“Women's involvement in the revolution is indeed not to be regarded as mere expressions of their will to topple such dictators as Gaddafi, Salah or Al'Assad, but also as a proof of their demand for more equality and women's rights in general”

Feminist Perspectives on the Egyptian Revolution

Master Dissertation in Human Rights Minor Field Study Uppsala University By: Anna Hellstrand Department of Theology 2012 Supervisor: Dr. Maria Malmström

1 Contents Abstract...... 4 Acknowledgements ...... 5 1. Introduction...... 6 1.1 Aims and questions ...... 8 1.2 Definitions ...... 8 Feminism/feminist 8 Women's rights 8 1.3 Method ...... 9 Qualitative interviews 9 Criteria 10 1.4 Theory...... 11 1.5 Limitations ...... 12 1.6 Material ...... 13 1.7 Disposition...... 14 2. Background contexts...... 15 2.1 “Colonial feminism”...... 15 2.2 Dis-covering a feminist consciousness ...... 17 Qasim Amin 18 Malak Hifni Nasif 18 2.3 Entanglement with the nationalist cause ...... 19 Huda Shaarawi 20 Doria Shafiq 20 2.4 “State feminism”...... 21 2.5 “Islamization”...... 22 The Mubarak-era 23 “Radicalization” of Islam 24 A revitalized feminist movement? 24 Nawal El Saadawi 25 3. Current considerations ...... 26 3.1 Socio-legal concerns...... 26 The gap between the law and its implementation 26 Family law 27 Violence against women 27 3.2 Post-revolutionary outlooks...... 28 Parliamentary elections 28 Position of women's issues 29 4. Universal conceptualizations of feminism and women's rights ...... 31 4.1 The “women's convention”...... 31 Critique of the human rights framework 32 Relevance of international law for women 32

2 4.2 Women's human rights as culture...... 33 Cultural biases in the UN system 33 Culture as impeding women's rights 34 Cultural legitimacy 34 Translating human rights 35 4.3 Feminism as agency...... 35 Religion and feminism 35 The meaning of agency 36 5. Voices from Egypt...... 37 5.1 Feminist conceptualizations...... 37 “The political outset of the country” 40 Legal contexts 41 Patriarchal culture 42 Acting within patriarchal norms 44 Gender stereotypes 46 Interpreting the religious context 48 Translating “women's rights” 50 Reaching cultural legitimacy 51 5.2 Revolutionary prospects ...... 53 “The barrier of fear has been broken” 54 Expanding agency 55 Contextualizing the feminist project after the revolution 56 “The same men, but with beards” 59 6. Conclusion...... 62 References...... 65 Appendix...... 73

3 Abstract

The Egyptian Revolution 2011 created a space and opportunity to forward important demands concerning different social and political issues, amongst these matters related to women's status and situations in the society. Feminist and women's rights proponents in Egypt conceptualize the aims of a feminist or women's rights agenda as (women's) human rights and citizen's rights, independence, freedom and choice, though such universal concepts are understood in accordance with particular cultural or individual contexts. Feminist struggles must be seen in the cultural and social environment in which they take place in order to be properly understood. Feminist struggles in Egypt takes place in an overarching religious context. Religion constitutes a source of legitimacy in the Egyptian society and feminist activists appropriate religious language to pose their political demands and to make them comprehensible at a local level. Feminist demands are generally brought forward strategically, in order to achieve acceptance and enhance cultural legitimacy. A patriarchal culture is perceived as the main obstacle to advance women's status and situations. For that reason, addressing and changing that patriarchal culture is seen as the main objective for feminist struggles. Individual agency is highlighted in this respect. The interest and responsibility of securing and forwarding women's rights is mainly perceived to lay in the hands of feminist activists and women's rights groups themselves. The Egyptian Revolution was an outcome of individual and collective agency. In the revolution, women may have enacted more of a public agency than an individual agency to realize their interests. During the revolution women transcended gender roles and exposed some images of women as stereotypes. The Egyptian Revolution broke a barrier of fear in the society and invoked in men and women a sense of dignity and rights. The post-revolutionary public and political discourse constituted a backlash for women's rights, but it may also have produced a renewed interest for feminist struggles and women's rights. After the revolution, the participation in the society may have increased and men and women might not be as easily intimidated as before.

4 Acknowledgements

I wish to thank all the persons that have allowed me the privilege of interviewing them for the purpose of this thesis, for their interest and support. I wish I could have done greater justice to your valuable information and insights than the limits and scope of this thesis has allowed for. I will remain deeply grateful for your contributions, not only in regard to this thesis, but also in terms of the development of my personal feminist and political consciousness.

My gratitude extends also to the personnel at the Swedish Institute in Alexandria whose interest and support has enabled an interview-based study to be carried out in the first place. Along the research and writing process, I am especially thankful for the feedback from Dr. Martina Rieker, Mr. Hamdi Hassan, Ulle Tammemagi-Abuelnaga, Karen Swartz and, last but not least, my supervisor Dr. Maria Malmström.

5 1. Introduction In 2011, the regions of North Africa and the Middle East saw an unprecedented wave of revolts and demonstrations taking place against despotic regimes, governmental corruption and social injustices. In the West, these uprisings were soon to be conceptualized as the “Arab spring”. The Arab uprisings were ignited as a young Tunisian street vendor in late December of 2010 set fire to himself in protest and frustration over degrading treatment from the police. His action was a desperate outcry against official policies and lack of opportunities reflecting a larger political situation also present in neighboring countries and in the region. Political uprisings spread throughout the region, touching upon virtually every country in the Arab world to some extent with varying results. Political protests were by no means new to the region – general disappointment with societal developments and oppressive policies were widespread among all groups in the societies in question and had since long stirred unrest and occasional outbursts of strikes and demonstrations.

In Egypt, youth groups and democracy activists engaged in online social networks played an important role in setting up the anti-governmental demonstrations that took place on January 25, 2011. Already existing protest movements, e.g., worker's and youth groups, enabled the massive demonstrations that manifested at Tahrir square in Cairo and all over the country, ones which grew in size the following days. The demand that President Mubarak and his family step down after thirty years of autocratic rule was met on February 11th. Unlike revolts in other countries, bearing in mind the hundreds of Egyptians that were killed or died in connection with the revolution, Egypt experienced a relatively peaceful revolution. Notable in the development of the revolution in Egypt has been the broad participation with regard to class, religion, sex and age in the demonstrations. Many accounts bear witness of how a unique national unity thrived during those eighteen days at Tahrir square; they narrate images of Christians protecting Muslims while praying, women taking on responsibility as guards to secure the peaceful demonstrations, and people even joining in to keep the area clean and tidy.1

The calls in Egypt were for democracy, dignity and economic justice. Arguably, these are issues that have been stressed particularly out of a feminist point of view, considering the substantial gender injustices women are or have been subjected to in these regards. However, after the wake of the revolution, women's rights, the status of and the situations of women, appeared to be a “non-issue” in the general discourse and public debates of the revolutionary agenda although, to an equal amount observed, women and men alike had participated in the revolution and furthermore done so in a reportedly equal manner. Declared concerns with the lost or non-existent interest in women's rights do appear legitimate out of a historical experience of lost or ignored rights. “Feminist concerns” have been put forth for at least a century in Egypt, and the country has a substantive

1 Al Jazeera English, Timeline: Egypt's revolution, 14th February 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112515334871490.html accessed on 14th of March 2012; The labour movement and the future of democracy in Egypt, 11th of April 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/04/20124117523568936.html accessed on 25th of May 2012 BBC News, Egypt's Muslims and Christians join hands in protests, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east- 12407793 accessed on 17th of March 2012 Human Rights Watch, No joy in Egypt, 25th of January 2012, http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/25/no-joy-egypt accessed on 16th of March 2012 The Guardian, Arab spring: an interactive timeline of Middle East protests, 5th of January 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactive-timeline accessed on 7th of March 2012 Reuters Africa, Witness report rioting in Tunisian town, 19th of December 2010, http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE6BI06U20101219 accessed on 14th of March 2012

6 historical account of feminist and women's rights struggles – i.e., these issues are by no means new in the national context. An explicit agenda on “women's issues” was introduced into the realm of official policies in connection with foreign interest (colonizing ambitions) invested in the country in the middle of the nineteenth century. Efforts and subsequent reforms regarding the status of women have taken place ever since throughout historical and political developments, though controversies regarding these subjects have remained.2

Egyptian feminists have over the years experienced some difficulties in promoting their politics for various reasons: their ideas being dismissed as “foreign” and hence “of no relevance” in the Egyptian society; because their politics itself might actually not have taken enough consideration for the differences among women in Egypt and hence not gained enough support for their politics; and, finally, a discourse presenting women's rights as part of a “foreign agenda” seems to have proved a useful strategy for conservative groups who oppose the whole idea of advancing or reforming women's rights and roles. Feminist theory has in recent years developed a critical stance towards universalist assumptions regarding “feminist concerns”, urging for an approach of sensibility towards different contexts. Anthropological studies have also provided evidence for the highly complex and differing lives and needs women have from a feminist perspective3. Hence, there are reasons to be cautious when articulating “politics of concern” for “women (or feminists) in Egypt”.

However, even out the various feminist perspectives that can be appropriated depending on which groups of women are taken into consideration, and, despite a progressive development and a long record of struggle, essential concerns with regard to women's status and situation in Egypt remain: Women in general suffer from disadvantages in legal, social, political and economical terms. Strategies addressing these inequalities have also been taken, but as of late, a matter which is clearly shown in connection with the revolution, change in regard to women's rights are resisted in public discourse and in political reforms by individuals as well as collectives. The revolution provided a space for women and men to formulate (feminist) demands of change. However, against the general background what chances could such demands stand?

2 Mahmood, Saba. Politics of Piety: The Islamic revival and the feminist subject. Princeton University Press. Princeton 2005, p. 189-192 Ahmed, Leila. Women and Gender and Islam: Historical Roots of a Moderns Debate. Yale University Press. London 1992, p. 128 Spagnolo, John P. (ed) Problems of the Modern Middle East in Historical Perspective: Essays in honour of Albert Hourani. Ithaca. Oxford. 1993, p. 27 The Egyptian Gazette, Are women loosing their rights? 25th of October 2011 http://213.158.162.45/~egyptian/index.php?action=news&id=21877&title=Are%20women%20losing%20their %20rights? accessed on 17th of March 2012 Women Living under Muslim Laws (WLML) Arab World: Women of the Revolution, May 27, 2011, http://www.wluml.org/node/7424 accessed on 17th of March 2012 Al Jazeera English, Women of the revolution, 19th of Febrary 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/02/2011217134411934738.html accessed on 3rd of January 2012 The Nation, An Interview With Nawal El Saadawi, 21st of March 2011, http://www.thenation.com/article/159362/interview-nawal-el-saadawi accessed on 21st of February 2012 Karama, Voices of Egypt, 19th of March 2011, http://www.el-karama.org/content/voices-egypt accessed on 21st of February 2012 3 Ahmed (1992) p. 225, 236-237, 245-248

7 1.1 Aims and questions The aim of this thesis is to explore feminist perspectives of the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. A point of departure is that the concepts of “feminism” and “women's rights” are differently perceived in different cultures, countries or contexts and cannot be presumed beforehand. It is necessary to first investigate how “feminism” and “women's rights” are defined and understood in Egypt specifically before the revolution is analyzed with consideration to such perspectives. The meaning of assessing the revolution from a feminist perspective(s) is to review what potential obstacles and opportunities it could carry for women's status and feminist struggles in Egypt. This thesis addresses the interrelated and overarching questions:

• How are “feminism” and “women's rights” defined or understood in an Egyptian context? • Roughly one year after the revolution, what are the perceived implications of the revolution in regard to women's status and feminist struggles?

1.2 Definitions Feminism/feminist There is a wide range of feminist definitions and orientations. I have chosen to appropriate a definition that would be the essence of or common feature among various feminism(s) in which the term: “… denotes both a consciousness and a social movement. It is based on the awareness that women suffer discrimination because of their gender. Awareness of injustice, however, is not sufficient. The other aspect of 'feminism' is found in the actual attempts to change these inequalities and remove constraints placed upon women in favor of a more equitable gender system. I perceive any groups or individuals who try to alleviate the position of – or change ideas about – women as 'feminist'” 4. That is, in this thesis I appropriate a definition of feminism as an awareness of gender injustices and women's subordination to men, one which includes a will to change that situation. A “feminist" in this thesis, hence, can be a person who explicitly (or implicitly) does or does not call herself or himself a feminist. The importance lies instead in that the person in question incorporates an understanding and opinion that can be regarded as feminist in accordance with the quote above.

I find such a broad definition useful – that might not be explicit, due to the existence of antagonistic ideas of the term “feminism”, while its actual politics might not be conceived of as hostile. This definition may also allow for new, unexpected or specific interpretations and meanings of the concept. If not stated otherwise, this is how feminism/feminist should be understood in this thesis. A notion of “women's rights” is implicit in the definition of feminism. However, “women's rights” alone bears a slightly different connotation.

Women's rights The concept of feminism invariably includes a notion of women's rights. However “women's rights” may not imply feminism. “Women's rights” does not necessarily include a notion of structural gender discrimination, oppression or patriarchy – the concept may be used to acknowledge gender injustices in the past without transferring such contexts to the present-day, for example. “Women's rights” refer here in essence to legal aspects of women's status and situations. I have chosen to use the concept of “women's rights” to denote and acknowledge its differences with “feminism”. Many proponents of women's rights, for example, do not regard themselves as feminists or contextualize their work as feminist – they may “only” work for women's (legal) rights without consideration to

4 Nelson, Cynthia & Rouse, Shahanaz (Eds.) Situating Globalization: Views from Egypt. Transcript. Bielefeld 2000 p. 355-356 Note 4 Gemzöe, Lena. Feminism. Bilda förlag. Stockholm 2003, p. 13-14

8 other (social) structural discrimination, women's status or roles in society. That is why I often use both the concepts of feminism and women's rights when referring to activists, organizations and movements.

1.3 Method There is an extensive amount of research and documentation on the subjects of women's rights and feminist struggles in Egypt, which has been valuable in providing a background context for this thesis. In addition to literature studies, qualitative interviews constitute the research method. Qualitative interviews were conducted during a Minor Field Study in Egypt, carried out from February to April 2012. The interviews were analyzed through a theoretical discussion on concepts of feminist's concerns, so as to achieve the thesis’s purpose (see 1.4 Theory).

Qualitative interviews Qualitative interviews are used to create new knowledge and to explore individual perspectives of experiences. The qualitative interview is a semi-structured conversation intended to create an understanding of the lived experiences of the interviewee. My ambition to present first-hand lived experiences and voices from the relatively recent events of the revolution is what has motivated me to choose to conduct qualitative interviews as a method in this thesis. I used an interview guide, which was followed to a certain extent, covering certain themes while the operational questions may have varied (see Interview-guide in appendix). My intention was to lead the interviewee to certain areas of focus but not to definite opinions regarding those subjects. During the interview, my ambition was to capture the actual meanings of the interviewee, attending to direct statements but also to underlying implications. Throughout the conversation, I reflected and interpreted what was being said through affirming or questioning the interviewee’s statements and thus verifying its content.

I have particularly considered the aspect of a normative position during the interviews and work in general with this thesis. An interview is not a conversation between equal partners, since the interviewer defines and controls the situation. It is easy for me to draw conclusions about what the interviewee means according to my own understanding or implicit assumptions in regard to the question at hand while the meanings in the interviewee’s mind might be quite different. The selection of material used, how the material has been interpreted and which persons have been considered relevant to interview for the purpose of this thesis are matters surely influenced by my own person. I have my background in the middle class of a liberal, secular and developed country in the West (Sweden). Politically and ideologically, I position myself as a feminist (explicitly). In my personal appropriation of feminism, women's inferior positions are a global phenomena due to men's structural dominance over women, or patriarchy 5. Whether I want it or not, the thesis will favor certain interests, although I have still had an ambition to be critical against my own assumptions and expectations so as to enable an openness towards the unknown and unpredicted.6

A critique towards interview-based studies is that the results cannot be generalized due to the insufficient number of persons interviewed. Paradoxically though, intensive study of a few cases may actually be what elevates general knowledge of a certain phenomenon through providing depth and investigative knowledge 7. Even though the voices presented in this thesis may not be regarded as “representative” for Egyptian women, men or even feminists, they nonetheless contribute

5 Gemzöe, Lena. Feminism. Bilda förlag. Stockholm. 2003, p. 45-49 6 Kvale, Steinar. Den kvalitativa forskningsintervjun. Studentlitteratur. Lund. 1997, p. 13, 34-35, 37, 40-41, 72-73, 100 7 Kvale (1997) p. 98

9 valuable information and insights concerning the status and situations for women's rights and feminism in post-revolutionary Egypt. Before the interviews were conducted, I presented myself and the purpose with the thesis. The interviews have mostly been carried out in public spaces such as cafés or in private spaces in people's homes or offices, at the request and convenience of the interviewee. Personal notes or a tape recorder have been used to document the meetings. All interviewed persons have been given the opportunity to review, comment and verify transcribed material in order to ensure that their voices have been well represented.

Ethical guidelines have been taken into consideration before and while interviews were carried out. Informed consent, confidentiality and risk assessment have been practiced 8. Many of my interviewees were more or less public figures, and quite a few were willing to go on public record. Nonetheless, taken into consideration the sensitiveness of the issues discussed and the relatively unstable political situation currently present in Egypt, I have decided to make all of my interviewees anonymous in the publication of this thesis. Hence, names have been replaced and occupation obscured. I have allowed for some transparency and validity by informing about gender and age. A number of twelve interviews were conducted, with ten women and two men, with ages ranging from 26-77 years. All interviewees were Muslims, except one who was Catholic (see References for an individual presentation). All of them were personally or professionally engaged in gender issues, through work or activism, which was also the main criteria in the selection of interviewees.

Criteria To collect and select relevant persons to interview, I have relied on personal networks attained during an internship at the Swedish Institute in Alexandria during the fall of 2011. In addition to previous connections (established during the internship) with persons that I knew I wanted to interview, the institute made propositions of persons they thought relevant for me to meet with for the purpose of this thesis. I have naturally myself also reflected upon the relevance of conducting interviews with the persons that were recommended to me, as well as in liaison with personnel at the institute and with my supervisor.

The imperative criterion for the selection of interviewees was that the interviewee incorporate a feminist perspective, i.e., that the person incorporate an understanding that according to the definition used in this thesis could be regarded as feminist. My ambition was to interview “feminists” as to connote the title and purpose of the thesis to ensure an “inside” (feminist) perspective and grasp feminist definitions adhering to an Egyptian context. Other criteria were practically motivated. As I do not speak Arabic, my interview subjects had to be more or less fluent in English. Considering the level and standards of education in general in Egypt, that basically implies that the persons I have interviewed belong to certain classes in society (middle or upper class). Positive sides with interviewing such a group is that they are generally well-informed and well-educated, which allows them to appropriate various perspective on the Egyptian society, even “outside” or international perspectives. On the other hand, they may not represent the great majority of deprived people in Egypt – they do not have that “inside” perspective. I have ruled out using translators, also for practical and economic reasons, but mainly due to my desire to present the voices of my interview subjects as accurately as possible, allowing them to choose the words for themselves and to enable a closeness in our encounters. I have not travelled outside of Cairo and Alexandria to conduct interviews. The persons I was referred to all resided in either of the two cities, and, moreover, traveling as an unaccompanied foreign woman was not advisable.

In spite of the above criteria, which admittedly substantially circumscribe the category of people who were eligible for me to interview, my ambition was to establish some diversity among my

8 Kvale (1997) p. 37, 39, 106-112

10 interviewees with regard to age, gender, religious background and occupation. Normally, interviews are conducted until a certain “fullness” is achieved. However, I cannot claim to have reached such a point, as opinions and standpoints indeed have been as varying as the individuals that I have met. Instead, I have limited the number of my interviews so it has been possible for me to analyze the material gained within the time frame allowed for the completion of the thesis. 9

1.4 Theory I have chosen to use as a theoretical basis a general – or universal discussion of feminist concerns and women's rights so as to distinguish the particular views that are appropriated in Egypt. The concepts put forth in the theoretical discussion include provisions of how women's status and situations are to be defined, understood and ultimately advanced, by women themselves or by society at large. The theoretical discussion is used as an analytical tool for the interviews – not as a blueprint for feminist concerns compared to how they are identified by my respondents but rather as points of reference for a discussion on their relevance in the Egyptian context.

I start with a presentation of the UN:s International Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The CEDAW was the first substantial tool within the human rights framework to address and advance issues of disadvantages experienced by women and marks in that way a beginning for a comprehensive struggle towards advancing women's status and rights. Today, it is one of the core international human rights conventions, ratified by a majority of the countries in the world. The CEDAW has arguably become standardized as the parameter for conceptualizing women's status and situations, not only because it drafts a global agenda of women's rights, but also because it is used locally as a lever to claim women's rights. Since the establishment of CEDAW, it has had a global impact on how women's rights and feminist concerns are perceived – for better and worse.10

Complementary and even contradictory theories on how women's status is to be conceptualized and advanced have indeed multiplied since the creation of CEDAW. I have chosen a few to further the discussion on feminist concerns, as elaborated by Sally Engle Merry and Saba Mahmood. I consider Merry and Mahmood to have contributed in important ways as to how women's rights and feminism(s) are to be imagined. Merry contributes to this theoretical discussion with a critique of CEDAW and the conventional conceptualization of women's human rights, but she also adds to that a perspective to make them more feasible at the level of implementation. This is interesting because the CEDAW, although recognized at both an international and national level, has been criticized as imposing standards in a colonial-like way. Such a discussion is relevant in Egypt's case, as in other post-colonial countries as well. Merry elevates the role of the human rights framework as a generator of fairly legitimate transnational moral values. Her interest is to reconcile universal human rights values with how they are understood and practiced at the local level. The key in this reconciliation spells culture. Cultural contexts may allow or reject moral values as suggested (or indeed imposed) by transnational frameworks: Thus, how culture is perceived is crucial as a prerequisite for the implementation of universal human rights. The issue of culture thus certainly

9 Kvale (1997) p. 97-98 10 Merry, Sall Engle. Human Rights & Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local Justice. University of Chicago Press. Chicago, p. 1-2, 218-219, 227, 231 Buss, Doris, Manji, Ambreena (Eds.), International Law. Modern Feminist Approaches, Hart Publishing, Portland, 2005, p. 117-120, 123 Charlesworth, Hilary & Chinkin, Christine. The boundaries of international law. A feminist analysis. Manchester University Press. Manchester 2000, p. 213, 216-218 United Nations Treaty Collection, 21st of May 2012, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx? src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en accessed on 21st of May 2012

11 plays a significant role in regard to the implementation of women's rights according to CEDAW. 11

Saba Mahmood has done extensive research in Egypt which is why her theories are actualized for the purpose of the thesis. Mahmood, in part due to her knowledge and insights in the Egyptian context, questions how women's rights in general are conceptualized in liberal feminist thought and objects in particular to “standard models” of or solutions to feminist concerns (such as the CEDAW). Mahmood argues that a feminist agenda must be based upon a genuine understanding of the lives of the women it is targeting in order to accurately and respectfully reflect women's needs and desires. Mahmood hence urges for a contextualization of women's rights and feminist concerns. In particular, Mahmood deals with the question of religion and how religious desires may indeed create political lines of differences which are relevant also within feminist thought. 12

1.5 Limitations The thesis is limited in a number of ways. Theories on feminism and women's rights are many, and I do not claim to cover them all. The theoretical approach is very limited in scope in regard to theories on or concepts of women's rights and feminist concerns. Still, the few theories that I have used have provided me with an abundance of tools to use in the analysis of the interview material. “Feminist perspectives” refers to the handful of voices documented for the purpose of this thesis. An important limitation regarding these voices is that they originate from more or less affluent urban classes. A great part of the population in Egypt lives in poverty, illiteracy and in other cities than Cairo and Alexandria, or in rural areas 13. I dismissed the idea of presenting such voices as I considered that it would take substantial time and effort to do so in an accurate and respectful manner; plus, it perhaps would be more suitable to do such a study within the field of anthropology. I have instead consciously focused on such voices that were more readily available to me, voices which represent another part of the population. Furthermore, the method of obtaining the interview subjects (through personal networks and contacts) may logically have limited the range of “feminist perspectives”. Other perspectives could be obtained through other research methods.

