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THE RISE AND FALL OF U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE 1918 -1939
DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the
Graduate School of the Ohio State University
By
William O. Odom, B. A., M. A.
X- * * X" *
The Ohio State University
1995
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE: Approved by
Allan R. Millett
John F. Guilmartin A dviser David Stebenne Department of History ÜMI Number; 9534040
Copyright 1995 by Odom, William Ollen All rights reserved.
UMI Microform 9534040 Copyright 1995, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 Copyright by William Ollen Odom 1995 To My Family
11 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I express sincere appreciation to Dr. Allan R. Millett for his guidance and patient support in the research and writing of this dissertation and to the faculty of the Ohio State University Department of History for equipping me with the necessary tools to complete the endeavor. In particular, I thank
Professors Williamson Murray, John F. Guilmartin, and Mark Grimsley for their steadfast support, encouragement, and guidance. I am especially grateful to Dr. Timothy K. Nenninger at the National
Archives and Dr. Richard Sommers, Mr. David Keough, and Mrs. Pamela
Cheney at the Military History Institute for their personal interest in and support of my research. On more than one occasion, they found important files in areas in which I would not have thought to look and provided helpful insights on the resources of the period. I acknowledge my mentors at the United States Military Academy — Colonels Robert A. Doughty, James M.
Johnson, and Cole C. Kingseed — for their unwavering support and encouragement during the last and most difficult leg of the journey. I could not have completed this work without their positive support of the effort.
Last, I offer sincere thanks to my wife and children, who endured my seemingly endless absences while conducting research and writing the dissertation.
Ill VITA
A ugust 1, 1957 ...... Born - Jonesboro, Arkansas
1979...... B.A., P urdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana
1990...... M.A., Department of History, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
1993...... Assistant Professor, Department of History, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York
1979 - Present...... Infantry Officer United States Army
PUBLICATIONS
"The Rudder In the Storm: George Washington As Senior Leader."Military Review 72 (June 1992): 54-66.
"Destined For Defeat: An Analysis of the St. Clair Expedition of 1791." Northwest Ohio Quarterly 65 (Spring 1993): 68-93.
FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: History Specialization: American Military
IV TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...... iii
VITA ...... iv
LIST OF TABLES...... viii
LIST OF FIGURES...... ix
INTRODUCTION: DOCTRINE AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY...... 1 Doctrine and Change...... 1 Doctrine Manuals...... 5 United States Army Doctrine Between the World Wars...... 8
PART I: THE RISE OF ARMY DOCTRINE, 1918-1923
CHAPTER...... PAGE
I. TOWARD AN AMERICAN ARMY...... 14 Alternatives: Upton or Palmer...... 15 Compromise: The National Defense Act of 1920...... 19 Implementation of National Defense Act of 1920...... 22
n. TOWARD AN AMERICAN DOCTRINE...... 32 Why a Doctrinal Review?...... 32 Writing the Manual...... 37
in. CONFIRMING THE LESSONS OF THE PAST...... 57 Combat Principles...... 58 The Principal Principles: Objective and Offense...... 60 Open Warfare: Offense "American Style"...... 62 The Human Element...... 65 Primacy of Infantry...... 68 IV. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE...... 74 O perations...... 76 Infantry...... 80 Machineguns...... 83 T an k s...... 89 Accompanying Guns...... 96 Artillery...... 99 C avalry ...... 106 Air Service ...... I l l Antiaircraft Defense...... 115 Chemical Warfare...... 117
V. THE RISE OF ARMY DOCTRINE...... 123
PART II: THE FALL OF ARMY DOCTRINE, 1923-1939
VI. THE ARMY IN THE TWENTIES...... 134 Army Schools ...... 143 Army Air Corps ...... 147 Ground Mobility...... 151 Return to Darkness...... 155
VII. THE ARMY IN THE THIRTIES...... 166 The Twilight Years, 1930-1935...... 167 Dawn of Recovery, 1936-1939...... 183
VIII. WRITING FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS 1939...... 203 Manual for Commanders of Large Units...... 204 Diverse Doctrines...... 208 Writing the Manual...... 214
IX. FSR1939: DOCTRINE IN THE DOLDRUMS...... 234 Objective, Offense, and the Human Element...... 235 O perations...... 238 Primacy of Infantry...... 246 Mechanization...... 253 C avalry ...... 259 Antimechanized Defense...... 266 Artillery...... 277 Close Air Support ...... 285 Antiaircraft Defense...... 294 C onclusion...... 299 vi X. FOREIGN INFLUENCES ON AMERICAN MILITARY THOUGHT ...302 Army War College Comparative Studies ...... 304 France...... 312 Great Britain...... 319 G erm any...... 328 Jap an...... 337 Soviet Union and Italy...... 343 Assessment of Foreign Influences...... 346 Influence of Foreign Developments...... 354
XI. ROOTS OF DEFICIENT DOCTRINE...... 359 No Money...... 360 No M en...... 364 No Material...... 366 No Maneuvers ...... 368 No Mechanisms — The Procurement System...... 370 No Mechanisms — The Intelligence System...... 385
XII. NO MECHANISMS - THE DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM ...399
XIII. CONCLUSION...... 430
XIV. EPILOGUE: FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS 1941...... 444
BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 464
VII LIST OF TABLES
TABLE PAGE
1. Life Span of Army Operations Manuals...... 7
2. Appropriations for Military Activity, 1921-1940...... 136
3. Regular Army Strength, 1921-1940...... 142
4. Army War College Comparative Studies ...... 309
VUl LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURES PAGE
1. United States Army Square Division (Post World War I)...... 28
2. United States Army Triangular Division...... 195
3. Army War College Comparative Studies ...... 309
IX THE RISE AND FALL OF U. S. ARMY DOCTRINE, 1918-1939
By
William Ollen Odom, M. A.
The Ohio State University, 1995
Professor Allan R. Millett, Adviser
This dissertation examines the development of combat doctrine by the
United States Army between the World Wars. An evaluation of the Army's capstone doctrine manuals, theField Sewice Regulations, form the basis for the assessment. The Army revised the manual immediately after World War
1 and twice on the eve of World War II. The manuals provided a clear statement of how the Army intended to operate on the battlefield. Analysis of the products and processes of doctrine development complements our understanding of the Army in the interwar years and identifies important influences on the Army's intellectual development during the period.
The first manual. Field Service Regulations 1923, reflected the organizations and doctrine developed by the Army in response to the lessons of World War I and mandates of postwar national defense policy. Drawing on the products of postwar boards formed to determine the war's lessons, the manual prescribed sound doctrine based on proven capabilities and recent combat experiences. Field Sei~vice Regulations 1923 marked the rise of Army doctrine demonstrating that the Army had correctly determined the war's
1 lessons and, accordingly, adjusted its doctrine, organization, and tactics. The
force created in the war's aftermath was, on paper, an effective military organization in terms of its organization and doctrine.
The interwar years witnessed technological advances with profound implications for the conduct of warfare. Experimental technologies had evolved into efficient, effective tools of war and had again greatly expanded the scale, tempo, and complexity of warfare. But, lack of money resulted in manpower and material shortages which diminished the quality of training and thus hindered development of new doctrine. Army decisions for the use of limited funds and ineffective institutional arrangements also contributed to the resulting decline of Army doctrine. In the second revision of theField
Service Regulations, the Army's doctrine did not keep pace with technological advances. Field Sei~vice Regulations 1939 remained remarkably similar to Field Sewice Regulations 1923. The lack of an effective mechanism for peacetime doctrine development left the Army scurrying to modernize its woefully outdated capstone manual on the eve of war. INTRODUCTION
DOCTRINE AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY
Doctrine comprises the "fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives.It is the core statement of an army's view of war and serves as a common guide for the conduct of military operations. This shared view facilitates communication, enhances flexibility, and fosters confidence throughout the force and it provides the basis for supporting doctrine, force structure, training, and education.
DOCTRINE AND CHANGE
Ideally, doctrine is dynamic, changing to incorporate new capabilities and accommodate new missions. The study of history, training experiences, contemporary conflict, technological developments, and emerging threats to national security drive changes in doctrine. Doctrinal evolution is vital to military success. Not surprisingly, the frequency of doctrine revision increases in wartime or periods of heightened readiness and usually accompanies major organizational and technological changes. This suggests
^Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5 Operations (Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office, 14 Jun 1993), glossary-3. that tactical methods quickly evolve in wartime because impediments to rapid change in both the political and military realms disappear in response to crisis. For example, the most short-lived of the United States Army's doctrine manuals existed during the World Wars with average lives of only three years. The longevity of Field Service Regulations 1923, the only doctrine manual to last more than a decade, also supports this relationship between existence of conflict and pace of doctrinal change. Its lifespan paralleled America's longest period of peace in this century. Likewise, all other peacetime doctrine manuals were in service twice as long as the wartime publications.
Doctrinal evolution is not an easy process during war and is even more difficult to effect in time of peace. Changing doctrine may not only require in tegration of new equipment and organizations, it also requires changes in the way an army thinks about fighting. The results of combat provide the most compelling reasons for change and, not surprisingly, defeated armies tend to make the greatest changes. Even victors, however, learn from their combat experiences. As a result, doctrine review commonly occurs in all armies in the aftermath of war.
Evidence indicating a need for change is not so obvious in peacetime as in time of war. Change is expensive and disruptive. Even when the need for change is obvious, it occurs slowly if at all. In the traditionally conservative military, good reasons must exist to warrant changing proven methods.
Officers in positions of leadership and influence in the postwar army are in many cases the same men who forged the tried and once true immediate postwar doctrine from their last combat experience. These decision-makers often hesitate to accept new doctrine without powerful evidence to support the move for change. Nevertheless, an effective army will overcome its natural tendency to rely upon the past's proven methods.
The impetus to change doctrine in peacetime originates from a change of mission or changes in operational and tactical capabilities. Changes in mis sion usually reflect shifts in threats to national security. The new mission de fines the Army's role in support of a national strategy developed to counter the threat. The change of mission may call for radical change in doctrine if the new threat is considerably different from the old one. Change of mission has driven change in doctrine many times in the Army's past. Doctrine appropriate for the small, frontier constabulary Army found slight application in the war waged by the million man American Expeditionary Forces in the
First World War. Similarly, doctrine for combatting the Vietnamese insur gency could draw little from the American experience in World War II or Ko rea. In both cases, the Army revised doctrine to guide combat against a new and different foe.2
Changes in operational and tactical capabilities may also warrant revi sion of doctrine. These changes may stem from adjustments in force size, structure, or readiness, but most often occur as a result of technological ad-
-See Paul H. Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done; General William H. Dupuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations (Fort Leavenworttu Combat Studies Institute, 1988); Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-1976 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1979); I. B. Holley, Jr., Ideas and Weapons: Exploitation of the Aerial Weapon by the United States During World War I: a Study in the Relationship of Technological Advance, Military Doctrine, and the Development of Weapons (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953); and Andrew Krepinevich, Jr.,The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986) for further discussion of doctrine evolution in the United States Army. vances. Technological advances inevitably spawn military applications that produce more capable armies and, in turn, prompt reassessment of doctrine and organization. The pace of military-related research and development quickens in time of war when possession of a technological advantage could well determine the victor. Heightened military demand, increased public support, abundant funding, and the availability of the ultimate proving ground, a battlefield, hasten the development of new weapons and equip ment. Doctrine for the employment of new technology follows quickly. However, in peacetime, all of these incentives for development of new mili tary hardware diminish or disappear entirely depending upon the level of public concern for national security. Despite these impediments, the Army must remain alert to the military potential of new technologies.
Study of an army's doctrine is essential to understanding the institu tion. The study not only explains an army's concept of how it will fight, it also increases understanding of decisions concerning force structure, material acquisition, research and development, and training programs. Examination of changes in doctrine offers an even better approach to understanding an army's thinking processes. Study of doctrinal change illuminates the intellectual dynamics within the organization. An army's response to changes in military capabilities and mission requirements is an important measure of the organization's effectiveness.^
^Other works that discuss the role of doctrine are: Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman, "The Effectiveness of Military Organizations,"International Security 11, no. 1 (Summer 1986): 37-71; Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5 Operations (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 14 Jun 1993), iv -1-2; and the forementioned works of Herbert and Doughty. DOCTRINE MANUALS
An army's training literature provides a reliable starting point for the study of its doctrine. All large armies publish training manuals of some sort to guide preparation of their forces for war. Most of these armies publish a basic capstone doctrine manual that describes, as a minimum, the leader's vi sion of the Army's purpose and capabilities. The scope of capstone manuals vary among armies. Some focus solely on operations doctrine while others address a wider array of topics including strategy, mobilization, administra tion, and logistics. Invariably, the armies develop supporting doctrine, tactics, and techniques to elaborate that found in the capstone manual. Examination of these manuals provides a clear statement of how an army intends to oper ate on the battlefield.
By studying these manuals, particularly the capstone operations man ual, one can learn the army's doctrine and therefrom improve understanding of the army itself. The correctness of the doctrine is always the first and most important question which arises from the study of manuals. Did the army correctly identify and develop viable solutions to the challenges of contempo rary combat? An army's ability to form the correct doctrine is an important measure of its effectiveness. Combat performance is the ultimate test of a doctrine's correctness. History often enables the comparison of the doctrine prescribed in manuals with its application in combat. In some cases, an army will change doctrine before it is tested in combat, but this is the exception rather than the rule. Knowing the quality of an army's doctrine invites fur ther study of the manuals. How did the army formulate its doctrine? What factors or personalities influenced doctrinal choices and decisions? The an swers to these questions complement the portrait of an army by providing in sight into its intellectual dimension.
Tracking doctrinal evolution in the United States Army since 1900 is not difficult. The United States Army has disseminated official doctrine through a single capstone manual since 1779 — first, through Baron von
S teu b en 's Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the
United States, then through privately published manuals in general use, such as Troops in Campaign (1892) and Colonel Arthur Wagner'sOrganization and Tactics, and, at the turn of the century, through official War Department publications. The War Department published the first Field Service
Regulations in 1905. Since then, the Army has revised or amended its principal doctrinal manual seventeen times. Table 1 lists the date of publication and life span for each manual. After 1939, the Army published the Field Service Regulations in three volumes. Although the Army continued to refer to the three volumes collectively as Field Service
Regulations, it identified each volume with a separate field manual (FM) number: FM 100-5 for operations, FM 100-10 for adm inistration, and FM 100-
15 for large units. In 1968, the Army changed the title of the operations manual, FM 100-5, from Field Service Regulations to Operations of Army
Forces in the Field. In 1976, it shortened the title to its current form.
Operations.'^ The frequency of publication in the twentieth century
^See John I. Alger, The Quest for Victory: The History of the Principles of War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), 166-68. underlines both the transient nature of doctrine and suggests that the Army believes that doctrinal evolution is important.
Table 1. Life Span of Army Operations Manuals
Publication Year Longevity (years) 1908 2 1910 3 1913 1 Average life of manual 1914 3 5.3 years 1917 6 1923 16 Average life of manual during war 1939 2 3.3 years 1941 3 1944 5 Average life of manual during peace 1949 5 6.5 years 1954 8 1962 6 1968 8 1976 5 1981 5 1986 7 1993 Current
The form and content of the capstone doctrine manual has varied widely since 1905, but the purpose has remained essentially the same. The
Field Service Regulations — orFM 100-5 Operations — provides the Army with combined arms operations doctrine for the handling of units of division-size or larger. The early manuals were comparatively small, all-inclusive publica tions that addressed operations, administration, and logistics in a single vol ume. After World War I, the manual grew larger to reflect the increased scale and complexity of modern warfare. By World War II, the separate volume addressing operations alone was as large as the entire early editions of the Field Service Regulations.
UNITED STATES ARMY DOCTRINE BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS
The United States Army revised its doctrine three times in the period between the World Wars. The first revision drew from the experiences of the
American Expeditionary Forces in the First World War. The First World
War provided a wealth of lessons for students of warfare. It was the first war fought with the full weight of modern industry supporting military tactics, organization, and technology; nearly all of the weapons and tactics of the
Second World War first appeared in the Great War. Tanks, airplanes, radios, motor transport, elastic defenses, rolling barrages, infiltration tactics, and chemical warfare were among the many new contraptions and concepts which confronted the combatants. Never had the battlefield changed so rapidly. The new scale, pace, and complexity of warfare demanded sound doctrine understood by all. Sorting the lessons of war — assimilating truths and discarding false practices — occupied all of the major powers in the aftermath of the struggle. Each of the powers rewrote their doctrine manuals to reflect their findings.
Between 1918 and 1923, the United States Army reevaluated its doc trine and organization in view of the Great War's lessons. By 1924, it had completed the evaluation and produced a comprehensive body of literature to guide the training of forces for combat operations. Field Service Regula tions 1923 capped the effort by providing overall doctrinal guidance to the
Army and serving as the basis for the development of supporting tactics and techniques for the arms and services. Written in the aftermath of the first truly modern war. Field Service Regulations 1923 presented the Army's solu tion to the problems it faced during the struggle. As such, it was the single best available description of how the Army believed it should wage war.
Field Service Regulations 1923 remained the official Army doctrine for the entire interwar period; the next edition of the manual did not appear until
1939.
The years between the First and Second World Wars witnessed startling technological advances with profound implications for the conduct of warfare. The advancements enabled improvements in the power, range, reliability, efficiency, speed, armor protection, and/or armament of every ma jor system. The experiments of the First World War had evolved into effi cient, effective, tools of war and had again greatly expanded the scale, tempo, and complexity of warfare. In the second revision of theField Service Regu lations, the Army's doctrine did not keep pace with technological advances.
In fact. Field Service Regulations 1939 remained remarkably similar to Field
Service Regulations 1923 despite the War Department's intention to modernize the doctrine. After allowing theField Service Regulations to stagnate for over a decade, the Army's first attempt to rejuvenate its doctrine uncovered alarming deficiencies. Less than two years later, the Army would publish a vastly improved operations manual that integrated interwar technological developments, foreign military experiences, and the results of organizational and operational tests conducted during large-scale maneuvers.
The United States Army would exercise this doctrine, embodiedFM in 100-5 10
Field Service Regulations, Operations 1941, during the first half of World
W ar II.
An analysis of the interwar revision of the capstone doctrine manuals complements our understanding of the Army between the World Wars. An assessment of the products and processes enhances understanding of the
Army's mission, organization, and operational concepts. It also identifies important influences on the Army's intellectual development during the pe riod. The circumstances accompanying each revision differed. The first interwar doctrine revision resulting in the publication ofField Service Regulations 1923 sought to apply the lessons of the recent World War to the mission requirements and capabilities of the postwar American Army. On the other hand, the Army producedField Service Regulations 1939 w ithout benefit of first-hand experience on a contemporary battlefield. To be sure, some evidence of change existed in the form of experimental organizations, new weapons demonstrations, and foreign combat experiences. But, this evidence could never substitute for trial in combat. In writing the 1941 revision, the Army still lacked first-hand combat experience with which to confirm its doctrine. Instead, it took advantage of abundant human and material resources, made available by a war-wary Congress, to update doctrine while concurrently mobilizing the force.
Several questions apply to all three revisions. How did the Army de termine the nature of contemporary combat? How well did the doctrine apply to contemporary battle? Did the doctrine support the mission and capabilities of the Army? What had changed to warrant the revision? What 11 had remained the same? In all cases, these answers begin with an in-depth look at the Field Service Regulations that governed Army doctrine in the interwar years.
This dissertation examines United States Army doctrine and its development through study of the Field Service Regulations p ro d u ced between the World Wars. It attempts to illustrate that the Army performed well in its effort to modernize doctrine when aided by the experience of recent war, but failed to to develop viable doctrine during the ensuing period of extended peace. Part 1 of the study traces the origins and development of
Field Service Regulations 1923, examines the content of the regulation, and identifies major influences in the development of the doctrine it prescribed.
The close relationship between doctrine and organization prevents the study of one without addressing the other. Likewise, one cannot understand nor evaluate organization and doctrine without first understanding the military policy which they should support. For these reasons. Chapter 1 addresses postwar military policy and Army organization. It explains the Army's postwar roles, briefly recounts the reorganization mandated by the National
Defense Act of 1920, and describes the tactical organizations developed by the
Army to support the new policies. Chapter 1 also discusses the effect of budget limitations on the War Department's plans for implementing the Act.
Chapter 11 explains the reasons for rewriting the doctrine manual and traces the writing process. The third and fourth chapters focus on the doctrine itself.
Chapter 111 highlights similarities between the doctrine inField Service
Regulations 1923 and prewar doctrine. Chapter IV addresses the changes that the Army implemented as a result of its war experience. Chapter V concludes 12 the first part of the dissertation by summarizing major changes in postwar policy, organization, and doctrine, and assessing the Army's solutions to the problems of modern warfare as prescribed in its reorganization plan andField
Service Regulations 1923.
In Part II, the dissertation examines Army doctrine at the end of the in terwar years through analysis of Field Service Regulations 1939. C hapters VI and VII bridge the gap between the two manuals with an overview of the
Army during the interwar years. Chapter VI describes major activities in the
1920s and Chapter VII addresses the Army in the 1930s. Both chapters include discussion of the mission, organization, and significant activities of the Army throughout the period highlighting the difficulties imposed by budget limitations. Chapter VIII explains the rationale for the doctrine revision that began in the mid-1930s and describes the writing of the manual in detail.
Chapter IX addresses the doctrine inField Service Regulations 1939 emphasizing the lack of change in the revised manual. The discussion includes summaries of developments within the separate arms. Chapter X measures the influence of foreign experiences on American doctrine development primarily through an assessment of Army War College studies conducted during the period. Chapter XI reviews the effect of obvious and omnipresent budget limitations on doctrine development, then expounds the explanation of doctrine deficiencies by examining less obvious impediments to doctrine development such as the Army's intelligence and procurement systems. Chapter XII continues the discussion of internal causes of the
Army's doctrine deficiencies by examining the War Department's doctrine development process. Chapter XIII concludes the work with a comparison of 13 the doctrines and writing processes highlighting the factors that contributed most to the quality of the manuals. The dissertation finishes with a brief epilogue describing the rapid doctrinal evolution that occurred between 1939 and 1941 and resulted in the publication FMof 100-5, Operations, 1941. CHAPTER I
TOWARD AN AMERICAN ARMY
For the first time, the American people had expressed in the form of a definite sanction a determination to constitute a definite military policy commensurate with their great potential requirements for national defense, and yet thoroughly consistent with their national traditions.^ — John W. Weeks Secretary of War
Reform and reorganization of the Army were key issues facing the War
Department immediately following the First World War. The most important lesson of the war for American military planners was the ability to mobilize rapidly a mass army. Conscription had provided ample manpower for the American Expeditionary Forces, but procedures for training and equipping the force had lagged far behind. During the war, most men had required additional training in France. And, American weapons and equipment had not begun to arrive in substantial quantities until well over a year after the declaration of war. These embarrassing deficiencies highlighted
American unpreparedness for war in the twentieth century. While civilian businessmen addressed the problems of economic and industrial mobilization, the Army examined the manpower mobilization problem in
^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of \Nar, 1921 (W ashington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1921), 8.
14 15 the light of recent experience. The planners sought to create a military establishment that met both the readiness requirements of modern warfare and fit the traditions of the American people — traditions which rejected large standing armies and their trappings of militarism. Army planners also faced the problem of developing forces capable of participating in mobile, open warfare, such as that anticipated in the southwestern United States or Mexico, and with the ability to penetrate deep, organized defensive positions such as those faced on the Western front in the recent war. These considerations shaped national military policy, force structure, and doctrine in the postwar years.
ALTERNATIVES: UPTON OR PALMER?
The World War experience brought nearly two decades of debate over
Army reorganization and reform to a climax. The views of Emory Upton and
John M. Palmer represented the two most popular proposals for organizing the Army. Upton graduated as an artillery officer with the the West Point class of 1861, led Volunteers as a major general in the Civil War, earned the rank of colonel in the postwar Army, served as Commandant of Cadets at the
Military Academy, and was superintendent of the Artillery School. A soldier in every sense of the word, Upton's bravery in battle, professional competence, and intellectual skills commanded the respect of his contemporaries. Among his most notable achievements was his selection by the Commanding General, William T. Sherman, to visit foreign armies and determine which of their features were worthy of adoption in the American
Army. During his travels, he found Germany's expandable army especially 16 impressive and proposed a similar system for the United States. Upton envisioned a large, heavily officered, standing army of professional soldiers expanded by volunteers or draftees in time of war. Only an expandable army could ensure the presence of professional leadership throughout the force. It was, he believed, the only viable alternative given the historically poor performances of militia forces. Upton's views, published in 1904 and entitled
The Military Policy of the United States, enjoyed wide readership and struck a sympathetic chord among many professional soldiers.2
John M. Palmer offered an alternative military policy based on a citizen army. Palmer graduated as an infantry officer with the West Point class of
1892. He served extensively overseas including tours in Cuba during the
Spanish-American War, with the China Relief Expedition during the Boxer
Rebellion in 1900, as a district governor in the Philippines, with the
American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in France, and in Panama as a brigade commander after the war. A renowned and respected military intellectual, he was the University of Chicago's first professor of military science and tactics and served five years as a chemistry professor on the West Point faculty.
Palmer's work as a member of the War Department General Staff, however, provided the springboard that launched his rise to a position of influence in the postwar years. As early as 1912, Palmer effectively argued against the expandable army concept in a supplement to Chief of Staff Leonard Wood's
^Robert K. Griffith, Jr., Men Wanted for the U.S. Army (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), 3-4; Roger J. Spiller, Joseph G. Dawson III, and T. Harry Williams, eds.Dictionary of American Military Biography (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984), s.v. "Upton, Emory," by Russell F. Weigley. 17 annual report. Having drawn praise for the quality of his staff work, the War
Department assigned him to assist with preparation of plans for the draft and organization of the AEF. Also impressed with Palmer's work. General John J.
Pershing, commander of the AEF, chose him to be his operations officer.
Palmer broke under the stress of this most demanding job and assumed less taxing responsibilities while recovering. Before the war's end, he commanded a brigade of National Guardsmen in the 29th Division. The solid performance of these soldiers cemented his confidence in the viability of a citizen army. Others shared Palmer's sentiments. The performance of citizen soldiers during the World War convinced many professional soldiers,
General Pershing among them, of the viability of such a force. At the close of the war, Pershing sent Palmer, now a colonel, to Washington where he argued persuasively for a citizen army before a Congressional committee examining postwar Army reorganization. Palmer's alternative to the expandable army advocated reliance on the citizenry. Palmer proposed a force consisting of a full-strength Regular Army supplemented by trained reserves.
Universal military training, a crucial component of his plan, would provide a steady source of manpower. Palmer's ideas attracted a growing number of followers after the war.3
Throughout 1919, the rapid demobilization heightened the need to resolve the Army organization question. The Uptonians, led by Secretary of
^Griffith, Men Wanted for the U.S. Army , 5; Roger J. Spiller, Joseph G. Dawson III, and T. Harry Williams, eds. Dictionary of American Military Biography (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984), s.v. "Palmer, John McAuley," by I. B. Holley, Jr. See Holley'sGeneral John M. Palmer, Citizen Soldiers, and the Army of a Democracy (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981) for the definitive biography of Palmer and further discussion of his views. 18
War Newton Baker and Chief of Staff Peyton C. March, recommended a
500,000-man expandable army organized into five skeletonized corps. A pool of reservists constituted by universal military training would expand the Army in time of war. Palmer, supported by such influential men as Pershing, former Chief of Staff Leonard Wood, and former Secretary of War Henry L.
Stimson, agreed with the need for universal military training, but recommended a much smaller standing army backed by trained citizen Guard units and federal Reserves. The Baker-March bill met opposition from all sides. The large size and cost of the proposed Regular Army, the provision for compulsory military training, the diminished role of the popular
National Guard and Citizens' Military Training Camps, lingering hostility toward March for his autocratic dealings with Congressmen during the war, the system's Prussian undertones, and the lack of a visible threat to national security guaranteed the bill would find enemies in every camp and virtually ensured its defeat. When the powerful and prestigious General Pershing expressed his preference for Palmer's ideas at Congressional hearings, the
Baker-March bill died. Congress drafted a bill that incorporated most of
Palmer's designs for the new force. In its final form, however. Congress eliminated provisions for compulsory military training, a vital component of both proposals. Signed by President Wilson on 20 June, the National Defense
Act of 1920 became law.4
'^Griffith, Men Wanted for the U.S. Army , 6-21. 19
COMPROMISE: THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT OF 19205
The National Defense Act of 1920 prescribed American military policy for the postwar years. After lengthy debate, civilian and military leaders had developed a logical plan that provided for the rapid mobilization of a citizen army and a small force of Regulars for immediate employment as required.
Even die-hard Uptonians found the bill workable. William Canoe, a Regular
Army colonel and well-known critic of citizen forces, wrote enthusiastically in his History of the United States Army:
This legislation was by all odds the greatest provision for prolonging of peace and the efficient control of war ever enacted by the Congress. It took into account lessons of the recent struggle and suited itself to the genius of our people. The regular during the conflict had learned much from the civilian, and the civilian had in turn gained something substantial from the soldier. . . . never before were National Guard, reserves, and regulars in such a healthy state of reciprocation and unity. The Army of the United States was by this Act to coalesce all these elements into a cooperative whole.^
Many others echoed such praise. Secretary of War John W. Weeks wrote that the act "marked the beginning of a new era in the service of [the
War] department to the country. For the first time, the American people had expressed in the form of a definite sanction a determination to constitute a definite military policy commensurate with their great potential
5por the complete record of the amendment, see Statutes at Large, 61, chap. 227, 759-87 (1920).
^William A. Canoe, The History of the United States Army (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1942), 481. 20 requirements for national defense, and yet thoroughly consistent with their national traditions."^
The Act established an Army of the United States consisting of three components: the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserves. The Regular Army, at an authorized strength of approximately
17,000 officers and 280,000 men, remained a combat-ready, balanced, force-in- being, rather than the skeletonized structure envisioned under the expandable Army concept. Its missions were fivefold:
1) to train the National Guard and Reserves
2) to provide personnel for the overhead of the Army of the
United States
3) to provide a domestic force for employment within the
United States or as required by orders and to serve as a model for the citizen arm ies
4) to provide garrisons for coastal defense
5) to provide garrisons for overseas possessions.
The National Guard, at an authorized strength of 435,000 men, provided the second line of defense. National Guard forces remained under state control, but organized and trained under the supervision of Regular Army personnel.
Upon mobilization, the Guard fell under Federal control. The Reserves, a purely Federal force, provided the third line of defense. The Reserve forces consisted of geographically organized skeleton forces expandable upon total
^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1921 (Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office, 1921), 8. 21 mobilization. Members of the Officer Reserve Corps and Enlisted Reserve
Corps comprised the Reserve forces.^
The other provisions of the Act also bore the mark of the war. The Act charged the Assistant Secretary of War with responsibility for industrial mobilization and procurement of supplies to meet wartime demands. It charged the Chief of Staff with responsibility for presiding over the War
Department General Staff and, under the direction of the President or
Secretary of War, for recruiting, organizing, equipping, supplying, mobilizing, training, employing for national defense, and demobilizing the Army of the
United States. It also created a War Council to ensure close coordination between the civilian and military heads of the Army. To enhance further the
Army's ability to mobilize, the Act specified the division of the country into corps areas on the basis of population, each of which would contain at least one division of citizen soldiers. The war experience prompted Congress to create a Chemical Warfare Service, Air Service, Finance Department, and the office of the Chief of Chaplains. The Act also established Chiefs of Infantry,
Field Artillery, Coast Artillery, Cavalry, Air Service, and Chemical Warfare
Service to promote the technical and tactical advancement of those arms.^
Postwar American military policy required an Army organized and trained to fight both small and large wars. The provisions of NDA 1920 supported that policy. The Army of the United States authorized in the
^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1922 (W ashington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1922), 113-18,138-140.
^Statutes at Large, 61, chap. 227, 759-87 (1920); Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 400. 22
National Defense Act provided a ready force, the 300,000-man Regular Army, to fight the small wars that characterized most of American military history.
Yet, it also provided a means of rapidly expanding the Army to meet the demands of total warfare as experienced during the American Civil War and the First World War.
IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT OF 1920
The National Defense Act left the details of organization to the War
Department. One of the major goals of the new defense policy was the establishment of "one harmonious and effective" Army of the United States in which the three components differed only in the amount of time required to bring them to full readiness. The War Department established nine corps areas within the continental United States. Each corps area contained one
Regular Army division, two National Guard divisions, and three Reserve divisions. Corps area commanders were responsible for the training and mobilization of forces within the territorial limits of their area. By decentralizing the execution of these activities, the War Department hoped to enhance the interrelationships between the Regular Army and citizen components. The Regular Army division, manned at full-strength, was the foundation of the corps. It set the training standard for the affiliated citizen components and assisted them in attaining it. Additionally, the nine Regular divisions could assemble to provide the combat elements of one organized. 23 trained, and equipped field army available for emergencies as required. ^0 To ensure interoperability and facilitate mobilization and training, the Army adopted standard organizations for the divisions, corps, and armies of the three components.
Members of the defense establishment studied Army organization and tactics intensively in the aftermath of the Great War. Pershing had convened several boards of officers in the American Expeditionary Forces to examine
Army organization and tactics in view of the recent war experience. The AEF
Superior Board on Organization and Tactics reviewed and consolidated the findings of the separate boards, then submitted its own report. The next chapter contains a more extensive discussion of the Superior Board's composition and findings. March received the Report of the Superior Board with Pershing's endorsement at about the same time that the National
Defense Act of 1920 became law. Pershing disagreed with some elements of the Superior Board's recommendations for division organization and submitted his own proposal. The War Department General Staff had also submitted recommendations for organizational changes. March convened a
Special Committee to consider the various proposals and provide recommendations for the implementation of the Act.
The members of the Special Committee were Major General Charles S.
Farnsworth (Commandant, Infantry School), Brigadier General William
Lassiter (Assistant Director, WDGS War Plans Division, former member of
^®U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Chief of Staff, 1921 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1921), 11-13. U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1921, 8-11, 20-21. 24 the AEF Superior Board, and former head of the AEF study of motor drawn artillery). Brigadier General Fox Conner (Headquarters, AEF), Brigadier
General Hugh A. Drum (Director, School of the Line and former member of the AEF Superior Board), Colonel Briant H. Wells (WDGS War Plans
Division and former member of AEF Infantry Board), Colonel Campbell King
(Instructor, General Staff College, later known as the Army War College),
Lieutenant Colonel John W. Gulick (WDGS War Plans Division), Lieutenant
Colonel Stuart Heintzelman (Instructor, General Staff College and former member of AEF General Staff Organization Board), Major George C. Marshall
(Headquarters, AEF), and Major A. W. Lane (WDGS War Plans Division).
The committee represented an outstanding collection of exceptionally bright and well-respected officers drawn from the Army schools. War Department
General Staff, and Headquarters, AEF. The determination of the best tactical organizations for the Army of the
United States occupied most of the Special Committee's time and attention.
In addition to the leading proposals submitted by the AEF Superior Board,
General Pershing, and the Organization Section of the General Staff, the
Committee considered reports from the Infantry and Cavalry Boards, the findings of conferences and committees convened by the Service Schools and
General Staff College, and the views of 70 knowledgeable and experienced war veterans.
The Special Committee's task was to develop organizations which best supported the missions prescribed by the National Defense Act. The Army's missions called for flexible organizations which optimized the balance between mobility and firepower. The World War division had numbered 25 over 28,000 men organized into two infantry brigades consisting of two regiments of three battalions each. The battalion consisted of four 250-man rifle companies. The division also included an artillery brigade, composed of two 75mm gun regiments and a 155mm howitzer regiment, and separate machine gun units at regimental, brigade, and division level. The "square division" was twice as large as the French, British, and German divisions. A large division could penetrate deeper than the smaller types before casualties rendered it ineffective. Since the penetration was the only feasible type of offensive operation on the static Western Front, the adoption of the large, square division structure was logical. The AEF Superior Board recommended a similarly organized division but increased its strength to 29,199 men. General Pershing, disagreeing with the findings of the Superior Board, believed that a division of more than 20,000 men was unwieldy and ill-suited to the mobility requirements of warfare in North America, which he felt was the most likely theater of operations. Pershing, instead, recommended a
16,875 man division consisting of one infantry brigade of three regiments of three battalions each. The battalions would consist of three rifle companies and a machine gun company. Pershing also proposed replacing the artillery brigade with a regiment of 75mm guns organized into three battalions of three batteries. The War Department General Staff recommended a division of 24,061 men organized into two infantry brigades of two regiments each and one artillery brigade of two 75mm gun regiments. The General Staff kept four rifle companies in the battalions but reduced their strength to 200 men.Tl
W. Lane, "Tables of Organization," Infantry Journal 18 (May 1921): 486-503; General 26
Three related issues guided the Special Committee's study of the proposals: 1) the strength of the World War division, 2) the comparative merit of three- and four-unit organizations, and 3) the feasibility of reducing the strength of four-unit organizations without losing their ability to endure sustained combat. In response to the first question, the Committee concluded that the World War division was too large for open warfare. It lacked tactical and strategic mobility and was difficult to control. On the second issue, the
Committee determined that the four-unit organization was superior to the three-unit organization. The report stated:
... in any war of the future against a first-class enemy, the forces encountered will be organized in great depth even though the ground may not be so organized. The organizations of our divisions, therefore, should be such as to insure great striking power to meet and overcome such organizations in depth. Mobility is important, but fire power and power of penetration are important considerations. That a division composed of two infantry brigades and one artillery brigade, while not possessing the same mobility as a division of one infantry brigade and one regiment of artillery, is sufficiently mobile (if the auxiliaries and smaller combat units are reduced); possesses great striking power and great power of penetration; is capable of maneuver; has a better framework for absorption and employment of artillery reinforcements; better preserves the higher tactical organization developed during the war and the knowledge of such organization acquired by large number of officers and men who have returned to civil life; and better facilitates compliance with those provisions of the Act of Congress which contemplate the preservation of our war organization designations.^2
Headquarters, A.E.F., "Forwarding Report of the Superior Board on Tactics and Organization, 16 Jun 1920," TMs, pp. 1-9, Box 2205, Entry #23, Record Group 120, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; "Reports from Committee on Army Reorganization," File WCD 8481-136, Box 310, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
^^Lane, "Tables of Organization," 490. 27
The third issue centered on reconciling the four-unit organization with the desired strength reduction. The Committee determined that it could increase the effectiveness of the division by reducing the number of smaller combat units, meaning companies and platoons, and by removing the corresponding slice of support units. The Committee believed that the removal of the fourth unit at company and platoon level would not seriously detract from the division's striking power and would increase the survivability of those units as a result of better command, control, and maneuverability.
The approved division organization (Figure 1) consisted of 19,385 men organized into two infantry brigades composed of two regiments of three battalions each. The battalions consisted of three rifle companies and a machine gun company. Smaller battalions and companies lacked the endurance of four-unit organizations, but gained maneuverability and survivability. The Committee retained the artillery brigade but deleted the
155mm howitzer regiment. The Army intended to substitute a 75mm howitzer regiment for the 155mm unit until the ordnance department could develop a larger caliber weapon, either 105mm or 155mm, with the mobility of a 75mm gun. Elimination of divisional cavalry and the reduction of support units to "those which will always be necessary for immediate employment in the habitual or average circumstance" accounted for a major portion of the strength reduction. The division added an observation
^^Lane, "Tables of Organization," 489-90. 28 squadron and replaced the motorized machine gun battalion with a light tank company 14
XX 19^85 MEN
T T _IL JJ. DIV 9 » TROOI’S ~ T — 13 OBSERVATION [ HHC 75MM INCLUDES MP 15 TANKS (to be tcjdaccd PLATOON IN by 105/135mm PEACETIME T when developed) JQ HowrraEpj Im iI—^ 3 ^ V S S s i STOKES MORTARMOSIOKES 37MM GUN
MOTORCYCLE
Figure 1. United States Army Square Division (Post World War I)
The Committee developed tables for the typical corps and army for war planning purposes fully realizing that the tactical situation would usually require a modified organization. The typical corps would consist of three infantry divisions; a fully-motorized general support artillery brigade
(155mm); an anti-aircraft artillery regiment; an engineer regiment
^^Lane, "Tables of Organization," 490-95; "Development of Organization," Army War College G-3 Course 1923-24, Document #7, 26 Nov 1923, TMs, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 29 supplemented by three auxiliary battalions; an air service of twenty-six observation airplanes and four balloons; a medical regiment; and the corps supply trains, 75% of which was motorized. Corps troops consisted of a signal battalion, military police battalion, ordnance company, field remount depot, and a service battalion for general labor. The typical army would consist of three corps; an army artillery headquarters; an anti-aircraft artillery brigade; an engineer brigade; an air service composed of attack, pursuit, and observation groups; two cavalry divisions; a large medical organization consisting of four regiments, fifteen evacuation hospitals, and twelve mobile surgical hospitals, a convalescent hospital, three veterinary hospitals, three supply depots, and a laboratory; and army trains. Special army troops included two signal battalions, one military police battalion, a maintenance company, three ammunition companies, a field remount depot, and eight service battalions.
The tables of organization added a new kind of organization, the general headquarters reserve. The reserve consisted of assets not habitually required by an army. The general headquarters reserve controlled additional light artillery, engineer assets, and anti-aircraft artillery units organized the same as corps and division units. The reserve also included heavy artillery regiments not found in the lower organizations. For every six armies, the general headquarters reserve provided trench mortars, railroad guns, tanks.
^^Lane, "Tables of Organization," 495-99. 30 additional airplanes including a bombardment group, as well as additional units of the types found at corps and divisionlevel. 16
The Special Committee based the new organizations on wartime requirements. It recognized that Congressional limitations on peacetime strength would limit the Army's ability to man all of the units prescribed by the study. The Committee recommended that the Army "maintain in time of peace as many cadres as the number of men authorized by the act of
Congress will permit, provided such cadres are so organized that they may be readily expanded to war strength, contain sufficient numbers of officers and men to insure effective training and guarantee units that without change or expansion, will be effective for immediate active service in case of internal disorder or other minor emergency."
The organizations recommended by the Special Committee admirably supported the national military policy. The new structures balanced the competing requirements for powerful forces capable of sustained combat and highly mobile forces capable of rapid movement over great distances. By standardizing Regular, Guard, and Reserve organizations, the Army fell in line with the policy of creating one Army of the United States.
While the National Defense Act of 1920 had outlined a plan for an army organized to respond to both small and large wars, budget limitations forced defense planners to choose between optimum readiness for one or the other. By manning the skeleton of a large force rather than retaining fewer
^^Lane, "Tables of Organization," 499-500.
^^Lane, "Tables of Organization," 501. 31 units at fighting strength, the Armyjchose to organize for what it believed was the most likely and most dangerous contingency — large-scale war. This change in military policy did not effect the Army's tactical organizations, however. The Army kept the organizations prescribed by the 1921 tables of organization, but only those units patrolling the Mexican border neared full- strength. The American Army that emerged in the postwar years was an impressive organization . . . on paper. If given the men, weapons, and equipment to fill its organization tables, the Army of the United States could have ranked among the most effective military organizations in the world for several years after the war. One of the keys to attaining and sustaining a high level of effectiveness was the development, dissemination, and practicing of a viable doctrine. As the Army reorganized to meet the challenges of a new mission, so too it reexamined its doctrine for validity. CHAPTER II
TOWARD AN AMERICAN DOCTRINE
During the past year it was felt that the time had come to make a general revision of the regulations which govern our training and tactics. There was a general need for such revision, since the existing manuals were in many respects not in conformity with our adopted types of organizations.^ — General John J. Pershing Army Chief of Staff
WHY A DOCTRINAL REVIEW?
Army leaders scrutinized doctrine in conjunction with their reorganization studies. The Army's post-war self-analysis was much more than a routine performance assessment, however. The Army reviewed its doctrine for the following reasons:
1) to incorporate the lessons of the war
2) to consolidate the many publications generated by the AEF and War Department during the war
3) to align doctrine with new missions and organizational changes
4) to establish an Army-wide unified doctrine
5) to codify the "American" method of fighting.
^U.S. War Department, "Excerpts From the Annual Report of the Chief of Staff," in A nnual Report of the Secretary of War, 1922 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1922), 119.
32 33
The most obvious stimulus for doctrinal revision was the desire to absorb the lessons of the Great War. New tactical techniques, trenches and barbed wire, airplanes, gas, tanks, radio, indirect fire artillery, and machine guns had introduced the Americans to a type of war that differed greatly from their recent experiences on the Mexican border and in the Philippine jungles.
While many officers believed that the combat principles remained unchanged, all agreed that the experience warranted study if only to incorporate the techniques of Western European combat into the American repertoire. Wartime efforts to disseminate combat "lessons" created a second reason for a review of the American means and methods. The War
Department and the American Expeditionary Forces produced numerous manuals, books, and pamphlets to facilitate the training of American forces.
Many of the manuals were translations of French and British publications since the methods of trench warfare and much of the equipment and weapons were new to the Americans. As the experience and confidence of
American leaders grew and the numbers of partially trained units arriving from the United States accelerated, the output of definitive "how-to-fight" manuals increased to meet the demands. Rapid changes in tactics and technology produced a bewildering number of changes and updates. By the end of the war, the Army had produced a confusing, sometimes conflicting, collection of literature that addressed nearly every aspect of fighting and 34 surviving on the European battlefield. As early as 1919, the Army recognized the need for a single source of doctrine and training methods.^
Third, the Army needed to adjust doctrine to reflect new missions and organizations prescribed under the National Defense Act of 1920. Unforeseen
Congressional reductions in Army strength frustrated efforts to reorganize the force in accordance with the Act. The Army finally stabilized enough to proceed with internal organizational and tactical revisions a full year after the passage of the reorganization law. The implementation of National Defense
Act 1920 and related changes in tactical organizations had created a different
Army than that of 1917. General Pershing wrote in 1922: "During the past year it was felt that the time had come to make a general revision of the regulations which govern our training and tactics. There was a general need for such revision, since the existing manuals were in many respects not in conformity with our adopted types of organizations."^ Fourth, the War Department General Staff finally had the power and the means to direct Army training and doctrine. Prior to the First World
War, the General Staff was too small, lacked experienced and trained officers, and lacked the administrative routines necessary to impose unified doctrine
^U.S. War Department, "Excerpts From the Annual Report of the Chief of Field Artillery," in Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1921 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1921), 234; H. B. Fiske, "The Training Branch, G-3," Lecture delivered at The Army War College, Army War College G-3 Course 1922-23, Document #4, 14 Nov 1922, TMs, pp. 12-13, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
^U.S. War Department, "Excerpts From the Annual Report of the Chief of Staff," in A nnual Report of the Secretary of War, 1922 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1922), 119. 35
on the far-flung units of the American Army. The power of the Chief of Staff
had grown steadily since General Leonard Wood established the supremacy of
the position over that of the Adjutant General. During the war, Peyton C.
March’s commendable performance as coordinator of the war effort in the
United States further enhanced the position. With Pershing's appointment
to the post in 1921, the Chief of Staff's prestige and influence grew to
unprecedented levels. Together with the postwar expansion and
improvement of the Army schools system, the General Staff possessed the
ability to prescribe and supervise the implementation of a unified doctrine for
the first time.4
The last and, perhaps, most significant reason for rewriting the tactical
doctrine was the conviction held by many influential senior American
officers that the war had confirmed the correctness of an "American" way of
war. The postwar review provided an opportunity to extol the virtue of the
American doctrine with its emphasis on the rifle and bayonet in "open
warfare." The American opinion of European doctrine had been generally
unfavorable during the war and remained so afterwards. General Pershing,
^For a discussion of the General Staff's inability to manage doctrine or modernization, see David A. Armstrong, Bullets and Bureaucrats: The Machinegun and the United States Army, 1861-1916 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982). Among the few notable published works which address American ground doctrine during the postwar period are: Jonathan M. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization in the 20th Century (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1984); Janice McKenney, "More Bang for the Buck in the Interwar Army," Military Affairs 42 (1978): 80-86; Timothy K. Nenninger, "The Development of American Armor, 1917-1940," Armor 78 (Jan-Feb 1969): 46-51, (Mar-Apr 1969): 34-38, (May-Jun 1969): 33-39, (Sep-Oct 1969): 45-49; James W. Rainey, "Ambivalent Warfare: The Tactical Doctrine of the AEF in World War I,"Parameters 13 (1983): 34-46; and Russell F. Weigley, "Mobility Versus Power,"Parameters 11 (1981): 13- 2 1 . 36 in particular, believed that the French and British overemphasized trench warfare and neglected open warfare. Many officers shared his views.
