Religious Education in Russia: Inter-Faith Harmony Or Neo-Imperial Toleration?

Home , Education in Russia, Religious education, Vsevolod Chaplin

Social Inclusion (ISSN: 2183-2803) 2016, Volume 4, Issue 2, Pages 117-132 Doi: 10.17645/si.v4i2.509

Article Religious Education in Russia: Inter-Faith Harmony or Neo-Imperial Toleration?

Elena Lisovskaya

Department of Sociology, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, MI 49008-5257, USA; E-Mail: [email protected]

Submitted: 14 November 2015 | Accepted: 18 February 2016 | Published: 19 April 2016

Abstract This paper explores the approach to religious education that has been instituted in Russia since 2012. The new policy’s manifestly proclaimed goals seem convergent with the values of religious freedom, self-determination, tolerance, and inter-faith peace that are espoused by Western liberal democracies. Yet Russia’s hidden religious education curriculum is far more consistent with a neo-imperial model of ethno-religious (Russian Orthodox) hegemony and limited toleration of selected, other faiths whose reach is restricted to politically peripheral ethno-territorial entities. This model embodies and revitalizes Russia’s imperial legacies. Yet the revitalization is, in itself, an outcome of strategic choices made by the country’s religious and secular elites in the course of its desecularization. Building on discourse analysis of five Russian textbooks and a teacher’s manual, this article shows how the neo-imperial model manifests itself in the suppression of exogenous and endogenous pluralism, cultivation of the ideology of “ethnodoxy”, and in essentially imperialist mythology. The paper concludes by predicting the new model’s potential instability.

Keywords education; ethnicity; multiculturalism; religion; Russia; hidden curriculum, neo-imperialism

Issue This article is part of the issue “Religious Diversity and Social Inclusion”, edited by Gary Bouma (Monash University, Australia).

1. Introduction: How Things May Not Be Quite What Russia’s ‘traditional’ religions—are included. All other They Seem faiths are not. Students can study one of these four religious cultures, choose a survey of world religions, or The drama surrounding attempts to find a place for re- take a secular ethics course. Russia’s rulers, including ligion in Russia’s state-run schools unfolded after the Vladimir Putin, have supported the new curriculum, collapse of the Soviet Union and its official atheism. and there has been a push to expand it. Patriarch Kirill, The drama lasted more than two decades, and involved the primate of the Russian Orthodox Church of Mos- tense debates, competing initiatives, and political cow Patriarchate (ROC MP), recently spoke in favor of struggles. Yet, at least for now, the drama seems to be making the course mandatory for grades two through over. In 2012, a new policy was finally put in place. nine or ten. Since then, Russian state-run schools have taught the Existing literature has focused largely on the history “fundamentals of religious cultures.” The course re- and politics of the struggles surrounding the introduc- ceived approbation in selected regions, where nearly tion of religion into public schooling, and—to a lesser 240,000 fourth graders took it, after then-president extent—on the content of the new course and its text- Dmitry Medvedev authorized the experiment in 2009. books, primarily the textbooks on Orthodox culture. The course teaches four religious cultures. Only Ortho- This literature includes critical commentary on aspects doxy, Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism—often dubbed of the new curriculum and its implementation (such as

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state patriotism and the privileging of Orthodoxy). Yet tutions. This paper incorporates conceptualizations of experts have also emphasized its positive, constructive empire, imperial toleration, and desecularization with aspects. These are said to include consensus building; qualitative discourse analysis of five Russian textbooks an open-minded search for reasonable compromise and a Manual for teachers. The analysis shows how the between the state, religious groups, and educators; neo-imperial model manifests itself in the texts’ content. and—particularly when contrasted with Russia’s past— This article begins by briefly outlining the core ideas the curriculum’s multicultural, inclusive nature. around which a consensus on religious education Such evaluations evoke some of the core values seems to have emerged in liberal democracies. I then that have shaped contemporary approaches to reli- provide an overview of how Russia has approached re- gious education in Western liberal democracies. As will ligious education, how religious education policies have be briefly discussed below, while specific policies have been presented by Russian leaders, and how experts varied historically and cross-nationally, contemporary have identified these policies with modern Western liberal approaches to religious education emphasize practices. This section is followed by an analysis of the multicultural inclusion of diverse religious and secular imperial and neo-imperial political and ideological con- orientations and constituencies into a shared educa- text of Russia’s policies. I build on desecularization tional and public spheres. Therefore, Russia’s educa- theory and research to suggest that Russia’s religious tional innovations may appear to bring the country and secular leaders have opted for a desecularization closer to the aforesaid Western values. I will show that “from above”, which has led to the re-emergence of a Russia’s religious leaders—including, paradoxically, her neo-imperial pattern of religious hegemony and limited staunchest proponents of the country’s civilizational toleration of ethno-religious pluralism. Finally, I show uniqueness—wish to present the new policy in this how these neo-imperial orientations have manifested light. Russia, proponents say, is simply doing what the in the ideological context of the new textbooks. West—and especially Europe—has done all along. This article—in contrast—shows that Russia’s new 2. Liberal Democratic Consensus in Religious policies may not be quite what they seem. On the sur- Education face, they display a multicultural compromise that resembles a liberal-democratic model of inclusion, but— In order to understand how the emerging Russian under the surface—are supported by a neo-imperial model of religious education differs from the model in regime of ethno-religious toleration that is being con- Western liberal democracies, let us look at the nature solidated through the policies. Social scientists have of the model around which Western democracies have long suggested that modern liberal-democratic forms built consensus. There is no doubt that existing ap- of inclusion have been historically preceded by other proaches to and forms of religious education in West- ways of handling pluralism, such as through imperial ern liberal democracies vary historically, cross- regimes of toleration, which handled ethno-religious nationally, and intra-nationally. These variations reflect pluralism in the Russian Empire. I suggest that a modi- the different patterns of historical church-state and fied version of an imperial regime of toleration has church-state-and-school relations in democratic socie- reemerged in post-Soviet Russia. This model secures a ties (Monsma & Soper, 1997); prevalent models for hegemonic role to the Orthodox Church and identifies regulating religion in the public sphere, including in ed- the Russian people as “first among equals” within the ucation (Richardson, 2004; Plesner, 2005a); and coun- neo-imperial project that has increasingly impacted the try-specific historical trajectories and institutional ar- ideology, politics, and foreign policy of Russia in recent rangements for integrating religious minorities (Fetzer decades. These neo-imperial orientations, I argue, & Soper, 2005). In the US, the First Amendment to the manifest themselves in the policy arrangements and Constitution and the country’s strict separation of content of the new course on religious cultures. church and state placed religious education beyond the Meanwhile, the idea of multi-cultural inclusion of di- scope of public education. In most of Europe, religious verse religious groups is used to legitimize the new pol- education has been incorporated in public school cur- icies by making them presentable and acceptable to ricula. Generally speaking, models of religious educa- Western critics. tion in Europe include: I approach this task as a social scientist. My goal is not to criticize or praise Russian policies, but to show (a) teaching religion as a separate and official how these policies are shaped by the Russian and Sovi- school subject, a subject for which the state et imperial legacies, and how the choices and strate- may have sole responsibility (as in the UK gies of Russia’s religious and secular elites have con- and Norway) or co-responsibility with the tributed to a neo-imperial model of ethno-religious churches (as in most German states); toleration. In particular, I link the emergence of this (b) offering religion outside formal curricula, model to elites’ decision to use a top-down approach and under the control of the church or to reviving religion (i.e., desecularizing) in Russia’s insti- other faith communities (as in the German