The Egyptian Revolution is in general considered to be ongoing as transitional developments only have begun at the time of this writing. When I use the “Egyptian Revolution” in this thesis, I refer to the demonstrations that took place in Egypt the 25th of January to the 11th of February, i.e., the events that caused the Mubarak-regime to succumb. It should be duly noted that this thesis took shape at a particular moment in time which informs the research in general and conclusions drawn. This means that the time period allotted to conduct the field study necessarily limits its scope and determines its content. As events are constantly unfolding, developing and changing with time, I have limited the time period I set out to explore until approximately when I ended my field study.

1.6 Material I have to a great extent relied on Leila Ahmed's Women & Gender in Islam: Historical roots of a modern debate (1992) which is a thorough historical review of the Middle East and North African regions from a gender perspective for the background context in this thesis. My reliance on Ahmed naturally frames and shapes which questions are brought up and how they are illuminated. To counter-weight a potential “one-sided story”, I have compensated with other works. An anthology edited by Cynthia Nelson and Shahanaz Rouze entitled Situating Globalization: Views from Egypt

11 Merry (2006) p. 6, 9, 14-16, 89, 228 12 Mahmood (2005) p. 2, 5, 11-12, 153, 155, 198 13 Utrikespolitiska institutet, Landguiden; Egypten: Sociala förhållanden, 24th of January 2012, http://www.landguiden.se/Lander/Afrika/Egypten/Sociala-Forhallanden accessed on 19th of March 2012

12 (2000) and Pioneering Feminist Anthropology: Selected Writings from Cynthia Nelson (2007), also by Nelson, have provided complementary information to the background. Articles by Margot Badran such as From Consciousness to Activism, Feminist Politics in Early Twentieth Century Egypt (1992), Dual Liberation: Feminism and Nationalism in Egypt 1870s-1925 (1988), and Women and Radicalization (2006) as well as writings by Lila-Abu-Lughod, e.g., “Orientalism” and Middle East feminist studies and The Active Social Life of “Muslim Women's Rights”: A plea for ethnography, not polemic, with cases from Egypt and Palestine, have also proved useful for background purposes. Nelson and Abu-Lughod write from an anthropological point of view, which is important for creating an understanding of political and historical developments.

Material used for information on the more current situation consists of documents, articles and reports from various local and international organizations, news agencies and official institutions. Mostly online material has been used, due to the proximity in time between the composition of the thesis and the events it sets out to explore. The thesis in part covers events that have taken place during its drafting. There is an abundance of online material covering the revolution and its aftermath in various aspects. It has been my intention to critically examine the sources of the information I have used, paying attention to who distributed the information, its content, the purpose of its publication, date and the target audience of the information 14. In regard to internet sites, information from sources I was not familiar with before, I have tried to validate it through comparing it with other internet sources, literature used in the thesis or through my own field experience. I have also made my own opinions about its reliability through browsing background, aim and purpose of the site or source. Almost all the data collected is public and open for validation. Some sources, such as news articles, interviews and statements from organizations, are more opinionated than others. In regard to “opinionated” sources, I have either tried to validate as above, or I have indicated through the text any uncertainties regarding the source's generalizability, using such language as “on the account of” or “according to”.

The CEDAW committee's country report's concluding observations of 2010 and a concurrent shadow report have been used as they are official records of women's rights in Egypt. The shadow report was composed by the Center for Egyptian Women's Legal Aid (CEWLA), a non- governmental organization established in 1995 and dedicated to provide women with legal aid 15. I have relied on the CEWLA as I have heard positive judgments regarding their activities from various sources during my research. Lastly, an additional local organization has been included due to its special monitoring of women's status and situations in the revolution and subsequent reports in English: The Egyptian Center for Women's Rights (ECWR), established in 1996, is an independent, community-based, non-governmental organization that works for the enjoyment of rights and establishment of gender equality 16.

As for the theoretical analysis, I have used a handbook on the women's convention, Kvinnors rättigheter – en handbok för aktivister, journalister och beslutsfattare, drafted by the CEDAW- network, a Swedish women's rights network consisting of a number of national and international organizations engaged in women's rights, for a comprehensible overview of the CEDAW. Anthropologist Sally Engle Merry's Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local Justice (2006) has provided critique of the CEDAW in addition to Merry's own theories. Merry's book has been helpful for me to contextualize human rights, i.e., to understand and

14 Critique of internet sources according to Uppsala University, Uppsala universitetsbibiliotek 11th of July 2011, http://www.ub.uu.se/sv/Sok/Soktips/Kallkritik-och-vetenskaplighet/ accessed on 16th of March 2012 15 Center for Egyptian Women's Legal Aid (CEWLA). About us, http://www.cewla.org/about_us.php accessed on 23rd of February 2012 16 The Egyptian Center for Women's Rights (ECWR). About us, http://www.ecwronline.org/english/about %20us/index.html, accessed on 23rd of February 2012

13 reconcile how human rights values may co-exist with local moral or cultural values. Professor of Law Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im’s book Islam and the secular state: Negotiating the Future of Shari'a, somewhat supporting Merry's theories from an Islamic point of view, has been relevant for this thesis. Lastly, Anthropologist Saba Mahmood's Politics of Piety: Historical roots of a modern debate (2005) is an important contribution to the further contextualization of morals and values. Her critique of a normative liberal feminism has been particularly interesting for this thesis.

1.7 Disposition The thesis begins with a presentation of a “Background context” of women's rights and feminist movements in Egypt, focusing mainly on feminist discourses throughout its history from the late nineteenth century to pre-revolution Egypt. The background covers a significant part of the thesis which also reflects its importance in understanding feminist discourses taking place in Egypt today. The intent with the following chapter on “Current considerations” is, as a complement to the historical review of discourses, to present some issues relevant for women's rights and feminist concerns in modern-day Egypt and some events and developments that took place after the revolution. My ambition is that this will give the reader a sense of where the women's rights and feminist struggles stand today. “Concepts of feminist concerns” constitutes the theoretical chapter in the thesis. The following chapter, “Voices from Egypt”, is the integrated empirical and analytical part of the thesis, presenting interviews and analyses. Finally, a “Conclusion” summarizes the findings of this thesis and proposes to answer the aims and questions posed in it.

14 2. Background contexts The historical and background context of the Egyptian feminist struggle is of crucial importance to understanding its current contexts. In particular, Egypt's history of colonial occupation has had implications for feminists and feminist movements, and its impacts continue yet today. I will therefore start a historical review of Egyptian feminism with the particular discourses developed in the colonial context. This time period also marks the beginning of a comprehensive struggle for advancing women's status and situations in Egypt. Further, I make a chronological review of phases of the Egyptian feminist movement, presenting overarching events of significance and concurrent feminist discourses up to today. Significant events are ones that have heavily impacted or circumscribed the contexts in which women's rights struggles and feminism(s) have developed. The background includes a brief presentation of historical contexts, discourses and issues of concern at the particular period that is under review. In addition, I give a closer presentation of some persons distinguished for their contributions to or affiliation with the feminist project. These persons may not be representative of the general political project of feminism (not even at the time reviewed), but their story tells us something about the time they lived in and concurrent political contexts.

Important to note in this historical review is that it mostly presumes Muslim women's status and situations in Egypt, which may differ from religious minorities' situation. This is not a conscious act on my behalf but reflects the literature on women in the Arab world that I have used. Perhaps it is indicative of a general tendency to forget the status and situations of religious minorities who nonetheless belong to this region just as much as any Muslim or that the general situation for religious minorities overshadows the particular situation for women of religious minorities. Muslims constitute an absolute majority of the Egyptians, though the situations for its population of approximately 10 million inhabitants of religious minorities (of which most are Christians) ought to be regarded as significant for the status of the society at large.

The major religious minority in Egypt, Christians, in turn consists of Copts, Catholics and Protestants. Religious minority groups are thus not internally homogenous. Commonly, minorities (whether religious, ethnic or other) enjoy a less advantageous position in society which is why it may be assumed that women belonging to such “outsider” groups live under “double” discrimination 17. However, to a great extent, Egyptian women who are diverted by religion share histories and many times suffer from the same kinds of disadvantages in Egyptian society, something which will be revealed in this thesis. I distinguish between Christian and Muslim women's situation when such a distinction is clear to me. I have, however, not set out to further investigate in particular Christian (or other minority) women's situations, in part due to limits in time and the scope of this thesis but also because such an investigation perhaps deserves to be raised as an issue on its own.18

2.1 “Colonial feminism” It is not too controversial to claim that the language of “women's rights” was directly or indirectly an import from European hegemonic powers during the colonial era. The “issue of (Muslim) women” was incorporated or transmitted into the intellectual and elite discourses that in turn would have a substantial influence on governmental politics and feminist development. The British Empire formally occupied Egypt in 1882 though Egypt had then been under European economical and political encroachment for centuries. The integration in the global market initiated during this

17 Minority Rights Group International, Gender, http://www.minorityrights.org/6861/thematic-focus/gender.html accessed on 5th of September 2012 18 Utrikespolitiska institutet. Landguiden: Egypten. Religion. 15th of March 2012 http://www.landguiden.se/Lander/Afrika/Egypten/Religion accessed on 18th of April 2012 Ahmed (1992) p. 7, 123, 245 15 period of foreign domination laid the foundation of Egypt's economical, and human, deprivation. It bred new social classes such as elites and intellectuals, the middle class grew and so did the gaps between the classes. Egyptian national elites that benefited from the foreign exploitations would entwine their interests with those of the colonizers. Class and access to position and status reflected attitudes towards the West.19

It was in this context in the late nineteenth century that the treatment of (Muslim) women emerged in the public debates among circuits of the upper classes. Importantly, it was a discourse carried out predominantly by men, European or Egyptian, indoctrinated in the colonial discourse but with little or no real insights into the actual lives of Egyptian (Muslim) women due to the severe seclusion of the sexes at the time. Proclaimed concerns had unlikely any foundation in a genuine understanding of the conditions of women's lives, needs and desires – certainly not those of the lower classes and questionably in regard to the relative minority of middle or upper class women. As for some European men engaged in such debates, it is noteworthy that while preaching women's liberation in Egypt they would at the same time vehemently oppose women's rights in their own home countries and conceptually held women inferior to men. The “issue of Muslim women” was thus, rather than a genuine concern for women's situation, part of the general imposition of the superiority of the West and inferiority of the indigenous culture and Islam, as well as a strategy to legitimize the colonial project. “Colonial feminism” professed that the derogatory treatment of women was intrinsic to Islam and “Arab culture”. There were nuancing arguments put forth by Egyptian intellectuals to suggest that the “backwardness” of the view of women in their societies depended on misinterpretations of Islam rather than Islam itself, though such suggestions did not wake much consideration in the mainstream debate.

More or less plainly, it was suggested that the solution to the oppression of women (in Egypt) was for the society to reject Islam, or at least the “native culture”, and embrace “Western culture”. The “woman question”, not to mention women themselves, became charged symbols caught between the assault on Islam and Arab culture and the defense of the same. Individuals or groups who heeded calls for social reforms risked being viewed as internal enemies by the forces and groups that opposed the colonization. The quest for “authenticity” became a response to the colonial discourses, according to which only the “true” culture or Islam would be of relevance to the society and consequently to politics in general and to women (or feminism) in particular. Women's bodies and women's issues became the ultimate repositories of culture.20

Feminism thus became entrapped within the field of culture. That is, women's rights activists and feminists were constantly challenged to prove their politics relevant to the Egyptian context, as opposed to “imposing a foreign agenda” or “collaborating with the West”. It became a balancing act of avoiding exclusive identification with the West that rejected the Arab heritage altogether, while rejecting traditions and patriarchal structures of subordination – without giving up their own visions and struggles. However, feminism cannot be reduced either to a western import or to an entirely indigenous project. Colonialism certainly took part in forming the feminist project in Egypt, but feminist demands were also informed by the (cultural) context in which it was proposed by Egyptian women of a specific class. Whether women's rights should be regarded as “Western” or

19 Utrikespolitiska Institutiet (UI). Landguiden, Egypt: Äldre historia 15th of March 2012. http://www.landguiden.se/Lander/Afrika/Egypten/Aldre-Historia, accessed on 30th of March 2012 Ahmed (1992) p. 127-128, 145-148, 168 ,225-226, 235-236, 240-241 Nelson, Cynthia. Pioneering Feminist Anthropology in Egypt: Selected Writings from Cynthia Nelson. Cairo Papers in Social Science. Vol 28. No 2 & 3. American University in Cairo Press. Summer/Fall 2005, p. 55 20 Dalacoura, Katerina. Islam, Liberalism and Human Rights: Implications for international relations. London. Tauris. 1998, p. 105 Ahmed (1992) p. 128, 149-153, 167, 244-245 Amin, Qasim. The Liberation of Women & The New Woman: Two Documents in the History of Egyptian Feminism. Cairo. American University Press. 2000, p. 4-5 16 “indigenous” caused a divide in the language and orientation of the feminist project – although not necessarily in its goals. That is, the advancement of women's status and situation was motivated either through comparing with women's situation in other countries (predominantly in Europe and US) and later on by referring to universal human rights; or through arguing within a religious (predominantly Islamic) framework. This kind of divide was visible at the very early stages of feminist expressions in Egypt.21

2.2 Dis-covering a feminist consciousness The (colonial or colonial-like) state's ambition to socially and technologically reform Egyptian society, with Europe as a model, was pursued aggressively. The primary goal for social reforms concerning women was education. Educational opportunities started to open up for upper and middle class girls in the mid-nineteenth century as part of a grander scheme to modernize (and Christianize) the society as perceived by its rulers. With time, women of lower classes would also be able to benefit from educational opportunities. The first governmental primary school for girls opened in 1873. Egyptian women's lives were at the time still highly circumscribed by social conventions that commanded strict segregation of the sexes in which women basically were confined to the private realm of the home. The system of seclusion applied to women and men regardless of class and religion, although it was implemented in various degrees depending on social status. The strictest segregation was practiced by upper class families, thus making it a sign of privilege. Families of the lower classes depending on the labour force and subsequent income of women, did not have the same prerequisites to live up to the same standards of segregation-norms, as women in such families had to exit the seclusion of the house and enter other or public areas to work.22

The practice of veiling (which meant fully covering the face at this time) was, among other things, an expression of the gender segregation system. Veiling was a way to uphold the seclusion of the female sex, however (then as now), it was also affiliated with other motives such as status, mentioned above, or fashion. It applied not only to Muslims but Christians and Jews as well, denoting its cultural rather than religious character. Nonetheless, in the (male) colonial discourse the practice of veiling provided evidence for the derogatory treatment of women and subsequent inferiority of Islam. Removing the (face)veil became the outmost expression of social reform, modernity and women's liberation at the turn of the century. To be duly noted, the abandonment of the veil was primarily a colonial and patriarchal idea – Muslim women took no part in identifying the veil as a tool of oppression. The veil would, however, be appropriated as a symbol of women's liberation by women's rights activists and feminists themselves, and consequently the custom of veiling also an expression of holding onto Islamic and “authentic” values.

Women of the upper and middle classes started to gain visibility in society as they themselves started to voice their concerns on a wide range of subjects through articles in journals, magazines and newspapers in the end on the nineteenth century. These voices belonged to women of the more or less affluent classes who had grown up with the privilege of tutoring at home or education abroad. These women were critically examining and opposing social norms and conventions

21 Ahmed (1992) p. 151, 165-166, 174-175, 244-247 Abu-Lughod, Lila. “Orientalism” and Middle East feminist studies. Feminist studies. Vol 27, No 1. 2001, p. 106, 110 Nelson, Cynthia & Rouse, Shahanaz (eds). Situating Globalization: Views from Egypt. Transcript. Bielefeld 2000, p. 339-340 22 Ahmed (1992) s. 117, 128, 133, 135-137, 143, 160 Badran, Margot. Dual liberation: Feminism and Nationalism in Egypt 1870-1925. Gender Issues. Vol . No 1. 1988, s. 19 Spagnolo, John P (ed). Problems of the Modern Middle East in Historical Perspective: Essays in honour of Albert Hourani. Ithaca. Oxford 1992, p. 37-38 17 through their writings, and although “feminism” as an explicit concept did not appear until after the turn of the century, it is evident that these women through their work and opinions were expressing what we could call a feminist consciousness. In addition to writing, upper class women also started to form women's organizations and associations. The networks would be for women of the same background and their objectives were associated with charity and welfare. They would meet at each other’s homes or other private spaces, complying with social conventions of gender seclusion. Still, it was the dawn of women organizing and pursuing interests and occupations outside the private sphere of the home. As women engaged in social and intellectual life, individual women's achievements became known among educated people.23

Qasim Amin Qasim Amin (1863-1908) has curiously been labeled the “first feminist” in Egypt. In 1899, he published The Liberation of Women, an essay on the status of women Egypt, in which he strongly criticized Egyptian society's regressive views and practices in regard to women and in equally strong terms hailed the European “sophisticated” treatment of women. He argued primarily for women's right to education, legal reforms of the divorce-laws that allowed husbands swift and unilateral divorces which often left ex-wives in social and economical despair, and the abolishment of polygamy and veiling. On the matters of polygamy and divorce, Amin enjoyed the support of various women writers at the time; however, the abolition of the practice of veiling was opposed on both patriarchal and feminist grounds (further elaborated upon below).

Qasim Amin may have proposed politics in favor of women, but his motives for doing so, consistent with the dominant colonial discourse at the time, reflected “society's need to modernize”, rather than a view of women as equal, and human, beings. In fact, Amin held quite derogatory views on women which also proved his modest comprehension of women’s lives and conditions. Amin, for example, loathed the fact that a woman (according to his observations) would obsess about her husband’s behavior although a woman in the face of a constant implicit threat of her husband divorcing her, economically and socially depriving her at his mere will, naturally had every reason to “observe his every mood and whim”. Such a connection did not seem to occur to Amin. In the end, Qasim Amin was “no more feminist than his critics anti-feminist”.24

Malak Hifni Nasif Malak Hifni Nasif (1886-1918) was an educated teacher who, like Amin, advocated the reform of (above all) polygamy and the divorce-laws. However, she did not propose that women unveil. Nasif demonstratively asked how men could propose that women should take off their veils when women then would suffer from men's abusive and shameless behavior in the streets. Through such remarks, Nasif effectively revealed the obscured position men inhabited when they formulated the needs and desires for women, as well as she transferred the responsibility of women's general status and situation in society on the harmful practices on the behalf of men. That is, rather than posing the veil as “derogatory” she pointed at men's behavior as derogatory.

Nasif argued for a gradual change of this custom – although the act of veiling itself was of no essential importance to her. The importance instead lay in its symbolism, demonstrating modesty, an important female virtue in Islamic conduct. According to Nasif, the virtue of modesty lay in behavior rather than in the practice of veiling. The practice of veiling at the turn of the century in fact smothered women's cautious move from the secluded sphere of private homes to the public one. Through veiling, women could demonstrate that they sustained the virtue of modesty while

23 Ahmed (1992) p. 5, 14-15, 140-142, 164-169, 171-172, Spagnolo (1992) p. 28, 33-37 Badran (1988) p. 18-19, 20-22 24 Ahmed (1992) p. 144-145, 149, 155-164 Amin (2000) p. xi-xiv, 11-34 Spagnolo (1992) p. 34 18 insisting that their access to the public was both possible and morally correct because it showed compliance with virtues that society in general dictated. Nasif pointed out how the “feminist discourse” at the time at large was a male product and that patriarchal customs were never really questioned, merely exchanged for new (Western) ones:

“If he order us to veil, we veil, and if he now demands that we unveil, we unveil, and if he wishes us to be educated, we are educated.”25

Nasif did indeed not see any salvation for Muslim women in “Western culture”, but stressed the importance of internal change rather than “importing” ideas and practices. The early decades of the twentieth century saw the first generation of Muslim and Egyptian (explicit) feminists. However, the feminist and the nationalist emancipating discourses were soon to intertwine. 26

2.3 Entanglement with the nationalist cause By the beginning of the twentieth century, under the weight of enhanced colonial social and economical subjugation, a revived and more articulated nationalist consciousness also grew. Egyptian demands of greater influence in their own affairs were spelled out and growing in force – and women participated in making these demands. Up until now, a “feminist consciousness” had been explored in seclusion, practically invisible to the outside world of men, although in connection with the first nationalist meeting in the Egyptian congress in 1911 feminist demands, consisting of enhanced opportunities for education and professions and women's righteous access to mosques, were publicly stated. These demands received support – as they were perceived as part of the general nationalist cause.

In 1919, the Egyptian revolution for independence erupted, consequential to a long history of occupation, oppression and a massive protest against the British rulers’ interference with a national delegation (al-Wafd) demanding independence. Allegedly, women's “authentic” active participation in public life began with the 1919 revolution. Women by the hundreds entered the streets to participate in the demonstrations and protests. Upper and middle class women participated veiled and in groups separated from men, and lower class women took part alongside their men. It might have been the first time women on such a demonstrative way broke with the social conventions of invisibility. Women also suffered alongside men from the British harsh responses. However, such responses were also conditioned by class: While women of the popular classes were killed, the “weapon” used against higher class women was sexual harassment.27

During the period of nationalist upheaval 1919-1923, the “veiled visibility” of women in public increased. The necessity of women's liberation as a prerequisite for national liberation was explicit in the nationalist discourse. At the same time, however, women's demands were ignored – the Wafd national party did, for example, not agree to politically pursue women's rights to vote. Egypt finally gained formal independence in 1922, although it was conditioned, and in practice Egypt's rule remained under British rule. Women's demands experienced a backlash: Women's political participation had been welcomed under the flag of national independence however pursued as a cause of its own, was resisted. The new constitution of 1923 declared equality among all Egyptians

25 Ahmed (1992) p. 181 26 Spagnolo (1992) p. 27, 30, 32, 37-40 Mahmood (2005) p. 23, 155 Ahmed (1992) p. 174, 179-183 27 Utrikespolitiska Institutiet (UI). Landguiden, Egypt 15th of March 2012. http://www.landguiden.se/Lander/Afrika/Egypten/Aldre-Historia, accessed on 30th of March 2012 Badran (1988) p. 21-23 Ahmed (1992) p. 169-173 Spagnolo (1992) p. 36 19 regardless of race, language and religion – notably leaving out gender. Egyptian women were not given the right to vote. They were even refused entry to the opening ceremony of the parliament unless they were foreigners or wives of parliamentarians. This constituted a turning point for the women's movement and marked the beginning of a struggle against the internal oppression of women. Huda Sharaawi and her organization the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU) may exemplify some of the concurrent feminist movements and concerns.28

Huda Shaarawi Huda Shaarawi (1879-1947) had fought alongside the nationalist for independence and women's rights. However, disillusioned of the nationalist interest in women's rights after the formally declared independence, she thought women's rights were better pursued independently and used her family fortune to establish the EFU. The union, as were other women's associations at the time, was concerned with charitable and social work rather than political rights. Shaarawi thought that if Egyptian women's “intellectual and moral level” was raised through these activities, it would enable them to obtain political, social and legal rights. She advocated legal reforms on polygamy and divorce-laws and opposed the use of veil due to its “symbolism of oppression”. In a dramatic political act, she publicly removed her face-veil (still covering her hair) in 1923 upon disembarking from a train. Unveiling became associated with education and building a new post-revolutionary Egypt and increased dramatically during the mid-1920s.