Repeated American successes in the war and Germany's relatively quick capitulation after the réintroduction of open warfare methods seemed to confirm the superiority of the so-called "American doctrine." In the schools and service journals, officers cited war experiences to justify American methods. Lieutenant Colonel Hugh A. Drum, director of Leavenworth's
School of the Line, aptly summarized the position when he wrote in 1920:
In view of our recent experiences with French, British, Italian and our own armies there will be a tendency to a diversified instead of a uniform tactical doctrine. The avoidance of such an undesirable condition is of primary importance and calls for energetic personal action by each instructor and student. Satisfactory results cannot be secured if the student body of this School receives instruction which is based on several different tactical doctrines, such as part French, part British, part German, etc. Our experiences in the European War have been sufficient and the results so creditable that we have little or no need to borrow tactical doctrines from a foreign country. The tactical principles and doctrines heretofore recognized and taught at the Leavenworth Schools have been tested in the European War and have been found to be as sound today as heretofore. The tactical doctrine to be imparted in this School will be the American doctrine as illustrated by our own teachings and experiences. Therefore, there will be no need to quote as authority for teaching French, British, or other foreign manuals and pamphlets. While there is no objection to utilizing incidents of the British, French, etc., campaigns as examples, the tactical doctrine deduced therefrom must be along the tactical lines taught by the A.E.F. and the Leavenworth Schools.^
^Lt. Col. H. A. Drum, "Annual Report of the Director of The School of the Line, 1919-1920," in Annual Report of Major General Charles H. Muir, Commandant of the General Service Schools, 1920 (Fort Leavenworth: The General Service Schools Press, 1920), 19-20. 37
The proud American victors of St. Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne needed no prompting from Colonel Drum to sing the praises of American fighting prowess.
WRITING THE MANUAL
The Army doctrine prescribed byField Service Regulations 1923 had three major sources: 1) previous editions of Field Service Regulations, 2) lessons from the war recorded by boards of officers, and 3) the schools. The general principles and doctrine specified in previousField Service
Regulations reappeared throughout the new manual. The apparent validity of the old general principles on the modern battlefield underlined the correctness of American practices. The manual forcefully restated these tenets of American doctrine.
The reports of boards of officers provided the second major source of input. Both the AEF and the War Department General Staff convened boards of officers to determine the lessons of the war and recommend changes in
Army organization, equipment, armament, and tactics. These boards, chaired by highly respected senior officers, concluded that the war had validated much of the previous doctrine, but they also made important recommendations for changes. That verbatim extracts from some of the boards' reports appeared inField Service Regulations 1923 testifies to their influence.
Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, convened over twenty separate boards between December 1918 and June 1919 to assess the war's lessons. These boards addressed an exhaustive array of topics: infantry. 38 artillery, cavalry, air service, engineers, signal corps, chemical warfare service, tanks, machine guns, motor transport, chaplaincy, central records office, inspector general, judge advocate, medical, ordnance, postal express, provost marshal, quartermaster, and remount service. Boards also examined special interest areas such as mail for the expeditionary forces and tonnage estimates.
Highly respected, experienced, senior officers constituted each board and, where applicable, the Chief of the Arm or Service within the AEF endorsed the report. Among the notable members of the boards who would rise to positions of influence in the interwar army were Major General William
Lassiter; Brigadier Generals Benjamin D. Foulois, Leslie J. McNair, George
Van Horn Moseley, and Stuart Heintzelman; Colonels Edward T. Collins,
John L. De Witt, and Hjalmer Erickson; and Lieutenant Colonel J. Lawton
Collins. Each board developed its own technique for gathering data.
Brigadier General Edward L. King's Cavalry Board mailed questionnaires to all cavalry officers in the AEF, visited foreign cavalry units to collect additional information, and then convened a conference to discuss the findings. Brigadier General Andrew Hero's Artillery Board gathered its data by sending questionnaires to all officers who commanded brigades, regiments, trains, or schools during the war. The Infantry Board used a similar technique, but due to the greater number of infantry officers in the population, only sent fourteen questionnaires to each division to be distributed as the commander saw fit. Each board prepared reports and submitted them to AEF Headquarters.^
*^The AEF Board Reports comprise eighteen boxes at the National Archives under General 39
The AEF Superior Board was the most influential of the boards assembled to assess the war's lessons. The board met at Chaumont, France, from 27 April to 1 July 1919 to summarize the lessons as they applied to the
Army's organization and tactics. Most of the reports of the various minor boards were available for consideration. In keeping with the Superior Board's high purpose, its membership represented some of the AEF's most respected officers. Its members were Major General Joseph T. Dickman, Major General
John L. Hines, Major General William Lassiter, Brigadier General Hugh A.
Drum, Brigadier General Wilson B. Burtt, Colonel George R. Spalding, and
Colonel Parker Hitt. All but Dickman would hold positions of influence in the postwar Army.^
Major General Dickman, one of the most respected officers in the prewar years and possibly the best of the AEF field commanders, was the senior member of the Superior Board. Dickman personified the professionalization of the Army officer corps at the turn of the century. He graduated from West Point in 1881 as a cavalryman and served in a wide variety of duty positions prior to the First World War. He saw action on the western frontier, in the Spanish-American War, the Philippines, and in
China during the Boxer Rebellion. More significant, he was a product and proponent of the Army's professional education system. An honor graduate of the newly-established Infantry and Cavalry School, two-time instructor at
Headquarters, A.E.F., Entry #23, Record Group 120, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
^General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Superior Board On Tactics and Organization, 27 Apr 1919," TMs, p. 20, Box 2205, Entry #23, Record Group 120, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 40
Fort Leavenworth, and serious student of military history, strategy, and tactics, Dickman developed an Army-wide reputation for technical and tactical competence. He served as a charter member of the War Department
General Staff where he wrote Field Service Regulations 1905, the Army's first official capstone doctrine manual. Dickman successfully applied his knowledge of military theory and tactics in combat as a division and corps commander. Despite the general's sixty years of age, his impressive performances demonstrated tactical acumen and a remarkable ability to meet the challenges of modern warfare. Major General Dickman brought extensive experience, intelligence, and widely recognized competence to the
Superior Board. Retiring in 1921 at the mandatory retirement age of sixty- four, he had no direct influence on the interwar Army. Through his contributions to the Superior Board, however, he was a factor in the postwar revision of an Army doctrine that survived nearly twenty years.8
Major General John L. Hines joined Dickman as a highly respected battlefield commander and model of professionalism. He graduated as an infantryman in the West Point class of 1891. Like Dickman, he served in the
American West and fought in the Spanish-American War, Philippines, and
Mexico, where he rode with Pershing on the 1916 Punitive Expedition.
General Pershing, on the basis of his observations in Mexico, selected Hines for early deployment to France with the AEF advance party. During the First
World War, Hines rose rapidly on the merit of his combat leadership.
^Roger J. Spiller, Joseph G. Dawson III, and T. Harry Williams, eds.Dictionary of American Military Biography (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984), s.v. "Dickman, Joseph Theodore," by John K. Ohl. 41
Having arrived in France as a lieutenant colonel, he attained the rank of major general in less than two years and commanded a regiment, brigade, division, and corps, a feat previously accomplished in the American Army only by Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson. Hines, unlike Dickman who would retire in 1921, continued to shape the Army in the interwar years. He succeeded Pershing as Chief of Staff in September 1924 just in time to sign
Field Service Regulations 1923, a manual to which he had contributed much as a member of the Superior Board. General Hines retired from active duty in
1932 at sixty-four years of age, but lived until 1968 when he died at the age of one hundred, as the oldest living graduate of West Point.9
Other members of the board were equally impressive and would also play important roles in the postwar army. Major General Lassiter chaired an
AEF study of motor drawn artillery, led one of several interwar studies of the feasibility of a separate air corps, and served as the War Department General
Staff G-3. Brigadier General Hugh A. Drum, one of the two youngest general officers in the AEF, would serve with distinction throughout the interwar period eventually attaining the rank of lieutenant general before retiring in
1943. As Commandant, he played a central role in the revision of theField
Service Regulations, discussed later in this chapter. Brigadier General Burtt would become an assistant commandant of the Command and General Staff
College. Colonel George R. Spalding sat on the AEF Engineer Board and
^Roger J. Spiller, Joseph G. Dawson III, and T. Harry Williams, eds.Dictionary of American Military Biography (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984), s.v. "Hines, John Leonard," by Louis A. Peake. 42 would rise to brigadier general in 1936. The members of the Superior Board indeed represented some of the best available minds in the AEF.
The schools were the third major influence on the writing of theField
Service Regulations. During the four years between the signing of the
Armistice and the publication of the manual, the impetus toward war studies faded; the most important boards had completed their work and reorganization under the National Defense Act held top priority at the War
Department. The role of the schools grew as new matters increasingly diverted the General Staff's attention from the war's lessons until the study of war and responsibility for rewriting Army doctrinal publications had shifted completely from the General Staff to the schools.
As early as 1919, General March had charged the Training and
Instruction Branch of the WDGS War Plans Division with the "study of methods of warfare and preparation for the training features of war plans, dissemination of correct tactical doctrines, and supervision of the preparation and distribution of military publications."^0 The War Plans Division approved selected AEF publications for use as training manuals as an interim measure until it determined the nature and extent of required revisions to prewar m anuals.Concurrently, the War Plans Division began reviewing all service school publications to ensure consistency with War Department
^^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Chief of Staff, 1921 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1921), 69.
^^W. G. Haan, "Annual Report of the Director of the War Plans Division, General Staff, 1919- 1920," TMs, pp. 16-17 , Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 43
doctrine.^2 The disruption caused by demobilization and reorganization prevented the Training and Instruction Branch from completing this enormous task of review and revision. The War Department realized that reasonable progress required dividing the work among the interested arms and services. Not surprisingly, the General Staff shifted most of the responsibility for drafting the new training regulations to the Armys c h o o l s .
The Army's schools became the focal point for the development of new doctrine as well as continuing their role in officer education. The
Leavenworth staff and faculty had already established the precedent for its involvement in the writing of theField Service Regulations having revised the 1905 edition on the initiative of Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell.^^
With the outstanding performances of "Leavenworth men" during the war, the schools assumed even greater importance in the light of the changing nature of warfare and the resource limitations imposed by Congress. More than ever before, the conduct of war required close, careful study in order to stay abreast of technological developments. Moreover, the schools were unparalleled as an economical forum for the study of war. Secretary Weeks wrote of the schools and their contribution to the development of doctrine in his Annual Report for 1922:
^2"Annual Report of the Director of the War Plans Division, General Staff, 1920-1921," TMs, p. 28, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
D h . B. Fiske, "The Training Branch, G-3," pp. 12-13. l^Boyd L. Dastrup, The U.S. Army Command and Staff College: A Centennial History (Manhattan, Kansas: Sunflower University Press, 1982), 56. 44
They are designed to complete the indoctrination of officers and to afford them facilities, in time of peace, of solving the problems which they must confront in war and which could be presented in no other manner. Aside from these purposes, if they had done nothing else, they could have justified their existence by their work in conserving and digesting the great mass of purely personal evidence collected by individuals during the war. We are accordingly assured that the lessons of the war have not this time, as they were after most of our previous wars, been lost to the service and to the organization. We have tested our doctrines in a comprehensive and truly democratic way. We have finally undertaken a complete and unified revision of the textbooks and training regulations which govern the training of all elements of our Army.^5
Pershing added that, through the schools, “[the Army has] exploited a great fund of unrelated information acquired during the war to the end that a sound military doctrine has been brought up to date."^^ The role of the schools in determining, writing, and disseminating doctrine would grow throughout the remainder of the interwar period. In fact, the General Staff would lose control of doctrine development in the near future and not regain centralized control until 1940.
Major General W. G. Haan, Director of the WDGS War Plans Division, charged the Commandant of the General Service Schools with the revision of the Field Service Regulations in an order dated December 7, 1920. The order read as follows:
^^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1922 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1922), 19.
^^U.S. War Department, "Excerpts From the Annual Report of the Chief of Staff," in Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1922, 115. 45
(a) The Field Service Regulations should cover doctrines, etc., of combined arms and larger units, i.e., divisions, army corps, and armies; and should not cover doctrines and principles relating to the arms of the service, which should be covered in the Drill Regulations of the different arms. (b) The Field Service Regulations should cover in general terms all phases of the handling of field forces, including theater of operations, and of forces in size from a division to a group of armies and including an expeditionary force. (c) The manual should be an authoritative reference book for officers in the field. It should contain general principles and directions, only, without any elaborate discussion as to the wherefores or reasons for such principles. Elaboration and instruction in the principles enunciated should be contained in the textbooks and other instructional matter made available by the General and Special Service Schools and Chiefs of Branches, or other appropriate agencies.
Brigadier General Drum was the Commandant of the General Service
Schools in December 1920. As commandant, the former member of the AEF
Superior Board held one of the Army's most influential positions, responsible for educating field grade officers in command and staff operations at brigade level and above. Drum's assignment to the post reflected the same confidence in his abilities shown by his previous appointment to the AEF
Superior Board; the Army's senior leadership widely recognized his intellectual capabilities.
Brigadier General Drum, unlike most of the Army's senior leadership, was not a West Point graduate. He received a direct commission in the
Regular Army, made available by President McKinley to the sons of officers killed in action in the Spanish-American War. His early assignments
17"Annual Report of the Director of the War Plans Division, General Staff, 1920-1921," pp. 33- 34. 46 included three tours in the Philippines, where he befriended Captain John J.
Pershing, and service in Mexico at Vera Cruz in 1914. He distinguished himself as a keen student by graduating with honors from the School of the
Line and completing the General Staff College course. General Pershing chose Captains Drum and George S. Patton, Jr. to serve as unassigned staff captains on the AEF advance party in 1917. The advance party consisted of highly capable, carefully selected, officers who had demonstrated outstanding abilities and great potential for future service. Both men would validate
Pershing's judgment with their performances during and after the war.
Drum, a tireless taskmaster, served as chief of staff in General Hunter Liggett's
First Army from August 1918 to April 1919 having quickly risen from captain to brigadier general in only a year. He supervised the expansion of the newly- formed 1st Army, assisted by Lieutenant Colonel George C. Marshall, and the planning and execution of the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives. In
April 1919, Drum reported for duty with the Superior Board. He left the board in June, before it had completed its final report, to assume duty as the director of the School of the Line. ^ 8
Drum remained an influential, renowned figure during the interwar years. One of the youngest wartime generals. Drum reverted to his permanent rank of major in July 1919 and did not regain his star until 1922.
He worked his way through the ranks, eventually earning his third star in
Roger J. Spiller, Joseph G. Dawson III, and T. Harry Williams, eds.Dictionary of American Military Biography (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984), s.v. "Drum, Hugh Aloysius," by Roger Beaumont; Larry I. Bland, ed. The Papers of George Catlett Marshall (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 1:155,1:191,1:713 passim. 47
1939, by serving in tough staff and command assignments commensurate i with his reputation as an officer who gets things done. He served as
Commandant of the General Staff School, WDGS G-3, and Deputy Chief of
Staff to General Douglas Mac Arthur. He commanded the 1st Division and V
Corps and led the 1st Army during the 1940 and 1941 large-scale maneuvers.
Army Chief of Staff was the one position that eluded Drum although he was a leading candidate to succeed General Mac Arthur in 1935 and the front- runner to replace General Malin Craig in 1939. Indeed, at the outbreak of
World War II, Drum was the Army's most experienced general and the only officer on active duty who served as a general during World War I. He left the Army in 1943 at age sixty-four having been denied command of American forces in Europe and relegated to the leadership of the Eastern Defense Com m and ^9
Drum was not the principal architect of any major changes in Army doctrine during his long career. However, he contributed to several developments through his role as an effective and powerful staff officer.
John M. Palmer pointed to Drum and Marshall as examples of "a new type in the American Army — the thoroughly trained staff officer."20 In this capacity, his leadership of the Drum Board in 1935 and membership on the Baker
Board contributed to the eventual establishment of an autonomous air arm.
^^Roger J. Spiller, Joseph G. Dawson III, and T. Harry Williams, eds.Dictionary of American Military Biography (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984), s.v. "Drum, Hugh Aloysius," by Roger Beaumont; Bland, 1:155,1:191,1:713 passim.
^^John M. Palmer, "The Problem of Promotion and Its Influence on Military Efficiency and National Policy," quoted in Bland, 1:348 48
His strong advocacy of a distinct American doctrine was apparent in the revision of the Field Service Regulations.^^
Brigadier General Drum eagerly accepted and immediately organized to accomplish the task of rewriting the manual. He relieved Colonel Ewing E.
Booth from duty as Assistant Commandant and appointed him president of the Field Service Regulations Board with full-time responsibility for the revision. Next, Drum appointed Colonel Robert H. Allen, Colonel Willey
Howell, Major Thomas B. Catron, and Major Condon C. McCornack as board members. Booth, a cavalry officer and former Leavenworth instructor, would later attain the rank of major general. Allen would also make major general and serve as Chief of Infantry from 1926 to 1929. Howell, an infantryman and
First Army G-2 in World War I, directed the General Staff School. Catron, an infantry officer, and McCornack, a medical corps officer, were instructors in the General Staff School at the time of their appointment to the board.^2
The Board decided "to make the Regulations of such scope as to give to the Regular Army, the National Guard, the Organized Reserves, and the public, a comprehensive and correct idea of the responsibilities and functions
21 Roger J. Spiller, Joseph G. Dawson III, and T. Harry Williams, eds.Dictionary of American Military Biography (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984), s.v. "Drum, Hugh Aloysius," by Roger Beaumont; Bland, 1:155,1:191,1:713 passim.
22Brigadier General Hanson E. Ely, Annual Report of Brigadier General H. £.. Ely, Commandant of the General Service Schools, 2922 (Fort Leavenworth: The General Service Schools Press, 1922), 7-8; Colonel E. E. Booth, "Annual Report of the Director of The School of the Publication Division, 1921-1922," in Annual Report of Brigadier General H. E.. Ely, Commandant of the General Service Schools, 2922 (Fort Leavenworth: The General Service Schools Press, 1922), 29-32; Brigadier General Hanson E. Ely, "Forwarding Letter to Field Service Regulations," 15 Jun 1922, TMs, pp. ii-iii. Military History Institute Library, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 49 of the various Governmental agencies in the preparation for war and the conduct of war, as well as the doch ines thereof, and the strategical and tactical principles employed therein, and in general terms all phases of the handling of field forces, including theater of operations and forces in size from a division to a group of armies."23 The Field Service Regulations were to serve as the basis for all other text within the War Department Training Regulation series. The Board then prepared a tentative outline of the new manual and forwarded it to the War Department for approval. In December 1921, the
General Service Schools created the Publications Division to handle increasing demands from the War Department for training regulations manuscripts. The new division, also headed by Booth, assumed the task of writing the Field Service Regulations. The Board, however, continued to oversee the work and remained principally responsible for the project. The members of the Field Service Regulations Board divided the task of preparing drafts between themselves and subject matter experts at the Schools. They distributed copies of completed sections to each of the General Service
Schools sections and subsections and to selected instructors for review and criticism.24
A new commandant. Brigadier General Hanson E. Ely, replaced Drum in 1921. Ely graduated in the W est Point class of 1891 with John Hines. He served as the 1st Division chief of staff in World War I with George Marshall
23 Ely, "Forwarding Letter to Field Service Regulations," TMs, p. ii.
2^Ely, Annual Report, 1922, 7-8; Booth, "Annual Report of the Director of The School of the Publication Division, 1921-1922," 29-32; Ely, "Forwarding Letter to Field Service Regulations," TMs, pp. ii-iii. 50 as his assistant and Drum in the Operations Section. Ely was present as division chief of staff during the famous incident when an angry Marshall jumped to Major General Sibert's defense after the division commander's severe public criticism by General Pershing following a division exercise. Ely attained the rank of major general, having commanded the 28th Infantry
Regiment at Cantigny, a brigade, and the 5th Division during the Meuse-
Argonne offensive. Following his assignment at Leavenworth, Ely served as
Commandant of the Army War College from 1923 to 1927 and then as the
Second Corps Area commander. He made a bid for selection as Army Chief of
Staff in 1930, but could not overcome the policy requiring four years remaining on active service upon assumption of the duty. Ely reached mandatory retirement age in 1931.25
Despite the demotion. Colonel Drum remained influential as the new
Assistant Commandant. Ely and Drum reviewed and modified the final draft. The Commandant forwarded fifty copies of the manuscript, as Training
Regulations No. 15, to the Adjutant General on 17 June 1922, a full year and a half after the receiving the order to revise the manual.26
The General Service Schools manuscript was a far-ranging and comprehensive work. Its authors had, with permission of the War
Department, expanded theField Service Regulations to encompass the activities of all governmental agencies concerned with peacetime
25Bland, 1:155,1:121-125,1:190, 1:244,1:296,1:298,1:349-351 passim.
2% ly, Annual Report, 1922, 7-8; Booth, "Annual Report of the Director of The School of the Publication Division, 1921-1922," 29-32; Ely, "Forwarding Letter to Field Service Regulations," TMs, pp. ii-iii. 51 preparations as well as the conduct of war. The manuscript included chapters addressing mobilization, training, and War Department General Staff functions. The authors proposed changing the name from "Field Service
Regulations" to "Regulations for War" to reflect the manual's expanded scope.27 .
By the time the draft Field Service Regulations reached the War
Department, several organizational changes had occurred in the General
Staff. When General Pershing became the Chief of Staff in June 1921, he promptly reorganized the War Department General Staff to mirror his AEF
General Staff. As a result of the reorganization, responsibility for most of the training publications shifted from the Training and Instruction Branch of the
War Plans Division to the G-3, Operations and Training Division.
In October, the Army renewed efforts toward a comprehensive revision of all drill and training regulations to reflect the organizational changes wrought by National Defense Act 1920, incorporate the lessons of the
World War, present a standardized doctrine for Army tactics and training, and prevent duplication of materials. The new system called for the publication of 565 training regulations in pamphlet form. Each pamphlet dealt with a specific topic. Such a system enabled soldiers to tailor reference libraries according to actual needs and facilitated amendment of the regulations. The Training Branch of G-3 Division determined an overall
^^"Analysis of Proposed Field Service Regulations," Army War College G-3 Course 1922-23, Supplement to Document U8, 21 Nov 1922, TMs, p. 2, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania; Ely, "Forwarding Letter to Field Service Regulations," TMs, p. v. 52 publication scheme and developed a subject outline for the regulations. The
General Staff then assigned responsibility for the revisions to the appropriate branches of the service. Upon receipt of the draft manuscripts, the Training
Branch standardized terms and phrases and ensured that the proposed regulations did not duplicate, overlap, or conflict with each other.28 The
Field Service Regulations was one of the last publications transferred from
War Plans to the Operations and Training Division. The Training Branch did not assume responsibility for the Field Service Regulations until June 1922, the same month that the General Service Schools forwarded the final draft.29
The Training Branch sent copies of the manuscript to each of the divisions of the General Staff, the Army schools, and the branch chiefs for comments. The draft received harsh criticism from many of its reviewers.
The Leavenworth board had incorporated the contributions of so many officers that the final text lacked continuity and uniformity.30 Comments from an Army War College committee assigned to review the proposed regulations highlight its stylistic deficiencies:
^®U.S. War Department, "Excerpts from the Annual Report of the Chief of Staff," in A nnual Report of the Secretary of War, 1922 , 119-20, 144-45; H. B. Fiske, "Annual Report of the Training Branch, Operations and Training Division, G-3, 1921-1922," TMs, p. 15, Entry #213, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; William Lassiter, "Annual Report of the Operations and Training Division, G-3, 1922-1923," TMs, pp. 16-17, Entry #213, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
^^Memorandum, 2 Jun 1922, File WPD 774, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
^^U.S. War Department, Memorandum For Record, Colonel E. L. Gruber, Acting WDGS G3, "Field Service Regulations," 4 Aug 1939, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 53
Suffice it to say that small portions of the text have been characterized as pedantic, longwinded, or academic and other portions have been criticized for lack of clearness, brevity, simplicity, and forcefulness; for repetitions, inconsistencies, errors, too much effort to define terms and to set forth reasons, clumsy and involved style, and circumlocution.^!
As for content, the committee's major objection centered on the manuscript's inclusion of matters beyond the scope of purely military operations. The report stated, "The 'Field Service Regulations' comprise supposedly brief and concise rules for 'service in the field;' and should not include a summary of the general Art of War. . . ." Its primary object was to cover the employment of combined arms, not military policy, mobilization, and training. But, the committee added that "many portions of the text are excellent and the doctrines generally sound." The Army War College committee concluded that "while they are an excellent contribution to the military literature of this country they are not a F.S.R." and recommended against their adoption.32
The General Staff divisions and branch chiefs also disapproved the draft.^3 By the end of November, the staffing action had clearly indicated that further work was necessary.
The Chief of Staff appointed a committee to review the comments and edit the final draft in November. Colonel Edgar T. Collins, Chief of the
Training Branch, Colonel John L. DeWitt of War Plans Division, and Major
3! "Analysis of Proposed Field Service Regulations," p. 1.
^2"Analysis of Proposed Field Service Regulations."
^^William Lassiter, "Annual Report of the Operations and Training Division, G-3, 1922-1923," TMs, p.l7. 54
George A. Lynch of the Military Intelligence Division sat on the review com m ittee.34 Colonel Collins graduated as an infantryman in the West Point class of 1897. He attended the School of the Line prior to the First World War.
His service with the AEF included membership on the postwar Infantry
Board convened to determine lessons in infantry organization and tactics.
After the war, he served on the War Department General Staff for four years where he attained the rank of brigadier general. In 1924, he reported as
Commandant of the Infantry School, a post he held for five years. The famous Marshall years at Fort Benning began on Colonel Collins' tour as commandant. He had known Marshall from their days together at the Fort
Leavenworth schools in 1906 and was highly supportive of the future Chief of
Staff's reform initiatives. Colonel Collins served in the Philippines and then returned to War Department General Staff asC -3.35
Colonel DeWitt, too, possessed impressive credentials and would continue to hold powerful positions in the interwar Army. He attended the
Leavenworth schools in 1906-1907 with Colonel Collins. During the First
World War, he served principally in logistics staff positions, first as C-4 for the AEF's I Corps and then as C-4 for the First Army. He sat on the AEF
General Staff Organization Board in 1919 before reporting for a five year tour with the War Department General Staff. Colonel DeWitt would continue to make his mark as a logistician, serving as the Army's quartermaster general
34h . B. Fiske, "The Training Branch, G-3," pp. 12-13; Edgar T. Collins, "Supplement to the Report of the Chief, Training Branch, Operations and Training Division, for the Month of June, 1923," TMs, pp. 1-2, Entry #213, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
35Bland, 1:47,1:298, 1:319-20,1:326,1:333, 1:410 passim. 55 from 1930 to 1934. He would attain the permanent rank of brigadier general in 1934, command a brigade in the 1st Division, and, in July 1937, report as
Commandant of the War College. Colonel DeWitt was second only to Hugh
Drum in seniority on the list of eligibles to replace Chief of Staff Malin Craig in 1939.36
Major George Lynch was one of the Army's rising stars after World
War I. He graduated as an infantryman in the West Point class of 1903. In his first tour of duty, he saw combat with the 17th Infantry Regiment in the
Philippines during the Moro expeditions. Major Lynch taught foreign languages at United States Military Academy from 1905 to 1909, then reported to Fort Benning where he served with the 29th Infantry Regiment for four years. From 1909 to 1913, he performed a variety of duties while assigned to
Washington, D. C. including assistant to the Chief of the Militia Bureau, editor of Infantry Journal, secretary of the United States Infantry Association, and Inspector Instructor of the National Guard in the District of Columbia.
During the First World War, his outstanding performance in several key staff positions earned him wide respect as an expert in training and doctrine. He served as Training Officer of the 80th Division, Chief of the Publications
Branch of the AEF Military Intelligence Division, and then in the Training
Division of the AEF General Headquarters where he drafted the American
Infantry Drill and Combat Regulations. After the war. Major Lynch joined
36Bland, 1:401, 1:425,1:695,1:701 passim. 56 the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff in which capacity he joined theField Service Regulations revision team.37
The committee, working under the supervision of G-3, completed the final editing in spring of 1923. To ensure uniformity of style. Major Lynch alone wrote and edited the final draft.38 The G-3 conducted final staffing during the summer and fall of that year. The Assistant Chiefs of Staff recommended approval of the revised regulations and, in nearly every instance, lauded its quality. The Acting Chief of Staff, Major General John L.
Hines, approved the new manual in November and publication began in early 1924. Field Service Regulations 1923, "so revised by the General Staff of the Army as to eliminate obsolete prescriptions and to embrace generally accepted lessons of the war," constituted "an up-to-date guide for the government of the Army of the United States in the theater of operations, and an authoritative basis for the instruction of the combined arms for war service."39 Over four years after the signing of the Armistice, the Army had finally distilled the wisdom of the Great War and placed "this most important training regulation" in the hands of its officers.40
D. Alcott, "A N ew Major General," Yankee Clipper (Mar 1937), 9.
33u.S. War Department, Memorandum For Record, Colonel E. L. Gruber, Acting WDGS G3, "Field Service Regulations," 4 Aug 1939, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
39Hugh A. Drum, "Annual Report of the Operations and Training Division, G-3, 1923-1924," TMs, p. 34, Entry #213, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
40william Lassiter, "Annual Report of the Operations and Training Division, G-3, 1922-1923," p.l7. CHAPTER III
CONFIRMING THE LESSONS OF THE PAST
The general principles governing combat remain unchanged in their essence. — General John J. Pershing^
Many Army leaders believed that the Great War had merely validated traditional American fighting concepts. Indeed, some insisted that little had changed; the war had only confirmed prewar practices despite its massive scale and the introduction of new tactics and equipment. American emphasis on combat principles, destruction of the enemy forces, offensive action, the human element in war, and the decisive role of infantry were fundamental characteristics of prewar doctrine. They not only survived the war, but grew in importance having stood the test of the greatest war in history. These features of prewar doctrine prominently appeared inField Service
Regulations 1923.
^U.S. Department of the Army, Historical Division, United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919 ,19 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), 2: 296. (hereafter cited as USAWW)
57 58
COMBAT PRINCIPLES
The existence of "immutable" principles of combat remained a central characteristic of Army doctrine during and after the war.2 Military analysts in the United States had concluded that the principles still applied in the stabilized warfare on the Western Front, even before the American forces entered the war. General Pershing, Commander of the American
Expeditionary Forces, was among them. He issued the following directive to govern the training of AEF units:
The general principles governing combat remain unchanged in their essence. This war has developed special features which involve special phases of training, but the fundamental ideas enunciated in our drill regulations, small arms firing manual, field service regulations and other service manuals remain the guide for both officers and soldiers and constitute the standard by which their efficiency is to be measured, except as modified in detail by instructions from these headquarters.3
Nothing that occurred during the remaining thirteen months of the war changed this conviction. After the war, Pershing reiterated this belief by quoting the same directive in his Final Report to the Secretary of War. A 1922
Army War College study reached the same conclusion. The committee
^The American military's acceptance of principles of war traces its roots to Jomini's influence on cadets at West Point. Today's familiar list of nine principles — objective, offense, security, surprise, mass, maneuver, economy of force, unity of command, and simplicity — did not appear until after the First World War. In the 19th and early 20th century. Army doctrine addressed the principles in lengthy paragraphs.
3USAWW, 2: 296. 59 reported, "American doctrines are sound regardless of the theater of operations; no radical changes recommended."^
The doctrine inField Service Regulations 1923 reflected these beliefs.
The World War had reinforced American convictions regarding the overall validity of the combat principles by demonstrating their applicability in both positional and maneuver warfare. General principles of combat had appeared in some form in previous editions ofField Service Regulations. In the new manual, however, they appeared in a simpler, more definitive form than ever before. Under the heading of "Combat: General Principles," short paragraphs addressed each of the principles. The new format reflected the trend toward a more scientific approach to warfare. Military planning and operations had become more predictable with the introduction of railroads, motor transport, more reliable weapons, and improved communications.
Movement tables, ballistics charts, fuel consumption rates, and ammunition resupply rates enabled war planners to forecast accurately requirements. The static nature of warfare on the Western Front also reduced the element of chance in combat. In keeping with the trend, many military theorists attempted to reduce the combat principles to their simplest form.5 In 1921, a list of principles appeared for the first time in Training Regulations 10-5,Basic
Principles, Doctrines, and Methods of Training. Students at Army schools
'^"Comparative Studies of Organization of the Armies of the United States, Japan, Great Britain, France and Pre-War Germany," Army War College G-3 Course 1922-23, Document #12, 27 Nov 1922, TMs, p. 21, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
^John 1. Alger, The Quest for Victory: The History of the Principles of War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), 183-89. 60
Studied the principles in detail. Lectures on the principles, routinely presented by Colonel William K. Naylor, Lieutenant Colonel Hjalmer
Erickson, and Major R. H. Kelley at service schools, received wide dissemination through Infantry Journal.^ The inclusion of the principles in
Field Service Regulations 1923 represented official endorsement of the concepts.
THE PRINCIPAL PRINCIPLES: OBJECTIVE AND OFFENSE
The principle of objective figured prominently in the American doctrine at all levels — strategic, operational, and tactical - before and after the war. The war had reinforced the American belief in an "unlimited" objective, one which targeted the opposing force, not a terrain feature or trench line. The Americans blamed the French and British failure to gain a decision prior to 1918 on their replacement of the "unlimited" objective of destroying the enemy forces with "limited" objectives. Limited objectives focused on the capture of terrain within range of artillery support. However, the depth of defensive lines usually exceeded the range of observed artillery fire. As a result, attackers either failed to break through the enemy position or lacked the ability to exploit a successful penetration. The Americans
*^Russell F. W eigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), 212-22; William K. Naylor, "Principles of War," Lecture delivered at The Army War College, 5 Jan 1922, Army War College Command Course 1921-1922, Document #12, TMs, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania; R. H. Kelley, "The Elements of War and the Application of Tactical Principles," Infantry Journal 19 (N ov 1921): 508-15; Hjalmer Erickson, "Doctrines and Principles of War," Infantry journal 20 (Jan 1922): 47- 55, William K. Naylor, "The Principles of War,"Infantry Journal 22 (Feb 1923): 144-162, (Mar 1923): 297-306, (Apr 1923): 416-25. 61 demonstrated the fallacy of limited objectives by pointing to the Somme offensive in 1916, in which the Allies penetrated only eight miles and failed to achieve a decisive victory at the cost of 300,000 lives and seven weeks of fighting. On the other hand, American officers believed that the German and
Allied operations in 1918 owed their success to the abandonment of limited objectives. Field Service Regulations 1923 displayed American confidence in this approach by flatly stating, "The ultimate objective of all military operations is the destruction of the enemy's armed forces by battle." This definition of the objective echoed past doctrine, butField Service Regulations
1923 magnified the statement by making it the first sentence of the chapter addressing combat operations. The 1914 version, in contrast, buried the discussion of the enemy's destruction in a subparagraph of the section covering pursuit operations.^
The attainment of such an objective demanded offensive action.
Emphasis on offensive action was a long-standing feature of American doctrine. All of the precedingField Service Regulations had stressed its importance in obtaining a decision in combat. The World War experience had only highlighted this fundamental tenet of American doctrine. Pershing had thought of no other form of combat. "The ultimate purpose of the
American army," he wrote, "is the decisive defeat of the enemy and not the
^U.S. War Department, Field Service Regulations 1923 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1924), 77. (hereafter cited as FSR 1923); U.S. War Department, Field Service Regulations 1914 (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1914), 95-97 (hereafter cited as FSR 1914); "Unlimited and Limited Objectives," Army War College Command Course 1924- 25, Document #48, 16 Mar 1925, TMs, pp. 13-18, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 62 mere passive result of the pure defensive. To realize this ultimate purpose it is essential that every officer and soldier of these forces be imbued with the offensive spirit."® He sought to inculcate that spirit in every aspect of training. He directed that "All instructions must contemplate the assumption of a vigorous offensive. This purpose will be emphasized in every phase of training until it becomes a settled habit of thought."^ After the war, the AEF Superior Board reported, "The present war has shown that it is only by the offensive that a decision can be reached, . . . ." Additionally, numerous service school lectures. Army War College committee reports, and articles in service journals emphasized offensive action as the key to decision in combat. The new manual continued the tradition.Field Service
Regulations 1923 stated that "decisive results are obtained only by the offensive" and that "the basis of training will be the attack." Even in the defense, the manual insisted that "the counterattack is the decisive element of defensive action."^0
OPEN WARFARE: OFFENSE "AMERICAN STYLE"
The key to victory, the Americans believed, came from offensive action through the successful application of "open warfare" tactics. Pershing
®John J. Pershing, "Instructions on Tactical Dispositions, 11 Jul 1918,"USA]N]N, 2: 521.
^John J. Pershing, "General Principles Governing the Training of Units of the American Expeditionary Forces," USAWW,2: 296.
^^FSR 1923, iii, 77, 102; General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Superior Board On Tactics and Organization, 27 Apr 1919," TMs, p. 20, Box 2205, Entry #23, Record Group 120, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 63 attributed the inability of the Allies to exploit success to their lack of training in such techniques. The Allies' trench warfare techniques overemphasized centralized control and lock-step operations. Pershing compared the two methods of combat;
From a tactical point of view, the method of combat in trench warfare presents a marked contrast to that employed in open warfare, and the attempt by assaulting infantry to use trench warfare methods in an open warfare combat will be successful only at great cost. Trench warfare is marked by uniform formations, the regulation of space and time by higher command down to the smallest details, absence of scouts preceding the first wave, fixed distances and intervals between units and individuals, voluminous orders, careful rehearsal, little initiative upon the part of the individual soldier. Open warfare is marked by scouts who precede the first wave, irregularity of formation, comparatively little regulation of space and time by the higher command, the greatest possible use of the infantry's own fire power to enable it to get forward, variable distances and intervals between units and individuals, use of every form of cover and accident of the ground during the advance, brief orders,and the greatest possible use of individual initiative by all troops engaged in the action.^^
Pershing noted that the lack of open warfare training repeatedly nullified
French and British successes. Their soldiers, having broken into the open, felt "nakedness andhelplessness." The British acknowledged the debilitating effects of too much time in the trenches:
Donald Smythe, Pershing: General of the Armies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 72-73; John J. Pershing, "Combat Instructions, 5 Sep 1918," USAW W , 2: 491.
12h . B. Fiske, "Final Report of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, 30 Jun 1919," USAWW, 14: 306. 64
[The soldiers] get out into the open and act as though they were suddenly thrust naked into the public view and didn't know what to do with themselves, as if something were radically wrong and that there ought to be another trench somewhere for them to get into.^3
Open warfare training corrected this deficiency. As a result, the Americans sought to minimize training in trench warfare and, instead, focused on training for a war of movement.
Their faith in the correctness of this approach held throughout the war and afterwards. In 1921, the General Service Schools distributed an instructional memorandum to explain the principles on which it based studies and instruction. The memorandum read, "The basis of instruction at these Schools will be open warfare situations. . . . The stabilized situations of the Western Front present special considerations which teach, only in restricted sense, modifications of the open warfare principles.Field
Service Regulations 1923 also focused on fighting under open warfare conditions. The manual did not ignore positional warfare, however. The teachings of the trenches echoed in its prescriptions for success in stabilized warfare: "The object of a major attack in a stabilized situation is to force the enemy into open ground with a view to his subsequent defeat by the methods of open w arfare."^5 Training for open warfare continued to be a central characteristic of American doctrine.
^^"Fnielligence Report," USAWW, 3:121.
^^General Service Schools, "Instruction Memorandum," Infantry journal 19 (Aug 1921): 189.
ISfSR 1923, 96. 65
THE HUMAN ELEMENT
The offensive spirit associated with open warfare was as important as its tactical advantages. The French and British experiences after 1914 convinced Pershing and many others that the defensive attitude represented by trench warfare and limited attacks was not only indecisive; it also eroded initiative and resourcefulness. Major General Robert L. Bullard, while III
Corps Commander, noted this tendency and urged limiting trench warfare training to "not more than two weeks at most" because it, "if prolonged beyond a very limited period, takes the offensive spirit out of the t r o o p s . " ^6
The Americans believed that success in war hinged on soldier morale.
The human element in war, man and his will to fight, continued to lie at the heart of American doctrine. Consideration of the human element was not a principle of war. But, human behavior defined the environment in which the commander applied the principles. The Americans, unlike the
British and French, had not witnessed the supposedly indomitable spirit of men crushed by enemy artillery, wire, and machine guns. They insisted that men and morale would overcome all obstacles. They also believed that
Americans were more resourceful, imaginative, aggressive, and willful than people of other nationalities. They believed that these national qualities made Americans better fighters. Individual initiative and resourcefulness, in particular, gave Americans an edge on the battlefield. "Yankee ingenuity"
16r. l. Bullard, "Memorandum for Chief of Staff, A.E.F., 22 Jul 1918," USAWW, 3: 341. 66 was a combat multiplier. This was nothing new; Field Service Regulations
1914 had stressed the need for initiative in combat stating:
Officers and men of all ranks and grades are given a certain independence in the execution of the tasks to which they are assigned and are expected to show initiative in meeting the different situations as they arise. Every individual, from the highest commander to the lowest private, must always remember that inaction and neglect of opportunities will warrant more severe censure than an error in the choice of means.
Tactics and training during the war sought to heighten these "innate"
American qualities of superior initiative and resourcefulness. Development of aggressive, self-reliant infantryman was a fundamental training goal.
Pershing, with the concurrence of most American officers, felt that Allied tactics and training did not contribute to attaining this goal and were thus
"not suited to American characteristics." Allied training plans, they believed, failed to take advantage of American vigor and vitality. Consequently, the
AEF gradually reduced the role of Allied instructors. By the middle of 1918,
Americans conducted nearly all of their own training.
After the war, the Americans attributed much of their tactical success to the high morale and superior individual fighting ability of the doughboys.
Although hand-to-hand combat was rare during the war, Americans argued that the doughboy's willingness to close with enemy and engage in personal combat was an important factor in American victories. The Infantry Board
FSR 1914,3. 67 insisted that it was the most important factor. The Board reported that "the requisite chiefly essential to success is the possession of an infantry imbued with the desire to close [with] the enemy." The Board added that "the human element... is still the most important factor and war is decided by man rather than a r m a m e n t . "^8 An Army War College committee tasked to analyze
American doctrine wrote of American methods of war, "The human element is considered the decisive one and all auxiliary methods, whether strategical, tactical, mechanical, or moral, will be used to bring about the physical encounter with bullet andb a y o n e t . " Lectures and articles in the service journals consistently highlighted the central role of man and morale on the battlefield. Major R. H. Kelley, lecturing to the Field Officers' Class at Fort
Benning, said, "In man, we have the essential human factor in war." Kelley added that "the most important factor dealing with man as considered from the military standpoint is the question of morale."20 Colonel Robert
McCleave taught students at the School of the Line that "moral force is the soul of battle" and that the only limit to advance is "the morale of the troops and that of their leaders."2l Field Service Regulations 1923 also emphasized
^ ^General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Infantry Board, 28 Apr 1919," TMs, p. 3, Box 2200, Entry #23, Record Group 120, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
^^"Doctrines and Methods of Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and the United States," Army War College G-3 Course 1923-24, Document #10, 30 Nov 1923, TMs, p. 1, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
20r. H. Kelley, "The Elements of War and the Application of Tactical Principles,"Infantry ]ournal 19 (Nov 1921): 508.
2i Robert McCleave, "Infantry: Its Role, Capabilities, Limitations and Relation to Other Arms," Infantry Journal 17 (Nov 1920): 442,447. 68 the importance of the human element. It reprinted the passage addressing initiative verbatim from the prewar edition. But the new manual added even greater emphasis by stating that "War is positive and requires positive action," that "All training should, therefore, aim to develop positive qualities of character rather than to encourage negative traits." In discussing the principal combat arm, the new manual stated, "Infantry fighting power rests upon the basis of morale."22
PRIMACY OF INFANTRY
No arm represented the human element on the battlefield better than the infantry. Prior to 1915, generals heavily relied on infantry to accomplish the critical task of placing superior fire at the decisive point. However, the importance of infantry firepower seemed to diminish in the face of the awesome growth in the destructive power of artillery and the introduction of new arms and weapons. The French, numbed by increasing casualty rates, chose to subordinate the infantry to the artillery — to let the artillery conquer and the infantry occupy contested land. The subordination of the infantry to the artillery was characteristic of the limited objective attacks employed by the
Allies between 1915 and 1917.23 This resulted in "the almost total elimination of the rifle as a weapon of offensive combat and a complete
22fSR 1923, iii, 11.
23ceneral Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Superior Board On Tactics and Organization, 27 Apr 1919," TMs, pp. 19-20. 69 neglect of rifle practice in training."24 The Americans strongly disagreed with these French practices. The removal of the infantry from the forefront and the subordination of the rifle to other weapons ran counter to American beliefs. In the American Army, infantry firepower still meant rifle firepower.
The Americans insisted that the rifle remain where it had always been, at the front and center of its doctrine.Field Service Regulations 1914 had described the infantry, men armed with rifle and bayonet, as "the principal and most important arm, which is charged with the main work on the field of battle and decides the final issue of combat."25 European warfare did nothing to change that strongly held view. The Americans believed that the inability of artillery to support an infantry attack throughout the depth of an enemy defensive position demanded that the infantry train to move under the cover of its own weapons. In spite of the abundance of new death-dealing devices, the infantry's principal weapon was still the rifle and bayonet. Pershing meant to keep it that way. The first page of every Division Program of
Training included the following paragraph:
The rifle and bayonet are the principal weapons of the Infantry soldier. He will be trained to high degree of skill as a marksman both on the target range and in field firing. An
24\v. H. Waldron, "The New Infantry Drill Regulations,"Infantry Journal 16 (1919): 375.
25fSR 1914, 74. 70
aggressive spirit must be developed until the soldier feels himself, as a bayonet fighter, invincible in battle.26
The American focus on marksmanship and bayonet skills anticipated the return to open warfare tactics where infantry fighting skills and superior morale would carry the victory. The AEF commanders and staff hammered the importance of marksmanship and bayonet skills from the fall of 1917 through every iteration of division training. After the smoke of battle had cleared, the doughboy with rifle and bayonet still stood at the front and center of the combat team. The AEF Superior Board could report that:
The infantry remains the predominant and basic arm. No offensive can be launched without infantry. Victory cannot be assured without an aggressive, highly trained, disciplined and intelligent infantry which possesses in the highest degree the qualities of combined and individual initiative, determination and resoluteness. The functions and decisive tasks of infantry in modern war demand that it be composed of the best personnel and material available and that every effort be made to foster in it a high state of morale and esprit de corps. The new infantry armament coupled with the difficulties of leadership and the hardships of prolonged and constant fighting makes the infantry the most difficult to train and to control in battle. The foregoing conclusions dictate that the infantry of an army must be recognized as the basic arm and all other arms must be organized and made subordinate to its needs, functions and methods. Any other conclusion must lead to a curtailment of the infantry's offensive power and therefore to a curtailment of the offensive capability of the a r m y .2 7
26pershing, "General Principles Governing the Training of Units of the American Expeditionary Forces," USAWW, 2: 296.
^^General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Superior Board On Tactics and Organization, 27 Apr 1919," TMs, p. 18. 71
A postwar War Department study also reported:
That man remains the fundamental instrument in battle and as such cannot be replaced by any imaginable instrument short of one more perfect than the human body including the human mind. That man in the bulk — meaning the greater portion of the armed forces — fights with greatest freedom of action and with greatest efficiency when on foot and not on horseback, in a tank, in an airplane, or in a fixed fortification; that to achieve decisive action he is best armed with the rifle and bayonet; that man is rendered least vulnerable when merely clothed against the weather and armored by his own agilities and a steel helmet.28
The study underlined the importance of infantry as the main force on the battlefield concluding "that infantry is the basic combatant arm upon whose success normally depends the success of the army."
In the postwar years, Americans continued to hail the infantryman with his rifle as the most important element on the battlefield. While the
Germans reorganized their squads around the automatic rifle, American infantry officers learned that the "rifle is the most important weapon in war and the automatic rifle merely augments the fire power of the squad." Tactics instructors condemned efforts to form special teams within the squad; such practices were "fundamentally in error."29 A rousingInfantry Journal article
^^Elbridge Colby, "Our Arm of the Service,"Infantry Journal 24 (Jan 1924): 5-6.
29R. H. Kelley, "The Elements of War and the Application of Tactical Principles,"Infantry journal 19 (N ov 1921): 513. The article by Colonel Robert McCleave, cited above, addresses the central role of infantry on the modern battlefield. The article is a reprint of a lecture that McCleave delivered to the School of the Line. 72 entitled "Queen of Infantry Weapons" expressed the opinion of most infantrymen of the day:
With the development of the automatic arms (the machine gun and the automatic rifle), the one-pounder accompanying gun, the light mortar, as well as the hand and rifle grenade, a number of officers and men of the military establishment to say nothing of the vast majority of the civilian population, consider the rifle and bayonet relegated to a secondary position among the Infantry weapons. So much time is necessarily devoted to these auxiliary arms that this impression is strengthened by the belief that high Army authorities hold the same opinion. Nothing could be further from the truth. The rifle and bayonet are still the dominant arms of the Infantry. 30
Field Service Regulations 1923 supported the writer's claim. The' manual stated that the infantry's "principal offensive weapon is the rifle and bayonet.
Its automatic weapons reinforce the firepower upon which the ability to advance depends;... ."3^
Principles of war, unlimited objectives, offensive action, the human element, and the primacy of the infantryman and his rifle characterized
American doctrine before, during, and after the war. American Army leaders remained unwaveringly committed to these concepts in spite of Allied insistence that they did not apply under conditions on the Western Front.
Americans attributed Allied failures to their abandonment of unlimited
30prancis A. Woolfey, "Queen of Infantry Weapons,"Infantry ]oiirnal 21 (Sep 1922): 308.
3: FSR 1923,12. 73 objectives, offensive action, and infantry riflery. Later, they contrasted the fruitless efforts of 1915-1917 with the decisive campaigns of 1918 to demonstrate the correctness of these concepts. The war had confirmed the superiority of these beliefs and their American expression in the practice of open w a r f a r e .32 American military leaders used the term "American doctrine" to describe collectively these concepts and practices. The school system, service journals, and postwar manuals reinforced these aspects of
Army doctrine. The School of the Line, for example, based its curriculum
"primarily on the recognized principles of open warfare which are accepted as the soundest preparation for w a r . " 3 3 The Army officially sanctioned
"American doctrine" with the inclusion of the concepts inField Service
Regulations 1923.
32h. B. Fiske, "Final Report of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, 30 Jun 1919," USAWW, 14: 314.
33ht. Col. Hugh A. Drum, "Annual Report of the Director of The School of the Line, 1919-1920," in Annual Report of Major General Charles H. Muir, Commandant of the General Service Schools, 1920 (Fort Leavenworth: The General Service Schools Press, 1920), 17. CHAPTER IV
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
The coordinating principle which underlies the employment of the combined arms is that the mission of the infantry is the general mission of the entire force. — Field Service Regulations 1923^
While Army leaders could insist that the general principles of combat and the theoretical system in which they operated remained valid, much had changed. The Army had to look to the future as it updated its tactical doctrine. Future war meant modern industrial war, and the Army knew it.
Major General John L. Hines, the Acting Chief of Staff at time of publication, introducedField Service Regulations 1923 by explaining the assumptions on which the General Staff based the doctrine. The Army wrote the doctrine
"from the viewpoint of a war against an opponent organized for war on modern principles and equipped with all the means of modern warfare" believing that "an Army capable of waging successful war under these conditions will prove adequate to any less grave emergency with which it m ay be confronted.A vigorous restatement of past doctrine would not suffice. The sheer magnitude of combat on the modern battlefield had
^U.S. War Department, Field Service Regulations 1923 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1924), iii. (hereafter referred to as FSR 1923).
ZPSR 1923,11.
74 75 rendered many of the methods of tactical application obsolete. New arms had emerged and required original doctrine to guide their employment. The added capabilities of the new arms changed the nature of combined arms operations. Moreover, the introduction of new weapons and technology had superseded the methods of the old, separate arms. Field Service Regulations
1923 was the first American doctrinal manual to address these problems of modern warfare. Field Service Regulations 1923 differed from previous editions in these and many other ways. The new manual doubled in size with the addition of material generated by the World War. In detail and sophistication.Field
Service Regulations 1923 had no equal in previous American military literature. Subjects formerly addressed in a few sentences or a short paragraph expanded to chapter-length. Combined arms operations, fire superiority, use of machine guns, artillery employment, night operations, and handling of casualties were among the subjects receiving expanded coverage.
Guidance for the use of tanks, aircraft, and gas made their debut in the new manual. It addressed meeting engagements, the attack and defense of fortified positions, attack and defense on a stabilized front, withdrawals, and delays. New chapters discussed combat in the woods and river crossing operations. Field Service Regulations 1923 had clearly shifted the focus of
Army doctrine from the Mexican border to the modern battlefield.
Field Service Regulations 1923 addressed the tactical organizations developed in the 1921 Tables of Organization. By doing so, the doctrine supported the Army's focus on preparing for the large war. The largest tactical organization discussed in the 1914 edition was the "army."Field 76
Service Regulations 1923 replaced the 1914 edition's "field army" with the
"corps" as an intermediate tactical organization between the division and the army, added the "group of armies" one echelon above army level, added a
"general headquarters" for command of all field forces, and a provided for a
"general headquarters r e s e r v e . The same postwar concern for large-scale conflicts that had influenced the Army's peacetime reorganization now surfaced in its doctrine.
OPERATIONS
The employment of combined arms was essential to victory on the battlefield. The combined arms now included infantry, artillery, cavalry, the signal corps, engineers, and the air service; use of combined arms no longer meant simply coordinating artillery fire with an infantry assault. Each arm played an important, sometimes decisive, role on the modern battlefield.
Field Service Regulations 1923 recognized this important fact and constantly stressed it. In fact, the manual's very purpose was to serve "as the basis of instruction of the combined arms for war service."4 In the chapter entitled
"The Combatant Arms," Field Service Regulations 1923 firmly established the rule of combined arms by unequivocally stating, "No one arm wins battles" and "The combined employment of all arms is essential to success."^
3fSR 1923,1-2.
4fSR 1923, iii.
5fSR 1923,11. 77
The nature of combined arms changed during the war. Combined arms teams rarely existed below division level prior to the twentieth century.
The Great War witnessed the creation of a battalion task force possessing its own heavy fire support and shock weapons. The meaning of combined arms operations evolved from the coordinated action of separate arms to include employment of an integrated combined arms team.
The new manual's emphasis on the use of combined arms remained consistent throughout the succeeding sections prescribing doctrine for the conduct of combat operations. The guides for action for every type of operation stressed the mutually supporting relationship between the arms.
For example, no section was complete without a description of potential uses of aircraft in accomplishing the mission. It also routinely mentioned the use of engineers and signal personnel. But, most of all.Field Service Regulations
1923 underlined the critical nature of coordination between the infantry and artillery. It addressed the use of artillery in almost every paragraph of the combat operations sections.
The importance of combined arms operations, especially infantry- artillery teamwork, was one of the great lessons of the World War. Artillery support was so important that, by the end of 1917, the French would not attack without it. The AEF deemed teaching infantry-artillery cooperation so important that a "first-rate infantry battalion" served full-time at the Army 78
Artillery School.^ No subject received more extensive coverage in AEF publications than infantry-artillery teamwork.
The coordinated action of the other arms and auxiliary weapons was also essential to success. An infantry battalion could swell from 600 riflemen to 1200 soldiers with the addition of Stokes mortars, 37mm guns, machine guns, accompanying artillery, tanks, and gas troops. Those augmentations and the frequent need to coordinate with supporting air units made the need for close relationships between the arms obvious.^ The Superior Board, with the full support of both the Artillery and Infantry Boards, reported:
We have been shown repeatedly during this war how indispensable it is to have close cooperation between the combat arms. To the lack of cooperation many tragic incidents are to be ascribed. Cooperation is assured only where it has become a habit. It becomes a habit only when the arms are continually associated together in practice and when personal acquaintance and mutual confidence have been established. It is impossible for a complex machine to work unless its parts are adjusted and oiled and duly controlled. The Infantry and artillery which are to work together in combat must train together and must live together to the greatest extent possible. Similarly the cavalry and horse artillery and the aeronautics and artillery must be very closely associated. For this reason our troops should be grouped in training areas, so that personal acquaintance may be established, so that combined action may be frequently practiced, and so that superior officers may learn how to handle the combined arms. Each arm requires separately the elements of its technique; but
B. Fiske, "Training in the American Expeditionary Forces," TMs, p. 5, Box 3, Entry #11, Record Group 200, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
^Paul B. Malone, "The Need of an Infantry School,"Infantry Journal 16 (Nov 1919): 357. 79
the adaptation of technique to battle conditions can be assured only by means of tactical exercises of the combined arms.8
After the war. Army leaders pushed for the establishment of an infantry school at which all of the arms and services could station units for combined arms training. Maneuver exercises, conducted by the Infantry
School during the summer of 1923, demonstrated the Army's commitment to combined arms training. The troop lists included infantry, cavalry, tanks, aircraft, artillery, engineers, and chemical warfare troops. Every situation offered the use of the combined arms to solve the tactical problem. In addition to the usual attack and defense scenarios, the exercises included night operations, the use of smoke and tear gas, and bridging operations.9
The infantry's lead in the effort is not surprising since it remained the core of the combined arms team. A lecturer at the School of the Line aptly described the role of infantry:
The air service gains information, stops the arrival of reserves, and uses direct actions against ground troops. The cavalry secures the flanks and acts as a mobile reserve. The artillery batters and holds down the opposing fire both of infantry and artillery; the tanks open the passage through obstacles, and demoralize the opposition, often entirely supplanting artillery preparation, but cannot occupy and hold terrain without immediate infantry assistance; the chemical warfare branch screens the movement, assisted by the use of gas and special shells, but in the final analysis the object is common
® General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Superior Board On Tactics and Organization, 27 Apr 1919," TMs, p. 36, Box 2205, Entry #23, Record Group 120, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
^"Infantry School Maneuvers,"Infantry Journal 23 (Jul 1923): 36-38. 80
to all, to assist in the forward infantry movement, which alone is decisive.'^^
Field Service Regulations 1923 clearly established the importance of the combined arms over any separate arm. Yet, it bestowed upon the infantry the position of first among equals by stating, "The coordinating principle which underlies the employment of the combined arms is that the mission of the infantry is the general mission of the entire force."
INFANTRY
The infantry remained the primary arm, yet its tactics, organization, and armament had changed dramatically. The doctrine prescribed in the prewar infantry drill regulations was wholly inadequate for combat on the
Western Front and needed immediate change. The authorsInfantry of Drill
Regulations 1911 could not have easily imagined the European battlefields of
1914-1918. The regulations still prescribed massing of soldiers to achieve fire superiority and deployment of troops in a single line. However, the increased firepower of modern weapons and the strength of trenchworks demanded infantry formations of greater depth, more distance between individual soldiers, better use of terrain, and the employment of new weapons and equipment in order to breach the enemy defenses without excessive casualties. The AEF adopted all of these and more new measures. General
19Robert McCleave, "Infantry: Its Role, Capabilities, Limitations and Relation to Other Arms," Infantry Journal 17 (Nov 1920): 444. llfieM Service Regulations 1923, 11. 81
Headquarters, AEF, issued "Notes on Recent Operations," memoranda, and combat instructions to supplement the drill regulations. ^2 The updated regulations expanded coverage to address the use of infantry auxiliary weapons, such as the tank and accompanying gun. It explained the use of scouts for locating machine guns and movement under cover of fire from supporting infantrymen. Pershing summarized the new infantry tactics:
. . . , the German machine guns constitute the chief weapon to be combated by our infantry. The platoon commander must oppose them by fire from his rifles, his automatics and his rifle grenades, and must close with their crews under cover of this fire and of ground beyond their flanks. The battalion commander, in addition to the weapons of the platoon, has his machine guns, one-pounder, light mortars and accompanying field piece. The battalion commander who makes the most intelligent use of the combined fire of these weapons and of the ground will lose the fewest men.^^
Shortly after the Armistice, the AEF published a revised edition of the infantry drill regulations. The AEF Infantry Board found it "practically the unanimous opinion that the Provisional Infantry Drill Regulations of the
A.E.F. fully interpret and embody the tactical developments of the war insofar as they pertain to infantry."The War Department approved the AEF
^2h . B. Fiske, "Training in the American Expeditionary Forces," TMs, p. 38, Box 3, Entry #11, Record Group 200, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
^^John J. Pershing, "Combat Instructions, 5 Sep 1918," USAWW, 2: 493.
^^General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Infantry Board, 28 Apr 1919," TMs, p. 5, Box 2200, Entry #23, Record Group 120, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 82 regulations for Army-wide use and republished the manual asInfantry Drill
Regulations (Provisional) 1919
The infantry had, indeed, retained its central position among the combat arms, but "infantry" had taken on a new meaning. The infantry of
1914 was a formation of riflemen. In contrast, the infantry of 1918 included riflemen, automatic riflemen, machine gunners, grenadiers, mortarmen, and
37mm gunners. Field Service Regulations 1923 reflected the change, specifying that:
Infantry is essentially the arm of close combat. This role rather than the nature of its armament distinguishes the infantry as a combatant arm. The armament of infantry is adapted to the execution of its mission as the arm of close combat. ^6
Despite the best efforts of die-hard infantrymen to protect the sanctity of the rifle and bayonet,^ ^ victory on the modern battlefield demanded more firepower than men armed only with rifles could produce. The rifle had to share the spotlight with machine guns and automatic rifles.
H. Waldron, "The New Infantry Drill Regulations,"Infantry Journal 16 (1919): 374-76.
^^Field Service Regulations 1923, 11.
^^See Elbridge Colby, "Our Arm of the Service," Infantry Journal 24 (Jan 1924): 4-8, for a defense of the bayonet's importance in the World War. 83
MACHINE GUNS
Machine guns changed American infantry doctrine more than any other weapons. Prior to the war, the machine gun had existed as an often- neglected specialty weapon. The development of the weapon and doctrine for its use lagged far behind othera r m i e s . ^8 The first mention of its use in the
Field Service Regulations did not occur until 1910. The 1914 edition still referred to it as an "emergency weapon" whose "effective use will be for short periods of time."^^ The lamentation of a division machine gun officer during the war highlighted Field Service Regulations 1 9 1 4's inadequacy. The officer wrote that "a request was made on Langres for the latest information and instructions on open warfare, and we were informed that nothing better than our Field Service Regulations had been issued on the subject, and yet as excellent as this publication is, it did not contain the information sought, i.e., the employment of machine guns in modern warfare."20 The scarcity of the guns highlighted their minor role in American tactical doctrine prior to the war. In 1912, the Army only allotted four machine guns for each infantry regiment. By 1919, the regimental allocation had jumped to 336 guns.2^
^®For a discussion of the Army's struggle to develop the machinegun prior to the World War, see David A. Armstrong, Bullets and Bureaucrats: The Machinegun and the United States Army, 1862-1916 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982).
Field Service Regulations 1914, 79.
20c. A. Dravo, "Machine Guns: The Offensive in Open Warfare," Infantry Journal 17 (Oct 1920): 322. Major Dravo was the Division Machine Gun Officer for the 42nd Division.
^^Infantry Journal 16 (1919): 305. 84
The machine gun dominated close combat in the First World War.
The World War I-vintage machine gun was a heavy weapon; it required the use of a cart or pack mule to move all but very short distances. The Army employed the weapon in two ways. The guns either accompanied the assault battalions to provide direct fire support or they remained grouped under central control to provide massed barrages of small arms fire as part of a machine gun “prep." In either case, effective machine gunnery demanded quality training in the technical and tactical employment of the gun. The
AEF established machine gun schools at army and corps level to ensure proper instruction. Even with schools to provide uniform doctrine and training, American lack of experience with the weapons sparked great debates over the correct methods of training, organization, and tactical control of machine guns.
Some officers, particularly those who had attended machine gun schools and commanded machine gun units, believed that centralization ensured uniform, quality training and expert tactical employment of gun crews. The tendency to divide machine gun units among the infantry battalions resulted in generally poor use of the weapons. Most officers simply lacked the knowledge of the weapon's capabilities and limitations to use it to best advantage. As a result, machine gun commanders frequently received no orders, assaulting force commanders missed opportunities to employ large-scale barrage fires in support of the attack, or they assigned gun crews the wasteful task of assaulting with the leading elements. To correct these deficiencies, many of the machine gun officers recommended the establishment of a separate machine gun corps, arguing that the gun was 85 neither an infantry nor artillery weapon, but something in between which demanded special handling. They pointed to the example of the British,
Canadians, Italians, and Germans, citing the increased effectiveness of their guns as a result of centralized control.22
Most officers viewed the machine gun as an infantry weapon that belonged under the decentralized control of the infantry commander. They believed that creation of a separate machine gun corps would hinder rather than promote close cooperation between infantry and machine guns.
The majority report of the AEF Machine Gun Board stated:
Technique would be favored by segregation of the machine gunners; tactics would suffer. Excellent technique is worthless without good tactics. Tactics takes much longer to acquire, and is much more important than technique. The most difficult part of machine gun tactics deals with the close support of rifle companies and is largely a matter of intimate acquaintance and team play. The required team of machine gunners and riflemen can be produced only by continual work and association together.23
The AEF Machine Gun, Infantry, and Superior Boards opposed the formation of a separate machine gun corps. The Superior Board further recommended the permanent assignment of a machine gun company to each infantry
22General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Minority Report of the Machine Gun Board, 29 May 1919," TMs, p. 11, Box 2203, Entry #23, Record Group 120, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; J. S. Switzer, "Concerning Machine Guns," Infantry Journal 16 (1920): 571-79.
23ceneral Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Machine Gun Board, 29 May 1919," TMs, p. 16, Box 2203, Entry #23, Record Group 120, National Archives, Washington, D.C. Brigadier General H. B. Fiske chaired the Machine Gun Board. Fiske's close association with training and doctrine as the AEF G-5 continued after the war when he served as Chief of the Training Branch and Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 on the War Department General Staff. 86 battalion. The Board found "the machine guns form a very essential part of the organization nor can we conceive of a situation that will not include m achine g u n s." 2 4 General Pershing strongly endorsed these findings in forwarding the Superior Board report:
The question . . . is simply whether or not the machine gun is an infantry weapon. If the machine gun is not an infantry weapon but is to be used principally in barrage fire and by indirect laying then the machine gun should be confined to the artillery which is best fitted by its other training to handle fire of that character. The truth is that the machine gun is purely an infantry weapon, its principal use is to supplement or replace infantry fire, and every infantryman must be trained in its use. The machine gun will be employed in most cases in immediate connection with the infantry and therefore under the battalion commander and he must accordingly be thoroughly trained in its employment. To be successfully used, and not forgotten, by the battalion commander the machine gun company must be a constituent part of the infantry battalion which, it can not be too often repeated, is the real combat unit.25 (underlined by Pershing)
The debate over the proper role, organization, and tactics of the machine gun continued after the war in the pages of service journals and at the schools. The majority view prevailed despite compelling and insistent
^^General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Superior Board On Tactics and Organization, 27 Apr 1919," TMs, pp. 26-27.
^^General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Forwarding Report of the Superior Board On Tactics and Organization, 16 Jun 1920," TMs, pp. 5-6, Box 2205, Entry #23, Record Group 120, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 87
arguments presented by machine gunofficers.26 The machine gun company
became an organic part of the infantry battalion and the Infantry School
absorbed responsibility for machine gun training and doctrine. The Infantry
School did not neglect the weapon. In its officer training courses, no subject
except tactics received more attention than machine guns. The School
devoted nearly twice as much time to machine gun instruction as to rifle
marksmanship training, the next largest block of instruction.^^
Drill regulations formalized tactics developed during the war but with
notable preference for direct fire support of infantry rather than use of barrage
concentrations. Although the battalion commander now owned the guns,
the machine gun company commander employed them. The commander
supported the infantry companies by assigning missions to his platoons, not
by transfering command of the platoons to the infantry captain. The doctrine
^^Infantry Journal covered the debate in numerous articles published between 1919 and 1925. Every volume contained an article addressing machine guns or automatic rifles. See Charles G. Morton, "Machine Guns," 16 (1919): 360-61; J. S. Switzer, "Concerning Machine Guns," 16 (1920): 571-79; Walter C. Short, "Machine Guns of an Infantry Division," 17 (Sep 1920): 261-63; C. A. Dravo, "Machine Guns: The Offensive in Open Warfare," 17 (Oct 1920): 319-29; J. A. Doe, "Infantry Machine Guns: The Attack," 17 (Dec 1920): 546-55; Jennings C. Wise, "Machine Guns," 19 (Oct 1921): 385-87; O. D. Moore, "Reminiscences of a Machine Gunner," 21 (Jul 1922): 26-29; Owen R. Meredith, "If Not, Why Not!" 21 (Oct 1922): 419-21. Machine gun officers and members of machine gun units wrote most of the articles supporting the establishment of a separate machine gun corps.
^^"The Infantry School," Infantry Journal 21 (Dec 1922): 635-37. The Company Officers' Course allocated 308 hours for tactics, 150 for machine guns, and 101 for rifle marksmanship out of a total of 1084 hours of instruction. The Advanced Course allocated 518 hours for tactics, 135 for machine guns, and 50 for rifle marksmanship out of a total of 1084 hours of instruction. For both courses, the Infantry School allotted 285 hours of machine gun instruction compared to 151 for rifle marksmanship training. 88 characteristically expected platoon leaders to exercise initiative in the employment of the guns.28
Field Service Regulations 1923 reflected the views of Pershing, the AEF
Boards, and the schools by not separately addressing machine guns as it had done in previous editions of the manual. The absence of a separate section dedicated to machine guns in no way diminished their importance in Army doctrine. The machine gun was no longer a specialty weapon, but an integral part of the infantry armament. References to the machine gun stand out in the paragraphs addressing fire superiority. In the combat operations sections of the new manual, machine guns appeared on every other page.
Significantly, Field Service Regulations 1923 designated automatic weapons in the defense "the most powerful weapons of the holding elements which make possible the action of the counterattack."29 Automatic weapons clearly occupied an important niche in the infantry armament and, at least in the defense, seriously challenged the supremacy of the rifle and bayonet.
28Donald D. Hay, "Machine Guns in Attack,"Infantry Journal 18 (Apr 1921): 333-41. Major Hay based the article on the postwar infantry battalion organized at war strength as taught at the Infantry School.
^^Field Service Regulations 1923, 12, 84-85, 88-113. The Field Service Regulations addresses combat operations in the sections entitled "The Offensive," "Pursuit," "The Defensive," "Withdrawal from Action," and "Delaying Action." 89
TANKS
The machine gun affected infantry doctrine in other ways too. Its use by the Germans was so effective that the AEF Infantry Board called it "the greatest obstacle to the successful offense today."30 The report continued:
Fire superiority can no longer be gained by thickening the firing line as formerly, because of the casualties that would result therefrom under modern fire conditions. This superiority must, therefore, be gained by the use of automatic and auxiliary weapons. The necessary fire superiority can be so obtained without increasing the number of men exposed to the hostile fire, the fire of the enemy can be kept down and our own infantry can advance and close with the enemy.31
Still, wider and deeper infantry formations, better use of terrain, improved rifle fire, and new movement techniques could not break a well-planned defense. Nor could artillery crush the defender; the heaviest artillery bombardments routinely failed to destroy all of the machine gun nests.
Furthermore, machine guns were not very effective against other machine guns. To defeat the machine gun, the Allies introduced the tank and the accompanying gun.
The AEF formed the Tank Corps within weeks of arriving in France.
The Corps went into battle with both heavy and light tanks supplied by the
Allies. The Americans used heavy tanks to forge a path through enemy defensive work, cross trenches, and cover the following assault waves. The
30General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Infantry Board, 28 Apr 1919," TMs, p. 4.
31 General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Superior Board On Tactics and Organization, 27 Apr 1919," TMs, p. 21. 90 heavy tanks, operating in platoons of three, usually followed within one hundred yards of a rolling barrage. Light tanks, slightly ahead of the infantry, attacked bypassed enemy machine guns and punched additional holes in the wire obstacles. The light tanks remained in close contact with the infantry until they secured the initial objectives. Then, with assistance of accompanying engineers, they crossed the trenches and resumed the attack.32
The functions of tanks were "to make a path through obstacles for the infantry and protect it from destructive loss from machine guns." Even the most ardent supporters of the new weapons realized that the use of the tank in any other role was beyond its operational capabilities at the time. While the Chief of the Tank Corps, Brigadier General Samuel D. Rockenbach, often said that "tanks can take anything," in the same breath he added "but they can hold nothing." That over forty percent of the Western Front was unsuitable for tank operations further limited their use. The tank's greatest shortcoming, however, was its mechanical unreliability. During the St.
Mihiel offensive, the American force lost only two tanks to enemy fire; ditching and mechanical failures accounted for the remaining thirty-six losses. Rockenbach wrote, "From the 15th to the 30th of October, out of two battalions, six companies of light tanks, we could operate only one."33 The heavy tanks were even more prone to engine failure. Tanks performed well on several occasions, but on balance they produced mixed results. Notably,
32Samuel D. Rockenbach, "Tanks and Their Cooperation with Other Arms," Infantry Journal 16 (1919-20): 533-45, 662-73; Timothy K. Nenninger, "The Development of American Armor, 1917- 1940" (M.A. thesis. University of Wisconsin, 1968), 46.
33Rockenbach, "Tanks and Their Cooperation with Other Arms," 536, 538, 540-43. 91
the AEF Infantry Board did not mention tanks in its report. The Superior
Board report stated the opinion of most American Army officers at the end of
the war:
The tank should be recognized as an infantry supporting and accompanying weapon incapable of independent decisive action. The infantry must accompany or follow the tank, otherwise no ground will be held. There is no such thing as an independent tank attack.^4
Armored forces failed to emerge as an independent arm in the post war Army. Largely as a result of AEF officers arguing that they were best utilized in support of the traditional arms, tanks remained under the control of the infantry. While this partially explains the slow development of armored doctrine in the United States, better reasons existed. First and foremost, budget limitations prevented experimentation on a meaningful scale. Second, the Army's primary concerns were training civilian components and maintaining the readiness of the scattered Regular units.
Planners found few applications for tanks of the World War vintage in these roles. Third, the American experience in the World War did not reveal great virtue in the use of tanks. American Expeditionary Forces operations included the use of tanks on occasion, but often produced disappointing results. Furthermore, AEF commanders did not appreciate the tank's potential as a means of reducing casualties as much as their foreign counterparts because American losses did not compare with those of France,
^^General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Superior Board On Tactics and Organization, 27 Apr 1919," TMs, p. 30. 92
Great Britain and Germany. This realization on the part of the European army leaders partially explains their assumption of the lead in the development of armored doctrine during the interwar period.35
While the development of armored forces probably would have progressed more rapidly if Congress had retained its status as an independent arm, the American Army did not ignore the tank. Like the Air Service, the tanks had vocal advocates who foresaw wondrous uses for the new machines.
Chief among them were Rockenbach, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Bradley C.
Chynoweth, and George S. Patton, Jr., most of whom were charter members of the Tank Corps. However, few of these men remained closely associated with tank development after the war. They realized that the current state of technology required tying tanks to supporting arms. Nevertheless, all of these supporters published articles anticipating the use of future tanks in the pursuit, for advance and rear guard operations, at night, and to conduct tactical and strategic raids. Like all of the proponents of new weapons, they argued for a separate corps because, Patton wrote, "the tank corps grafted on infantry, cavalry, artillery, or engineers, will be like the third leg to a duck — worthless for control, for combat impotent."36
The Army kept the tank alive, but barely. The tank forces consisted of two light battalions, one heavy battalion, two maintenance companies, and
^^Russell F. Weigley, "The Interwar Army, 1919-1941," in Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History From Colonial Times to Present, ed. Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1986), 261.
^^Rockenbach, "Tanks and Their Cooperation with Other Arms," 670-73; George S. Patton, Jr., "Tanks in Future Wars," Infantry Journal 16 (1920): 960-62. 93 the Tank School. The infantry division gained a light tank company over the strenuous objections of many officers.37 Experimentation with mechanization and motorization continued after the war at Camp Meade,
Maryland and Fort Benning, Georgia. In fact, the Ordnance Department's top priority was the development of a medium tank which combined the maneuverability of a light tank with the armament and armor protection of a heavy tank.38 The Army determined that the weight limitations and dimensions of American highways, bridges, tunnels, and railcars prohibited the development of a tank weighing more than fifteen tons, wider than eight- feet four inches, or longer than nineteen feet.39Infantry Journal frequently addressed the use of tanks publishing several forward-lookingarticles.^0 And of fifty-nine studies conducted by the Infantry after 1920, nine related to tanks
37"Development of Organization," Army War College G-3 Course 1923-24, Document #7,26 Nov 1923, TMs, pp. 7-9, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania; "Comparative Studies of Organization of the Armies of the United States, Japan, Great Britain, France, and Pre-War Germany," Army War College G-3 Course 1922-23, Document #12, 27 Nov 1922, TMs, p. 18, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
38u.S. War Department, "Excerpts From the Annual Report of the Chief of Ordnance" in Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1922 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1922), 252.
39samuel D. Rockenbach, "Weight and Dimensions of Tanks," 21 (Jul 1922): 36; Dwight D. Eisenhower, "A Tank Discussion," 17 (N ov 1920): 456.
^^In addition to those previously cited, the following articles appeared inInfantry Journal between 1920 and 1923: Isaac Gill, Jr., "Value of Tanks in Action," 18 (Mar 1921): 248-50; B. C. Chynoweth, "Tank Infantry," 18 (May 1921): 504-507; "Mechanical Transport," 18 (Jun 1921): 561-65; Samuel D. Rockenbach, "A Visit to the Infantry Tank Center, Franklin Cantonment, Camp Meade, Md.," 18 (Apr 1921): 367-70; "Tanks at Cambrai," 20 (Jun 1922): 623-29. Infantry journal also frequently discusses tanks in its "Varied Ground" and "Notes from the Chief of Infantry" sections. 94 or their employment.'^^ Despite the strident efforts of a few far-sighted enthusiasts and the general recognition of the tank’s potential, development continued to focus solely on its role as an infantry auxiliary. Consequently, tank doctrine stagnated.
In 1922, the Infantry School had still not decided on a mission for tanks. The "best thought to date" continued to limit tank employment to situations "where the terrain is practicable for their use and where their assistance is necessary to facilitate the uninterrupted and economical advance of riflemen in attack." The school envisioned the independent use of tanks to exploit success and in rear guard actions. The tank required speed, a large cruising radius, and adequate ammunition supply, all of which it lacked, to accomplish these m i s s i o n s . As late as 1924, instructors reminded Army
War College students that "the tank is a new weapon and the principles of its employment depend so much on the ever-changing mechanical improvements that it is believed to be unwise to dogmatize at present on a definite tactical employment in battle." The War College instructors summarized the principles for tank employment as follow:
1) Reinforce the main blow
2) Attack on a broad front
3) Attack sim ultaneously
4) Attack in depth
U.S. War Department, "Excerpts From the Annual Report of the Chief of Infantry," in Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1921 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1921), 229.
'^^"Notes from the Chief of Infantry," Infantry Journal 20 (May 1922): 560. 95
5) Use surprise
6) Close cooperation with infantry
7) Coordinate for artillery and air support
8) Attack with infantry that can advance
9) Attack on suitable terrain
These principles, sound for tanks in the assault, demonstrated the Army's limited uses for the armored weapons. The use of tanks as part of far-ranging, independent armored forces as envisioned by the enthusiasts did not appear in the main stream of Army doctrine.43 Postwar tank doctrine remained tied to World War experiences for direction.
Field Service Regulations 1923 addressed tanks as an infantry support weapon. Echoing the findings of the AEF Boards and the majority of opinions regarding their use.Field Service Regulations 1923 stated:
The tank constitutes an armored infantry element possessing protective properties that enable it to close with intrenched defensive groups protected against the effects of ordinary infantry fire. Its essential mission is to assist in the progression of infantry by overcoming or neutralizing resistances or breaking down obstacles that check the infantry advance.44
A. McAndrew, "The Employment of Tanks in Combat by the Higher Command," General Remarks delivered at The Army War College in conjunction with Map Exercise No. 1, Army War College Command Course 1923-24, Document #11, Military History Research Collection, Military History Research Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
44fSR 1923, 13. 96
The manual stressed the tank's role as an assault weapon, its vulnerability to
artillery fire, and its limited radius of action. Interestingly, the combat
operations sections mentioned defensive measures against hostile tanks
more often than they prescribed doctrine for use of friendly tanks. The
general principles of tank employment written in theField Service
Regulations and taught in the service schools differed little from those
deduced by other a r m i e s . 4 5 The use of armored forces to conduct deep
penetrations did not evolve in any country until later in the interwar period.
Considering the mixed performances of tanks during the war and their still
crude state of development in the early twenties, the doctrine Fieldin Service
Regulations 1923 was sound.^^
ACCOMPANYING GUNS47
Accompanying guns provided a more reliable and familiar means of
dealing with machine guns and bunkers than tanks. The Allies employed the
45see Von Jugenieur R. Kruger, "Tanks in the World War," trans. William E. Lucas, Jr.,Infantry Journal 23 (1923): 408, for the German list of principles for tank employment.
^^For further discussion of tanks in the interwar period, see Timothy K. Nenninger, "The Development of American Armor, 1917-1940," Armor 78 (Jan-Feb 1969): 46-51, (Mar-Apr 1969): 34-38, (May-Jun 1969): 33-39, (Sep-Oct 1969): 45-49.
'^^Wartime literature often referred to all three auxiliary weapons — the mortar, 37mm gun, and 75mm gun — as accompanying guns. But, because the mortar and 37mm gun always served with the infantry and infantrymen operated them, they became known more frequently as infantry weapons . The 75mm gun, on the other hand, was detached from the division artillery for support of the infantry as required. The term "accompanying gun" eventually referred to 75mm gun alone. 97
Stokes mortar, 37mm gun, and 75mm gun in this role.48 The Stokes mortar fired a three-inch high-explosive round at high angles for use against targets such as machine gun nests, bunkers, trenches, and reverse slopes. The 37mm and 75mm guns used direct fire to attack targets such as firing ports of machine gun nests, walls, and tanks. Americans had not trained with any of these weapons prior to the war.
The need for increased firepower was undeniable, but the solutions offered by the accompanying guns did not completely satisfy American officers. The 75mm gun especially failed to impress reviewers. The comparatively large and unwieldy artillery piece could not keep pace with the infantrymen on many occasions. Additionally, its great visibility quickly drew fire which often killed the transport animals and left the gun to be manhandled by the crew. The gun weighed too much for men alone to move it across an obstacle-laden battlefield. Or as one infantry commander wrote, ".
. . the 75 is too large a gun, too visible, too heavy, and above all too valuable to be wasted by attempting progress over ground which a man on foot has difficulty enough in getting across."^9
The Stokes mortar performed only slightly better and far from well enough to justify its retention. The AEF Superior Board recommended
^®Sources sometimes called the 37mm gun a "one-pounder" and referred to the 75mm gun as a "three-incher."
^^General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Superior Board On Tactics and Organization, 27 Apr 1919," TMs, pp. 23-24; General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Infantry Board, 28 Apr 1919," TMs, pp. 15-17; Frank Parker, "Certain Observations on Infantry," TMs, n.p.. Box 8, Entry #11, Record Group 200, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; A. J. Dougherty, "Accompanying Gun," Infantry Journal 17 (Nov 1920): 488. 98
discarding the Stokes mortar for many reasons: lack of mobility, difficulty of
ammunition supply, inaccuracy, limited range, and difficulty of concealment.
The Army retained the Stokes mortar after the war only because it lacked a reasonable substitute.^O
The 37mm gun performed reasonably well. Called "a most excellent adjunct to the infantry" and "a most excellent accessory weapon of the battalion of infantry," both the Superior and Infantry Boards recommended its retention. The Superior Board recommended increasing the quantity of guns in the regiment from three to six.51 Various models of the 37mm gun remained the standard antitank weapons during the interwar years. Larger weapons and more effective weapons, such as 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles, did not replace the 37mm gun until well into the Second World War.
The ideal was an "infantry howitzer" that combined the properties of both the 37mm gun and the Stokes mortar. The Infantry Board had recommended the development of a single gun to simplify infantry armament. The only significant change was the proposal to increase the size of the projectile from one to five pounds. The Army developed nothing to replace the 37mm gun before the Second World War despite the recognition of its great value. Nevertheless, the gun had earned a place in the infantry
^^General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Superior Board On Tactics and Organization, 27 Apr 1919," TMs, pp. 23-24; General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Infantry Board, 28 Apr 1919," TMs, pp. 15-17; Parker, 13.
General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Superior Board On Tactics and Organization, 27 Apr 1919," TMs, pp. 23-24; General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Infantry Board, 28 Apr 1919," TMs, pp. 15-17; Parker, 13. 99
armament by virtue of its performance during the w a r . 5 2 Field Service
Regulations 1923's mention of the "infantry cannon" almost as frequently as it addressed machine guns demonstrated the prominence of the new gun in
American doctrine.
ARTILLERY
The World War witnessed a quantum increase in the destructive power and use of artillery fire. The AEF Superior Board reported, "In the number of guns, absolute and relative, in the number of different calibers, in the proportions of heavy and very heavy guns, in the number and types of ammunition and in the expenditure of ammunition we have reached figures unheard of before inw a r ."53 In 1914, no combatant possessed more than seven guns per one thousand rifles. In 1917, supporting the attack with three times as many tubes was common.
From well-prepared positions, machine gun and artillery fire could easily break an infantry attack. Attempts to intensify the attack by adding more troops to the assault waves only resulted in greater slaughter. The first solution to these difficulties was an increase in duration and weight of the artillery preparation and the use of a "rolling barrage" to escort infantry to within fighting distance of the enemy. Both types of fires required close
53por an interesting discussion of the accompanying gun's development, a comparison of the performances of the principal accompanying guns, and suggestions for improving the gun, see Franklin T. Burt, "The Accompanying Gun,"Infantry Journal 16 (1920): 834-40.
53Ceneral Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Superior Board On Tactics and Organization, 27 Apr 1919," TMs, p. 33. 100
cooperation between the supporting artillery and the infantry assault units.
Location and duration of the preparation, types of shells used, rate and extent of the rolling barrage, and the infantry scheme of maneuver were among the
critical elements of information required by infantry and artillery commanders. These tactical developments enabled the infantry to achieve local successes. Yet, after three years of ever-increasing artillery bombardments and steadily improving rolling barrages, neither side could achieve decisive results.
The organization of the German defenses posed new problems for the
Allies. The defenses forced attackers beyond the range of their artillery support before they encountered the main defensive belt. Forward-deployed machine gun nests raked attackers from all directions as they progressed toward the main defenses. Clearing the machine gun nests consumed both time and men. Exhausted by the fighting, burdened with casualties, and without friendly artillery support, the attackers faced counterattacks, infantry fires from the main position, and defensive artilleryf i r e s . 5 4 The success of the attack at this point depended on enemy weaknesses, the infantryman's skill in open warfare and, most importantly, the ability to provide alternate means of supporting fires. The development of the forementioned infantry auxiliary weapons resulted from the need to fill this gap. At the end of the war, the artillery still could not provide continuous fire support.
^'^See Timothy Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Combat Studies Institute, 1981) for an in-depth discussion of German defensive tactics. 101
Two problems prevented the artillery from accomplishing this mission: 1) lack of adequate means of communications and 2) lack of mobility. Every report, questionnaire response, and interview stressed the need for better cooperation between the artillery and infantry. Many went as far as recommending permanent cohabitation of infantry and its supporting artillery personnel. Most of the recommendations simply extended methods practiced during the war. The AEF Superior Board and the Hero Board^^ called for more and better training of staff officers, more liaison personnel, and more combined arms exercises.^^ The crux of the problem, however, was the lack of a reliable, portable radio to link forward observers with the guns.
Telephone wire was too susceptible to damage and slow to install to meet the needs of rapidly advancing forces. The Superior Board wrote.
When artillery is passed from stabilization to movement in this war, one of its greatest lacks was a fully organized system of observation and quick communication adapted to the new conditions. . . . Communication by radio must be employed to a large extent. Aeroplane assistance is most essential and its value
^^The three most important boards of officers convened to study artillery problems were the Hero, Lassiter, and Westervelt Boards, each named after the general officer who chaired it. The Hero Board met in December 1918 to study the experience gained by the artillery of the AEF. It corresponds to the AEF boards convened to investigate the organization and tactics of the other arms and services although it preceded them by several months. The Westervelt Board met in May 1919 to study artillery ammunition, transportation, and armament. The Lassitier Board met in July 1919 to test and evaluate motorization of divisional artillery.
^^General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Superior Board On Tactics and Organization, 27 Apr 1919," TMs, p. 36, 61; Chief of Artillery, A.E.F., "Report of the Hero Board, 9 Dec 1918," TMs, pp. 27-28, 35, Box 2194, Entry #23, Record Group 120, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 102
will be very greatly enhanced with the successful development of radio telephony.57
The Hero Board also emphasized the criticality of communications. It recommended doubling the size of the communications section and greatly increasing the amount of signal equipment's
Although communication was crucial for effective fire support, the most impo’’:ant requirement was mobility. If the guns were beyond supporting distance of the troops, good communication was of little use.
Artillerymen quickly grasped the importance of mobility despite their lack of training with motorized artillery. The deficit was so great that, upon arrival in France, the "most urgent problem" facing heavy artillerymen was learning to operate an autom obile.59 By the end of the war, the AEF had completely motorized all artillery except for the 75mm guns.^O
The Field Artillery continued experimenting with motorization, using tractors after the World War. Unlike the cavalry, artillerymen preferred mechanical transportation to the horse. The experience of the war had shown that animal-drawn transport could not support a breakthrough; the animals died of sheer exhaustion trying to keep pace with the advancing
5^Ceneral Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Superior Board On Tactics and Organization, 27 Apr 1919," TMs, p. 41.
58chief of Artillery, A.E.F., "Report of the Hero Board, 9 Dec 1918," TMs, p. 22.
59Ernest Hinds, "Final Report of the Chief of Artillery," USAWW, 15: 181.
•’^General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Superior Board On Tactics and Organization, 27 Apr 1919," TMs, p. 42. 103
troops. Tractors, on the other hand, "were employed almost continuously . . .
in bad weather, night and day, and stood the test very well." The Lassiter Board, chaired by the Third Army's Chief of Artillery, Major General William
Lassiter, tested tractor-drawn artillery in June 1919. The Board recommended motorizing the 155mm howitzer regiment and one of the two 75mm gun regiments in the division and that the other regiment should be motorized as soon as possible. The Superior Board also found that "tractors could do practically all that the horse could have done and more" but was unsure of its capability to operate in unimproved country.61 The Board's report stated:
If we could state that all our future campaigns would be in a country like Europe or the well-inhabited parts of the United States, we would probably soon be able to agree to give up the horse in favor of the motor for the 75's as well as the heavy artillery, it being evident that, by modifications and developments, now well within reach, the motor equipment now available can be adapted to meet the conditions of warfare in a country having good roads. The adaptability of the motor to countries like Mexico is, however, not yet fully established. In order to carry on development, and to satisfy ourselves as to the limitations on motorization, it is recommended that one 75mm regiment in each brigade of divisional artillery be motorized and that the other remain horse drawn for thep r e s e n t . ^ 2
General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Superior Board On Tactics and Organization, 27 Apr 1919," TMs, p. 43; General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Westervelt Board, 5 May 1919," TMs, pp. 40-44, Box 2194, Entry #23, Record Group 120, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Lassiter Board, 2 Jul 1919," TMs, pp. 12-15, Box 2194, Entry #23, Record Group 120, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
^^General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Superior Board On Tactics and Organization, 27 Apr 1919," TMs, p. 43. 104
The Army retained the horse-drawn artillery but continued to experiment with tractors. By 1922, financial limitations had forced the abandonment of experimentation with tractors for divisional artillery although interest in its future development remained keen.
The Westervelt Board, or Caliber Board, studied the technical aspects of the guns used during the War. The board, chaired by Major General William
I. Westervelt, concluded that American armament was unsatisfactory and required replacement by an entirely new system. The board recommended a gun-howitzer mix in each of three classes — light, medium, and heavy. Each class would then have a flat-trajectory and high-angle fire capability. The light class would support the infantry attack at division level while the medium and heavy classes would provide deep fires against enemy lines of communications and second echelon forces. The revised American doctrine reflected the Westervelt Board's recommendations for organization.
Field Service Regulations 1923 contained thorough guidance for the employment of artillery in every operation. In fact, artillery fire support received more coverage than any other single subject in the manual. The flexibility, accuracy, power, and steadily increasing mobility of artillery made it the "principal means of attack against material objectives", "a powerful means of influencing the course of combat after the infantry has been committed to action," and "the most effective means of defeating the enemy's attempts to reorganize his forces for their movement in retreat."63 Field
Service Regulations 1923 grouped the many artillery weapons developed
63fSR 1 9 2 314,101. , 105 during the war into light, medium, and heavy artillery categories and distributed them to the division, corps, and echelons above corps. The manual used the modern terms "direct support" and "general support" to define artillery missions and relationships between the infantry commander and the supporting artillery.64 This seemingly simple addition to the manual spoke volumes for the Army's advancement in infantry-artillery coordination. Field Service Regulations 1923 also recognized the still unsolved difficulties of communicating artillery fire support needs in a war of movement. The manual insisted that:
The artillery must employ all means at its disposal (observers, liaison detachments, artillery airplanes, lines of signal communication to infantry units, etc.) to obtain exact information relative to the situation of the infantry; infantry must cooperate by employing all its means of transmitting information to the artillery (display of panels, flares, various means of signal communication, etc.).65
The World War experience may have confirmed American belief in the primacy of infantry, but the idea of infantry operating without artillery support had disappeared. Artillery had earned an equal partnership with the infantry; the "King" and the "Queen" reigned together.Field Service
Regulations 1923, in recognition of this partnership, elevated the artillery to a position of new importance in American doctrine.
64fSR 1923, 83.
65 f s R 1923, 94. 106
CAVALRY
The new techniques and tactics evolved during the First World War did little to change American cavalry doctrine. In fact, many cavalrymen argued that the lessons of the war only confirmed the correctness of
American practices. Unlike its European counterparts, American cavalry had emphasized firepower over shock action for several decades prior to the Great
War. The American cavalryman's principal weapon was the rifle; the
European's was the lance. American horse soldiers usually dismounted to fire rifles or carbines at the enemy; European cavalrymen charged with drawn sabres. So, when the increased lethality of new weapons rendered the cavalry charge obsolete, American cavalrymen felt vindicated.66 The stabilized front in the west limited the use of cavalry in its other traditional roles such as screening and guarding the main body of troops during movement. The cavalry had fewer opportunities than the other arms to adapt its methods to modern combat. In fact, only one of the Army's seventeen cavalry regiments deployed to Europe and it saw little action. As a result, the war experience provided little impetus to change the ways of horsemen. The lack of a reliable vehicle with cross-country mobility equal to that of the horse further justified American claims that few changes in doctrine were necessary. The caterpillar tractor was slow, unreliable, and limited to relatively open terrain.
Trucks were road-bound. A reserve force of truck-transported infantry, the
Cavalry Board submitted, could not react as quickly as cavalry on the
^•^General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Superior Board On Tactics and Organization, 27 Apr 1919," TMs, pp. 64-65. 107 battlefield because of the delays they would face on the congested road networks. In open warfare such as that seen on the Eastern Front and in
Palestine, cavalry played a significant role. Cavalrymen were quick to chronicle the successes of their arm during the war and no experience received more attention than the operations of General Allenby's Desert
M ounted Corps.The Chief of Cavalry, Major General W. A. Holbrook, cited the success of Allenby's light horsemen as "brilliant and conclusive proof" of the ability to extend cavalry operations. Notably, Allenby's successes were the exceptions during the war. Still, the Chief insisted that "there is more use for cavalry than ever before in modern war." In any case, cavalry's tactical mobility still made it the best arm for security of open flanks, close reconnaissance, pursuit, and reserve missions.^^ Some changes were necessary, however. The Superior Board concluded that:
The mounted combat of large bodies of Cavalry is probably a thing of the past. While still possible against mounted units, modern machinery of war has become so effective, and the use of obstacles so general, that the masses affording large targets would be destroyed by fire action before they could reach their objective. Small units, however, perhaps up to a squadron, will still have opportunities for mounted action, especially against
^^The "Annual Reports of the Chief of Cavalry" and numerous service journal articles defend the retention of horse cavalry with accounts of its successful use during the war. See Elbridge Colby, "Cavalry in the Recent War,"Infantry Journal 16 (Jun 1919): 26-37
^^General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Cavalry Board, 24 Apr 1919," TMs, pp. 33-41, Box 2197, Entry #23, Record Group 120, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 108
troops that are shaken by fire or are disorganized and in retreat. Instant decision is of utmost importance in such cases.69
Both the Superior and Cavalry Boards stressed the value of cavalry's unique ability to combine mobility and firepower. Each recommended increasing the cavalry’s firepower with the addition of automatic rifles, machine guns, and horse artillery. They stressed future training in dismounted tactics, close coordination with the air service, and the abolition of training for close order sabre charge.^0 The Superior Board found that "dismounted fire action is now the most important battle action of cavalry and should be frequently practiced.It concluded that "with heightened mobility, increased fire power, and under command of alert, vigorous and enthusiastic officers, it can look forward to the opportunities of the future with confidence." ^2
The cavalry stood to gain the most from the war's technological advancements. Mobility and firepower, the fundamental attributes of cavalry, had each increased dramatically by the end of the war. It was only a
^^General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Superior Board On Tactics and Organization, 27 Apr 1919," TMs, p. 67.
^Oceneral Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Cavalry Board, 24 Apr 1919," TMs, pp. 6-7. Interestingly, the Superior Board recommended retention of the saber even though two-thirds of the respondents to the Cavalry Board's questionnaire wanted to discard it. Many cavalrymen equated the psychological value of sabre to that of the infantryman's bayonet. It represented the willingness to close with the enemy and engage in the ultimate combat — hand- to-hand.
21 General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Superior Board On Tactics and Organization, 27 Apr 1919," TMs, pp. 73-74.
220eneral Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Superior Board On Tactics and Organization, 27 Apr 1919," TMs, p. 78. 109 matter of time before scientists and engineers successfully integrated the two into a single machine. But rather than aggressively seeking more efficient means of accomplishing cavalry missions through the use of new technology, the horse soldiers stubbornly defended the utility of their four-legged partners. Out of over 250 articles appearing in Cavalry Journal betw een 1915 and 1925, five addressed motorization of cavalry, one briefly discussed chemical warfare, three explored the relationship between the air service and cavalry, and another three articles covered the employment of machine guns.
Most of the two hundred remaining articles focused on horses, horsemanship, care of horses, endurance rides, polo competitions, and the exploits of cavalrymen throughout history. An article extolling the virtues of cavalry, entitled "Is It Not Treason to Cry Down the Horse," exemplified the arm's apparent attitude towardprogress.^3
Although cavalry operations continued to play an important role in
American doctrine, the day of the horse was passing. The air service assumed responsibility for distant reconnaissance and motor transport, though still primitive, threatened the horse's monopoly on tactical battlefield mobility.
Trucks were already superior for road transport of troops and equipment for distances of over one hundred kilometers and tractors were rapidly improving as a means of cross-country transportation. Procuring, training, equipping, and maintaining horses and horsemen were expensive and time-
^^The article appeared in Cavalry Journal 28 (Apr 1918): 569. A brief review of the table of contents in any number of Cavalry Journal published from 1917-1925 (volumes 28-34) demonstrates preference for horse stories. no
consum ing activities/^ The fragility and expense of the mounted arm made it inappropriate for combat on a battlefield where the expenditure of large quantities of men and material was rapidly becoming a prerequisite for victory.
Field Service Regulations 1923 did not much change the role of cavalry.
Cavalry forces still reconnoitered, screened, and guarded. It attacked on occasion, but that was rarely its primary mission. Field Service Regulations
1923 did, however, reflect the decline of horse cavalry. The chapters previously dominated by horse cavalry, those addressing reconnaissance and security, added extensive guidance for the use of aircraft and motor vehicles to accomplish cavalry tasks. The manual frequently mentioned augmentation of the cavalry with armored cars and infantry in motor trucks.
Field Service Regulations 1923 only mentioned cavalry in the last sentence of the section which addressed reserve forces; the doctrine formerly treated the horse cavalry as the principal reserve. As a result of the cavalry's vulnerability to attack when operating in large bodies, the Field Service
Regulations suggested that it operate at night and in small units, which further decreased its employability as a combat force. Like infantry, the role of cavalry remained the same, but "cavalry" no longer referred to the horse- mounted soldiers alone.
^^General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Superior Board On Tactics and Organization, 27 Apr 1919," TMs, pp. 66-67. I l l
AIR SERVICE
The vast potential of air power was obvious to all. Aircraft developed so rapidly during the war "that the lessons learned in one season were hardly available in time for use in the nexh"75 The Commander-in-Chief underlined the importance of the war in the skies by creating a separate Air
Service within weeks of the AEF's arrival in France. The Air Service saw extensive action and quickly increased American understanding of the arm's capabilities. By the end of the war, the Air Service had used aircraft to perform all of the modern missions: pursuit, attack, bombardment, and observation. The airplane's contributions to the war effort and its potential for further development led to the creation of a separate, permanent Air
Service under the Reorganization Act of 1920.
The airplane's range, mobility, firepower, and ability to move in the vertical dimension enabled commanders to strike rapidly anywhere on the battlefield and see deep behind enemy lines. The air service assumed many of the tasks formerly performed by cavalry. Additionally, its powers of observation and communication provided invaluable aid to command posts, infantry, and artillery. The Air Service had become a full-fledged member of the combined arms team by war's end.
Field Service Regulations 1923, addressing the Air Service as a combatant arm for the first time, covered air operations in detail. It described each of the major air missions which evolved during the war. Field Service
^^General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Superior Board On Tactics and Organization, 27 Apr 1919," TMs, p. 80. 112
Regulations 1923 correctly identified pursuit aviation as "the most vital element of the air service." The mission of pursuit aviation was "to establish and maintain aerial supremacy" by defeating the hostile air forces. Lack of air superiority hindered the accomplishment of the other missions both on the ground and in the air. Without mastery of the air, enemy counterbattery fire could neutralize an attack, higher commanders lost contact with (and hence control of) forward troops, and friendly artillery could not support the attack with observed f i r e . ^ 6 The last point was critical as observed artillery fire had become a decisive factor in combat.^^ Attack aviation targeted enemy ground troops, bombardment aviation bombed targets beyond the range of artillery, and observation aviation provided visual and photographic reports on enemy dispositions and activities. Throughout the section addressing the air service, the Field Service Regulations 1923 stressed the close relationship between the air and ground forces.^8
The Army Air Service took an early lead in developing a close relationship between air and ground forces in the immediate postwar years.
General "Billy" Mitchell was among the strongest advocates of a separate attack aviation organization dedicated to support of the ground troops. His
"Provisional Manual of Operations of Air Units," written just after the war, specifically addressed employment of attack squadrons and insisted that these
^^General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Aviation Project for the U.S. Army in France, 19 Jun 1917," TMs, Exhibit C, Box 2194, Entry #23, Record Group 120, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
^^Ceneral Headquarters, A.E.F., "Aviation Project for the U.S. Army in France, 19 Jun 1917."
78fSR 19 2 3 ,21-24. 113 formations only support "decisive infantry actions." General Mitchell based his prescriptions for employment of attack air on the American experiences in the reduction of the Saint Mihiel salient and on a captured German document on "The Employment of Battle Flights." The theory of dedicated attack air, known as close air support in modern terminology, led to the creation of the 3rd Attack Group in 1921, the first unit in the world organized specifically for ground s u p p o r t . ^ 9
The role of bombardment aviation later became a hotly-debated topic among the air power enthusiasts and the Army leadership. The "strategic" bombing concepts developed by the Royal Air Force's Hugh Trenchard influenced many American aviators, most notably "Billy" Mitchell. Their arguments for a separate air force capable of destroying an enemy’s will to fight using massive bombing strikes ran counter to the main doctrinal trend in the U.S. Army. The AEF Superior Board had determined that attack aviation was "more efficacious and decisive than distant bombing operations and should receive the greatest attention." The report went on to state:
Nothing so far brought out in the war show that Aerial activities can be carried on, independently of ground troops, to such an extent as to materially affect the conduct of the war as a whole. It is possible, perhaps, that future wars may develop aerial forces of far greater extent than those provided in this war. It is safe to assume that Air forces will not be developed for war purposes to such an extent as to largely supplant ground and water forces, until such a proportion of the people become air- faring as now are known as sea-faring people. In other words.
^^Lee Kennett, "Developments to 1939," in Case Studies in the Development of Close Air S u p p o rt, ed. Benjamin Franklin Cooling (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990), 42-43. 114
aerial activity must bear much the same relation to the commercial life of the nation as at present sea-faring activities bear to public trade and commerce. . . . and [in combat involving both ground and air forces] Aviation must continue to be one of the auxiliaries of the principal arm, the Infantry. For the present, all questions of Air tactics. Air strategy and employment of Aviation must be governed by the well known and established principles of military art. Superior officers must be so thoroughly well grounded in the fundamentals of war that this important auxiliary will be used always in pursuance of the paramount object.SO
Despite the loud cries to make bombardment aviation a separate, "strategic" bombing force, the official doctrine in 1923 unequivocally stated that "its effort is concentrated to render the greatest assistance possible to the main attack."8l An Army War College study, entitled "Fundamental Principles for the Employment of the Air Service," reiterated the majority view. The report stated that "the fundamental doctrine of the Air Service is to aid the ground forces in the accomplishment of their mission." The report added, "While strategical bombardment does not involve direct cooperation with ground troops it is always so employed, as an integral part of the broad plans of operation of the military force, as to have a direct bearing on theirsuccess."®^
®^General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Superior Board On Tactics and Organization, 27 Apr 1919," TMs, pp. 81-82.
1923, 23.
"Fundamental Principles for the Employment of the Air Service," Army War College Command Course 1924-25, Document #36, 2 Mar 1925, TMs, pp. 2-5, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The chairman of the committee which authored the report was Maj. C. C. McCornack, a former member of the Field Service Regulations Board at the General Service Schools. Only two weeks earlier than the presentation of the committee's paper, Maj. Cen. Mason M. Patrick had delivered a lecture on 115
The Army had correctly defined the role of air power in the immediate postwar years. The state of the art did not support the claims of the aviation enthusiasts. Clearly, the potential for vast expansion of air power existed and warranted further development. But, the purpose of the Field Service
Regulations was to address current capabilities, not future warfare. Field
Service Regulations 1923 reflected the lessons of the war and demonstrable capabilities of the aircraft in limiting its air forces to the support of the ground forces.
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE
The United States Army's gained its first antiaircraft warfare experiences during World War I. The American Expeditionary Forces immediately recognized the need for an antiaircraft capability and charged Brigadier General James A. Shipton with organizing the force. Brigadier
General Shipton, a Coast Artillery officer, formed a composite organization consisting of artillery guns, machineguns, and searchlights. The Army gave the mission to the Coast Artillery because it was the branch most familiar with firing large caliber weapons at moving targets. The Coast Artillery did not control all of the Antiaircraft Service assets, however. The Coast Artillery manned the guns, but the Infantry manned the machineguns and Engineers manned the searchlights. Borrowing from French and British practices, the Americans quickly achieved proficiency and emerged with a notable gunnery
the future of the Air Service in which he predicted an independent air force along the lines of that proposed by Billy Mitchell. 116 record. Despite the Antiaircraft Service's outstanding performance, it did not survive as a separate organization after the First World War.83
The Army was aware of the growing importance of protecting itself against air attack. In its 1920 reorganization recommendation. General
March's Special Committee included an antiaircraft artillery regiment within each corps and an antiaircraft artillery brigade within each army and in
General Headquarters Reserve. The regiment kept its World War I composite structure of one gun battalion and one machinegun battalion. The Coast
Artillery, under the vigorous leadership of Major General Frank W. Coe, retained control of antiaircraft artillery after the war despite challenges from the Air Service and the Navy for the mission. Major General Coe decentralized control of the few existing antiaircraft defense assets by distributing the weapons to each of the corps area commands and overseas departments.84
The Army's antiaircraft armament included guns, machineguns, and searchlights. At the close of the war, the Army had 159 three-inch antiaircraft artillery guns dispersed at various sites in the continental United States and overseas. By 1920, it had increased mobility by added fifty-one 75mm truck- mounted guns and 117 trailer-mounted three-inch guns. The weapons were effective against contemporary aircraft despite having a number of limitations. The 75mm gun was less effective than the three-inch gun
83Bryon E. Greenwald, "The Development of Antiaircraft Artillery Organization, Doctrine, and Technology In the United States Army, 1919-1941," (MA thesis, Ohio State University, 1991), 8-36.
84creenwald, 41-84. 117 because it was unstable, difficult to put into operation, and lacked mobility on rough roads. It also had poor firing characteristics to include the inability to traverse a full circle, limited elevation, and a low muzzle velocity which gave it a range of less than 20,000 feet. The mobile three-inch gun was unsteady and the trailer frequently broke during cross-country movement. The fixed mount three-inch gun was the best of the three weapons, but was still slow to fire. The .50 caliber machinegun and searchlight complemented the artillery guns.85
The mission of the antiaircraft artillery prescribed inField Service
Regulations 1923 was to reinforce the the fires of ground units with priority to engaging targets beyond the range of the supported unit'sw e a p o n s . 86
Divisional units provided their own antiaircraft fires. The doctrine reflected the lack of a mobile weapons system and the satisfactory capability of units to protect themselves against contemporary aircraft. The balanced would shift in favor of the aircraft shortly after the war, but not before the Army published the Field Service Regulations. Still, in 1924, the Army's antiaircraft defense doctrine and armament were effective.
CHEMICAL WARFARE
The Chief of the Gas Service's appeal for increasing the scope of gas warfare was never far from the minds of defense planners during and after the war. The Chief had written in May, 1918;
85Greenwald, 41-84.
86fSR 1923,17-22. 118
From information furnished by the great battles now waging, one fact stands out unmistakably clear. Except through overwhelming superiority in other directions, the war will be won by gas. Victory will be achieved by the side which plans with the greatest thoroughness and executes with the greatest skill its offensive and defensive gas program. The enormous scale on which the enemy has utilized gas in his well planned attacks, and the remarkable success in retaking within a few days positions which the Allies obtained at enormous sacrifice and after months of exertion, leave no doubt as to the present importance of gas warfare and the certainty of its continued rapid development. The development of gas methods has been more recent and more rapid than that of aviation and, like aviation, has produced fundamental changes in the art of war. A year ago gas was still in the experimental stage, and it was employed only sporadically for the sake of local tactical gains. It is now used by the enemy as an essential part of every offensive and is a weapon of coordinate importance with high explosive. There can be no doubt that the successes achieved by the enemy in his present drive have been due to the intelligent and well coordinated employment of gas and smoke.87
Americans quickly learned to how to fight with chemicals. In a few months, they progressed from preoccupation with survival measures, such as masking and wear of protective clothing, to employment of chemicals in the attack. The American forces extensively used gas, white phosphorus, and smoke at St. Mihiel and during the Meuse-Argonne offensive. Artillery, mortars, aerial bombs, and grenades carried phosgene, chlorine, mustard gas, incendiary materials, and smoke to the enemy. Artillery was the principal means of delivery, however. By the end of the war, gas shells comprised half
®^General Headquarters, A.E.F., "Report of the Chemical Warfare Board, 19 May 1919," TMs, App. 7, Box 2198, Entry #23, Record Group 120, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 119 of the artillery munitions on both sides.88 The war demonstrated the seemingly unlimited potential for the use of chemicals on the battlefield.
The alarming effectiveness of gas against an unprepared opponent convinced Army organizers to retain the Chemical Warfare Service after the
Armistice. Chemical warfare training assumed new importance in the postwar years. The War Department ordered the Chemical Warfare Service to instruct "the entire Army in the use of smoke and incendiary materials, nontoxic gas, and gas-defense appliances." The Army established the
Chemical Warfare School early in 1920 and detailed branch personnel to instruct at the general and special service schools. The Chemical Warfare
Service organized special gas troops for instruction at the Chemical Warfare
School and for demonstrations. It stationed one company of the First Gas
Regiment at Fort Benning, Georgia, where it could "develop the tactical use of
Chemical Warfare troops with Infantry in battle and assist the Infantry in experimental work in new chemical warfare developments."89 Additionally, corps and division staffs received chemical warfare officers to plan and supervise chemical defense training.
Army doctrine did not limit tactical uses of chemical agents. It planned for the employment of gas in all operations. Tacticians recognized the
88Amos A. Fries, "Chemical Warfare Service," Infantry fournal 21 (N ov 1922): 524-34. Brigadier General Fries was the Chief of the the Chemical Warfare Service.
89u.S. War Department, "Excerpts From the Annual Report of the Chief of Chemical Warfare Service," in Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1921 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1921), 219-21; U.S. War Department, "Excerpts From the Annual Report of the Chief of Chemical Warfare Service," in Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1922 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1922), 278. 120 potential value of smoke and incendiary materials in both the attack and defense. The Chemical Warfare Service advocated the use of smoke for concealment for infantry and tanks, as a feint, and to fool the enemy into donning restrictive chemical protective equipment. White phosphorus, a material capable of both screening and burning, also impressed the Chemical
W arfare Service.^O
Field Service Regulations 1923 expertly addressed the use of gas and smoke in a separate section of the chapter on combat. The manual matter-of- factly discussed the employment of gas warfare in offensive and defensive operations, its effect on friendly and enemy troops, the effects of weather and terrain, and means of delivery. The thorough knowledge of chemical warfare contained in the regulations reflected the recent experience with man's only large-scale use of gas on the battlefield. The decisive potential for gas in future war demanded its inclusion in Army doctrine even though treaties had outlawed its use. In hisFinal Report, Pershing wrote, "Whether or not gas will be employed in future wars is a matter of conjecture, but the effect is so deadly to the unprepared that we can never afford to neglect the question."9i His words still ring true.
As the Army looked to the future, it drew from its recent combat experience to ensure its fighting methods reflected the trends of modern
^^U.S. War Department, "Excerpts From the Annual Report of the Chief of Chemical Warfare Service," in Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1922 285; , Fries, "The Chemical Warfare Service," 665-75.
^^John J. Pershing, "Final Report of General John J. Pershing, 1 Sep 1919,"USAWW, 12; 60. 121 warfare. The doctrine embodied inField Service Regulations 1923 rev ealed that the Army had developed sound tactical practices based on the current capabilities of the arms. The manual emphasized the importance of combined arms operations on an increasingly complex and lethal battlefield.
It recognized that no arm by itself could defeat the growing array of weapons and tactics. The new manual continued to stress the primacy of infantry in the combined arms team, but it also recognized that infantry had changed.
Infantry armament now included all weapons of close combat — tanks, mortars, accompanying guns, and machine guns. Tanks of that time were incapable of independent action and therefore, remained infantry auxiliary weapons. Field Service Regulations 1923 conceded that the rifle and bayonet was the infantry's principaloffensive weapon. However, it advised building the defense around machine guns. Guidance for the use of artillery support occupied as much of the manual as guidance for the employment of infantry.
Indeed, no section of the manual was complete without a discussion of artillery support. Field Service Regulations 1923 addressed traditional cavalry missions, but acknowledged the superiority of aircraft and motor vehicles for many of the long range missions. Air doctrine focused on the direct support of ground troops by first obtaining air superiority over the battlefield and then assisting the ground commander. Although some air enthusiasts insisted on a greater role for strategic bombardment, the doctrine inField Service
Regulations 1923 placed a low priority on bombing unless it directly assisted the ground element. Lastly, the new manual's detailed and knowledgeable prescriptions for the conduct of chemical operations demonstrated the
Army's healthy respect for the terrible new kind of warfare. In summary, the 122
Army's postwar studies of organization and tactics accurately reflected the state of the warfare and contributed to the development of sound doctrine in the immediate postwar years. CHAPTER V
THE RISE OF ARMY DOCTRINE
In the aftermath of the First World War, American defense planners adjusted military policy to meet new security requirements and integrate new capabilities. American lack of preparedness to fight a modern war was at the top of the list of shortcomings revealed by the war. On Armistice Day, the United States had still not reached its full mobilization production capacity and heavily relied on the Allies for material support. Now, isolationism and the protective ocean barriers no longer guaranteed peace nor time to mobilize in the event of war. Modern war required rapid and total mobilization of manpower and industry. In addition to a mobilization capability, the United
States required some form of full-time military force to secure its borders and overseas possessions. Protection of American interests in the Philippines,
Panama Canal, China, the Caribbean, and along the border with Mexico demanded a military presence. The National Defense Act of 1920 addressed both of these concerns. It authorized a small Regular Army for immediate, short-term, small-scale military action and a large citizen Army which the nation could rapidly mobilize for major commitments. The Act also delineated responsibilities for economic and industrial mobilization to arm, equip, transport, feed, and clothe the mass army.
The National Defense Act reorganized the Army by authorizing a force of nine combat-ready Regular divisions with the mission of immediate
123 124 availability for fighting small wars. The force was also available to assist in the training of civilian components, the National Guard and Reserve, which were available in case of large-scale conflict. The National Defense Act of
1920, in effect, provided a force capable of fighting both the small and large wars — the three-component Army of the United States. The policy not only met the nation's security requirements but created a defense establishment which supported traditional American reliance on citizen soldiers rather than a large, standing army.
The drive for economy in government took a heavy toll on the Army's plan for the implementation of National Defense Act of 1920. Congressional budget appropriations limited the size of the Regular Army to less than half of its authorized strength. The War Department could not man Regular units at full-strength and provide Regulars to train the citizen components.
The decision to man skeletonized units rather than a small, full-strength, combat-ready force demonstrated the War Department's greater concern for rapidly mobilizing the citizen army for a major war.
After the passage of the National Defense Act, the War Department modified its wartime organizations and doctrine to accommodate the national military policy and the lessons of the war. The Army had completed some of its work prior to the enactment of the legislation. While Congress and the War Department deliberated national defense policy, the Army had concurrently evaluated its organization and tactics in view of its recent war experience. General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces conducted some of the most important studies. The findings of AEF boards figured prominently in Army decisions concerning postwar organization and tactical 125
doctrine. The War Department, too, had studied organizational and doctrinal
issues. To reconcile the many findings and recommendations generated by
the various studies, the Chief of Staff appointed the Special Committee to
address Army organizational issues and charged the War Plans Division with
the clarification and unification of doctrine. The resulting organizations and
tactical doctrine were remarkably sound.
The division, corps, and army structures prescribed by the 1921 Tables
of Organization provided an optimal mix of firepower and maneuverability.
The new division retained the "square" organization to preserve its striking
power and its ability to sustain combat operations. But, the Army improved
the division's mobility by reducing its size by one-third. The division
included machine guns, tanks, aircraft, mobile artillery and significantly
increased the number of motor vehicles in the support units. The corps and
army absorbed the units not required for routine division operations, nearly
all of which were motorized. The Army standardized these organizations in
all three components thereby enhancing interoperability and facilitating
mobilization and training. The result was a force structure easily mobilized
for operations ranging from division-level security operations to large-scale
commitments and capable of conducting operations in either positional or
open warfare environments. The new organizations supported the national
military policy and incorporated the tactical lessons learned on the Western
Front.
Reports from European battlefields had prompted American military
leaders to review Army doctrine even before it had entered the war.
Throughout the war, they remained convinced that the American approach 126 to war was fundamentally correct. Neither the applicability of the combat principles nor the central role of man on the battlefield had changed despite the greatly increased impact of technology. They recognized that the tactics involved in applying the principles had changed, however. During the war, countless notes, pamphlets, instruction booklets, and interim manuals flooded unit headquarters as the War Department and the AEF constantly strove to update American fighting methods. Study of the war intensified after the armistice as soldiers rushed to record their observations while memories remained vivid. American officers generally agreed with the tactical lessons discerned by the AEF boards. The boards' findings provided the basis for much of the doctrine which later appeared inField Service
Regulations 1923. The task of the Field Service Regulation's authors was to refine and package the doctrine rather than conduct an entirely new study.
Inefficient bureaucracy and disagreement over the nature of some material covered in the draft manual delayed publication, not debate over the doctrine itself. Thus, Army tactical doctrine did not change appreciably between the end of the war and 1924 when the War Department published the newField
Service Regulations. The provisions of the National Defense Act did not necessitate changing the tactical doctrine developed in 1919.
Field Service Regulations 1923 clearly demonstrated that the United
States Army had learned the lessons of modern warfare and had incorporated the new tactics and technologies into its doctrine. The manual reflected the expanded scope of modern warfare by including, for the first time, groups of armies and general reserves in its discussion of tactical organizations. It also stressed the vital role of combined arms in concentrating superior force at the 127 decisive point, which was still the object of battlefield maneuver. The combined arms team emerged clearly superior to any separate arm. No longer a simple combination of large formations of the separate arms, the combined arms concept now integrated shock, mobility, and firepower down to battalion level.
Artillery-infantry cooperation was the most important linkage in the combined arms team. But, artillery support was not so crucial that its absence warranted halting an attack in progress. American infantry trained to use auxiliary weapons, air support, and rifle fire to advance without artillery support. Infantry armament grew from rifle and bayonet to include automatic weapons, machine guns, hand grenades, mortars, and 37mm guns.
Doctrine stressed the need for infantry to advance throughout the depth of the enemy defenses covered by the fire of its own weapons. It was this reliance on infantry weapons and willingness to fight without the artillery that distinguished American from French doctrine after the failure of their
1917 offensives. The Americans justified their belief in the correctness of their doctrine by contrasting the failures of Allied limited objective attacks with the successful operations which ended the war.
Additionally, Field Service Regulations 1923 addressed the use of motor transport, tractor artillery, tanks, aircraft, and chemical warfare. None of these new considerations in warfare had decisively influenced the battles in Europe, but each demonstrated potential for a greater role in future warfare. In 1923, when theField Service Regulations were in final draft, tanks, aircraft, and tractor artillery were still in the developmental stage. 128
Field Service Regulations 1923, therefore, prescribed doctrine based on the proven capabilities of existing equipment.
Both national military policy and doctrine focused on fighting a modern, large-scale war. This did not necessarily mean the next war would mirror the positional warfare fought on the Western Front. On the contrary,
American military leaders believed the "flankless" battlefield was an anomaly. Few parts of the world reproduced the geopolitical conditions found in Western Europe. North America, in particular, lent itself to open warfare. A war of maneuver remained the most likely possibility for the
Army of the United States. In either case, great depth, large armies, rapid movement, increased weapons range and lethality, and faster communications would characterize modern warfare. The manual provided balanced coverage of position and open warfare, though clearly preferring the latter.
Despite the Army's insistence that open warfare techniques won the
Great War, the doctrine was not without its critics. An editorial in the
Chicago Tribune blasted the generals for needlessly shedding the blood of
American youths by wrongly pitting rifles against machineguns and infantry against artillery. The French and British, the article contended, had adopted the right approach.! Some argued that Americans did not perform any better than the Allies in 1918 and would not have performed better in the preceding years had the United States entered the war at an earlier date. Critics of the
American emphasis on the rifle pointed to British experiences at the
! "The Artillery Conquers the Ground," Chicago Tribune, 25 Jul 1925. 129 beginning of the war. At Mens in 1914, British infantry had fired so rapidly and accurately that the Germans believed they were facing automatic weapons. Still, the British failed to defeat the Germans. Critics contended that American advances in 1918, like those all along the front, were more attributable to German weakness than superior American tactics. In fact, the
British advanced farther, faster, and captured more guns and prisoners than the Americans during the final months of the war. Pershing explained the disparity by pointing out that the Americans progressed more slowly because they faced the toughest resistance in the Meuse-Argonne. Hindenburg's labeling of the region as "our most sensitive point" along with his comment that "the American infantry in the Argonne won the war" bolstered
American claims that they had employed the right doctrine — the American doctrine.2 Consequently, the Americans boasted that they had developed and validated a uniquely American way of war.
One of the few erroneous aspects of Army doctrine, however, was the claim for originality and uniqueness of "American" doctrine. In fact, the
American doctrine differed little from that independently developed and employed by any one of the combatants in 1918 and afterwards. Earlier in the war, the French, British, and Germans had tried "American style" tactics with disastrous results. Conditions on the Western Front from 1915 through 1917 prevented the use of open warfare techniques. American criticisms of the
European doctrines were both naive and ill-founded. All of the combatants
^Donald Smythe, Pershing: General of the Armies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 235-37. 130 turned to open warfare when the opportunity presented itself. Tactics were strikingly similar throughout the war. The close liaison between allies and the detailed study of the enemy methods produced similar doctrines on both sides of the trenches. The convergence of military thinking continued after the war. A study conducted at The Army War College in 1924 concluded, "To the extent that the deductions of military students from the lessons of that war are in agreement, the present accepted doctrines of the nations engaged, have approached uniformity. . . . the World War has crystallized the strategical and tactical doctrines in practice as well as in theory."3 The
Americans could rightfully point to the success of open warfare tactics in the decisive campaigns of the war, but could not claim sole ownership of the formula for victory.
As a result of in-depth, timely, and insightful study, the Army had correctly determined the lessons of the First World War and taken steps to apply them to its organization and doctrine.Field Service Regulations 1923 was a first-rate operations manual which fully addressed the problems of modern combat at that time. And, the new tables of organization supported the doctrine with forces that possessed mobility, firepower, and accounted for expansion through the addition of units from the civilian components.
However, the significance of the new organizations and doctrine lie not in
^"Indoctrination As a Basis for Military Training," Army War College G-3 Course 1924-25, Document #13, 2 Dec 1924, TMs, p.3. Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 131 their correctness so much as in the processes and institutions used to develop them . The examples of the French, British, and German armies certainly aided the process. Despite the fervent denials of some American officers, the
European armies taught the Americans the fine points of fighting and surviving on the modern battlefield and, in doing so, introduced them to large-scale wartime training programs. The AEF G-5 (Training) Section borrowed heavily from foreign armies and a large portion of the AEF instructional material consisted of translated foreign documents. The
Americans seized on the benefits of gathering, analyzing, interpreting, and disseminating training tips and still today places great emphasis on the after action review. The war provided the catalyst for internal review and reform that ultimately resulted in the new organization tables andField Service
Regulations 1923, but, the critical element in the process was the pre-existence of professional attitudes and institutions. For the first time, the U.S. Army had recognized the need for and undertaken a comprehensive study of the lessons of recent war. These actions marked the maturing of a trend toward military professionalism that had begun in the aftermath of the American
Civil War. The recognition of military expertise as a distinct body of knowledge, the mastery of which required long-term study and experience, was widespread by 1900. The institutions of professionalism — a comprehensive educational system, unified doctrine, rational command and staff organization, and merit-based promotions — developed more slowly, although most existed in their original form before the war. The United 132
States entered World War I with unvalidated, nascent, professional institutions. These institutions emerged from the cauldron of war battle- tested and imbued with a fresh sense of purpose. Never before had the Army possessed a sufficiently powerful centralized general staff to direct the effort nor had it possessed an integrated training and education system capable of developing and disseminating the new doctrines. The intense efforts of the
AEF Boards, War Department General Staff committees, and school faculties to determine the war's lessons and produce unified doctrine and organizations were a major milestone in the professionalization of the U.S
Army.
Throughout the remainder of the interwar period, technological developments generated novel approaches to the conduct of war and battle.
All of the trends which appeared during the Great War — greater mobility, increased firepower, better communications, and so on — developed at an accelerated pace. By 1930, technological developments clearly demonstrated the need for revised doctrine. But, without a battlefield to test the new ideas generated by technological improvements, one man's conceptions were as good as another's. Economic constraints prevented the exercise of units on a large-scale. The resulting inability to test new weapons, equipment, organization, and tactics led to the stagnation of training and doctrinal development; American military effectiveness declined sharply. In the late thirties, the United States, spurred by the looming specter of crises in Europe and the Pacific, conducted a comprehensive review of its military capability.
The first large-scale maneuvers conducted since the First World War exposed 133 glaring deficiencies in the Army's forces and its methods. In 1939, nearly fifteen years after the publication of Field Service Regulations 1923, the Arm y finally produced a new doctrinal manual. Part II examines the Army's experience developing doctrine in peacetime. CHAPTER VI
THE ARMY IN THE TWENTIES
During this period I commanded a post which had for its garrison a battalion of infantry, the basic fighting unit of every army. It was a battalion only in name, for it could muster barely 200 men in ranks when every available man, including cooks, clerks and kitchen police, [was] present for the little field training that could be accomplished with available funds. The normal strength of a battalion in most armies of the world varies from 800 to 1000 men. — General George C. Marshall^
The National Defense Act of 1920 guided policy throughout the interwar years as the Army struggled vigorously, but in vain, to execute the missions prescribed by the legislation. Initial steps taken to implement the
Act were encouraging. Recruiting drives, initiated to replace soldiers lost to demobilization and to meet the troop requirements of the Act, had increased
Regular Army strength from 185,000 to 215,000 and more than doubled
National Guard strength to 114,000 during the first year. However, Congress gutted the War Department's implementation plans with severe manpower and budget reductions less than one year after the Act's passage. Despite vehement objections from General March and only by overriding a
Presidential veto. Congress reduced the Regular Army's authorized strength
^George C. Marshall quoted in Raymond G. O'Connor,American Defense Policy in Perspective: From Colonial Times to the Present (N ew York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), 220.
134 135 to 150,000 in 1921. By 1922, Army strength authorizations fell to 12,000 officers and 125,000 enlisted men. The reductions in manpower and expenditures had reached the point which the new Chief of Staff, General Pershing,
"consider[ed] below the minimum required for the effective performance of our various missions."^ Neither the American public nor its Congressional representatives heeded the alarm sounded by Pershing and each of his successors. Military appropriations dropped dramatically after 1922 and would not reach the fiscal year 1921 level of expenditure until 1938 (Table 2).
Resigned to functioning within the limitations imposed by the lack of money, the Chiefs of Staff tailored implementation plans for the National Defense
Act to the available means. These decisions concerning the use of the tiny appropriations for military activities largely shaped the history of the interwar Army.
The decrease in military expenditures reflected the public's rejection of
Wilsonian idealism for Harding's promise to take the nation "back to normalcy." Harding's victory and the election of a Republican majority in
Congress represented a mandate for limited American involvement in collective internationalism and strict economy in government at home. The recent victory in "the war to end all wars," the possession of a huge surplus of military hardware, and the lack of a security threat on the North American continent muted efforts to win support for large investment in military
“U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1921 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1921), 14-18, 24; Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1922 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1922), 12; "Excerpts From the Annual Report of the Chief of Staff," in Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1922 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1922), 112. 136
Table 2. A ppropriations for Military Activity, 1921-19403
FISCAL ARMY BUDGET BUREAU CONGRESSIONAL ANNUAL PERCENT YEAR REQUEST ALLOWANCE APPROPRIATION CHANGE CHANGE
1921 $982,800,020 N\ $394,700,577 1922 $699,275,502 NA $328,113,530 ($66,587,047) -16.87% 1923 NOT PUBLISHED $293,333,027 $270,563,264 ($57,550,266) -17.54%
1924 NOT PUBLISHED $264,284,200 $257,274,768 ($13,288,496) -4.91% 1925 NOT PUBLISHED $259,024,006 $256,515,279 ($759,489) -0.30% 1926 NOT PUBLISHED $259,685,275 $260,757,250 $4,241,971 1.65% 1927 NOT PUBLISHED $261,116,650 $269,339,246 $8,581,996 3.29% 1928 NOT PUBLISHED $281,616,286 $282,118,885 $12,779,639 4.74% 1929 $334,368,880 $310,902,655 $311,167,468 $29,048,583 10.30% 1930 $349,986,426 $329,366,607 $332,404,342 $21,236,874 6.82% 1931 $362,382,069 $340,802,365 $341,050,664 $8,646,322 2.60% 1932 $351,304,294 $340,301,759 $336,081,865 ($4,968,799) -1.46% 1933 $331,243,723 $302,106,542 $299,993,920 ($36,087,945) -10.74% 1934 $320,900,513 $273,366,338 $277,126,281 ($22,867,639) -7.62% 1935 $305,271,154 $287,703,033 $250,846,736 ($26,279,545) -9.48%
1936 $361,351,154 $312,235,811 $345,861,022 $95,014,286 37.88%
1937 $467,022,915 $369,586,298 $382,787,267 $36,926,245 10.68% 1938 $410,936,294 $406,398,954 $23,611,687 6.17% 1939 $427,060,318 $449,931,374 $43,532,420 10.71% 1940 $461,710,990 $660,167,878 $210,236,504 46.73%
3 Based on data extracted from Robert K. Griffith, Jr., Men Wanted for the U.S. Army: (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982), Appendix D. 137
preparedness. Indeed, the world's major powers appeared more committed to peace than ever before as disarmament and arms limitations talks dominated international affairs. The United States agreed to naval limitations at the Washington Conference in 1922 and again at the London
Conference in 1930. American leadership in the drafting of the Kellogg-
Briand Pact outlawing war highlighted the optimism with which the United
States viewed the world situation during the first half of the interwar period.
At home, normalcy meant a balanced budget and limited government involvement in the economy. Shortly after Harding's election. Congress demonstrated its commitment to the policy by passing the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921, which improved budgeting methods and created a budget director and a comptroller general to supervise the process. The budget director's mission was to minimize federal expenditures by justifying every penny spent. In view of these domestic and foreign policies and practices, it is not surprising that the War Department was a leading candidate for budget reductions in peacetime.
The first decision facing the War Department involved distribution of the significantly fewer Regular forces supported by the shrunken appropriation. The War Department had two alternatives for manning the
Regular Army. It could man nine skeletonized divisions or provide troops for fewer divisions at full strength. The first option would provide a force readily expandable to meet the requirements of a large war, but weaken the
Army's ability to respond to small wars with a ready force. The second option would provide a small combat-ready Army, but limited the Army's ability to 138 accomplish its other peacetime missions. With Pershing’s support, the Secretary chose the first option.3
Pershing summarized the reason for the new policy in a graduation address presented before the Army War College class of 1923:
Our view is no longer circumscribed by a Regular Army small and widely dispersed, but we must visualize great citizen forces brought into being through established basic units. . . . There are officers, fortunately in constantly diminishing numbers, who cannot turn their minds from concentration on a diminutive Regular Army, successfully and gallantly fighting the country's battles, as in Cuba and the Philippines, or serving at isolated stations along the Mexican Border. Those days have not entirely passed and probably never will pass, but they are now of secondary importance in the general scheme of National Defense.4
Pershing's remarks removed any doubt about the Army's primary mission and the focus of its training.
The choice of a large skeletonized force facilitated training the citizen components and thereby reinforced the decision to make the execution of this task the Army's primary concern under the National Defense Act. Secretary
Weeks called the training of the Reserve "the major work of the Regular
Army" in his annual report to the President. Reporting as Chief of Staff the following year, Pershing wrote "the primary consideration in the problems of the Regular Army is that the citizens of America shall be assisted in their
^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1921, 19.
^John ]. Pershing, Graduation address given to Army War College class of 1923, quoted in Infantry Journal 23 (Aug 1923): 204. 139 preparation to defend themselves in time of emergency" and that "our officers must be trained mainly with a view to service with citizens who have responded in an emergency.''^ In the ensuing years, the Army became "to all intents and purposes a great institution of military instruction."^ The Army chose to disperse Regular officers and units to facilitate civilian training instead of constituting full-strength Regular divisions. The readiness of
Regular units was second to preparing the citizen army for war. In other words, the ability to mobilize a large force concerned defense planners more than the immediate readiness of the standing army.
The decision to preserve skeletal divisions allowed the Army to retain more command and staff positions. The retention of these key leadership positions was beneficial for two reasons. It provided more opportunities for advancement which was an important consideration for recruiters in a time of resurgent pacifism. And, it enabled Regular officers to serve in duty positions and at ranks which more closely approximated their probable wartime ranks and duties in an expandedarmy.7 In an army geared for rapid expansion, manning skeletonized battalion headquarters was more important
^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1921, 21; "Excerpts From the Annual Report of the Chief of Staff," in Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1922, 114, 119.
^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1925 (W ashington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1925), 4.
^Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: The Education of a General (N ew York: The Viking Press, 1963), 220. 140 than manning platoons and companies. This decision also belied the Army’s belief in the correctness of preparing for the large war rather than the small.®
For the remainder of the decade, the War Department placed its main effort into the development of an effective organizational framework through which it could accomplish the many tasks prescribed in the National
Defense Act with the training of the citizen components receiving first priority. However, unprojected budget cuts plagued this effort. Until 1925, fiscal instability left the Army in a state of perpetual turbulence as it adjusted unit strengths, composition, and locations to optimize its ability to meet the requirements of the National Defense Act. Each reduction caused repeated shuffling of Regular troops to preserve viable combat and training organizations. The resulting instability not only hindered the Army's ability to train itself, but completely prevented the conduct of citizen component training. Pershing reported in 1922, "it has not been possible for this force to settle down to routine duties after the war, and the personnel generally was far from being well trained or even well disciplined." Secretary of War John
W. Weeks underlined the deleterious effects of the unprogrammed reductions in his annual report to the President claiming "there is nothing more important than to afford this force a few years of uninterrupted opportunity to accomplish its own reconstruction and to fulfill its functions concerning the other components of the Army of the UnitedStates.The
®Donald Smythe, Pershing: General of the Armies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 279.
^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1922, 12-15, 115. 141
Secretary of War and Chiefs of Staff both reported as late as 1927, that stability was the Army's single most vital need as it struggled to build a viable force.^^
General Charles P. Summerall assumed duties as Chief of Staff as the
Army's postwar structure finally solidified. During his tenure, officer strength stabilized at approximately 12,000 men and enlisted strength increased from 113,000 to 118,000 soldiers (Table 3). Military appropriations remained small, but experienced modest growth during the last years of the decade (Table 2). General Summerall, acknowledging that the success of the new military policy rested on the ability of the Regular Army to accomplish its training missions, continued to employ the limited Army manpower and money toward the development of citizenforces.By the end of his tenure, the Army had established a framework for the military organization prescribed in the National Defense Act. It had partitioned the country into three army areas each consisting of three corps areas. Each of the nine corps consisted of one Regular Army division, two National Guard divisions, three
Reserve divisions, and a Regular Army detachment dedicated to training the
Guard and Reserveu n i t s . ^2 The emphasis given to training the citizen forces led to their highest state of peacetime readiness in the Army's history. The
^^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1927 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1927), 2. l^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1927, 51-56.
^^Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army , enlarged edition, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 400. 142
Table 3. Regular Army Personnel Strength* 1921-1940^
REGULAR ARMY STRENGTH, 1920-1940 H9CAL ANNUAL PERCENT CUMULATIVE YEAR OFFICER ENLISTED TOTAL CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE
1920 1921 177,974 177,974 1922 125,272 125,272 -52,702 -29.61% -29.61% 1923 111,341 111,341 -13,931 -11.12% 40.73% 1924 121,108 121,108 9,767 8.77% -31.96% 1925 115,177 115,177 -5,931 4.90% -36.86% 1926 12,027 112,901 124,928 9,751 8.47% -28.39% 1927 11,961 113,066 125,027 99 0.08% -28.31% 1928 12,005 114,785 126,790 1,763 1.41% -26.90% 1929 12,074 117,725 129,799 3,009 2.37% -24.53% 1930 12,160 117,821 129,981 182 0.14% -24.39% 1931 12,232 119,034 131,266 1,285 0.99% -23.40% 1932 12,230 113,441 125,671 -5,595 4.26% -27.66% 1933 12,231 115,390 127,621 1,950 155% -26.11% 1934 12,217 117,517 129,734 2,113 1.66% -24.46% 1935 11,985 118,727 130,712 978 0.75% -23.70% 1936 12,075 146,826 158,901 28,189 21.57% -2.14% 1937 12,275 158,626 170,901 12,000 755% 5.42% 1938 12,479 163,800 176,279 5,378 3.15% 856% 1939 12,999 167,712 180,711 4,432 2.51% 11.08% 1940 13,879 243,095 256,974 76,263 42.20% 53.28% 1941 14,740 479,880 494,620 237,646 92.48% 145.7%
*Less Philippine Scouts and warrant officers
^Compiled from Annual Reports of the Secretary of War (1920-1941). 143
Army of the 1920s showed promising progress in several other important areas.
ARMY SCHOOLS
The school system was one of the bright spots in an otherwise dark period in Army history. The Army school system expanded after the war to form the bedrock for education and training during the interwar period. By the end of the decade, it encompassed three general service schools — the
Army War College, Command and General Staff School, and Army Industrial
College — and over thirty special service schools. The Army Industrial
College was a new addition to the school system established to educate officers in procurement procedures and mobilization of civilian industry.
Additionally, Army Correspondence Schools operated in each corps area and department. Officers found in the schools a forum for comparing war experiences and addressing the problems faced in time of war. The schools were central players in the formulation of new training and tactical doctrine and ensured the dissemination of high quality, standardized instruction to all components through its officer graduates. Notably, nearly every school emphasized techniques for training citizen soldiers in addition to the traditional preparation for duty with Regular Army units.^3
Army leaders clearly recognized the value of the schools in the period of economy. At one point, the Command and General Staff School reduced
^^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1922, 19,119; Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1925, 7; Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1929 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1929), 279-301. 144
the length of the course to one year to accommodate the large number of
officers who had not attended. The War Department also initiated a policy
requiring all officers to attend their branch special service school within four
years of being commissioned. Secretary of War Dwight F. Davis wrote,
"Progressive education in military matters is vital in all modern armies; even
more so in an Army where the assembling of large bodies of troops for field
maneuvers is impracticable."All of the annual reports submitted by the
Secretaries of War and Chiefs of Staff during the twenties praised the school
system. The school system increased emphasis on training for instruction of
the civilian components and tactical exercises to compensate for the
conditions in the field.
Instruction at The Infantry School, under the able direction of Colonel
George Marshall, demonstrated the Army school system at its best.
Marshall's experience with young officers of the 15th Infantry in China convinced him that tactics courses wrongly taught "what to think" instead of
"how to think." He wrote, "I find the officers are highly developed in the tactical handling or functioning of weapons, in target practice, in bayonet combat, and in the special and intricate details of paperwork or administration generally, but that when it comes to simple tactical problems, the actual duties of troop leading, they all fall far below the standards they set in other matters.Marshall drew on his personal experiences, Pershing's
l^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1925, 7; Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1929, 101-102. l^George C. Marshall to John J. Pershing, January 30,1925, quoted in Pogue, 250. 145 example, and the tactics classes he received from John F. Morrison at the
Command and General Staff School prior to the war. He emphasized simplicity, movement, and the ability to react quickly to unanticipated situations. In all cases, he strove to break reliance on set-piece, traditional responses to problems and to encourage imaginative solutions. He used historical studies to underline how frequently combat situations force commanders to make decisions with only little or no information. The classic Infantry in Battle, written under Marshall's supervision, contains examples of problems used at The Infantry School during the period. One hundred and fifty generals of the Second World War learned the basics at the
"Marshall school of tactics."!^
The school system was not perfect. Some criticized the Command and
General Staff School, the premier school in the system, for stifling creative thinking by rewarding only those who could produce the "school solution" to tactical problems. They complained that emphasis on problem-solving methods took priority over the content of the problem. As a result, tactical problems involved static defenses, square divisions, and World War scenarios as late as 1937. While the school may have failed to stimulate imaginative tactical thinking, Leavenworth established standardized staff procedures and terminology and provided a common experience on which future leaders would build during the Second World War. The School's goal
^%ogue, 248-59. 146
was to ensure that every officer was minimally competent, not to maximize brilliance. To that end it succeeded.
Adequate schools played a vital role in producing quality officers in sufficient quantity to meet mobilization requirements. The decision to maintain cadres greatly increased the need for officers in all three components of the Army. World War veterans provided a base of National
Guard and Reserve officers, but both required some form of sustainment training to prevent the deterioration of their military skills. And eventually, the Army would have to replace the aging veterans with new officers. The
War Department expanded Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs, enlarged United States Military Academy classes, and created Citizens'
Military Training Camps (CMTC) to sustain and train the officer population required to support full mobilization of the Army of the United States.
Completion of ROTC courses, offered in conjunction with the normal school curriculum, qualified a college graduate for an officer's commission in the reserves. The ROTC program would ultimately produce 5000 officers per year and become the "lifeblood of the OrganizedR eserves." 18 The Citizens'
Military Training Camps provided a second source of reserve personnel.
The camps offered an avenue to a commission in the Officers' Reserve Corps for those who could not afford a college education. The CMTC program consisted of Red, White, and Blue courses taken in sequence over three years.
l^Charles E. Kirkpatrick, "Filling the Gaps: Reevaluating Officer Professional Education in the Inter-War Army, 1920-1940," Paper presented at the 1989 American Military History Institute Annual Conference, Lexington, Va., 14-15 April 1989, TMs in author's possession, 7-24.
18u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1929, 1-11. 147
Graduates of the Blue course qualified for reserve commissions. Beginning in 1921 with 12 camps and over 10,000 attendees, the camps grew each year.
By the end of the decade, the program had expanded to include 57 camps training 36,000 civilians.
Responsibility for sustainment training, ROTC instruction, and administration of the CMTCs rested with the RegularA r m y . ^ 9 in his annual report for fiscal year 1921, the Secretary of War stressed the importance of this work, "There must be a corps of Regular officers sufficient in numbers to maintain the Regular Army, to devote themselves to the life-time study of an intricate profession, and to diffuse the leaven of their knowledge through the mass of the Nation. Responsibility for our military projects falls directly upon these."20 Planners envisioned that half of the Regular officers of the combat arms would serve with citizen components in somecapacity.21 As a result, the size of the officers corps increased to nearly four times its prewar level.
ARMY AIR CORPS
The modernization and expansion of the Air Corps was another Army success during the 1920s. The passage of the Air Corps Act of July 1926 inaugurated a program of growth that would make the Air Corps the Army's most proficient and modern arm by the end of the interwar years and
^^U.S. War Department,Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1922, 18-19, 142-43.
20u.S. War Department,Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1921, 32.
2^ U.S. War Department,Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1921, 11, 21. 148 ultimately emerge as a separate branch of the service. The Act established an
Assistant Secretary of War for matters concerning the Air Corps, authorized three brigadier generals to assist the Chief of the Air Corps, created air sections in each of the War Department General Staff divisions, and directed the incremental expansion of the Air Corps to attain 1800 serviceable airplanes,
1650 officers, and 15,000 enlisted personnel over a five year period. The legislation resulted in large part from the highly visible debate over the role and control airpower in the early twenties.
After the National Defense Act placed the Air Service under control of the War Department, Brigadier General Billy Mitchell flew in the face of the policy and continued to argue publicly for an independent air force. The results of bombing tests added weight to General Mitchell's arguments for greater reliance on airpower for coast defense by demonstrating that aircraft could sink battleships. Mitchell's increasingly outspoken and insubordinate methods, however, undercut his effectiveness as an advocate for an independent air force and ultimately led to his court-martial and resignation.
Meanwhile, Major General Patrick Mason assumed duties as Chief of the Air
Service and took the first concrete steps toward creating an independent air force.
Major General Patrick shared Mitchell's goal, but chose a more subtle and sophisticated approach toward achieving it. One of his first actions was to differentiate between the "air service" and an "air force." The air service included all observation aircraft and lighter-than-air craft that functioned in support of the other branches of the army while the air force conducted offensive fighting independent of ground troops to destroy enemy air 149 capability and attack ground targets.22 He further recommended the consolidation of all aircraft under the commander of the General
Headquarters Reserve thereby removing it from the control of the tactical ground commander. The acceptance of an air force with a separate mission and apart from tactical ground force command constituted a major step toward the establishment of an independent arm. Secretary of War Weeks appointed Major General William Lassiter to chair a board to evaluate Major General Patrick's proposals. The board concurred with the proposals and recommended the establishment of a force of 2500 airplanes augmented by airships and balloons. The Lassiter Board's report also warned that the Air Service was in extremely poor condition and should receive the highest priority for military expenditures due to its critical defensive role in the early stages of a war. Both Congress and the President initiated studies of the Air Service as a result of the Lassiter Board's findings.
President Coolidge appointed Dwight W. Morrow to chair a board charged with investigating the state of American aviation policy. The
Morrow Board, reporting in November 1925, recommended establishing an
Assistant Secretary of War for air activities, including air sections in the divisions of the War Department General Staff, authorizing two additional brigadier generals to assist the Chief, changing the name from "Air Service" to "Air Corps, offering flight pay, and implementation of a five year modernization and expansion program. Congress incorporated nearly all of the board's recommendations in the Air Corps Act of 1926. The passage of
22patrick quoted in Johnson, 205-206. 150 this legislation marked the beginning of the air arm's journey to independence.
The Army began the expansion the following year highlighted by the conduct of combined maneuvers with the 2nd Division in Texas. These maneuvers, noted the Assistant Secretary of War, "afforded a convincing demonstration of the rapidly increasing value of aircraft in military operations and necessity for close coordination between ground and air troops in large-scale maneuvers."23 Air Corps training exercises increased in scale and complexity each year. The number of flying hours nearly doubled by 1929 as the Air Corps conducted pilot training, annual machinegunnery and bombing matches, field maneuvers to include exercises with the Navy, bombing experiments, altitude tests, navigation experiments, refueling tests, antiaircraft tests, aerial photographic projects, participation in national air races, and support of civil activities.
The implementation of the Air Corps Act was not without problems.
Equipment procurement remained a slow and frustrating process. The Air
Corps initially drew its aircraft engines from the 3000 outdated and unreliable
Liberty motors remaining in war stocks. Still, the Assistant Secretary of War
(Air) believed that the United States possessed good aircraft in every category but bombardment. The Air Corps, therefore, focused procurement efforts toward development of satisfactory b o m b e r s . 24 Importantly, Air Corps
23u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1927, 43.
24u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1928 (Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office, 1928), 67-75. 151 research and development would occur within the branch and was not shared with the Ordnance Department. To be sure, the civilian National
Aeronautical Advisory Committee would play the leading role in the research and development effort. As a result of this cooperation with civilian industry, American military aviation progressed at an impressive pace. By
1930, the Air Corps had replaced the World War I vintage wood-and-cloth biplanes with all-metal, monoplanes. In his final report as Chief of Staff,
General Summerall noted that the Air Corps had progressed rapidly, but at the expense of the rest of the Army. Upon completion of the five-year modernization program, he correctly forecast that the Air Corps would possess the highest state of relative readiness than any otherbranch.25
GROUND MOBILITY
Ground mobility was a third area in which the Army made progress during the 1920s. The War Department General Staff had studied mechanization and motorization in 1927 and 1928 seeking ways to improve mobility by taking advantage of new and existing technology. Through
"mechanization," the Army sought ways to increase the soldier's mobility, striking power, and protection in close combat. Tracked vehicles, such as tanks, armored cars, self-propelled artillery, and other vehicles employing caterpillar track-laying technology fit in the mechanization category. The term "motorization" described the use of wheeled vehicles such as trucks and
^^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1930 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1930), 123. 152 cars to move soldiers and equipment. The objective of motorization was to increase operational mobility, the ability to move large units within a theater of operations. Both ground mobility technologies sought to replace animal drawn transportation throughout the Army.
The Army embraced motorization more readily than mechanization.
By the late twenties, nearly all branches experimented with motor movement as a means of increasing their efficiency.26 The Army moved units of the
First Cavalry Division by truck for distances from 25 to 300 miles and tested a fully motorized artillery battery in early experiments conducted in 1927. The results of these tests. General Summerall reported, were inconclusive, but deserved further study.27 And, the Army placed special stress on mobility within the National Guard by emphasizing motor marches to and from training sites.28 While many recognized the importance of motorization and supported its widespread use, motor vehicle technology did not yet warrant complete abandonment of animal-drawn transport. General SummeralTs annual report in 1930 reflected the Army's cautious attitude toward motorization at the turn of the decade:
Motors are being used in lieu of animals wherever possible. In spite of the popular prejudice against animals in a motorized age, the horse and mule still remain the surest reliance in military operations wherever a complete network of metaled roads is lacking. This is largely the case throughout the
28u.S. War Department,Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1927, 51-56.
22u.S. War Department,Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1928, 81-82.
28u.S. War Department,Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1929 1-11. , 153
United States and its overseas possessions. It is also found more economical to use animals than trucks for most post service where short hauls are required. It has therefore been necessary to retain between 30,000 and 35,000 animals to meet the peacetime needs of the Army and to insure adequate provision for the movement of supplies and trains in the immediate vicinity of the troops in campaign where road systems are not available.29
The Army was even less willing to commit fully to mechanization, but still made promising steps forward in that area.
Secretary of War Dwight Davis, having witnessed the British
Experimental Mechanized Force in 1927, ordered the creation of a similar force in the United States Army. The Army established an Experimental
Mechanized Force at Fort Meade in 1928 in a short-lived but progressive effort to test mechanized combined arms concepts. Unfortunately, ten years after
World War I the Army had yet to develop a new tank, so the Experimental
Mechanized Force maneuvered with unreliable, slow, machines drawn from war stocks. The experiment terminated in September 1928 one month ahead of schedule. It had demonstrated little other than that the United States
Army lacked a tank force. Still, the exercise had stimulated interest in mechanization and provided a base of knowledge on which to base a long- range program of development.^O
The Army clearly recognized the tank's potential and continued to study mechanization. General Summerall's last annual report as Chief of
29u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1930, 150.
^^Timothy K. Nenninger, "The Development of American Armor, 1917-1940" (MA thesis. University of Wisconsin, 1968), 84-89. 154
Staff highlighted the tank's potential and prophesied that, with improved speed, it would become invulnerable to artillery fire and "become a weapon exercising offensive power in its own right."3l He warned that the Army would lag behind in mechanized advances until it produced a satisfactory tank. The Army did establish an ad hoc force at Fort Eustis in 1930 by equipping its older tanks with more powerful engines. This force of upgraded vehicles formed the core of the Army's sole mechanized force until the end of the d e c a d e . 3 2 While the Army's recognition of the growing potential of mechanization is commendable, its first attempt to develop a mechanized combined arms force was an overall failure. General Summerall could point to some significant achievements during his tenure. The Army had stabilized its budget and organization, possessed an outstanding school system, initiated a five-year plan to modernize its air force, experimented with mechanized forces, and increased use of motor vehicles. Still, economic stringency compelled the Chief of Staff to report that "funds provided have been insufficient for even an approximate realization of the military system contemplated in the national defense act."33
3^ U.S. War Department,Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1930, 125.
32u.S. War Department,Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1930, 125-26.
33u.S. War Department,Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1930, 137. 155
RETURN TO DARKNESS Even after the force stabilized. Regular Army strengths remained too low to accomplish the missions assigned to it by the National Defense Act.
Between 1921 and 1930, the Regular Army's enlisted strength declined from an authorization of 280,000 to 118,750 men (Table 3). The annual reports of the Secretaries of War and Chiefs of Staff are ripe with statements proclaiming the Army's inability to fulfill its missions as a result of personnel shortages.34 During most of the period, over 25% of the Regular Army served in overseas garrisons. After deduction of troops for overseas garrisons. Army overhead requirements, instructor duty, and a 20,000 man force to guard the
Mexican border, only 33,954 soldiers remained to man a ready mobile military force, provide Regulars with meaningful troop experience, administer reserve training programs, and furnish troops for testing and evaluation of new equipment and doctrine. General Summerall concluded that the strength of the Army was "entirely inadequate" to meet these challenges. A
General Staff study conducted in 1925 estimated that the bare minimum strength required to execute the missions assigned under the National
Defense Act was a Regular Army of 165,000 men with 14,063 officers and a
National Guard of at least 210,000.35 That the Allies believed they had
34All of the Annual Reports submitted by either the Secretary of War or the Chief of Staff in the 1920s highlight the officer shortage problem in particular and the personnel shortage in general.
35u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1930, 98-99. 156 neutered the German Army by limiting its strength to 100,000 men highlights the difficulties faced by the Regular A r m y . 3 6
The personnel shortages severely hindered unit training in the
Regular Army. Only three of the nine Regular Army divisions were active; the other six existed as skeleton divisions. Only the 2nd Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division, responsible for patrolling the Mexican border, remained intact.37 The remaining forces, far-flung and sparsely manned, could hardly attain proficiency in much beyond small unit tactics, marching, and marksmanship. The Regular Army could have reorganized to preserve a viable force-in-being, but the overriding importance of training the citizen soldiers and lack of transportation funds to bring Regulars and civilians together demanded retention of the dispersed formations. The high priority afforded civilian training contributed to the neglect of unit training in the
Regular Army. The Regular Army spent nearly 20% of its own money supporting the training of the civilian components. Many officers served full-time with the citizen components and nearly all Regulars participated in some form of citizen training during the summers. While officers and enlisted men received more individual training than ever before through the school system, they lacked the opportunity to apply their newly acquired skills
36peyton C. March, The Nation at War (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, Doran, and Co., 1932), 341.
^^Russell F. W eigley, "The Interwar Army, 1919-1941," inAgainst All Enemies, ed. Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986), 259. 157 in fully-manned units. As a result, training of Regular Army units suffered and readiness declined.38
Throughout the decade, increased demands for Regulars to train the citizen forces exacerbated the problem. Every year the ROTC, CMTCs,
National Guard, and Reserves grew while the size of the Regular Army remained unchanged. Though the National Guard only reached half strength, its growth relative to the Regular Army still caused problems. As early as 1924, the Operations and Training Division of the General Staff complained:
The strength of the Regular Army should bear a definite relation to that of the other components of the Army of the United States. As the latter expands, the instruction and training functions of the Regular Army become more extensive and far- reaching. If such a policy is not followed it will be difficult for the Regular Army to fulfill its dual mission; i.e., an efficient combat force and an efficient instructing force for the civilian components.39
And, Chief of Staff George C. Marshall later wrote:
Let me give you a specific example of the effect of these reductions upon the efficiency of the Army. During this period I commanded a post which had for its garrison a battalion of infantry, the basic fighting unit of every army. It was a battalion only in name, for it could muster barely 200 men in ranks when every available man, including cooks, clerks and kitchen police, [was] present for the little field training that could be accomplished with available funds. The normal strength of a
38u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1925, 4-8; Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1926, 43, 57.
39u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1924, 7. 158
battalion in most armies of the world varies from 800 to 1000 m en.40
The strength of the Regular Army did not substantially increase at any time during the decade despite the strongly-worded confessions of inadequacy from the Secretaries of War and Chiefs of Staff. The inability to assemble complete units, instructor duty, summer camps, fatigue details and personnel turnover contributed to the unacceptable state of Regular unit training.41
Officer shortages, in particular, degraded the Army's ability to train. Of
12,000 officers, 3000 served in noncombatant arms and 2000 served overseas leaving only 7000 available to train themselves. Regular units, and the citizen components. Training of the citizen components received top priority. The officer's professional training and Regular Army unit training suffered accordingly. Secretary Weeks wrote, "In the effort to meet at least some of the demands [of civilian training requirements] we are forced to overtax the efforts of the commissioned personnel. The result is that our officers are forced to neglect the proper attention to their own advanced professional education."42 The demands of manning over 200 ROTC programs, administering growing numbers of CMTCs, and advising National Guard units, simply bled the officer corps white. While junior officers undoubtedly reaped some benefits from instructing basic military skills in the camps, their
40ceorge C. Marshall quoted in Raymond G. O'Connor,American Defense Policy in Perspective: From Colonial Times to the Present (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), 220. Marshall refers to his service with the 8th Infantry at Fort Screven, Georgia in 1932.
41 U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1926, 43-44.
42u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1924, 8. 159 lack of experience serving at higher levels and infrequent exposure to fully- assembled units significantly retarded their professional development. Until
1928, the Army relied on school instruction to substitute for experience with large formations — "the only substitute available under our military s y s t e m ."43 Beginning that year, the use of command post exercises provided the closest approximation to the maneuver of large bodies of troops that most
American officers would experience until the late thirties.
Disaster relief missions provided another opportunity for training in mobilization and non-military operations. The Army responded to 24 disaster relief emergencies from 1924-1928 in the United States and overseas.
These disasters ranged included hurricanes in Florida and Puerto Rico, an earthquake in Venezuela, tornados in Mississippi and Georgia, and flooding in Florida, Louisiana, andAlabama.44 Although the Army reaped some benefits from the disaster relief operations, they were no substitute for field training exercises. The demands of the Air Corps for men, money, and material were yet another training detractor. Personnel for the creation and later expansion of the Air Corps largely came from within the Army. In his annual report for
1930, Secretary Patrick J. Hurley wrote, "If the policy of building up the enlisted strength of the Air Corps by transfers from the other arms is continued, the Army will soon be unable properly to perform its many
43u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1930, 98.
44u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1929, 1-11. 160 missions. Already training in our summer camps has been adversely affected by the reduction in strength of our Regularorganizations.'''^^
The lack of money not only restricted the size of the Army, but also limited and degraded training in other ways. Financial shortages limited printing and distribution of the important new training regulations. The
War Department only had enough money to print half of the regulations in
1922. Additionally, financial limitations caused the discontinuance of distributing information bulletins to reserve officers. Thereafter, branch journals, especially the Infantry Journal, became the principal means of disseminating information to citizenofficers.46
Transportation funds were almost nonexistent. Foot marches were the normal means of transportation for soldiers. While frequent marching certainly was of some benefit, it quickly reached the point of diminishing returns.47 A soldier could spend more time moving to and from training sites than in actual training. The mule was the primary means of transporting equipment; vehicles were too costly to maintain.48 Lack of funds to pay transportation costs prevented the dispersed forces from uniting to conduct large-scale combined maneuvers. In some cases, the lack of funds for transporting recruits reduced some "important combat units" to "a strength
48u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1929, 104; Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1930, 3.
46u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1922, 144-45, 295-96.
47u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1922, 115.
48ccorge C. Reinhardt and William R. Kintner, The Haphazard Years: How America Has Gone to War (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1960), 127. 161 inadequate for their own training or for the efficient conduct of the training of civilian components."49 The inability to pay transportation costs for reserve officers to attend summer drill sessions led to the gradual erosion of skills learned in ROTC and the CMTCs. The training of both the Regular and citizen components suffered from the lack of transportation funds.
One of the Army's responses to the reduction of transportation funds was decentralization of training. Decentralization reportedly "served to increase local interest and establish common bonds between local military units of the various components of the Army of the United States,. . . [and] to develop the initiative, resourcefulness, and leadership of junior officers, who have gained better knowledge of both the economic administration and the tactical conduct of their units." The War Department specified training objectives and left local commanders to determine the best way to achieve th em .50 The success of decentralized training depended on periodic inspections to ensure compliance with standards. Ironically, the very lack of transportation funds that inspired decentralized training also prohibited supervision of the training. Uneven and substandard training went unchecked.
Lack of funds for ammunition, fuel, weapons, and equipment degraded training at all levels. The Army drew uniforms, weapons, and equipment from World War stockages to outfit new soldiers and replace broken items for
49u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1926, 45; Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1924, 3.
50u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1926, 43; Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1929, 103. 162 ten years after the end of the war. In 1930, the standard Army weapons remained the M1903 Springfield rifle, Stokes mortar, 75mm field artillery piece, and, for tank defense, the .50 caliber machinegun. Units drew ammunition for target practice from rapidly diminishing and deteriorating stores. Fuel economy measures limited tank training to a few hours daily.
Some modern equipment was available at the schools for officer training.
But upon return to their units, the graduates' only exposure to new equipment was through reading.51
Lack of funds for facilities maintenance affected training and morale.
Army camps and cantonment areas had deteriorated so badly since the war that soldiers had to sacrifice training time to maintain the facilities. In 1924,
40,000 soldiers lived in tents or temporary wooden barracks. By 1925, the situation was so bad that Secretary of War Dwight F. Davis believed "no greater problem faces the War Department today than that of providing shelter."52 The following year, in the midst of increasing desertions and officer resignations. Congress funded a long-range housing program which began to alleviate the problem. Housing improved, but resulted in an undesirable dispersal of troops which hindered training effectiveness. As late
51 Reinhardt, 127,140. Ronald Specter, "The Military Effectiveness of U.S. Armed Forces, 1919- 1939," in Military Effectiveness: The Interwar Years, eds. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (Winchester, Mass.: Allen and Unwin, 1988), 72; Weigley, 419.
52(1.5. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1925, 16-20; Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1924, 14-20. 163
as 1930, the Secretary of War would report, "In numerous cases where
housing was poor, the garrison became little more than cheapl a b o r . " 5 3
The training that did occur was extremely basic. Individual training in
units continued to focus on infantry skills — marching and marksmanship.
Although training regulations specified that soldiers would practice firing under combat conditions, units mostly conducted marksmanship training on known-distance ranges. Rating of officers by their unit's marksmanship scores and the provision of extra pay for qualification reinforced the tendency
to ignore combat firing in favor of the known-distance range. Inspections remained prominent in the training of soldiers. On a positive note, training now included defense against two of the new weapons of war, the airplane and gas. Soldiers fired at aircraft instead of hiding from them. And, soldiers practiced all combat tasks wearing gas m a s k s . 5 4 Some units trained with tanks, but the vast majority limited combined arms training to exercising with infantry, artillery, and sometimes airplanes. Training of enlisted recruits took place at the unit level after economic constraints forced the elimination of recruit training depots. New soldiers learned basic skills under the supervision of noncommissioned officers. The quality and quantity of training varied from unit to unit depending on the quality of the
53u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1930, 144.
54u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1930, 129. 164 instructor and the needs of the unit. New soldiers acquired many military skills on the job rather than through formal training.55
By the end of the decade, the Army had compensated as much as possible for many of the problems created by resource limitations. The previously mentioned use of decentralized training and the school system improved small unit and individual training. And, increased funding for facilities reduced some of the training time lost to maintenance, not to mention the positive effects on morale and discipline which in turn produced higher quality training. Some units averaged two weeks in the field and made practice marches of at least 100 miles. A few units conducted collective training and the Army conducted command post exercises annually beginning in the summer of 1928 leading General Summerall to report optimistically that training was "eminently satisfactory given the limitations imposed by the dispersion of troops."^6 The Chief of Staff also highlighted the conduct of joint air-ground operations, one of which included air units from the Regular Army and National Guard, and division level field exercises in 1929. Experimentation with motorized and mechanized forces had begun by the same year.^7 Despite the positive outlook portrayed by the
Secretary of War and Chief of Staff and the commendable school system, air
^^Robert K. Griffith, Jr., Men Wanted for the U.S. Army: (Westport; Greenwood Press, 1982), 165.
^^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1928, 79.
^^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1930, 1-3, 122; Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1929, 1-2. 165 arm modernization program, and ground mobility experiments, the overall capability of the United Army had, at best, stagnated during the decade.
The decisions concerning the use of the Army's limited resources hindered progress throughout the 1920s. The National Defense Act of 1920 created great expectations among Army leaders. The policy seemed to reflect a genuine understanding of and commitment to supporting the military establishment as never before in peacetime. But, budget and manpower reductions quickly prevented the Army from fully implementing the policy prescribed by the legislation. The Army used its limited resources to improve its ability to mobilize a large citizen army. The costs of this decision were a decline in the immediate readiness of the active forces, failure to remain abreast of technological development, and failure to develop doctrine to support new capabilities. The situation would worsen before improving. CHAPTER VII
THE ARMY IN THE THIRTIES
As an Army we were ineffective. Our equipment, modern at the conclusion of the World War, was now in a large measure obsolescent. In fact, during the post-war period, continuing paring of appropriations had reduced the Army virtually to the status of a third rate power. "George C. Marshall^ Army Chief of Staff
The ten years prior to United States entry into World War II saw the
American Army fall to seventeenth among the world's major armies, then rebound to rank among the most powerful military forces of all time. The
Great Depression and American determination to avoid involvement in foreign affairs suppressed concern for readiness and added five years of paltry military appropriations to those of the preceding decade. By the mid-thirties, acts of aggression in Asia, Africa, and Europe and economic recovery at home rekindled support for military spending. Still, the Army failed to take major strides toward large-scale modernization until after the fall of France. The
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor found the Army preparing for war, but far from ready.
^U.S. War Department, "Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff, July 1, 1939 to June 30, 1941" in the Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1941 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1941), 47-48.
166 167
The Army had begun to show concern for the deteriorating condition of its active forces near the end of the 1920s. The high priority given to mobilization and training the citizen components in the twenties had led to the gradual weakening of active Army units. General Summerall, in 1928, identified the Regular Army and National Guard as the first line of defense and noted their deficiencies in his annual report. He highlighted the decreasing effectiveness of the active units resulting from low personnel strengths and lack of training. He further noted that assembly of a division, the basic unit of field operations, would take months because of the great dispersion necessitated by the existing situation. Summerall, while warning that "we would be negligent were we to fail to take cognizance of the fact that our divisions are incomplete organizations,"^ left office before he could complete plans for improving the readiness of the active Army. His successors. Generals Douglas A. MacArthur and Malin Craig, would take the first real steps toward building a credible peacetime standing Army.
However, the impact of the Great Depression would frustrate advances during the MacArthur years.
THE TW ILIGHT YEARS, 1930-1935
General Douglas A. MacArthur assumed duties as the Army Chief of
Staff in 1930 committed to modernizing the Army through a three-step process that would in turn address deficiencies in organization, equipment.
^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1928 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1928), 78-79. 168
and training. Budget reductions hamstrung efforts to implement any part of
his plan. The Army felt the full impact of budget reductions in 1932 when the state of the economy led to a four year slide in military appropriations (Table
2). The slide hit bottom in 1935 when the Army received the smallest budget for military activities for the entire interwar period. Throughout the twilight years, MacArthur argued eloquently against a wide array of proposals for further reducing military spending. Among the suggestions were the reduction of officer strength, curtailment of civilian component training, elimination of water-transport organizations, revision of the Army organization, creation of a separate Air department, and combination of the
War and Navy Departments. General MacArthur insisted that the current organization was satisfactory and suffered only from a lack of personnel.^ He prevailed.
As before, the Chief of Staff had to make hard choices concerning the use of the Army's limited money. General MacArthur, like his predecessors in the 1920s, chose to retain sufficient personnel to maintain a skeleton organization rather than a smaller, better prepared, force. He realized that the decision would continue to leave the United States dangerously ill-prepared to field a force capable of responding to immediate threats to the continental
United States. The unrest in China and subsequent deployment of American troops to enforce the International Settlement in Shanghai invigorated his concern with the Army's state of readiness. The Army's tiny size and the
^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1932 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1932), 53-54. 169
dispersion of the Regular Army units were major limiting factors in its ability
to respond to crisis. The Army's meager strength was the Chief of Staff's greatest concern.
While MacArthur praised the National Defense Act of 1920, he decried the
failure to maintain a minimum strength in the Regular Army capable of
meeting the missions prescribed in the act. The 1932 appropriation provided
for only 12,000 officers and 125,250 men, a strength, he warned, that was 2000
officers and 40,000 enlisted men short of the minimum strength established
in the still valid 1929 War Department General Staff study and clearly "below
the point of safety.'"^ Compared to the armies of the world's major powers,
the American Army ranked behind sixteen other countries in total number of
active and reserve soldiers even though it was the world's richest nation and
had the fourth largest population. After deduction of the strength of overseas
garrisons in Hawaii, Panama, the Philippines, Alaska, Puerto Rico, and
China, the Army had but 9750 officers, 820 warrant officers, and83,600
enlisted men available to execute the provisions of the act. Consideration of
all other requirements further reduced the Army's strength to only 3000
officers and 55,000 men available for duty in tactical units in 1932.5
The situation worsened over the next two years. In 1934, the number
of soldiers in the continental United States was less than three times the size
^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1932, 56-57; The War Department General Staff's "Survey of the Military Establishment" called for an Army of 179,000 officers and men in the Regular Army, 250,000 National Guardsmen, 116,000 men in the Officer Reserve Corps, and annual training of 6000 ROTC cadets and 37,500 men through the CMTCs.
5u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1932, 57-59. 170 of the New York police force and scattered throughout the United States.^ Of the nine 12,000-man divisions provided for in the National Defense Act, the
Army maintained six understrength brigades and three skeletonized divisions at 6000 men each, half the minimum strength necessary for peacetime training and less than one-third of the 20,000-man war strength.
General MacArthur estimated that it would take four to six months to mobilize a defense force at the Army's current strength. He again called for increasing the Regular Army to a minimum strength to 14,000 officers and
165,000 enlisted men. At this strength, the Army could man one division in each of the four army areas, and using five skeletonized brigades, establish a
Regular Army unit in each of the nine corps areas. The National Guard and
Organized Reserves had fared no better than the Regulars. Each was at less than half the strength authorized by the National Defense Act and the state of training had begun to decline as a result of Depression-related assignments diverting Regular officers from instructor duty.^
The dispersion of this small population of soldiers exacerbated the problem. In his first annual report to the Secretary of War, General
MacArthur reported:
The few Infantry troops in the United States available for immediate field service are distributed among 24 regiments located at 45 different posts with a battalion or less at 34.
^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1934 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1934), 3.
^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1934, 51-58; Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950), 26-29. 171
Artillery troops are in a similar situation. They are distributed among 7 regiments and 7 separate battalions located at 19 different posts with a battalion or less at 16.®
The dispersion was necessary to facilitate summer training of the civilian components and to take advantage of existing housing. While saving some money as a result of these considerations, the price paid in lost tactical training of any significance was steep. Likewise, the Army's dispersion hindered the ability to assemble a force rapidly to meet a threat to national security.^ The Army's laudable participation in the Civilian Conservation Corps program also dispersed its few officers throughout the United States and drew them from duty with tactical units. Congress established the Civilian
Conservation Corps in March 1933 to alleviate unemployment by providing jobs for public works projects, the most common of which was reforestation.
A Director of Emergency Conservation Work presided over an organization that included parts of the Interior, Agriculture, Labor, and War Departments.
The War Department's role, initially limited to receiving, processing, organizing, and transporting the enrollees, expanded significantly as the other government agencies proved unable to handle the quarter million laborers.
Less than a month after the program's start, the War Department assumed responsibility for nearly every aspect of the program, a major part of which was establishing the 1450 camps and administering to the health and welfare
®U.S. War Departm ent, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1931 (Washington, B.C.: Government Printing Office, 1931), 40.
^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1932, 59. 172 of the men stationed in them. The Army accomplished the mission with impressive speed and organization. General MacArthur attributed the success of the effort to the number and quality of Regular Army officers, the existence of an Officers' Reserve Corps, reserve supplies and equipment, and sound policies and practices developed since the World War.^0
The execution of the Civilian Conservation Corps mission was not without a high price. MacArthur reported, "Defense functions were temporarily relegated to second place and in every line of activity priority was given to the execution of this emergency task."^^ The detail of officers to
Civilian Conservation Corps duty detracted from the quality of instruction in schools and the conduct of training in troop units. The number of officers conducting civilian instruction duty shrank from 1600 to 700, a number
"entirely inadequate" for the mission. The situation in combat units was even more alarming. In some cases, a single officer remained on duty in an entire battalion. The 1st Division had only 127 of its 403 officers. The 26th
Regiment of the division had only seven company grade officers. MacArthur noted, "This lack of officers has brought Regular Army training in the continental United States to a virtual standstill, and has almost destroyed the readiness of units for immediate and effective employment on emergency d u t y . " ^2 The distractions caused by the administration of the Civilian
^^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1933 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1933), 3-8.
^^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1933, 3-5.
^2u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1933, 9-10. 173
Conservation Corps was but one of the many of the Great Depression's effects on the interwar Army. Army units participated in relief work, provided employment by accelerating government construction projects, distributed food and clothing, and provided shelter. National Guard armories often emerged at the center of local relief efforts. While the Army reaped some benefits from its experience mobilizing the large number of Civilian
Conservation Corps laborers and participating in relief work, the positive aspects of the mission did not outweigh the deleterious effects of removing officers from tactical units that were already critically short of key personnel.
General MacArthur recognized that the Army's most important resource was its personnel, particularly the Regular officers. He believed that the base of professional skill represented by the Regular Army officer corps was essential to national defense. The Regular Army officer was the product of a long process of education and training that the nation could not replicate in time of national emergency. MacArthur argued that "Training — professional training — and the skill and knowledge and morale resulting therefrom are the first indispensables to efficiency incombat."The W ar
Department insisted on maintaining an adequate and well-trained Regular officer corps "no matter what other reductions policy may compel in the Military Establishment."^^
The decision to place a higher priority on maintaining the manpower, especially officer manpower, needed to sustain a skeleton force reduced the
^^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1933, 23.
^'^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1933, 24. 174 amount of money available for material acquisition and training. Budget cuts resulted in cessation of motor vehicle procurement, suspension of mechanization programs, reduction in aircraft replacement, and reduction of training. Cost cutting meant retaining obsolete material and suspending research and development programs, and curtailment of target practice and field t r a i n i n g . ^5 The Army felt the repercussions from this decision at all levels with only the Air Corps retaining a tolerable level of support.
As in the 1920s, the Air Corps received the largest share of the budget and continued to thrive at the expense of the Army as a whole. Air Corps expenditures claimed 20% of the military budget in 1933, exceeding the percentage spent on aviation in most of the world's armies. In 1931, the
United States air forces ranked fifth in the world with 449 combat aircraft and another 214 trainers and transports. By 1934, the Air Corps ranked among the top three in total aircraft despite lagging behind the five-year program objectives established for aircraft production and officers. General MacArthur supported the high priority given to military aviation in recognition of its critical defensive function in the early stages of war and the complex training and equipment requirements associated with it. In fact, the Army requested a
12% increase in the number of aircraft prescribed in the Air Corps Act. The additional aircraft would allow the Air Corps to keep 1800 aircraft available for immediate use while it overhauled the remaining portion of the fleet.
^^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1933, 15-20. 175
The Air Corps also began development of a new attack aircraft for procurement in sufficient quantities to equip one attack s q u a d r o n .
Two major developments in military aviation occurred during the
MacArthur years. One was the placement of the Air Corps directly under the
Chief of Staff and subsequent abolishment of the supervisory position for air matters in the Office of the Secretary of War in July 1933. The other was the formation of a board chaired by the former Secretary of War, Newton D.
Baker, to "inquire into all phases of military aviation" as the five year program initiated under the Air Corps Act ended. The Secretary of War adopted the Baker Board's recommendations as the basis for a new Air Corps development program. Among the recommendations of the Baker Board were: 1) the organization of a General Headquarters Air Force consisting of the Air Corps combat units and immediately responsive to the Chief of Staff and 2) the immediate availability of 2320 serviceable planes exclusive of reserves. The board recommended increasing the number of aircraft by 600 over three years. The Baker Board recommendation more than doubled the size of the Army's earlier request for additional aircraft.
The Army fared far worse in its attempts to modernize in other areas.
In 1933, nearly all units lacked sufficient motor transportation. The Army needed 9385 trucks and 279 tractors to replace the currently existing World
War I vintage equipment and animal drawn transport. MacArthur stressed,
"Ever since the World War the American Army has not only failed to keep
^6u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1931, 29-36.
^^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1934, 1-10. 176
pace with world trends toward increasing mobility in military forces but has
actually retrogressed in this resp ect." ^ 8
The Army's efforts to mechanize were even less productive. General MacArthur reported:
Except for about a dozen machines produced during the past few years, every tank in the Army today is of World War manufacture. Their number is entirely inadequate. Even more serious than this is the fact that they are so obsolete in design as to be completely useless for employment against any modern unit on the battlefield.^ 9
To address this shortcoming, the Army sought to equip two regiments and one cavalry brigade with armored vehicles for testing and the development of
tactical doctrine and to have a minimal force available for immediate defensive requirements. But, the Army had yet to procure a modern tank in sufficient quantities to equip even a single battalion. Compared to other nations, the United States had spent only a miniscule amount on mechanization — $2 million since 1920 compared to Great Britain's $20 million in a four year span.20 In 1931, the Army finally gained approval for procurement of seven Christie tanks and 12 armored cars for field testing.
General MacArthur made a decision that would fundamentally shape the development of American mechanized doctrine during his first year in
^®U.S. War Department,Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1933, 20.
^^U.S. War Department,Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1933, 20
20u.S. War Department,Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1933, 20-21. 177 office. Divergent views on the proper line of development for mechanized forces brought the issue to head. One view called for a separate mechanized combined arms task force as the basis for future development similar to the
Experimental Mechanized Force. This school believed that centralization of armored assets would facilitate better integration of the arms and more rapid development of new vehicle types and tactics. The proponents of centralization envisioned the potential employment of the mechanized force as a separate arm. The other view believed more efficient development resulted from allowing each branch to mechanize in accordance with its needs. This decentralized approach was more economical and better suited the specific requirements of the branches. Based on the lack of a suitable vehicle on which to base a separate armored task force, the cost of maintaining the overhead for such an organization, and to end interbranch fighting over armored vehicle development. General MacArthur chose the second option.21
The mechanization policy resulted in the development of armored vehicles along two lines as the principal using branches, the Infantry and the
Cavalry, each sought vehicles to suit their unique requirements. The Cavalry focused on the development of light, fast, vehicles for reconnaissance, security, and pursuit missions. The Infantry continued to hold the lead for development of an assault vehicle. The Infantry tank required thick armor, a
U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1931, 43; U.S. War Department, Memorandum from Brigadier General George P. Tyner, WDGS G-3, to Army Chief of Staff, 25 Oct 1937, File 470.8, Office of the Chief of Infantry Correspondence, 1921-42, Record Croup 177, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 178 powerful engine, and heavy armament for destroying bunkers and other tanks. With the disbanding of the mechanized force at Fort Eustis, the Chief of Infantry established The Tank School and Tank Board at Fort Benning.
Although the Infantry and Cavalry were the lead branches, every arm could experiment with mechanization and motorization to further their capabilities.^^ The Army only produced pilot models of all major items except aircraft during the interwar years. The pace of technological development and high procurement costs made mass production uneconomical. General
MacArthur highlighted the difficulty the Army faced in developing a new tank:
As would naturally be expected in a development of such recent origin, all models of combat vehicles so far produced tend to become obsolete as a result of continued progress in this branch of the mechanical sciences. The best tank of the World War is now hopelessly antiquated, and it is safe to predict that the best of today will be considered of small relative value a few years hence. Eventually a greater degree of stabilization will probably apply, and the effective life of each model will be substantially greater. Under present conditions, however, any attempt to maintain large units equipped with the latest and most efficient models of combat vehicles would entail the replacement of great amounts of equipment every few years. Manifestly the expense of such a procedure would be enormous.23
22u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1931, 43.
23u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1932, 83-84. 179
MacArthur also cited improvements in armor-piercing bullets as a complicating factor in tank design. Moreover, tests of the latest tank, the
Christie type, still revealed significant defects that mitigated against its adoption as a standard type. Nevertheless, the Army bought five more for continued testing. The Army's modernization programs in every area except aviation and antiaircraft defense suffered in the first half of the 1930s. The need for airplanes and air defenses at the outset of war justified the top priority given to their production in peacetime. The Army tested semiautomatic weapons, pack howitzers, and all-purpose field guns, but made no effort to produce these items in mass.^4
By 1934, the Army had deteriorated badly. The lack of equipment and personnel had brought the Army to an all-time low in its ability to defend the nation. Having already reported the Army's readiness level at "below the danger line"25 and facing another major budget reduction in the next fiscal year, General MacArthur submitted a bleak assessment of the Army's readiness. Material shortages topped the list of deficiencies. World War I stocks had been depleted or were obsolete by 1930. The Chief of Staff reported that although the World War I inventory still held hundreds of tanks, they were "hopelessly out of date."26 Of the twelve Christies, only one model was worthy of mass production and it still fell short in many areas. The shortage
^'^U.S. War Department,Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1932, 86-87.
2^U.S. War Department,Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1933, 49.
^^U.S. War Department,Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1934, 40. 180 of tanks and armored cars meant that a tactical doctrine for their employment had yet to be developed.27 Field artillery units still trained with the "French
75" gun. The old 75mm field piece could not stand high speed towing and possessed limited traverse and elevation capabilities. The Army had developed a new weapon, but like armored vehicles, chose to limit production to pilot m o d e l s . 28 The Infantry had only 80 Garand semiautomatic rifles with plans to purchase only 1500 more the next year.
The .50 caliber machinegun was the only available antiaircraft or antitank weapon. To be sure, the Army had made significant progress in the development of antiaircraft fire control systems, but the improved weapons were not in the hands of the troops. A $10 million appropriation from the
Public Works Administration gave the Army's motorization program a boost, but represented only a fraction of the amount needed to replace the aging
World War I trucks and animal-drawn transport.
Training suffered as a result of the personnel and equipment deficiencies. General MacArthur complained that "in the absence of modern equipment in all essential classes, we are compelled to train and prepare the
Army too distinctly in the 1918 pattern, whereas our effort should be to look ahead and mold it to the requirements of futureem ergencies."^^ The Chief of
Staff envisioned a battlefield dominated by widely dispersed units linked through advanced communications systems employing "fast machines" and
22u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1934, 40.
28u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1934, 40-41.
29u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1934, 44. 181
"weapons of great efficiency" to strike with surprise at the enemy flanks and sending air forces to bomb the enemy's vital supply points.30 Success on such a battlefield required training with sufficient personnel and equipment to make the effort worthwhile. Command post exercises and theoretical training in the Army schools were the sole sources of combat practice as limited funds prevented any field training for Regular Army troops and halted nearly all target practice in fiscal year 1934. General MacArthur cautioned that the lack of practical training opportunities resulting from the manpower and equipment shortages meant that an officer's first exposure to modern mechanized forces would occur in battle:
Commanders and staffs must, therefore, visualize early operations in which only a very few mechanized units will be on hand, and develop methods that will be effective in spite of this shortage, at the same time that tactics are evolved for the employment of machines when they have become available in quantity .31
Between manpower shortages, equipment deficiencies, dispersion of the few capable troop units, and lack of training, the Army was unable to field a credible force in1 9 3 4 .3 2
39u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1934, 44.
31 U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1932, 85.
32u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1934, 51-58. 182
In 1938, Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring, who had served as
Assistant Secretary of War from 1933 to 1936, recalled the the Army's desperate condition:
. . . despite the insistent warnings of the military authorities, much of our Army existed in little more than name only. Our territorial posts were inadequately garrisoned — dangerously so. The number of Regular troops in the continental United States barely sufficed for what might be termed military 'housekeeping' and overhead duties. Training was being conducted with outmoded equipment. In the development of air power, motorization, and mechanization, the rest of the world was setting a fast pace; the United States was floundering along in the ruck. What troops we had were housed to great extent in flimsy structures erected during the World War and designed for temporary occupancy.33
With no relief in sight. General MacArthur assessed the situation in
1934 as follows:
In spite of its moderate purposes, the National Defense Act has been given but limited and decreasing support. Our military framework has become so attenuated that the ideal of reasonable security sought by the Congress which enacted it is far from attainment. Our Regular Army and National Guard are at considerably less than half the strength contemplated in the law. The Officers' Reserve Corps is inadequately supported in the essentials of training. We have no enlisted Reserve. Stocks of material are in vital respects inadequate even for limited forces, and, such as they are, comprise principally World War equipment, manifestly obsolescent. The preparatory missions devolving upon the Military Establishment in time of peace cannot in some respects be efficiently performed; while the grave
^^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1938 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1938), 2-3. 183
responsibilities that would fall to it in emergency would require frantic improvisations, and wasteful and possibly ineffective sacrifice of the Nation's manhood and material resources. These are facts — demonstrable both in the light of history's lessons and through logical analysis of existing conditions.34
The situation did not improve in 1935. The Army had developed some good quality pilot model tanks, artillery, and antiaircraft weapons, but it still lacked sufficient quantities for training or development of tactical doctrine.35
DAWN OF RECOVERY, 1936-1939
Only the nation's slow emergence from the Great Depression stabilized the shrinking military appropriation and deteriorating condition of the
United States Army. The fiscal year 1936 appropriation was the largest since
1921 and represented an increase of nearly $100 million dollars over the previous year's total (Table 2). As a result. General Mac Arthur's annual report in 1935 was one of the most positive reports on the state of the Army since the First World War declaring that the means to establish a minimum defense organization were available for the first time since 1922. The outgoing Chief of Staff wrote, "For 13 years the curve representing the Army's ability to perform its vital emergency missions has been trending continuously and dangerously dow nw ard."36 He blamed insufficient
34U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1934, 34.
33u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1935 (Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office, 1935), 53.
36u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1935, 42. 184
Strength in the Regular Army, obsolete equipment, curtailment of training, consumption of reserve stocks, and inadequate funds for the decline and noted that the next fiscal year's budget earmarked money to correct deficiencies in all of these areas.
The Army's first priority was to improve the personnel situation. The greatest and most obvious weakness was in enlisted strength. Reduced to a strength of 118,750 in 1922, the War Department had argued for a force of at least 165,000 men since 1930. Recruiting the additional 46,250 men began immediately on the first day of the new fiscal year. The Army used the recruits to flesh out the skeletonized units of the Regular Army with priority to Air Corps units and mechanized test elements in the Infantry, Cavalry, and
Artillery. Other related breakthroughs were the acceptance of the Army's proposed officer promotion system which alleviated the stagnation that had occurred in the preceding fifteen years, pay increases, and an increase in the number of West Point attendees from 1374 to 1960. Officers' Reserve Corps training returned to 20,000 officers annually after to dropping to 12,000 and
16,000 in fiscal years 1934 and 1935 respectively. The 1936 bill allocated $1 million for expansion of the ROTC program and the return to a six-week active duty training period after cutting back to thirty days in 1934. Citizens'
Military Training Camp enrollments returned to 30,000 after falling to half that number in the preceding twoy e a r s . 3 7
In his final report. General MacArthur highlighted the importance of wisely using the new money. He cautioned against building large overhead
^^U.S. War Department, Annual Rqjort of the Secretary of War, 1 9 3 5 , 43-52. 185 organizations or spending money on post maintenance at the expense of revitalizing combat training programs. The Chief of Staff urged the Army to increase mobility in all branches and at all levels because . . nothing is more important to the future efficiency of the Army than to multiply its rate of movement."38 MacArthur's specific proposals for the use of the increased funds were to procure 18,000 motor vehicles to meet the needs of all branches; replace the "French 75" with the modernize 75mm piece; equip all active antiaircraft artillery units with new systems; arm every Regular Army rifleman with a semiautomatic rifle (and arm every National Guard riflemen over a five year period); mechanize one cavalry brigade, two tank regiments, an armored car troop for each cavalry division, a mechanized platoon for each Regular Army cavalry regiment, and seven tank companies for the
Regular Army divisions. He recommended the accumulation of a 30-day reserve of all types of ammunition and procurement of miscellaneous smaller items such as mortars, machineguns, searchlights, and signal equipment in sufficient quantities to equip the Regular Army and National
Guard Divisions at peace strength. Last, he urged the commencement of the first large-scale maneuvers with troops in 1 9 3 6 .3 9 With this optimistic prescription. General MacArthur passed the reins of Army leadership to
General Malin Craig.
General Malin C. Craig assumed duties as Army Chief of Staff in
October 1935. During his tenure, the United States Army gradually improved.
38u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 2935, 54-60.
39u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 2935, 68-69. 186 but would still be unprepared to wage large-scale, modern, industrial war in 1939. The National Defense Act of 1920 continued to define American military policy with the Regular Army forming the core around which the citizen components would rally in time of war. Neither General Craig nor the Secretary Woodring, however, were satisfied with the Army's ability to provide the protective shield behind which the citizen components were to mobilize. Woodring was intimately familiar with the War Department's mobilization plans. The entire mobilization plan, they believed, was unrealistic in its reliance on the depleted and obsolete World War I stocks.
Although non-threatening neighbors and two oceans afforded Americans the luxury of not maintaining a large standing army, war stocks, and a peacetime draft, it still required well-conceived, viable, mobilization plans that integrated the active forces, reserves, and industry. The existing plans did not take into account that "sums appropriated this year will not be fully transformed into military power for two years." Accordingly, the War
Department's first concern was the constitution of an immediately available forward defense shield behind which the nation and its armed forces could prepare for war. This translated to strengthening all three components of the
Army with priority to the forward defenses, improving the Air Corps, arming and equipping the Regular Army, and placing "educational orders" to exercise industry's ability to produce war munitions.40
^^U.S. War Department, "Annual Report of the Chief of Staff" in the Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1939 (Washington, D C.: Government Printing Office, 1939), 23-26; A nnual Report of the Secretary of War, 1936, 6; Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1938, 2. 187
The revised defense structure which evolved during the Craig years was an outgrowth of General MacArthur's mobilization plan for a 165,000- man Regular Army and 235,000-man National Guard. These forces constituted the 400,000-man Initial Protective Force that would shield the mobilization of the Army. Upon mobilization, the addition of 600,000 men to the Initial Protective Force would complete the Protective Mobilization Plan.
The War Department subsequently based its logistics planning on these strength figures.^l
International developments supported General Craig's estimate of the situation even if Congress and the American public remained only mildly concerned. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria was the first in a string of acts that warranted increased military readiness. The Spanish Civil War in
1936, continued Japanese advances in China, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia,
German aggression in Austria and Czechoslovakia, and finally the outbreak of general war in September 1939 argued at least for improving American defenses.
The Army's progress during the Craig years was encouraging compared to the preceding decade and a half. Army personnel strength reached 147,000 enlisted men in 1936 and would continue to increase through World War II
(Table 3). The Reserve Officers' Training Corps and Citizens' Military
Training Camps continued to expand with the former averaging over 6000
^^Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, 29-30. 188 new officers per year.42 Improved housing conditions, promotion prospects, and maintenance of training facilities fostered higher morale.^3
The personnel situation was far from satisfactory, however. The
Secretary of War and Chief of Staff pressed Congress to increase Regular
Army officer strength to 14,500 men and enlisted strength to 165,000 men to fill Air Corps vacancies and antiaircraft artillery regiment positions. He recommended increasing the officer strength over the next 4 to 5 years by annual increments of 500. The Army supplemented its officer corps under the authority of the Thomason Act which permitted the calling to active duty of 1000 reserve second lieutenants for service with the Regular Army for one year with subsequent permanent retention of the 50 best officers.44 He also recommended increasing the National Guard to 210,000 men to round out and balance existing organizations.45 General Craig supported the Secretary's appeal adding that the Army could not attain the minimum strength of
165,000 required to perform its missions due to budget limitations. He argued that maintaining the Army at less than the minimum required strength figures jeopardized national security because the nucleus around which the expanded Army was to be built could not exist.46 Indeed, with an increased
42u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1936, 36-37.
45u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1936, 1-4, 31-32.
44u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1937 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1937), 3-4.
45(J.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1937, 8-9.
45u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1937, 30-31. 189 strength of 165,000, the United States Army had still fallen to eighteenth among the world's a r m i e s . ^ 7 In addition to the Regular Army and Guard requirements, the Army needed approximately 120,000 reserve officers to meet its mobilization requirements. In 1936, it had nearly 96,000 men eligible for assignment, but could offer training to less than one-fourth of them. The
Civilian Conservation Corps continued to provide reserve officers with outstanding training in leadership and administration of large numbers of men, but the lack of tactical training associated with the experience reduced much of its value. While the officer reserve program was inadequate, at least i t existed; the enlisted Reserve was practicallynonexistent.^^
Early in General Craig's tenure, the Army shifted its emphasis from research and development of pilot models to acquiring large quantities of available modern equipment. The purpose of this shift was to equip the
Army with the best equipment currently available. When funds were scarce, the Army had focused on building only pilot models in an effort to stay abreast of emerging technology. Until the mid-1930s, however, the Army lacked the money for mass production of the standardized equipment.
Brigadier General George R. Spalding, Chief of the WDCS Supply Division,
C-4, initiated the curtailment of research and development spending until the Army had filled its current shortages.^9
^^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1938, 29.
^®U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1936, 35. 6,
^^Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, 42-43. 190
The Air Corps was a major beneficiary of the increased spending and continued to thrive despite competition from mechanization, antitank weapons, and antiaircraft armament acquisitions. The Air Corps continued to lead the other branches in both quality and quantity of equipment. The
Baker Board objective of procuring 2320 modern, serviceable aircraft by the end of fiscal year 1940 guided the aircraft procurement program in the late
1930s. The Army made notable progress in aircraft procurement. The
Secretary of War noted that, in 1937, American aircraft were equal to or better than any other produced in the world, though fewer in quantity. The need for a ready air force to supplement the Navy as the first line of defense and the long aircraft procurement cycle underpinned the high priority given its development.50 Policy makers in and out of the War Department shared the
Secretary's view. Aircraft procurement remained on track throughout the period.
In 1936, new weapons and equipment finally began to replace the old and obsolete material.^i The Chief of Staff reported "marked progress" in the
"mechanization, motorization, and modernization of Infantry, Cavalry, Field
Artillery, and Antiaircraft Artillery units in accordance with a definite War
Department plan."52 The Infantry received funds for limited production of
81mm mortars, .50 caliber machineguns. Ml semiautomatic rifles, an improved machinegun mount, and radio equipment for mechanized units.
50u.S. War Department,Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1937, 5.
5^U.S. War Department,Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1936, 4-5.
52u.S. War Department,Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1936, 37. 191
The mechanized cavalry brigade had "the major portion" of the equipment it required and the Army was procuring scout cars for mechanized cavalry platoons in the mounted regiments and tanks for the infantry's single tank regiment and divisional tank companies. The Army completed its light tank program in 1938 and was developing a medium tank for production in 1939.
Money was now available to purchase just over half of the minimum requirements for motor vehicles. The Field Artillery was adapting artillery gun and howitzer carriages for high-speed towing by motorized prime movers, had equipped most Regular units with an improved 75mm gun, and, in 1937, inaugurated a program to rearm the divisional artillery with
105mm guns. The first of five antiaircraft artillery regiments received "modern" equipment.53
Despite these encouraging developments, the Army remained woefully deficient in weapons and equipment. Although the Secretary of
War could report that "marked progress has been made in modernizing the equipment of our Army," he stressed that the program still needed to be accelerated in1 9 3 7 . 5 4 Only the active units of the Regular Army received new material. Moreover, the quantity of equipment received by the Regular units was still inadequate to support large scale training. The Army still lacked sufficient numbers of semiautomatic rifles, machineguns, and gas masks.
The Chief of Staff projected motorization to be only 67% complete in Regular
53u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1936, 37-38; Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1937, 34-35; Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1938, 33-34.
54u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1937, 5. 192
Army and 50% complete in the National Guard by the end of fiscal year 1938.
The National Guard received only sufficient quantities for training in peacetime which amounted to no more than a platoon's worth of equipment for an entire battalion.55
Deficiencies in antiaircraft defense of vital seacoast and harbor areas became an area of major concern in the late 1930s. The priority given to improving capabilities in this area was second only to that given to aviation.
The Chief of Staff underlined the vital need for antiaircraft material in his
1936 annual report as did the Secretary of War the followingy e a r . 5 6 General
Craig ranked the shortages of antiaircraft artillery among the most significant material deficiencies. The active antiaircraft regiments of the Regular Army still needed 3-inch antiaircraft guns, fire control equipment, height finders, and .50 caliber m achineguns.57 Although the high priority given to antiaircraft artillery modernization continued, the active regiments still lacked fire control equipment, searchlights, and minor armament required for full operation in 1939.58
Antitank armament also became a high priority for procurement during the second half of the1 9 3 0 s . 5 9 The Army had relied on the.5 0 caliber
55u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1936, 37-38; Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1937 , 6; Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1938, 33-34.
56u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1936, 37-38; Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1937, 6.
57u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1937, 34-35.
58u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1938, 33-34.
59u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1937, 34-35. 193 machinegun and 75mm artillery guns for antitank fire for most of the interwar period. The development of medium and heavy tanks with armor exceeding one inch thickness demanded the development of a more powerful antitank weapon. The Army still lacked an effective antitank weapon in 1938.
Limited production of a gun developed by the Ordnance Department was projected for fiscal year 1939.60
As late as 1938, the Army had not equipped completely any unit with modern weapons and equipment and, by 1939, the need for new types of equipment became apparent as reports from Europe highlighted the improving state of art. The G-4 loosened the tight clamp on research and development funds and supported increased spending for selected items, notably the development of mobile artillery, antiaircraft artillery, and antitank weaponry.61
The production of new types of equipment allowed the Army to begin field testing an experimental triangular division in the vicinity of Fort Sam
Houston in late 1937. The division, initially designed by the General Staff, had already been subjected to theoretical testing in the service schools. The
Army initiated the study in recognition of the changes in military technology since the World War. It had realized by the mid-1930s that technological developments had reduced the probability of stabilized warfare and that mobility was becoming increasingly important. Because larger units were less mobile than smaller ones, many began to question the utility of the World
60u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1938, 33-34.
61W atson, Chief of Staff; Prewar Plans and Preparations, 43-44. 194
War I square division organization. The rationale for retaining the square division had been its balance between mobility and, more important, the ability to penetrate enemy defenses. Now, the ability to penetrate was becoming less important than the tactical and operational mobility offered by a smaller organization. The study's objective was to decrease the size of the division without loss of firepower and to increase its mobility. The proposed division would number 13,500 men, a 39% reduction from the square division's postwar strength of 22,000. Corps and army organization were also under study, but would not be tested until the results of the infantry division test w ere k n o w n . 6 2 in 1938, the Army extended the test of triangularized organization to the cavalry division.63
Experimental field maneuvers in 1937, 1938, and 1939 culminated in the adoption of the triangular organization for Regular Army divisions
(Figure 2). In the triangular division, the Army organized all units from squad through regiment in threes — three squads to a platoon, three platoons to a company, three companies to a battalion, and three battalions to a regiment — while eliminating the brigade entirely. Triangularization supported a simple doctrine: one unit assaulted, the second supported by fire, and the third served as a reserve. The Army believed that the triangular division increased mobility without great loss of firepower. The "pooling" concept was one of the means the Army used to reduce the size of the
62u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1937, 34.6,
63john K. Mahon and Romana Danysh, Infantry, Part I: Regular Army (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), 56; U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of W ar, 1938, 33. 195 division and its subordinate units. Pooling involved removing nonessential units from lower echelon units and consolidating them at higher levels. This resulted in the creation of a weapons platoon at company level, a heavy weapons company in the infantry battalion, and the formation of antitank companies at regiment level. The end result was a smaller regiment and, hence, a smaller division. The army or corps commander would make the pooled assets available to the lower echelon commander as required by the tactical situation.64
XX IS, 245 MEN 48 HOWITZERS 68 ANTITANK GUNS
HHCand MP I^Ü ËË I T 11 SVC HHB i2x37m m
HEAVY 4 xlQSmm 4 xlOSmm 6x 37mm WEAPONS HOWITZER HOWITZER 8x75 mm
Figure 2. United States Army Triangular Division
*^‘^Mahon and Danysh, Infantry, Part I: Regular Army, 56-57. 196
General Craig heeded MacArthur's parting plea to resume field training as soon as practicable. Early in his tenure, MacArthur had established army headquarters between the corps area commands the War
Department General Staff to facilitate tactical control and the conduct of large- scale unit training. Previously, the corps areas headquarters were administrative organizations which focused almost solely on preparation for mobilization; they did not function as tactical headquarters. The divisions mobilized by the corps area commands reported directly to the War
Department for the execution of tactical missions. MacArthur imposed a tactical command and control structure in the form of a four-army organization upon the nine corps area commands. The army headquarters were to provide: 1) agencies for completion of War Department General Staff war plans, 2) commanders and staffs to execute the war plans and participate in large-unit command post exercises, 3) a protective force to shield mobilization, and 4) an emergency force for action short of general mobilization. The senior corps commander and his staff furnished the army headquarters. The four armies comprised an army group commanded by the
Chief of Staff. The WDGS War Plans Division provided the General
Headquarters staff in the event of war. The four armies were the First Army
(I, II, and 111 Corps Areas/North Atlantic), Second Army (V and VI Corps
Areas/Great Lakes), Third Army (IV and VIII Corps Areas/Gulf of Mexico), and Fourth Army (VII and IX Corps Areas/Pacific Coast). However, assumption of Civilian Conservation Corps duties in 1933 and budget 197 limitations delayed implementation of the four-army organization and the
conduct of meaningful training exercises.^^
One army conducted a command post exercise and one conducted field
maneuvers annually beginning in late 1935. In each of these army exercises, integration of the three components — Regulars, National Guard, and Organized Reserves — continued to be a prime training objective.66 The
Army completed the four year cycle of army maneuvers and command post exercises in 1939.67 Lack of combat support and combat service support troops severely reduced the effectiveness of the field exercises, however. The First
Army "maneuvered" in New York in 1935 with but a single active division.
The First Army's wartime composition included six corps, three Regular
Army divisions, six National Guard divisions, and nine Organized Reserve
Corps divisions. Moreover, personnel from the Second Corps Area headquarters provided the First Army staff. The entire exercise amounted to no more than an assembly drill for units in the northeastern states. The
Third Army's maneuvers in 1938 were not much more encouraging. While the Third Army did conduct a free two-sided maneuver between its units, less than a corps participated in the exercise. In 1939, the First Army executed its second large-scale maneuver with many of the same deficiencies that had
66u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1933, 11-15; Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1934, 36-38.
66u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1936, 1-4, 31-32.
67u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1936, 37; Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1937, 7, 31-32; Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1938, 33; U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1939 (Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1939), 23-30. 198 existed four years earlier. The army staff consisted of only two permanently assigned officers and the entire army and corps support troop list consisted of but two signal battalions. First Army was an army in name only. The army commander. General Hugh Drum, had stripped harbor defenses of the eastern seaboard to furnish the minimum essential personnel and equipment for army and corps support units. The First Army had to borrow tanks for the exercise since it had none of its own. The large number of missing units, personnel shortages, and equipment deficiencies in all of the large scale maneuvers conducted between 1935 and 1940 rendered the exercises almost useless for deriving meaningful lessons. Among the conclusions drawn by the Army commanders were to retain the square division and horse cavalry.68
Training the citizen components remained a high priority in addition to the new emphasis placed on upgrading the active forces. Although the
National Guard remained understrength, training and equipment steadily improved, most notably in the use of motor trucks for extended marches to and from annual encampments. Also of note, four National Guard divisions maneuvered with Regular Army units in 1936.69 The National Guard's greatest material shortcoming of the many from which it suffered was in modern antiaircraft armament.General Craig reported, "The total
68Jean R. Moenk, A History of Large-Scale Maneuvers in the United States, 1935-1964, (Fort Monroe, Virginia: Historical Branch, Office of the Chief of Staff for Military Operations and Reserve Forces, U. S. Continental Army Command, 1969), 21-26.
69u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1936, 5, 34-35.
^^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1937, 7, 31-32. 199 equipment in the 10 National Guard antiaircraft regiments is inadequate to equip one of them completely for war service."^^
Reflecting on the Army's improvement during his tenure. General
Craig wrote optimistically in his final report as Chief of Staff in June 1939.
The Army had, indeed, progressed to a higher state of readiness than at any time during the interwar period. The Regular Army had attained a minimum sufficient strength. The National Guard could boast 18 nearly complete infantry divisions and three cavalry divisions. The National Guard had also completed the organization of 10 antiaircraft regiments and was in the process of equipping them. The ROTC and CMTC programs continued to thrive. The Army had updated 249 tables of organization and equipment since June 1938 to integrate modern equipment and motor transport. The triangular infantry division was nearly completed while the cavalry division and mechanized cavalry brigade were under study in pursuit of ways to improve their organization. The Army had also begun to study the feasibility of merging the Coast Artillery and Field Artillery. Training activities included the previously mentioned tests of the experimental divisions, combined air force and antiaircraft exercises, and joint exercises with the
Navy. Equipment procurement was progressing rapidly. General Craig reported that funds projected for fiscal year 1940 were sufficient to equip the
400,000 man Initial Protective Force, but admitted that the Army still lacked war reserves for the Initial Protective Force and the initial issue for the
^^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1937, 31. 200 additional 600,000 soldiers called to arms under the Protective Mobilization
Plan. Airplane procurement was now proceeding at double the quantity recommended by the Baker Board. By the end of fiscal year 1940, General
Craig forecast the Initial Protective Force would have its full complement of light tanks and that one medium tank regiment would be on hand. He also projected 79% completion of motorization of the Regular Army and 80% of the National Guard. The National Guard with all of its deficiencies was still in a higher state of peacetime readiness than at any time in its history.
Finally, General Craig proudly announced that the next fiscal year's appropriations would provide the new semiautomatic rifle, 81mm mortar,
37mm antitank gun, gas masks, and machineguns of various calibers to all
Initial Protective Force units and meet 2/3 of the requirement for 60mm mortars.72 General Craig could point with pride to the great strides the Army had taken since 1935. It did not change the fact, however, that in 1939 the
United States lacked an army capable of taking the field against a modern military power.
General George C. Marshall replaced General Craig as Chief of Staff in
September 1939. He looked back on the Army of 1939 from the vantage point of a Chief of Staff on the verge of going to war in his 1941Biennial Report to the Secretary of War:
72u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1937, 34; Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1938, 33; Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1939, 23-30. 201
The active Army of the United States consisted of approximately 174,000 enlisted men scattered over 130 posts, camps, and stations. Within the United States we had no field army. There existed the mere framework of about 3 1/2 square divisions approximately 50% complete as personnel and scattered among a number of Army posts. There was such a shortage in motor transportation that divisional training was impracticable. There were virtually no corps units, which are necessary for the functioning of the larger tactical units. The Air Corps consisted of but 62 tactical squadrons. The funds which were authorized for training were less than 5% of the annual War Department appropriations. As an Army we were ineffective. Our equipment, modern at the conclusion of the World War, was now in a large measure obsolescent. In fact, during the post-war period, continuing paring of appropriations had reduced the Army virtually to the status of a third rate power. 73
Except for the existence of plans, the Secretary of War believed that "the situation in 1 9 4 0 was immeasurably worse than in 1 9 1 7 . " 7 4
With Europe at war and the likelihood of American involvement growing, the Army strove frantically to create a force capable of winning on the modern battlefield. The Army would have only two years to integrate nearly twenty years of advances in military technology and master related tactical and operational skills. The nation's choice to limit military expenditures, reflected in Congressional budget appropriations, and the
Army's decision to maintain the largest possible force resulted in the gradual
73u.S. War Department, "Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff, July 1, 1939 to June 30, 1941" in the Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1941, 47-48.
74u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1941, 2. 202 deterioration of the field forces. Throughout the interwar years, most units lacked the manpower to conduct meaningful training. The few units that could muster at wartime strength trained with World War I vintage weapons and equipment. The resulting training was unrealistic and potentially counterproductive. The gradual increases of money, men, and material beginning in 1935, presented the first opportunity for thorough research, development, testing, and evaluation of new weapons, equipment, organizations, and doctrine. It was then, over a decade after the publication of
Field Service Regulations 1923, that the Army began to revise its operational doctrine. The remaining chapters discuss the process of doctrine development and evaluate the doctrine itself as embodied Field in Service
Regulations 1939. CHAPTER VIII
W RITING FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS 1939
A Field Service Regulations brought up to date and properly revised is the basic document from which the tactical doctrine should spring. — Major General John L. DeWitt^ Commandant, Army War College
The Army undertook the second postwar revision of its training publications in the late 1920s in response to dissatisfaction with the pamphlet system developed immediately after the First World War. General
Summerall based his decision to launch the Field Manual Project in August
1927 on the belief that the issuance of training regulations in pamphlet form
"did not meet the needs of troop commanders for handy reference data for use in the field."^ Notably, modernization of doctrine was not a major reason for the latest revision. In 1928, the WDGS G-3 Division developed a list of manuals for inclusion in the Field Manual Project. The list initially included a two-volume Field Service Regulations, a staff officers' field manual, eight
^ Major General George A. Lynch, "The Infantry," Lecture delivered to Army War College G-3 Course 1938-39, Document #5, 20 Sep 1938, TMs, pp. 5-6, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
^U.S. War Department, Memorandum from Brigadier General John H. Hughes, WDGS G-3, to Army Chief of Staff, "A Manual for Commanders of Large Units," 22 Aug 1935, Box 289, AGO File 062.11 (Training Manuals, Alphabetical Files - Commander of Large Units, section 2), Record Group 407, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
203 204 basic field manuals to address matters applicable to more than one arm, and manuals for each arm containing specific principles, doctrines, and methods governing the employment of the arm. The WDGS G-3 assigned responsibility for the basic field manuals and branch manuals to the arms and services. The G-3 and G-4 Divisions were to prepare the two volumes of the
Field Service Regulations.
MANUAL FOR COMMANDERS OF LARGE UNITS
The revision of the Field Service Regulations was controversial from the very start of the project. Major General Frank Parker, the WDGS G-3, and
Colonel Samuel C. Vestal, his principal action officer for the volume addressing operations, quickly concluded that the revised manual should be more specific in its treatment of large unit operations. Their efforts led to the development of a new manual, entitledA Manual for Commanders of Large
Units, that would supplement rather than replace Field Service Regidations
1923. Parker, the most powerful proponent of the new manual, explained the decision to a board of officers convened to review the manuscript on 25
March 1929.3 Parker believed that no existing manual provided "a ready
3u.S. War Department, "Proceedings of a Committee of Officers to Review the Manual for Commanders of Large Units," 25 Mar 1929, TMs, Box 289, AGO File 062.11 (Training Manuals, Alphabetical Files - Commander of Large Units, section 1), Record Group 407, National Archives, Washington, D.C. The committee members were: General Charles P. Summerall (Chief of Staff), Major General Hanson E. Ely (Commanding General, 2nd Corps Area), Major General William D. Connor (Commandant, Army War College), Major General Frank Parker (WDGS G-3), Brigadier General Edward L. King (Commandant, Command and General Staff School), Colonel Edward Croft (Infantry, WDGS G-3), Colonel Guy V. Henry (Cavalry, 3rd Cavalry, Fort Myer), Colonel Samuel C. Vestal (Coast Artillery, Historical Section, Army War College), Colonel Andrew Moses (Field Artillery, Instructor, Army War College), and 205 reference book for higher commanders.'"^ He stated thatField Service
Regulations 1923 contained but "brief and scattered directions for large units," made "little distinction between units, large and small," and offered only
"general precepts and directions which deal with no particular organization.''^ He concluded, "The fact that these Regulations are written to cover as they do units of all sizes, gives the book a limp and generic character."^ Parker sought to publish a manual that provided the large unit commander detailed guidance for the conduct of operations. He believed the new manual filled this gap in Army training literature by describing "in orderly and comprehensive fashion the functions and needs of large units and the specific responsibility of their commanders."^
Two important members of the review committee disagreed with
Parker. Major General William D. Connor, Commandant of the Army War
College, and Brigadier General Edward L. King, Commandant of the
Command and General Staff School, opposed publication of the manual.
Both officers objected to heavy borrowing from French doctrine and believed that in some instances the manual violated sound principles. Only the vote
Major Thomas D. Milling (Air Corps, Office of the Chief of Air Corps). Also present were Lieutenant Colonel W. S. Bowen and a recorder. Major Adna R. Chaffee (WDGS G-3).
^"Proceedings of a Committee of Officers to Review the Manual for Commanders of Large Units," 25 Mar 1929, TMs, p. 2.
^"Proceedings of a Committee of Officers to Review the Manual for Commanders of Large Units," 25 Mar 1929, TMs, pp. 2-3.
^"Proceedings of a Committee of Officers to Review the Manual for Commanders of Large Units," 25 Mar 1929, TMs, p. 3.
^"Proceedings of a Committee of Officers to Review the Manual for Commanders of Large Units," 25 Mar 1929, TMs, p. 3. 206 of the Chief of Staff himself could outbalance the powerful voices of the commandants of the Army's two most prestigious schools. General
Summerall sided with Parker, apparently convinced that a decided need for such a manual existed. All agreed, however, that the manual still needed work and determined that by 1 May each member would submit detailed criticisms of the draft manual to a subcommittee charged with writing the final draft. The Chief of Staff appointed Colonels Samuel C. Vestal, Guy V.
Henry, and Edward Croft to the subcommittee and assigned Major William
A. Ganoe as recorder.^
The two commandants remained adamantly opposed to the new manual. King thought the manual too bulky and detailed, filled with errors, contained much repetition of material inField Service Regulations 1923 and other Army publications, and unnecessarily contributed one more pamphlet to a publications scheme that had already grown too large. He did, however,
"recommend that a very careful revision of the Field Service Regulations be made at this time" since ten years had passed since the end of the First World
War.9 King also offered a chapter on large unit operations for inclusion in the next revision of theField Service Regulations in a last ditch effort to
8 "Proceedings of a Committee of Officers to Review the Manual for Commanders of Large Units," 25 Mar 1929, TMs, p. 5; U.S. War Department, Memorandum from Major General Frank Parker, WDGS G-3, to The Adjutant General, "Manual for Commanders of Large Units," 27 Mar 1929, Box 289, AGO File 062.11 (Training Manuals, Alphabetical Files - Commander of Large Units, section 1), Record Group 407, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
^U.S. War Department, Memorandum from Brigadier General Edward L. King, Commandant, Command and General Staff School, to The Adjutant General, "Manual for (Commanders of Large Units," 1 Apr 1929, Box 289, AGO File 062.11 (Training Manuals, Alphabetical Files - Commander of Large Units, section 1), Record Group 407, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 207 preserve the publication of American doctrine in a singlemanual.Major
General Connor also continued to argue against the manual stating that its
"deplorable lack of concrete matter" and "glittering generalities" made it unworthy of publication.^^ Despite the lack of support from the Command and General Staff School and the Army War College, the subcommittee completed the revision and mailed it to the board members for final review in July 1929.
The selection of Brigadier General King to replace Parker as WDCS C-3 in the latter half of 1929 portended an uncertain future for the new manual.
By the end of the year, the subcommittee had completed its work and the manual was ready for publication and distribution. King, however, suggested to General Summerall that because the manual "was prepared and reviewed by a comparatively small group of officers. . . that it may be lacking in that clarity, logical arrangement, and exactness of statement desirable in a final document of such im portance."^^ He convinced the Chief of Staff to issue the manual in provisional form with a requirement for corps area and department commanders, commandants of the general service schools, chiefs of the arms and services, and all general officers to submit comments and
^^King to The Adjutant General, "Manual for Commanders of Large Units," 1 Apr 1929. l^U.S. War Department, Memorandum from Major General William D. Connor, Commandant, Army War College, to Major General Frank Parker, WDGS G-3, "Manuscript for a Manual of Large Units," 10 Apr 1929, Box 289, AGO File 062.11 (Training Manuals, Alphabetical Files - Commander of Large Units, section 1), Record Group 407, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
^^U.S. War Department, Memorandum from Brigadier General Edward L. King, WDGS G-3, to General Summerall, Army Chief of Staff, "Printing 'A Manual of Large Units,'" 23 Dec 1929, Box 289, AGO File 062.11 (Training Manuals, Alphabetical Files - Commander of Large Units, section 1), Record Group 407, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 208
recommendations within sixm o n t h s . The War Department distributed the
Manual for Commanders of Large Units (Provisional), Volume - I
Operations, in May 1930 with a suspense date of 15 November for comments from reviewers. The manual remained in provisional form until its eventual replacement by revised Field Service Regulations nine years later.
The Army began work on yet a third combined arms manual in the early 1930s adding to the confusion that had begun to characterize American doctrine. The WDGS G-3 had intended for Volume VIII of the Basic Field
Manual series. Operations of Combined Arms (Small Units), to link the
Manual for Commanders of Large Units with the Field Manuals for the
Arms. The Army never completed Operations of Combined Arms, but it remained part or the Field Manual Project until 1936. Meanwhile, the Army had its hands full attempting to reconcile differences between theManual for
Commanders of Large Units and theField Service Regulations A
DIVERSE DOCTRINES
The Manual for Commanders of Large Units (Provisional) (Volume 1,
Operations) 1930 was a 74-page document that addressed army, corps, infantry and cavalry division, and special operations. The WDGS G-3 based much of
^^King to Summerall, "Printing 'A Manual of Large Units,'" 23 Dec 1929.
^'^U.S. War Department, Memorandum from Lieutenant Colonel Ralph M. Parker, Acting WDGS G-3, to The Adjutant General, "Field Manual Project," 17 Apr 1930, Box 283, AGO File 062.11 (Army Manuals), Record Group 407, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; U.S. War Department, Memorandum from Major General John H. Hughes, WDGS G-3, to The Adjutant General, "Basic Field Manual, Chapter VIII - Operations of the Combined Arms," 6 Oct 1936, Box 283, AGO File 062.11 (Army Manuals), Record Group 407, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 209 the manual on the French War Ministry'sProvisional Instruction on the
Tactical Employment of Large Units (1921). In fact, the first draft was mostly a translation of the French manual. The final draft, reflecting the objections of
King and Connor, integrated parts Fieldof Service Regulations 1923 but still retained many features of the French doctrine. As a result, conflicts between the Manual for Commanders of Large Units and the Field Service
Regulations existed and drew the attention of officers at the Command and
General Staff School and the Army War College. When the Command and
General Staff School began teaching from theManual for Commanders of
Large Units instead of theField Service Regulations, the differences between the manuals became increasingly noticeable.
One of the first critics of the new manual was none other than
Lieutenant Colonel George A. Lynch, a principal author ofField Service
Regulations 1923 and now a student in the 1929-1930 Army War College class.
He prepared an individual study highlighting the discrepancies between the two manuals for the War Department General Staff which was then considering publishing the product. Lieutenant Colonel Lynch wrote:
The object of this study has been to demonstrate that these features of French tactics are based upon a very different conception of battle from our own and that their adoption involves a radical revision of all our tactical regulations, those governing the tactical conduct of small as well as of large units. The approval of a Manual for Large Units based upon French principles without such revision would leave us with a 210
hybridized tactical doctrine which would produce the utmost confusion in our training and tacticalinstruction. 15
The G-3 Division noted Lynch's memorandum as a "work of exceptional merit," but published the controversial Manual for Commanders of Large
Units a n y w a y .
Eight years later. Major General John L. DeWitt, a former member of the War Department General Staff committee that conducted the final review of Field Service Regulations 1923 and now Commandant of the Army War
College, attempted to explain the decision to publish theManual for
Commanders of Large Units in response to a question posed by an Army War
College student. DeWitt recalled:
When The Manual for Commanders of Large Units was first written, the manuscript was sent to the War College. We went over it here and called attention to the fact that it was practically a translation of the French manual of the same name. We took paragraph after paragraph and noted beside each paragraph, the paragraph of the French manual from which it was copied. Then those paragraphs remaining that were not copied from the French were taken verbatim from the F.S.R. We recommended against its publication, first because it involved the doctrine of a foreign nation and we felt we should adopt our own, and because we felt the Field Service Regulations of 1923 were comprehensive enough, feeling the Field Service Regulations was the one book that should contain the basic doctrine for all arms and for the combined forces and should be revised from
^^Major General George A. Lynch, "Tactical Doctrine Governing the Employment of Large Units and its Relation to the Tactics of Small Units," 1 Mar 1930," TMs, p. 12, George A. Lynch Papers, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. l^Lynch, "Tactical Doctrine," 1 Mar 1930," TMs, p. 12. 211
time to time as developments in weapons and tactics took place as a result of the passage of time. But that was disapproved by the General Staff and the book was published. I feel that is the cause of the confusion: the two books. A Field Service Regulations brought up to date and properly revised is the basic document from which the tactical doctrine should spring. But that is the reason. They wanted that book, the Manual for Commanders of Large Units, and it was published against the advice of a good many people who studied it.^^
For the better part of the 1930s, the Army maintained two conflicting doctrinal manuals. The differences between the French-flavored doctrine contained in the
Manual for Commanders of Large Units and American doctrine prescribed in the Field Service Regulations were significant and clearly warranted a choice between one or the o t h e r . ^8 Because the two manuals coexisted for nearly a decade, their differences are worth description. The French based their doctrine on the successive application of force, or "methodical battle." The methodical battle stressed the dominance of firepower and resulting superiority of the defense on the modern battlefield, the two most important lessons of the World War in the eyes of the French military. A key tenet of the methodical battle was the centralized control of battlefield decision making to ensure the perfectly sequenced commitment of subordinate units.
A clearly discernable "one-two" count characterized both the attack and
^^Lynch, "The Jnfantry," TMs, pp. 5-6.
^®For a detailed discussion of French doctrine in the interwar period, see Robert A. Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939 (H am den, Connecticut: Shoestring Press, 1985). Chapters 1,4, and 5 address the French postwar doctrine and its origins. 212 defense. The attacker first engaged the enemy on a broad front, then conducted the decisive attack; the defender first checked the enemy penetration, then counterattacked. American doctrine hinged on applying concentrated and simultaneous force in a battle of annihilation. Each approach had its weaknesses. The French doctrine was cautious, risked losing the initiative, and relied on the piecemeal application of force. The American approach risked striking a "blow in the void" and loss ofcontrol.In essence, one approach stressed aggressive offensive action to destroy the enemy force while the other focused more on the preservation of its own forces. Each clearly reflected the nation's different experiences in the World
War. These fundamentally different philosophies necessitated different approaches to the conduct of combat operations.
The French doctrine drew no distinction between reconnaissance and security. The French advance guard was the the spearhead of the main attack, the first echelon of combat. The security mission subsumed the reconnaissance mission. Upon contact with the enemy, the French advance guard attacked. The advance guard received successively larger reinforcements from the main body extending the front of attack and fixing the enemy all along the line of contact. The main body then delivered the decisive attack at the point in the line where it could reinforce success. The
French built the defense around successive defensive lines the strength of
I^Lynch, "Tactical Doctrine," 1 Mar 1930," TMs, p. 12; Final Report of the Chief of Infantry, 30 Apr 1941, Appendix IX ("The Infantry," lecture delivered at Army War College, 20 Sep 1938), p. 7, George A. Lynch Papers, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 213 which rested on "a good system of fires [and] a judicious organization of terrain." Each line maintained a local counterattack force for successive employment until the enemy penetration was defeated.20
In American operations, the advance guard was a security force geared to shield the main body's deployment. Reconnaissance and security were usually two separate missions. In the attack, the Field Service Regulations prescribed making contact with a small force then striking with the main force using the best available estimate of the enemy's dispositions. The
American doctrine for defensive operations stressed surprise, concealment of positions, and deception in the selection of positions and maintenance of a large, mobile reserve for counterattack on the flanks of the enemy penetration.
In summary, the major themes of the American doctrine inField
Service Regulations 1923 and the FrenchProvisional Instruction on the
Tactical Employment of Large Units (1921) were radically different. The
American manual continued to stress the primacy of infantry, morale, and the offensive. On the other hand, the French manual clearly rejected the pre-
W orld W ar I offensive à outrance in favor of firepower and the defense. The
Am erican Manual for Commanders of Large Units echoed the French way of war particularly in its emphasis on gaining contact and engaging the enemy, concepts of security and employment of the advance guard, extreme depth of the army in deployment, "one-two" cadence of combat operations, and the
^Olynch, "Tactical Doctrine," 1 Mar 1930," TMs, p. 11-12; Final Report, pp. 1-37.
Lynch, "Tactical Doctrine," 1 Mar 1930," TMs, p. 11-12; Final Report, pp. 1-37. 214 use of successive lines for defense.22 The Manual for Commanders of Large
Units clearly leaned toward the French approach in prescribing "as long as the the enemy is capable of offering a coordinated resistance, the attack in itself should be a step-by-step forward movement from one good position to another." 23 These and other tell-tale statements meant that the two doctrines were incompatible and their coexistence could only confuse students struggling to learn operations and tactics. This doctrinal chasm between the
Field Service Regulations and the Manual for Commanders of Large Units remained officially unchanged until the 1939 publication of the revisedField
Service Regulations.
WRITING THE MANUAL
As late as 1935, the Army had yet to publish a complete capstone doctrine manual. Volume I, Operations, of the Manual for Commanders of
Large Units remained in provisional form and Volume II,Administration, was still in draft. Field Service Regulations 1923 was still the Army's principal doctrine publication. With the departure of Major General Parker and General Summerall from the War Department General Staff, theManual for Commanders of Large Units lost the powerful sponsorship required to push the work through the Army bureaucracy. Resistance to manuals from the field and schools further slowed the manual's progress.
22Lynch, "The Infantry," TMs, p. 18.
23u. S. War Department, Manual for Commanders of Large Units (Provisional) (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1930), 10. 215
In the mid-1930s, modernization became an increasingly important concern. Although the Great Depression had significantly slowed the pace of modernization, technological advances demanded reassessment of doctrine.
In 1934, General MacArthur established a board to determine whether the
Army's training and doctrine had kept pace with his modernization initiatives instituted in 1931. The modernization of training and doctrine, he believed, could not begin until after the Army had decided upon new organizations and equipment. The board found American methods "were based on sound tactical doctrine and adapted to modern conditions," 24 but it also reported that many officers believed theField Service Regulations did not "take full cognizance of many improvements in armament and other means of combat."25 Within the War Department General Staff, revising the capstone doctrine manual remained a low priority project despite the increased interest in modernization.
By 1935, the WDGS G-3 had finally begun to question the usefulness of retaining both the Manual for Commanders of Large Units and the Field
Service Regulations. The issue arose as a result of the WDGS G-4's failure to publish Volume II of the Manual for Commanders of Large Units after five years. The WDGS G-4, Brigadier General Charles S. Lincoln, recommended
24u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of Vlar, 1934 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1934), 60-62; U.S. War Department, Memorandum from Colonel E. L. Gruber, Acting WDGS G-3, to Army Chief of Staff, "Field Service Regulations, Volume I, Operations," 4 Aug 1939, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
25Cruber to Army Chief of Staff, "Field Service Regulations, Volume I, Operations," 4 Aug 1939. 216 against publishing the second volume. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Major
General George S. Simonds, directed the WDGS G-3, Brigadier General John
H. Hughes, to review Lincoln's recommendation and assess the effect on the
Field Manual Project. Hughes not only agreed with Lincoln's recommendation concerning Volume II, he added:
The G-3 Division believes the Volume I, Operations, as published, and that Volume II, Administration, and Volume VIII, Operations of the Combined Arms, in their present draft form, do not adequately replace Field Service Regulations (1923). It appears preferable to abandon the idea of rewriting the Field Service Regulations under three titles and to contemplate the revision of Field Service Regulations as such. However, it appears impracticable to rewrite the Field Service Regulations at this time, in view of the major changes in prospect in organization, supply methods and tactics and technique of the separate and combined arms arising for post war development in weapons, motorization and mechanization and the creation of the GHQ Air Force.
The WDGS G-3 formulated a tentative plan for the revision ofField Service
Regulations 1923, but temporarily suspended the work for several reasons.
Key among the reasons delaying work on the new manual were: 1) the development of several new untested weapons systems which signalled potential changes in tactical doctrine, 2) the Army's contemplation of infantry and cavalry division reorganization in response to increased use of motor transport and availability of new weaponry, and 3) the War Department's decision to finish fielding manuals to support lower echelon training of the 217
com bat a r m s . 26 As a result, the Field Service Regulations re m a in ed untouched for two more years and the conflict between it andManual for
Commanders of Large Units persisted.
Seemingly never far from the Field Service Regulations, M ajor
General George A. Lynch, newly appointed as Chief of Infantry, rekindled interest in revising the manual in 1937.27 His appointment as Chief of
Infantry capped an impressive career. Lynch's staff experience during and since the World War included service at division, corps, and theater levels, as well as eight years in three different divisions of the War Department
General Staff. Upon leaving the War Department General Staff, he attended the Army War College and subsequently served as executive officer in the
31st Infantry stationed in the Philippines. He deployed with the unit to Shanghai in 1932 in response to deteriorating relations between China and
Japan in the early thirties. In 1934, he was the principal assistant to the
National Recovery Act Administrator, General Hugh Johnson. Then-
Colonel Lynch was in command of the 15th Infantry Regiment when appointed Chief of Infantry and promoted to major general in May 1937.28
Major General Lynch had not forgotten the conflict between the doctrine embodied in theField Service Regulations 1923 and theManual for
Commanders of Large Units and moved quickly using his influence as Chief
26Cruber to Army Chief of Staff, "Field Service Regulations, Volume I, Operations," 4 Aug 1939.
27hynch, Final Report, TMs, pp. 68-75.
28c. D. Alcott, "A N ew Major General," Yankee Clipper (Mar 1937), 9. 218 of Infantry to resolve it. In his final report as Chief of Infantry he recounted his frustration with the lack of a capstone operations manual. He wrote that at the beginning of his term of office he:
recognized the urgency of modernizing the tactics of the infantry but was confronted with the fact that two basic directives issued by the War Department, the Field Service Regulations and the Manual for Commanders of Large Units, were not only obsolete but stood in diametric contradiction with each other as to matters of fundamental doctrine. These documents were supposed to be basic directives for the guidance of the several arms in the preparation of their tactical manuals, but their obsolescence and contradictory character made it impossible to base any system of infantry tactics upon them.29
Although Lynch clearly preferred the American doctrine, his purpose was not to criticize the French doctrine as much as it was to force a choice between one or the other. He noted that French doctrine at all levels consistently supported their capstone manual. The United States Army, on the other hand, could not begin to develop supporting doctrine until it published a single, unified, operations doctrine. In his speech to the Army War College class in September 1938, he discarded the traditional "state of the Infantry" address to focus on "The subject that is pressing us most closely . . . the simplification and clarification of our tactical regulations, their condensation and th eir m odernization. "^0 He stressed that "conflict as to matters of fundamental doctrine pervade our whole system of tactical regulations.
^^Lynch, Final Report, p. 68.
^^Lynch, "The Infantry," TMs, p. 1. 219 rendering impossible any unity of teaching, either in our schools or in the regiments."31 He concluded, "I think it is clear that we cannot follow two contradictory principles in our revision. We can't sing in tune with both the
F.S.R. and theManual for Commanders of Large Units — all we could do would be to produce a discord. . . . Either theF.S.R. or the Manual for
Commanders of Large Units m ust be discarded."32 Major General Lynch succeeded in bringing the issue to the Chief of Staff's attention.
In late July 1937, the Chief of Staff, General Craig, expedited the revision of Field Service Regulations 1923. He directed an investigation of doctrinal conflicts between theField Service Regulations and theManual for Commanders of Large Units. The Chief of Staff's memorandum required an explanation of the "diverse doctrines" being taught in the field. The Secretary of the General Staff routed the memorandum to the G-3, Brigadier General
George P. Tyner, for action.33 Within G-3, the Training Branch was responsible for training publications to include theField Service Regulations.
The Training Branch was the largest of the three G-3 branches employing 10 of the 19 officers assigned to the division. Colonel Edmund L. Gruber, Chief of the Training Branch in 1937, was to supervise the revision. He would later
31 Lynch, "The Infantry," TMs, p. 1.
32Lynch, Final Report, Appendix IX, p. 37; "The Infantry," TMs, p. 19.
33u.S. War Department, Memorandum from Brigadier General George P. Tyner, WDGS G-3, to Army Chief of Staff, "Diverse Doctrines," 27 Oct 1937, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; U.S. War Department, Memorandum from Major General R. M. Beck, Jr., WDGS G-3, to Commandant, Command and General Staff School, "Draft of the new Field Service Regulations, Volume I, Operations," 20 Apr 1939, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 220 become the principal author and coordinator of the 1941 revision as
Commandant of the Command and General Staff School.34
Brigadier General Tyner responded to the Chief of Staff's memorandum by explaining that the G-3 Division had already begun work on the manual as part of the ongoing Field Manual Project. He stressed that the project contemplated revision ofField Service Regulations 1923 and the
Manual for Commanders of Large Units. As the capstone manual in the series, he assured General Craig that the Field Service Regulations held top priority for early completion.35
By early 1937, the WDGS G-3 had completed a tentative outline for the new manual. The G-3 proposed dividing the manual into three volumes.
He explained the proposed organization to the Chief of Staff as follows:
a. Volume I - Operations. - This volume will contain the fundamental considerations governing the employment of the combined arms. It will be based on Part I, Operations, of Field Service Regulations, 1923. Details of the preparation of orders, transmission of orders, and data subject to change now contained in the Staff Officers' Field Manual will be omitted. A large part of the subject matter on troop movements and shelter will be more appropriately placed in Volume II on Administration and in the Staff Officers' Field Manual.
b. Volume II - Administration. - This volume will contain the fundamental considerations governing the employment of the combined services. It will be based on Part II,
^^Tyner to Army Chief of Staff, "Diverse Doctrines," 27 Oct 1937; Beck to Commandant, Command and General Staff School, "Draft of the new Field Service Regulations, Volume 1, Operations," 20 Apr 1939.
^^Tyner to Army Chief of Staff, "Diverse Doctrines," 27 Oct 1937. 221
Administration, Field Service Regulations. Data subject to constant change will be placed in the Staff Officers' Field Manual.
Ç. Volume III - Large Formations. - This volume will contain the strategical, tactical, and administrative employment of large formations. It will replace the present Manual for Commanders of Large Units. It is to be a guide rather than a Manual for Commanders and Staffs of Large Units. The subject matter, however, is to be coordinated with Volumes I and 11.^6
The G-3 Division would prepare Volumes I and III; the G-4 Division held responsibility for Volume II. The Command and General Staff School would prepare the Staff Officers' Field Manual. Brigadier General Tyner advised
General Craig that he could not provide a specific date for completion of the project, but anticipated completion of a preliminary draft of the revisedField
Service Regulations by 1 May 1938.37 One of the more significant actions delaying the manual was the ongoing experimentation with divisional organization.38 General Craig approved the outline and work continued on the project with a new sense of urgency.39
3^Tyner to Army Chief of Staff, "Diverse Doctrines," 27 Oct 1937.
37Tyner, to Army Chief of Staff, "Diverse Doctrines," 27 Oct 1937.
38u.S. War Department, Memorandum from Lieutenant Colonel R. B. Woodruff, WDGS G-3, to Major Christenbury, Publications Division, Adjutant General's Officer, 12 Feb 1938, Box 2, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
3^U.S. War Department, Memorandum from Major A. D. Bruce to Chief, Training Branch, WDGS G-3, "PM 100-15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units (Larger Formations)," 18 Mar 1940, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 222
Colonel Gruber's revision of the Field Service Regulations occupied most of his time for nearly two years.^O Colonel Edmund L. "Snitz" Gruber, a
1904 West Point graduate and field artillery officer, appeared well-qualified to write the draft. He had taught at the Command and General Staff College for five years during which time the Manual for Commanders of Large Units had been introduced for instruction. He had supervised much of the work on the
Field Manual Project as Chief of the Training Branch and had also prepared several studies recommending tactical doctrine for the employment of new weapons and capabilities. He appeared to be well-versed in tactical doctrine and understood staff coordination procedures as well.
Colonel Gruber attempted to survey completely all developments that might effect tactical doctrine. He incorporated the results of new equipment service tests and data obtained from Army maneuvers including the field tests of the Provisional Infantry and Cavalry Divisions. He also integrated the findings from the report of the War Department Air Corps Board appointed to study the employment of aviation in 1939. The G-3 formally tasked selected commands and agencies to comment on rthe n a n u a h ^ l
The tasking drew mixed responses ranging from high quality analyses to an apparent complete lack of concern for the effort. For example, in mid-
December, 1938, the G-4 tasked the Surgeon General to revise portions of the manual pertaining to hospitalization and evacuation in view of recent
40E. L. Gruber to Lesley J. McNair, 7 Aug 39, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
Gruber to Army Chief of Staff, "Field Service Regulations, Volume I, Operations," 4 Aug 1939. 223 developments in motorization and mechanization. The Surgeon General responded four months later by explaining that it could not provide the information until after the War Department had decided upon the doctrine for combined arms operations and employment of larger units. The Surgeon
General correctly indicated that the tactical employment of medical support depended directly on "the character of the tactical operation to be undertaken and the distribution and employment of the troops to be supported."42 In short, the Surgeon General complained that Colonel Gruber was putting the cart before the horse.
The Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service complained that he had not received a draft of the proposed manual for comment. He obtained a copy and offered eight pages of single-spaced typewritten material for incorporation into the manual. His introductory comments highlighting the many significant changes that had occurred in the field of chemical warfare evidently failed to impress Colonel Gruber as few of the comments survived the final editing process.
Upon completion of the lengthy staffing process. Colonel Gruber and his principal assistant. Major Andrew D. Bruce, consolidated and reviewed comments from the WDGS divisions. Chiefs of Arms and Services, and
42u.S. War Department, Memorandum from The Surgeon General to The Adjutant General, "Revision of Field Service Regulations, United States Army, 1923," 1st Indorsement, 10 Apr 1939, Adjutant General File 062.11 FM 100-5 , Record Group 407, National Archives, W ashington, D.C. 224
Army schools through early 1939. Then, Colonel Gruber alone revised the entire draft to ensure consistency throughout the text.^3
Major General Robert M. Beck, Jr., the G-3 since March, distributed few copies of Colonel Gruber's draft of the new Field Service Regulations,
Volume I, Operations for comment. Major General Lynch, the Chief of
Infantry, was not on the distribution list. He would later complain:
Only a few brief pages of this text had been transmitted to the chiefs of branches for comment. The great body of the regulation was prepared in the utmost secrecy. This procedure had two adverse effects: it negatived any parallel development of tactical doctrine by the War Department and the chiefs of arms; and no common basis for the revision of the tactics of the arms was made available.^^
The G-3 may have realized that offering Major General Lynch an opportunity to comment on the revised manual would probably have delayed further its publication since he was a harsh critic of current doctrine and the Army's handling of the development process. By mid-1939, the Army urgently needed the revised doctrine to guide the completion of supporting manuals and important field training projected for the next fiscal year.
The G-3 sent the manuscript to Brigadier General Lesley J. McNair,
Commandant of the Command and General Staff School, for comments on
43Cruber to Army Chief of Staff, "Field Service Regulations, Volume I, Operations," 4 Aug 1939.
^^Lynch, Final Report, p. 68. 225
20 April 1939. In the transmittal memorandum. Major General Beck emphasized:
. . . the fundamental tactical doctrine for the employment of the combined arms as laid down in our FSR (1923) has been carefully restudied and is adhered to as sound. Cognizance has been taken, however of new weapons and means that are now available to our army, and the results of tests with new organizations andw e a p o n s . 4 5
The tone of the memorandum discouraged comments although its purpose was to solicit recommendations for improvements. The final sentence suggesting that the Commandant "informally" bring "any minor changes recommended" to the Chief of the Training Branch underlined the G-3's apparent satisfaction with the manual and reluctance to make major changes^G Brigadier General McNair was the most important reviewer of the new manual. As Commandant of the Command and General Staff School, he headed the organization responsible for instructing the Army's field and senior company grade officers in combined arms operations. His assignment as Commandant was a deliberate step taken to revitalize instruction at the
^^u.S. War Department, Memorandum from Major General R. M. Beck, Jr., WDGS G-3, to Commandant, Command and General Staff School, "Draft of the new Field Service Regulations, Volume I, Operations," 20 Apr 1939, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
^^Beck to Commandant, Command and General Staff School, "Draft of the new Field Service Regulations, Volume 1, Operations," 20 Apr 1939. 226 critically important educational institution.^^ Brigadier General McNair was one of the Army's great trainers and would play a major role in preparing the
Army for World War II. He graduated in the top 10% of the West Point class of 1904 and received his commission in the field artillery. He served in various Ordnance Department assignments, observed artillery training in
France in 1913, and participated in the 1914 Vera Cruz and the 1916 Punitive
Expeditions before the First World War. He deployed to France with the 1st
Division as an assistant chief of staff for training, but moved to the American
Expeditionary Forces General Staff where his talents carried him quickly from major to brigadier general, the youngest in the AEF at age thirty-five. McNair sat on the AEF's Lassiter Board convened to study the Army's experience with motor drawn artillery. After the war, McNair reverted to his permanent rank of major and reported to Fort Leavenworth for instructor duty. He was at
Leavenworth during the preparation ofField Service Regulations 1923, but did not participate in its revision. McNair subsequently served as assistant commandant of the Field Artillery School, Purdue University's Professor of
Military Science and Tactics, and with the Civilian Conservation Corps. He also attended the Arm)' War College before regaining his rank of brigadier general and command of 2nd Field Artillery Brigade. He participated in the tests which eventually led to the replacement of the square division with the more flexible and maneuverable triangular organization. This experience made him particularly attractive to the Army's senior leadership when
^^Larry I. Bland, ed. The Papers of George Catlett Marshall (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 1:702-03. 227 seeking officers to lead reorganization efforts after 1939. Brigadier General
McNair remained at Leavenworth for just over a year putting his stamp on the revision of both Field Service Regulations 1939 and Field Service
Regulations 1941 before General Marshall summoned him to Washington as
General Headquarters chief of staff where he would oversee the mobilization and training of forces for combat overseas. He would eventually attain the rank of lieutenant general and command the two million man Army Ground
Forces before his death in 1943, the first American three-star general to die on the battlefield. American aircraft, preparing the way for the VII Corps breakout during Operation COBRA, inadvertently bombed American forces killing over 600 soldiers, among them Lieutenant General McNair. He received a posthum ous prom otion to general in 1954.48
Although having assumed duties the very month the manuscript arrived for review, the new Commandant was well qualified for the task of reviewing the manual having recently served as chief of staff for the
Provisional Infantry Division tested at Camp Bullis, Texas, in 1938. This test was among the several conducted in the late 1930s that spawned the revision of the Army's doctrine. Brigadier General McNair and his Leavenworth team began the review in mid-May. The Leavenworth team studied each chapter, then the Commandant added his comments before mailing the manuscript to
48Roger J. Spiller, Joseph G. Dawson III, and T. Harry Williams, eds.Dictionary of American Military Biography (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984), s.v. "McNair, Lesley James" by Brooks E. Kleber. Also see E. J. Kahn, Jr., McNair: Educator of an Army (Washington, D.C.: The Infantry Journal, 1945) for a more detailed discussion of Lieutenant General McNair's personal life and professional contributions during World War II. 228
the G-3. Colonel Gruber received the last chapter in A u g u s t . 4 9 The
Command and General Staff School's comments constituted the bulk of the suggested changes to the Field Service Regulations. McNair himself authored many of the recommendations and the G-3 adopted most of them.50
Colonel Gruber, serving as the acting G-3, forwarded the revised manual to the Chief of Staff on 4 August 1939. He highlighted the manual's emphasis on "the influence of fire power, air power and terrain on the conduct of operations and the importance of cooperation between the principal arms in battle."51 He also stressed the inclusion of sections addressing air defense, antimechanized security, protection against chemicals, special operations, and the "influence of modern technical means on conduct of operations, especially of motor transportation, air observation and photography, and radio."52 Colonel Gruber urged the Chief of Staff to approve the manual for publication so that "its provisions may be studied by
^^Gruber to Army Chief of Staff, "Field Service Regulations, Volume I, Operations," 4 Aug 1939.
50u.S. War Department, Memorandum from Brigadier General P. M. Andrews through The Adjutant General to the Commandant, Command and General Staff School, "Field Service Regulations," 29 Nov 1939, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
51 Gruber to Army Chief of Staff, "Field Service Regulations, Volume I, Operations," 4 Aug 1939.
52cruber to Army Chief of Staff, "Field Service Regulations, Volume I, Operations," 4 Aug 1939. 229
all concerned during the coming year and applied when reorganization and rearmament are completed."53
Colonel Gruber mailed a copy of the unapproved manual to an eagerly
awaiting Brigadier General McNair at the Command and General Staff School
on 12 August. He encouraged the Commandant to mimeograph the text,
since official publication by the Government Printing Office would take three
or four months, and use it for the instruction of the 1939-1940 class. The next
day, the newly assigned G-3, Brigadier General Frank M.A n d r e w s , 5 4
authorized the use of the draft manual during the approaching school year
pending final approval of therevision.55 Colonel Gruber passed the staff
action to Lieutenant Colonel R. B. Woodruff, his replacement as Chief of the
^^Gruber to Army Chief of Staff, "Field Service Regulations, Volume I, Operations," 4 Aug 1939.
S^The new G-3 had arrived too late in the revision process to influence the writing of Field Service Regulations 1938, but his advocacy of an autonomous Air Corps and the importance of strategic air power would shape the next revision. Andrews graduated from West Point in 1906 as a cavalry officer, but joined the Air Section of the Signal Corps in 1917 and would make his mark as an aviator during the interwar years. He, unlike most of the interwar Army leaders, did not see action during World War I having remained in command of airfields in the southeastern United States for the duration of the war. Determined to at least see the battlefields in Europe, Andrews replaced Billy Mitchell as Air Service Officer in the American Army of Occupation in 1920. He subsequently commanded the Advanced Flying School at Kelly Field, Texas and attended the Air Corps Tactical School, Command and General Staff School, and Army War College in succession. Andrews, as the first commander of General Headquarters Air Force from 1935 to 1939, established a firm organizational foundation for the subsequent creation of an independent air arm. Marshall selected him as the War Department General Staff G-3, the first aviator to hold the demanding and critically important staff position. He would later command air forces in Panama, the Caribbean Defense Command, and the Middle East and Europe during World War II before his untimely death in a flying accident in 1943. Dictionary of American Military Biography, s.v. "Andrews, Frank Maxwell," by Dennis G. Hall.
^^U.S. War Department, Memorandum from Brigadier Frank M. Andrews, WDGS G-3, to The Adjutant General, "Revision of Field Service Regulations," 8 Aug 1939, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 230
Training Branch, and departed for leave prior to assuming command at Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont, in September.56
A month passed before the new Chief of Staff, General George C.
Marshall, approved the Field Service Regulations, Volume I, Operations for publication as a tentative manual. Lieutenant Colonel Woodruff continued to monitor the staff action's progress through the Office of the Chief of Staff urged on by McNair's request for "earliest possible notification ofaction."57
Final approval of the Field Service Regulations 1939 hinged on a decision by the Secretary of W a r . 5 8 On 9 September 1939, General Marshall approved the manual for general distribution as a tentative regulation. He directed the G-3 to solicit comments from all interested personnel and to task selected commanders and schools to provide mandatory comments. The Chief of
Staff further directed the G-3 to consolidate the reviewers' comments within four months after distribution, then revise and submit the manual for his final approval.59 The G-3 immediately informed Brigadier General McNair by telegram of the new manual's tentative approval. Brigadier General
Andrews supported McNair's desire to use the manual for instruction during
5&E. L. Gruber to Lesley J. McNair, 7 Aug 1939, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
57Lesley J. McNair to R. B. Woodruff, 19 Aug 1939, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
58r . b . Woodruff to Lesley J. McNair, 30 Aug 1939, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
59u.S. War Department, Memorandum from Lieutenant Colonel Orlando Ward, WDGS Secretary, General Staff, to WDGS G-3, "Field Service Regulation," 9 Sep 1939, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 231 the 1939-1940 school year agreeing that the class was a potentially rich source of criticism.60
Brigadier General Andrews informed The Adjutant General that printing the 25,000 copies ofField Service Regulations for general distribution was to receive priority above all other publications. He also directed The
Adjutant General to prepare a circular for distribution with the manual specifying procedures for submission of comments. He specifically named the
Chiefs of Arms and Services; Army, Corps Area and Department
Commanders; Commandants of the Army War College and Command and
General Staff School; Commanding Generals of the GHQ Air Force, 7th
Cavalry Brigade, 2nd Division, 1st Cavalry Division, and the 13th Field
Artillery Brigade; and Generals Walter C. Short, Henry C. Pratt, Philip B.
Peyton, Fulton Q. C. Gardner, and Daniel I. Sultan to make mandatory comments.61 The Government Printing Office publishedFM 100-5, Tentative
Field Service Regulations, Operations, on 1 October 1939. By the end of the month. The Adjutant General had distributed 17,000 manuals and the
60u.S. War Department, Memorandum from Brigadier General F. M. Andrews, WDGS G-3, to The Adjutant General, "Field Service Regulations," 14 Sep 1939, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
61 U.S. War Department, Memorandum For Record, WDGS G-3, "Field Service Regulations, Volume I, Operations," 12 Sep 1939 , Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; U.S. War Department, Memorandum from Brigadier General F. M. Andrews, WDGS G-3, to The Adjutant General, "FM 100-5, Tentative Field Service Regulations, Operations," 26 Sep 1939 , Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 232 accompanying circular requesting comments and suggestions. The circular established 1 March 1940 as the suspense date for submission ofcom m ents.^2
Unlike the positive reception given Field Service Regulations 1923, the
Army was highly critical of the doctrine inField Service Regulations 1939. By late spring of 1940, the War Department General Staff would, as in 1920, pass the burden of revising the Field Service Regulations to the Command and General Staff College as the pace in Washington quickened in preparation for war. Comments on the new manual began to arrive from the field as March approached. The C-3 forwarded the comments to the Commandant of the
Command and General Staff College for use in the final revision. Based on comments from the outside reviewers, the faculty, and his own assessment,
McNair concluded that the manual needed "a pretty complete overhauling."63 He requested additional time to produce a manual "which needs noapology."64 He presumed that General Marshall had approved the manual in tentative form because of its imperfections. Clearly, General
Marshall's tentative approval of the manual signalled his lack of confidence in the work. The Chief of Staff had personally reviewed the manual, but offered few comments. Notably, he thought the treatment of guerrilla warfare warranted amplification and suggested consideration of Marine Corps
62u.S. War Department, War Department Circular No. 87, 3 Nov 1939, Adjutant General File 062.11 FM 100-5 , Record Croup 407, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
63Lesley J. McNair to F. M. Andrews, 6 Apr 1940, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
64Lesley J. McNair to F. M. Andrews, 6 Apr 1940. 233 publications on the subject andSoldiers In the Sun, a study of the Army's
Philippine campaign, 1899-1902.65 Brigadier General McNair believed the heavy pressure to publish a revised Field Service Regulations was to blame for most of the manual's shortcomings. Therefore, he sought to defer publication until the next fiscal year to allow more time for a quality revision.66 Brigadier General Andrews, having seen the voluminous and substantial comments from reviewers criticizing Field Service Regulations
1939, agreed with the Commandant. He established 1 January 1941 as the new suspense for the Leavenworth draft manuscript and asked the
Commandant to assign the work on it andFM 100-10 "the highest priority in the preparation of any publications at the Command and General Staff
School."67 Despite the high priority given the project, nearly two more years would pass before the Chief of Staff approved the final version of the manual.
Clearly, the Army's first attempt to revise its doctrine in the interwar years was a failure.
65u.S. War Department, Memorandum from General Marshall to WDGS, G-3, 17 Feb 1940, Adjutant General File 062.11 FM 100-5 , Record Group 407, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
66Lesley J. McNair to F. M. Andrews, 6 Apr 1940.
67u.S. War Department, Memorandum from Brigadier General F. M. Andrews, WDGS G-3, to Commandant, Command and General Staff College, "FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations," 10 Apr 1940, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; U.S. War Department, Memorandum from Brigadier General F. M. Andrews, WDGS G-3, to Commandant, Command and General Staff College, "FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations," 17 Apr 1940, Adjutant General File 062.11 FM 100-5 , Record Group 407, National Archives, Washington, D.C. CHAPTER IX
FSR 1939: DOCTRINE IN THE DOLDRUMS
They fail to recognize the revolutionary character of modern means of action and are marked by a traditionalism and arm partisanship which seeks to defend the retention of branch functions rendered obsolete by the nature of modern operations. — Major General George A. Lynch^ Chief of Infantry
The publication of FM 100-5, Tentative Field Service Regulations,
Operations, on 1 October 1939 marked the first revision of Army operations doctrine in nearly two decades. The new manual contained nearly twice as much material as its predecessor despite moving all discussion of administration to a separate volume. The manual added General
Headquarters Aviation as a principal tactical organization and took a step toward the modern use of temporary task forces in its discussion of "tactical groupings" of combined arms for special short term missions.Field Service
Regulations 1939 added sections on antiaircraft defense, protection against mechanized units, and chemical defense. WhereField Service Regulations
1923 had addressed combat operations in a single chapter, the new manual devoted a chapter each to the offensive, defensive, and special operations.
^George A. Lynch, "Final Report of the Chief of Infantry," 30 Apr 1941, p. 72, George A. Lynch Papers, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
234 235
Special operations now included new material addressing combat in towns, combat in mountainous terrain, and conduct of guerrilla warfare. The manual reflected interwar technological advances in motorization, mechanization, aeronautics, and radio communications in nearly every chap ter, though not to the degree one hoped to find following 16 years of important technological advances. Detailed examination of the new material revealed that the manual did little more than acknowledge the developments and their potential for change rather than prescribe fresh doctrine that incorporated new capabilities. Significantly, most of the changes in the manual emphasized the increased capabilities of the separate arms and services rather than a wholesale revision of operations doctrine. Despite the notable forward-looking features of the revised manual, most of the doctrine remained unchanged from that contained Field in Service Regulations 1923.
In fact, the operational doctrine was remarkably similar to that contained in the earlier manual. Continuity and, in some areas, regression rather than progress characterized the revised Army doctrine.
OBJECTIVE, OFFENSE, AND THE HUMAN ELEMENT
The revised manual reprinted most of the paragraphs addressing combat principles found inField Service Regulations 1923. It affirmed the
long-standing American belief that "the ultimate objective of all military operations is the destruction of the enemy's armed forces in battle" lifting the sentence almost verbatim from the previous manual and again positioning it 236 at the head of the chapter on the conduct of war.2 The accompanying discussion of offensive action, however, reflected a subtle change in the
Army's attitude toward the attack. The manual prescribed a more cautious approach no longer insisting that the attack form the basis for all training, and deleted the statement that "decisive results are obtainedonly by the offensive."3 The changes in wording represented the Army's acknowledgement that advances in firepower technology had made offensive action more difficult. Still, the doctrine did not subordinate offensive to defensive action. Field Service Regulations 1939 repeated the 1923 manual's emphasis on the use of offensive action as the only means through which a commander can "exercise his initiative, preserve his freedom of action, and impose his will on the enemy."^ It stressed that success relied upon attacking at the right place and time. The defense remained a temporary expedient until conditions permitted resumption of the attack. At most, the American doctrine inField Service Regulations 1939 offered only a nod to the French preoccupation with methodical battle and defensive orientation. The
American belief in the annihilation of the enemy army through offensive action remained paramount.
2fSR 1939, 26; FSR 1923, 77. The sentence in the 1923 manual actually used the phrase "by battle," not "in battle."
3fSR 1923, iii, 77.
4fSR 1939, 27. 237
Man, the human element in war, not only remained at the forefront of
American doctrine, but held a position of increased prominence. Borrowing wholesale from the 1936 edition of the GermanTruppenfiihrung,^ Field
Service Regulations 1939 expanded its treatment of leadership adding a ten- paragraph section immediately following the discussion of combat principles.
The section began by stating, "Man is the fundamental instrument in war; other instruments may change but he remains a constantf a c t o r . "6 The section stressed developing initiative, moral stamina, discipline, physical endurance, and cohesion through training. In response to technological and tactical change, the manual stated:
In spite of advances in technique, the worth of theindividual man is still decisive. His importance has risen due to the open order of combat. Every individual must be trained to exploit a situation with energy and boldness, imbued with the idea that success will depend upon his action.^
The section closed by underlining the importance of exercising initiative on the battlefield by all soldiers "from the highest commander to the lowest private." The same passage had appeared nearly word for word inField
Service Regulations 1923 and pre-World War FieldI Service Regulations.^
^Heeres Dienstvorschrift 300 (HDv 300) Truppenfiihrung (translated as Troop Command or Troop Leading) was the German equivalent to the American Field Service Regulations. The 1936 edition remained in force for the duration of World War II.
^FSR 2939, 28.
7FSR 1939, 29.
SfSR 1939, 31; FSR 1 9 2 3 ,iii; F SR 1 9 1 43. , 238
The Army's doctrinal foundation was sound, but the methods of application had changed. Technological advances had not invalidated the principles of objective and offense, nor had they eliminated the human element from war. Significant changes had occurred, however, that would alter the way in which commanders should apply the principles. The application of the human element had also changed. The idea that "man is least vulnerable when merely clothed against the weather and armored by his own agilities and a steel helmet"^ was no longer valid. The new challenge for man on the battlefield was mastery of new weapons and equipment and, most important, their combination. The doctrine inField Service
Regulations 1939 revealed that the Army was unprepared to meet the challenge.
OPERATIONS
Field Service Regulations 1939 expanded the discussion of operations, but espoused doctrine that was essentially unchanged. WhereField Service
Regulations 1923 had discussed all types of combat actions in a single chapter, the revised manual dedicated a separate chapter each to offensive, defensive, and special operations. This change was more than a simple reorganization of the old material. The new manual contained more detailed guidance for the execution and planning of operations and added new material covering the employment of motorized, mechanized, and air forces. The inclusion of
^Elbridge Colby, "Our Arm of the Service,"Infantry Journal 24 (Jan 1924): 5-6. 239 the new material indicated that the Army was fully aware of advances in battlefield mobility provided by motorization, mechanization, and flight technology. However, the operations doctrine changed only in its mention of the additional considerations offered by increased mobility. The doctrine failed to recognize that advances in ground and air mobility had fundamentally changed doctrine by creating new arms, redefining the combined arms team, and significantly altering the tempo and range of battlefield maneuver.
Of all the new technologies, motor vehicle development had the most pervasive influence on the conduct of operations. Maximum usage of motor vehicles in all areas of military operations received widespread support among officers from the beginning of the interwar period. TheArmy consistently cited the need for more and better motor vehicles to replace ani mal transportation. Support increased each year with rapid improvements in the capabilities of motor vehicles. The difference between the treatment of motorized infantry in the three interwar manuals illustrated the changing attitudes toward motorization during the period.Field Service Regulations
1923 stated that the "operative mobility of infantry can be increased by the employment of motor transportation." Field Service Regulations 1939 noted that it "can be greatly increased." The statements provide evidence of the
Army's growing recognition of the potential offered by motorization. More significant, the choice of the verb form "can be" underlined the fact that extensive motorization had not yet taken place. Interestingly,Field Service 240
Regulations 1941 would flatly state that "mobility has been greatly increased/'^O
Field Service Regulations 1939 reflected the Army's incomplete understanding of the new operational and tactical mobility. The discussion of maneuver illustrated the manual's restrained prescriptions. Of the three forms of maneuver addressed in the manual — envelopment, turning movement, and penetration — the envelopment remained the preferred form. Yet, despite great progress in tactical and operational mobility which had significantly improved opportunities for passing around enemy flanks, the manual limited itself to noting briefly that "superior mobility increases the prospect of success."!^ The conservative assessment underlined both the
Army's lack of experience with mechanized forces and unreceptive attitude toward a major change in its approach to combat. The doctrine for turning movements was no more progressive. The turning movement, a form of maneuver that seeks to draw an enemy force out of a defensive position by conduct of a wide envelopment to threaten vulnerable rear areas, was essentially the same as that found inField Service Regulations 1923.
Mobility advances changed the nature of the pursuit more than any other combat operation. Pursuit is an offensive operation against a retreating enemy force. Its object is to maintain relentless pressure on the enemy and completely destroy him. Superior relative mobility is key to the success of
IOfSR 1923,13; FSR 1939,7; FSR 1941, 6.
FSR 1939,127. 241 pursuit operations. Advances in mobility and communications technologies enabled commanders to pursue farther, faster, and with greater control than ever before. Yet, Field Service Regulations 1939 echoed its predecessor almost word for word with few indications that the doctrine writers understood the advantages offered by improved weapons and equipment. To be sure.Field
Service Regulations 1939 placed additional emphasis on the use of radio to control pursuing forces and its suggested composition of encircling forces did include mobile combined arms forces of engineers, antiaircraft units, chemical defense, and antimechanized elements all supported by reconnaissance aircraft. Still, the manual revealed a failure to grasp fully the effect of motorization and mechanization on tactics and operations despite its frequent mention of modern organizations and technologies.
Specific doctrine for the conduct of offensive, defensive, and special operations changed little. In each type of operation, the doctrine stressed the role of infantry as the base of an infantry-artillery combined arms team and use of motorized forces to improve mobility where appropriate. Other aspects of combat operations, such as use of reserves, deployment from march formation into the attack, designation of zones and sectors, employment of chemicals, and fire support coordination remained unchanged. Doctrine for the conduct of the meeting engagement was also the same with a few exceptions. Motor elements now joined the cavalry, aviation, and advance guard as means of gaining intelligence on enemy dispositions and the division commander detached aircraft to his artillery commander to assist in early identification of forward firing positions. But, the basic concept of 242
meeting the enemy with an advance guard, deploying artillery, and then
launching the infantry attack at a weak point in the enemy defense remained
the same. In short, the combat doctrine that had evolved during the First
World War resurfaced intact in the pages of the revised manual.
Although the manual repeated verbatim that "no one arm wins
b a t t l e s , "12 the concept of combined arms operations remained centered
around infantry-artillery coordination and the infantry task force. The
infantry remained the principal maneuver force in all operations. In the
deliberate attack, the manual continued to refer to the infantry of the main
body as the sole attacking force. The maneuver plan was the infantry plan of
maneuver, artillery's first task was to protect the approach and assembly of
infantry units, and suppression of enemy artillery was indispensable for the
success of the infantry attack. The manual even referred to the division
commander's aircraft dedicated to observation of the front line infantry as
airplanes. Discussion of defensive operations also stressed the infantry's
central role on the battlefield: "the fire of infantry weapons forms the basis
for defensive fires."13 As in 1923, rifle strength determ ined frontage, further
testament to the continuing primacy of infantry among the combat arms.
The width of a main attack zone for an infantry battalion attack widened from a range of 400-800 yards to 500-1000 yards, a modest change reflecting minor increases in weapons capabilities. The most important factors in determining
IZfSR 1939,5.
13fSR 2939, 167. 243 defensive positions were artillery observation and infantry fields of fire.
Indeed, synchronizing infantry fires and maneuver with artillery fire support continued to define combined arms operations.
The key to the success of the field force was still the infantry's advance and the principal means of supporting the advance was artillery fire.Field
Service Regulations 1939 unequivocally stated, "The best guarantee for success in the attack is the effective cooperation between the troops in the attacking echelon and the supporting artillery" and "superiority of fire rests chiefly upon the mutual support of infantry and cavalry units, and the coordination of their action with the fire support of theartillery."Two pages of detailed guidance for infantry-artillery fire coordination followed. As in Field Service Regulations 1923, the use of artillery to achieve fire superiority was so important that the manual discussed artillery fire coordination more than any other aspect of combined arms operations.
Doctrine for artillery support of the attack remained largely unchanged. The artillery concentrated first on counterbattery fires, then shifted to pounding the enemy positions. Close coordination between the infantry and artillery remained the vital component of a successful attack. Still, the Army continued to rely on timed fires and prearranged signals to synchronize the shifting of artillery fires with the infantry assault having found no better means of maintaining constant communication between the King and Queen of battle. The doctrine implored the artillery to employ all means to maintain
1 9 3 9134,137. , 244 contact with the infantry, but offered no technological solution which could improve the ability to do so. As before, the new manual highlighted the use of combat aviation to cover the assault after the artillery fires shifted to deeper targets, but infantry-artillery synchronization remained the centerpiece of
American doctrine.
The Army's best hope for discovering the capabilities of combined arms forces faded with the disbanding of the early mechanized forces. These organizations consisted of armored vehicles performing a variety of functions. Unencumbered by narrowly focused branch missions, they stimulated new ideas about tank employment that moved beyond the shallow focus on infantry support. Articles in service journals reflected views of American and British officers who saw in the tank a new weapon with vast potential for transforming doctrine. To be sure, responsibility for tank development still belonged to the Infantry and official doctrine as well as the mainstream view placed the tank in the infantry support role. The inactivation of the Mechanized Forces and subsequent distribution of its vehicles to the Infantry and Cavalry Schools meant that further experimentation with mechanization would focus on branch specific requirements rather than on the operations of an independent, combined arms force. ^5
l^David E. Johnson, "Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers" (Ph. D. diss, Duke University, 1990), 269-95. For evidence of progressive ideas, Johnson cites Ralph E. Jones, "The Tactical Influence of Recent Tank Developments," Infantry Journal 32 (May 1928): 457-67; Ralph E. Jones, "The Weak Spot in Military Progress," Infantry Journal 34 (Mar 1929): 290-92; George H. Rarey, "United States Tank Requirements," Tank Notes (Mar 1932): 31-39; B. H. Liddell Hart, "The 245
Field Service Regulations 1939's description of the arms and services confirmed that Army still subscribed to an archaic conception of combined arms operations and had yet to address adequately the new challenges of mechanization, antitank defense, close air support, and antiaircraft defense.
The discussion of each arm incorporated changes in capabilities and organization that had occurred during the interwar period. Generally, branch doctrine demonstrated respectable progress considering the limitations of the period. Each arm, through their respective service schools and test boards, kept pace with tactical developments at small unit level since, in most cases, technological developments did not significantly alter squad, section, or platoon actions in the traditional arms. However, doctrine development hobbled fitfully forward in several important instances when branches shared an interest in a combat role such as antimechanized defense, antiaircraft defense, or tank employment. In these areas.Field Service Regulations 1939 either avoided assigning proponency to a single arm, as with antimechanized defense, or fell back on the traditional delineation of responsibility as in the case of tank employment. The idea of autonomous armored, antitank, or air defense organizations was nowhere to be found in the revised manual. The
Army's failure to evolve its concept for combined arms operations and its inability to resolve doctrinal issues pertaining to more than one branch was at the root of the deficiencies inField Service Regulations 1939. Acloser look at
British Army Exercises of 1930," Infantry Journal 38 (Feb 1931): 99-104; B. H. Liddell Hart, "Contrasts of 1931 — Mobility of Stagnation,"Infantry Journal 39 (Jan-Feb 1932): 5-11; K. B. Edmunds, "Defense Against Tanks," Infantry Journal 38 (Jan 1931): 38-41; W. L. Roberts, "Tanks, a G.H.Q. Weapon," Tank Notes (Mar 1932): 16-18; and William C. Lee, "Fast Tanks as Leading Tanks and Exploiting Tanks," Tank Notes (Mar 1932): 3. 246 the manual's discussion of the separate arms and its treatment of mechanization, antimechanization, antiaircraft defense, and close air support further illustrates the lack of change during the interwar years.
THE PRIMACY OF INFANTRY
Field Service Regulations 1939's discussion of infantry demonstrated little change since 1923. The infantry mission was still the "principal mission in battle"16 and infantry combat power still derived from the "morale and fighting ability of the individualsoldier."l7 The Americans believed that nothing had occurred during the interwar years to diminish these central features of Army doctrine. From the annual reports of the Chiefs of Staff to articles in service journals, the Army continued to defend the primacy of the infantry. General Summerall summarized the state of the arms in his final report as Chief of Staff in 1930:
Infantry remains the basic arm. Its mission is still to gain with the support of the other arms the tactical successes required for carrying the Army mission. It alone has the characteristics essential to this mission — ability to maneuver and fight over all kinds of ground and in all kinds of weather, to close with the enemy, and place the final seal of victory on the combat action of the entire force. More than ever before, the Infantry of today
1 9 3 95. ,
1 9 3 95-7 , 247
must be highly trained to meet the conditions of modern battle and employ effectively its diverse armament. ^ 8
Nearly a decade later, the Army's interpretation of the lessons from foreign wars had done nothing to unseat the infantry's central position among the combat arms. In his 1937 annual report. General Craig wrote that combat in
Spain and China could:
. . . afford practical proving-ground tests of new equipment, and factual evidence of the roles in which the two relatively new arms, viz, tanks and aviation, can be employed effectively. This evidence demonstrates again that neither of these arms can bring about a decision in land operation. They are auxiliaries, valuable auxiliaries, to the Infantry, whether the support given be of a tactical or strategical nature. But for the decision we must still look to the man on foot. The new arms can aid him; they cannot replace, him.19
A year of reflection had not changed General Craig's view of the Infantry. He reported in 1938:
The current operations in Spain and China illustrate from day to day the greatly increased power of these new defensive weapons. They have restored to the defense the superiority it seemed to lose with advent of the new offensive arms. It is largely because of these new defensive weapons that we find current operation confirming anew the testimony of history that the Infantry is the core and the essential substance of an army. It alone of all the arms approximates a military entity. It alone can win a decision.
l^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1930 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1930), 127. l^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1937 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1937), 29. 248
Each of the other arms is but an auxiliary — its utility measured by the aid that it can bring to theIn fa n try.20
Indeed, new weapons promised to increase both the infantry's offensive and defensive capabilities. The combined arms team that the infantry regiment had become by the end of World War I had grown more powerful and more capable by the end of the interwar period. But for most of the interwar years, the infantryman's panoply remained unchanged.
As late as 1937, the infantry was not far removed from its immediate post-World War I state of material readiness. It still moved by foot, animal- drawn transport, or two-wheeled drive motor vehicle, lacked a high-angle weapon, had no light machinegun, and messengers or wire were the only reliable means of communication. It still lacked "even ab l u e p r i n t " 2^ of an antitank gun capable of defeating anything but a lightly armored vehicle though all other major armies had one. The .50 caliber machinegun was the main means of antiaircraft defense, but the lack of a fire control system or vehicular mount severely hindered its effectiveness. The infantry had yet to field a medium tank despite the Spanish Civil War having demonstrated the inadequacy of light tanks for assault missions, the principal role for an infantry tank. The Army had standardized the Ml Garand, a clip-fed, semiautomatic rifle which doubled the infantryman's rate of fire without loss of accuracy, but only a few production models were in the hands of troops.
20u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1938 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1938), 29-30.
21 Lynch, Final Report, p. 6. 249
Although the Army still considered the firepower of heavier weapons secondary to the firepower of the individual rifleman, it sought to develop a lighter automatic weapon to replace the Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR). In the interim, the highly inaccurate. World War I-vintage, BAR substituted for a light machinegun. The "walkie-talkie" portable radio, though representing a notable advance in tactical signal communications, was ineffective in broken terrain and could function only in a limited radio net. Tank and vehicular radios still exhibited serious deficiencies and the Army had not yet tested light wire telephone sets. The infantry's tactical organization and doctrine reflected the state of the equipment. Six different infantry regiments existed in 1937: the school regiment at Fort Benning, the triangular regiment in the Provisional Infantry Division at Fort Sam Houston, and four different types in field units throughout the Army each of which was further differentiated by varying degrees of motorization. Finally, in the words of the
Chief of Infantry, "Infantry tactics were, for the most part, literal reproductions of the regulations developed in the American Expeditionary
Forces, 1918-1919. They took little account of the immense advances in aviation and mechanization that had subsequently takenp l a c e . "22 In short, the infantry's ability to shoot, move, and communicate was not far removed from that two decades earlier.
22Lynch, Final Report, pp. 6-9; John K. Mahon and Romana Danysh,Infantry, Part I: Regular A m iy (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), 52-54. 250
Army leaders were aware of changes in the nature of infantry warfare and had attempted to improve infantry weapons and equipment throughout the interwar years. As Chief of Staff, General Summerall highlighted plans to increase infantry firepower with the addition of machineguns, automatic rifles, and special weapons. He also reported the study of mechanization for cross-country movement of heavy weapons, ammunition, and supplies and projected the use of motorized infantry as a follow-on force for a mechanized unit.23 General MacArthur also recognized the infantry's changing requirements noting the need to outfit a regiment with semiautomatic rifles and light machineguns in order to test them and develop doctrine.
MacArthur also forecast that motor transport would soon permeate all aspects of infantry mobility.24 The Army's awareness of the infantry's decline meant nothing without the resources to stop the slide.
The influx of men and money in the last half of the 1930s cued the infantry's resurgence along with the rest of the Army. Major General Lynch, as Chief of Infantry, attempted to modernize the infantry in the closing years of the decade. The Chief of Infantry continued to place the rifleman at the front and center of the battlefield. In his final report submitted in 1941, Lynch explained that the American principle was to:
23u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1930 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1930), 127-28.
24u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1933 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1933), 26-34. 251
. . . raise the combat value of the individual soldier to the highest degree of destructiveness by arming him with the most efficient shoulder rifle obtainable; and to support his action by automatic weapons of high destructive power graduated in mobile characteristics so as to insure the effective fire in all situations. In this respect, our policy has run counter to that of most foreign armies where the automatic rifle has been the principal weapon of the rifle company; the function of the European rifleman is subsidiary to it, and his duty is to protect it, to carry ammunition for it, and to replace casualties in the auto rifle crew.25
Around the infantryman armed with a semiautomatic rifle. Lynch built successive echelons each characterized by uniform standards of mobility and homogeneous organization. Borrowing from the Germans, he pushed support weapons down to battalion and company level using mortars and machineguns to provide a more effective base of fire in support of the rifleman's maneuver against the enemy position.26 The rifleman set the pace at platoon level and below, the company carried no weapons heavier than light machineguns (BARs at the time) and 60mm mortars, and the battalion moved nothing larger than 81mm mortars and .50 caliber machineguns. This left the regiment with all weapons requiring a prime mover as well as the bulk of the supply and communications assets. Lynch noted that the regiment still required a motorized reconnaissance platoon, as found in all foreign armies, and a howitzer company to be complete.27
Lynch, Final Report, p. 23.
^^Christopher R. Gabel, The U.S. Arm y Maneuvers of 1941 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991), 10.
^^Lynch, Final Report, pp. 41-44. 252
The new organization required a change in tactics. The number of riflemen had fallen from comprising three-quarters of the World War I infantry regiment to less than one-third of the new organization. This required closer coordination of supporting weapons with the maneuver of the rifleman, greater use of flanking fires, dropping concern for alignment, and movement of the squad leader to the front of the formation from where he could synchronize advances with supportingf i r e s . 2 8 These changes improved the effectiveness of the infantry regiment, but contributed little to the integration of fire and maneuver with non-organic assets.
The lack of modern weapons and equipment hampered Lynch's attempt to modernize infantry doctrine. The lengthy material procurement cycle meant that delivery of modern material would not occur for two or more years. Experience with the new weapons for the vast majority of infantrymen amounted to no more than reading about them in the pages of
Infantry Journal. The Ml rifle did not replace the 1903 Springfield until after
World War II had begun and a true light machinegun did not receive widespread distribution until the end of the period. The development of heavy infantry weapons - mortars, antitank guns, and heavy machineguns - suffered even more than the infantryman's individual weapons.
Experiments with 60mm and 81mm mortars, improved versions of 37mm antitank guns, and .50 caliber machineguns failed to result in mass procure ment of new weapons systems. As late as 1941, stove pipes and broomsticks
28Lynch, Final Report, pp. 56-59. 253 served as surrogate mortars and machineguns.29 As a result, the development of doctrine for the infantry both as a branch and as a component of combined arms operations, remained wedded to the past.
Field Service Regulations 1939 reflected few changes in infantry doctrine and its role in combined arms operations. Notably, the light machinegun joined the rifle and bayonet as the principal offensive infantry weapons. However, the manual failed to mention the more important changes such as use of motorized and mechanized infantry troops in support of armored operations, integration of aviation assets for long-range fire support, and clear guidance for antimechanized and antiaircraft defense. Of these shortcomings, the obsolete prescriptions for employment of mechanized forces were the most notable deficiencies.
MECHANIZATION
Doctrine for employment of mechanized vehicles reflected no significant change from the doctrine two decades earlier. The tank remained an infantry support weapon. Field Service Regulations 1939 stated, "Tank units are ordinarily assigned the same objective as the troops they support" and "Normally tanks do not operate beyond the effective fire support of the infantry and other supporting arms."30 Artillery ranges, not that of aircraft, determined the operating distance for tanks. This limited tanks to maximum
29Mahon and Danysh,In fa n try, 52-54.
1 9 3 9137-138. , 254 penetrations of 20 kilometers and only then when infantry could keep pace with the mechanized vehicles. The infantry tanks fought in two echelons.
The first echelon, comprised of medium tanks, attacked enemy antitank weapons. The second wave, followed closely by the infantry, defeated the enemy machineguns and cleared the way for the infantry advance. The manual did acknowledge that some technological improvements had occurred by noting the tank's ability "to penetrate deeply into the hostile position and attack the enemy's reserves and artillery." However, the next paragraph told the real story: "As a rule, tanks are employed to assist the advance of infantry foot troops. . . ."31 These prescriptions, correct in 1923, underlined the failure of American doctrine to keep pace with the potential of mechanization. Despite great gains in the field of armored warfare, the
Army's doctrine for the employment of tanks remained stagnant.
The War Department made an important decision early in the interwar period to abolish the Tank Corps and place tanks under the Infantry.
This decision, discussed in Chapter IV, would steer the development of mechanized vehicles and shape doctrine for their employment. The infantry needed a tank with firepower and armor protection for close support of assaulting foot troops. The infantry vehicle required thick armor protection and a gun capable of defeating enemy antitank weapons, fortifications, and counterattacking tanks. The additional weight added by the heavy armament and armor limited the tank's speed. This was not a major concern for an
1939, 7. 255 infantry tank since its principal role was in support of foot soldiers.
Specifications for early models required maximum speeds of only 12 miles per hour. Light and medium tanks geared to the pace of the foot soldier and built for assault of defended positions continued to define the infantry's official view of the tank for most of the interwar period. The Infantry view dominated tank development until issuance of General MacArthur's mechanization policy in 1931. The decision to designate tanks as an infantry support weapon was justifiable in the immediate postwar years, but warranted review as technological advances improved the reliability and mobility of mechanized vehicles. Unfortunately, the subordination of the tank to the Infantry branch kept it tied to the pace of the foot soldier long after the weapon system was technologically capable of independent action. The
Infantry does not deserve sole blame for the Army's deficient tank doctrine, how ever.
Mechanization technology had evolved sufficiently during the interwar years to warrant either a redefinition of branch missions or the development of an entirely new combat arm. Neither development occurred until July 1940 when the Army ended branch domination with the estab lishment of the Armored Force. For the preceding two decades, doctrine for employment of mechanized forces reflected branch concerns with each focusing development efforts on branch specific requirements. The crux of the problem was that the Army needed two types of tanks but could barely afford one. Until mechanized technology could produce a vehicle combining speed, range, large caliber armament, and thick armor, the Army needed one 256 tank built for power to support the infantry assault and one built for speed to support cavalry missions. The history of mechanization in the United States
Army is largely a tale of the struggle between the Infantry, Cavalry, and
Ordnance Department over the type of tank tod e v e l o p . 3 2
The lack of a modern tank capable of independent action contributed to the Army's failure to develop a bolder doctrine for mechanized forces. Tanks were new and expensive weapons. The average cost of a tank started at no less than $30,000; the appropriation for tank development between 1925 and
1939 averaged only $60,000 a year.33 As a result, the War Department limited initial production to pilot tanks and prohibited the equipping of a complete unit until the pilot model received War Departmentapproval.34 This cautious and necessarily frugal approach forced the Infantry to use World
War I tanks to develop tactical doctrine. The tanks that comprised the
Experimental Mechanized Force were capable of performing only in the infantry support role. Employment of tanks in an independent role required new models. Unfortunately, the procurement process was at its worst in the
^^Development of tanks and armored warfare doctrine has been and continues to be the most popular topic for students of the Army during the interwar years. Among the most notable of the several outstanding works are: Timothy K. Nenninger, "The Development of American Armor, 1917-1940," MA thesis. University of Wisconsin, 1968; Mildred Gillie, Forging the Thunderbolt; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Military Service Publishing, Co., 1947; and, most recently, David E. Johnson, "Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers, Ph. D. dissertation, Duke University, 1990.
33constance M. Green, Harry C. Thomson, and Peter C. Roots, The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War, United States Army in World War II Series (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955), 195.
34creen, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department, 190-91. 257 development of the tank and ultimately failed to produce pilot models until the 1930s. Even then, the War Department failed to standardize any of the pilot m odels developed betw een 1919 and 1938.35 W ithout m odern tanks, the
Army lacked tangible evidence to support the development of independent mechanized units and associated doctrine. The performance of the existing models sustained the predominant view in the Army that the tank's primary role was infantry support.
Mechanization was not without its advocates. Many officers, including
Generals Summerall and MacArthur, foresaw an expanded role for tanks and mechanized vehicles. General Summerall's formation of the Experimental
Mechanized Force and General MacArthur's Mechanization Policy demonstrated the Army's recognition of the importance of mechanization.
The greatest challenge to the role of the tank solely as an infantry support weapon came from the advocates of mechanized cavalry forces. General
MacArthur's mechanization policy permitted the Cavalry to develop light, fast, tanks for traditional cavalry missions, but called the vehicles "combat cars" to stay within the legal requirement reserving tank development to the
Infantry. Nevertheless, the idea that mechanized combined arms warfare would dominate the next battlefield did not gain widespread acceptance.
The officers who led the Army in the interwar years believed that manpower, not mechanization nor motorization, was the key to battlefield victory. As late as 1937, Chief of Staff Malin Craig echoed the mainstream
35Creen, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department, 202. 258 position in his annual report writing, "The lessons of the current operations abroad confirm the conclusions drawn from tests made by the War
Department that in the provision of tanks emphasis should be laid upon a type suitable for close support of the Infantry."36 Two years later and only months before the German invasion of Poland, General Craig again revealed his belief in the primacy of infantry and prejudice against independent mechanized operations in his 1939 report:
As experience mounts with this yet incompletely war-tested mechanized force, our training indicates too great emphasis on detached and independent missions with a consequent disregard of hard-hitting supporting missions which have a direct influence on battle. Tendencies to date are leading toward a dispersion of effort with a consequent loss of equipment and a probable absence of this arm from the field at critical times. Present tactical doctrines should receive intensive study from this viewpoint.37
Field Service Regulations 1939 simply reflected the accepted views and demonstrated capabilities of the tank in 1939. The Army remained divided on the issue of mechanization until 1940. Even after the German victory in
Poland, some failed to see the power of the mechanized combined arms team explaining away the results by pointing to Poland's poor defensive performance. Only after the blitzkrieg shattered the French Army did
Americans fully accept the idea that mechanization had introduced a new era
3^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1937 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1937), 34.
3^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1939 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1939), 31. 259 in warfare and demanded a fresh approach to combined arms operations.38
The establishment of the Armored Force in 1940 broke the Infantry's stranglehold on tank development and enabled the combining of its views with those of the other principal user of mechanized technology, the Cavalry.
CAVALRY
Advances in mobility technology foreshadowed changes in cavalry capabilities more than those of any other branch. Mobility is the quintessential characteristic of cavalry. Successful execution of traditional cavalry missions — reconnaissance, security, reserve, exploitation, and pursuit
" hinges on possession of a relative mobility advantage. Since the dawn of warfare, the horse had provided that advantage. Early 20th century developments in aviation and ground mobility technology provided means of transportation that challenged the capabilities of animals in the performance of most cavalry missions. By the end of the interwar period, motor-driven ground and air vehicles could accomplish all cavalry missions.
However, Army leaders in general and Cavalry officers in particular were slow to accept fully this fundamental change in the nature of a traditional arm. Hesitation to both embrace emerging ground mobility technology and to forfeit the tried and true horse impeded the progress of cavalry doctrine.
During the 1920s, the Cavalry showed little concern with the possibility that airplanes and armored vehicles might replace the horse. Cavalrymen
^®Gabel, M a n eu vers, 23. 260 conceded that air observation was a valuable function, but could not substitute for ground reconnaissance. Armored vehicle technology remained unreliable and insufficiently mobile to warrant use in cavalry operations. On the other hand, the horse was reliable, highly mobile, and economical. Horse cavalry spearheaded the Army's operations along the Mexican border, which was the most important security mission of the period. Simply put, the horse was superior to mechanized and motorized vehicles for the execution of cavalry missions because mobility technology had not yet attained the state of development at which it could eclipse the horse in all situations. Other arguments in support of the horse were less practical, but no less important.
The man on horseback was a long standing image of heroic courage. Like the infantryman with rifle and bayonet, the horse-mounted cavalryman represented the human element so central to idealistic American conceptions of warfare. Additionally, Army-wide interest in horsemanship, to include polo matches, steeplechases, fox hunts, and horse shows, grew during the interw ar y e a r s . 3 9 The advocates of horse cavalry drew successfully from fact and fantasy in their defense of the arm, but fought an increasingly desperate battle as the capabilities of mechanized vehicles improved. The rationale for retaining large bodies of horse cavalry grew weaker each year with constantly improving performances of mechanized vehicles.
By the 1930s, fast, reliable, tracked vehicles capable of long-range operation offered possibilities for employment of mechanized vehicles in roles other
^^Johnson, "Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers," 297-99. 261 than support of infantry assault. Colonel Adna R. Chaffee and Major General
George Van Horn Moseley became influential advocates of cavalry mechanization.40 Moseley, as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, was instrumental in drafting the 1931 Mechanization Policy that broke the
Infantry's grip on tank development and opened the door for cavalry mechanization. The official decentralization of mechanization research and development allowed the Cavalry to exploit the potential of its "combat cars" and revitalize the cavalry's battlefield role.
Mechanization of cavalry forces centered in the development of the 7th
Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized). The Army converted the Mechanized Force to a mechanized cavalry regiment in 1931 in accordance with MacArthur's
Mechanization Policy directing decentralization of mechanization efforts.
The purpose of the organization was to explore the application of mechanization to cavalry missions, not the development of doctrine for an independent combined arms force. The Mechanization Policy prescribed the following missions for the mechanized cavalry regiment:
(a) Long distance strategic reconnaissance. (b) Fighting for the control of theater reconnaissance. (c) Seizing points of strategic and tactical importance. (d) Tactical reconnaissance. (e) Pursuit of the enemy, or delay of his advance. (f) As an exploitation force to take advantage of any break or weakened point in a hostile battle line. In this type of operation, the cavalry may act alone or in conjunction with other arms.
40chaffee was the WDGS G-3 Troop Training Section chief and a principal author of the 1928 Mechanization Study. Moseley was a former commander of the 1st Cavalry Division and a staunch supporter of cavalry modernization. 262
(g) As part of a reserve to be used tactically or strategically.^^
The regiment became the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) in January 1932 but existed as a brigade only in name for most of the decade.^2
The Cavalry's experimentation with the mechanized brigade focused on the execution of cavalry missions, not independent combined arms operations. The nature of the brigade's vehicles underlined the emphasis on cavalry missions. The brigade needed a vehicle with speed and mobility for rapid, long-range, reconnaissance, screening, and pursuit missions.
Accordingly, its combat car was a light tank armed with no more than a turret-mounted .50 caliber machine gun. The lack of infantry also limited the brigade's ability to conduct other than cavalry missions.^^ The leaders of the brigade consistently stressed the cavalry mission and specifically avoided talk of independent operations. The horse advocates remained alive and well even while the mechanized cavalry regiment continued to gain strength. Even the most die hard horse-lover had conceded operational reconnaissance to motorized and mechanized forces. Tactical reconnaissance, however, still offered the horse a
U.S. War Department, Inclosure 1, Letter from General Douglas MacArthur, Army Chief of Staff, through the Adjutant General to Commanding Generals of all Corps Areas and Departments, Commandants of all General and Special Service Schools, Superintendent, U. S. Military Academy, Chiefs of all Arms, Services and Bureaus, and the War Department General Staff, AC 537.3 I.R. (12-18-34), 1 May 1931, File 322.012, Office of the Chief of Cavalry, Correspondence, 1921-42, Box 7a, Record Croup 177, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
^^Johnson, "Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers," 311-26.
43johnson, "Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers," 326-334. 263 viable function. The appointment of Major General John K. Herr as Chief of
Cavalry in 1938 marked the horse cavalry's last great push to find a niche in the Army's modern combat organization. Major General Herr believed that the mechanized forces only succeeded in Europe because of the improved road networks and that the horse was still a vital asset in unimproved a r e a s . ^ 4 Under Herr's domination, the most advanced formation the Cavalry adopted was a combined horse- mechanized corps reconnaissance unit.45 While Herr's predecessors. Major
Generals Guy V. Henry and Leon B. Kromer, had advocated balanced development of cavalry forces, the new Chief of Cavalry personally spearheaded a crusade to reestablish the horse cavalry as the principal type.
He viewed the mechanized cavalry not as component of the branch, but a drain on cavalry manpower that he could otherwise assign to horse units. He believed that the mechanized cavalry had reached its fullest state of development and that any further effort on its behalf could only occur at the expense of the horse units. Herr would not permit any increase in mechanized cavalry strength without a similar increase in horse cavalry. As a result, the 7th Cavalry remained the only mechanized brigade in the Army
44see John K. Herr and Edward S. Wallace, The Story of the U.S. Cavalry (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1953) for Herr's views on cavalry and the limitations of mechanization.
^^Gabel, M a n e u v e rs, 29-30. 264 until 1940. Herr wanted a Cavalry Corps of three horse division and one mechanized cavalry division.46
By the end of the period, few Cavalry officers wholly rejected mechanized cavalry in favor of horse cavalry, but most still believed that a mix between horse and mechanized units was the optimum solution. The belief that mechanization and motorization could not match the all-terrain capabilities of the horse prevailed. As a result, the Army sought balanced organizations of horse and mechanized vehicles as late as 1939 and retained a pure horse cavalry division in 1941. With the exception of Chaffee's mechanized brigade, the Cavalry were still rearward looking.
Field Service Regulations 1939's doctrine for employment of mechanized cavalry was slightly more progressive than that for tank support of infantry, reflecting the Cavalry's appreciation of the range and speed offered by light armored vehicles. But even in this most promising area.
Field Service Regulations 1939 still focused on cooperation between mechanized and horse cavalry in the execution of security missions without a word dedicated to the long-range, independent, mechanized combined arms operations that would stun the world before the year was out.
Field Service Regulations 1939 reflected the transitional condition of cavalry in its discussion of the arm. The manual acknowledged advances in the arm by expanding discussion of mechanized units, dropping the previous manual's warning about the cavalry's lack of firepower, and noting reliance
^^Johnson, "Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers," 335-338. 265 on radio as its primary means of communication. However, much of the discussion treated both types of cavalry forces as one. The manual stressed that "Cavalry is characterized by a high degree of mobility; its special value is derived from the rapidity and ease with which its power can be displaced from one position or locality to another."47 All cavalry forces, regardless of type, executed "missions of reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, and security for large units."^® When the manual addressed capabilities of horse and mechanized units, however, the incompatibility of the two forces became obvious. Horse cavalry continued to provide commanders with a highly mobile force for traditional reconnaissance and security missions and capable of operating "in almost any terrain."49 The mechanized cavalry received the mission to exploit and pursue in the offense and counterattack in the defense.
The mechanized cavalry's ability "to intervene rapidly at a decisive point in battle," "exploit a success," and "seize an objective" stressed its firepower and armor protection as much as its mobility.^O The struggle within the branch and the Army to define the role of cavalry on the modern battlefield was evident in theField Service Regulations 1939.
47fSR 1939,7.
48fSRI939,8.
49fSR 1939,8.
SOfSR 1939,9. 266
ANTIMECHANIZED DEFENSE
The Field Service Regulations reflected the unsteady state of American antimechanized doctrine in 1939. Great concern for protection against a mechanized attack was evident in the dedication of a full section within the chapter on security measures to antimechanized defense. On the other hand, the lack of a well-formed doctrine was also obvious in the vague and sometimes conflicting guidance in the manual. The operational concept borrowed mainly from the Command and General Staff School's 1939 edition of Antimechanized Defense. Antimechanized Defense was a revision of the
Army's first antitank manual. Antitank Defense (Tentative) which appeared as a Leavenworth school text in 1936 in response to growing concerns about the increasing capabilities of mechanized forces. All three manuals prescribed the use of regimental antimechanized weapons to provide local defense and employment of mobile antimechanized units at division level and above for flank and rear defense. These centrally-controlled mobile units would also reinforce forward areas as required.^l
The roots of the antimechanized doctrine reached back to World War I.
The lack of a significant German tank threat provided little incentive for developing special antitank capabilities. From the German experience fighting against Allied tanks, the Americans learned that artillery fire was the most effective tank killer, although mines and armor piercing bullets also took their toll, and that the tanks were easier to defeat when separated from
^^FSR 1939, 76-78; Gabel, Seek, Strike, and Destroy, 5-6. 267 the infantry. As a result, the American Army adopted the practice of employing mobile artillery batteries in depth poised to react to a tank penetration. Against these slow-moving infantry tanks, the key to the defense was to destroy the accompanying infantry thereby making the tanks vulnerable to destruction by the artillery. The Army's belief that the tank was solely an infantry support weapon and that antitank defense required no special tactics survived the entire interwar period and shaped American antitank doctrine into World War 11.^2
A major problem with the doctrine, however, was that neither an adequate antitank weapon nor the organizations discussed in the doctrine existed as late as 1939. The doctrine was untested. The Army's antitank doctrine represented its best estimate of how to stop a massed tank assault without having had the benefit of experimenting with the concept. The doctrine remained essentially the same into World War II with successively higher levels of command controlling increasingly larger antitank reserves.
The concept reached its ultimate expression in the employment of semi- autonomous tank destroyer units under the control of the General
Headquarters. The ultimate failure of the doctrine is not surprising given the conditions under which the Army developed it, but it was a deficient doctrine nonetheless.
Several reasons explain the Army's failure to develop a viable antimechanized doctrine by 1939. For one, the Army lacked interest in
^^Gabel, Seek, Strike, and Destroy, 3-4. 268 antimechanized defense for the first 15 years of the interwar period. The threat of becoming embroiled in a mechanized war was insignificant compared to the many more important problems the Army had to solve with its limited resources. The Army had not entirely ignored the matter. It had abandoned the development of a multipurpose 37mm gun in the 1920s only after it proved unsuccessful and did continue to develop the .50 caliber machinegun with armor-piercing ammunition for antitank defense.53 The
Army first began to consider antimechanized defense seriously in the mid-
1930s. Interest in antimechanization at the Army War College, as indicated by the topics of lectures, student committee reports, and individual staff studies, was not evident until after 1935.54 Neither the annual reports of the Secretary of War nor those of the Chief of Staff mentioned antimechanized defense until 1936.
The Army's nonchalant attitude toward antimechanized defenses stemmed in part from the belief that current and developing technology used in accordance with conventional defensive doctrine was sufficient. The
German combined mechanized warfare concept, blitzkrieg, had not proven itself yet and certainly, the lessons of the Spanish Civil War offered nothing to refute the American view of mechanized warfare. Tanks had achieved no decisive results and early antitank guns appeared fully capable of stopping the
53Green, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department, 182.
54ceneral Indices to Courses at the Army War College, 1920-1940, TMs, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 269 mechanized vehicles. The Army did not foresee the use of highly mobile, heavily armed and armored, tanks in the coming blitzkrieg. The Spanish
Civil War had indicated the need for more powerful antitank weapons to counter heavier tanks, but did not reveal anything about a new operational concept that would require not only larger, but more mobile antitank weapons. The interpretation of combat in Spain supported the World War I antitank doctrine relying on forward units to provide local defenses and higher commands to thicken the line or counterattack at critical points with larger guns. The operational concept might have worked, if the Army had developed the weapons and organization required to execute it.
A major part of the problem in developing supporting organizations and equipment was the Army's failure to establish clear lines of responsibility for antitank matters. The failure to assign responsibility to a single branch hindered the development of antitank material, organization, and doctrine.
Both the Infantry and the Field Artillery could claim a role in antitank matters. The Infantry argued that the role of the weapon, not its characteristics determined the controlling branch. As a weapon of close combat, it belonged to the Infantry. TheField Service Regulations 1939 supported this argument by addressing antitank weapons in the Infantry section in its chapter on the arms and services. The Field Artillery countered that the antitank gun was identical in most respects to the artillery armament so it could best develop the system. Furthermore, the 1939 triangular division structure would place the division's 24 antitank guns under the control of the division artillery. The War Department had partially resolved 270 the fight for control of antitank matters when it assigned proponency for development of the 37mm gun to the Infantry in August 1938, but left the question of overall proponency for antitank matters unresolved. The competition for control of antitank matters was not resolved completely until
1941 when General Marshall directed the WDGS G-3 to take the lead in antitank development.55
During the 1930s, the Infantry had taken the greatest interest and made the most progress of any one branch in the development of antitank doctrine.
The Infantry School had experimented with an antitank unit in the early thirties that became the prototype for the regimental antitank company in the triangular infantry division. The Provisional Infantry Division tests conducted in 1937 led to the adoption of the regimental antitank company with its twelve .50 caliber machineguns the following year. The actual reorganization did not occur, however, until General Marshall pushed it through in 1939. Until then, the Army had no experience with the organization outside of the Infantry School.56 The operational concept that accompanied this organization was not much different from the World War I doctrine. The antitank company's function was to thicken the infantry line with antitank weapons.
The organization and weapons of higher level antitank assets were the focal point of the greatest debate. The Field Service Regulations provided
^^Gabel, Seek, Strike, and Destroy, 7-10; FSR 1939, 6.
^^Gabel, Seek, Strike, and Destroy, 5. 271 little guidance for either integrating antitank weapons into the defense or for the employment of the higher command's mobile assets. Brigadier General
McNair was the most powerful advocate of the centrally-controlled, offense- oriented, antitank unit. His experience as director of the Provisional Infantry
Division tests convinced him of the need to consolidate antitank weapons at regimental level and higher. He argued forcefully for pooling mobile antitank units to protect against mechanized attacks. An opponent of this view. Major
General Lynch countered, "In the complex armies of the present day, one of the great problems of command is to integrate the various means of action in a coordinated system,"^^ adding that the removal of critical assets from the forward units weakened the defense. McNair, as Commandant of the
Command and General Staff School and principal reviewer of the draftField
Service Regulations, was in a better position to influence the doctrine and made his strongly felt views known through the review process. Lieutenant
Colonel Andrew D. Bruce, Colonel Gruber's primary assistant in rewriting
Field Service Regulations 1939 and the primary staff officer for coordinating the 1941 version, was an even more closely placed proponent of the doctrine.
Lieutenant Colonel Bruce would rise to three-star rank and head the Army's effort to develop an antitank capability built around a semi-autonomous tank destroyer organization during the war. With these two men deciding the contents of Field Service Regulations 1939, the employment of pooled antitank elements by the higher command was a certainty.
^^Lynch, Final Report, p. 62. 272
One of the major shortcomings in the doctrine was the lack of modern antitank weapons to implement it. The antitank weapons of the late 1930s and even the early tank destroyers that followed lacked the mobility, protection, and armament required for mobile antimechanized defense.
Antitank guns were still most effective when integrated with infantry in static defenses. Generals Chaffee and Lynch both recognized the potential weaknesses in the doctrine and proposed what would ultimately prove to be the correct solution. Both men believed that the best weapon for use in the second echelon as a mobile weapon to counter armored attacks was another tank. Lynch, reflecting on the failures of antitank units during recent maneuvers, concluded, "The best anti-tank defense lies in the defeat of the hostile armored forces by our own armored units supported by anti-tank units and foot infantry"58 and added, the "Tank must be regarded as a universal rather than a special weapon."59 in 1941, the creation of a planning branch for antitank development within the WDGS G-3 division effectively ended the debate. The doctrine continued to evolve in the direction of pooled antitank resources at division level and higher. The Army would eventually complete a circle as the tank destroyer weapon evolved into a tank in all but name. Throughout the entire period of doctrinal debate, the Army lacked a modern antitank weapon with which to test the competing positions. This
Lynch, Final Report, p. 65.
59 Lynch, Final Report, p. 66. 273 condition was another major reason for the Army's deficient doctrine and underlined the lack of interest in antimechanized defense in the preceding decade. The Army had no dedicated antitank weapon until 1936 despite recognizing the waning adequacy of the 1916 model 37mm gun after service tests in 1932 demonstrated its shortcomings.60 The even more critical deficiencies in mechanization, motorization, semiautomatic rifles, modern artillery, and ammunition reserves consumed the increased appropriations for procurement that year. Within available means, the Infantry experimented with mines, grenades, shoulder weapons, light and medium cannons, and flame throwers in search of an antitank weapon, but failed to standardize any of these weapons systems until 1940. Until then, the .50 caliber machinegun using armor-piercing ammunition was the principal antitank weapon and the Army did not field it until 1936.61 The .50 caliber machinegun's ability to penetrate one-half inch armor plate at 500 yards meant that it could stop early model light tanks, but was useless against the new, more heavily armored, tanks being fielded concurrently by the
G erm ans.
The Spanish Civil War offered evidence supporting the need for a larger antitank weapon. By 1937, the need for an improved antitank weapon had become acute. The Chief of Infantry called for the rapid fielding of an adequate weapon with which the Infantry School could develop antitank
60Creen, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department, 182.
61 Lynch, Final Report, Appendix I (Antitank Weapons). 274 organizations and tactics. The Infantry identified the need for three types of antitank weapons: 1) a semiautomatic, portable, light (37mm) antitank weapon, 2) a medium (75mm) antitank weapon capable of disabling any tank and man-portable for several hundred yards, and 3) a heavy antitank weapon for use in defense of fortified positions. He further noted that anything larger than 37mm would lack the mobility required of a light weapon and that a medium weapon of less than 75mm was senseless because it sacrificed power for a negligible gain in mobility. He also argued against adoption of a self- propelled antitank weapon since the tank already filled that role. Of these three types, the most urgent need was for the light antitank weapon. The immediate development of this weapon would constitute the Army's major procurem ent effort in antitank arm am ent until 1941.62
The United States had fallen well behind the state of the art in antitank armament by 1937. The Germans had equipped every infantry regiment with the low silhouette, towed, Rheinmetall 37mm gun and was experimenting with larger guns. The British, too, were testing larger caliber weapons to counter advances in tank technology.63 In September 1936, the Chief of
Infantry had recommended that the Ordnance Department develop an antitank gun capable of penetrating one-inch armor plate at one thousand yards at a 20% angle of impact, semiautomatic fire at thirty rounds per
62Lynch, Final Report, p. 13.
63"Antitank Defense in Foreign Armies," The Mailing List, XIII (Jan 1937), 233-71. (footnote from Charles E. Miller, "United States Antitank Developments Between the World Wars," MA thesis, Duke University, 1968, p. 8.) 275 minute, 360 degree traverse, range and deflection knobs, and as light as possible. One year later, the Chief of Infantry concurred with the Ordnance
Department's blueprints for the T3 37mm Antitank Gun and the War
Department standardized the gun as the M3.64 The "new" model was a copy of the earlier German 37mm gun and nearly obsolete by the time it was in production.65 But, had the Army waited to develop an entirely new gun, it may have been without any antitank weapon before 1941. As it was, only sixty of the 37mm guns were available to equip the triangular divisions at the end of1940.66 And these guns, though capable weapons for use against the light tanks of the interwar years, were useless against the medium and heavy tanks the Americans would face in World War II.
The Army could have produced a better antitank weapon. No innovations in armor technology had occurred during the interwar years; cast, rolled homogeneous, and face-hardened plate remained the dominant types. Automotive improvements, however, allowed tanks to carry thicker armor and larger guns. These improvements required antitank weapons of larger caliber and with greater ranges. A wide selection of high-velocity cannons were available after 1935; even the "bazooka" rocket propelled grenade launcher was feasible. No technological barrier can explain the
64Lynch, Final Report, p. 13; Final Report, Appendix I (Antitank Weapons).
65watson, 43; Green, Thomson, and Roots, 182-186.
66"The Triangular Division Today," Infantry Journal, Jan 1941, p. 25. 276
American failure to develop a better antitank weapon during the interwar years.67
The Infantry's satisfaction with the 37mm gun was the main reason for the Army's failure to develop a more powerful type. The branch leaders derived that satisfaction from a imperfect view of mechanized warfare.
Clearly, the Infantry did not foresee the need for a weapon more mobile or powerful than the existing 75mm gun and believed the 37mm gun would continue to defeat an armored threat at lower echelons. In fact, it recognized that many European armies possessed marginally superior antitank guns, but believed that the existing American 37mm and 75mm guns were adequate short-term solutions.68 The evidence pointing toward the need for a better antitank weapon was simply unconvincing.
In summary, the Army's deficient antimechanized doctrine resulted from its failure to forecast correctly the nature of mechanized warfare. The
Army underestimated the rapidity with which tanks would increase armor thickness, armament, and rate of movement. It based its decision to delay the development of more powerful guns on the false assumption that the 37mm and 75mm guns would provide adequate protection and turned away from using tanks to counter other tanks. Neither technological deficiencies nor ignorance of foreign developments prevented the United States from producing a better weapon. The decision left the Army with neither an
67Miller, "United States Antitank Developments Between the World Wars," 38-39.
68Creen, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department, 182-186. 277 adequate antitank weapon nor a viable doctrine. As the Army scrambled to prepare for war in 1939, it followed the prescription in its capstone doctrinal manual, "The antitank cannon is of first importance in antimechanized defense,"69 without any first hand evidence to support the claim.
ARTILLERY
The Army's field artillery armament remained essentially the same throughout the interwar period despite the Westervelt Board's specific recommendations for sweeping changes in 1919 and the Army's postwar decision to give first priority to the development of modern artillery weapons. The Army had emerged from World War I with an artillery organization based on horse-drawn 75mm guns for direct support of the infantry regiments and a larger caliber gun of similar mobility for general support of the division. In 1926, the Army standardized a new model,
American-built, 75mm gun and the 105mm howitzer as the the division artillery pieces. The new 75mm boasted a split trail, better stability, and greater elevation and traverse than previous models, and had a range of nearly 15,000 yards. As with most new weapons, the Army could not afford to purchase the gun in mass quantities. The existence of several thousand surplus French, British, and American 75mm guns undercut efforts to procure the weapon during the period of economy in government. As an economy measure, the War Department decided to modernize the "French
69fSk m s , 76. 278
75s" in stock by upgrading the carriage and producing a more powerful shell to increase range. The improved 75mm gun did not enter production until
1936 and, even then, the 75mm gun still lacked the capability for high-speed towing.70
The development of the 105mm howitzer had been the Ordnance
Department's top project in the 1920s. By 1926, the Army had spent over
$400,000 on the system. The Army standardized a horse-drawn 105mm howitzer two years later, but lacked the funds to equip the division artillery with the new weapon. The Army substituted the tractor drawn 155mm howitzer in its place the following year. As late as 1934, the 105mm howitzer had still not gone into production and pilot models were found incapable of withstanding high-speed towing. This arrangement gave the division one regiment of tractor drawn 155mm howitzers and two horse-drawn 75mm gun regiments in 1934.^1 This organization stood until the 105mm howitzer reached quantity production after World War II began.
Development of medium and heavy artillery fared worse. The sole corps field artillery piece remained the World War I-vintage French 155mm
GFF gun as lack of funds prevented development of an American 155mm howitzer. Development of heavy artillery, such as the 8-inch gun, also
70Boyd L. Dastrup, King of Battle: A Branch History of the U.S. Army's Field Artillery (Fort Monroe: Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1992), 185-186.
Dastrup, King of Battle, 186-88; Green, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department, 186- 188. 279 suffered from lack of funds in the 1920s. The Field Artillery faced arguments from the Air Corps that aviation had assumed the harassing and interdiction mission previously assigned to the corps and army guns. Development of heavy artillery found few champions. The 1920s ended without having implemented the system envisioned by the Westervelt Board and as discussed in theField Service Regulations. Lack of funds, available war surplus, and artillery conservatism in the 1920s meant that the next decade would begin with World WarI artillery p i e c e s . 7 2
The Field Artillery continued to examine mechanization and motorization as means of providing sustained fire in support of advancing forces. Self-propelled artillery never enjoyed widespread popularity in the
United States Army during the interwar years. Early tests found the type to be dangerously conspicuous, difficult to maneuver, expensive, and mechanically unreliable. Limited funds and lack of interest within the Field
Artillery led to the abandonment of research and development efforts in the
1920s. Self-propelled artillery eventually evolved during World WarI I from the self-propelled antitankg u n . ^ 3
Most Field Artillery officers recognized the potential offered by motorization even before World War I had ended. Although more reliable than tractors, motor vehicles were still slow and prone to mechanical failure in the early 1920s. The reliable simplicity of the horse still appealed to a
22Dastrup, King of Battle, 191-92.
^^Green, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department, 203, 314-317. 280 conservative Army in the early 1920s and remained the prime mover for light artillery throughout the interwar years. The weight of medium and heavy artillery demanded more powerful means, however. But, budget cuts in 1922 eliminated all experimental motorized division artillery except for the two battalions at the Infantry and Artillery Schools. Experimentation continued, but on a much smaller scale. In November 1928, the War
Department decided to retain horse-drawn artillery in the division for the foreseeable future because it was dependable, mobile enough to keep up with the infantry, and most important, it lacked funds to pursue further research and development. Conservatism and belief in the horse's superiority over motor vehicles also played a role in the decision. While medium and heavy artillery continued to motorize, horses remained the prime movers for light guns and howitzers.^^ Major General Harry G. Bishop, Chief of Field Artillery from 1930 to
1934, moved aggressively to motorize division artillery shortly after taking office. Bishop argued that motor vehicles had progressed far during the 1920s and that reliability was no longer a factor in choosing the horse over a motor vehicle. Only the lack of funds prevented motorization of all division artillery. Tests of truck-drawn 75mm guns equipped for high-speed towing between 1932 and 1933 proved Bishop's point.^^ Major General Bishop's drive to modernize the Field Artillery paralleled General MacArthur's efforts
^4Dastrup, King of Battle, 188-89.
^^Dastrup, King of Battle, 190-91. 281 to modernize the Army. Motorization was a key aspect of both plans. The
Field Artillery reached an important milestone in 1933 when it received funds to motorize. The Army would motorize fifty-six of eighty-one 75mm gun batteries and 75% of all division artillery by 1940 as a result of the change in attitudes toward the motor vehicle that began in the early 1930s.76
The horse was not dead however. The Chief of Field Artillery from 1938 to 1942, Major General Robert M. Danford, told an Army War College class in 1939, "For light division artillery, the horse still remains superior as the prime mover off roads, through the mud, the darkness and the rain. . . .
To discard him during peace in favor of the motor, 100 per cent, is simply putting all our eggs in one basket, and is in my judgement, an unsound policy."77
In the mid-1930s, the Field Artillery reevaluated the earlier decision to replace the 155mm howitzer in view of foreign combat experiences. The
Spanish Civil War reaffirmed the importance of firepower and therefore argued against taking the 155mm howitzer from the division. In 1938, the
Field Artillery School moved to replace the 75mm gun with the 105mm howitzer and retain the 155mm howitzer, but again, costs prohibited abandoning the ubiquitous 75mm gun.78
^^Dastrup, King of Battle, 192.
^^Quoted in Dastrup, King of Battle, 193.
^^Dastrup, King of Battle, 194. 282
The Army's Provisional Infantry Division in 1937 tested the
75mm/105mm combination. The motorized artillery regiment consisted of three 75mm gun battalions in direct support and one 105mm howitzer battalion in general support. The test substantiated the mobility of the combination, but also exposed its lack of firepower. Brigadier General Lesley J. McNair, the 2nd Division artillery commander, argued for heavier guns in the division. A subsequent test in 1938-1939 with a 155mm battalion in general support corroborated the earlier findings of insufficient firepower in the 75mm/105mm combination, but the War Department retained the
105mm howitzer as the general support weapon in the triangular division nevertheless. In spite of this decision, the Army equipped the first divisions formed during mobilization with the 155mm because it lacked sufficient
105mm howitzers. The War Department refused to replace the 75mm guns with the 105mm howitzer because of the surplus of 75mm guns and ammunition, high replacement costs, the 105mm had a shorter range than the 75mm, it took longer to place into action, and was not combat-tested.
Only after the Germans demonstrated the effectiveness of their heavier guns, did the Army change the artillery organization. Nevertheless, the 105mm was not available in large numbers until 1943. The 75mm gun remained a common division artillery piece in the early years of the war.^9
The mobility brought to the battlefield by motorization and mechanization meant that the slow. World War I style, fire adjustment
^^Dastrup, King of Battle, 194-95. 283 procedures would no longer suffice. A quicker method for massing fires was necessary. Major Carlos Brewer and his successor. Major Orlando Ward, improved fire direction methods in the early 1930s. The new system relied on a combination of surveyed battery positions, radio-equipped forward observers, and a battalion-level fire direction center to gather target information, convert it to firing data, and transmit the data to the firing batteries. The technique, which allowed the battalion to mass fires within ten minutes if provided with good maps, was the best in the world at the time.
The establishment of the fire direction center shifted the principal responsibility for fire support from the battery to the battalion by placing the battalion commander in charge of directing fire.80
The fire direction center concept met resistance from senior artillery commanders who were hesitant to take away the battery commander's authority to direct fires. First among the naysayers was the Chief of Field
Artillery himself. Major General Upton Birnie, Jr. (1934-1938). More logical arguments included having the forward observer talk directly to the battery.
The War Department abandoned the idea. The Field Artillery would not revive the concept until 1941.81
The 75mm gun had retained its World War I secondary role as an antitank weapon. Use of indirect fire from medium and heavy artillery against tanks in assembly areas was doctrine in 1934. The operational concept
80oastrup, King of Battle, 196-98.
81 Dastrup, King of Battle, 198-99. 284 called for long-range attack of tanks in assembly areas using medium and heavy indirect fires, then engaging the remaining tanks with 75mm and
37mm in the direct fire role. The antitank mission was not popular with many field artillerymen, but nevertheless became a point of contention when the infantry antitank weapons began to look like artillery guns. The Chief of
Field Artillery in 1938, Major General Danford, supported the development of mobile antitank weapons and attaching them to division or corps. He wanted no part of the antitank role believing that it was defensive in nature and not in accord with the artillery's primary missions of providing close support and counterbattery fire. The Field Artillery believed the tank should continue to be an aid to the infantry, not the core of an independent force. Instructors at the Field Artillery School did not integrate tanks, infantry, and field artillery into formations and, as a result, did not develop tactics to support armored thrusts.82
The only real changes since 1918 were the development of improved fuzes and the adoption of the 105mm howitzer. A 155mm howitzer did not appear until 1940 and the fire direction center concept did not take hold until
1941. The impressive performances of American artillery in World War II were the products of rapid improvisation and adaptation of largely untested interwar theories. As expected, the United States Army began its next war using World War I vintage equipment. It also began the war with World
W ar I doctrine.
^^Dastrup, King of Battle, 199-201. 285
Despite impressive gains in operational mobility and fire control procedures, the artillery doctrine was least changed in the new manual.
Firepower and flexibility continued to define the arm's capabilities, though, the "great moral effects" of artillery earned but a sentence, a substantial re duction from the two paragraphs dedicated to moral effects inField Service
Regulations 1923. The artillery mission expanded from supporting the infantry by fire to include supporting the cavalry and providing depth by attacking targets at extended ranges. The manual added army artillery organization to the division, corps, and GHQ reserve structure. Other than these negligible changes, artillery operational doctrine remained unchanged in the 15 years since publication of the last manual. The manual was accurate; little had changed.
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
The Army's air forces gained functional independence during the interwar years. Technological advances supported the powerful movement among aviators to develop a strategic bombing fleet for employment against an enemy's vital centers. The groundwork laid by the inspirational General
Billy Mitchell and carried forward by the Air Corps Tactical School led to the creation of the General Headquarters Air Force and, eventually, an independent air force. Unfortunately, the high priority given to strategic bombardment severely undermined efforts to develop organizations, doctrine, and equipment for close air support. 286
In the immediate postwar years, the Army had taken promising steps to integrate air and ground operations in its creation of the world's only dedicated ground attack unit, the 3rd Attack Group. Failure to field a satisfactory attack aircraft and develop an accompanying doctrine for close air support sapped the potential of the new organization. Early models of heavily armed and armored aircraft were unsuccessful leaving the 3rd Attack
Group equipped with World War I DH-4 observation planes. Because these aircraft, powered by Liberty engines, could not carry concurrently bombs and machineguns, close air support training and doctrine development suffered.
Moreover, the lack of similar organizations in other armies left the Army without another source for experiences from which to draw conclusions and shape doctrine. United States Marine Corps employment of air support in
Nicaragua and Army missions flown along the Mexican border contributed some additional expertise, but the Air Corps Tactical School paid little attention to the experiences. The Army conducted its own highly publicized air-ground exercises, but these maneuvers occurred infrequently. Army close air support doctrine made little progress under these difficult conditions. By the mid-1920s, the emerging strategic bombardment doctrine joined fighter pursuit in pushing close air support into the background.®^
The shift to strategic bombardment began in the mid-1920s. The Air
Corps Tactical School, inspired by General Mitchell's vocal advocacy of a
®®Lee Kennett, "Developments to 1939," in Case Studies in the Development of Close Air S u p p o rt, ed. Benjamin Franklin Cooling (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990), 42. 287 separate air force, developed doctrine that reinforced the goal of an independent air force. As a result. Air Corps officers began shifting their focus away from ground support to long-range bombing. The shift was gradual and often obscured by the official statements of the Air Corps leaders and the publication of doctrine manuals stressing the importance of air support to ground operations. Major General Mason Patrick's "Fundamental
Conceptions of the Air Service" and the Air Corps Tactical School's 1924 and
1926 Bombardment texts still stressed the importance of supporting the ground force. By 1928, the Air Corps Tactical School began to shift its emphasis to the effectiveness of bombardment and moved away from the formerly dominant air supremacy mission.84 The 1930Bombardment text would flatly state that "Bombardment aviation, under the circumstances anticipated in a major war, is the basic arm of the Air Force."85 Air Corps
Tactical School texts stated that air forces only attacked battlefield objectives under "most unusual circumstances" and operated over the battlefield "in only the rarest of situations."86 Furthermore, attack aircraft were to engage large unit reserves is assembly areas and strike within artillery range only "in cases of great emergency."87
8^Johnson, "Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers," 204-13.
85johnson, "Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers," 212.
86Quoted in Kennett, "Developments to 1939," in Case Studies in the Development of Close Air S u p p o r t,47.
8^Kennett, "Developments to 1939," 47. 288
During the 1930s, the emphasis on strategic bombing continued despite lessons from foreign wars that highlighted successful air-ground combination. The wars of the 1930s offered a number of lessons to observers.
The Italo-Ethiopian War demonstrated numerous ways in which air and ground forces could cooperate on the modern battlefield, but offered few concrete lessons because of the Ethiopian's inability to counter the Italian air effort. In the Sino-Japanese fighting in 1937, Japan's dominance again shaded the value of lessons offered by the air war. In both wars, however, the principal lessons focused on the value of airpower in close support of ground forces. The Spanish Civil War offered similar lessons regarding the relative value of tactical and strategic airpower. The Spanish Civil War was particularly important because it occurred in Europe, the combatants were closely matched in the air, and both sides employed modern aircraft. Time after time, observers highlighted the effectiveness of aircraft in ground support roles. The war confirmed the effectiveness of machineguns and small bombs against light ground targets and that low-level approaches and diving attacks yielded the best results. These lessons, applied by the Germans,
Italians, and Russians in World War II, were not as well received by other foreign observers, notably the British and Americans. Analysts in both countries offered the lack of artillery, inadequate antiaircraft weapons, and ill- trained troops as explanations for the effectiveness of close air support 289
operations.88 American assessments of air operations in Spain revealed an unmistakable bias against close air support operations.
The Air Corps' procurement of relatively few attack aircraft revealed the low priority given the ground support mission. The Air Corps fielded 156 attack aircraft between 1932 and 1936, but only Congress and the War Department kept the Air Corps from procuring bombers to the exclusion of all other types of aircraft arguing that the bomber was not a defensive weapon and was therefore not consistent with the needs of the United States. To be sure, development of attack aircraft was a more difficult proposition than development of bombers and fighters since these types of aircraft could benefit more from commercial research efforts designed to increase load capacity, speed, and altitude. Armored aircraft had no commercial application. Attack aircraft did benefit from the invention of retractable landing gear, higher speeds, greater wing load capacity, and dive brakes.
Development of light bombs, improved aircraft machineguns, aerial cannons, and explosive projectiles also increased the effectiveness of attack aircraft.
Inability to agree on the optimal characteristics of attack aircraft further hindered the procurement effort as new design philosophies repeatedly short- circuited on-going procurement programs. The Army's preference shifted from the heavily armored. World War I "trench fighter" to light, fast, aircraft in the mid-1920s. In 1930, the Army decided to build a low-winged monoplane for ground support. By 1934, a multi-purpose, twin-engine.
88Kennett, "Developments to 1939," 37-42. 290 attack-bomber gained favor. The Army entered World War II with the
Douglas A-20, a twin-engine, light bomber, designated for ground support.
Although the performance characteristics of attack aircraft improved, their ability to communicate with ground forces remained primitive.89
Difficulty establishing and maintaining air-ground communications nets hindered the evolution of close air support operations. Radio sets were still unreliable and had limited range. Attack aircraft were further burdened by the weight of the sets, a critical concern for low-flying aircraft. Low-level flight also decreased the effectiveness of radio communications as terrain interfered with transmissions, the trailing antenna was often lost, and operation of the radio during flight was difficult. On the ground, the SCR-197 radio took ten minutes to place into operation and could not operate on the move. Visual signals and dropped messages were the principal means of air- ground communication on the eve of the war. As a result, immediate air requests still took over an hour from time of request until delivery of aircraft ordnance. Satisfactory air-ground communications would not develop until after World War II had begun.90
Aerial observation and reconnaissance were other air missions that directly supported ground forces. Doctrine in this area, too, remained ill- defined during the interwar years. The Army had achieved little in its efforts to exercise air and ground reconnaissance forces although it had tried on
^^Kennett, "Developments to 1939," 33-37; Gabel, Maneuvers, 36-41.
^^Kennett, "Developments to 1939," 36-37. 291 several occasions to address the matter. As early as 1927, the Chief of the Air
Section in the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General
Staff participated in the joint Air Corps-Second Division maneuvers in order to study air-ground staff relationships. Despite this and a few other attempts to bring air and ground forces together, the Army failed to develop an air- ground doctrine compatible with rapidly evolving aviation and communications capabilities. The Army still lacked a dedicated observation aircraft in 1941.91
In 1939, the United States Army was among the least prepared of the world's major forces in the area of air-ground coordination. Subordination of close air support to the pursuit and bombardment missions, procurement problems, infrequent joint exercises, and unsatisfactory air-ground radios contributed to the stagnation of close air support doctrine. Indeed, the trend away from closer coordination with ground forces was well-established. By the end of 1939, the Air Corps Tactical School replaced the term "attack" with
"light bombardment." The accompanying Air Corps Tactical School manual.
Light Bombardment Aviation, stated, "To use this force to supplement and increase the firepower of ground arms is decidedly an incorrect employment of this class of aviation, since it would neglect the more distant and vital objectives."92 The Army failed to develop viable air-ground support doctrine
91 Bruce W. Bidwell, History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff: 1775-1941 (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, 1986), 306.
92Quoted in Kennett, "Developments to 1939," 52. 292
or update its attack organization until after the German defeat of France in
1940. Only then did the Army begin a comprehensive review of close air support requirements within the Army Air Forces' Directorate of Air
Support. These efforts still failed to produce satisfactory results leaving the
Army without a firm doctrine for air-ground operations as it deployed for
N orth Africa in 1942.93
Field Service Regulations 1939 mirrored organizational trends in the air forces during the 1930s. The revised manual classified air operations by tactical function and aircraft type. The "air attack" function included attack of all ground targets without distinguishing between "bombardment" and
"attack" (close air support). "Air fighting" described all air-to-air combat and
"air reconnaissance and liaison" described airborne intelligence collection.
The manual divided the types of aircraft available to execute these functions into combat; reconnaissance, observation, and liaison; transport; and training and special purpose aviation. Within combat aviation, bombardment and pursuit units conducted air attack and air fighting functions.Field Service
Regulations 1939 further divided bombardment aviation into light, medium, and heavy units. The manual used the term "light bombardment" instead of
"attack" to define the "principal element of GHQ aviation which operates in direct support of ground forces."94 Close air support, once one of the four
93cabel, M a n eu ve rs, 39-41.
94fSR 1 9 3 916. , 293 major air operations, was now a third tier subtask in the hierarchy of air m issions. Trends in Air Corps doctrine away from the ground support mission were also evident inField Service Regulations 1939. The manual stated, "the greatest effectiveness of military aviation is secured through centralized control," and, "Combat aviation should be employed in mass against objectives of decisive importance for the mission of the field forces, and not dispersed or dissipated operations of minor or secondary importance."95 Of the seven pages dedicated to the Air Corps, only two paragraphs specifically addressed ground support operations. Reflecting the lessons of recent foreign w ars. Field Service Regulations 1939 correctly noted that motorization and mechanization increased the need for air-ground coordination as opportunities for air attack in cooperation with ground forces would increase as these forces outdistanced their supporting artillery fires. The following paragraph quickly clarified that this support aviation was most effective when directed against rear areas and "not employed against objectives which can be effectively engaged by available ground weapons within the time required."96
Moreover, the manual stressed that support aviation obtained the most effective results "from bombing attacks launched at altitudes above the
95fSR 2939, 20-21.
96fSR 2939,21. 294
effective range of ground w eapons."97 Field Service Regulations 1939 clearly reflected the broken state of air-ground operations in the United States Army.
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE
Antiaircraft defense grew in importance throughout the interwar years until it became one of the top priority matters in the War Department. The central issues concerning armament, organization, and doctrine remained unresolved until World War II. Despite some impressive theoretical work, the Army never fielded the actual organizations and equipment required to implement the emerging doctrine.
Antiaircraft defense fell into two categories: defense of static positions and defense of mobile units. Defense of static positions concerned protection of harbors, industrial centers, transportation nodes, and other critical fixed assets. Defense of mobile units, found mostly at division level, required weapons sufficiently transportable to protect march columns and capable of repositioning rapidly for protection of supply depots, headquarters, and artillery concentrations. Throughout the interwar years, the Army emphasized defense of static positions. Its organization, equipment, and doctrine reflected the priority. The Army's 1920 reorganization of artillery provided no organic divisional assets for antiaircraft defense. The lowest level antiaircraft unit was the corps artillery regiment. Antiaircraft defense
97fSK 19 3 9 ,21. 295 within the division continued to rely principally on the organic fires of the divisional units.98
In 1925, the Army investigated its antiaircraft defense arrangements bringing the issue of division assets to the fore. The central issue was the need for antiaircraft defense in the division.Field Service Regulations 1923 had specified that units would provide their own protection. Antiaircraft units attached from corps might supplement the division's fires, but this mission was secondary to defense of critical installations usually located in rear areas. Major General Frank W. Coe, Chief of the Coast Artillery, recommended adding to the division an antiaircraft battalion consisting of two .50 caliber machinegun batteries. The Infantry preferred adding a machinegun company to the infantry battalion for use as a multipurpose weapon against tanks and aircraft. A WDGS War Plans Division study concluded that division needed an organic means of antiaircraft defense, but postponed a recommendation pending further development of antiaircraft weapons. Coe continued to push for a decision, but to no avail. The Army retained the doctrine requiring the division to provide its own air defense — the division would not receive its own organic antiaircraft assets because the additional units would have increased the division's size and reduced its
^^Bryon E. Greenwald, "The Development of Antiaircraft Artillery Organization, Doctrine, and Technology In the United States Army, 1919-1941," (MA thesis, Ohio State University, 1991), 41-84. 296 overall mobility. The organization and doctrine would remain unchanged until after World War 11.99
The Army also failed to implement fully an antiaircraft defense system that integrated machineguns, artillery, searchlights, and detection equipment.
The Army completed a design for the system, but lack of funding prevented its procurement. The system was to consist of three-inch guns, .50 caliber machineguns, searchlights, and fire control equipment. The existing machinegun had a 15,000 foot vertical range and used tracers to adjust rounds to the target. The searchlight could illuminate out to 6000 yards. The only new item procured was a three-inch gun in both mobile and fixed configurations that remained the standard from 1928 into early World War II.
The system still lacked a sound locator. Lacking equipment, men, and money, the Army entered the second half of the in ter war period with only six reduced strength active antiaircraftregim ents.100
During the 1930s, advances in the antiaircraft organizational and operational theories reflected the increased attention the topic received within the Coast Artillery Corps and the Army in general. The Coast
Artillery Corps published its first branch doctrine manual in 1930 and updated it in 1933, 1938, and 1940. The two-volume branch m anual dedicated one entire volume to antiaircraft artillery. By the end of the decade, the
Army's antiaircraft doctrine in these manuals revealed increased
99Greenwald, "The Development of Antiaircraft Artillery Organization," 41-84.
^O^Greenwald, "The Development of Antiaircraft Artillery Organization," 41-84. 297 understanding of air defense requirements resulting from the studies of the
Army's own experiences and reports from the Spanish Civil War. The doctrine specified that the antiaircraft gun battalion provide area defense and specifically targeted slow-moving, high-altitude, bombers and observation aircraft. Machinegun units were to provide point defense focusing on engagement of fast, low-flying, attack aircraft and protection of moving units.
In 1933, the Army started to assign machineguns to gun batteries for defense against attack aviation. In addition to the more specific missions, the manuals contained more detailed and sophisticated discussion of antiaircraft tactics. The 1938 revision, incorporating lessons from the Spanish Civil War and following a trend in Army organization, called for pooling of all elements in the general headquarters reserve to ensure that no antiaircraft assets were held in reserve by unemployedu n i t s . ^ 9 1
As before, the division still lacked organic air defense assets and continued to depend on attachment of one gun and two machinegun batteries from the corps to supplement the fires of organic w e a p o n s . The
Infantry had given special attention to antiaircraft defense since the late 1920s.
Four years of testing had convinced the branch leaders that an infantryman's best defense against air attack was his own rifle. This finding did not.
Greenwald, "The Development of Antiaircraft Artillery Organization," 92-119.
^^^Greenwald, "The Development of Antiaircraft Artillery Organization," 92-119. 298 however, diminish the Infantry's desire to include dedicated antiaircraft units in the division organization.^03
These organizational and operational concepts were only theories despite the growing acceptance of the importance of antiaircraft defense and realization that the United States had pitifully few assets. The Army sought to equip the fifteen active regiments in six years through General
MacArthur's modernization program. However, the $33 million allocated only slightly improved the situation. In 1933, the Coast Artillery Corps had only 122 three-inch guns, thirty-two fire control mechanisms, ninety-eight .50 caliber machineguns, and forty-six searchlights for the entire United States distributed among three understrength active regiments. The four regiments protecting overseas possessions were the Army's top priority antiaircraft units, yet were at only half-strength. In 1935, three of four regiments had only one battery each of lights, guns, and machineguns. By June 1936, the Army had equipped but one Regular regim ent.^^4 The situation grew urgent as the decade closed. In 1937, antiaircraft defense moved to the top of the priority list for rearmament spending as result of combat reports from Spain and
China. Although acquisition of antiaircraft material remained the Army's top priority through 1939, it still only had 448 three-inch guns, fifteen 37mm
^^^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1930 (Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1930), 128.
^O^Creenwald, "The Development of Antiaircraft Artillery Organization," 92-119. 299 guns, roughly one thousand .50 cal machineguns and 285 searchlights to equip the planned force of more than eighty-eightregim ents.^05
The Army's interest in antiaircraft defense grew during the interwar years until antiaircraft material eventually topped the list of procurement priorities in the late 1930s. Field Service Regulations 1939 reflected the increased emphasis by dedicating a separate section to the topic within the chapter addressing security measures. The manual also stressed antiaircraft security in offensive, defensive, and special operations warning that "all units within the range of hostile air operations must reckon with the probability of hostile air attack and reconnaissance." ^06 Although the expanded coverage in
Field Service Regulations 1939 represented the Army's recognition of the importance of air defense, the manual also reflected a major organizational and doctrine deficiency of the interwar period that would continue to exist until after World War II — the lack of organic divisional antiaircraft assets.
CONCLUSION
Field Service Regulations 1939 was remarkably similar to its predecessor, particularly in its emphasis on the offense, destruction of the enemy army as the ultimate objective in battle, central importance of man over machine, and its conception of combined arms operations. Infantry- artillery coordination remained at the core of the combined arms team with
^^^Greenwald, "The Development of Antiaircraft Artillery Organization," 92-119.
^O^fsr 1939, 73. 300 the infantry retaining its position as the principal arm. The manual acknowledged the increased operational and tactical mobility offered to all arms by technological progress, but failed to note the full extent to which mobility advances had changed warfare. The manual also noted the importance of antimechanized and antiaircraft defense, but offered few suggestions for the execution of these increasingly challenging functions.
Field Service Regulations 1939 prescriptions for employment of air forces mirrored the trend toward independent air operations and, while frequently mentioning the importance of air-ground operations, virtually ignored close air support. The doctrine prescribed by Field Service Regulations 1939 remained conservatively focused on the increased capabilities of the traditional combat arms rather than redefining combined arms warfare.
It is unfair to judge the Army too harshly for its failure to prescribe more accurate doctrine for the employment of combined arms forces on the eve of World War II. After all, by the end of the interwar period, only the
German Army had developed a correct formula for success on the modern battlefield and it did so through an expensive and extensive process of field testing and combat trials. All of the major armies had continued to refine doctrine and organizations to reflect technological advances and changing national security requirements. In nearly every case, these armies possessed significantly greater resources for doctrine development than those available in the United States. The American Army monitored these foreign military developments throughout the interwar period in search of solutions to the challenges presented by evolving combat capabilities. The next chapter 301 examines the influences of foreign military practices on American doctrine and organization. C H A P T E R X
FOREIGN INFLUENCES ON AM ERICAN M ILITARY THOUGHT
It is not believed that any officer or board of officers can draw up a tactical organization on theoretical considerations only. To arrive at the best we must apply the results of accumulated experience. In brief, comparative studies, organizational and historical, are always necessary. — C. E. Kilbourne^ Lecturer, Army War College
The World War I experience and abundantly available time created fertile ground for the intellectual advancement of the officer corps. Lacking physical resources with which to practice their profession. Army officers turned to studying manuals, writing for professional journals, participating in roundtable discussions, and enrolling in correspondence courses to hone their military skills in preparation for the next war. Most officers, during the inter war period, had seen battle. Even as late as 1940, "more than 49% of the officer corps were World War I veterans."^ The American Army's wealth of
NOTE: All Army War College documents cited in this chapter may be found in the Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
^C. E. Kilboume, "Period of Informative Studies," Lecture delivered to Army War College G-3 Course 1922-23, Document #1,11 Nov 1922, TMs.
^Edward M. Coffman and Peter F. Herrly, "The American Regular Army Officer Between the World Wars: A Collective Biography," Armed Forces and Society (Fall 1977), 67.
302 303 combat experience proved both helpful and detrimental to advancement of military thought. Some combat veterans assimilated their wartime experience with modern developments and contributed to the development of new doctrine and techniques. However, veterans who failed to realize the shortcomings of narrow perspectives, fought against innovations that contradicted their limited personal combat experiences.^ The Army needed imaginative, progressive military thinkers to match the quickening pace of technological change occurring during the interwar years. By the late 1920s, constantly increasing mobility and firepower demanded revision of war-based doctrine and organization. The absence of a battlefield or a realistic training program, however, left the Army without a means of testing new weapons and developing new tactics. The officer corps, taking advantage of the only abundant resources, time and experience, addressed organizational and doctrinal changes through the expanded and improved system of military schools, publications, and periodicals. The lack of evidence, namely combat experience or field tests, to support or refute the ideas and theories proposed by American officers led to increased interest in foreign developments.
This chapter examines foreign military influences on American doctrine during the interwar period as reflected in reports prepared by Army
War College student committees which compared American and foreign military systems. The chapter addresses four questions:
1) Which countries' military systems received the most attention?
^Major George C. Marshall cautioned World War veterans against making too much of their experiences when attempting to determine the war's lessons. See his article, "Profiting by War Experiences," in Infantry Journal (Jan 1921). 304
2) What subjects did the reports address?
3) How did the reports assess foreign military systems?
4) How influential were foreign military systems in the development of United States Army doctrine and organization?
ARMY WAR COLLEGE COMMITTEE COMPARATIVE STUDIES
The views presented by officers at the Army War College are significant for three reasons: 1) the War College was at the top of the Army educational system hierarchy; 2) its curriculum focused on large organizational and doctrinal issues; and 3) War College graduates were the Army's senior leaders.
In short, the Army War College student committee reports were among the best available sources of American attitudes toward foreign military systems.
The Army War College^ reopened in September 1919 after the World
War had demonstrated the need for officers trained to serve on the War
Department General Staff and in high command. The school's mission was to prepare senior officers for modern war. Since modern industrial warfare demanded greater knowledge of command and staff skills to handle increasingly complex administration, operations, logistics, and communications, the Army sent only its most promising officers to the War
College. Building on the demonstrated need for a multi-institutional approach to war studies, the school broadened its focus after the war by
^The Army War College reopened in 1919 as the "General Staff College." To avoid confusion with the General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, the General Staff College changed its name back to the "Army War College" in 1922. I will refer to the school as the Army War College throughout the chapter. 305 inviting National Guard and reserve officers, naval officers, educators, labor managers, government civilians, and foreign military officers to lecture and attend classes. The Army War College and its Navy counterpart provided the nation's only forums where civilians and military men regularly addressed national defense issues.
Major General James W. McAndrew, the school's first postwar commandant, developed a curriculum to meet the need for War Department
General Staff officers. The curriculum, which remained virtually unchanged for the entire interwar period, focused primarily on the military aspects of preparedness, but also addressed political, economic, and psychological factors in international relationships. Students began their study by preparing intelligence "estimates of the situation" for major countries, including the
United States. These estimates assessed the military, economic, sociological, geographic, and political situations in a designated country or group of countries to determine the United States' most likely opponents.^ Then, students developed war plans with supporting operational, administrative, training, and logistical annexes. Finally, the students tested their solutions through war games. A separate course related each step in the process to the appropriate WDGS division. Students divided into committees to prepare intelligence estimates in the G-2 Course, operations estimates in the G-3
Course, personnel and administrative estimates in the G-1 Course, logistics estimates in the G-4 Course, and developed war plans in the War Plans
Course. In the Command Course, the class conducted the war game. The
^Japan remained the main enemy for the entire period. 306
Student committees presented solutions to the entire class at scheduled conferences held throughout the school year. Although war plan preparation was the heart of the course, an
"informative period" supplemented the officers' education. The informative period consisted of lectures, conferences, individual research, and committee reports designed to improve the student's understanding of the General Staff and its functions. During this period, guest lecturers presented papers on a variety of topics. Standard lectures included reports on trends and developments by Chiefs of the Arms and Services, information briefings by members of the WDGS on the staff's organization and functions, country briefings by intelligence staff officers and civilian experts, and presentations by foreign officers describing military practices in their countries. Additionally, the faculty assigned special topics for examination by individuals and student committees. These research assignments could range from an analysis of proposed manuals to a comparative study of training systems in the major armies of the world.
The study of foreign armies was an integral part of the curriculum from the War College's postwar rebirth until another World War closed its doors in 1940. Some lectures specifically addressed foreign armies. Others, particularly those dealing with new trends and developments, summarized the status of military forces in the major powers. The students themselves, as previously mentioned, conducted broad country studies in the G-2 Course, typically reporting on a dozen or more nations or groups of nations every year. