do that unless I know the industry backdrop against which they're working. 如果我们拥有所有业务，我想拥有所有竞争对手的股份，以便跟踪发生的事情。我希望能够聪明地评估我们的经理如何做到这一点。除非我知道他们正在工作的行业背景，否则我不能这样做。

It's amazing, you know, what — how well you can do in investing, really, with what I would call outside information.I ﬁnd inside information — I'm not sure how useful that is. 令人惊讶的是，你知道，你在投资方面做得怎么样，真的，我称之为外界信息。我发现内幕消息 - 我不确定它有多大用处。

But outside information — there's all kinds of information around, as to businesses.And you don't have to understand all of them.You just have to understand the ones that you're thinking about getting in. And you can do it, if you just — nobody will do it for you. 但是外部信息 - 关于企业，有各种各样的信息。而且你不必了解所有这些。你只需要了解你正在考虑进入的那些。你可以做到，如果你只是 - 没有人会为你做。

You can't read — in my view — you can't read Wall Street reports and get anything out of them.You have to do it yourself and get your arms around it. 您无法阅读 - 在我看来 - 您无法阅读华尔街报道并从中获取任何信息。你必须自己做，并搂着它。

I don't think we've ever gotten an idea, you know, in 40 years from a Wall Street report.But we've gotten a lot of ideas from annual reports. 我不认为我们从华尔街报道40年后就已经有了一个想法。但是我们从年度报告中得到了很多想法。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: What I ﬁnd is that it takes a long time to read the annual report even if it's a comparatively simple business, because if you really are trying to understand it, it's not a bit easy. CHARLIE MUNGER：我发现即使这是一个相对简单的业务，也需要很长时间才能阅读年度报告，因为如果你真的想要了解它，那就不容易了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.I would say that, on average, in a business we're really interested in, even though we know what to skip, to some extent, and what to read, I mean, it's going to be 45 minutes or an hour on a report. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。我会说，平均而言，在我们真正感兴趣的业务中，即使我们知道要跳过什么，在某种程度上，以及要阅读的内容，我的意思是，报告的时间是45分钟或一小时。

And if there are six or eight companies in the industry, that's going to be six or eight hours, perhaps, and then their quarterlies and a lot of other — 如果行业中有六到八家公司，那么可能会是六到八个小时，然后是他们的季度和其他很多公司 -

I mean, it — the way you learn about businesses is by absorbing information about them, thinking, deciding what counts and what doesn't count, relating one thing to another.And, you know, that's the job. 我的意思是，它 - 你了解企业的方式是吸收有关他们的信息，思考，决定什么是重要的，什么是不重要的，将一件事与另一件事联系起来。而且，你知道，这就是工作。

And you can't get that by looking at a bunch of little numbers on a chart bobbing up and down about a — or reading, you know, market commentary and periodicals or anything of the sort.That just won't do it.You've got to understand the businesses.That's where it all begins and ends. 你不能通过查看图表上的一堆小数字来获得这一点 - 或者阅读，或者阅读市场评论和期刊或类似的东西。那就是不会这样做。你必须了解这些业务。这就是它开始和结束的地方。

44. "Berkshire is not a one-man show" 44.“伯克希尔不是一个单人秀”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5? WARREN BUFFETT：5区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is Hank Strickland (PH).I'm from Fairfax, Virginia, which, if it were a city, would be the tenth largest in the United States.I'm here as a stockholder.And my daughter, who's also my broker, is here with me. 听众：巴菲特先生，我叫Hank Strickland（PH）。我来自弗吉尼亚州的费尔法克斯，如果它是一个城市，它将成为美国第十大城市。我在这里是股东。而我的女儿，也是我的经纪人，和我在一起。

We were also out there Friday night when we watched you warming up for the beginning of the ballgame.And we noted that you didn't drop the ball.You seemed to be able to get it to the guy that was warming you up. 星期五晚上，当我们看到你为球赛的开始热身时，我们也在那里。我们注意到你没有丢球。你似乎能够把它变成让你温暖的家伙。

We noticed your ﬁrst pitch, which I had difﬁculty characterizing as either being a passed ball or a wild pitch. 我们注意到你的第一个球场，我很难将其描述为传球或狂野球。

WARREN BUFFETT: It was a premature sinker, actually.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：实际上，这是一个过早的沉降片。（笑声）

Very hard to hit, I might add.(Laughter) 很难打，我可能会补充道。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: And, then, you moved spritely into the stands, did a lot of picture taking, photo opportunities, signed autographs, vaulted over a rail or two.And we noted, with great enthusiasm, your ﬁtness. 观众：然后，你精灵地走进看台，做了很多拍照，拍照机会，签名签名，在一两个轨道上拱起。我们非常热情地注意到你的健康状况。

