WHY MATTERS By Barry Rubin*

The emergence of the HISH alliance (Hizballah, Iran, Syria, Hamas) has changed the direction of the Middle East in several respects. This group has formulated a new ideology merging and Islamism, which can be called “National Islamism.” It has sought hegemony in and Iraq as well as an intensified struggle against the United States and Israel. What is especially interesting is how its strategy, tactics, and world-view correspond so thoroughly with the dominant—and failed—equivalents during the 1950s-1980s period. Syria has become the most important Arab state due to its involvement in these matters.**

“It is my pleasure to meet with you in the said is that his policy is beneficial to him, new Middle East,” said Syrian President simultaneously brilliant and disastrous for Bashar al-Asad in a speech to the Syrian Syria, and just plain disastrous for many Journalists Union on August 15, 2006.1 Yet others. Bashar’s new Middle East is neither the one To understand Syria’s special feature, it hoped for by many since Saddam Hussein’s is best to heed the all-important insight of a 1991 defeat in , nor is it actually Lebanese-American scholar, Fouad Ajami: new at all. Actually, it is a reversion, often "Syria's main asset, in contrast to Egypt's in remarkable detail, to the Middle East of preeminence and Saudi wealth, is its the 1950s through the 1980s. The Arab capacity for mischief."2 Mischief is in the world, now accompanied by Iran, is re- service of regime maintenance, the all- embracing an era that was an unmitigated encompassing cause and goal of the Syrian disaster for itself and is extolling the ideas government’s behavior. Demagoguery, not and strategies that led it repeatedly to the delivery of material benefits, is the basis catastrophes. of its power. No Arab state had more to do with this Why have those who have governed important and tragic turnabout than does Syria, under some very different regimes, Syria. It was the main architect and followed such a pattern over a half-century? beneficiary of this change. Egypt, Saudi Precisely because the country is a weak one Arabia, Jordan, and other Arab states in many respects. Aside from lacking wanted quiet; Iraq needed peace to rebuild Egypt’s power and ’s money, itself. Even Libyan dictator Muammar it also lacks internal coherence due to its Qadhafi, pressed by sanctions and scared by diverse population and minority-dominated his Iraqi counterpart Saddam’s fate, was on regime. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein used his best behavior. Only Syria remained as a repression, ideology, and foreign source of instability and radicalism. adventures to hold together a system Thus, a small and not particularly dominated by Sunni Arab Muslims who wealthy country proved the fulcrum on were only one-fifth of the population. In which the Middle East shifted and which, in Syria, an Alawite regime rules based on a turn, shook the globe. Is Syrian President community that is only half as large Bashar al-Asad a fool or a genius? That proportionately. cannot be determined directly. What can be To survive, then, the regime needs

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) 21 Barry Rubin transcendent slogans that make this works in the sense that the regime survives problem disappear. Arabism and, in more and the public perceives it as successful. recent years, Islamism, are its solution. In Objectively, however, the society and this light, Syria is ruled not by a rather economy are damaged, freedom is inept, corrupt dictatorship, but by the restricted, and resources are wasted. This leaders of all Arabs and the champions of pattern is the bane of the Arab world while all Muslims. These battle cries are very also being the basis of its ideologies and effectively used to justify oppression at governance. home and aggression abroad. No other Syria, then, is both the most revealing country in the world throws around the test case for the failure of change in Middle word “imperialism” more in describing East politics and the key actor—though foreign adversaries, and yet no other state there is plenty of blame to go around—in on the globe follows a more classical making things go so wrong for the Arab imperialist policy. world. If Damascus had moved from the In broad terms, this approach is followed radical to the moderate camp, it would have by most, if not all, Arab governments, but decisively shifted the balance, making a Syria offers the purest example of the breakthrough toward a more peaceful and system. As for the consequences, two basic progressing Middle East. Syria’s principles are useful to keep in mind: participation in the Gulf war coalition of First, the worse Syria behaves, the better 1991, readiness to negotiate with Israel, its regime does. Syrian leaders do not severe economic and social stagnation, and accept the Western view that pragmatism, strategic vulnerability—all topped off by moderation, compromise, an open the coming to power of a new generation of economy, and peace are always better. leadership—provoked expectations that it When Syria acts radical (up to a point of would undergo dramatic change. course), it maximizes its main asset— Like so many of the Arab regimes’ causing trouble—rather than its weakness policies during the second half of the in terms of a bargaining position. As a twentieth century, Syria’s strategy was both dictatorship, tight control and popularity brilliant and useless. The regime survived, achieved through demagoguery work better. its foreign maneuvers worked well much of Second, success for the regime and state the time, and Syrian control over Lebanon means disaster for the people, society, and was a money-maker. However, what did all economy. The regime prospers by keeping of this avail Syria compared to what an Syrians believing that the battle against emphasis on peace and development might America and Israel, not freedom and have achieved? prosperity, should be their top priority. The It was a Western idea that desperation at state’s control over the economy means their country’s difficult strategic and lower living standards for most, while economic plight would make Hafiz al-Asad simultaneously preserving a rich ruling elite (as well as Saddam, Arafat, and other Arab with large amounts of money to give to its or Iranian leaders) move toward supporters. Imprisoning or intimidating concessions and moderation. Yet the rulers liberal critics means domestic stability, but themselves reasoned in the exact opposite without human rights. way: Faced with pressure to change, they This pattern might be called one of became more demanding and intransigent. brilliantly successful disasters. The policy Often, at least up to a point, this strategy

22 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) Why Syria Matters worked as the West offered more Precisely 20 years after his father’s concessions in an attempt to encourage the remark, Bashar made his most important expected reforms, ensure commerce, buy speech to date at the journalists’ peace, and buy off terrorism. Of course, conference, August 15, 2006. Only power such actions are carried out in the context of and violence, he argued, forced the other Western interests but they also signal the side to make concessions, negotiate, or even desire to define those interests as pay attention to the issue. Speaking about enlightened ones. The purpose is to uproot the international reaction just after the the issues causing conflict, build Israel-Lebanon war he said, “The world understanding and confidence, and prove does not care about our interests, feelings their good intentions. and rights except when we are powerful. Yet to the regimes this behavior seemed Otherwise, they would not do anything.”4 not the result of generosity or proffered The remarks by Hafiz and Bashar tell a friendship, but rather from Western fear of great deal. In the absence of pressure, their their power and an imperialist desire to regime would become bolder in seeking its control the Arabs and Muslims. Frequently, goals. When fearful, it retreats to too, it is seen as a tribute to their superior consolidate and survive. Consequently, the tactics, which fool or outmaneuver their only way to get Syria to be moderate in adversaries. This perception encouraged behavior was credible pressure to convince continued intransigence in hope of reaping it—at least temporarily—that trouble- still more benefits. Eventually, this process making did not pay. This model of Syria destroyed any possibility of moderation, retreating into relative moderation under though not always Western illusions. pressure was most clearly visible when a Here are two examples of such thinking. weak Syria was pressed into a peace In 1986, at a moment of great weakness for process with Israel in the 1990s; by Turkey Syria and the Arabs, Hafiz told the British in forcing Syria to stop sponsoring ambassador, “If I were prime minister of terrorism against itself in 1998; and Israel with its present military superiority immediately after the September 11, 2001 and the support of the world’s number one terror attacks on the United States. power, I would not make a single Yet even on each of these and other such concession.”3 occasions (except for the narrowly focused Yet at that time and thereafter, the Turkish intervention), Damascus was United States was working hard to bring the allowed to get away with the kind of things PLO into a negotiated agreement that would that would have brought the roof down on make it head of a state. A few years later, most states. Thus, frequent Western when in even a stronger position, Israel attempts to negotiate, bargain with, and negotiated with the PLO and made massive appease only worsened the situation when concessions, because it wanted peace. The Syria decided it had nothing to fear. This is intention was to solve the conflict by what happened when Syria came out of the finding some mutually acceptable 1990s and understood that the United States compromise solution. On the other side, was not going to go after it, and that the however, the interpretation was either that it Europeans would give it benefits. It turned was a trick that should be rejected or a sign the tables. of weakness that should be exploited. This brings us to Bashar’s task. Since the 1980s, Syria has faced big problems. Its

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Soviet ally (and arms supplier) collapsed; war against Israel—again at no cost to the economy has not done well, domestic himself, though plenty for the Lebanese. In unrest has increased, Israel has widened the this case, most of the arms and money military gap, and Saddam Hussein was comes from Tehran, with Syria getting a overthrown by the Americans. free ride. Today in Damascus, Bashar is a Bashar’s father and predecessor, Hafiz, hero for confronting Israel at the Lebanese maneuvered very well. He participated in expense. He has also piled up considerable the battle against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait credit with radical Islamists by being their enough to win help from the rich Gulf friend and ally in Iraq, Lebanon, and among Arabs and the United States. His the Palestinians. involvement in negotiations with Israel also The whole thing might well blow up helped, though he refused to make an against Bashar some day through agreement in the end. Then, Hafiz died and international pressure or domestic upheaval. passed on the presidency to his For the moment, though, he is riding high. inexperienced son. Maybe that answers the question about Clearly, Bashar is no Hafiz. His father Bashar: Someone who acts like a fool in was a far better strategist. In contrast to Western terms may well be a genius as a Bashar, he probably would never have Middle Eastern leader. withdrawn from Lebanon and would have So how did this young, new leader and been more careful to avoid friction with the his relatively small, weak country help turn Gulf Arabs and America. He would never the Middle East—and indeed the world—in have let Iran turn Syria into something like such a different, bloody, and dangerous a client state or treat Hizballah leader Hasan direction? Nasrallah on an equal basis. After 1991, there had been hopes in the Yet the Asad genes are still working. West, Israel, and also among many people Bashar withdrew from Lebanon but kept the in the -speaking world, that dramatic security and economic assets in place. changes around the globe and in the region Almost 20 major bombings and would produce a new Middle East of assassinations have shown Lebanese that pragmatism, reform, democracy, and peace. Syrian interests better be attended; and by Given the USSR’s collapse, Saddam’s killing Rafik Hariri, the former Lebanese defeat, trends toward democracy elsewhere, prime minister, Bashar got into some America’s emergence as sole superpower, apparent trouble, but eliminated the only and other factors, a better world seemed to man who could unite the country and stand be in birth. A generation of Arabs had up to Hizballah. experienced defeat, tragedy, and stagnation. Bashar’s risk-taking seemed to pay off. Surely, they would recognize what had On the Iraqi front, starting in 2003, he has gone wrong and choose another path. been waging war against America at almost Bashar took credit in killing this dream no cost to himself. Syria is equipping, of something different and better, though he training, and sending into battle terrorists perhaps overstated the difficulty of that who are killing hundreds of Iraqis and achievement. “It was not easy at all to Americans without any threat of manage to convince many people about our international action or even condemnation. vision of the future,” he explained. Yet the Then, on the Lebanese front in 2006, he “cherished Middle East” of the West, Israel, mounted what was basically a conventional and moderate Arabs, he views as being

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“built on submission and humiliation and unsuccessful the first time around, and deprivation of peoples of their rights.” In its which instead produced disasters whose place is arising “[a] sweeping popular repercussions are still being felt for Arab upsurge…characterized by honor and societies, the Middle East, and the entire Arabism,” of struggle and resistance.5 globe. The Arabic-speaking world is often It is all very familiar. After the 2006 said to have a long memory. Yet what is as Hizballah-Israel war, the Middle East has bizarre as the enthusiastic revival of failed clearly and probably irreversibly entered a ideas is that virtually no one seems to notice new era with a decidedly old twist. The that this is what has happened. The points possibility of a negotiated Arab-Israeli made in this article have been mentioned by peace and for Arab progress toward few Arab authors, even those critical of the democracy is dead; radical Islamism, “new” thinking. All the elements of this whether or not it achieves political power, world-view have certainly been time-tested, sets the agenda. For a half-dozen years, but the problem is that they failed the exam. things had been certainly heading in this Bashar’s version of the new Middle East direction, heralded by the Palestinian and may well persist for an entire generation. Syrian rejection of peace with Israel in What turns it from merely an extremely 2000; the turn to a terrorist-based intifada; remarkable into a truly amazing the fall-out from the September 11, 2001 phenomenon, however, is that this shift attacks on America; the post-Saddam marks a return, often down to the smallest violence in Iraq; the Arab regimes' defeat of details, to the Arab thinking and strategy of reform movements; and electoral advances the 1950s-1980s period. Once again the by Hamas, Hizballah, and the Egyptian political line is the traditional one of Muslim Brotherhood, along with many extolling violent struggle in pursuit of total other developments. victory rather than pragmatism, democracy, One of its most visible features of this compromise, and economic construction. new, decidedly unimproved, Middle East is Sometimes this will simply be used in an Iran-Syria-Hizballah-Hamas alliance demagogic terms; at other times it will seeking regional hegemony, the destruction actually be implemented. of Israel, and the expulsion of Western Why, then, revitalize a world-view and influence—all the old goals—under the program that failed so miserably and slogan of resistance to aggression. The disastrously, leading the Arab world into emergence of this new axis represents a years of defeat, wasted resources, sharp break with the past only regarding dictatorship, and a steady falling behind the two issues: unprecedented levels of Iranian rest of the world in most socio-economic involvement in Arab politics and the categories? creation of an Arab nationalist-Islamist A large part of the answer is that this synthesis for which Bashar has been the new state of affairs serves the two groups main promoter and advocate. When one that matter most in Arab politics: the Arab takes into account the fact that Bashar is not nationalist dictators and the revolutionary really a Muslim, though he plays one on Islamist challengers seeking to displace television, the accomplishment is them. The Arab regimes rejected reforms, stupendous in its audacity. because change threatened to unseat them. It is rather strange to see the revival of Using demagoguery enabled them to policies that were so spectacularly continue as both dictatorships and failed

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) 25 Barry Rubin leaderships, while still enjoying popular belonged to history," stated Hani Hourani, support. On the other side of the rivalry, head of the New Jordan Research Center. radical Islamist forces, far more able to Yet by 2006, most notably in regard to the compete for mass support than the small Israel-Hizballah war of that year, that though courageous bands of liberals, sought thinking was either forgotten or deemed to a new strategy to expand their influence and have been wrong. In Hourani’s words, gain power. “Hizballah created a new way of thinking In addition to this world-view’s about the whole conflict in the region: utilitarian aspects, the analytical emphasis Israel is not that invincible. It could be on “resistance” to foreigners rather than beaten. It could be harmed…. Hezbollah, reform at home builds on a very strong even if we don't agree with its ideology, foundation: A half-century-long was suggesting a different option to the indoctrination overwhelmingly dominating Arab people."6 Arab discourse that all the problems of the There were specific cases cited to make Arab world are caused by Israel, America, this claim, but upon examination, the data and the West. A third factor is simply that did not support that conclusion. The the noble resistance concept does make Palestinian intifada of 2000 to 2005—like people feel good. It is an opium for the its predecessor of 1979-81—did not gain a masses, especially those masses who can Palestinian state, much less destroy Israel. vicariously experience battle by watching Its main effect was to wreck the others—Iraqis, Israelis, Lebanese, and infrastructure on the Gaza Strip and West Palestinians—getting killed as a result. Bank, causing massive Palestinian A second aspect of revitalizing long-held casualties and a loss of international positions that eroded somewhat in the support. For Fatah, the group mainly 1990s, is the claim that Israel, America, and responsible for these events, that strategy the West are really weak. If Arabs and brought its downfall. Unless one’s goal was Muslims are willing to sacrifice themselves to “hurt” Israel regardless of the cost, this and their societies as martyrs, they can was not an attractive example. achieve victory. In this respect, Hizballah The second situation cited was that of leader Hasan Nasrallah, Palestinian Hamas Iraq. Again, while some Americans were leader Khaled Mashal, Syrian President killed, the great majority of the victims Bashar al-Asad, and Iranian President were Arab Muslims. Iraq’s society and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad sound eerily like economy were driven into the ground. As if Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat, Egyptian that were not enough, communal hatreds President Gamal Abd al-Nasser, Iraqi were heightened to the point of civil war, a President Saddam Hussein, and Syrian war which the Sunni Arab insurgents would Presidents Salah Jadid and Hafiz al-Asad in not only lose eventually, but one that could the 1960s and 1970s. It was this kind of cause the massacre of their own thinking, for example, that led to the Arab community. Again, as with the September defeat in the 1967 War and a number of 11 attacks, if the goal was to hurt wars thereafter. Americans, then some success was As a result, conclusions were being achieved. Yet the cost to Afghanistan and drawn in the 1990s, that this kind of Iraq were much higher. strategy did not work. “We had given up on As the final and most important the military option. We believed this example, the 2006 Israel-Hizballah war was

26 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) Why Syria Matters cited. Yet it is easy to see in the 2006 outcome, however, has not been to reject Lebanon War that Israel basically won this spurious hope, but rather simply to seek militarily. It did not feel the need for a another candidate for the job. quick ceasefire and captured the battlefield. Iran’s President Ahmadinejad in 2006 is On the negative side, Israel suffered a resurrected Nasser from 1966, threatening damage from rocket attacks—though this the West, confidently predicting Israel will was in no way disabling—and military be wiped off the map, and toying with war casualties, which happened in all wars as a way of achieving a quick, easy victory. including those that saw its biggest Bashar is not a brash young man of gangly victories. Yet the common Arab perception frame and failed moustache but a champion was that a military option against Israel was of resistance. Hamas leader Nasrallah, a viable, something widely doubted in the client of Syria, and Hamas head Khalid 1980s and even more so in the 1990s. Mashal, a resident of Damascus, are the What is most amazing about this and ideal of Arab manhood. They promise to similar statements is that other than the achieve the impossible and persuade massive use of rockets against Israeli millions of people that they will do so. civilians—which had no impact on the Finally, the new “resistance” axis military situation—there was absolutely promises to solve all problems quickly and nothing new in Hizballah’s approach. simply, albeit through large-scale Similar tactics had no real effect during the bloodshed. Why compromise if you believe 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War or when Iraq fired you can achieve total victory, revolution, missiles at Israel during the 1991 Kuwait and wipe Israel off the map with armed War. struggle and the intimidation of the West? The 2006 Lebanon War merely Why engage in the long, hard work of succeeded in re-convincing many Arabs of economic development when merely the merits of an otherwise rightly showing courage in battle and killing a few discredited strategy that would not work enemies fulfills one’s dreams. Victory, said except to make them feel good about Bashar in the speech cited above, requires supposedly making their enemies feel bad. recklessness. If nobody remembers where That is hardly the basis for a serious or this kind of mistaken thinking led before, successful political strategy. It certainly is they are all the more ready to embrace it no substitute for social progress or anew. economic development. In the absence of In many ways, what is happening now is material victory, one is left hoping for like the revival of a play that bankrupted its miracles—the intervention of God or of a backers and ruined the reputation of all the demi-god in human form. actors involved. Yet all the old parts are This leads into a third element that cast anew with great faithfulness. Iran plays repeats itself from the past: the belief in a the role of revolutionary patron in 2006, political superhero who will lead Arabs and which Egypt purported to do in 1966. Syria Muslims to victory. In the 1950s and 1960s, takes the part of patron of Arab nationalism there was Nasser; in the 1970s, Arafat and and revolutionary terrorism that Syria did in Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad, Bashar’s 1966. Hizballah and Hamas are the new father; in the 1980s and 1990s, it was Iraqi PLO, promising to destroy Israel through President Saddam Hussein; and then Usama non-state violence. bin Ladin. All failed, all were defeated. The

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This experience of past tragedy has not, conflict as an excuse for their domestic to paraphrase Karl Marx’s remark on system. The same point applies for keeping repetition in history, discouraged the farce their distance from the United States. of this second go-round. Indeed, the sad Equally, they can eliminate the democratic history of such past endeavors seems to challenge and repress domestic criticism have no impact on the majority of Arab since fair elections or open debate might thinkers, writers, journalists, and others strengthen radical Islamists. celebrating the revival of intransigence in What is this new era that sweeps all search of total victory. before it, at least in terms of rhetoric? True, a small liberal Arab minority is Briefly, it is characterized by the following horrified by the turn toward radicalism and points: increased confrontation with the West and • A rise in radical Islamist Israel in the name of heroic resistance. It is movements, though the Arab both hard and dangerous for them to make nationalist regimes are still holding the case against this world-view and onto power and might well not lose strategy. Emperors do not like it when some it. of their subjects announce their nakedness. • Growing hatred of the United States Societies, especially undemocratic ones, do and Israel, at least compared to the not like to see their most cherished beliefs levels in some places during the questioned. 1990s. More moderate, but still dictatorial, • The belief that total victory can be regimes want to use the radical doctrine in achieved through terrorism and their own interest—rationalizing their other violent tactics. regimes; mobilizing their people for • A euphoric expectation of imminent resisting foreigners rather than reform, revolution, glorious victories, and while also preventing it being used against unprecedented Arab or Muslim themselves. At the same time, the rulers of unity. Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia also • A disinterest in diplomatic remember a great deal more about how this compromise solutions, as ideology failed in the past than they unnecessary and even treasonous. pretend. To concede nothing is to lose Just as Nasser and Saddam posed threats nothing, because you still have the to them in the previous era, the new tyranny claim to all you want and have thus of Tehran and sword of Damascus are left open an opportunity to gain direct challenges to their survival today. everything. They often use and reinforce the new ideas, • The death of hopes for democracy but also hope to blunt the edge, at least due to both regime manipulation when their own interests are concerned. Yet and radical Islamist exploitation of in seeking to avoid being victims of the the opportunities offered by some revolutionary tidal wave, they also play openings in the system. along with it. The only real difference between the Even the apparent threat has its new and the old concepts is that what was advantages. They have a good reason for formally expressed in Arab nationalist not making or implementing peace with terms is now stated in Islamist, or at least Israel, which lets them use the continuing more Islamic, ones. The idea is that

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Islamism can succeed where Arab even utopian society. The Islamists still nationalism failed. Yet aside from the make this claim, but the Arab nationalist obvious difference in the content of the two rulers hardly even make a pretense on such ideologies, their basic perceptions and goals issues any more. are quite parallel. First, the Arab/Muslim In general, though, while Islamists and world faces a U.S.-Israel (or Western- Arab nationalists compete for power, Israel) or Zionist-Crusader conspiracy to sometimes even violently, they destroy it. A secondary enemy is the simultaneously mutually reinforce the majority of Arab rulers whose relative intellectual system and world-view that moderation shows them to be traitors. Only locks the Arab world into the very problems those who preach intransigence and they purport to remedy. struggle are upholders of proper Arab and One feature of the new era very similar Muslim values. In the 1950s and 1960s, this to that of the 1950s-1980s period is the distinction pitted Egypt, Syria, and Iraq as expectation of imminent transfiguration, a the progressive states against “reactionary” millenarian sense that dramatic change is Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other about to happen. The idea is that the future monarchies. Today, it is Iran and Syria will defy the past, that such things as against Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. balance of forces or politics as the “art of Since the main enemy is purely evil, the possible” will be overcome by the hand there can be no compromise with it. By the of God, the proper ideology, or the right same token, virtually all types of violence military strategy. are justified. This cannot be terrorism, This idea was very much in evidence because the violence is defensive, during the period beginning with the 1952 responsive, necessary, and against a satanic coup in Egypt and particularly after the foe. Total victory is achievable and 1956 Suez War, which catapulted Nasser therefore anything less is treasonous. into being the closest thing there has ever Consequently, the people must unite under been to a leader of the Arab world, the hero governments with the proper ideologies and able to unite all the Arabs. Soon he had that are able to mobilize the entire society, followers in every country. Nasser asserted i.e., a dictatorship. The priorities for these Egypt's pride and strength; ridiculed regimes would be to destroy Israel, defeat Western powers; smashed Islamist rivals America, and reject Western cultural and and the Marxist left at home; intrigued the intellectual influences. As this is all so intellectuals; and intimidated Arab regimes necessary and workable, anything other that opposed him. “We would clap in proud than struggle and resistance—such as more surprise,” recalled Tawfiq al-Hakim, “when citizen rights, reform, modernized he delivered a powerful speech and said economic structures, etc.—would be a about [the United States] which had the distraction. Only after total victory is atomic bomb that ‘if they don't like our achieved can these luxuries be arranged. In conduct, let them drink from the sea,’ he contrast, the idea of liberalism and reform is filled us with pride.”7 essentially a trick of the enemy. Hakim made a devastating critique of An additional irony is that in the original the original resistance mentality: Arab nationalist era, it was also hoped and expected that the radical regimes would Are the people made happy because bring rapid development and create a just, they hear socialist songs although

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they are submerged in misery which on Islam in politics were opposite. It was everyone sees?.... Masses of people also noted that the Lebanon “victory” took wait for long hours in front of place on the fiftieth anniversary of the Suez consumer co-operatives for a piece one. What was not mentioned was that a of meat to be thrown to them…. Or half-century after Nasser first took power take Arab unity.… Did the has not brought much progress in Egypt. revolution succeed in bringing it Even getting back the Sinai Peninsula about by political means? Did it captured by Israel in 1967 had not been bring it closer and strengthen it, or achieved by struggle, but rather through rather did it scatter and weaken it by friendship with America and a peace treaty policies which included with Israel. intervention, pretension to Another revived concept is that the leadership, domination, influence- balance of forces or technology—military, spreading, showering money in the industrial, or electronic—is not really planning of plots, fomenting coups important, but that spirit overcomes all d'état, and in the Yemen war these things. As early as 1947, Fawzi al- inducing Arab to kill Arab, and Qawukji, commander of the Syrian-backed Arab to use burning napalm and People’s Army fighting to prevent Israel’s poison gas against Arab?8 creation, explained that the Arabs would win by saying, “More than the arms I value At the time, though, few paid attention the people who will be conducting this holy to this kind of critique. This particular war”9 In the rhetoric of a 1960s’ radical emperor’s nakedness was only revealed in slogan, “The power of the people is greater the 1967 defeat and more particularly, after than the technology of the man.” This is the his death in 1970. Hakim’s book was idea behind the celebration of Hizballah and entitled, The Return of Consciousness. Hamas, the Iraqi insurgency, of the suicide Today, however, it seems as if the age of bomber and the rock thrower as capable of the coma has returned since now many have achieving victory against apparently forgotten this outcome. It is also instructive overwhelming odds. to recall that Nasser’s victorious reputation Arab nationalists, aside from their own rested mainly on the 1956 Suez War, which past exploits, looked to the Cuban and was actually a military humiliation for Chinese revolutions as well as Vietnam for Egypt. Only American and Soviet proof that the weaker side could win diplomatic intervention saved Nasser—a through determined resistance and situation paralleling the Lebanon war steadfastness. It was all very 1960s retro. “victory” of Nasrallah, rescued by “Long live the victory of people’s war,” international pressure for a ceasefire that said the Chinese, while the Cubans had left Hizballah armed and in place. their “Year of the Heroic Guerrilla.” These Ignoring all this history, supporters now ideas live on in the Arab world as if in a make the comparison of Nasrallah and time capsule. Nasser in a positive sense, often playing on Nasrallah is now, as Arafat once was, the similarity of both men’s names to the compared to Che Guevara, the romantic but Arabic word for “victory.” In Cairo, their failed Cuban revolutionary leader, who like pictures have been carried in Nasrallah did not overthrow any demonstrations together, though their views governments, but has many t-shirts