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states of Brandenburg and Berlin); and sus is not about a particular form of religious educa- (c) teaching religious traditions within history, tion, but about the general principles and framework social studies, or other subjects (e.g., in within which particular jurisdictions should design their France with exception of Alsace-Lorraine) specific forms of religious incorporation in curricula. (Plesner, 2005b, p. 1). This framework is grounded in the democratic values of human rights and religious freedom. It establishes in- Approaches to religious education in public schools ternational standards that prohibit violations of these vary in many other ways, such as in whether one rights, and prevent indoctrination of students into any teaches in, for, or about religion; whether one presents particular system of religious values or dogmas. Van the subject as a devotion or confessional; whether one Arragon and Beaman suggest modern democracies teaches students in segregated or integrated class- agree that a country’s chosen model should cause no rooms; and whether one offers religious education as harm to religious or non-religious minorities “by prac- an elective or mandatory course (e.g., Jackson et al., tices they experience as coercive indoctrination” (2015, 2007; Lahnemann & Schreiner, 2009). Similarly com- pp. 3-4). They emphasize that, particularly in public plex and diversified is the landscape of forms and ap- schools, “the quest is for a mechanism which will both proaches to religious education in liberal democracies protect the religious freedoms of religious groups while outside of Europe. Thus in most Australian states, reli- at the same time persuading students to see their religious instruction remains an important feature of pub- gions and religious traditions in the context of wider, lic school curricula, while the schools of Canadian On- commonly accepted civic values and interests” (p. 3). tario teach religion in a neutral way, and Quebec just These guiding principles give public schools the introduced religious education as a subject for primary charge to accommodate religious constituencies with re- and secondary schools in 2008 (for a survey of non- spect to their rights and freedoms, and—by doing so— European approaches to religious education, see—for help build inter-religious and “intercultural understand- example—Beaman & Van Arragon, 2015). Yet amidst ing, tolerance and harmony (Weisse, 2007, p. 17). The the growing religious and cultural diversity of the sociologist Jean-Paul Willaime (2007) notes that, “what- Western world, the need to develop a set of interna- ever their legal framework, all European countries are tional principles and standards (compatible with basic facing the question of how to approach religious faith democratic principles) for incorporating religion into respecting the freedom of conscience of students and public education became pressing, and commonly rec- their families while at the same time educating them ognized among the West’s educational administrations towards freedom of thought and a critical stance” (p. and scholarly communities. Europe took a leading role 100). As such, religious education (as education about in developing these principles. Despite the considera- and from religions) is perceived by leading European ble plurality of conceptualizations, institutionalizations, scholars as another form of civic education, which facili- and practices of religious education in European de- tates the development of European and global values of mocracies, citizenship and cultural pluralism (Jackson, 2003, 2007). Thus it seems that—amidst the diversity of national, so- “there have been several significant European-wide cio-historical, and legal contexts, and in the varied forms developments that aim toward the creation of a of religion’s delivery into schools—there is indeed a con- more general, trans-national consensus regarding sensus on principles and desirable outcomes. the rationale and guidelines for RE [religious educa- This developing consensus is a commonly shared tion—E.L.] in public schools. These developments approach, and is rooted in the cornerstone principles include public statements and research activities of liberal democracy. It views the harmonious unity of sponsored by the European Union, projects and diverse groups as a result of policies and structural ar- documents developed by the Council of Europe, rangements that are based on respect for religious and initiatives undertaken by the Organization for freedom, choice, and cultural self-determination. Find- Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).” ings from the EU-funded research project, Religion in (Grelle, 2015, pp. 236-237) Education. A Contribution to Dialogue or a Factor of Conflict in Transforming societies of European Coun- A consensus regarding religious education has been tries, 2006–2009 (REDCo), suggest that this approach reached during these activities, and endorsed in the succeeds, and brings desirable outcomes. Thus it was Toledo Guiding Principles of Teaching about Religions found that students from countries with different, even and Beliefs in Public Schools (OSCE, 2007). The consen- polar, models of religious education (e.g., English ver- sus serves as “a basis for the study of religions in edu- sus French) reported that at school they “learn to re- cational institutions across Europe and beyond that is spect everyone, whatever their religion” (Jozsa, 2010, not driven by any theological agenda, but rather re- p. 43). The liberal democratic approach respects free- lates to human rights, citizenship and intercultural ed- dom of critical thought, which precludes hegemonic ucation arguments” (Jackson, 2010, p. vii). This consen- imposition of religious views and ascription of religious

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identities. And it is in this regard, we will see, that the The process culminated in the development and liberal democratic approach differs from the emerging implementation of a course called the Fundamentals of Russian model. However, in order to see how and why Religious Cultures and Secular Ethics (FRCSE), which the Russian model is different, let us look at how the was introduced as a mandatory component under the model developed and at its essential traits. Federal Educational Standard through the directives of President Medvedev (August 2, 2009) and the Gov- 3. Teaching Religious Cultures: A Brief History and ernment of the Russian Federation (October 29, 2009). Basic Facts The course was taught on a trial basis in nineteen regions of the country in 2009–2010, and introduced in By all historical accounts, attempts to find a place for two more regions (the Mari Republic and Yaroslavl re- religion in public schooling date back to the fall of the gion) in 2011. Some observers noted that the course Soviet rule and the emergence of post-Soviet Russia; had been taught de facto in selected regions of the that is, they date back to the end of the 1980s and the country long before it became mandatory (Glanzer & early 1990s. Some highly positioned members of the Petrenko, 2007). In February 2012, then Prime Minister political, administrative, intellectual, and religious Vladimir Putin praised the experiment, and approved elites lobbied for and contributed to the process of in- its expansion at a meeting with the religious leaders of troducing religions into schools. The process lasted Russia’s major confessions while at the Danilov Monas- more than two decades, and has gone through a num- tery in Moscow (Stenogramma, 2012). After his appro- ber of dramatic stages. It was marked by considerable bation, the course was launched in all state-run general struggles between the forces that promoted and sup- education schools. Since 2012, teachers have been reported a (re)introduction of religious education and quired to teach the course to all fourth graders for one those who opposed it (see Lisovskaya & Karpov, 2005, hour per week (34 hours total). The ROC MP leadership 2010, for an analysis of the social and political dynam- is currently pushing to expand the course, making it a ics of the struggle). The ROC MP, Russia’s largest and requirement for almost the whole of elementary and most influential religious organization, played a key secondary school (grades two through nine or ten). role in the process. Initially, the ROC MP insisted on How does the newly instituted approach work? Stu- teaching only one course, on Orthodox Culture. In dents and/or their parents are allowed to choose be- 2002, Minister of Education Filippov signed an order in- tween six modules, five of which have an explicitly reli- troducing the course on Orthodox Culture into the gious focus, and one of which is dedicated to secular basic curricula of municipal schools. A highly contro- ethics. There is one textbook for each module, and one versial textbook, Fundamentals of Orthodox Culture— instructional Manual for teachers (Tishkov & Shaposhni- written by Alla Borodina—became the first educational kova, 2011). The texts focusing on religions include: text taught in the course. One year later, in 2003, after Fundamentals of Orthodox Culture (FOC) (Kuraev, 2012), receiving heavy criticism for privileging Orthodoxy in a Fundamentals of Islamic Culture (FIC) (Latyshina & Mur- religiously diverse society, Filippov suggested develop- tazin, 2012), Fundamentals of Judaic Culture (FJC) ing a course on multiple religions instead. Orthodox hi- (Chlenov, Mindrina, & Glotser, 2012), Fundamentals of erarchs strongly objected to the suggestion; in their Buddhist Culture (FBC) (Chimitdorzhiev, 2012), Funda- pursuit to preserve a separate course on Orthodoxy, mentals of World Religious Cultures (FWRC) (Beglov, they began lobbying for a confessional model of reli- Saplina, Tokareva, & Yarlykapov, 2012), and Fundamen- gious education, which would allow students to be tals of Secular Ethics (FSE) (no author, 2012). These text- taught their religious preference in separate class- books have been written by individuals who held posi- rooms (Vasilenko, 2005). These hierarchs might have tions in both secular and religious institutions (Basil, calculated that, in a country where a vast majority of 2013, p. 733), have been approved by the Ministry of citizens (up to 80%, according to some polls) identified Education Coordinating Council, and were published by themselves as Orthodox, a similarly vast majority of the largest state-controlled publishing house (Prosvesh- parents and students would opt for a course on Ortho- chenie) in 2012. Authored by Daniliuk and identical in all dox Culture; the expectation did not, however, quite textbooks, the first and last lessons articulate the materialize. In 2007—through amendments to educa- course’s general goals and patriotic ideals in language tion law—local and regional curricular components understandable to fourth-graders. Later in this article, I were abolished, leaving public schools bound only by present findings from critical discourse analysis of five of the federally mandated curricular standard. The same these textbooks (the ones dealing with specific religious year, the ROC MP leadership—in collaboration with the cultures). The findings reveal the latent ideological con- Ministry of Education—expanded the federal standard tent of the textbooks, and shed light on the new by establishing a new curricular area called Spiritual- course’s ‘hidden curriculum’, to use a term from sociolo- Moral Development of Russia’s Citizens; the course on gy of education. However, let us first look at the new religious cultures became the first taught within this curriculum’s manifestly proclaimed goals and principles new division. as they were articulated by its promoters and advocates.