Shaarawi and her feminist movement were conceived of as strongly affiliated with the West although she opposed the colonization, colonial institutions and the concept of a secular state. It is clear, however, that Shaarawi and the EFU represented and reflected the interests of upper class Egyptian women and may not have had a genuine understanding of the majority of Egyptian women's lives. At the end of the Second World War, the politics and goals of the EFU, which evolved around welfare, charity and health, were outdated as it had not proved to solve the systematical social problems women faced. However, Huda Shaarawi became a role model and mentor for many women who would carry on her feminist legacy – albeit through different directions. One exceptional apprentice of Shaarawi's was Doria Shafik.29

Doria Shafiq Doria Shafik's (1914-1976) life and deeds may exemplify the politicalization, and politicization, feminist politics underwent during the decades following the Second World War, i.e., feminist activities became more political in their nature, and discrepancies and various orientations within feminist movements became more obvious. Shafik, like former Egyptians engaged in a feminist cause, concluded that many of women's grievances emanated from polygamy and men's rights to divorce although she recognized that the gravity of these problems required redress at the political and legal levels. Shafik pursued demands of political rights for women in dramatic ways – by running (ineligibly, due to gender) for office, storming the parliament, publicly complaining about the situation for Egyptian women in front of an international audience, among other things. Shafik's politics and strategies were out of line with most feminist or women's movements at the time, alienating her from other feminists. She employed a liberal discourse that bordered dangerously close to that of a “colonial feminism” at a time when the relations with the hegemonic European domination were about to detonate.30

28 Spagnolo (1992) p. 27, 29 Badran (1988) p. 24-30 Nelson (2005) p. 97, 101 29 Ahmed (1992) p. 176-179, 185 Nelson (2005) p. 98-99 Guenena, Nemat & Wasset, Nadia. Unfulfilled Promises: Women's Rights in Egypt. Population Council. New York. 1999, p. 15 Spagnolo (1992) p. 31-32, 41 30 Nelson (2005) p. 98-105 20 Nationalistic discourse was at a peak in the mid-nineteenth century. Resentment for the British rule had grown, and in 1952 an underground association of military officers overthrew the regime in a coupe under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970) who was installed as the first president of Egypt in 1956. Nasser launched a policy of “Arab socialism” which would bring welfare to all Egyptians. Social elites and monopolies of power and wealth were to be eradicated, and the great majority of the population was to be lifted out of poverty. Resources were nationalized, and minimum wages and social services were established. Nasser's politics also included a gender equality program although it was never a priority of the state's concerns.

Women gained the rights to vote and run for office in 1956. However, while men were obligated to vote, women had to apply for the right to vote which naturally gave women of different classes and statuses different prerequisites to exercise their rights. For Shafik, this was not enough. At a time when Nasser was immensely popular, Shafik publicly criticized these restricted rights and furthermore criticized Nasser for despotic governmental politics. Nasser's political agenda to elevate the lower classes received its due popular support while feminist or particular women's demands were still predominantly affiliated with the elite and collaborating with the West. Shafik was consequently placed under house arrest where she was to spend the remainder of her life, politically ignored. She remained in house arrest till 1976 when she took her life by jumping off of her balcony.31

2.4 “State feminism” Nasser's era, 1952-1970, would prove to be ambiguous decades for feminists and women's rights movements. In the new nationalist-state's egalitarian discourse and policy, women as well as men would contribute to the greater good of the society through the means of education and labour force. Women were in fact expected on the behalf of the state to participate in the political and economical life that had previously been reserved for men. For middle and upper class women, a larger arena than they ever before had experienced opened up. The proportion of women at the universities, in different professional positions in the society and even in the streets increased to an unprecedented number. At the same time, though, the National Charter of 1962 stated that women's primary concern (still) was the family. Nasser's nationalization program extended to include private activities as well. The state overtook the work of women's organizations, replacing it with welfare politics and protective legislation. Any independent organizations were shut down. Thus, organizational activities under this era would in essence be an extension of governmental politics. 32

State politics and the increasing visibility of women in society challenged traditional gender roles such as men's roles as the provider for the family. Male authority was thus compromised (in theory) as the post-revolutionary context brought new expectations on the sexes. Middle class women, equipped with an education and an income, could exercise personal choice to a greater extent than before. Feminist discourses thrived although purported feminist concerns were continuously the project of and reflected an elite, predominately of the urban, middle classes. Its goals were pursued

Ahmed (1992) p. 202 31 Ahmed (1992) p. 204-207 Nelson (2005) p. 105-116 Nelson & Rouse (2000) p. 99-115 Guenena & Wasset (1999) p. 41 Utrikespolitiska Institutet. Landguiden. Egypten: Äldre historia, 15th of March 2012, http://www.landguiden.se/Lander/Afrika/Egypten/Aldre-Historia accessed on 30th of March 2012 32 Abu-Lughod, Lila. The Active Social Life of “Muslim Women's Rights”: A plea for ethnography, not polemic, with cases from Egypt and Palestine. Journal of Middle East Women's Studies. Vol 6. No 1. Winter 2010, p. 3 Ahmed (1992) p. 214-216 Malmström, Maria. Just like couscous: Gender, agency and the politics of female circumcision in Cairo (forthcoming, title may change). New York, London. Berghahn Books 2009, p. 40 Guenena & Wasset (1999) p. 26-27, 29 21 in a secular and liberal language and would continue to be so to a great extent.

Nasser's politics advanced women's positions and gender equality, although many concerns remained, and failure to address the socio-economical situation at large also hampered gender equality. The state gave everyone the right to an education but did not have the means to realize those rights fully. Illiteracy rates remained high, partially due to rapid birth rates. The old elitist class of power and influence were bereft by Nasser's policies but instead other privileged classes grew within the state and military bureaucracy. Women's opportunities to pursue a professional career started to open up in the 1970s-80s, but work was hard to combine with family duties, inconvenient working hours and lack of efficient transportation systems. It would take yet more time for women to obtain leadership positions. Although change had been initiated at the legal and formal levels, value systems and affiliated beliefs were consistent. The image of the home as the domain of women was strongly rooted in society – among men as well as women. Participation in politics or in the public sphere was discouraged by the occurrence of sexual harassment (for which women themselves were blamed) and the general “dirty game” of politics. In people’s mindsets, politics was still a male preserve.33

2.5 “Islamization” Nasser died in 1970 and was replaced by Anwar al-Sadat (1918-1981), another military officer. Sadat carried on the legacy of controlling political opposition but through different tactics. He encouraged Islamic groups and called himself a “modern Muslim”, using Islam to legitimize his politics and as a means to counter political opposition (such as communists). He broke with Nasser's socialist politics and cut ties with the Soviet Union, in favor of a free, market-based economy and relations with US (called the “open-door” policy). Instead of welfare, opening for private investments and strengthening the private sector were proposed as the means to advance and modernize the Egyptian society. A small minority was benefitted by Sadat's economic policies, and the socio-economical gaps among the population grew even further. Under Sadat, as a consequence of loosened governmental control and legislation, non-governmental and independent organizations were given extended space to conduct their work and receive funding from abroad. Needs in society, including women's needs, would to an increasing extent be addressed by such organizations rather than the state. Particularly religious institutions became an important source of social services and welfare for the deprived majority of the population. In addition, they offered a space and ideology to raise political demands and issue critique against the autocratic regime, US hegemony and liberal politics.34

Islamist groups gained popularity and increased their presence in society in multiple ways throughout the coming decades. Aside from those concerned with charity and welfare, there were extremist militant groups who carried out a number of violent attacks aimed at the state and the “West” under the second half of the nineteenth century. There was also a mobilization of a political Islam. Amid the disappointment and discontent with national policies, Islam filled a vacuum of the failure of Arab nationalism, socialism and other ideologies that would free Islamic countries from unjust politics, social and economic injustice and Western imperialism. The practice of veiling

33 Guenena &Wasset (1999) p. 31, 35-37 Ahmed (1992) p. 211, 216-217, 225 Utrikespolitiska Institutet. Landguiden. Egypten: Modern historia, 15th of March 2012, http://www.landguiden.se/Lander/Afrika/Egypten/Modern-Historia accessed on 14th of April 2012 Nelson (2007) p. 59, 63-64, 69-70 34 Utrikespolitiska Institutet. Landguiden. Egypten: Modern historia, 15th of March 2012, http://www.landguiden.se/Lander/Afrika/Egypten/Modern-Historia accessed on 14th of April 2012 Abu-Lughod (2010) p. 3-4 Malmström (2009) p. 40-42 Guenena & Wasset (1999) p. 8, 43-45 22 became popular in urban Egypt in the 1970s, most notably among women of the middle classes. However, although various theories may offer explanations of the fact that “modern Egyptian women” returned to the practice of veiling, e.g., aversion of sexual harassment in public, fashion, or an assertion of religious devotion or political statement, there are in the end no universal or conclusive explanations as to the motives of veiling as such.35

The Mubarak-era In 1981, a fundamentalist Islamic group assassinated Sadat, and he was replaced by Hosni Mubarak (1928-). Mubarak, during his regime, invoked the language of democracy and freedom of speech, but in practice, like his predecessors, political opposition was never allowed to threaten the monopoly of power. Emergency laws were imposed and effectively referred to as a means of preventing terrorist attacks and maintaining stability – also effectively preventing any official political mobilization. Mubarak followed and enhanced the neoliberal politics introduced by Sadat, and he also maintained the state's ambiguous relationship with religious authorities and institutions. Even though more moderately than Sadat, Mubarak affirmed his Muslim identity and collaborated with religious interests (Islamic as well as Christian) when it suited his purposes as a means of gaining legitimacy for his policies and undermining any tendencies of independent power-struggles. Religion and religious language was embraced as a means of controlling rather than submitting to religious rhetoric. The Mubarak-regime tolerated, or even when found necessary, cultivated religious utterances – as long as the regime itself was not the object of critique. 36

Religious authorities in turn supported state policies as long as their own interests were not compromised. Such a political climate made issues relevant for women's status and situations politically controversial, and impeded attempts to address and advance women's rights and roles. “Women's issues” were, however, put on the official political agenda and advocated by the first lady Suzanne Mubarak (1941-) herself – but this was not very appreciated by all feminist and women's rights advocates. S. Mubarak, like her predecessor Jihan Sadat (1933-), used her position to influence politics and legal reforms. However, S. Mubarak and J. Sadat were immensely unpopular, as became any issues with which they were associated. S. Mubarak publicly debated female genital mutilation (FGM) and trafficking, advocating change. From 2000, she headed the newly established National Council for Women (NCW), the first governmental organ to promote women's empowerment and legal, political and social rights in Egypt. Hence, S. Mubarak may have contributed in making feminist demands controversial in an Egyptian context, but, on the other hand, several women's rights demands were achieved due to her political pressure and the NCW.37

35 Abu-Lughod (2010) p. 3-4 Ahmed (1992) p. 222-224 Mahmood (2005) p. 3-4, 15-16, 50 Hassan, Hamdi. Religion, Identity and Democracy. The Arab Spring: Transition to Democracy at a crossroads. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). November 2011, p. 8 Utrikespolitiska Institutet. Landguiden. Egypten: Modern historia, 15th of March 2012, http://www.landguiden.se/Lander/Afrika/Egypten/Modern-Historia accessed on 14th of April 2012 36 Guenena & Wasset (1999) p. 8 Utrikespolitiska Institutet. Landguiden. Egypten: Modern historia, 15th of March 2012, http://www.landguiden.se/Lander/Afrika/Egypten/Modern-Historia accessed on 14th of April 2012 Malmström (2009) p. 40-42 37 Middle East Policy Council, Interview: Egyptian Feminist Fatma Khafagy, Summer 2008, XV, No 2 http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/interview-fatma-khafagy accessed on 8th of April 2012 National Council for Women, Presidential Decree, http://www.ncwegypt.com/index.php? option=com_content&view=article&id=47&Itemid=53&lang=en accessed on 7th of April 2012. The Daily Beast. Suzanne Mubarak: Egypt's Mean Queen. 1st of January 2012, http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2012/01/01/suzanne-mubarak-egypt-s-mean-queen.html accessed on 6th of April 2012. Sveriges Radio, Kvinnlig könsstympning Egyptens skamfläck. 13th of March 2012. http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=1637&artikel=5013490 accessed on 17th of April 2012 Hassan (2011) p. 13-14, 20, 22 23 “Radicalization” of Islam The occurrence of a “radical (patriarchal) Islamism” as a global trend developed during the previous decades. In Egypt, militant Islamist groups declined in the 1990s and politically radical groups appeared instead. The popular support of Islamic political groups should be related to the unpopularity of the state and the (grand) failure of state politics to meet people's needs. Neoliberal politics, privatizations and structural adjustment programs have bereft a great part of the population of welfare which is instead addressed by religious institutions. The political movement of Islam has also represented morality and self-esteem, in contrast to the state-promoted Islam, whose politics have been affiliated with humility and impoverishment. Political Islamic discourse has also been informed by Egyptian migrant workers, returning from the religiously more conservative Gulf countries, promoting an Islam in which women's roles are perceived mainly as mothers and wives.

Islamist groups have also proposed Islam as a unifying force to counter “Westernization” and secularization of the society: For example, during the 1990s, a (women's) mosque movement developed allegedly as a response to the perceived moral decay of society. Most notable in Egypt among the Islamist groups are the Muslim Brotherhood (established already in the 1920s though illegal under the Mubarak regime) and the Salafists. Both groups strive to establish an Islamic state although the Salafists are generally considered to propose a stricter application of Islamic law. In the view of radical (patriarchal) Islamist groups, a return to Islamic values is the solution to the nation's problems. Virtuous values are proposed to counter poverty and corruption. To be duly noted, not all Islamists are the same or have the same political program, but these are some of the views presented within “political Islam”, that may have had an impact in various ways in the society. Radical (religious) groups hostile towards women's rights may have impeded with the work of feminist or women's rights groups, or, interacted with how some women's rights agendas were articulated and evolved. For example, CEWLA, an Egyptian women's rights organization, launched a project to demonstrate the compatibility between Islamic law (Sharia) and CEDAW. 38

A revitalized feminist movement? By the end of the twentieth century, women's rights organizations began to challenge or reject the official governmental agenda of women's issues. Organizations, for example, registered themselves as “civil companies” instead of NGO's, thereby escaping rigorous state impositions. An international climate favoring women's rights affected policies also in Egypt. The UN declared 1975-85 a decade for women. There was a rapid evolution of women's international, regional and national organizations and networks especially after the 4th international conference on women in Beijing in 1995. Particularly the status and situations of Muslim women received attention in public debates. Egypt saw a wave of new women's NGO's in the 1980s-90s. Emerging new technology such as the internet, e-mail and mobile phones (although subjected to state surveillance) created new possibilities for civil society to communicate their message. It enabled and enhanced organizations' possibilities to build coalitions, as well as to advocate and spread their ideas. 39

The mainstream feminist discourses (still) expressed women's issues in terms of universal human rights – most notably working with or departing from the CEDAW and a liberal and secular framework. However, in the 1990s, an “alternative” feminist discourse was also articulated more clearly – Islamic feminism. Islamic feminism refers to an ideology and practice of articulating

38 Guanena & Wasset (1999) p. 52-61 Hassan (2011) p. 7-8, 17, 20 Abu-Lughod (2010) p. 9-13 Malmström (2009) p. 37-42 Badran, Margot. Women and Radicalization. Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). Copenhagen. Working paper no 5 2006, p. 4-5 Mahmood (2005) p. 3 39 Guanena & Wasset (1999) p. 29, 51-52 Badran (2006) p. 2 24 feminist concerns out of a religious (Islamic) framework. Islamic feminism seeks to re-interpret Islamic religious sources from a gender and feminist perspective and expose male biased interpretations. The Islamic methodologies of itjihad, critically examining religious sources, and tafsir, religious exegeses, are used. These new interpretations supposedly uproot earlier imaginations of Islam as segregating women and men in the public and private sphere and profess gender equality. What Islamic feminism in particular might contribute to feminist discourses, is that it expresses concerns for women's status and situations in terms internal to the Muslim world. The West, the secular and liberal, is no longer the sole preserve of a gender-egalitarian feminist discourses.40

Nawal El Saadawi Nawal El Saadawi (1931-) distinguished herself in the Egyptian contemporary history of feminism. She might not be perceived as “representative” of feminists or feminism in Egypt, but not least due to the great attention she has attracted, internationally, regionally and nationally, she deserves to be introduced here. Breaking taboos could be labeled an imaginative red thread throughout Saadawi's life and work – a working scheme not approved of by several segments of society, such as governmental officials, religious authorities and, indeed, other feminists. Saadawi is a trained medical doctor but is perhaps more known as a writer occupied with the subject of being a woman in the Arab world. Saadawi was the first Egyptian medical doctor to publicly condemn the practice of FGM, in the 1960s. Yet even more controversially, Saadawi also opposes male circumcision (on medical grounds). She considers circumcision part of a “patriarchal package” of practices, together with veiling, seclusion and discriminatory criminal punishment of adultery, used to oppress women's bodies and minds. Saadawi views patriarchy and the oppression of women as global phenomena, embedded in politics, culture, economy and, importantly (and controversially), religion.

In her opinion, religion is used to support and enhance patriarchy. Saadawi's religious critique has been strongly opposed, even prosecuted. She has condemned the Islamization of Egyptian society but also the increasing Americanization and spread of capitalism, turning not only religious institutions against her but also various governmental regimes; she was sentenced to prison after criticizing Sadat and was forced to withdraw her presidential candidacy after pressure from the Mubarak regime among other things. Saadawi's political ideology and strategies have perhaps proved too headstrong to receive any substantial local support, even from other feminists or women's rights activists or organizations in general. She has, however, continued to work, write and provoke. She was present during the demonstrations at Tahrir square in January of 2011 at the age of 80.41

As will be demonstrated in the following chapter(s), many of the concerns regarding women's status and situations reviewed in this background chapter remain relevant in a reading of the current context of feminism in Egypt. A lot of the contexts that have informed feminist and women's rights struggles historically continue to do so even today. In many instances, history seems to repeat itself.

40 Badran (2011) p. 2-6 Abu-Lughod (2010) p. 3-4 41 The Nation. An Interview with Nawal El Saadawi. 21st of March 2012, http://www.thenation.com/article/159362/interview-nawal-el-saadawi accessed on 21st of February 2012 Newton-Horst, Adele (ed). The Essential Nawal El Saadawi: a reader. London. Zed Books. 2010, p. Vii-viv, 1-3, 141-142, 313-316, 321-330 Nawal El Saadawi. Biography, http://www.nawalsaadawi.net/index.php? option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=34&Itemid=54 accessed on 24th of February 2012 25 3. Current considerations The purpose of this chapter is to provide a summary assessment of some current issues that are relevant to understanding the status and situation of women in Egypt today and to display points of reference for continuous feminist and women's rights struggles. Included in this chapter is a presentation of some general and particular issues of concern as elevated by international and local institutions and organizations monitoring women's status and situations as well as a presentation of the political developments that took place during the field work of this thesis. The political developments concurrent with the interview studies may be particularly important to keep in mind as they at least to a certain extent ought to have informed my informants’ thoughts and opinions. My intention is not to dwell on particularities but to inform the reader of some events and circumstances telling of or significant for the general status of women. Naturally, an exhaustive list of concerns, developments and events cannot be presented here, and issues presented may not reflect or represent the prioritized concerns of every Egyptian woman, man or feminist. I have made a selection based upon my own understanding of prioritized issues and concerns in accordance with my research and my field and interview experiences.

3.1 Socio-legal concerns The legal framework itself, or perhaps at times the lack of a legal framework, impacts in one way or another virtually every Egyptian woman (and man) which is why I have chosen to begin with a summary review of how the general legal situation in Egypt influences or circumscribes women's lives. Secondly, I give a short introduction to what many feminists and women's rights activists have expressed as a major concern, historically as well as presently, namely family law. Last but not least, violence against women is put forth as a current concern. Although many times ignored or overlooked in national public discourse as a societal concern, it is manifested in various forms the Egyptian society.

The gap between the law and its implementation Although Egypt, like a majority of the countries in the Arab region during the past recent years, witnessed an unprecedented reform of gender discriminatory laws (such as the ratification of CEDAW and its optional protocol, introducing Muslim women's right to unilateral divorce, the criminalization of FGM, raising the legal age of marriage to 18 years for both sexes and introducing affirmative actions to further advance women's status and positions in the society), gender discriminatory laws still remains. Men and women are unequally treated before the law in practice – even in cases where the law states equality. This could partially be seen as a consequence of a general situation of corruption that exists at all levels in Egyptian society where kinship, economic resources and social status determine the outcome of legal affairs rather than the rule of law – affecting men and women to an equal extent, but with particular gender implications 42.

Impeding the law from being implemented may also be the social stigma affiliated with reporting certain crimes and abuses. Society normally condemns the (female) victim of, for example, domestic abuse rather than the (male) perpetrator of the act of violence. Moreover, women of the deprived classes may (also) lack actual access to legal justice due to poverty and illiteracy. It has been interpreted that the execution of the law brings to surface a patriarchal value system intact in Egyptian society and that a male dominated political and legal system may serve to sustain this kind of culture. Religious interpretation (also male biased) has been used to legitimize the status quo. A biased cultural and value system may thus partially explain the discrepancies between de jure and de facto law and continuous gender discriminatory laws.43 42 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2012, Egypt http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom- world/2012/egypt-0 accessed on 30th of August 2012 43 Khafagy, Fatemah. Concept Paper of the Arab Women Think Tank: Challenges facing Arab Women. Swedish 26 Family law After gaining national independence, the jurisdiction was divided into secular and religious law. The secular law was adopted from the French Code under which the civil, commercial and penal code fall, while family and personal matters were referred to respective religious authorities and institutions. Thus there is no unified (national) family law. Civil alternatives, for example for marriage, may exist, but it is not clear if it is accessible in practice for all, due to social, legal or religious restrictions 44. An un-unified family law renders different legal options and opportunities for Egyptian men and women according to their religion. Concerning Muslims, polygamy is still legal, and men may marry up to four wives. Related problems that have been expressed with polygamy are, for example, that the man cannot afford to sustain several wives with children and that women are not entitled to divorce only due to the husbands second marriage, although out of a human rights perspective polygamy also ought to be regarded as fundamentally unequal and discriminatory against women. Muslim women gained the right to apply for unilateral divorce, khul, in 2000, although this law is circumscribed and discriminatory, requiring the woman to give up all her financial rights and refund any dowry. Christian women, on the other hand, are practically not allowed to divorce at all. According to a decree issued by the (late) Coptic Pope, divorce is feasible only in the cases of death, adultery and converting to a different religion. Cases of Coptic women converting to Islam as means of escaping their marriages are stirring unrest in society and sharpening religious tensions.45

Violence against women Violence against women has reportedly increased in Egypt during the latest years both in the public and private spheres although it is not clear why or how violence against women has increased or how this has been noticed. There are many forms in which violence against women can manifest, under legal or semi-legal banners, or simply overlooked by jurisprudence altogether. Domestic violence, marital rape, honor violence and sexual harassment are not criminalized. Trafficking may occur within the legal sphere of marriage, and FGM is illegal though still practiced on a large scale among all classes and in all parts of Egyptian society. Combating violence against women may be impeded due to the state's (and even at times the public's) unwillingness to confess that such practices exist. This is due to issues of prestige in front of a public (international) audience but also as a consequence of honoring cultural ideals of keeping any matter related to female sexuality within the private sphere, i.e., a refusal to bring up such matters in public (whatever the circumstances and purposes for doing so). President Hosni Mubarak, for example, denied the existence of FGM before a film was released on that very subject in 1994. His wife and First Lady Suzanne Mubarak accused a private initiative taken in 2010 to map out sexual harassment of

Institute of Alexandria. 16th of November 2009 The Arab Republic of Egypt, 12th of April 2012 http://www.cabinet.gov.eg/AboutEgypt/Egyptian_constitution.aspx accessed on 12th of April 2012 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women – Egypt. February 2010, p. 3, 5-6, 11 Center for Egyptian Women's Legal Assistance (CEWLA). The Shadow Report on the Status of Egyptian women in matters of personal status and forms of violence against women according to CEDAW convention. (2010) p. 2, 5-6, 11 44 CEWLA (2010) p. 3, 5-6, 8 Guenena, Nemat & Wasset (1999) p. 20-21 45 Al-Ahram weekly on-line. Keeping it in the family. 7th of August 2008 http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/909/eg5.htm accessed on 26th of February 2012 CEWLA (2010) p. 11-12 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Programme of Governance in the Arab Region, Gender: Egypt, http://www.pogar.org/countries/theme.aspx?cid=5&t=4 accessed of 25th of February 2012 Network of Women's Rights Organizations (NWRO). Legal guide for developing a more just integrated family law. Second edition. December 2011, p. 47-62 Egypt Independent 2nd of July 2011, Egyptian women's legal center demands personal status law for Copts, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egyptian-womens-legal-center-demands-personal-status-law-copts accessed on 11th of April 2012 27 exaggerating the problem and tarnishing Egypt's reputation.46