30 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) Why Syria Matters dedicated to him. Islamists pointed to such was World War II, when the relatively examples as the victory over the Soviet mighty Japanese were defeated despite their superpower in Afghanistan (forgetting the suicidal kamikaze pilots and soldiers? U.S. role in helping that campaign) and In this light, the Arab memory of losing such “successes” as September 11 or the so many wars and conflicts in the past is not Iraqi insurgency. They also claim Israel’s a sign of cowardice, but a valuable political withdrawal from south Lebanon and the experience which should be heeded. Having Gaza Strip as triumphs. The Iranians can spent so many years of suffering, add their own revolution, the U.S. embassy dictatorship, and squandered resources in hostage crisis and their standing up against the second half of the twentieth century Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq War, should have been used to teach the lesson which they nonetheless really lost. that intransigence and violence did not Victory is said to be inevitable. An work, that extreme goals brought about far- Egyptian Islamist writes that the Americans reaching disaster. are cowards while the Muslims are brave: When in the 1990s, Arabs faced this sad “The believers do not fear the enemy…. story more honestly and directly, they were Yet their enemies protect [their] lives like a inclined toward rethinking their future. miser protects his money. They… do not Knowing what doesn’t work tells you what enter into battles seeking martyrdom…. needs to be done. If Israel could not be This is the secret of the believers' victory destroyed and the conflict was so costly, over their enemies.” Indeed, the fact is that perhaps it was better to make peace. If it is the infidels’ cowardice that leads them America was so powerful than it would be to “bolster their status by means of science better to get along with that country than to and inventions.”10 The fact that this fight it. If the Arabs were falling behind in statement was published in a state- every economic, scientific, and social controlled Egyptian newspaper, al- category, comprehensive reform seemed Gumhuriya on October 7, 2001, as a necessary. If terrorism abroad turns on you reaction to September 11, shows how Arab and poisons your own society, reject this nationalist institutions collude to promote path. The idea of change was on the agenda, “Islamist” ideas, which feed the resistance challenging all the assumptions that had mentality. been made, pursued, and found wanting. Yet in fact these alleged victories are Now, however, this process has gone illusory ones. And this doctrine prompts the down the memory hole. A new aggressive violence and rejection of peace, generation—which does not remember which produces the casualties in Lebanon, history and has no one to remind it—and a Iraq, and among the Palestinians that different ideology, which discounts Arab furnish the alleged need for resistance in the nationalism's dreadful experience as not first place. There is, however, a good reason applying to itself, repeats all these mistakes. why weaker states usually avoid provoking In Bashar’s version, three generations of or going to war against stronger ones: They Arabs fought Israel and lost, leading to the lose. History is full of examples of high- expectation that the desire to fight would spirited, ideologically motivated states that decrease over time. However, Bashar said, simply could not overcome the odds of now a fourth generation was ready for reality and ended up with their own cities in battle and the desire for struggle was in fact ruins. One of the most obvious examples increasing over time.11

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) 31 Barry Rubin

The Arabs did not make mistakes, they paper tiger; the West is beatable. This explain, but simply did not struggle enough contest does not necessarily require war, or follow the proper ideology. It is as if indeed if the United States and West are so someone has been hitting their head against weak, they will back down if faced with the a brick wall, momentarily considered the threat of war. As Winston Churchill said of possibility that this was not beneficial Soviet methods in his 1946 speech noting behavior, and then after brief consideration the beginning of the Cold War, “I do not concluded that they simply had not been believe that Soviet Russia desires war. bashing their head hard enough against the What they desire is the fruits of war and the obstacle. indefinite expansion of their power and “Oh, Master of Resistance,” the Syrian doctrines.”13 state-run newspaper Tishrin on August 3, For the West in general and America in 2006 intoned in an ode to Nasrallah, the particular is perceived by Syria not only as man who set Lebanon back 20 years: too craven to fight, but so stupid as to be easily outmaneuvered. Experience also You have cloaked yourself in honor gives them reasons for thinking this way. merely by writing the first page in Still, this is the mistaken argument Saddam the book of deterring and defeating Hussein made from the late 1980s, through the Zionist-American invaders, the 1991 Kuwait crisis, and up to the along with all those who are hiding moment he was overthrown in 2003, and behind them. No one thinks that the the one that Usama bin Ladin said was [war] will be won today, tomorrow, proven by the success of the September 11, or [even] next year–but it is the 2001 attacks before he was driven into beginning of the end, and the road hiding. Doesn’t the story’s outcome towards victory has begun....12 disprove this conception? Not if it is ignored. The fate of Iraq’s dictator has not And so we are at the start of a long, long prevented Ahmadinejad from calling road of conflict, just as Arabs stated in the America a “superpower made of straw”14 or 1950s. Perhaps some time around 2035, we the head of the powerful head of the Iranian will be due for another round in the peace Council of Guardians, Ayatollah Ahmad process. Once this memory of experience Jannati, saying that America “is weaker has been shredded by the resistance than a spider web…. If the Islamic mentality, it may be necessary to go countries act like Hizballah, and stand up to through the entire, decades-long, America like men, America will be generational swallowing ordeal all over humiliated….”15 again before real progress can be made on Saddam thought the same way. Speaking the basis of new defeats, failures, and at the Royal Cultural Center in Amman, shortcomings. Jordan, on February 24, 1990, he explained An assessment of the balance of forces that the Americans had run away from should show that conflict with the West is a Vietnam and Lebanon (in the 1983) and big mistake since it is so much more abandoned the shah of Iran. He argued that powerful in military and technological they would not fight or at least would not terms. However, what if this is an illusion, long endure in a battle. Khomeini agreed if Muslim spiritual power or Arab courage with him on this point, if on nothing else, can triumph? In other words, America is a and famously noted on November 7, 1979

32 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) Why Syria Matters that America “could not do a damn thing” perhaps aid) from other Arab and Muslim to stop the Islamist Revolution.16 countries. The goal is not war but the fruits Bin Ladin himself explained, “[Those] of war. God guides will never lose….America [is] Regarding Israel, though, it is not so filled with fear from the north to south and easy to separate brinksmanship from actual east to west….[Now there will be] two fighting. The strategists of the new camps: the camp of belief and of resistance strategy, like their earlier disbelief….Every Muslim shall…support predecessors (after 1973, many of those his religion.”17 After all, the entire forerunners had already learned a lesson) September 11 attack was designed to believe that big talk, attacking from third puncture the myth of American power, to countries, firing rockets, and dispatching show how vulnerable it was. In terms of suicide bombers, along with pure courage Muslim perceptions on this point, the will fill the gap. September 11 attack and the other acts of Part of this calculation is a dangerous “resistance” achieved a great deal of underestimate of their enemy. When success. Nasrallah and other extremist Islamists The basic approach of Bashar’s new speak about Israel, they echo word for word Middle East permeated throughout the Arab what Arafat and Arab nationalists said in world, from Yemen’s president advocating the 1960s. Basically, it boils down to this: If immediate war with Israel to Sudanese Arabs or Muslims are only ready to become President Omar al-Bashir boasting that he martyrs and sacrifice everything in warfare, would rather fight the UN than let its forces wiping Israel off the map will be easy. into Darfur, where his troops have been Israel has only continued to exist, because murdering ethnic minorities. “We've done Arab rulers were too cowardly and the math…. We've found out that a traitorous up to now. confrontation is a million times better for This kind of thinking produced four us.”18 decades of disaster for the Arab world. It The idea of Sudan taking on the entire began when Arab leaders announced in the world does not accord with any known 1960s that soon they would defeat Israel mathematical systems, but this is not and throw the Jews into the sea. In fact, it literally Bashir’s intention any more than was the Arabs who suffered a humiliating Bashar wants to fight a war on his own soil loss. Thereafter, Arafat and others bragged with his own army. Bashir’s calculation is that guerrilla warfare would do the trick, in that the world does not care about Darfur or thinking parallel to Hizballah’s strategy in would soon grow tired of having 2006. peacekeeping forces there (a fatigue The result, however, was not Israel’s heightened by casualties inflicted upon defeat, but civil wars in Jordan and them) and go away. Lebanon, more defeats on the battlefield, Bashar holds parallel views about Iraq years of suffering, and the waste of billions and Lebanon. Will the West give him of dollars in resources. The Gaza Strip is control over Lebanon in order to buy him now being wrecked by such thinking for the off in return for his restoring order there? third time in 15 years. The Arab states Moreover, both Bashir and Bashar also remain virtually the only place in the world know that this demagogic response will win exclusively ruled by dictatorships, since them support at home as well as cheers (and only authoritarian governments, it was

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) 33 Barry Rubin argued, could defeat Israel and expel incomprehension of Israel. Since Arab Western influence; and so it went, down nationalists and Islamists did not want through Saddam Hussein’s three costly Israel to exist, they decided that it was an wars and Usama bin Ladin, to present-day illusion. Israel was weak, divided, and Hizballah and Hamas. cowardly. Soon it would crumble. When intellectuals and leaders are Here is Arafat in 1968: "The Israelis irresponsible there are consequences. have one great fear, the fear of casualties." Zaghlul al-Najjar, a columnist in al- This principle guided PLO strategy: Kill Ahram—not an Iranian publication or some enough Israelis by war or terrorism, and the crackpost al-Qa’ida site, but the flagship country would collapse or surrender. A newspaper of the moderate Egyptian PLO official in 1970 said the Jews could government, which has had a peace treaty not long remain under so much tension and with Israel for more than a quarter- threat; “Zionist efforts to transform them century—wrote on August 14, 2006: into a homogeneous, cohesive nation have failed,” and so they would leave.21 On Imagine what would [happen] to September 12, 1973, just before his country this oppressive entity [Israel] if an and Egypt attacked Israel, the Syrian oil embargo was imposed on it, if ambassador confided in a Soviet official its air force was destroyed in a that Arab states would need 10 to15 years surprise attack, and if all the Arab to destroy Israel, but would soon launch an countries around it fired rockets attack to destroy the myth of Israeli on it simultaneously and decided invincibility and undermine foreign to put an end to its crimes and its investment and Jewish immigration.22 filth. [If this happens], this Yet while the Arabs did well in the criminal entity which threatens the war’s beginning and claimed afterward that entire region with mass they had restored their honor, more than 30 destruction will not continue to years later, all the same issues remained: exist on its stolen land even one Israeli invincibility, a belief that Israeli more day.19 society could be undermined, and that victory would be certain if Arab self- To show that this is no fluke, the same confidence were restored. The following are newspaper carried a similar article by Nasrallah’s words on July 29, 2006: "When Anwar Abd al-Malek, an Arab nationalist, the people of this tyrannical state loses its on August 29, 2006, about the miracle of faith in its mythical army, it is the Hizballah showing Israel was nothing and beginning of the end of this entity."23 Yet thus changing the course of history.20 Does Israel suffered far heavier losses fighting Egypt want war with Israel? No, but this PLO terrorists in the 1960s, when the kind of demagoguery, which has been country's population was far smaller, than going on for a long time, gives it a degree in the 2006 Lebanon War without political of immunity from radical criticism while or social upheaval. reinforcing the new/old resistance ideology Nevertheless, Bashar and Nasrallah even further. say, as Arafat did periodically over almost During all these flights of fantasy and forty years, the fighting has shown, in the failure what has stood out, except perhaps latter’s words, Israel's army to be “helpless, for brief periods in the 1990s, was weak, defeated, humiliated, and a

34 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) Why Syria Matters failure...”24 Of course, this is propaganda Palestinian terrorist groups is largely based aimed to win the cheers of the masses and on the principle of state sponsorship and the cadres' steadfastness, but the leaders, safe havens. Again, it didn’t work. too, believe their own propaganda. After Remarkably consistent—or perhaps all, they base their strategy and tactics on it. circular—in Arab thinking has been the The big hope of Arafat then and search for a great charismatic hero to Bashar, Nasrallah or Hamas now is to produce victory. While there is a long terrorize Israeli civilians. This is why they historical basis for this approach—Salah al- use terrorism, not because they are Din and his defeat of the Crusaders is often intrinsically evil, but rather because they mentioned—Nasser was the first in modern think it will be effective. By attacking times to wear this mantle (1956-70), civilian targets, Arafat said in 1968, the followed by would-be Iraqi and Syrian PLO would “weaken the Israeli economy” imitators (1960s-1980s), Arafat and and “create and maintain an atmosphere of Khomeini (to some), Saddam (1980-91), strain and anxiety that will force the and now Iraqi insurgent leader Abu Musab Zionists to realize that it is impossible for al-Zarqawi, Ahmadinejad, Nasrallah, and them to live in Israel.”25 Bashar. In short, paralyze the country, make Of course, leaders try to persuade others Israelis afraid, and the end is near. Or, as an that they are the anointed one, a stance article in a PLO magazine explained in useful for promoting the interests of the 1970, if all Israelis would be made to feel country or group they lead. This hero “isolated and defenseless,” they would want worship takes on many forms, which seem to leave, and Israel would cease to exist.26 to be repeated with each new hero. To give What Bashar, Nasrallah, and Iran say today some examples, babies are named after sounds like the PLO a quarter-century ago in him; his picture is inscribed on such documents like, “Guidelines for attacking consumer items as key rings and necklaces; civilian targets in Israel,” which calls for, songs are written about him, and so on. “[using] weapons in terrifying ways against The idea of a great leader who will them where they live,” including for example deliver victory on a silver platter undercuts attacking tourist facilities “during the height the appeal of democracy, moderation, or of the tourist season,”27 which is what pragmatism. Ironically, it also subverts happened in 2006. In calling for Israel’s mobilization, since one merely need wait destruction, Ahmadinejad echoed what Arab for the great leader—and another country or leaders were saying at the time he was a some organization of heroes—to do all the mere lad, with no real success. work. However, the work does not get Similarly, the other main strategic idea of done. As for the last three great heroes, the Iranian-led alliance today is precisely the Saddam is in a prison cell, bin Ladin hiding same one developed in the 1960s, in which out perhaps in a cave, and Zarqawi is dead. terror-sponsoring states assaulted Israel Yet the enthusiasm for the next candidate through another country and client groups. lives on. Syria used Jordan and Lebanon for this The Arab reaction to the 2006 war in purpose in 1947, even before Israel’s Lebanon follows an old tradition in which creation, when Damascus wanted to hide its military defeats are turned by verbal involvement in the fighting.28 The whole gymnastics into victories, partly based on history of the PLO and more than a dozen the fact that Arab forces won some battles

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) 35 Barry Rubin and fought bravely. The 1956 and 1973 There was some dissent on this point. wars have been transformed in this way. A Isam Sartawi, the PLO's leading moderate, superb example of this pattern is what presented a different perspective, demanding happened at Karama, Jordan in March an investigation of the PLO's poor 1968. Israel’s army crossed the river to performance in the fighting. He urged the destroy the main Fatah camp there and PLO to "wake up" and leave the "path of succeeded in doing so. Arafat fled, leaving defeat" that had led to the 1982 debacle. his men to fend for themselves. Most of the Sartawi ridiculed the wishful thinking that fighting was done by Jordan’s army. Israel claimed that war to be a PLO victory. lost 21 men while Fatah had 150 killed. The “Another victory such as this,” he joked, battle was an Israeli victory and the main “and the PLO will find itself in the Fiji credit for resistance belonged to the Islands.”30 Jordanian army. Yet what happened between Arafat’s Arafat, however, persuaded Palestinians fantasy and Sartawi’s realism? Arafat went and the Arab world that Karama was a great on to lead the PLO until his death. Two victory for Fatah, making it appear heroic months after voicing his complaints, Sartawi next to the Arab armies' apparent cowardice was murdered by Palestinian terrorists by a and incompetence a year earlier in the 1967 group headquartered in Damascus, which War. Thousands begged to join Fatah and often served as an instrument of the Syrian Nasser invited Arafat to come to Cairo and regime. be his protégé. Arafat’s career, and the next Still, while imagination can persuade 35 years of tragedy and bloodshed, was set. people that a defeat was actually a victory, Egypt itself used the 1973 War in this imagination cannot produce future military manner. While the Egyptian offensive at the victories. start of the war was indeed brilliant and its This ideological and political system use of new antitank weapons (another represented by the resistance mentality also parallel with Lebanon in 2006) successful, has a brilliant safeguard mechanism. If Egypt lost the war. By the end of the anyone in the Arab world or Iran disagrees fighting, the international community saved or doubts it will work, this merely proves Egypt, when Israeli forces were across the them to be agents of the West and Zionism. Suez Canal and its Third Army was Such pressure also operates very much on a surrounded. At least, Sadat used the war as a personal level. As a Lebanese Shi’a wrote basis for his peace bid, turning the claimed of this problem, “How should I react to victory to some productive use. Yet virtually Lebanese people… that tell me that they are no one in the Arabic-speaking world-views ready to kill themselves, their kids, see their the war in that context. houses destroyed and their jobs nonexistent, A more typical case is the PLO’s while looking at me [and implying], if ‘you handling of its disastrous defeat in Lebanon are not willing to do the same, thus you are in 1982, which ended with that group being an American/Israeli agent?’”31 driven from the country. Arafat called it a The same treatment is given to victory, and his colleague, Khalid al-Hasan, governments or groups if they seek outside modestly proclaimed, "We should not support to protect themselves from the become arrogant in the future as a result of radicals, since that means turning to the this victory."29 West. Sometimes, of course, the threat is so grave that the taboo is broken—as when the

36 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) Why Syria Matters

Saudis and Kuwaitis got Western help to things have once again been pushed off the save them from Saddam in 1990. agenda. Indeed, the philosophy of Yet there is a terrible reckoning resistance breeds resistance to the changes afterward, since this decision was a major the Arab world really needs. factor in the rise of bin Ladin’s A superb example of this thinking is international jihadism. Egyptian President provided by Youssef al-Rashed, a columnist Anwar Sadat made peace with Israel in for the Kuwaiti daily al-Anba, who wrote 1979 and was assassinated in 1981. The that “the Lebanese people may have lost a same fate befell Lebanese President Bashir lot of economic and human resources [in al-Gemayel in 1982, and Jordan’s King the 2006 war]...but [aside] from figures and Abdallah in 1951 for merely attempting to calculations, they have achieved a lot of make peace. gains,” because Lebanon's “heroic This technique of intimidation is also resistance fighters have proven to the world being used once again against countries. that Lebanese borders are not open to Bashar, for example, attacked Egyptian, Israeli tanks without a price. Lebanon was Jordanian, and Syrian leaders as midgets victorious in the battle of dignity and who act as lackeys of the West. Such honor.”32 polarization stirs both inter-Arab quarrels Upon examination, however, what this and subversion within different Arab really says is that billions of dollars in countries, setting back both inter-Arab damage, death, suffering, the return of cooperation and stability. No one talks Syrian influence to Lebanon, the rise of more about unity and has less of it than inter-communal tensions to the brink of does the Arab world. civil war, and the setting back of that Another old/new precept of the country’s economy are all worthwhile, resistance mentality is the idea that a war because it made people feel better about has restored Arab honor. This was claimed themselves. Even then, Rashed couldn't say in the late 1960s with the PLO, after the that Lebanese borders are closed to Israeli 1973 War, two Palestinian intifadas, and on tanks, it is simply that they cannot enter at other occasions. In addition, the argument no cost whatsoever. was made that Hizballah forced Israel out This kind of statement is common in of south Lebanon and Hamas did so from modern Arab political history. To choose the Gaza Strip thus redeeming Arab honor. only one example, a 1966 internal Syrian The historical problem is that after each Ba’th Party document stated that the highly publicized restoration of Arab honor struggle against imperialism and Zionism it soon seems to be tarnished, or perhaps was so important, that it was worth insatiable, requiring another round of sacrificing everything the party and the repairs. During the 1990s, it was often Syrian people had achieved: “We have to stated by reformers that the true way to risk destruction of all we have built up in raise Arab honor and dignity was not order to eliminate Israel!” It was all very through fighting Israel or the West, but by well, the Ba’th Party explained, to have putting the priority on building a productive summit conferences and make military economy, higher living standards, equality preparations, but there had to come a for women, a free society, independent moment when this plan for war would be courts, an honest media, and good implemented.33 The next year, with the educational and health systems. Yet these 1967 War, the regime got its wish.

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) 37 Barry Rubin

If the priority is on resistance, reform is history of Arab nationalism in remarkable at best a distraction, at worst it is treason. detail, including the wildly exaggerated Thus, struggle excuses stagnation. What promises of victory, the intoxication with matters is the glory of resistance rather than supposed triumphs, the investment of the banality of economic reform, improving resources into struggle instead of the school system, and developing an constructive pursuits, and so on. The old honest media or independent judiciary. “In con game of offering ideology and hatred of a state of war,” wrote the dissident Egyptian Israel and the West as a substitute for playwright Ali Salem whose works are democracy, reform, and material progress is banned in his own country, “No one going on with an intensity of success as if it argues... or asks questions.” They are told had never been used over and over in the that this is not the right time to talk about past. free speech, democracy, or corruption, and The demonization of Israel by Iran, then ordered, “Get back to the trench Bashar, and Nasrallah—which wins so immediately!’"34 much popularity—is almost precisely the And when in March 2001, Ba’th Party same as that of past Arab nationalists who members asked Syrian Vice-President Abd led their people into so many messes and Halim Khaddam at a public meeting why away from peace. The same is true for the the regime did not do more to solve the dominant view of the United States (and problems of corruption, incompetence, and often the West in general) as both hostile the slow pace of reform, his answer was and weak. that the Arab-Israeli conflict permitted no In some ways, as a world-view that does changes at home. “This country is in a state not correspond with reality, this is a form of of war as long as the occupation insanity. However, there is much method in continues.”35 The irony of this argument the “madness” of those who promulgate it. was that the regime had turned down The resistance mentality is an excellent tool Israel’s offer to return the entire Golan for regime preservation and in mobilizing Heights a year earlier. support for radical Islamist movements. The The regime needed the continuation of main victims are peace, pragmatism, the conflict with Israel to rationalize its own moderation, reform, and democracy, which dictatorship, corruption, and even continued means, in essence, that the main victims of rule. However, this allowed endless chances the resistance mentality are the Arabs for posturing bravely. Bashar roared in a themselves. 2001 speech, “An inch of land is like a For Arab reformers, this contradiction is kilometer and that in turn is like a thousand incredibly frustrating. Wrote, Tarek Heggy, kilometers. A country that concedes even a an Egyptian liberal and one of the most tiny part of its territory, is bound to concede brilliant minds in the Arab world, “I hear a much bigger part in the future.... Land is people all over the Arab television stations an issue of honor not meters.” He added talking about our dignity and how Gamal that this was his inheritance: “President Abdel Nasser and Hasan Nasrallah Hafez al-Asad did not give in,” boasted safeguarded it…. Sometimes, I say to Bashar, “and neither shall we; neither today myself, ‘Either these people around me are nor in the future.”36 all insane or it is me who is insane.’” Today, radical Islamism—with an assist However, the propaganda of the from the nationalists—is recapitulating the resistance philosophy is so pervasive—in

38 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) Why Syria Matters schools, media, mosques, the statements of government and opposition groups, and so U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign on—that it takes the greatest courage and Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). strength of character to stand against it. 2 Fouad Ajami, "Arab Road," Foreign Policy, Even then, it was hard for voices of reason No. 47 (Summer 1982), p. 16. to compete with the battle cries, accusations 3 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, of treason, and celebrations of alleged The World Was Going Our Way (NY: Basic triumphs. Books, 2005), p. 212. There were those who believed that 4 Speech by Bashar al-Asad. moderation, reform, and good relations with 5 Speech by Bashar al-Asad. the West were the way to solve the Arabs’ 6 Quoted in the New York Post, September problems. Yet as Bashar told an Egyptian 3, 2006. magazine interview in August 2006, “the 7 Tawfiq al-Hakim, The Return of resistance’s firm stand [in Lebanon] and the Consciousness (NY: New York University change we see in the Arab world, due to Press, 1985), p. 50. which we can see millions of youngsters 8 Ibid. waving the Hizballah and resistance flags, 9 Text of UPI interview in FO371 have proven that this nation is on the brink E8124/951/31, August 16, 1947. of a new phase in its history.”37 10 Al-Gumhuriya, October 7, 2001. Perhaps true, but it is the same as the old Translation in MEMRI, #289, October 19, phase, and ultimately so will be its results. 2001, In the meantime, though, the Syrian regime http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archi is stable and popular. Unless he makes a ves&Area=sd&ID=SP28901#_edn1. major miscalculation, it is springtime for 11 Speech by Bashar al-Asad. Bashar. 12 Tishrin, August 3, 2006. 13 Speech of March 5, 1946. Text available *Barry Rubin is director of the Global at: Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/churc Center, Interdisciplinary University, and hill-iron.html. editor of the Middle East Review of 14 IRINN TV, February 1, 2006. Translation International Affairs. His book, The Truth in MEMRI, Clip #1019, About Syria, will be published by Palgrave- http://www.memritv.org/Search.asp?ACT= Macmillan in Spring 2007. His most recent S1. book is The Long War for Freedom: The 15 Sermon broadcast on Iranian channel one Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle television, September 1, 2006. Translation East (Wiley). by MEMRI, http://www.memritv.org/search.asp?ACT= **A different version of this article was S9&P1=1261. previously published in Middle East 16 Text in FBIS, November 8, 1979. Quarterly. 17 Al-Jazira television, October 7, 2001. 18 Interview on al-Jazira television, August NOTES 1, 2006. Translation in MEMRI, No. 1217, August 1, 2006; Al-Jazira television, 1 Speech by Bashar al-Asad, Syrian Arab August 29, 2006. Translation in MEMRI, Television, August 15, 2006. Translation in Clip #129,

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) 39 Barry Rubin

http://www.memritv.org/search.asp?ACT= 33 “The Palestinian Problem in the Internal S9&P1=1255. Political Report of the Extraordinary 19 Al-Ahram, August 14, 2006. Regional Congress,” March 10-27, 1966. 20 Al-Ahram, August 29, 2006. Text in Abraham Ben Tzur, The Syrian 21 “Yassir Arafat,” Third World Quarterly, Baath Party and Israel (Givat Haviva, Vol. 8, No. 2 (April 1986); al-Anwar 1968), p. 19. symposium of March 8, 1970, cited in 34 Ali Salem, “My Drive to Israel,” Middle Yehoshafat Harkabi, The Palestinian East Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Winter Covenant and its Meaning (London: 2002), http://www.meforum.org/article/130. Vallentine Mitchell, 1979); p. 12; Arafat 35 New York Times, March 12, 2001 statement, May 1969, International 36 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, February 8, 2001. Documents On Palestine 1969 (IDOP), pp. Translation in MEMRI, No. 49, February 691-92. 16, 2001, 22 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The World Was http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archi Going Our Way, pp. 203-4. ves&Area=ia&ID=IA4901#_edn1. 23 Al-Manar television, July 29, 2006. 37 Al-Usbua, August 14, 2006. Translation in MEMRI, #1224, August 1, 2006, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archi ves&Area=sd&ID=SP122406. 24 Ibid. 25 Interview, January 22, 1968 in IDOP 1968, p. 300. 26 Filastin al-Thawra, January 1970, p. 8. 27 Raphael Israeli, PLO in Lebanon: Selected Documents (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1983), p. 31. 28 The details are discussed in Barry Rubin, The Arab States and the Palestine Question (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982), pp. 187-88. 29 Al-Madina, August 31, 1982, FBIS, September 9, 1982; 30 Muhammad Anis, "An interview with `Isam Sartawi," al-Musawwar, March 25, 1983; Avner Yaniv, "Phoenix of Phantom? The PLO after ," Terrorism, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1984). 31 Abu Kais, “Loving Life, Loving Death,” in From Beirut to the Beltway, August 26, 2006, http://www.beirutbeltway.com/beirutbeltwa y/2006/08/loving_life_lov.html. 32 Associated Press, August 17, 2006.

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