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4. Legitimizing the New Curriculum “In Europe, and particularly in Germany, teaching spiritual and moral subjects is a common practice, As mentioned above, the introduction of the new poli- in spite of the heated debates surrounding it. It is cy involved serious political struggles. Resistance and gratifying that in our country religious education in criticism came mainly in two forms. First, there was vo- coming back to the school system after a long ciferous and energetic resistance from secular intellec- break.” (Alfeyev, 2010) tuals, educators, opposition politicians, and human rights activists. The second type of serious resistance Proponents of the new course also included in their came from Muslim leaders (see Lisovskaya & Karpov, rhetoric appeals to Russia’s Law on Education, which 2010) and other minority religious groups who feared was originally formulated in the early, relatively liberal the new arrangements would further disadvantage climate of the post-Soviet transition. In particular, the them by privileging Orthodoxy. Remarkably, since the Law states that, criticisms came from very different angles, both sides’ arguments against bringing religion into schools em- “the content of education must contribute to mu- phasized the constitutionally secular nature of the Rus- tual understanding and cooperation among people sian state and Russian education, as well as the need to and nations irrespective of their racial, national, protect religious freedom and human rights. These ar- ethnic, religious and social affiliation; it has to ac- guments resonated with the values of Western liberal commodate the diversity of world outlooks and democracies; it is therefore no accident that official help students to exercise their right to the free advocates of the new curriculum chose to focus on choice of opinions and convictions.” (Law on Educa- precisely these Western values. tion, 14 [4]) Telling is the following statement by the ROC MP’s then official spokesman, archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin— Following this logic, the Conception for the Spiritual- former chairman of the Synodal Department for the Moral Development of Russia’s Citizens—the founda- Cooperation of Church and Society and a member of tional document behind the new course (Daniliuk, the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation: Kondakov, & Tishkov, 2009)—promises that religious education will help future citizens of the Russian Fed- “Proposed by the President, [Dmitry Medvedev at eration internalize “the values of tolerance created on the time—E.L.] the model of teaching religious cul- the grounds of inter-confessional dialogue” (p. 18). tures is based on the principle of free choice and Under such an interpretation, the new curriculum has long been established in most countries of Eu- perfectly matches the values and expectations for reli- rope and the world and everywhere contributes not gious education in Western democracies, which I dis- only to the moral upbringing of people, but also to cussed earlier. And—compared to the not so distant the strengthening of inter-religious and inter-ethnic Soviet past, where religions were almost entirely sup- harmony and cooperation.” (Chaplin, 2009) pressed, and even against earlier plans to introduce only Orthodox education in multi-religious Russia—the The emphasis here is clearly on free choice, religious new policy does appear an important advancement liberty, and inter-religious harmony, which, along with towards religious liberty and multiculturalism. Not sur- the explicit reference to the European and global expe- prisingly, as we will see below, experts in Russia and rience, implies that Russia would join the club of civi- the West have noted and emphasized these remarka- lized Western liberal democracies by introducing the ble developments. new religious education policy. Chaplin further stated that the new approach “satisfies interests of practically 5. Expert Evaluations all religious groups and the groups with different world views that are actually [emphasis added—E.L.] repre- Writing before the introduction of the new curriculum, sented in our society” (Chaplin, 2009). Let us note that Kozyrev and Fedorov (2007) raised the following theo- the ‘actually’ represented groups do not include retical possibilities of Russia’s development in the area Protestants, Catholics, and many other established and of religious education. Since contemporary Russian cul- new religious groups who are present in Russia and ex- ture is rooted, they said, in “a common European cul- cluded from the new arrangement. The exclusionary tural and religious heritage,…one might expect that the and discriminatory aspect of this policy has been per- new global challenges facing Russia today will bring to sistently glossed over by its advocates. life the same social, cultural and scientific develop- The same line of argument was presented by an- ments as in the West and that that would result in other ROC leader, Hilarion Alfeyev, the Metropolitan of growing partnerships and mutual understandings with Volokolamsk and Chairman of the Department of Ex- European states” (p. 133). Yet their assessment of the ternal Church Relations of the ROC: place of religious education in Russia was inconclusive. On the one hand, they suggested that an increased role

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for religious education in Russia might contribute to in- neo-imperial—not only in its reliance on selected ‘tra- ter-religious dialogue. However, on the other hand, ditional’ organizations, but also in its recreation of an and given the history of post-totalitarianism in Russia, imperial mode towards handling ethno-religious plural- the introduction of religious education could become ism. This, we will see, is reflected not only in the course “a factor of conflict” (p. 155). Against the background structure, but also in its ideological content. Thus, let of this cautious assessment, later Russian evaluations us look at Russia’s new model of religious education in of recent developments in religious education have the context of the country’s imperial history and its been far more positive. For example, Romanova (2013) neo-imperial aspirations. says that the course fits the “fundamental principle” of building “unity in diversity,” which “reflects the social, 6. Russia’s Imperial Legacies and Aspirations ethnic, cultural, and religious complexity of Russia and the modern world” (p. 293). Overall, since the intro- Among the many factors that have shaped Russia’s ap- duction of the course, criticisms by Russian experts proach to religious education, a most important and have become less noticeable, which can be attribut- perhaps most overlooked one is the country’s imperial ed—at least in part—to growing compliance with a legacies and the neo-imperial aspirations of its current new, far more authoritarian, ideological mainstream. leadership, political and religious. Historically, what we Development and implementation of the new poli- now know as the Russian Federation was once the core cy did not escape the attention of Western observers of two empires, Russian and Soviet. Moreover, its eth- (see Basil, 2013; Clay, 2015; Glanzer, 2005; Glanzer & no-territorial composition and current “vertical” struc- Petrenko, 2007; Loya, 2006, 2008; Willems, 2007, ture of governance is a remnant of these empires. And 2012). The course’s multi-module, multi-religious, and in the last twenty years (and increasingly in the last few multicultural structure, and its elective nature have years), Russia’s ruling regime has worked to rebuild been generally appreciated by observers, and inter- and regain its partly lost imperial might. preted within the discourse of accommodation for reli- There have been debates as to how one should de- gious diversity and religious freedom. Thus, before the fine empire. Yale H. Ferguson (2008) lists four main ap- course was introduced in its present six-module struc- proaches for how one might identify an empire, all use- ture, Willems (2007) argued that “schools must ensure ful in some way. One approach simply compares the that the other large or traditional religions can be of- questionable empire to indisputable ones. Thus, a po- fered similar instructions” to properly address the issue litical entity can be considered an empire if it is similar of religious freedom (p. 241). After its introduction, the to the Roman, Ottoman, or Tsarist Russian empires. To six-module course structure was described as “the cor- use Giorgio Agamben’s (2009) term, the known singu- rect formula”, signifying that many Russian leaders had lar cases serve as “paradigms” that help to recognize the “capacity to compromise on this very difficult is- and understand unique cases while avoiding generali- sue,” as well as openness “to the idea of turning away zations. The second approach delves more into what from a tradition of ideological or ecclesiastical domi- constitutes the essence of empirically existing empires, nance, prevalent during the Romanov and Soviet eras,” and attempts to give a general, “ideal type” definition. and a readiness “to follow a path where cooperation The third, “constructivist” approach relies on opinion and negotiation replace the demands of one omnipo- and perception. To simplify, it holds that an entity is an tent opinion” (Basil, 2015, p. 739). Clay (2015) also empire if it is broadly perceived as one. Finally, the notes the new curriculum’s multicultural nature. Yet he fourth, “normative” approach treats a polity as an em- suggests that the new Russian model of religious edu- pire in order to praise it or resist and change it (Fergu- cation “strikingly resembles the state-sponsored hier- son, 2008, pp. 272-273). One could argue that Russia is archy of religions in the nineteenth-century Russian an empire under all four criteria, but—for the purpose Empire. Increasingly, the Russian state actively cooper- of this paper—let me limit the discussion to the first ates with certain favored religious organizations, la- two. First, pre-Soviet Russia is among the aforesaid belled “traditional,” to achieve its social and political paradigmatic examples, and its Soviet version is com- goals” (Clay, 2015, p. 44). This observation adds an im- monly seen by social scientists as a modified reincarna- portant dimension to existing evaluations of the Rus- tion of the Tsarist original. In its present form, Russia is sian model as convergent or inconsistent with the the largest remnant of both, and its ethno-territorial above described consensus on the place of religious structure and even ethno-religious composition are education in liberal democracies. The Russian experi- part of its imperial legacy of conquest and colonization. ence can and should be compared with Western mod- Furthermore, the Russian Federation largely fits ideal- els, yet its nature becomes clearer when we observe it typical definitions, such as Motyl’s (1999) structural in the context of Russia’s own history, going back well definition: beyond the relatively short post-Soviet and even Soviet past. Below, I take this point a step further, and sug- “Empires…are structurally centralized political sys- gest that Russia’s emerging model can be described as tems within which core states and elites dominate