3.2 Post-revolutionary outlooks As Mubarak resigned as president on February 11th of 2011, the governmental administration was temporarily handed over to the Supreme Council of the Army Forces (SCAF). The SCAF was subsequently the authority in charge of political and governmental decisions. They announced new elections and the redrafting of the constitution. Parliamentary elections were carried out in 2011- 2012, and a new president was elected and appointed in June of 2012. Traditionally, much power has been in the hands of the president. However, at this moment of writing, it is not clear what kind of authority the president or the parliament will have under a new constitution. The constitution has yet to be drafted, and subsequent consequences for the political system in Egypt as a whole have yet to be seen.47

Parliamentary elections In the first free elections for more than 60 years, Islamist parties won an overwhelming victory (Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party and Salafist's Party Al-Nour). Even though parties with a more liberal and secular agenda allegedly represented those who initiated the revolution, they only gained a minority position in the parliament, which is why surprise has been expressed that the Islamists won with such a big marginal. Various factors could explain the Islamists’ success. Election results may reflect, at least in part, the Islamists’ (unmatched) resources and capabilities to organize. As reviewed earlier (p. 22-24), Islamist groups have had a presence at the grassroots level in society, constituting for decades the welfare and social security systems for a large part of the deprived population, providing them with both popular support and prerequisites to organize. Islamic parties may also ideologically (popularly) have represented morality and unity – or indeed those who would genuinely fight for citizens’ rights. Furthermore, they seem to have been the only political alternative presenting themselves in some places, as other parties ignored such areas they perceived as being “already taken” by the Islamists.48

The religious connotation of the Islamist parties is likely to have had a general appeal to many Egyptians. Liberal and secular parties are sometimes perceived or depicted by opponents as anti- religious – and Egypt is a religious society. Liberal parties are newly formed and have not been known among the people like the Islamists. Other parties than the liberal and Islamist participating in the elections were former (pseudo)parties established under the Mubarak regime who had consequently lost their political credibility. Still, it is hard to predict any actual outcome of the parliamentary electoral results. Parties and individual candidates may have expressed some political 46 CEWLA (2010) p. 10-11, 13-15 CEDAW (2010) p. 2-3, 5-7, 11-12, 15 BBC News, Middle East. Egyptian sexual harasser jailed. 21st of October 2008 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7682951.stm 26th of February 2012; Egypt's sexual harassment 'cancer', 18th of July 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7514567.stm accessed on 26th of February 2012 Mulsimah Media Watch, Harassment = Jail Time! 23rd of October 2008, http://www.patheos.com/blogs/mmw/2008/10/harassment-jail-time/ accessed on 26th of February 2012 The Guardian, Women in Egypt get hi-tech aid to beat sexual harassment. 19th of September 2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/19/women-egypt-sexual-harassment-harassmap accessed on 19th of April Malmström (2009) p. 215-220, 221-224 47 Utrikespolitiska institutet, Landguiden, Egypten: Fördjupning, 16th of March 2012, http://www.landguiden.se/Lander/Afrika/Egypten/Aktuell-Politik/Fordjupning accessed on 11th of April 2012 48 Utrikespolitiska institutet, Landguiden, Politiskt system i Egypten. 2nd of April 2012 http://www.landguiden.se/Lander/Afrika/Egypten/Politiskt-System accessed on the 28th of February 2012 The Guardian, Egypt's election results show firm win for Islamists, 21st of January 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/21/egypt-election-clear-islamist-victory accessed on 10th of April 2012 BBC News, Profile's of Egypt's Political Parties, 25th of November 2011,http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle- east-15899548 accessed on 12th of April 2012; What will Salafist's election success mean for Egypt? 12th of December 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16112833 accessed on 12th of April 2012 28 visions, but if and how they manifest in reality is yet to be shown.49

Position of women's issues During the revolution, there were actually no specific demands on the rights of women as a group – the demands rather reflected the larger situation in Egypt of political unfreedom and social injustice. However, as women's participation in political life after the revolution was obviously ignored or resisted (by some groups in society), women's right to equal access to and participation in political events was stressed by women's rights activists and organizations. In making such demands, women's equal partaking in the revolution was referred to. The resentment of women's rights after the revolution became manifest (for example) in an attack on a demonstration to celebrate International Women's Day on the 8th of March 2011 where demonstrators were verbally and physically attacked. Also in the aftermath of the revolution, it was revealed that some women had been subjected to “virginity tests” by the military. Particularly one incident during the military's violent responses to large demonstration in November of 2011 shocked both the international and local communities when the media caught soldiers beating and stripping a young woman. This incident contributed to a change in the general view of the military as “heroes” during the revolution. In November, they instead symbolized the “villain” who wanted to keep the political power for themselves.50

The stories of the resentment of women's rights and freedoms might not be representative accounts, but they do display some of the extreme positions taken in society and state the existence of a resentment of women partaking in public political life and expanding their roles in society. The post-revolution government (SCAF) in general continued with gender discriminatory practices, intentionally and systematically excluding women from political decision making processes. A quota of 64 seats for women in the parliament (installed in 2010) was abolished. Instead, the law of the electoral system required parties to nominate at least one woman on their district party lists. However, unless placed on the top of the list, few nominees would have any chance of getting elected, although a quota to ensure a certain representation of workers and peasants was kept, indicating the particular exclusion of women. Furthermore, it has been observed that female participation in nominations and elections was discouraged through direct abuse and violence. The outcome of the of the first parliamentary elections also demonstrated extremely low participation of women (2 %).51

49 Egypt Independent. Who do Egypt's villagers vote for? And why? 10th of April 2012, http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/764101 accessed on 12th of April 2012 Malmström (2009) p. 41-42 Hassan (2011) p. 7-8, 19-22 50 The Guardian, Egyptian women protest in Cairo against brutal treatment. 20th of December 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/20/egyptian-women-protest-cairo-treatment accessed on 12th of April 2012; Bibars, Iman. The Doha Debates Experience: Reflections and Lessons Learned. 7th of March 2012. Ashoka Arab World (AAW) Ahram online,; Egyptian million woman march ends with a gunshot, 8th of March 2011, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/7292/Egypt/Politics-/Egyptian-million-woman-march-ends-with-a- gunshot.aspx accessed on 11th of April 2012 ECWR Press release, The Egyptian Women between the Wings of the revolution and Stripping the Reality. http://www.ecwronline.org/english/press%20reless/2011/Press%20Release-%20English-%20Women's%20Status %20Report%202011.pdf accessed on 12th of April 2012 Al Akhbar English, Egypt's Military Junta: The road from Hero to Villain. 12th of February 2012, http://english.al- akhbar.com/content/egypt’s-military-junta-road-hero-villain accessed on 12th of April 2012 51 ECWR Exploitation of Women's Voting Blocs by the Religious Movments in the First Round of the 2011 Peoples's Assembly Council Elections, http://www.ecwronline.org/english/press%20reless/2011/English-%20Summary%20of %20the%201st%20round%20of%20the%20People's%20Assembly%20Election%202011-.pdf; In the first round of the parliamentary election 2011 Women present and absent, http://www.ecwronline.org/english/press %20reless/2011/English-%20Results%20of%20the%20indvidual%20system%20-%20first%20round.pdf; Less than half-hearted Nominations led to Weak Results Only Three Women Elected, http://www.ecwronline.org/english/press%20reless/2011/English-%20Results%20of%20the%20Party%20List 29 Approximately one year after the revolution, the drafting of the new constitution was allegedly one of the current and most urgent battles for those who call for women's equal participation: to ensure female participation in the committee to draft the constitution and that the new constitution recognizes men's and women's equality before the law. The general attack on women's rights caused many women's rights activists and organizations to express concern regarding the future for women in Egypt, although it might also reflect the uncertainty of the short and long term outcome of the revolution at large.52

The political situation reviewed in this chapter, at large and with particular concern in regard to women's status and situations, will be recognized in the chapter on “Voices from Egypt”. Even though not all these issues or events are analyzed further, they may be important to keep in mind in order to contextualize the voiced concerns of my interviewees so as to understand how or why certain issues are put forth as problems or opportunities.

%20system%20-%20first%20round.pdf; The cancellation of Women's Quota without alternative legal methods that guarantee women's political participaition is pushing women back to point zero, http://www.ecwronline.org/english/press%20reless/2011/Press%20Release-the%20Egyptian%20Coalition%20for %20civil%20Education%20and%20Women's%20Participation-%20women's%20quota.pdf all accessed on 12th of April 2012 quotaProject: Global Database of Quotas for Women, Egypt, http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm? country=69 accessed on 28th of February 2012 52 Women Living under Muslim Laws (WLML). Egypt: Fighting for Women's rights in the Aftermath of the Revolution, 6th of September 2011, http://www.wluml.org/node/7255 accessed on 7th of April 2012 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Programme of Governance in the Arab Region. Gender: Egypt, http://www.pogar.org/countries/theme.aspx?cid=5&t=4, accessed on 25th of February 2012 ECWR Only Six Women in the Constitutional Assembly, 26th of March 2012, http://www.ecwronline.org/english/press%20reless/2012/Press%20Release-%20English-Only%20Six%20Women %20in%20the%20Constitutional%20Assembly.pdf accessed on 12th of April 2012 The Daily News Egypt, Egyptian protesters mark Women's Day chanting against SCAF and Islamists. 8th of March 2012. http://www.thedailynewsegypt.com/egypt/egyptian-protesters-mark-womens-day-chanting-against-military- and-islamists.html accessed on 11th of April 2012 CEDAW (2010) p. 2 30 4. Universal conceptualizations of feminism and women's rights Feminism has a dual character as both an analytical and politically prescriptive project as it offers an understanding of women's situations as marginalized, subordinated or oppressed and an agenda for how those situations are to be addressed 53. Naturally, even though there are some essential features or common denominators of feminism, there are various orientations within the movement that respond differently to how women's subordination is to be understood and addressed. The theoretical basis of this thesis consists of a review of some such general or universal theories or conceptualizations (“universal”, as in meant to apply globally; universally applicable) as forwarded by the CEDAW and human rights framework, Sally Engle Merry and Saba Mahmood respectively. This review forms a basis or reference for the analysis of the interview material of feminist conceptualizations in Egypt and may suggest how these are consistent with or distinguished from universal theories. The following presentations of the “women's convention”, cultural perspectives on women's human rights, and ultimately feminist concerns as agency are naturally not conclusive of the various feminist conceptualizations that exist, but they do offer both conventional and non- conventional theories of how women's rights and feminist concerns are to be understood.

4.1 The “women's convention” The drafting of a “women's convention” was based on a recognition that the existing international legal human rights documents at present did not satisfactory cover or address issues of concern for women as a group. The convention was adopted in 1979 by the General Assembly of the UN and has been called an international bill of rights for women. The convention defines discrimination against women and sets up an agenda for ending such discrimination. Discrimination against women is defined as “... any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field” 54.

Important features of the convention are that it is concerned not only with the output on behalf of the state in order to end gender discrimination against women but also with the actual outcome of measures taken against such discrimination. In other words, the state is not only obliged to take measures against discrimination but actually also to follow-up their implementation and results. In addition, the convention recognizes that gender discrimination against women may occur as a result of stereotypes or gender roles, which is why measures also should be taken against reproducing or re-enforcing such stereotypes. Finally, the CEDAW-committee, the governing body of the convention and “supervisor” of its implementation, has been entitled to issue general recommendations applicable to all parties of the convention. The general recommendations serve both as interpretational guidelines but also as progressive elaborations of the conventional text. The recommendations are, however, not legally binding in the same way as the conventional text. The ratification of the CEDAW is formally voluntary by individual states. Once ratified, though, the state binds themselves to fulfill the obligations of the text. The state can upon ratification make reservations against certain articles, theoretically not against core articles essential for the understanding of the convention (such as Article 2 and 16) however in reality this is nonetheless done.55

53 Mahmood (2006) p. 10, 196-198 54 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women – Convention, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/convention.htm accessed on 2nd of March 2012 55 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/index.htm accessed on 24th of March 2012 31 Critique of the human rights framework First of all, the international human rights law as such suffers from its given system: even though legal in its nature, binding states to obligations, women's rights (as human rights) cannot be enforced. UN governing bodies lack legal instruments to make states comply with its laws, based on the current understanding of and respect for state sovereignty. Thus there are no sanctions for states or governments who ignore or violates them. Moreover and ironically, the responsibility for human rights falls ultimately upon the state at the same time as the state itself many times is the perpetrator of human rights violations. The historical reason behind this is the identification of the state as the main violator of human rights and human dignity. The basic idea was that states would pledge a commitment to respect human rights values on a voluntary basis and (given recent events after the Second World War) would feel complied to do so. This framework (and much of these ideas) is still the working system of the UN.

The UN and the international community are not completely out of options when it comes to sanctioning states. Its power lies in exposing and shaming states that do not show compliance with human rights norms. Demonstrating compliance with international human rights standards is of political interests to most states, due to the affiliation with appearing “civilized” in front of an international audience. How efficient such a policy of shame is, however, depends on the status of the country in question. Countries with great economic and political wealth have less incentive to yield for such tactics than countries with a greater international dependency on aid, trade or foreign investment. States can employ other tactics to avoid scrutiny, such as ignoring questions; refering to state sovereignty; and arguing that certain human rights articles are against national religion, culture, tradition or customs. Notably, states’ complicity with human rights norms at this level is played out as politics and high diplomacy.56

Relevance of international law for women The relevance of international law as a method of advancing women's status and situation has been questioned from various (feminist) viewpoints. An important objection is that international law covers a relatively limited space of many women's lives. Traditionally within law, a distinction has been made between what constitutes private and public life, where law only applies to the public sphere of life. Thus rights can be pursued or violated (formally) only within that sphere, and the state is the only actor answerable for human rights-violations. However, many of the abuses women as a group suffer occur within the private sphere of life, committed by a “private perpetrator”. Such abuses (for example, domestic violence) are hence to be covered by national law, and national law, in turn, may regard such cases as being “too private” to be a concern for the law at all. There have been strategies made to address this dilemma, but at large and in practice this situation remains. 57

The CEDAW is to a great extent a (cultural) product of the ideas of women's rights in Europe and US in the 1950s-70s which at that time highlighted and problematized discrimination rather than, for example, violence against women. Consequently, there are no provisions on violence against women, although gender-based violence surely has been a major concern regarding women's status and situation historically as well as presently. The theoretical base of the discourse that generated the international women's rights provisions was instead that “women should have the same rights as men” and that constraints on women to achieve the same things as men would be removed. Implicit in such a proposal lays a conception of man as the universal human subject. Some feminists argue

Buss & Manji (2005) p. 117-120, 123 Ljung, Christina. Kvinnors rättigheter – en handbok för aktivister, journalister och beslutsfattare. CEDAW- nätverket. Wallin och Dahlbom Boktryckeri AB 2004, p. 20-23, 64-68 56 Merry (2006) p. 5, 72-73, 79-81, 85, 87-89, 225-226 Charlesworth & Chinkin (2000) p. 24-25, 124-125, 202 57 Buss & Manji (2005) p. 94-100 Charlesworth & Chinkin (2000) p. 30-31 Merry (2006), p. 78 32 that social justice, instead of gender equality, ought to be based upon the recognition of gender differences. The rights of men and women could be viewed as “complementary” instead of “competitive”. Gender roles are not always conceptualized as contrary to the realization of women's rights and freedoms – equity rather than equality is stressed, according to these theories. In other words, women's needs and desires may be visualized differently than how they are expressed in the universal agenda of women's rights according to the CEDAW.58

4.2 Women's human rights as culture While acknowledging the importance international human rights law plays in raising issues of global concern and promoting change at the local level, Sally Engle Merry points out some dilemmas in the system of the production of human rights itself and in its implementation. She discusses how human rights are produced in transnational settings though understood in other ways at the local level of implementation. International human rights law and the CEDAW are fundamentally legal provisions for advocating change and implementing justice. Legal reforms inhabit the potential of social reform, but it is not only as law human and women's rights concepts can shape the society, argues Merry. Merry points out how understandings of human rights also carry transformative power as they become embedded in everyday life. She argues that the significance of CEDAW foremost lies in its culturally constitutive role shaping visions of rights and morality although there are discrepancies of the understandings of what human rights are at the site of their production as compared to at the level of local implementation. Merry proposes that human rights need to be translated into local contexts.59

Cultural biases in the UN system Producing human rights norms is affiliated with certain biases, Merry recognizes. In many ways, the UN and the human rights system is a reflection of former colonial relationships: the proponents of human rights are the former colonial powers of North America and Europe, and similar to the colonial system's imposition of “civilization” and law, the human rights discourse implies certain assumptions of what is progressive and what is backward, which is often expressed as modern verses traditional. The human rights system is furthermore shaped by the power and resource inequalities between the global North and South, which determines the flow of capital and thus influence – receiving countries or organizations must, for example, normally abide by donor countries’ or institutions’ agendas in form or substance. The human rights system, however, is not a simple replica of the colonial system. Merry points out that however unequal it may be in many respects, human rights discourse is a subject of global concern. In the UN General Assembly, every state holds one vote. Human rights law cannot be enforced upon countries involuntarily, but the governments may themselves choose if and how they will comply with human rights norms. Human rights are furthermore not only a matter between governments but have been seized at the grassroots level, proving useful for activists and NGO's as a tool for proposing change. Human rights are thus appropriated rather than imposed.60

Cultural biases, however, manifest in yet other ways. CEDAW expresses, through its provision of

58 Merry (2006) p. 21-24, 74, 77-78 Pruzan-Joergensen, Julie Elisabeth. Islamic Women's Activism in the Arab World – Potentials and Challenges for External Actors. DIIS report 2012, p. 7-8 Charlesworth & Chinkin (2000) p. 59-60 Buss, Doris, Manji, Ambreena (Eds.), International Law. Modern Feminist Approaches, Hart Publishing, Portland, 2005, p. 97, 107, 117, 128 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women – General recommendations, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/comments.htm accessed on 21st of March 2012 59 Merry (2006) p. 2-3, 89-91, 221 60 Merry (2006) p. 100-101, 225-228 33 general recommendation number 19, that oppression of women or practices harmful to women cannot be legitimized by referring to traditions, customs or religion, but what constitutes harmful practices for women? FGM has become a “perfect example” of a harmful cultural practice. On the other hand, domestic violence and stalking, for example, are not labeled as “harmful cultural practices”. This is not to suggest that FGM should not be challenged or opposed or ranked among various forms of oppression, but it exposes that our ways of thinking about what is “cultural” and what is “harmful for women” are deeply culturally embedded. FGM is certainly not considered harmful in the societies where it is being practiced, or its perceived benefits outweighs the harm. Culture is often perceived of as “out there” rather than “in here”, but, as Merry points out, culture is as important in shaping human rights conferences as it is in structuring village rituals. 61

Culture as impeding women's rights Merry notes that “culture” commonly is apprehended by the CEDAW committee as being opposed to women's rights. The committee in its work generally holds an essentialist, static notion of culture as impeding or negatively affecting the implementation of the convention. Merry shares this analysis with other researchers, such as Professor in law Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im. The committee, however, might not always be aware of how different local cultural practices in reality affect women to their benefit or disadvantage or whether they actually complement international law. The committee's priority is to implement the law, not to understand the various and indeed multiple local settings and contexts in which the law is to be implemented. Merry argues that cultural practices must be understood in accordance with the local contexts in which they exist before any judgment on their (mis)use is passed. Culture or cultural practices cannot be properly judged if they are not understood in reference to their local contexts.

Furthermore, what constitutes “culture” is constantly subjected to challenges and change even from within. Culture as such should therefore not be attributed essentialist characteristics since culture changes with time and space. Merry proposes an adoption of an “anthropological” notion of culture, which admits that culture is an internally contested concept. An adoption of an anthropological notion of culture, Merry asserts, would be of benefit to the human rights system in that it avoids essentialist (colonial) parallels of “good” and “bad” cultures and encourages reforms to take place within cultures themselves.62

Cultural legitimacy An-Na'im has suggested that in order to be legitimate, coherent and sustainable, social reforms must be grounded in the culture of the local community. Furthermore, he has argued that cultural and social change can only happen in effect of internal discourse – change must be proposed from within the culture itself, by actors “internal” to the cultural context. He has directed critique towards the assumption that Muslims educated in the West would be “unauthentic” proponents of change and their views unrepresentative of “real” Islam. These Muslims according to An-Na'im are dismissed both in Western and Islamic discourse as either “westernized” or “not sufficiently Muslim” – non-representative of either Islam or the West. An-Na'im states that Muslims must be allowed to be Muslims in their own right without having to fulfill Western or Islamic notions of who is an “authentic” Muslim. Likewise, Merry raises the question of who is considered an internal actor. Her conclusion is that it is simply not possible to judge who is an internal or external actor. These boundaries are too shifting to be conclusive, Merry states.

Merry and An-Na'im recognize that compliance with human rights standards depend on the extent to which these concepts and norms are embedded in consciousness and cultural practice, and they see that the universal human rights system has a role to play as a cultural transformer at the local

61 Merry (2006) p. 10-12, 16, 27-28 World Health Organization (WHO). Eliminating female genital mutilation – An interagency statement. 2008, p. 5-6 62 Merry (2006) p. 4-5, 7-10, 14-16, 90-92, 228 34 level. In order to be comprehensible at the local level, and achieve cultural legitimacy, however, human rights need to be translated into the local context.63

Translating human rights Translating human rights does not mean that they are transformed, but their “standards tailored” to the local context. For example, local culture or religion could be used to see conjunctures with human rights. Local activists, human rights advocates and local leaders with a “double consciousness” recognizing local culture while at the same time sympathizing with human rights standards play a crucial role in the process of translating human rights, Merry proposes. Such activists are faced with a dilemma: international human rights must be framed within a local context, “packaged in familiar terms”, yet they must not be in conformity with those terms in order to purposefully challenge those very norms. It remains an open question what strategies various actors and activists should employ to constructively challenge norms and propose cultural reforms.

Human rights are better understood as cultural practice rather than law, Merry concludes. She sees the creation of human rights law itself as a production of culture, producing new visions and norms of morality, with “global legality” through its processes of transnational consensus-building. In spite of all its flaws and biases, ultimately the human rights system is the only global vision of social justice available, and so far the best we have, Merry states.64

4.3 Feminism as agency Quite antithetical to a conceptualization of feminist's concerns as a substantial agenda (like the CEDAW), but possibly as a continuation of Merry's (cultural) contextualization of women's human rights, Saba Mahmood argues that a feminist agenda must be derived from the women it is targeting, i.e., acknowledging women's agency should be a prerequisite for feminism and feminists. Mahmood points out that in current liberal political and feminist discourse, religion in general (and Islam in particular) is often proposed as contrary to women's interests, and Muslim women are not unusually seen as submissive or victims of their own (patriarchal) religion. Mahmood objects to such simplifications and suggests that women's autonomy and choices be recognized even when they occur within patriarchal frameworks. Mahmood proposes that (women's) agency does not only mean resistance to social or patriarchal norms but can occur as “modalities of action” within patriarchal norms.

Religion and feminism In the 1990s, Saba Mahmood conducted an anthropological study of a women's mosque-movement that had developed in the context of a greater Islamic revival in Egypt (see also p. 22-25). The Islamic revival was allegedly a response to perceptions of the “Westernization” of society and to an increasing confinement of religion to the private sphere. The women's movement towards “piety” that Mahmood studied was, in opposition to societal and political developments, an active striving to employ religion (Islam) as an ethical guide of conduct in daily life. Participants in the movement would seek to enact such values that are usually conceptualized as religious and patriarchal norms – arguably to much dilemma for feminists or women's rights activists. However, the participant's strive to incorporate such values and virtues that are proposed by a religious patriarchal framework, may not necessary be interpreted as “collaborating with patriarchal interests”, suggests Mahmood. It may be a matter of religious devotion. Religious devotion may be viewed as requiring one to act in certain ways (for example, to “be a good Muslim”). In spite of such virtues generally being viewed as “backward” or patriarchal, the individual's striving for acquiring such virtues marks indeed

63 An-Na'im, Abdullahi Ahmed. Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the future of Shari'a. Harvard University Press. Cambridge 2008, p. 20-26, 269 Merry (2006) p. 1, 16, 89-92 64 Merry (2006) p. 96, 222, 229-230 35 investment, struggle and achievement, i.e., agency.

Mahmood notes how although feminist thought has evolved from universalistic assumptions, taking into consideration such divergence factors as class, ethnicity and sexuality, feminist analysis has ignored a politics of difference based on faith. Mahmood explains this with the fact that religion many times is viewed as contradictory to women's interests – and since 9/11 (in Europe and the US) Islam in particular has popularly been perceived as being against women altogether. She suggests that we move beyond such simplistic assumptions, since there are indeed women who are Islamist or support Islamist movements. Dismissing such women who incorporate or inhabit values traditionally perceived as being patriarchal as “going against their own interests”, is outdated, Mahmood argues. To dismiss them would for the first be to repeat historical patterns of superiority and for the second to revert to rhetoric where we yet again assume the universality of our own feminist agenda.65

The meaning of agency Even though it may pose a challenge perhaps for feminists in particular, Mahmood proposes that we learn to see women's agency within patriarchal norms. Normally agency is perceived as resisting or opposing social and patriarchal norms, but resistance may also occur within those very norms. To recognize what Mahmood calls modalities of action, it is necessary to question normative liberal assumptions of what agency actually means. In liberal political theory, an individual is considered free if she acts autonomously. Acting autonomously has in liberal thought, however, developed into an understanding of working for certain (predetermined) goals of “progressive politics”. But autonomy is a principle defined through its procedure, not its substance, according to Mahmood. As long as an individual acts on her own accord, whatever she consents to or strives for cannot be objected to as “unfreedom”, Mahmood argues. It is not the substance but the origin that matters in judgments about autonomy. Hence agency, and by extension feminism, need to be de-coupled from any specific agenda.66

In the political discourse of “liberating women”, it is easy to invoke and presume a specific agenda as relevant for (perhaps particularly Muslim) women. In order to avoid playing into the hands of such politics and, above all, to accurately and respectfully work for women's genuine interests, we need to contextualize in depth what feminist politics means according to differing circumstances and desires among the women for whom we claim to work. This proposal is not new within feminist thought – politics of difference have been reviewed by such writers as Chandra Talpade Mohanty and Gayatri Spivak. We need to recognize the autonomous lives of those women who we may perceive as “stuck” within patriarchal norms. Mahmood urges us to ask ourselves – as feminists: do we really understand the lives of the women we so passionately want to remake? Ultimately, we may need to reconsider our own imaginings of what constitutes feminism and reconcile with the idea that feminist agendas divert (also) along the axis of religion.67

The above reviewed concepts of feminist's concerns, essentially (in my interpretation) as a substantial agenda of (legal) issues (CEDAW), women's (human) rights as culture (Merry), and choice (Mahmood) display a few of the multiple and at times contradictory feminist perspectives that exist. These conceptualizations are theoretical in their nature and are assumed to apply universally. In the following chapter, I use these references in interpreting the universal and the particular in how feminism(s) is conceptualized in an Egyptian context specifically.

65 Mahmood (2006) p. 2-8 66 Mahmood (2006) p. 5-8, 10-12, 148-149, 153, 155, 157 67 Mahmood (2006) p. 39, 75, 126, 148-149,153-155, 174, 188, 192-199 Gemzöe (2003) p. 155-156 Freedman, Jane. Feminism – en introduktion. Liber AB. Malmö. 2003, p. 124-125 Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. Feminism Without Borders – Decolonizing Theory and Practicing Solidarity. Duke University Press. New Delhi. 2003, p. 1-6, 43-45 36 5. Voices from Egypt This chapter is a presentation and an analysis of the interviews I conducted during a minor field study lasting ten weeks in Cairo and Alexandria, Egypt. “Voices” refers to the expressed opinions, thoughts and perspectives of the persons I have documented for the purpose of this thesis. I have chosen to present the voices of my informants through actual quotations, which I subsequently analyze, to allow for transparency. The chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, I review conceptualizations of feminism(s) and women's rights in Egypt, including definitions or understandings, contexts or points of departure and suggested aims, as well as problems and solutions regarding women's status and situations. The second section addresses the prospects of the revolution – (some) perceived implications, positive and negative, or what my informants expressed might have changed during or after the revolution, with an impact on or relevance to women's status and feminist struggles. Many of my interviewees were logically weary of giving conclusive comments on the outcome of the revolution in regard to women's status or anything else, for that matter, which is why this part might not be as substantial as I preliminarily had thought. On the other hand, grasping “Egyptian feminism(s)” was more allusive than I had suspected and has required considerable effort and space in this thesis.

The following review of “feminist meanings” serves the purpose of contextualizing feminist struggles in Egypt. My main proposal in this thesis is to present implications of the revolution regarding women's status and feminist struggles, and I could have settled for carrying out interviews that “only” encircled that subject. However, such a thesis would have left many questions regarding points of departure for the feminist movement, aims and perceived problems unanswered. It would have left it up to the reader to define, or indeed presume, certain issues as being relevant. Ultimately, such a thesis would have been rather void of substance. The purpose of the first section below is thus to provide the reader with a platform from which the stated implications of the revolution in the second section can be understood. Not all issues reviewed below correspond with the issues reviewed in the section addressing the revolution. Still, they may prove to be important in order to apprehend the general image of women's status and feminism in Egypt.

5.1 Feminist conceptualizations One of the main questions asked in the thesis is how feminism and women's rights are conceptualized in modern day Egypt, and it was a question that all my interviews encircled. How feminism itself is conceptualized, how my interviewees related to the very term, set off a series of indications of how feminist's concerns were purported. A personal notion of the concept was objected to, as to allow for various conceptualizations to be expressed. In other words, I asked my interviewees how they personally perceived the concept, but what I also gained was an understanding of how my informants related “feminism” to the society at large. There was often a clear discrepancy between the personal notion of the concept and how the interviewee perceived society's view of the concept. Here I have compressed, as I have understood it, the essence of my informants’ individual understandings and definitions of the concept, as a summary introduction to the voices that are heard throughout this analysis – or perhaps as a snapshot of a handful of various (feminist) positions that are taken in Egypt today:

“[Feminism is] a woman who struggles for women's rights … [I'm a feminist] because I am a woman!”68

“I'm a feminist, but not a radical feminist. For feminism to succeed, men have to be brought into the cause. Feminism is a cause for gender equality. It has to include the partnership of

68 Layla, 1st of March 2012 37 men in society. It's also about the right to be a woman and not have to struggle to be a woman.”69

“We have here in Egypt feminists, women-activists and human rights-activists. I'm a combination of the three because I'm a feminist that will not take it to the extreme because this is not accepted by society, so I need a platform that would be accepted by society … Feminism in Egypt is totally different from the real feminism anywhere else. It's more 'women- activism' … [Feminism is] a person calling for women's rights.”70

“Freedom of choice, economical independence … I'm not an activist but feminism has been important to me, for making me aware of things.”71

“Feminism is women's right to be equal and independent, not to be treated like a second class citizen, not to be treated as an object, to be free … [I'm a feminist] on some level. I believe in the rights of women, but I'm not a feminist-activist.”72

“I judge them according to their stand on human rights ... This is how I evaluate any kind of thought: with whom are you? Whose interests are you defending? What is your imagination for humanity? ... Feminism or whoever calls himself a feminist or whichever literature written on feminism that adopts my view – I'm a feminist. If not, I'm not! Very simple.” 73

“I never use it ... Because you know I'm Egyptian, I know my society. If you say 'feminism' they think of giving complete freedom for women to do whatever they want ... Emancipation, it means to be empowered, to be educated, to be trained, to have a work.”74

“Feminism for me is to start by admitting that there is a problem of gender equality, and we want to address it because there is a lot of ignoring this...”75

“It's all about equality … Feminism means that every woman has a choice, whether it concerns her body, intellect, the ways she walks, or the way she talks.”76

“To participate in life. It's a human right to be and to act – to participate ... I prefer to deal with human rights and citizen's rights.”77

“I don't like it ... I prefer equality, human rights for women.”78

To be regarded, in the Egyptian context, as pointed out by my informants and detected in the quotes above, is that the term feminism was generally viewed as controversial. Even persons who struggled for women's rights or for what could be called feminist goals may not have favored “feminism” as a term. What was perceived as its message though, the meaning of feminism in society's view, did not seem to be as controversial (not to imply that feminist politics would be non- controversial). I interpret it as meaning that the use or non-use of the term feminism was of secondary or strategic importance, i.e., many of my informants would simply avoid using the term

69 Samia, 8th of March 2012 70 Dina, 18th of March 2012 71 Safa, 6th of March 2012 72 Khaled, 23rd of March 2012 73 Karim, 28th of March 2012 74 Rania, 25th of March 2012 75 Marwa, 8th of April 2012 76 Farida, 4th of April 2012 77 Sara, 12th of April 2012 78 Nehad, 10th of April 2012 38 because it could stir too much negative attention or associations. As Sohaila pinpointed it:

“...some of the women's rights advocates would be very reluctant to call themselves feminists, in some circles. And for me... Generally, if we are sitting in such a context, I would say of course I'm a feminist, but I will not say I'm an extreme feminist. You know when you say you are a feminist, everybody would say 'ah, you want to abolish men', for example ... you know those extreme things. And I say, no, I'm not like that, for me the term means, this very simple thing, that I would not want to be underestimated just because of my sex. Full stop. And you know whenever I say that, people are like 'okay, then we are all feminists'!”79

The quotes above imply goals or aims for feminism or women's rights struggles. The expressed aims, gender equality, women's rights and human rights, political and economical participation, citizenship, emancipation, independence and freedom of choice and recognizing that women's rights in fact are compromised, correlate to a large extent with an agenda of universal human rights and the CEDAW. The CEDAW above all stresses equality between men and women and the right of women not to be discriminated against. Also, choice, (economic) freedom and independence are expressed as main objectives,which connotes Mahmood's vision of feminism as agency – the ability to act according to one's own accord or have the opportunity and choice to lead one's own life. There are, however, some hints of limits to this, as “women's freedom to do whatever they want” is negatively implied (Rania's quote p. 38), although it remained unclear to me where this possible limit to women's freedom was drawn, or why it would be. What this highlights, though, is that these stated general and universal aims may be perceived or visualized in specific ways. For example, “equality” was by several of my informants clearly disassociated from a male standard:

“...of course there are differences between the sexes, but these differences do not make someone better than the other. We are different, but we are not better, like there is an apple and an orange, which is better? No! They are two different things...”80

In other words, equality does not or should not imply dissolving gender differences. This is also implied in Samia's quote (p. 37-38) when she states that feminism is “the right to be a woman”. Gender differences, whether biologically or socially explained, were clearly recognized and appreciated by at least some of my interviewees. Such a position is contrary to some feminist theories that do in fact visualize an elimination of the differences between the sexes or rather that all differences we see are basically constructed and that in reality there are not really any differences between the sexes. As reviewed in the theory chapter, the CEDAW has been criticized for denying gender differences (p. 32-33). On the other hand, there are feminist theories that elevate the differences between the sexes, for example “women's natural nurturing role”, and picture gender differences as equally worthy but non-competitive 81. So, although there were clear references to CEDAW and universal human rights in how my informants perceived feminism, there were also deviations from such frameworks more consistent with its critique.

My point is here that even though general terms such as equality, human rights or women's rights, consistent with a human rights framework are used to describe feminism and women's rights, they may hold specific, contextual or individual meanings. However these feminist positions (or aims), may not necessarily differ from feminist positions on a global scale – that is, they are not the same as everywhere else but may be conceptualized as equally diverse as anywhere else, in accordance with various feminist theories and positions. There are indeed standpoints that are (superficially) “universal”, i.e., referring to global or general theories, frameworks or positions, but their content and meaning have to be further analyzed. It can be done by looking at the particular issues,

79 Sohaila, 8th of March 2012 80 Sohaila, 8th of March 2012 81 Gemzöe (2003) p. 38-40 39 problems and obstacles that are brought up in the present circumstances. Such insights may further an understanding of why certain aims are proposed. How are women's rights and feminist concerns contextualized?

“The political outset of the country” Many (if not all) of my interviewees made an important point of putting “issues of women's concerns” in a greater context, as part of or consequential to societal problems and needs. This is one way “Egyptian feminism” may be framed. I was indeed reminded of the very concrete economical and political prerequisites any political struggle taking place in Egypt today (also after the revolution) has to relate to. Egypt still belongs to the developing countries of the world. The legacy of imperialism and autocratic regimes, which have certainly contributed to poverty and corruption, still inhibits its inhabitants from securing basic human needs and citizenship.

“I guess basically the issues that are also important for men. The very general issues. I mean, having a president, social equality, social justice, basically all the revolutionary demands that have never been achieved so far. In Egypt, every citizen is discriminated against by some way or another, even if they are upper class, middle age, Muslim men, they are also discriminated against by way of the political outset of the country, but some people are more discriminated than others ... Because there is social injustice basically everybody is discriminated against.”82

“There is a lot of illiteracy. Knowledge based on hearsay is common, as people cannot verify, cannot read for themselves what they are told. When I hear something, I can question it, demand proof, ask from where somebody read this, and read it for myself. But the majority of women accept what they are told. Illiteracy is a major setback for women's rights!”83

“The inequality is between my family or families like mine and the majority of the people that would come to more than 90 % of the population … So many people are still living under the human level, pre-human, are treated like that.”84

“I don't think ordinary women lack interest, passion or concern. It is a question of 'Do I go sell my vegetables today so I can feed my kids, so they can go to school, so I can buy them water to drink, or do I go to Tahrir Square to discuss politics'?”85

“It is a problem to talk only about “political rights” in Egypt because people don't care, they don't support it when they have no work, no money. The issue is not only about political rights but social rights and democracy to ensure those rights …to protect democracy you have to give people a reason to believe in democracy.”86

“...what I recognize in the villages is that men do not object to women working. They have no objections to the work of the women. They do not object it, because they have the reward, but if you come to tell them 'let her go for elections, and let her go and vote', he finds it useless. Why should she go out? What is the return of it? You understand? And I think this is, pretty much, poverty.”87

“The great setback for women's rights” due to the general situation does not mean, however, and neither did my interviewees imply, that women are not subjugated to particular (gender)

82 Sohaila, 8th of March 2012 83 Samia, 8th of March 2012 84 Karim, 28th of March 2012 85 Farida, 4th of April 2012 86 Khaled, 23rd of March 2012 87 Rania, 25th of March 2012 40 discrimination. Some groups are indeed more discriminated against than others, and, importantly, some groups among women (and men) are more discriminated against than others. This is acknowledged in the quotes above and could be interpreted as an indirect critique of CEDAW which assumes women to be a homogenous group. Egyptian society is deeply diverse and a substantial list of rights may not be sensitive enough to various needs and desires within a population. Discrimination occurs also according to such factors as social and/or economical status and religion even if we should not presume exactly how such discrimination occur.

Legal contexts Many of the issues reviewed in the previous chapters (“Background” and “Current considerations”) were brought up by my informants as issues of concern: the need to reform some of the laws such as family law, the penal code and employments laws, to establish particular laws that protect women from gender-related threats such as rape, sexual harassment and domestic violence. The right to education, work, divorce, to participate in politics and to obtain leadership positions in society, to establish equality before the law in general, in theory and in practice, for all Egyptians. The discrepancies between the law and its implementation, the corruption of the legal system as a whole, not only in regard to women's rights, were expressed as important issues of concern. In general, many of the issues were expressed as legal concerns, either as non-existent or unfulfilled rights. Such stances are in accordance with the CEDAW, which is a fundamentally legal instrument for advancing women's status and situations and which frames women's (and societal) concerns as legal.

Issues of concern were not exclusively expressed as legal, however. In fact, some of my interviewees claimed that the law was not the main obstacle in achieving or advancing women's rights or that the law was not necessarily the means by which legal (or other) concerns should be addressed or reformed. It may be interpreted that law, at least under the current circumstances of an unreliable juridical system, is an unsatisfactory framework to propose or advance women's status and rights. It could reflect a larger (global) situation where the law and legal system(s) have been subjected to feminist critique for being male biased and drawing an invisible but quite tangible line of division between the private and public sphere of life (p. 32). Thus, the relevance of law in connection with women's rights was questioned or at least nuanced. It may not necessarily mean that law was dismissed as irrelevant, but perhaps as not enough, or unsatisfactory as a method to advance women's status and situations:

“Well, according to our constitution and laws, women have the same rights as men, in almost everything except getting married to four men. According to the constitution, according to the rules so many rights are given, including the right to vote and to be elected to presidency, but what is happening now, we have five female candidates for presidency who are applying. I do not expect any of them to get it. So it is not enough to get the rights on paper, according to law, according to constitution. What is needed more is to change the social cultural milieu or atmosphere and keep pressing in order to realize those rights you got on paper. This is very important, and this needs a great effort on part of the feminist movements in order to realize that. To work not only on this specific gender, but work on the culture, work on the minds of the people, whether men or women … Because there is some culture still prevailing that does not accept even among females that the president be a woman”.88

“...things will not happen by legislation or constitution. You just need to overcome the culture, and that's also my main field of interest. Like, for example, as long as someone in the street is saying of a brave girl that she's 'worth a hundred men', then we still have a problem no matter what our constitution says or no matter what the law says. Our constitution is very female friendly. It doesn't have anything against women. It says everybody is equal and so on,

88 Karim, 28th of March 2012 41 but this is not what's happening on the ground … You know as long as that is in the mind of the people, in the culture, in the background, even in the discourse, the language used, then this is reflecting a problem, and we still need to work on that.”89

Thus, what was identified as the reason behind the lack of implementation of (women's) rights or even proposed as the main concern regarding women's issues in Egypt was culture. In fact, all of my interviewees in one way or another related women's concerns to “culture” – as an obstacle to advance women's status. Using the “cultural explanation” in this way, my informants tuned in with a chorus of critique that is sometimes issued from committees monitoring the human rights situation globally (see p. 34), which perhaps is telling of their own origin from or familiarity with the international community. However, “culture” in itself is an unsatisfactory explanation as to why feminist demands or women's rights are resisted. “Culture” is not static to its content, as argued by Merry and An-Na'im (p. 34). Various and contradicting values are contained within the one and same culture – it is an internally contested concept. Hence “Egyptian culture” (in itself) cannot be understood to be opposed to women's interests – neither do I suggest that it was in this way my interviewees intended it. Rather, I interpret it as something within the culture, certain aspects of the culture that worked against women's interests. Therefore, I tried to assess what my interviewees meant with “culture”.

Patriarchal culture I interpret that what my interviewees actually meant by culture was more specifically patriarchal culture in its various manifestations. Patriarchy is generally defined as a societal system which builds on men's dominance over women. Patriarchy is a universal phenomena present to a lesser or greater extent in different cultures, hardly confined to an Egyptian context, although it may take on specific, contextual or cultural forms 90. “Patriarchy” or “patriarchal culture” was explicitly mentioned by a few of my interviewees, although simply “culture” was more often referred to. However, I am still inclined to interpret it, broadly, as patriarchal culture. One way the part of the culture which impeded women's rights was described was as hierarchy and male dominance:

“We have to understand that we are also a society that does not allow discussion, by nature. The father gives orders, the mother is giving orders and the children are obeying or disobeying the orders. Afterwards, they are used to this. Look at the schools. The schools are giving the students orders. They go to the university – the professors at the university are giving orders. We are an 'army style' society … We are a society where the young have to respect the old. By fact. And if you don't do this, you lose your credit, your respect in the society.”91

“...'I order and she obeys!' This is patriarchy. Until now, they don't have in mind that things can be discussed with his wife.”92

In the first quote, it is suggested that obedience is perceived as equivalent to “respect” in Egyptian society. Obedience to and the honoring of hierarchies could thus be connected to generally esteemed societal values – you gain respectability by respecting and appropriating your place on the “social ladder”. Importantly, it is also pointed out that women are not only subjected to but are part of the hierarchal system – women appropriate their assigned positions and status, e.g., as “mothers” and exercise their “right” to pronounce orders (to children). The hierarchal culture subjects (among others) children to the dominance of their parents, students to that of their teachers and wives to that of their husbands (as implied in the second quote). The perception of obedience as

89 Sohaila, 8th of March 2012 90 Gemzöe (2003) s. 46-47 91 Dina, 18th of March 2012 92 Rania, 25th of March 2012 42 respect may imply that it could be socially difficult to deviate from the social norms of hierarchy. Thus, hierarchal (and male biased) systems or culture are sustained also by women, by society as a whole, by individuals and collectives of men as well as women.

Several of my interviewees in fact informed me that: “Women are the biggest problem for women's rights!”93. I interpret it as the patriarchal culture is supported (also) by women in general. It was not always clear which kind of or groups of women that were referred to in this regard; it might have been women of the popular classes or uneducated women. However, I am inclined to interpret that my interviewees rather than a certain group of women referred to certain values incorporated and advanced by women – something which I see could happen within virtually any category of women. In other words, both men and women (in general) are active in the creation of a hierarchal and male biased culture(s) – including gender ideals:

“Women themselves are building ignorance! Upper Egypt is very conservative, women there teach that men are higher than women. This is common among women in the south. Normally women are the ones that trigger honor violence, not men, and if the men don't implement it, women will kill the man for not doing that! …the main problem is women. They are protecting the discrimination system!”94

Other statements also express why women would actively contribute to protecting cultures or systems of gender discrimination. That women have incorporated (patriarchal) values of female inferiority may offer a partial explanation, according to the quotes below:

“But at the same time women themselves, because I think the most failing thing is if women themselves do not want to be considered as equal – and this unfortunately is something that has been engraved by religion, by media, by education – all these years, and we have to undo it, and it will take a long time.”95

“This happens everywhere and in every case, not only with women because what determines your attitude towards something or your behavior or action is the state of your consciousness or the state of your mind, and your mind is not made by you, your mind is made by the whole circumstances you are living in. Your mind, or your consciousness-formation depends on your education, on your economic status, on your ideology, of course on your location in the society, on your profession, the kind of media you have access to.”96

Stated another way, society in general with its institutions and authorities has imprinted in women (and men) certain (patriarchal) values. However, the view that women have incorporated patriarchal values was somewhat nuanced during another one of my interviews, as the problem was not posed as women's lack of awareness, but rather as a lack of incentives to act:

“All women care, but they are different in culture. Some women are brought up to say yes, and because they experience harassing in the streets, consequently, they begin to bring up their daughters to fear men and teach them that it is better to stay at home. They quit understanding their situation in society and they give up fighting these things and they teach their daughters to stay home.”97

The quote above may imply that compliance with patriarchal norms are not (at all times) dependent on sympathy with its values, but to (strategic) personal interests. Mahmood alerts us that acting 93 Khaled, 23rd of March 2012 94 Khaled, 23rd of March 2012 95 Farida, 4th of April 2012 96 Karim, 28th of March 2012 97 Layla, 1st of March 2012 43 within patriarchal norms does not necessarily imply lack of autonomy – and, furthermore, agency is not equivalent to acting specifically; it could also be a conscious decision not to act (as exemplified in the quote) 98. I interpret the above statement to mean that (some) women may have given up fighting against discrimination or oppression because it seems too overwhelming a struggle and other ways of dealing with the situation are preferred. A patriarchal culture or gender discriminatory systems could also actually be actively and consciously supported by women because they perceive them as being beneficial. For example, according to Egyptian family (Shari'a) law, in marriages a husband is alone obliged to provide for wives and children while the wife has no such legal duty (even though her corresponding duty is to be obedient to her husband) 99. This is an evident or explicit example, although women may also benefit from gender discriminatory systems in other, more subtle ways (further investigated below).

My point here is that the widespread hierarchal and male biased (patriarchal) culture that obviously is present in Egyptian society may actually, at least in some instances or by certain groups, not be seen as a problem or obstacle to obtaining rights and freedoms, and it certainly does not exhaust the possibility of women's agency. For feminist and women's rights proponents, however, the patriarchal culture is identified as a major obstacle to establishing formal, institutionalized and equal rights of women, and when such a culture is popularly supported it is telling of what they are up against.

Acting within patriarchal norms Several of my interviewees in fact highlighted Egyptian women's non-submissive positions in society: in one way as various high level professions are occupied by women (such as judges, ministers) and as providers of their families, and in another way as women employing strategies to outmaneuver, compromise or corrupt the patriarchal culture in which they are situated in order to realize their rights and interests:

“Since 1919, women gained a good deal of their rights, up until 2011. They got the rights for education, they got the rights for work, they got the rights for voting first, then they got the rights for being candidates and being elected and for representation in the parliament and for high-rank positions in the country. So they became ministers, although the number is few, but they got it, you see. Last but not least, they became judges in Egypt.”100

“But I feel that in Egypt women have power. They are running the whole thing. Their husbands run away or don't do anything. Women provide for the family and raise the kids. They are running the economy. It is a patriarchy, but there is a strength and autonomy in women. The welfare-system has provided women with rights in Europe, but it doesn't mean that they are more emancipated ... In Europe you have rights, but there are subtle ways of submission! That is obvious here, but subtle in Europe … My grandmother was horrible and my grandfather a little man – that was a matriarchy. There are forms of domination that are interesting to study”.101

“Women learn that women need to take their rights – but not by equality but by manipulating! … They have been raised that way – that you get your rights by controlling your man. This is a historical fact also in the West: women have been controlling the men in power behind the curtains, literary. This mentality is hard to change.”102

98 Mahmood (2005) p. 5-7, 17-18, 23-24, 34-35, 188 99 Network of Women's Rights Organizations (NWRO). Legal guide for developing a more just integrated family law. Second edition. December 2011, p. 30-31 100Karim, 28th of March 2012 101Safa, 6th of March 2012 102Khaled, 23rd of March 2012 44 As Mahmood importantly notes, which is actualized here, women's agency may occur within patriarchal norms, i.e., hierarchal and male biased cultures do not necessarily render its subjects helpless, non-independent or un-free 103. There are subtle ways in which women may submit to but also dominate in patriarchal structures: the above quotes expresses that women have learned to realize their rights in other ways than legal or formal, e.g., by manipulation – which indicates agency. Hence it may not be presumed that women lose their autonomy even in a strong patriarchal culture. The last quote even suggests that women may not be willing to give up traditionally employed strategies to counter their position in society in order to gain more equality, legal or formal rights.

In a way, such a stance is understandable against the background of a malfunctioning or biased juridical and governing system where Egyptians in general and perhaps women in particular for generations in fact had to (and still) rely on personal networks or economical status in order to realize their rights and interests and the great part of the population that does not have such assets to give up or find alternative ways. There would simply be no reason for women (or for society at large, for that matter) to rely on state institutions in order to realize rights or improve their situation – or such reasons have yet to appear. There may (understandably) lay a fear in giving up a “system” that works in exchange for something new and untested or previously unreliable. It may also be that state regulation of “private matters” (under which women's concerns often fall) is still perceived both by men and women as an intrusion into private life, which is why related issues are preferably dealt with personally (see p. 27-28).

I would put the preference of informal ways to realize rights and interests in the context of a strongly hierarchal and male biased culture which generally favors men and persons of high positions (economical and social status) and disfavors others. Anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod has also suggested that the “production-site” of “women's rights” may have been disconnected from the women it actually targets, i.e., the state, NGO's and the international (donor) community that during the past years at large have been commonly responsible for the drafting of the agenda of women's rights and concerns may have more or less been departing from their own agendas of interest rather than the women they were supposed to benefit, or goals have been compromised by other interests necessary to take into account 104. This would mean that the state or NGO's would not have been sufficiently competent to comprehend the needs and problems of women that they targeted so that these women would not have had any reason to turn to these actors in order to realize rights and interests but continued to employ informal and traditional strategies. This situation was also recognized by one of my interviewees when we discussed the women's rights movements in Egypt:

“ ...we really have to revise our approaches and methodology a lot because we have to admit we failed. We failed to reach so many women. There are many reasons for that. I mean, we should not really only blame ourselves because we were all involved in getting donors’ money and that would take like 70 % of our time, and then when we implement projects we have to finish it within the two years that the donors want to see something has happened – so there is no time actually to talk...”105

The quote pinpoints how the women's rights movement may have failed to reach the groups it has targeted. Neither the state nor the civil society have constituted resources or platforms by which problems could be solved. Hence, familial or informal means to realize rights and interests “by agency” seem continuously to be a strategy employed in Egypt.

103Mahmood (2005) p. 153-155, 167, 173-175 104Abu-Lughod (2010) p. 1-15 105Marwa, 8th of April 2012 45 Gender stereotypes Another way feminism was contextualized (or possibly, yet another outcome of a patriarchal culture) was through gender stereotypes. The images of women in society as portrayed by the media, educational systems, religious institutions and last but not least by men and women themselves were mentioned in my interviews as a rather serious issue of concern, ultimately impeding the advancement of women's status and situations. Re-occurring themes during my interviews particularly were marriage and divorce as themes connected to stereotypes of women:

“This is how society sees the woman: mainly as a mother, mainly as a wife, not more. Not as a worker, not as a journalist, not as an activists for political rights.”106

Marriage (and subsequent family life) was depicted in society as the main interest in an Egyptian woman's life. That women (regardless of class) marry and have children be the main occupation, personal interest and vision for life is an expectation of women, by women and men. This generally held expectation impedes other visions for women's lives. Consequently, there is a social stigma, not of minor significance, connected to unmarried or divorced women. To choose not to marry or to divorce is often thought inconceivable. It is a social stigma of (highly) varying degrees according to other factors such as social class, status and location in society, but I had the impression that it is a stigma that virtually all (unmarried or divorced) women would face to some extent. For example, some of the women I interviewed who were unmarried or divorced would themselves bring up personal experiences of familial and societal expectations connected to marital life (naturally, although I did not further investigate this, other and possibly more grave implications for women of other classes would be expected):

“Women are oppressed by their families, not only by the society. By families: in some areas, women are not allowed to study or to go to school. They are secluded. To marry and bring up children is the only thing in life for them. By society: how society regards unmarried women – this view has to be changed. Normal life does not mean to marry and have a husband. There are good role models regarding this, but still women are not considered complete if they don't get married … In fact, a divorced woman in real life is regarded by society as a bad woman. They never think that she might be maltreated ...but they ask themselves 'why she is divorced?' And the answer is always 'of course, because she did something wrong to her good husband'...and they always think that the husband is a good person even if they don’t know him.”107

“And there is no tolerance with divorced women in the Christian community. It is more stigmatized to be divorced as a Christian than as a Muslim woman. There is a big question mark around divorced women because the only reasons she could have gotten divorced were because of either adultery or there was a problem with the contract – and everybody will think it is because she is an adulterer … And even if Christian women do get a divorce they cannot marry again. It is against the church.”108

Familial and societal expectations (or stereotypes) that women marry and dedicate their lives to family life could impede their possibilities to participate in other things in life such as pursuing a professional or political career. Professional women or women in politics could even be viewed suspiciously because they are presumed to have “given up” family life, according to one account 109. The importance of married life and motherhood for women ought to be easy to recognize also cross-culturally – it is hardly a phenomena peculiar for the Egyptian context. The reference to 106Nehad, 10th of April 2012 107Leyla, 1st of March 2012 108Sara, 12th of April 2012 109Tammemagi-Abuelnaga, Ulle. How Women's Participation in Politics is Perceived by Egyptians. Conference paper at Young Voices, University of Tartu, Estonia. 27-28th of April 2011 (unpublished) 46 women's contribution to society as mothers has even been used as a feminist strategy to legitimize demands on women's rights 110. Thus, “women as mothers” may constitute a double-edged sword, serving both to perpetuate gender stereotypes and to enhance women's status in society. In my interviews, however, the image of women as married and mothers was mainly brought up as an obstacle to other imaginings of women. Other, anthropological research carried out in Egypt also stresses that motherhood even constitutes identity characteristics for women in Egypt essential for being considered an adult or even a person 111.

Other examples of how women were affected by stereotypes were also given. Sohaila, when I asked her to elaborate on what she meant when she said that culture was the main problem of women's rights in Egypt, replied:

“There isn't an overwhelming culture that is against women. In fact, I cannot say that. It would be unfair to say that, but it is a culture that... If you're a woman, you need to be really, really good at what you're doing so that you are recognized, and when you are recognized, you are not recognized as a woman, you are recognized as good person, but when you are bad, you are recognized as bad because you are a woman. For example, this is a very simple example: a woman driving a car. If she does a wrong thing, everybody would say, you know 'women, they cannot drive'. But …if she observes everything, no one would say 'women are good drivers', but 'this person is a good driver' … When you are good, you just transcend those [gender] differences, but when you are not, those differences are there. You need to be really good in order for you to be recognized. Not accepted, but I mean realized, and that you are applying your space which is right for you. But when you are not, no one would just give the space for you.”112

Thus women, in contrast to men, need to “prove themselves” to a great extent. A woman's space is observed as righteous only if she appropriates it in a demonstratively good way. The metaphor of women as bad drivers seems to me to be an almost universal gender stereotype. The CEDAW recognizes gender stereotypes as a form of gender discrimination because they constitute a force in society that may restrict women's enjoyment of their fundamental rights. The fact that CEDAW elaborate on the potential and actual harm of stereotypes may underline what a concrete and persistent obstacle against the advancement of women's status they actually constitute 113. It is evident that many of my informants considered gender stereotypes as obstacles to feminist visions and women's agency.

Yet, although gender stereotypes were declared obstacles to women's rights and feminist goals, gender differences were affirmed, even elevated, by some of my informants (as “the right to be a woman” and “keeping femininity”, p. 37-38). However, proclaimed gender differences have often formed the very basis for the legitimization of women's inferior position and, indeed, stereotypes. Traditionally, specific gender characteristics, regardless of whether they have been motivated as biological or sociological differences, have been coupled with certain values and estimated as being positive (male) or negative (female). Thus, there is a danger of perpetuating gender hierarchies in defending or arguing for gender differences. This potential conflict was not highlighted or problematized by any of my interviewees. The issue of gender differences, to elevate or deny them as means of advancing women's positions, actually continues to constitute one of the central dilemmas in feminist thought, and there are no consistent or conclusive answers as to the most

110Gemzöe (2003) p. 39-40, 101-103 111Malmström (2009) p. 136-137 112Sohaila, 8th of March 2012 113Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women New York 18 december 1979, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cedaw.htm accessed on 14th of May 2012 47 favorable way to deal with this problem 114.

My point is that it could (possibly) prove to be a difficult case to argue against gender stereotypes while “defending” gender differences and to differentiate between stereotypes and differences as they often are interconnected at some level. The practical meaning or implication of gender differences was not, however, further discussed during my interviews though the (positive) reference to gender differences may imply that the elimination of gender roles, as the CEDAW actually proposes, may not be a universal vision for (all) feminists 115. In the end, it is hard to say anything conclusive of my informants' positions regarding the subject of gender roles and differences although they identified stereotypes as a serious problem.

Interpreting the religious context Religion in general and Islam in particular have often in the West and in liberal feminist theory been accused as being responsible for the inferior position of women in religious (or Muslim) societies and communities 116. I will therefore here clarify and further a discussion that none of my informants regarded Islam or Christianity (religion) per se as contrary to feminist interests and demands. This was a point that was particularly emphasized by several of my informants, and this discussion may further distinguish particular feminist positions taken in Egypt.

“If you talk to Western feminists, they obsess over religion and Islam, but these are not the issues, and they are not the pressure points of change. It is not about religion; it is about society.”117

In this first quote, the relevance of religion as an issue for feminist demands is questioned. My interpretation of this statement is that the status and situations of women in Muslim societies cannot (exclusively or mainly) be adhered to religious issues and Islam. It is suggested that interpreting women's status as consequential to religion is detracting the attention from the “real” issues which are found in general societal concerns.

“In Islam, women and men are equal. Islam gives women many rights, but the Islamists misinterpret. It's not the correct Shari'a … Women are equal to men [in Islam]. They have the same rights. If man is cheating, God punishes man and women in the same way, but in Egyptian law women are more punished.”118

Above, Layla clearly demonstrates a perception of Islam and Islamic law that does not discriminate between men and women. She separates “the correct Sharia” (or her perception of it) with how Islam is interpreted by “Islamists” and Egyptian legislation. In other words, she transfer the “blame” of the unequal treatment of women in Egypt from Islam itself to various actors in society that are interpreting its message. In her view, Islam (in itself) does not constitute an obstacle for feminist demands or women's rights. My other interviewees expressed themselves similarly, as they also differentiated between religion (how it “truly” is to be understood or their own interpretation of it) and how religion is used by various forces or actors in society:

“In general, in Arab-Islamic culture, when legislators are men – like anywhere in the world – women are not supposed to be on equal footing with men. This is not according to Islam!

114Freedman (2003) p. 17-23 115Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women New York 18 december 1979 (Article 5a) http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cedaw.htm accessed on 14th of May 2012 116Mahmood (2005) p. x-xii, 1-5 117Farida, 4th of April 2012 118Layla, 1st of March 2012 48 Women according to Islam have rights. It's not a religious thing. It’s a cultural thing.”119

“...in Egypt, you choose what you want to follow in the religion, not what the religion says. For example, the 'father of the Salafists' preached that you should only take one wife: People followed him on every word – except on that single point! They would still take four wives.”120

“I fight a lot with my church, about our image of God, what is legal and illegal, about how we transfer our image of religion to children … God created me as a free human, so I have the right to do what I chose to do. Jesus never controlled the church. He died because of the church! He never controlled women's lives.”121

My interviewees did not pose themselves or their political views as contrary to their faith but rather against what they saw as misinterpretations or misuse of religion. Misinterpretation or misuse in turn they saw as emanating from a male biased culture or simply from individual action. Hence, it was recognized that religion was used by anti-women's rights and anti-feminist forces such as male legislators and “Islamists”. However, the concept or category of “Islamists” was also nuanced. It was recognized that not all Islamists are anti-women, nor are all of them are men, and some of my interviewees made a differentiation between Islamists who belong to the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists – the former more “lenient” in their politics (or “women-friendly”) than the latter:

“...the rise of the Islamic – or rather conservative groups, because they are not Islamic, they are extreme conservatives...”122

“There are two types of Islamists, though: The Muslim Brotherhood are moderate, generally good people. The Salafist's have made some strange speeches in the Parliament...”123

“Also, there is this concept that all Islamic trends are basically against women. Of course some of them are really fanatical, but not all of them.”124

It was a personal impression that quite a few of my interviewees did not want to recognize persons affiliated with radical or extreme Islamism as Islamic at all – i.e., they did not consider them representative of Islam itself and made a point of differentiating between their own faith and how political Islam was proposed in some instances. In these instances, such “Islamists” were seen as working for their own political agenda of achieving or enhancing personal power or privileges. So, when “Islamists” are mentioned in these quotations, it should be understood in this context: “Islamism” is a contested concept, and “Islamists” are in any case a heterogenous group, but in the sense many of my informants used these terms, it was actually not to denote Islam as religion but rather radical groups or individuals using Islam for their own ends to legitimize their politics.

I interpret it as religious interpretation, and devotion, at least in part, was seen as a choice – “you choose what you want to believe in, in Egypt” (Khaled's quote above). There are indeed multiple, and at times contradictory, interpretations of, for example, Islamic law, even if different strands are more or less dominant or influential, and there are principles in Islam (talfiq) which emphasize the freedom of Muslims to choose among various interpretations 125. If religious interpretation or use of religion is seen as a choice, then it indeed becomes inconsistent of, for example, Western feminists to attack religion itself for misogyny – then it is rather to originate from the interlocutor of the

119Samia, 8th of March 2012 120Khaled, 23rd of March 2012 121Sara, 12th of April 2012 122Dina, 18th of March 2012 123Laya, 1st of March 2012 124Sohaila, 8th of March 2012 125Mahmood (2005) s. 85-86 49 religion. Agency is thus actualized in this discussion of how religion is appropriated and understood, and my impression is that religion in an Egyptian context is highly “agency-oriented”. In the further discussion on feminism in Egypt, a point of departure is thus that the religious context does not exclude feminist positions: religious beliefs and feminist positions can co-exist peacefully and may be mutually supportive ideologies, depending on choice and interpretation. However, that is not to say that the religious context would be superfluous in interpreting feminist perspectives in Egypt.

Translating “women's rights” In fact, it was observed by some of my interviewees that the work of advancing women's status and situations necessarily involves the inclusion of religion or religious language – to a smaller or greater extent. Such a (perceived) need ought to differentiate feminism in Egypt with how it is conceptualized in other, secular countries and contexts. The necessity of invoking religion could be understood against the religious landscape that Egypt constitutes:

“Because almost all people believe in the religions, and they like to live as the religions say, as Muslims and as Copts, not only Muslims. Egyptians actually from the Pharaohs’ period have a God and speak about God – before any concept about any Gods. This is something from 7,000 years ago. So it's hard for Egyptians to live without a religion. It’s a concept in Egypt…”126

Referring to religion was expressed as making women's rights comprehensible and legitimate in society. This implies (just as Islamists were referred to as using religion for their own ends) that religion constitutes a source of legitimacy in the Egyptian context. In Merry's wording, religion may constitute the idiom for translating universal human rights values 127. Although, as I understood it, all of my interviewees were generally positive towards referring to religion or invoking religious language as a strategy to advance and support women's issues, opinions differed as to what extent this should be done:

“Religion should not have a place in the debate on women's rights, but one has to be aware of religious implications. When you use religion as a framework, it is easy to fall into controversies. It is complicated to re-interpret and controversial to determine what was intended. It is mainly an academic discourse — rhetoric, not practice. The majority of the population cannot appropriate it ...in the end, different groups are sharing interpretations in line with their own agendas, which may or may not have basis in religious texts.”128

“We don't need to say 'these concepts are from UN'. We need to say 'it is right! It is religious' … I cannot use CEDAW as a concept when I talk to normal women. No word about CEDAW. I speak in Islamic terms, and I read about this because the real Islam supports women. The problem is not in Islam, but the theories and the stories provided by Islamists and Saudi Arabia … I talk about human rights, rights as human beings.”129

The second quote illustrates the importance of using local terminology. It should be noted here that (“the real”) Islam is expressed as an equivalent to universal human rights. Hence it was proposed both that women's (human) rights, their values and ideals be advocated in “language” accepted by society at large, i.e., religious language, but also that a foundation of such ideals were to be found in the religious sources themselves. This proposal is consistent with Merry's theory of translating human rights and may support her hypothesis that the rights do not lose their value or meaning in

126Nehad, 10th of April 2012 127Merry (2006) p. 1-3, 221-222 128Farida, 4th of April 2012 129Nehad, 10th of April 2012 50 the “translating” process; they are just “tailored into context” 130. On the other hand, as illustrated in the first quote, others I interviewed were more restrictive in their approach towards invoking religion in feminist discourse because they thought it made advocating women's rights more difficult due to the various and contradicting interpretations that exist. Therefore, two of my informants did not regard Islamic feminism (p. 24-25) as particularly useful in promoting feminism and women's rights. Although they acknowledged the work of such scholars, they pointed out that it was still a relatively new area that feminists have entered and still too academic to be appropriated by “ordinary people” – and indeed by feminists like themselves:

“...there are beautiful verses in Islam as in Christianity, like 'women are equal to men', but this is not the issue because we are not talking theory but practice, what is happening on the ground… The Islamic feminists have done very good work, but it is still very academic, and they are not really into simplifying their work for those who work using the approach like myself, gender and development-approach. How is this to be simplified when we talk to Islamic people? Because the Islamic feminism is not in contact with ordinary people. Maybe one time there will be such cooperation, but I don't see it now. The other [feminists], the majority, I don't see it as they are excluding the religion. As far as I know, we still say [religious] things – because we all studied Islam in school, and we read the Qur'an, and some of us are better than others in remembering the hadith's, and we use it sometimes when we think it's going to have an effect.”131

Hence, there was a general consensus among those I interviewed that religious language could be useful – on a “superficial” level in the political project of advancing women's status. However, going in depth in religious interpretation was by a few noted as affiliated with certain (potential) complications, such as the risk of endless argumentation about the correct interpretation, and that carrying out such debates required a very high level of knowledge on religious and legal matters by which you could actually not connect to “ordinary people”. There is thus an ambiguity to be detected in translating women's rights through religion: it may or should be used to make women's rights locally comprehensible and legitimate – but not “too much” in order avoid going into controversies and perhaps risking “losing the battle”.

The process of translation may also exemplify how, in Merry’s terms, a “double consciousness” is enacted. Those who seek to and succeed in translating universal human rights values must also be in contact and see conjunctures with local and cultural expressions, contexts and values. There is a built-in ambiguity also in this process – balance must be sought between leaning on local, cultural or traditional values (for cultural legitimacy, further discussed below) while at the same time challenging them, presenting human rights values (of feminist ideologies) as (the better) alternative. Merry recognizes that “double loyalties” (to the local/traditional and the universal/new) may in fact be an effective strategy to advance culturally challenging issues without losing credibility. It does not mean that political visions are lost but that they instead are advanced strategically 132.

Reaching cultural legitimacy I interpret it as my informants to a large extent prioritized cultural legitimacy for their demands. It could be noted in their proposals of advocating women's issues little by little, using “non- confrontational” (sometimes religious) language and avoiding controversies in general:

“Concepts are important because it is a religious society, an oriental society, a traditional society – we need to resist the traditional, but gradually.”133

130Merry (2006) p. 1, 222 131Marwa, 8th of April 2012 132Merry (2006) p. 220-223, 229 133Nehad, 10th of April 2012 51 “But me personally I wouldn't use a controversial discourse. I would try bit by bit because using that you go very clearly against the tide, and you get stuck. I would try to transmit the very same ideas but in a lighter wording.”134

The political project of advancing women's status in Egypt may generally be considered a sensitive or even controversial issue. That is detected in public discourse, (patriarchal) culture, legal discrimination and heavily impacting gender stereotypes, as reviewed earlier. Hence a strategic approach towards addressing women's status and situations was generally advised by my informants, e.g., that certain rhetoric be avoided while others be embraced, or that politics in practice consciously deviate from the political visions in mind, in order to advance issues gradually and to enhance popular support. This kind of approach connotes with An-Nai'm's theory that social reforms must be grounded locally to be legitimate, coherent and sustainable 135. Perhaps such an approach emanates from an awareness of or historical experience that rights on paper are not necessarily the same as rights in real life and that Egypt in many instances has been governed, rather than by the rule of law, by social values and informal codes of conduct (see p. 26) – thus imposed legal rights might not have the same power of enforcement as “social laws”. The “strategic approach” could as a matter of fact also imply a fear of or uncertainty towards breaking with social and cultural taboos. The preference of “a lighter wording” might be coupled with the perception of feminine morality in general, an unwillingness to deviate too much from ideals of, for example, modesty 136.

The advantages of a strategic approach was though further commented in some of my interviews. Even though it may not have been perceived as particularly constructive for the cause, even though my interviewees themselves did not incorporate or propose such strategies, a few of them nonetheless expressed appreciation of radical or more confrontational approaches towards advancing feminist demands. More precisely, appreciation was expressed towards the life and deeds of Nawal El Saadawi (p. 25). It should be noted that most of my interviewees, even those who acknowledged her work, did not regard Saadawi as “representative” of the feminist movement in Egypt due to both the particular issues she had advanced “before her time” and to the way she had proposed those issues. Some even regarded Saadawi's work as more damaging than beneficial for the feminist political cause:

“I don't like her. She's an ego-maniac. She started the movement but only wants to be a star”.137

“Here, the majority of people don't like her. She is too extreme for them. I don't have a problem with her, but it usually provokes an aggressive response to discuss her”.138

“I admire her, but she is not representative for feminists – she is a secularist, and women in general here are not.”139

Hence, what is expressed below should probably be regarded as the exception rather than the rule.

“I agree with much of what she says …I also think that because society perhaps has gone so far on an extreme level that someone must appear and say to them in the face the very extreme on the very other level. Like if someone is slamming someone on the face. Of course it is not nice to slam someone in the face, but it is needed. So, I think we need someone like

134Sohaila, 8th of March 2012 135An-Nai'm (2008) p. 24-26 136Mahmood (2005) s. 23, 155 137Safa, 6th of March 2012 138Khaled, 23rd of March 2012 139Samia, 8th of March 2012 52 her, and I'm very happy she's doing what she's doing because, yes, some groups in the society really need to hear that voice. What they are doing is also extreme fanatic on the other side. It is only a reaction, mind you. If you are doing something crazy, do not expect something rational. If you are crazy, then we are crazy too.”140

Here it is suggested that even though it might not be the constructive way to advance women's interests, such radical role models as Saadawi may constitute important contributions to the feminist struggle because they “take the other side of the extreme” like “a needed slap in the face”. Even though my interviewee here did not herself appropriate “extreme strategies” – she even recognized that they might not be worthwhile (see Sohailia's quote p. 50) – she nonetheless expressed her appreciation that they existed. I would suggest that her viewpoints are not to be regarded as contradictory but rather as complementary: that there may be a need for various approaches as to address feminist concerns. Another of my interviewees also commented defiantly on the generally perceived “radicalness” of feminism in Egypt: society's view on the one hand of feminism and on feminist demands as radical is here objected to and indicates a rebellious stance towards “cultural legitimacy”:

“Women's rights are supposed to be natural and basic, but they are conceived of as the most radical thing. What is so dangerous about feminism? About advocating for education? About women's full participation?”141

Although “being strategic” in posing feminist political demands was the common proposal, “radicalness” was not totally rejected by all. In any case, this discussions points at what importance agency plays – how demands are posed in language, behavior and concepts, in the political project of feminism in Egypt. I do not suggest that agency is irrelevant in advocating feminism in general or in other places, but I do recognize that the individual agency (of activists or feminist NGO's) was referred to more than, for example, the responsibility of the state or international community which actually had been more in line with my expectations. Perhaps that is more telling of my personal origin from a functioning state with an explicit ambition to promote gender equality. Anyhow, feminist discourses in Egypt emphasize agency and individual responsibility as political strategies.

The Egyptian Revolution was indeed also an outcome of individual and collective action, of internal struggle and a manifestation of political will. This chapter has provided a context for and content of women's status and feminism(s) in Egypt, in general, or “before” the revolution. This review accentuates the interrelations with societal (including political) concerns, situatedness within a patriarchal and religious culture, and stresses the agency-oriented (in contrast to, for example, legal) approach to advocate feminist demands and women's status. In the following chapter, some (perceived) impacts of the revolution, with respect to women's status and feminist struggles, are distinguished.

5.2 Revolutionary prospects My informants expressed a wide range of opinions and positions regarding the revolution and women's status and situations. While it was recognized that the revolution indeed had created a space and an opportunity to raise feminist or women's rights concerns, opinions differed to a great extent as to how the space of opportunity had actually been maneuvered and whether or not the opportunity was seized or lost. Even though somewhat withholding their expectations, my informants could be said to be more or less optimistic (or pessimistic) for the near and far future, and they emphasized or appropriated various perspectives of the revolution. I do not necessarily consider them (all) contradictory, but they differ in points of view.

140Sohaila, 8th of March 2012 141Farida, 4th of April 2012 53 “The barrier of fear has been broken” Recognized by nearly all of my informants and strikingly expressed in almost the same wording was that after the revolution the “wall of fear is gone”. It was expressed that Egyptians now to a larger extent than before enter streets, political discussions and debates, and that they are no longer afraid to speak their minds; the general participation of women and men in society increased. The broken barrier of fear seemed to be general in society but might have had particular implications for women as a group:

“The most important thing that I see in the revolution is that many people now feel that they have rights, something that was not there before. People were really scared. They accepted being humiliated much more easily. Now, no. I see many people are very assertive of their rights – I would like to see more within women's groups, and hopefully that will happen one day, but also I see very young women coming to Tahrir from governorates, being assertive of their political rights and women's rights, and I don't think that these women will go back to their families and accept being circumcised or accept being married when they are 13 years old, so I think there will be, whether we like it or not, change, especially with the younger generation.”142

“The revolution’s contribution to women's rights is enormous, in fact. First of all, it broke the barrier of fear and it gave all the women of Egypt, of all ages and from different religions the opportunity to actively participate in one of the events never preceded in history in Egypt, the revolution, and they participated in all the levels … Also, it gave a big stroke to the patriarchal kind of authority – the fathers’ authority, the sheikhs, the kabilah, the big man, something like that. Also, it gave them hope for the future. All the Egyptian women were actually affected, except of course those who belonged to the regime, such as Susanne Mubarak and other wives of the corrupt regime-men, and all those who benefitted from Mubarak's regime.”143

“The unique thing that has happened in Egypt is that people felt 'Oh, my God! I went there, and I made a difference because Mubarak is gone'. What a fantastic example! The dinosaur is gone. People have that sense of pride now. They believe they can actually make a difference because there was a result. This propels people to continue the fight, knowing that change is possible and that there is precedent for it.”144

“Now Egyptians participate in everything. There is no fear, at least at some levels, but at the same time some people think they can do whatever they want!”145

“I do believe it has very much contributed to reviving both the feminist movement and the student movements. Before the November events, there were all those women in the streets, all those photos we have been seeing and all those voices. All those kinds of things. Even if we do not have a formally announced feminist movement, but all that spirit that it has revived... Even on the very simple level... we now see girls joining sit-ins for days and weeks, not caring about her parents shouting at home and calling her and she doesn't answer... My mother doesn't even object anymore to me joining protests because she knows I will go anyway. Even on that level, you know breaking all those patriarchal rules – by patriarchy not just masculine ones but social ones as well.”146

Here, my informants referred to the general context(s) or culture(s) of hierarchy and male 142Marwa, 8th of April 2012 143Karim, 28th of March 2012 144Farida, 4th of April 2012 145Khaled, 23rd of March 2012 146Sohaila, 8th of March 2012 54 dominance that penetrates Egyptian society and how such cultures were undermined in connection with the revolution. The hierarchal kind of authority was attacked, whether sprung from patriarchal or social values (expressed as disobedience of the father as well as the mother, for example) – and importantly women participated in this attack. As reviewed earlier (p. 42-45), women (and men) undermining or countering patriarchal cultures (though manipulation, etc.) in order to realize their interests is nothing new in the Egyptian context – however, in the revolution, this was performed publicly and explicitly (further elaborated below). Social and patriarchal conventions and taboos were broken in society at large and “politically” (criticizing the authority) but also on a micro-level in the families. The image of women – and self-image of women – was challenged, as it was “not in society” to see women so demonstratively make demands in the public, and perhaps this initiated a process of questioning yet other taboos:

“We have been brought up and told that there are things that we just cannot do, we are not able to do that – and, then, voila! We can do it! So, why have you been telling us that we cannot? Now, we are questioning. Now, this is the mind-set of someone who has not been thinking about that before. They have been telling us a bunch of things, and none of it has been proved right. They have been telling us 'the revolution will not happen' – and it happened. They have been telling us 'we cannot overthrow the dictator' – and we did it. They have been telling us all sorts of things – and the list is getting longer and longer! And among the list is that women are not able to do anything, but we are now able to do all kinds of things. There isn't anything that we cannot do … This breaks the rules 'you cannot do that, women cannot do that' – no, they can! Just give them some of the space, and they will surprise everyone, including themselves.”147

The revolution hence illuminated some images of women as stereotypes and might have initiated a process of social and cultural change in this regard. This would provide an example of how cultures can be contested, challenged or changed “from within” in accordance with Merry's anthropological notion of the concept of culture 148. The potential initiation of change “from within” may here not only refer to (cultural) change within a nation but also within a person. The quote above expresses just this – if given the space, “we will surprise even ourselves”. In other words, the revolution, as a “window of fearlessness”, may have provided an opportunity to explore and expand behaviors, independence and choices – agency.

Expanding agency During the interviews, I further inquired if and how my interviewees themselves had experienced any personal change due to the revolution which would possibly further define or exemplify implications of the revolution:

“…some of the things I thought I couldn't do, I did. I always thought of myself as a very sensitive, timid girl, and I've got myself shouting to people in the streets. On the 25th, I shouted to a police officer, and I was like 'what did I actually do'?”149

“Before, I was like any girl from Upper Egypt. I come from a conservative community. I came to Cairo to study. To be on the streets was terrible at first, but after sleeping together with men at Tahrir square, have made new areas to open up. Now, I don't feel it is an effort to be in the streets. Now, I feel there is no problem because there is another big problem we need to work on. Being on the street feels comparatively small to those bigger issues … I am hopeful. Not because of the situation but because we have to be hopeful. Those who are pessimists are

147Sohaila, 8th of March 2012 148Merry (2006) p. 228 149Sohaila, 8th of March 2012 55 afraid of changes. Every change has its risks, but I'm not afraid.”150

“I've always said my opinion, pre- and post-revolution. But I will no longer keep quiet if someone oppresses me as a woman. I will not accept it – I wouldn't have accepted it before, but even less after the revolution.”151

“It gave me hope, actually, that things could change. Before the revolution, I did not have much hope that things would happen during my days… The most important thing that see in the revolution is that many people now feel that they have rights, something that was not there before. People were really scared. They accepted being humiliated much more easily. Now, no.”152

“With the revolution, the society is more dynamic, the street is dynamic. More clashes will come because things have changed. Something has changed: people have lost their fear, people have died, been killed, but they ousted the regime, and now they are not afraid to express their demands.”153

The quotes above I would interpret as affirmations of agency. My interviewees expressed that after the revolution people in general or they themselves are more self-confident, independent and assertive of their actions. As earlier reviewed in this thesis, agency may play a role of how rights and interests are realized in “non-formal” ways in Egypt (p. 44-45). However, I would suggest that the affirmations above indicate a more “public” character of agency. The agency expressed in the quotes here is not manipulative nor is it intended to go unnoticed – it is rather an indication of a “dis-covered” agency in the public sphere. I would interpret that the revolution contributed to uncovering and stimulating political (public) agency – not only concerning women but perhaps with particular importance to women. Generally, imaginings of women's lives are heavily circumscribed by gender stereotypes (see p. 46-48). In the revolution, though, women exposed themselves as protestors and political opponents. New imaginings for behaviors, freedoms and the future seemed to have opened up.

Contextualizing the feminist project after the revolution The revolution (may have) made it necessary for feminist activists and organizations to reconsider their strategies and agendas to adapt to a new or different political situation, or the revolution (possibly) revealed a disconnection between the society and feminist demands. This was an important point made to me during one of my interviews:

“We have to get sophisticated enough to understand that the dialogue cannot just be among ourselves. Activists speaking with activists will not do anything. We need to go into the local communities and address the men, women, and children there. Find out about their situation and identify what they most need or want to see changed and why. How many of us to go villages? How many of us really take the patience and the time to understand and to adapt? … You have to link what is happening at the parliament level to what is affecting and impacting ordinary people and everyday issues they face. Don't talk to them about re-inventing the Shari'a. Keep religion out of it. You have to make sure you address concrete issues in a way that is direct and meaningful. Our visions should be representative of their passions, inspirations and concerns. Once you can build this relationship, this trust that you care about and can affect and impact the issues they are most concerned with, then you can begin to grow this coalition, building campaigns to help, support, and lobby for reforms needed. This is the

150Sara, 12th of April 2012 151Samia, 8th of March 2012 152Marwa, 8th of April 2012 153Safa, 6th of March 2012 56 beginning of a movement! The term 'movement' refers to motion. In this movement, we have moved masses of people, not just into action but into emotion. That was what the revolution was about. Dignity was so personal, social justice was so personal, and this is what brought men and women to the streets and made them fearless. We need to sustain this connection, going forward, so that the changes we enact are supported at the very basic level by the people they will most impact.”154

Feminist and women's rights agendas in Egypt, as they have been articulated for decades, may actually not resonate with the issues that many Egyptians, women and men, experience as problems. This was recognized also by others of my informants. One important note in the above quote is that feminist and women's rights agendas need to engage more in procedure than in substance – to find out what the actual concerns are of the women that are targeted by various organizations and institutions. That is to contextualize, as Mahmood argues, even on a small scale, the political project of feminism. Mahmood argues that feminist agendas cannot be prescriptive, for example, as a substantial list, and be applied at any given situation or context 155. One of my interviewees self-critically remarked that the feminist movement (before the revolution) was not particularly political. Naturally, which was also acknowledged, under Mubarak political involvement could not be carried out without restrictions and was connected with certain risks, thus impeding developing relevant feminist politics:

“What I see for us, my generation and maybe the little bit older generation, we have not addressed politics very much. We only focused on how to safeguard women's rights, how to call for gender equality. And not being very outspoken about politics … Now I see my generation and the little bit older one, and of course the younger, very much involved in politics. We talk very much about the constitution in general, we talk about women in the constitution, we talk about election, we talk about presidential candidates, we also have our views in politics and we also try to link women's issues into it, but we never worked in politics as much as we do now.”156

“Feminists are not political enough. They don't have the patience to learn and adapt to new ideas. They are impatient. There is a very thin line between fanatics – fundamentalists, Islamic/Christian—and feminists. These groups have a lot in common in the sense that they are focusing on one thing consistently and obsessively. They are working in a certain box, and this is how others relate to them as well.”157

Political restrictions under the Mubarak regime thus (logically) circumscribed the work of feminist activists and organizations. However, this might not be the only explanation of the suggested “disconnected” or un-contextualized feminist movement. A point argued by several of my informants (also suggested in the last quote above) was that feminist concerns have not been personal or represented adequately because they had been too focused on women. The exclusive focus on women's issues may have created a distance to people in general (men and women) for whom many other problems in society are much more tangible and urgent to address than abstract democratic or political ideals. My interviewees stressed earlier that feminism(s) cannot be conceptualized outside the given social and political contexts (p. 40-41). Marwa, in the first quote below, expressed it as a “lesson learned” in the revolution. Feminist and women's rights issues need to be made understandable in the life-world of “ordinary” women and men. Feminists can no longer talk only about the status and situations of women only but need to put such problems in a greater context:

154Farida, 4th of April 2012 155Mahmood (2005) p. 2, 4-6, 10-12 156Marwa, 8th of April 2012 157Farida, 4th of April 2012 57 “...normal people had really gotten frustrated, 'women, women, women, and women must work, and women must vote, and women' – you know. Talking about [only] women has really sort of created a reverse thing … And I think we learned a lesson. Since the revolution, we are talking about everyone … We are talking about equal citizenship, rights, equality and citizenship. We are talking about non-Muslims and that they too have rights, we are talking about women and we are careful in all our arguments, like 'women are not represented but also Christians are not represented' ... So, I think that we are not only talking about women's issues, but we are talking about all political and economic issues as well. I think there's is a much better way of addressing these issues now than how it was before.”158

“The old feminists want to work on the personal status laws or family law. It seems like women have separate rights. Why should we have a separate council for women when they are citizens? Now we need to participate, to protest, to be in those risky areas men try to control for themselves. Family law is important to change but there is also a need to change criminal law, tax law, labor law – Egyptian law on the whole needs reform! It was written 1923, based on French law. You cannot just take one article and amend it because the law on the whole will counter it … Now, we need to build the constitution, we need to stress that it expresses the rights of humans, not of men … We have to change our demands, asking for women's rights equals asking for citizen's rights. It is not longer to demand specific gender rights but to see things from a gender perspective.”159

Critique of “particularizing” women's rights resonates with critique that has been expressed towards the CEDAW, i.e., creating a “particular” agenda for women's rights carries the potential of separating them from human rights: The acknowledgement and protection of women's “particular” rights reinforces the male standard of the human subject and perpetuates gender hierarchies 160. At the same time, however, it can indeed be argued that women do have particular needs, as women as a group are subjected to particular threats. This internal contradiction or “feminist paradox” is still a dilemma within feminist thought. A further challenge in this regard ought to include how to “make politics” of interest and relevance to all women-groups in society. “Politics of difference” emphasizes that identities are social constructions and subject to change which (possibly) makes an unstable ground for political struggle 161. On the other hand, it is necessary (as raised by my informants) to take into consideration that Egypt is a diverse society. Adopting a gender or citizen's perspective could be seen as a response to these dilemmas. One of my interviewees did, however, have another response to how to make “feminist politics of difference” or how to reconcile politics with differences:

“It is difficult. We realize that some of the issues cannot be of interest to everybody, but still they have to be addressed. For instance, the constitution is not a priority issue to a woman in a remote village in Upper Egypt. She would like to see how they are going to survive… And we have to realize this … But, for instance, something like family law – it affects everybody, it affects every family, it affects children and so on. So, maybe this is the one that we should be focusing on, how to reach every woman if we can, or different groups of women, with that. In family law itself, some of the issues are more important to rural women, to educated women, to non-educated women and so on, but the whole thing actually needs to be addressed … what are the things that would really bring everybody together, and what are the things that we, who are little bit more privileged, could take on our own to do? … I think the issue of work also …the right of women to work, to have equal pay, the right to be protected in the informal

158Marwa, 8th of April 2012 159Sara, 12th of April 2012 160Buss & Manji (2005) s. 109, 111-113, 116-120, 123 161Gemzöe (2003) p. 155-156 58 sector, there are so many issues I think the majority would be agreeing on.”162

Above, Marwa suggests that political struggles may have to be divided into different struggles, according to group or identities. A collective identity may be a prerequisite for political struggle – however, identities may also be appropriated for a political cause. Anthropologist Gayatri Spivak called this strategy for political struggles strategic essentialism. This does not mean that identities are permanent or fixed but that they are (temporarily) used for a specific cause 163. How various feminist activists and organizations choose to move forward in a new political context in Egypt; whether it be continuing with a substantial agenda, arguing out of citizen's or gender perspectives, building coalitions with others (appropriating a collective ideology) or accentuating their own political struggle, they may now at least have greater prerequisites to do so, i.e., (supposedly) after the revolution the possibility to contextualize political projects ought to have enhanced.

“The same men, but with beards” Khaled exclaimed:“Now, Egypt is ruled with the same mentality – it's the same men, but with grown beards!” 164. He expressed what several of my other interviewees also noted, namely that nothing in essence had changed after the revolution so far. It was expressed that even though the Mubarak regime appeared secular for the outside world, it had always been more or less in agreement with, informed or influenced by religious authorities (see p. 23). Hence, with an Islamist-heavy parliament, nothing had really changed, or it was expressed that the revolution, due to the emergence or increase of conservative groups, actually had created a backlash for women's rights. Many expressed either anxiety or disappointment because of the political developments after the revolution and had a restrained outlook on the future.

“We expected that the revolution would give a really good space for women and an excellent opportunity to ask for what they hadn't achieved before. Very quickly we noticed that we were day-dreamers. Why we were day dreamers? First, the rise of the Islamic – or rather conservative groups, because they are not Islamic, they are extreme conservatives; and the un- unified messages from the feminists and the women's groups gave a backlash ... So, the un- unified, the contradicting messages, gave a chance for the conservative groups to say 'Look! The feminists themselves do not know what they want!' … It's a missed opportunity. Right now, I think the Egyptian women are missing the opportunity … This is what is happening on the political level. Well organized groups in front of unorganized groups … And then they blame the government, they blame the SCAF – no, I think we have to blame ourselves first. Let us be organized, let us have one voice and let us blame people afterwards.”165

Dina in the quote above remarked on the fractured feminist and women's rights movement. She was not alone among my interviewees in her viewpoint that the feminist and women's rights groups are really the only actors in Egypt who are interested in safeguarding or pushing for women's rights (including new liberal parties and human rights organizations). Yet furthermore, Dina insisted that the responsibility for advocating and implementing women's rights was actually only the women's rights groups – in contrast to stressing the responsibility of such actors as the state or government or the international community, on which the human rights framework really relies 166. Even though she referred to, used and perhaps envisioned women's rights as defined by CEDAW and international conventions, she did not in practice have any expectations that they would be ensured as implied by such a framework. I would suggest that this is telling, again, of a strongly agency influenced view of the feminist project, where neither responsibility nor expectations are transferred

162Marwa, 8th of April 2012 163Freedman, Jane. Feminism – en introduktion. Liber AB. Malmö. 2003, p. 134-135 Morton, Stephen. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Routledge. London. 2002, p. 72-76 164Khaled, 23rd of March 2012 165Dina, 18th of March 2012 166Ljung (2004) p. 23 59 onto other actors:

“Who is the government? The government at this stage is not going to do anything. Apart from the constitution, the parliament is the main role player, and the parliament is the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist. Look, yesterday there was an announcement from the Salafist that it is against the religion to have the picture of women on ID-cards … It's ridiculous. I was shocked at the announcement … So, this is the sort of thing that we are facing … If you are not calling for your rights, who are going to call for them? The international community can help but cannot stand and say 'we are protecting women's rights'. They [feminist and women's rights groups] have to protect it. NGO's are helping, giving them support, documents, but if they cannot speak up… I'm sorry, it's going to be their problem.”167

“The only means to achieve what we want is to mobilize, continue pressuring and sacrificing to get what we want. Liberty, equality, freedom, social justice, gender equality are not given by someone to you, you have to take it! You have to force them to give it to you. No one will give it to you voluntary. Without this, you will never get anything.”168

The positions expressed in the quotes above may demonstrate again, in Merry's wording, how human rights impact as culture rather than rights 169: universal human rights could work as theoretical principles or visions for a good life, though in reality, rights are not expected to simply be given through legal frameworks. In Egypt, according to my field experience, the state or government was hardly regularly referred to as the safeguard of people's rights which also ought to reflect the experience of Egyptians for generations whether the rulers have been colonizers or natives. Human rights and freedoms may thus provide a vision for political struggles, but they are not taken for granted, and not presumed to be implemented by those in power, and certainly not by those in power at the time the interviews were conducted. None of my interviewees expressed any high or appreciative opinions of the representatives in power in the first elected parliament. On the other hand, positive sides of this fact were also noted:

“The Salafists and Muslim Brotherhood that have come to power are definitely anti-women. They are not only anti-women, they are anti culture, too, and pro-censorship, but these are not new features in Egyptian society. There are still good sides with them coming to power as they will demonstrate who they really are.”170

“First of all, it is not the Islamic trends that are anti-women, it is the culture. This parliament is only a reflection of the culture, bot the culture, but the culture that has won … I think the parliament is not representing the country in any way – not just women, it is not representing young people, it is not representing the revolution in the first place. It's not a representative parliament. So, I just don't care about the parliament now. They have not been representing me in any sense.”171

“The Islamists have come to power, and I think it's both good and bad: good, because they have been deprived of their political rights and regarded as terrorists. Now they have a chance to prove that they are good people. Bad, because there are some narrow-minded people and we don't know what will be next.”172

“Actually, it started to change because the belief in the Islamists came back, a little bit, because

167Dina, 18th of March 2012 168Karim, 28th of March 2012 169Merry (2006) p. 4, 14-16, 36-37, 218-219 170Safa, 6th of March 2012 171Sohaila, 8th of March 2012 172Layla, 1st of March 2012 60 of their actions in the political life. Some people start to see them as liars.”173

Detected in the quotes above is again the nuancing of Islamism – the disassociation of Islam as “anti-women” and the differences of views within the Islamist movements (see p. 48-50). Nonetheless, the parliament, in spite of democratic elections, was not regarded as “representative” according to my informants. That my informants did not feel represented in the parliament may also be indicative of their own political or ideological positions but also in regard to social classes, i.e., even if they did not vote for them, a majority of Egyptians apparently did. Sohailia makes an interesting remark (quote p. 60) that the parliament represents “the culture that has won”, indicating a persisting or predominant culture that disfavors women. Thus, contrary to my previous interpretations (p. 55-56), the revolution may not have set in motion any cultural change. Generally, it was noted that nothing of substance had changed after the revolution or that if it did it has not been to the advantage of women. On the other hand, the “anti-women trends” that had been exposed during the events of the revolution may have created a counter-reaction and increased demands and interest in women's rights – or that was at least an observation by one of my interviewees:

“…I see more women getting together and being organized than before. After the revolution, women or especially young women were not for addressing women's issues at all or gender equality issues because we would have democracy soon and a very good regime that would call for gender equality which would be realized later. But it's not happening, and that is why much more now I see that groups of women and especially young women are joining, I don't want to call it yet a movement, but more are joining others and sort of asking or having the same demands. So, it is actually mushrooming. I have an optimism of seeing this quantitative- wise enlarged and also being more organized than before.”174

Here, again, is the newly found fearlessness of expression highlighting the expanding space for women's roles and political participation – in spite of culture disfavoring women persisting. It is suggested that as women have started to break with conventions and taboos anti-women trends are actually providing fuel for further political engagement. This could be an effect of the after-quakes of the revolution, but it could also be indicative of a trend that will eventually spread or penetrate the culture. Change of cultural attitudes might take a long time, but “individual culture” is presumably subjected to rapid change. Individual actions and patterns of behavior of some women might at least have changed, according to my field research, but there are also other accounts: one of my interviewees informed me of a news flash of a woman underwear store owner who had in the face of being threatened by a self-appointed group of “moral police” attacked them and chased them out of the store 175. This story could be a confirmation of the expanding spaces that women are appropriating after the revolution, though as several of my interviewees also stressed, there are “no guarantees”.

173Nehad, 10th of April 2012 174Marwa, 8th of April 2012 175International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association ILGA, Egyptian Women Cane Morality Police, 15th of January 2012, http://ilga.org/ilga/en/article/nm1Hmxg1Bw accessed on 13th of August 2012 61 6. Conclusion “Feminism” and “women's rights” in Egypt may in essence generally be conceptualized as human rights and women's rights in accordance with the universal human rights framework and international conventions such as the CEDAW. Other “universal” concepts such as equality, choice and independence are also used to describe feminism or the aims of the political project of feminism in Egypt. However, how these universal concepts are understood may be in accordance with particular cultural or individual perceptions or contexts. Their actual meaning cannot be presumed beforehand. Moreover, there is no single, unified feminist movement in Egypt – but multiple feminist positions are appropriated, according to various theories and orientations within feminist thought. Feminism(s) in Egypt thus, may not differ from how feminism is conceptualized in other places, but they are informed by its given, particular contexts and may share some common features departing from those contexts.

One way feminism in Egypt may be distinguished is through its connection with the religious context. Egypt is a religious society, and religion in fact constitutes a source of legitimacy in various respects. Many feminist and women's rights activists thus draw upon religious references in order to legitimize their political goals and demands. Sally Engle Merry proposes that human rights values, in order to be understood and implemented locally, can be translated into context, using conjunctures with the local culture 176. In Egypt, “religious language” or speaking in religious terms, is a strategy to advocate women's rights and feminism, but religion (Islam as well as Christianity respectively) also constitutes a source to discover values that could be labeled as “feminist”. There is no consistency among Egyptian feminist proponents as to what extent religion can or should be used in order to advocate feminist concerns, though there is a general awareness of the religious implications of such work. Importantly, the adoption of religious views may also (at least partially) be seen as a choice – “you choose what you want to believe in, in Egypt” – which is why religion (be it Islam or Christianity) is not seen as inherently anti-women. Saba Mahmood alerts us that automatically connecting religion with misogyny is stereotyping and simpleminded, and such views risks that we erroneously connect female religious devotion to victimhood 177. Religious forces in Egyptian society opposing women's rights and freedoms are not viewed as representative of the religion itself but rather as being representative of predominant patriarchal or misogynic cultures (or simply motivated by personal interests in power or prestige).

Feminism in Egypt may be highly agency-oriented. There is an awareness and historical (and present) experience of laws on paper are not being equivalent to rights or freedoms in real life. Therefore, people in general, but perhaps women in particular, may have learned to realize their rights and interests in “informal ways”, relying on agency. This might have been necessary to counter an ever present, culturally, legally and religiously penetrating patriarchal culture – defined as hierarchal and biased towards the male. As Mahmood also notes, though, even a strong framework of patriarchal norms does not exclude women's autonomy 178. Although a strong patriarchal culture may circumscribe the lives of Egyptian women, it does not render them helpless or unfree. Universal human rights may function more as moral or cultural visions rather than law, as Merry suggests 179. Women's rights are not suggested to be enforced primarily as law, as implied by the human rights framework, since that may actually not create the desired effect in reality. Instead, address and reform of the (patriarchal) culture that is impeding the advancement of women's status in real life is proposed as a method to enforce or implement women's rights and freedoms, and culture is primarily changed through individual agency. Similarly, on a political level, feminist and women's rights activists in Egypt emphasize the responsibility of individuals and

176Merry (2006) p. 1, 28, 77, 134-139, 229 177Mahmood (2005) x-xii, p. 1-10, 38-39, 195-199 178Mahmood (2005) p. 5-17, 34-39, 188-192 179Merry (2006) p. 16, 19-21, 89-90, 102, 227-231 62 collectives of (feminist) women and men in regard to promoting women's rights and freedoms. There is an acute awareness or perception that arguing for women's rights and drafting a feminist agenda is an interest contained within feminist and women's rights groups or other proponents of women's rights – in contrast to a common state or policy interest.

The Egyptian revolution accentuated and possibly expanded (women's) agency. The Egyptian Revolution of 2011 was an outcome of internal struggle and individual and collective effort. The main achievement in the revolution has been expressed as “the wall of fear was broken”. In the revolution, patriarchal cultures of hierarchy and male dominance were publicly and vehemently opposed, and importantly, women took part in this opposition. During the revolution itself, women transcended gender roles, disobeyed social and patriarchal norms and conventions of female behavior, and thus exposed some images of women as stereotypes. Women exercised their autonomy, though not in informal ways, but publicly, exposing themselves as political participants, contrasting expected roles of women. It could be said that they moved from an individual and informal agency to a collective and public agency though in reality the revolution also created a backlash for women's rights. Soon after the former president Mubarak was ousted, women's public and political participation were discouraged, and women were urged to “go back home”. However, it might have been too late to dispute women's presumably newly found public agency, as an anti- women discourse in fact may have stimulated quite a contrary effect, noted in an increase of particularly young women turning activists and joining feminist and women's rights groups. It would seem that after the revolution, women are not as easily intimidated as before.

The Egyptian Revolution of 2011 may parallel some historical experiences made by feminists and feminism in Egypt. For once, given the origin of the struggle for women's liberation in colonial discourses, feminists still fight to validate their struggle as culturally relevant. “Women's rights” were first publicly promoted in Egypt by British colonizers as part of legitimizing the colonial project in general and hardly with a genuine concern for or interest in women's situation although even after social and political struggles to advance women's status were pursued domestically, opponents of social reforms could rely on arguments that such struggles were “culturally foreign” or “imperial” and not applicable in the case of Egypt 180. This continues to be an argument, which is why feminist and women's rights activists have continually had to engage in debates to prove their policies “authentic”. However, arguments of both “foreign-hood” and “nativeness” rest on void assurances that cultures are fixed in time and space. On the contrary, as Merry also argues, cultures are internally contradictory and change with time 181.

Egyptian women's political engagement goes further back then the Revolution of 1911, but this may have been the first time women of all classes in large number broke with social conventions of female seclusion. Women were also welcome to participate in nationalist demands of independence, though their political rights were denounced once (formal) independence was gained in 1923. As independent struggles, the advancement of women's rights and freedoms were resisted 182. This historical experience seems to have been repeated in the present-day revolution. Feminist struggles have historically mainly originated from an “elitist” point of view, i.e., it is women of the affluent classes that have drafted the feminist agenda, somewhat detached from the realities (needs and interests) of the lives of women of the popular classes who still constitute a majority of the population 183. This may still be a feature of some feminist and women's rights organizations. At

180Ahmed (1992) p. 127-129, 149-155, 162, 167 181Merry (2006) p. 14-16, 228 Abu-Lughod (2001) p. 106, 110 Ahmed (1992) p. 236-237 182Ahmed (1992) p. 169-173 Badran (1988) p. 24-27 183Ahmed (1992) p. 225 Badran (1988) p. 28 63 least until the revolution, the project of feminism may not have had the prerequisites to be particularly political – for example, because an autocratic regime has for a long time put obstacles in front of any political movements. After the revolution though, feminist groups and organizations may have better prerequisites to politically address men and women, taking into greater consideration the general national and social struggles and injustices than before – in other words, to further contextualize their struggles. The Egyptian Revolution of 2011 may have created some additional space for feminist and women's rights struggles though how that space is appropriated will have to be the subject for future analysis.

Utrikespolitiska institutet (UI) Landguiden: Egypten. Sociala förhållanden, 24th of January 2012, http://www.landguiden.se/Lander/Afrika/Egypten/Sociala-Forhallanden accessed on 19th of March 2012 64 References

Books, articles and reports

Abu-Lughod, Lila. The Active Social Life of “Muslim Women's Rights”: A plea for ethnography, not polemic, with cases from Egypt and Palestine. Journal of Middle East Women's Studies. Vol. 6. No 1. Winter 2010

“Orientalism” and Middle East feminist studies. Feminist studies. Vol 27. No 1. 2001

Ahmed, Leila. Women and Gender In Islam: Historical roots of a modern debate. Yale University Press. London 1992

Amin, Qasim. The Liberation of Women & The New Woman: Two Documents in the History of Egyptian Feminism. Cairo. American University Press 2000

An-Na'im, Abdullahi Ahmed. Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the future of Shari'a. Harvard University Press. Cambridge 2008

Badran, Margot Dual liberation: Feminism and Nationalism in Egypt 1870-1925. Gender Issues. Vol . No 1. 1988, s. 17-19

Women and Radicalization. Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). Copenhagen. Working paper no 5 2006

Bibars, Iman The Doha Debates Experience: Reflections and Lessons Learned. 7th of March 2012. Ashoka Arab World (AAW)

Buss, Doris & Manji, Ambreena (eds) International Law, Modern Feminist Approaches. Hart Publishing. Portland 2005

Center for Egyptian Women's Legal Assistance (CEWLA) The Shadow Report on the Status of Egyptian women in matters of personal status and forms of violence against women according to CEDAW convention. CEWLA Foundation. 2010

Charlesworth, Hilary & Chinkin, Christine. The boundaries of international law. A feminist analysis. Manchester University Press. Manchester 2000

Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) CEDAW/C/EGY/CO/7 Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women – Egypt. February 2010

Dalacoura, Katerina Islam, Liberalism and Human Rights: Implications for international relations. London. Tauris. 1998

65 Freedman, Jane Feminism – en introduktion. Liber AB. Malmö. 2003

Gemzöe, Lena Feminism. Bilda förlag. Stockholm. 2003

Guenena, Nemat & Wasset, Nadia Unfulfilled Promises: Women's Rights in Egypt. Population Council. New York. 1999

Hassan, Hamdi Religion, Identity and Democracy. The Arab Spring: Transition to Democracy at a Crossroads. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). November 2011

Hausmann, Ricardo; Tyson, Laura D; Zahidi, Saadia. The Global Gender Gap Report 2011. World Economic Forum. 2011

Khafagy, Fatemah Concept Paper of the Arab Women Think Tank: Challenges facing Arab Women. Swedish Institute of Alexandria. 16th of November 2009 (unpublished)

Kvale, Steinar. Den kvalitativa forskningsintervjun. Studentlitteratur. Lund 1997

Ljung, Christina. Kvinnors rättigheter – en handbok för aktivister, journalister och beslutsfattare. CEDAW- nätverket. Wallin och Dahlbom Boktryckeri AB 2004

Mahmood, Saba Politics of Piety: The Islamic revival and the feminist subject. Princeton University Press. Princeton 2005

Malmström, Maria Just like couscous: Gender, agency and the politics of female circumcision in Cairo. (forthcoming – title may change). New York, London. Berghahn Books. 2009

Merry, Sally Engle. Human Rights & Gender Violence: Translating international law into local justice. University of Chicago Press. Chicago 2006

Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. Feminism Without Borders – Decolonizing Theory and Practicing Solidarity. Duke University Press. New Delhi. 2003

Morton, Stephen. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Routledge. London. 2002

Nelson, Cynthia . & Rouse, Shahanaz (eds). Situating Globalization: Views from Egypt. Transcript. Bielefeld 2000

Pioneering Feminist Anthropology in Egypt: Selected Writings from Cynthia Nelson. Cairo

66 Papers in Social Science. Vol 28. No 2 & 3. American University in Cairo Press. Summer/Fall 2005

Network of Women's Rights Organizations (NWRO) Legal guide for developing a more just integrated family law. Second edition. December 2011

Newton-Horst, Adele (ed). The Essential Nawal El Saadawi: a reader. London. Zed Books. 2010

Pruzan-Joergensen, Julie Elisabeth. Islamic Women's Activism in the Arab World – Potentials and Challenges for External Actors. Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) Report 2012

Spagnolo, John P (ed) Problems of the Modern Middle East in Historical Perspective: Essays in honour of Albert Hourani. Ithaca. Oxford 1992

Tammemagi-Abuelnaga, Ulle. How Women's Participation in Politics is Perceived by Egyptians. Conference paper at Young Voices, University of Tartu, Estonia. 27-28th of April 2011 (unpublished)

United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Regional Bureau for Arab States, The Arab Human Development Report 2005 – Towards the Rise of Women in the Arab World. National Press, Amman, Jordan. 2006.

UN WOMEN Egypt Country Strategy (unpublished)

World Health Organization (WHO) Eliminating female genital mutilation – An interagency statement. 2008

Internet sources

Ahram online, Egyptian million woman march ends with a gunshot, 8th of March 2011, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/7292/Egypt/Politics-/Egyptian-million- woman-march-ends-with-a-gunshot.aspx accessed on 11th of April 2012

Activists organize solidarity with Samira Ibrahim. 16th of March 2012, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/36912/Egypt/Activists-organise-solidarity-with- Samira-Ibrahim.aspx accessed on 12th of April 2012

Al-Ahram weekly online. Keeping it in the family. 7th of August 2008 http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/909/eg5.htm accessed on 26th of February 2012

Al Akhbar English, Egypt's Military Junta: The road from Hero to Villain. 12th of February 2012, http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/egypt’s-military-junta-road-hero-villain accessed on 12th of April 2012

67 Al Jazeera English Timeline: Egypt's revolution, 14th of February 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112515334871490.html accessed on 14th of March 2012 Women of the Revolution, 19th of February 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/02/2011217134411934738.html accessed on 3rd of January 2012

The labour movement and the future of democracy in Egypt, 11th of April 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/04/20124117523568936.html accessed on 25th of May 2012

The Arab Republic of Egypt, 12th of April 2012 http://www.cabinet.gov.eg/AboutEgypt/Egyptian_constitution.aspx accessed on 12th of April 2012

BBC News: Egypt's Muslims and Christians join hands in protests, 14th of February 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12407793 accessed on 17th of March 2012

Egyptian sexual harasser jailed. 21st of October 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7682951.stm accessed on 26th of February 2012

Egypt's sexual harassment 'cancer', 18th of July 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7514567.stm accessed on 26th of February 2012

Profile's of Egypt's Political Parties, 25th of November 2011,http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15899548 accessed on 12th of April 2012

What will Salafist's election success mean for Egypt? 12th of December 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15899548 accessed on 12th of April 2012

Center for Egyptian Women's Legal Aid (CEWLA) About us, http://www.cewla.org/about_us.php accessed on 23rd of February 2012

The Daily Beast. Suzanne Mubarak: Egypt's Mean Queen. 1st of January 2012, http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2012/01/01/suzanne-mubarak-egypt-s-mean- queen.html accessed on 6th of April 2012.

The Daily News Egypt Egyptian protesters mark Women's Day chanting against SCAF and Islamists. 8th of March 2012. http://www.thedailynewsegypt.com/egypt/egyptian-protesters-mark-womens-day- chanting-against-military-and-islamists.html accessed on 11th of April 2012

Egyptian Center for Women's Rights (ECWR) About us, http://www.ecwronline.org/english/about%20us/index.html accessed on 23rd of February 2012

The cancellation of Women's Quota without alternative legal methods that guarantee women's political participaition is pushing women back to point zero, http://www.ecwronline.org/english/press%20reless/2011/Press%20Release-the%20Egyptian

68 %20Coalition%20for%20civil%20Education%20and%20Women's%20Participation- %20women's%20quota.pdf accessed on 12th of April 2012

The Egyptian Women between the Wings of the revolution and Stripping the Reality. http://www.ecwronline.org/english/press%20reless/2011/Press%20Release-%20English- %20Women's%20Status%20Report%202011.pdf accessed on 12th of April 2012

Exploitation of Women's Voting Blocs by the Religious Movments in the First Round of the 2011 Peoples's Assembly Council Elections, http://www.ecwronline.org/english/press %20reless/2011/English-%20Summary%20of%20the%201st%20round%20of%20the %20People's%20Assembly%20Election%202011-.pdf;

In the first round of the parliamentary election 2011 Women present and absent, http://www.ecwronline.org/english/press%20reless/2011/English-%20Results%20of%20the %20indvidual%20system%20-%20first%20round.pdf; accessed on 12th of April 2012

Less than half-hearted Nominations led to Weak Results Only Three Women Elected, http://www.ecwronline.org/english/press%20reless/2011/English-%20Results%20of%20the %20Party%20List%20system%20-%20first%20round.pdf accessed on 12th of April 2012

Only Six Women in the Constitutional Assembly, 26th of March 2012, http://www.ecwronline.org/english/press%20reless/2012/Press%20Release-%20English-Only %20Six%20Women%20in%20the%20Constitutional%20Assembly.pdf accessed on 12th of April 2012

The Egyptian Gazette Are women loosing their rights?, 25th of October 2011, http://213.158.162.45/~egyptian/index.php?action=news&id=21877&title=Are%20women %20losing%20their%20rights? accessed on 17th of March 2012

Egypt Independent Egyptian women's legal center demands personal status laws for Copts, 2nd of July 2012, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egyptian-womens-legal-center-demands-personal- status-law-copts. Accessed on 11th of April 2012

Who do Egypt's villagers vote for? And why? 10th of April 2012, http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/764101 accessed on 12th of April 2012

Freedom House Freedom in the World 2012, Egypt http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom- world/2012/egypt-0 accessed on 30th of August 2012

The Guardian Arab spring: an interactive timeline of Middle East Protests, 5th of January 2012 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactive-timeline accessed on 7th of March 2012.

Egypt's election results show firm win for Islamists, 21st of January 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/21/egypt-election-clear-islamist-victory accessed on 10th of April 2012

Who do Egypt's villagers vote for? And why? 10th of April 2012,

69 http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/764101 accessed on 12th of April 2012

Egyptian women protest in Cairo against brutal treatment. 20th of December 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/20/egyptian-women-protest-cairo-treatment accessed on 12th of April 2012

Nawal El Saadawi. 8th of March 2011 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/08/nawal- el-saadawi-100-women accessed on 23rd of February 2012

Egyptian army doctor cleared over 'virginity tests' on women activists, 11th of March 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/11/egypt-doctor-cleared-virginity-tests accessed on 12th of April 2012

Women in Egypt get hi-tech aid to beat sexual harassment. 19th of September 2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/19/women-egypt-sexual-harassment-harassmap accessed on 19th of April

Human Rights Watch No joy in Egypt, 25th of January 2012, http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/25/no-joy-egypt accessed on 16th of March 2012

International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association ILGA Egyptian Women Cane Morality Police, 15th of January 2012, http://ilga.org/ilga/en/article/nm1Hmxg1Bw accessed on 13th of August 2012

Karama Voices of Egypt, 19th of March 2011, http://www.el-karama.org/content/voices-egypt accessed on 21st of February 2012

Middle East Policy Council Interview: Egyptian Feminist Fatma Khafagy, Summer 2008, XV, No 2 http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/interview-fatma-khafagy accessed on 8th of April 2012

Minority Rights Group International Gender, http://www.minorityrights.org/6861/thematic-focus/gender.html accessed on 5th of September 2012

Muslimah Media Watch Harassment=jail time! 23rd of October 2008, http://www.patheos.com/blogs/mmw/2008/10/harassment-jail-time/ accessed on 26th of February 2012

The Nation An interview with Nawal El-Saadawi, 21st of March 2011, http://www.thenation.com/article/159362/interview-nawal-el-saadawi accessed on 21st of February 2012

The National Egyptian constitution committee suspended, 11th of April, http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/egyptian-constitution-committee-suspended accessed on 12th of April

70 National Council for Women Presidential Decree, http://www.ncwegypt.com/index.php? option=com_content&view=article&id=47&Itemid=53&lang=en accessed on 7th of April 2012. Nawal El Saadawi webpage Biography, http://www.nawalsaadawi.net/index.php? option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=34&Itemid=54 accessed on 24th of February 2012

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/index.htm accessed on 24th of March, 2012

Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women – General recommendations, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/comments.htm accessed on 21st of March 2012

Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women – Convention, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/convention.htm accessed on 2nd of March 2012

Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women New York 18 december 1979, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cedaw.htm accessed on 14th of May 2012 quotaProject: Global Database of Quotas for Women Egypt, http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?country=69 accessed on 28th of February 2012

Reuters Africa Witness report rioting in Tunisian town, 19th of December 2010 http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE6BI06U20101219 accessed on 7th of March 2012

Sveriges Radio Kvinnlig könsstympning Egyptens skamfläck. 13th of March 2012. http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=1637&artikel=5013490 accessed on 17th of April 2012

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Programme of Governance in the Arab Region. Gender: Egypt, http://www.pogar.org/countries/theme.aspx?cid=5&t=4, accessed on 25th of February 2012

United Nations Treaty Collection Conventional on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 21st of May 2012, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en accessed on 21st of May 2012

Uppsala University Uppsala universitetsbibliotek, 11th of July 2011 http://www.ub.uu.se/sv/Sok/Soktips/Kallkritik-och- vetenskaplighet/ accessed on 16th of March 2012

Utrikespolitiska institutet (UI) Landguiden: Egypten Sociala förhållanden, 24th of January 2012, http://www.landguiden.se/Lander/Afrika/Egypten/Sociala- Forhallanden accessed on 19th of March 2012

71 Politiskt system, 2nd of April 2012, http://www.landguiden.se/Lander/Afrika/Egypten/Politiskt-System accessed on 28th of February 2012

Religion, 15th of March 2012 http://www.landguiden.se/Lander/Afrika/Egypten/Religion accessed on 18th of April 2012

Fördjupning, 16th of March 2012, http://www.landguiden.se/Lander/Afrika/Egypten/Aktuell- Politik/Fordjupning accessed on 11th of April 2012 Egypten: Modern historia, 15th of March 2012, http://www.landguiden.se/Lander/Afrika/Egypten/Modern-Historia accessed on 14th of April 2012

Äldre historia, 15th of March 2012, http://www.landguiden.se/Lander/Afrika/Egypten/Aldre-Historia accessed on 30th of March 2012

Women living under Muslim Laws (WLML) Arab world: Women of the Revolution, 27th of May 2011, http://www.wluml.org/node/7424 accessed on 17th of March 2012

Egypt: Fighting for Women's rights in the Aftermath of the Revolution, 6th of September 2011, http://www.wluml.org/node/7255 accessed on 7th of April 2012

Interviews

Layla, 26 years, 1st of March 2012

Safa, 45 years, 6th of March 2012

Sohaila, 27 years, 8th of March 2012

Samia, 52 years, 8th of March 2012

Dina, 39 years, 18th of March 2012

Khaled, 27 years, 23rd of March 2012

Rania, 77 years, 25th of March 2012

Karim, 75 years, 28th of March 2012

Farida, 45 years, 4th of April 2012

Marwa, 50 years, 8th of April 2012

Nehad, 52 years, 10th of April 2012

Sara, 37 years, 12th of April 2012

72 Appendix

Interview-guide Themes Operational interview questions (optional) 1. Positioning a) Name, age, occupation and religious background? b) Would you like to make a presentation of yourself, describing your background?

2. Political orientation, assessing “feminism” and a) Are you a feminist? (why or why not) “feminist language” b) What is ”feminism” for you? c) In your opinion, what are the issues that needs to be addressed or changed with regard to women's roles, rights, status and situation? (how and why) d) What obstacles do you see for addressing the issues you identified? (how and why) e) What do you think have led you to hold your (political) views? (Upbringing, personal experiences, education etc) f) In Europe and in US, Nawal El Saadawi has received a lot of attention for her political opinions and work, especially after the revolution. Do you think she is representative of the Egyptian feminist or women's rights movement? (why or why not) 3. Revolution, opinion of and assessing spaces a) Did you participate in the demonstrations or engaged in other ways in the revolution? (how and why) b) Do you think the revolution has had an impact on the activities or agendas of various women's rights movements? (how and why/why not) Negative and positive impacts? Short and long term effects? c) Has the revolution changed you yourself in any way? (how and why) d) What are your hopes and expectations for the outcome of the revolution? Fears? (how and why)

73