Now that all having been said, many people would characterize Berkshire as a one-man company, with all due respect to Charlie.And many of this audience here, I'm sure, are retired or semi- retired.It's not unthinkable that, perhaps, you might want to retire, or for good — God’s sakes — 现在所有人都说过了，很多人都将伯克希尔描述为一个独立的公司，对查理充满了敬意。我敢肯定，这里的许多观众已退休或半退休。也许，你可能想要退休，或者为了好 - 上帝的缘故 - 这并不是不可想象的 -

WARREN BUFFETT: It's unthinkable.I don't want that one to go by.(Applause) WARREN BUFFETT：这是不可想象的。我不希望那个过去。（掌声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Or for something — something worse could happen.And for those of us — 观众：或者某事 - 可能会发生更糟糕的事情。而对于我们这些人 -

WARREN BUFFETT: That would be the worst, I think — (Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：我认为那将是最糟糕的 - （笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well I — 观众成员：嗯，我 -

WARREN BUFFETT: I think death would be second.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：我认为死亡将是第二位。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I could think of some things some of us might want to do to protect our sizeable investments, say, having owned Berkshire since Blue Shamp — Blue Chip Stamp days.But anyway, we could put in a stop order, might take out an insurance policy. 观众：我可以想到我们中的一些人可能想做些什么来保护我们相当大的投资，比如，自Blue Shamp - Blue Chip Stamp日以来一直拥有Berkshire。但无论如何，我们可能会停止订单，可能会采取保险政策。 We might ask Charlie to masquerade as Warren after you've moved on.Those don't seem like very attractive options.So, I'm very serious now. 在你继续前行之后，我们可能会要求查理伪装成沃伦。那些似乎不是非常有吸引力的选择。所以，我现在非常认真。

How would you respond to the question of a stockholder that's really concerned about Berkshire being a one-man show? 你如何回应一个真正关注伯克希尔是单人秀的股东的问题？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.Well, Berkshire is not a one-man show.It's a two-man show, in terms of capital allocation.There's no question about that, at present. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。好吧，伯克希尔不是一个单人秀。就资本配置而言，这是一个双人秀。目前，毫无疑问。

But it's run by many managers that are doing an outstanding job and that don't need any guidance from Charlie or me as they go along. 但它由许多经理做得很好，他们做得很出色，不需要查理或我的任何指导。

But I might say that, you know, I will die with all of my Berkshire stock, essentially.And that will — stock will be held, either in the family or in a foundation, depending on the order of death, for a long time thereafter. 但我可能会说，你知道，基本上我会死于我所有的伯克希尔股票。而这将是 - 股票将在家庭或基金会举行，取决于死亡的顺序，此后很长一段时间。

So, there's no one that's more concerned about the subsequent management issue than I. I mean, this is not something that ends, at all, on my death.And it doesn't end for the Buffett family or The Buffett Foundation.So, it's a subject that Charlie and I have both thought about. 所以，没有人比我更关心后续的管理问题。我的意思是，这根本不是我死亡的结果。对于巴菲特家族或巴菲特基金会而言，它并没有结束。所以，这是查理和我都想到的主题。

The most likely situation — you got to get away from the idea that it's a one-man show because, right now, we've got 33,000 people working for Berkshire out there, you know, as we speak. 最可能的情况 - 你必须摆脱这是一个单人表演的想法，因为现在，我们有33,000人为伯克希尔工作，你知道，正如我们所说的那样。

And I'm sitting around, you know, watching movies about myself or something.I mean, you can see how vital I am to the place.(Laughter) So the — but the question — 我知道，我正坐在那里看电影，关于我自己或其他什么。我的意思是，你可以看到我对这个地方的重要性。（笑声）所以 - 但问题 -

And the other thing we do, besides allocate capital, is we do identify these managers.And hopefully, we make it attractive for them to stay and work for Berkshire. 除了分配资金之外，我们做的另一件事是确定这些经理人。希望我们能让他们留在伯克希尔并为他们工作。

But that — you know, that doesn't require 150 IQ or anything to do that.It does require a certain sensitivity to why people want to get up in the morning and do what they do. 但是 - 你知道，这不需要150智商或任何事情。它确实需要一定的敏感性，以便人们想要在早上起床并做他们做的事情。

And when I’m not around, the logical, at some point — it depends on exactly when it happens, again.But Charlie's a little older than I am.And it's likely that it will be broken into a two-person function again, but not exactly the way Charlie and I function. 当我不在身边时，逻辑上，在某种程度上 - 它又取决于它何时发生。但查理比我年长一点。它可能会再次被分成两个人的功能，但不完全是查理和我的功能。 And that is that there will be someone in charge of investments and capital allocation.I mentioned Lou Simpson’s position, because he is younger than I am, in the annual report, and then someone in charge of operations.And we have that person in the organization now. 那就是有人负责投资和资本分配。我提到了Lou Simpson的立场，因为他比我年轻，在年度报告中，然后是负责操作的人。我们现在在组织中有这个人。

Now, I don't know what the situation will be when I die, because it could be in 20 minutes or it could be in 20 years.And when that — so, I can't speciﬁcally name the individuals. 现在，我不知道我死的时候会是什么情况，因为它可能在20分钟内，也可能在 20年内。那时 - 所以，我不能具体指出这些人。

We have the individuals now for both those functions.We'll have the individuals for the same functions 20 years from now.I don't know whether they'll be the same people. 我们现在有这些职能的人。 20年后，我们将拥有相同职能的人员。我不知道他们是否会是同一个人。

But it's quite a logical way to run the business.GEICO was run that way and still is run that way and has been for some years. 但这是运营业务的合理方式。 GEICO以这种方式运行，并且仍然以这种方式运行并且已经使用了几年。

It's always struck me as terribly illogical, the way property-casualty insurance companies are run, because they've been dominated by the underwriting side of the business.And here they have this important investment side, but it’s always been — virtually every company's been subservient to the underwriting. 它总是让我觉得非常不合逻辑，财产保险公司的运作方式，因为它们一直由业务的承保方主导。在这里，他们有这个重要的投资方面，但它始终是 - 几乎每家公司都服从承销。

And GEICO, very logically, set up a co-CEO arrangement some years back where — originally Bill Snyder before that — but Tony Nicely ran the underwriting end of the business and Lou Simpson ran the investment side. 几年前，GEICO在很大程度上建立了一个联合首席执行官的安排 - 最初是Bill Snyder - 但是Tony Nicely负责业务的承销，Lou Simpson负责投资。

And those are two very different functions.Same person, logically, doesn't ﬁt both functions in most cases.I mean, it's a rarity when the same person happens to hit for both functions. 这是两个非常不同的功能。在逻辑上，同一个人在大多数情况下不适合这两种功能。我的意思是，当同一个人碰巧遇到这两种功能时，这是很罕见的。

So GEICO worked very well that way.Still works that way.Lou runs investments.Tony runs underwriting. 所以GEICO就这样工作得非常好。仍然是这样的。娄经营投资。托尼经营承保。

And Berkshire — slightly different — it's a variant on it.But, essentially, at Berkshire headquarters, you need someone overseeing and not meddling in them too much, but making sure you've got the right manager and you're treating him fairly. 和伯克希尔 - 略有不同 - 它是一个变种。但是，基本上，在伯克希尔总部，你需要有人监督而不是过多地干涉他们，但要确保你拥有合适的经理并且你公平地对待他。

You need someone on the operating side.You need someone on the investment/capital allocation side.We've got those people now.And we'll have them, you know, whenever it happens, too. 你需要有人在操作方面。您需要投资/资本分配方面的人。我们现在有了这些人。无论什么时候发生，我们都会拥有它们。 That's the — that is the structure.And we've got some very good businesses. 那是 - 那就是结构。我们有一些非常好的业务。

And, you know, nobody's buying See's Candy because they think I'm sitting in some ofﬁce in Omaha.And no one's buying a GEICO insurance policy because, you know, my name is there as chairman or CEO.The businesses are marvelous businesses.They'll continue very well. 而且，你知道，没有人会购买See's Candy，因为他们认为我坐在奥马哈的办公室里。并且没有人购买GEICO保险单，因为您知道我的名字是主席或首席执行官。这些企业都是不可思议的业务。他们会继续很好。

And there will be a capital allocation problem then just like there is now.And there will be the problem of keeping good managers in place and treating them fairly.And that's a solvable problem. 然后会出现资本分配问题，就像现在一样。并且存在保持优秀管理人员并公平对待他们的问题。这是一个可以解决的问题。

So, that's the future as seen from Kiewit Plaza. 所以，这就是Kiewit Plaza的未来。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes.If you just run your mind through all the assets, I think you will quickly decide that there are large momentums in place that would do very well without us. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。如果你只是通过所有的资产，我想你会很快决定，如果没有我们，有很大的动力可以做得很好。

I mean, is Coca-Cola going to suddenly stop selling because some manager's dead at Berkshire Hathaway? 我的意思是，可口可乐突然停止销售，因为一些经理在伯克希尔哈撒韦公司死了吗？

You know, are the people going to stop using Gillette razor blades?Is GEICO suddenly going to stop being intelligently run?Are — is the Nebraska Furniture Mart going to try any less hard? 你知道吗，人们会不再使用吉列剃须刀？ GEICO会突然停止智能运行吗？是 - 内布拉斯加家具市场会不会那么努力？

So, the existing assets, you can argue, have been lovingly put together, so as not to require continuing intelligence at headquarters.(Laughter) 因此，你可以说，现有资产已被精心整合在一起，以免在总部需要持续的情报。（笑声）

And what — there would be a disadvantage in that I think it would be unreasonable to expect that a successor would be as good at making new investments as Warren has been in the past.Well, that's just too damn bad.(Laughter and applause) 什么 - 会有一个缺点，我认为期望继任者像沃伦过去一样善于进行新的投资是不合理的。嗯，那太糟糕了。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: The sympathetic ear over here.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：这里有同情心的耳朵。（笑声）

45. Buffett doesn't answer individual letters 巴菲特没有回信

WARREN BUFFETT: Let's see, where are we?Zone 6 now? WARREN BUFFETT：我们看看，我们在哪里？ 6区现在？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, I'm indebted to Walter Schloss for introducing me to you some 40 years ago.And ﬁnally in the early '80s, I became a stockholder. 观众：巴菲特先生，我非常感谢Walter Schloss大约40年前向我介绍过的。最后在80年代初，我成了股东。

My question is, now that you've expanded headquarters 9 percent from 11 people to 12 people — (laughter) — do you now more frequently answer letters from stockholders? 我的问题是，既然你将总部的9％从11人扩大到12人 - （笑声） - 你现在更频繁地回答股东的来信吗？

As a speciﬁc, had you looked at my letter from January 1986?(Laughter) 具体来说，你看过我1986年1月的来信吗？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We haven't gotten to January yet.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：我们还没到1月份。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Relating to Cap Cities/ABC and talk radio, the problem that occurred last month at cape — Cap Cities might have been prevented. 听众会员：关于Cap Cities / ABC和谈话电台，上个月在海角城市发生的问题可能已被阻止。

WARREN BUFFETT: You should get a form letter from us.But the — we do not — A, we do not get into the activities of our investee companies. WARREN BUFFETT：您应该收到我们的来信。但是 - 我们没有 - A，我们没有参与我们投资公司的活动。

I mean, it — if people are unhappy about Coca-Cola or Gillette, and they shouldn't be — (laughs) — but if they happen to be, they should talk to the companies themselves.I don't interject myself into the management or operations of the investee companies. 我的意思是，如果人们对可口可乐或吉列不满意，他们不应该 - （笑） - 但如果他们碰巧，他们应该与公司自己交谈。我不会介入被投资公司的管理或运营。

In terms of questions about Berkshire — I put in the annual report a few years back — just running Berkshire takes up a fair amount of time, in terms of keeping track of a lot of businesses. 关于伯克希尔的问题 - 我在几年前提交了年度报告 - 在跟踪许多业务方面，只运营伯克希尔需要相当长的时间。

And it doesn't need to take up as much time as it does with me.But I enjoy it.But the — I feel that the annual report, the annual meeting, are the time to take up everything on shareholder's minds.And so, I don't answer one-on-one questions. 而且它不需要占用与我一样多的时间。但我喜欢它。但是 - 我觉得年度报告，年度会议，是时候考虑股东的一切。所以，我不回答一对一的问题。

I get all kinds of letters.They want career guidance.They want advice on their business.I mean, there's a million letters that come in. 我收到各种信件。他们想要职业指导。他们需要有关他们业务的建议。我的意思是，有一百万个字母进来。

And it would really be — it would take a signiﬁcant amount of time, that otherwise would be spent on Berkshire, to reply to that sort of thing.I may note them, in terms of what I address in subsequent annual reports. 它真的会 - 这将花费大量时间，否则将用于伯克希尔，以回复这类事情。就我在随后的年度报告中所述的内容而言，我可能会注意到它们。

But the annual meeting and the annual report, I feel, are the best ways to communicate with shareholders.And I really don't do it the rest of the year, although you will get some form reply or you should get some form reply on it.

但我认为，年会和年度报告是与股东沟通的最佳方式。而且我真的不会在今年余下的时间里这样做，虽然你会得到一些表格回复，或者你应该得到一些表格回复。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. 听众会员：谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thanks.It's noon now.And I'd like to give everybody a chance to visit our other stores and everything.But we will be back here at 12:15. 沃伦巴菲特：谢谢。现在是中午。而且我想让每个人都有机会参观我们的其他商店和一切。但我们将在12:15回到这里。

Mon, May 6 1996 • 9:00 AM