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peripheral societies, serve as intermediaries for handful of recognized religions” (Clay, 2015, pp. 47-48). their significant interactions, and channel resource In this hierarchy, the next, lower level was taken by flows from the periphery to the core and back to other Christian confessions (inoslavie), such as the Ap- the periphery.” (Motyl, 1999, p. 126) ostolic Church, the Evangelical Lutheran Church, and the Roman Catholic Church. Judaism, Islam, and Bud- When the Soviet Union was near its death, and shortly dhism (inoverie) were positioned at an even lower lev- after its demise in 1991, Russian leaders appealed to el, with different kinds of pagans occupying the bottom regional authorities to take, in the famous words of level (p. 48). Furthermore, and very importantly for this then president Yeltsin, “as much sovereignty as you article’s argument, the Russian Empire had what soci- can swallow.” This was instrumental in undermining ologists of religion would call a monopolistic division of the centralized structure of Soviet control, and for a religious markets prior to 1917. Religious adherents be- short while, centrifugal tendencies were tolerated by longed to historically distinct and—typically— the relatively weak central government of post-Soviet geographically separated ethnic groups. This meant Russia. Yet a rude awakening followed when Moscow’s that ethnic and religious identities were closely linked, bloody war in Chechnya set very clear limits on any as- not only to one another, but also to a particular and pirations for regional and ethno-territorial sovereignty. clearly demarcated territory. To put it differently, eth- With Putin’s rise to power, structural, imperial-style nic divisions in the country coincided with religious and centralization accelerated. Since 2004, regional gover- territorial divisions. Thus the Russian Orthodox ethno- nors have been appointed by Moscow, and the practice religious majority group occupied the central part of of rebuilding a “vertical of power” has continued and the empire while minority ethno-religious groups lived intensified. Political discourse glorifying Russia’s impe- on its periphery. Minority groups belonged to particu- rial legacy, including its Soviet hypostasis has become lar territories because they were colonized by the em- mainstream. Even so-called “liberals” and market re- pire at different times in its consolidation. Thus Mus- formers like Anatoly Chubais have proclaimed the crea- lims dwelled either in Central Asia, North Caucasus, tion of a “liberal empire” (Chubais, 2003). In recent Crimea, or the Volga river Basin (Bulgaria); Buddhists years, military interventions in Georgia and Ukraine lived in traditional regions south of the Ural mountains and the annexation of Crimea made Russia’s neo- (Kalmykia) or in the Baikal region (Buryatia and Tuva); imperial aspirations even clearer. Russia has reverted Lutherans lived to the north and west from the imperi- to imperial models after a short-lived attempt to al capitals (Finland and Estonia). The fact that the first change to de-centralized, democratic modes of gov- synagogue, first mosque, and first Buddhist temple ernance and center-periphery relations. Its political were all opened in St. Petersburg—the capital of Rus- structure and current prevailing orientations can thus sian Empire—only at the turn of the twentieth century be legitimately called neo-imperial, and it is in this con- (in 1888, 1913, and 1915 respectively) suggests that text that we will look at the re-emergence of the old, minority ethno-religious groups were not welcomed albeit modified, imperial practices of handling ethno- and did not settle in the Orthodox parts of the empire. religious pluralism in education. Within this ethno-religious-territorial structure, minority religions were tolerated in that they were allowed to 7. Patterns of Dealing with Religious Diversity in be practiced and even taught in schools, though within Imperial and Neo-Imperial Russia clearly demarcated geographical boundaries. Thus, Ta- tar children received Islamic instruction in Kazan and A closer look at how religious and ethno-religious di- Crimea, Finns received instruction in Lutheranism in versity was handled in the Russian and Soviet empires Finland, and Russian children were instructed in Or- will give us better insight into the nature of the new thodoxy everywhere they resided. model of religious education in contemporary Russia. This system was a particular, imperial “regime of toleration,” to borrow Michael Walzer’s term (1997, p. 7.1. The Russian Empire before 1917 14). In multinational empires like Persia or Rome, Walzer explains, various cultural and religious groups In the Russian Empire, ethnic and religious identities could entertain a certain level of legal autonomy, ruling were closely interrelated. Russians were Orthodox; themselves “across a considerable range of their activi- Chechens, Tatars, and Kazakhs were Muslims; Buryats ties” (1997, p. 14). They co-existed with one another and Kalmyks were Buddhists; and so on (e.g., Willems, because they had no other choice, and because their 2007, p. 232). Religious identity was practically as- “interactions [were] governed by imperial bureaucrats signed at birth, and was considered a valid indicator of in accordance with an imperial code…designed to one’s ethnicity. Furthermore, these faiths and identi- maintain some minimal fairness, as fairness is under- ties represented a hierarchical system with the ROC at stood in the imperial center” (1997, p. 14). He consid- the top. “The Russian legal code, systematized in the ers this regime of imperial toleration the most histori- mid-nineteenth century, established a hierarchy of a cally successful at dealing with the problem of religious

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diversity (p. 15). When taxes were paid and groups did et schools did not have to address the issue of religious not openly object to the central authority, peaceful co- diversity; religious diversity was no longer an issue. Re- existence among groups could be maintained. Howev- ligious life was suppressed all over the country, and ex- er, Walzer argues that—in comparison with a liberal isting cultural diversity no longer had a manifestly reli- democracy— this type of regime is nothing more than gious dimension. Thus the Soviet imperial regime did autocratic and discriminatory, and can become “brutal- not have to exhibit toleration of religious diversity. Alt- ly repressive” (p. 15). Moreover, as shown by Barkey hough religions were still practiced around the country, (2014) in her comparative study of the Habsburg and the state effectively and overtly exhibited intolerance Ottoman Empires, a positive relationship between an towards religion. True, the intolerance was applied se- empire and toleration of diversity should not be as- lectively: some churches (such as the ROC MP) were sumed. Toleration of diversity is not essential to impe- less suppressed than others (such as the Baptists or rial states (or regimes); diverse groups are incorpo- Greco-Catholics), and the selectivity resembled—to a rated for economic and/or political expediency, and degree—the pre-1917 hierarchical structure. states would not hesitate to engage in “serious perse- However, cultural diversity was effectively reduced cution of minority populations” should there be a to ethnic differences. Even within that realm, diversity change in pragmatic orientation (p. 227). was supposed to be limited; cultures could be national It is difficult to doubt that the Russian Empire rep- in their form, but official doctrine stipulated that cul- resents an imperial mode towards the toleration of di- tures be socialist in their content. Soviet approaches to versity. Historians like Geraci and Khodarkovsky (2001) handling diversity evolved over time, yet they invaria- clearly show the applicability of Walzer’s concept to bly aimed at suppressing ethno-national self- Tsarist Russia, even though they do not use Walzer’s determination. This suppression included massive and term. In Tsarist Russia, taxes were paid and religious forced russification of ethnic republics and regions, as minorities functioned within prescribed territorial well as forced relocation of ethnic groups, which boundaries and within a centrally defined legal code; changed the ethno-territorial composition of the coun- minority religions were taught in regional schools and try considerably; the country’s composition became indigenous languages under the supervision of local re- more complex and mixed than it was before the revo- ligious communities and organizations. Yet—grounded lution. In addition to deportations and other forced re- in the imperial model of separating ethno-religious locations, the Soviet industrialization and urbanization groups into territorial enclaves on the outskirts of the increased geographic mobility, leading to greater eth- country, and of relegating them a silent minority status nic heterogeneity in large cities. However, these under the bureaucratic control of the central authori- changes did not eliminate the challenge of ethno- ty—this regime represented a distinctly autocratic ap- religious diversity, which continued to exist, albeit in a proach to handling cultural and religious diversity and suppressed way. Russification of the republics poten- enforcing peaceful co-existence. tially involved their Orthodoxization, further reinforc- ing the minority status of non-Orthodox ethnic groups. 7.2. The Soviet Empire Moreover, this mixing of cultures and ethnicities within regions prepared the ground for future tensions and After 1917, schools became thoroughly atheistic. No conflicts, including ones that surrounded religious edu- religion was taught as a subject in its own right, and re- cation in public schools after the collapse of com- ligion could not be incorporated within other subjects munism (Lisovskaya & Karpov, 2010). like history or literature, at least through the 1960s. In the 1980s, and closer to the collapse, some minimal 7.3. Postcommunist Russia knowledge of religions was given to students through courses on world and Russian history (Lukhovitskiy, As the Soviet order and its official atheism collapsed, 2005, p. 147). Although it was difficult to completely the return of religion to the public sphere raised with exclude references to religions when teaching the hu- renewed vigor the question of religious diversity. Rus- manities, any positive references to religious life or sia’s handling of religious diversity has reflected the thought were ridiculed, banned, or excluded from legit- prevalent pattern of its desecularization. Sociologists imate educational discourse. In this sense, the Soviet use the term “desecularization” (Berger, 1999) to de- model was even more secularized than the laical ap- note the process by which religion reasserts its societal proach developed in France, which—according to Wil- influence after a period of secularization. The process laime (2007)—is not alien to incorporating religious is not self-propelled. Actors and activists initiate and themes within the humanities and social studies (p. promote it in the direction that best serves their inter- 64). As such, the Soviet school represents a truly ex- ests and visions. Depending on the actors involved, treme case of opposition to confessional or denomina- desecularization of public institutions may develop tional teaching. “from above” and “from below” (Karpov, 2010, 2013). Being totally a-religious and anti-religious, the Sovi- In Russia, the predominant pattern of the return of re-

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ligion to the public sphere, including in education, was ed with Protestant and other Western religions, such “from above.” In other words, it was carried out as the Salvation Army, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, through an alliance of religious and political elites with and many others. The definition of ‘traditional’ reli- minimal and rigidly controlled grassroots participation gions or religious organizations is missing from the law. (Lisovskaya & Karpov, 2005, 2010). In the aftermath of However, it may be found in the Manual for teachers the Soviet collapse, religious elites—especially those of of religious cultures (Tishkov & Shaposhnikova, 2011). the ROC MP—faced a formidable challenge. They Traditional religions are there defined as those that needed to reassert their dominant role in society, have been “transmitted from one generation to anoth- but—after seven decades of atheistic suppression— er within a particular entity of people. They develop their actual flock was negligibly small, a fact which un- within ethnic or state-defined boundaries” (p. 203). dermined the legitimacy of any claims they might make This definition clearly resonates with the ethno- to religious domination. Under these circumstances, territorial religious divisions of the Russia Empire. The the ROC MP leadership and other leading religious 2015 edition of the 1997 law reinforces this resem- groups chose the path of least resistance and most ef- blance by stipulating that a religious organization may ficacy. Specifically, they attempted to “reclaim” their be established by “the citizens permanently living on positions of domination by re-attaching religion to eth- the same territory or in one settlement of urban or ru- nicity (Karpov, 2013, p.16). This meant that the ROC ral type” (Amendments to the 1997 Law, 2015). The MP claimed all ethnic Russians as part of its flock re- logical outcome of this strategy was a reestablishment gardless of whether ‘the flock’ had been baptized, at- (albeit a modified one) of the imperial model for deal- tended church services, or believed in Orthodox teaching with religious diversity. The boundaries of religious ing. Similarly, Russia’s Muslim leadership could claim communities have once again become co-extensive Chechens, Ingushs, Tatars, Bashkirs, and other histori- with ethnic and territorial boundaries. Making this neo- cally Islamic people as Muslims, regardless of these imperial model legitimate in people’s eyes represented peoples’ religiosity or lack thereof. Buddhism was rele- a serious challenge for elites, although it was deeply gated to Kalmyks, Buryats, and Tuvins; Judaism was rooted in pre-revolutionary patterns and mentality. relegated to Jews, and so on. This, again, was the First, the successful imposition of such a model had to shortest path to reasserting the dominant societal po- overcome social-structural and psychological obstacles. sition of these religious groups. For minority religions, In particular, during Soviet ethnic mixing and migra- i.e., non-Orthodox ones, this path was the only way to tion, the boundaries between ethno-religious commu- re-establish recognition, status, and control vis-à-vis nities substantially disintegrated and lost their distinc- the ROC MP, which claimed dominance within the hi- tive character. Second, in spite of decades of atheism, erarchy of post-Soviet religions. The path also allowed religious conversions did not come to a total halt, control of any competition on the religious market, and which corroded the once solid connections between a helped keep any outsiders out. In other words, this was particular religion and its corresponding ethnicity. Thus a way to prevent and suppress any “exogenous and Orthodox Christians became Baptists, Muslims con- endogenous religious pluralism” (p. 11). The exogenous verted to Lutheranism, and some even joined the In- threat was—in particular—associated with American ternational Society of Krishna (Willems, 2007, p. 232). and other Protestant missionaries, who enthusiastically Finally, boundaries between religious communities turned their steps to evangelize Russia in the mid- were more often imagined than real because levels of 1980s, and were initially received there with great fer- religious belief, belonging, and behavior were quite low vor. Endogenous pluralism developed from within as after years of atheism. deviations from the official versions of Orthodoxy, Is- To revive, inculcate, and disseminate the beliefs lam, and other faiths (Burdo & Filatov, 2004; Mitrokhin, that ethnic and religious boundaries are essentially in- 2004; Papkova, 2011). For example, mass conversions tertwined, and that crossing these boundaries should to Pentecostalism in Siberia and the Far East (territo- be viewed with suspicion and be discouraged, a partic- ries perceived as canonically Orthodox) represented ular type of ideology was propagated. In my previous, both an exogenous and endogenous threat to the ROC co-authored work, the ideology is dubbed “eth- MP domination. The high rate of conversions, in par- nodoxy”, and conceptualized as a “belief system that ticular, led to changes in legislation on religion (Shterin, rigidly links a group’s ethnic identity to its dominant re- 2012). Trying to minimize the challenge of pluralism, ligion and consequently tends to view other religions as the ROC MP leadership lobbied for “The Freedom of potentially or actually harmful to the group’s unity and Conscience and Religious Associations”, which was wellbeing and, therefore, seeks protected and privi- passed in 1997 and privileged Orthodoxy, Islam, Bud- leged status for the groups’ dominant faith” (Karpov & dhism, and Judaism as Russia’s traditional faiths. All Lisovskaya, 2008, p. 370; Karpov, Lisovskaya, & Barry, other religions were deemed ‘non-traditional’, and 2012, p. 644). their rights were curtailed. Especially disadvantaged It is in this context of limited pluralism—reverting were the newly arriving or re-emerging groups affiliat- to a neo-imperial regime of inter-faith relations, ethni-

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cization, territorial binding of religion, and propaganda The course’s Teachers’ Manual (Tishkov & of ethnodoxy—that the new Russian model of religious Shaposhnikova, 2011) reinforces these attitudes to- education is best understood. The structure and con- wards non-Orthodox churches. Interestingly, the Man- tent of the new curriculum are functional within the ual’s discussion of Roman Catholicism is lengthy and neo-imperial model. First, it selectively privileges some detailed, consuming 13 pages, which is comparable to religions and effectively excludes others. Second, it re- its presentations of Judaism (17 pages) and Islam (22 tains the privileged status of Orthodoxy vis-à-vis other pages). However, it presents Catholicism as entirely for- religions. Third, it promotes ethnodoxy by involuntarily eign to Russia. The chapter on Catholicism gives no men- including students in and excluding them from preas- tion of Catholicism or Catholics in Russia (pp. 102-116). signed ethno-religious categories. Findings from my The presentation of Protestantism spans 25 pages, and discourse analysis of the five modular textbooks and selectively identifies only four Protestant denomina- the teachers’ Manual show how these unarticulated tions—Lutherans, Seventh Day Adventists, Pentecostals, goals are meant to be achieved. The analysis leads me and Baptists (pp. 117-141); certainly, these four denom- to conclude that the ideas of the course are congruent inations do not exhaust all Protestant groups in contem- with the neo-imperial ideology of the Russian state. Let porary Russia. Given that Protestants constitute the us now turn to the analysis and its findings. third largest group of believers in modern Russia (Kozyrev & Fedorov, 2007, p. 135), 25 pages isn’t exactly 8. Findings from Discourse Analysis excessive next to the 24 pages devoted to Orthodoxy. Like the Roman Catholic Church, the Lutheran Church is 8.1. Suppression of Exogenous Religious Pluralism portrayed as foreign to Russia, even though it is Russia’s oldest and most influential Protestant denomination. The course obviously limits the range of studied reli- Only ten lines at the end of the chapter are devoted to gions to Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism. This Lutheranism; these lines mention that the Lutheran range of inclusion and exclusion mirrors the restrictive Church was established in 1576, and was primarily at- 1997 law. The ‘big four’ are taught in separate mod- tended by people of Finnish and German origins (Tish- ules, and to each is devoted a specially developed text- kov & Shaposhnikova, 2011, p. 125), once again imply- book. No modules exist for non-Orthodox Christians. ing the ethnic boundaries of religious affiliation. At the For the millions of Russian Protestants, no module ex- same time, the Manual doesn’t indicate the rapidly ists on the Fundamentals of Protestant Culture. No growing numbers of Protestants in Russia; charismatic module exists for perhaps a million Russian Catholics, and Pentecostal Christians in Siberia and the Far East nor for the 1.5 million Armenian Apostolic Christians (Kozyrev & Fedorov, 2007, p. 135) largely reflect the (numbers taken from Clay, 2015, p. 56). One of the conversions of ethnic Russians. Since these facts disa- course’s five modules covers the textbook, Fundamen- gree with the dominant ethnodoxy, they are ignored. tals of World Religious Cultures (FWRC). Here, one The notion that ‘non-traditional’ faiths are funda- would expect to find other religions discussed. Howev- mentally problematic is reinforced by the definition the er, this isn’t entirely the case. The FWRC textbook Manual provides of ‘new’ religions. First, the Manual (Beglov et al., 2012) primarily focuses on the four tradi- explains that ‘new’ religions are synonymous with tional faiths; it mentions paganism in passing, and gives ‘non-traditional’ ones, and that they may include both scant attention to Roman Catholicism, Western Protes- emerging (recent) and re-emerging (historically old) re- tantism, and the Armenian Apostolic church. Presenta- ligions (Tishkov & Shaposhnikova, 2011, p. 202). Alt- tion of these religions spans 1.3 pages out of the FWRC hough this is not explicitly articulated in the Manual, textbook’s 79 pages. Information about these non- such an understanding allows for categorizing Catholi- Orthodox branches of Christianity is scarce. Protestant- cism and Protestantism as ‘new’ religions since they ism is represented as one undifferentiated religion. In- are re-emerging religions. Secondly, and more im- formation is often inaccurate and biased. Thus stu- portantly, the ‘new’ religions are described—in sharp dents learn that the Orthodox Church was established contrast with ‘traditional’ ones—as less concerned after the Great Schism between Eastern and Western with faith as such, and more concerned with earthly Christianity in the eleventh century. ‘Orthodox’ is matters. They are said to be rooted in the emotional translated as, “teaching about God correctly and truth- and psychological aspects of faith rather than its doc- fully” (pp. 46-47). The limited space of this article pre- trinal dimensions, and as appealing to young people’s cludes a detailed analysis of these interpretations, yet desires to belong to a collectivity of like-minded peo- it is clear that the textbook’s interpretations are histor- ple, as well as to their immature susceptibility to peer ically and semantically inaccurate and and biased in fa- pressure (pp. 204-207). Making ‘non-traditional’ (or vor of Orthodoxy. For example, the term ‘Orthodoxy’ ‘new’) religions even less attractive, the Manual cites hardly means ‘correct church’, and such a translation the document accepted at the Hierarchical Council of has an unfavorable connotation for other Christian the ROC in 1994, which declares all ‘new’ religions “in- churches. compatible with Christianity” (p. 210).

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8.2. Suppression of Endogenous Pluralism understand “all that is connected to the world of religion,” students should look inside their souls and to Suppression of endogenous pluralism is similarly “feel its connection to Motherland [i.e., to Russia— achieved through inclusion of the ‘right’ and exclusion E.L.]” (p. 32). Although the textbook is supposed to be of the ‘wrong’ factions and currents within confessions. about Orthodox culture in general, it represents Or- We have already seen that Christianity is discussed in a thodoxy as an essentially Russian phenomenon. It pro- very limited way in the World Religions textbook and in vides no distinction between the Orthodox Church the Manual. All other textbooks give little if any atten- proper and the Russian Orthodox Church as a particu- tion to religious diversity within faiths. Thus, the text- lar embodiment of Orthodoxy. In this sense, the textbook on Orthodox Culture heavily focuses on a generic book is on Russian Orthodoxy, not on Orthodox cul- type of Russian Orthodoxy. Not a single Orthodox ture. For example, it admits that in “Orthodox Church group outside of the ROC MP is mentioned. Students prayer and sermon may be in languages other than will learn nothing about the Old Believers and Russian Russian.” However, immediately after this concession, Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (formerly in Exile), it suggests that the “Russian [emphasis mine] Orthodox let alone the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church prays in Japanese, English, German and many Church, or the Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate other languages” (p. 54). By doing so, the textbook that broke from the ROC. subtly implies that all Orthodox churches—regardless Similarly, while the textbook on Islam (Latyshina & of the language in which they conduct services—fall Murtazin, 2012) rightly calls Islam a “world religion” and under the jurisdiction of the ROC MP. Why a service mentions that there are 1.5 billion Muslims on the plan- conducted in English does not belong to the American et (p. 6), it bypasses the enormous diversity within Islam. Orthodox Church, or why Greek services do not belong It neither discusses nor mentions the Shia-Sunni split, to the Greek Orthodox Church is left unexplained. In Sufism, Ahmadiyya, or other currents. The Teacher’s the fine print, it admits that other Orthodox Christians Manual is equally silent on the issue of Islamic diversity. exist in “Bulgaria, Serbia, and Czech Republic” (p. 54). In a remarkable contrast, textbooks on Buddhist Yet the range of “other countries” is limited to these (Chimitdorzhiev, 2012) and Judaic Cultures (Chlenov et three Slavic nations, leaving aside the rest of the world, al., 2012) acknowledge internal religious diversity and where Orthodoxy was introduced much earlier or took different interpretations within the faiths. Buddhism is root later. Especially salient, the overtly Russian nature represented by three teachings—Theravada, Mahayana, of what is presented as Orthodoxy manifests itself in and Gelug (or Gelukpa). None of the three—including how the textbook describes Easter. Although Easter is a Gelug, the most common strand in Russia—is described common feast for all Christians, the textbook uses the as more truthful or better than the others concept ‘Russian Easter’ interchangeably with the con- (Chimitdorzhiev, 2012, p. 32). Similarly, the Judaic Cul- cept ‘Christian Easter,’ thus implying that specifically ture textbook discusses Orthodox, Conservative, and Re- Russian traditions for celebrating Easter are the same formed Judaism, as well as Hassidism. Although its in- traditions celebrated by the whole of Christendom (pp. terpretation of Reformed Judaism as “simplifying” and 29-31) . “distancing from Orthodox Judaism” (Chlenov et al., The link between Orthodoxy and Russianness is fur- 2012, p. 56) possesses a disapproving connotation, this ther emphasized in the story of the tenth century bap- textbook is the only one of the five that gives a definition tism of the people of Kyivan Rus’, which is recounted in of religious tolerance (veroterpimost’) as “acceptance of both the Orthodox and World Religious Cultures text- the right of other faiths to exist freely” (p. 7). books. This adaptation is done entirely in the spirit of cultural-imperialist appropriation; the Kyivan Rus’ is 8.3. Ethnodoxy appropriated as Kyivan Russia, even though the former is also the cradle of the Ukrainian and Belarusian cul- All textbooks on religious cultures mention the histori- tures and nations, and even though Ukrainian Greco- cal connections between nationalities (ethnicities) and Catholics legitimately trace their roots to the times of particular religions. However, not all represent this acceptance of Orthodoxy by ancient Rus’. Such an im- connection as rigid and inseparable. Ethnodoxy is par- perialist appropriation of Rus’ is by no means novel. ticularly strong in the textbooks on Orthodox and Is- Appropriation is part of the Russian religious national- lamic cultures. The first textbook on Orthodox culture ism that has been cultivated since the second half of by Borodina (2002) presented Orthodoxy as insepara- the nineteenth century, and resurged in Russia after ble from Russianness and Slavic ancestry (Shnirelman, the collapse of communism. This ideology is clearly 2012, p. 264). The 2012 Orthodox Culture textbook present in both the Orthodox and World Religious Cul- strengthens this connection. Students are taught that a ture textbooks. Both textbooks (Kuraev, 2012, and person “does not typically choose his/her culture. They Beglov et al., 2012) blur the distinction between Rus- are born into it, breathe it, and grow within it” (Kuraev, sians and the people of the Rus’. The texts consistently 2012, p. 6). The textbook instructs that, to properly refer to the people of Kyivan Rus’—its princes Vladimir

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and Jaroslav, and their ambassadors to Constantino- roes” are remarkable in this sense. One is Musa ple—as ‘Russians’ (russkie) (Beglov et al., 2012, p. 42; Dzhalil’, a Soviet poet who died in a Nazi camp. Anoth- Kuraev, 2012, p. 59). Further, the textbooks represent er is Abdul Khakim Ismailov, a soldier, one of those the adoption of “Orthodoxy” (which, strictly speaking, who erected the Soviet banner over Reichstag in May did not exist as a confession at the time of baptism of of 1945. The third is Makhmud Esambaev, a famous Rus’ in 988 A.D.) as the starting point for the estab- dancer in the Soviet Union. Who were these people? lishment of ‘Holy Russia,’ a mythologeme that has oc- Dzhalil’ and Ismailov were members of the Communist cupied a central role in Russian religious nationalism Party of the USSR. All three were recipients of numer- and imperialism from the Tsarist times to the annexa- ous Soviet-time governmental awards, and experi- tion of Crimea in 2014. Let us note that—in this re- enced the peak of their popularity under Soviet athe- gard—the textbooks’ ideas have become congruent ism. However, the textbook unequivocally labels them with the neo-imperialist ideology that has been culti- ‘Muslims.’ This labelling is done posthumously, and vated in Russia and used to justify its openly expan- thus ascribes religious identity arbitrarily (pp. 54-57). sionist aspirations. The Orthodox Culture textbook ex- What, then, makes them Muslim? The answer is clear. plains the meaning of ‘Holy Russia’ as the Russian The only aspect that makes these heroes Muslim is people’s “search for holiness” (Kuraev, 2012, p. 60). It their membership in traditionally Islamic ethnicities— notes that “high appeals of the Gospel found a quick one was a Tatar, another Dagestani, and the last Che- response among Russian people after they had been chen. Thus, the students are subtly but surely forced to baptized” (p. 59). This all sounds as if the people of develop a rigid connection between ethnic and reli- Rus’ (read ‘Russians’) were predestined to become Or- gious identity. thodox believers, and that no other faith could possibly Of the five textbooks, the ones on Judaic and Bud- match “the Russian soul” or Russian worldview. From dhist cultures show the least evidence of ethnodoxy. these presentations, students are likely to learn that Moreover, they include a number of anti-ethnodox being ethnically Russian means being Orthodox—as if statements. Both FJC and FBC emphasize the global by birth—and that being Orthodox ultimately means reach of Judaism and Buddhism, and do not necessarily being Russian. relate these religions to particular ethnicities or geo- Finally, this belief is enhanced by the overall aes- graphic territories. Statements like these typify the thetics of the Orthodox Culture textbook. All illustra- textbooks’ content: tions and photographs represent Russian churches, Russian icons, Russian art, or stereotypically Russian “millions of people in various countries glorify Bud- individuals. There are fifteen photographs of lay people dha.” (Chimitdorzhiev, 2012, p. 8) in the textbook in which the photographed persons’ fa- cial features are clearly recognizable. All are stereo- “Buddhist rituals emerged and developed under the typically Russian (or at least Slavic), with blond hair, influence of traditions and customs of various peo- beards or braids, and blue eyes. No Asian-looking (e.g., ples, different in their culture, language and life- Tatar or Yakut) physiques or features can be found style.” (p. 52) among the pictures. Moreover, to reinforce attribution of Orthodoxy to the Russian land, the textbook liberally Similarly, the Judaic Culture textbook shows a low or uses appropriate imagery—both visual and verbal—of non-existent level of ethnodoxy. The text differentiates typical Russian nature and landscapes. For example, a between ‘religious’ and ‘non-religious’ Jews, and sug- lengthy excerpt from Solzhenitsyn narrates that the gests that one does not have to be religious to be con- “Orthodox churches and bell towers are the key for sidered an ethnic Jew (Chlenov et al., 2012, p. 7). By so understanding the conciliatory nature of Russian land- saying, the text suggests that the religious marker of scape….In these very bell towers our ancestors had in- Jewishness is not rigidly attached to its ethnic marker. vested the best of them, all their understanding of the Moreover, by suggesting that members of any ethnicity meaning of life” (Kuraev, 2012, p. 61). who pass an exam may become a Jew in religious The Islamic Culture textbook is no less permeated terms (p. 67), the textbook paints the ethno-religious with ethnodoxy. Throughout the text, the word ‘Mus- boundary as permeable. However, it is permeable in lim’ and ethnic markers are used interchangeably. For only one direction. Ethnicity does not presuppose relig- example, in the lesson on customs and morals, it is iosity, but acceptance of Judaism automatically in- noted that “Muslims are very hospitable. If you happen cludes one in the “Jewish people” (p. 7). Thus, students to be a guest in the house of a mountaineer, such as an of the Judaic culture textbook receive a mixed message Ingush, Chechen, or Avar”, you will be given everything on the link between ethnicity and religion. The ethno- you need (Latyshina & Murtazin, 2012, p. 67). Similarly, religious boundary seems to work as a one-way street, heroic acts of “Muslim people” in times of war or i.e., religion assumes ethnicity, but not the other way peace are discussed as the “heroism of Bashkir or Da- around. Let us note, however, that while this represen- gestani people” (p. 55). Three examples of “Muslim he- tation only partly fits our definition of ethnodoxy, eth-

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nodoxy itself is a foundational dogma within Judaism. It contributions of Islam to Russian culture (Latyshina & reflects an essential dogma of Judaism rather than an Murtazin, 2012, pp. 52-53). In sum, Orthodoxy has an ideological interpretation of the faith. invariably positive image, and was unjustly treated by the state. Islam contributed positively to Russia, but 8.4. Hierarchy of Religions the textbook mentions no state injustices against Mus- lims. Finally, Judaism and Buddhism are thankful recip- As mentioned above, the idea of the hierarchy of reli- ients of state favors, yet none of the religions’ positive gions is central to the neo-imperial model of dealing contributions are mentioned. with religious diversity, and is clearly reinforced by the Thus, the textbooks’ content demonstrates that the textbooks discussed. These textbooks put the ROC at ROC is entitled to boast not only of its contributions to the top of the religious hierarchy. The textbooks do not the Russian state and nation, but also to remember say this directly. However, the notion is promoted that it was once hurt by it. Islam is not entitled to re- through how they represent each religion’s relation to member any wounds, but is allowed to claim its contri- the Russian state. Therefore, it is remarkable that each butions. Buddhism and Judaism may only thank the textbook glorifies the role of the state in the historical state for its favors. The hierarchy that transpires is very and contemporary development of the faith it discuss- clear. I conclude that, by means of these representa- es. Yet each faith’s position in the hierarchy of religions tions, the studied textbooks approve the existing hierar- becomes obvious through what the textbooks specifi- chical relationships between religions and vis-à-vis the cally do or do not say about the Russian state. Unsur- state. Such approval provides ideological support to the prisingly, representations of how the ROC stands vis-à- neo-imperial model of religious toleration in the context vis the state unmistakably indicate that the Church of—to use Motyl’s definition of empires—“structurally possesses a much higher status than Islam, Buddhism, centralized political system[s] within which core states or Judaism. For example, only the FWRC textbook re- and elites [including the ROC MP elites—E.L.] dominate counts some of the historical faults of the state to- peripheral societies” (1999, p. 126). wards the Orthodox Church, such as Peter the Great’s abolition of the institution of Patriarchate (Beglov et 9. Conclusion al., 2012, p. 46). The ROC is depicted as a victim of ill- treatment by the state, on the one hand, and as an im- We have seen that the content of the textbooks de- portant player in the history of Russian society on the signed for the religious education of Russian students other. Thus Orthodoxy emerges as an invariably posi- exhibits a specific constellation of ideological charac- tive force, while the state is portrayed as capable of in- teristics. These include bypassing the reality of exoge- justices (albeit only past and limited ones). Yet any his- nous and—in the cases of Orthodox and Islamic text- torical injustices by the state towards minority religions books—endogenous pluralism. Furthermore, the have been totally omitted from the textbooks. Moreo- textbooks on Orthodox and Islamic cultures—whose ver, the Judaic and Buddhist culture textbooks not only combined target audience accounts for the vast majori- gloss over all instances of mistreatment by the state, ty of Russia’s students—promote the ideology of eth- but also ignore the positive contributions of Judaism nodoxy, which rigidly links religion to ethnicity and and Buddhism to the Russian state and society. When leads to negative perceptions of ethnically “alien” speaking of the Russian State, the textbooks express faiths. Moreover, the Orthodox Culture textbook em- only gratitude. For example, the Buddhist culture text- ploys mythologemes and interpretations that have book thanks Elisabeth II for officially recognizing that been historically central to Russian religious national- Buddhism existed in Russia in 1741 (Chimitdorzhiev, ism and imperialism, and that are congruent with the 2012, p. 38). The textbook emphasizes that a temple in neo-imperialist expansionism of Russia’s current lead- Buryatia was built in memory of Russia’s victory over ership and its dominant ideology. Finally, the textbooks Napoleon in 1812 (p. 64). The Judaic Culture textbook perpetuate the notion of an imperial, state domination gratefully brings up the February Revolution of 1917, of religious minorities, as well as a hierarchy of reli- which “removed all forms of inequality of Jews as citi- gions in which the ROC MP sits at the top. These find- zens and made Judaism equal with all other religions in ings indicate the function that religious education is the country” (Chlenov et al., 2012, p. 48). Not a word supposed to fulfill in contemporary Russia. The mani- of criticism of the state policy against Buddhists or the festly proclaimed goals of religious education appear state-supported anti-Semitism is uttered. Islam seems convergent with the values of religious freedom, self- to construe its status somewhere between—on the determination, tolerance, and inter-faith peace that one hand—Buddhism and Judaism and—on the oth- are espoused by Western liberal democracies. Yet the er—Orthodoxy. The Islamic culture textbook neither hidden curriculum of religious education that shows in praises the Russian State for its support, nor blames it this constellation of ideological characteristics is far for any ill-treatment of Islam or Muslims. Yet, similarly more consistent with a neo-imperial model of an eth- to the Orthodox culture text, it strongly emphasizes the no-religious hegemony (of Russian Orthodoxy) and

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with limited toleration of selected faiths whose reach is 0f33f541a09d2acd9d5e260401f5a0c84247c/#dst100 supposedly restricted to politically peripheral ethno- 015 territorial entities. This model embodies and revitalizes Barkey, K. (2014). Empire and toleration: A comparative Russia’s imperial legacies. Yet this revitalization is in it- sociology of toleration within Empire. In A. Stepan, & self an outcome of strategic choices made by the coun- C. Taylor (Eds.), Boundaries of toleration (pp. 203- try’s religious and secular elites. 232). New York, NY: Columbia University Press. As was mentioned above, the neo-imperial model Basil, J. D. (2013). Russian school textbooks on religion: emerged as a result of a lengthy process that involved Theological learning, ideological confrontation, or re- intense contestation and political struggle. However, in ligious education. Journal of Church and State, 55(4), the current, increasingly authoritarian political atmos- 712-739. phere, any further contestation of the neo-imperial Beaman, L., & Van Arragon, L. (Eds.). (2015). Issues in re- model of ethno-religious hegemony has been shunned. ligion and education (Vol. 25). Leiden, the Nether- Yet no matter how much the new model resonates lands: Koninklijke Brill NV. with Russia’s imperial traditions and current authori- Beglov, A. L., Saplina, E. V., Tokareva, E. S., & Yarlykapov, tarianism, it may be a short-lived creation. Social and A. A. (2012). Oсновы Мировых Религиозных geographic mobility in today’s Russia undermines eth- Культур [Fundamentals of world religious cultures]. no-territorial approaches to religious pluralism. The Moscow: Prosveshchenie. suppression of pro-independence movements in Rus- Berger, P. (1999). The desecularization of the world: Re- sian regions requires resources of which Russia may surgent religion and world politics. Grand Rapids, MI: run out in the not so distant future. The “vertical of William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. power” that has enforced the hierarchy of religions Borodina, A. B. (2002). Osnovy pravoslavnoi kul’tury may crumble as a result of economic and socio-political [Fundamentals of Orthodox culture]. Moscow: challenges. And, finally, globalization leads to a rapid Pokrov. growth of religious diversity, and undermines tradi- Burdo, M., & Filatov, S. (Eds.). (2004). Sovremennaia tional, imperial approaches. Under these circumstanc- religioznaia zhizn’ v Rossii: Opyt sistematicheskogo es—and if it wishes to preserve itself as a unified politi- opisaniia [Contemporary religious life in Russia: An cal entity—Russia must adopt a much more attempt of systematic description] (Vol. 1). Moscow: consistently pluralistic and non-hegemonic model of Logos. religious education. Chaplin, V. (2009). Prisutstvie religioznoi kul’tury v shkole i dukhovenstva v armii: Eto estestvenno I normal’no Acknowledgments dlia sovremennogo obschestva. [Presence of religious culture in school and in the army is natural and nor- I thank Dr. Vyacheslav Karpov, whose professional in- mal in contemporary world]. Sedmitsa-RU. Retrieved sight and expertise greatly assisted in this research. from http://www.sedmitza.ru/text/742809.html Chlenov, M. A., Mindrina, G. A., & Glotser, A. V. (2012). Conflict of Interests Osnovy iudeiskoi kul’tury [Fundamentals of Judaic culture]. Moscow: Prosveshchenie. The author declares no conflict of interests. Chimitdorzhiev, V. L. (2012). Osnovy buddiiskoi kul’tury [Fundamentals of Buddhist culture]. Moscow: Pros- References veshchenie. Chubais. A. (2003). Russia should aim to create liberal Agamben, G. (2009). The signature of all things: On empire in CIS. Pravda.ru. Retrieved from http:// method. New York, NY: Zone Books. www.pravdareport.com/news/russia/25-09-2003/ Alfeyev, H. (2010). Teaching religion in public school: 52757-0 Important discussion in Russia and in Germany. Rus- Clay, E. (2015). Multiculturalism and religious education sian Orthodox Church. The Official Website of the in the Russian Federation: The Fundamentals of Reli- Department for External Church Relations. Retrieved gious Cultures and Secular Ethics. State, Religion and from Church, 2(1), 44-74. http://www.mospat.ru/ru/2010/02/24/news13598 Daniliuk, A. I., Kondakov, A. M., & Tishkov, V. A. (2009). Amendments to the1997 Law “On Freedom of Con- Концепция духовно-нравственного развития и science and Religious Organizations.” (2015, July 13). воспитания личности гражданина России [Con- Article 9 (1). [Обзор изменений Федерального ception for the spiritual-moral development and up- закона от 26.09.1997 N 125-ФЗ «О Свободе bringing of the personality of the citizen of Russia]. Совести и о Религиозных Объединениях.» Moscow: Prosveshchenie. Retrieved from http:// Редакция от 13.07. Редакция от 13.07.2015 www.r-komitet.ru/school/program/action2009/ Артикль 9, пункт 1]. Retrieved from https://www. razdel/cdn consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_79440/912 Ferguson, Y. H. (2008). Approaches to defining “Empire”

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About the Author Dr. Elena Lisovskaya Elena Lisovskaya is Professor of Sociology at Western Michigan University. Her interests are in comparative studies of ideological and institutional changes with foci on education and religion. She has published on privatization, dogmatism, and new ideologies of textbooks. Since the 2000s, she has en- gaged in comparative research on desecularization and religious education, and has co-authored Re- ligious Intolerance among Orthodox Christians and Muslims in Russia (2008); Orthodoxy, Islam, and the Desecularization of Russia’s State Schools (2010); Ethnodoxy: How Popular Ideologies Fuse Reli- gious and Ethnic Identities (2012); and others.

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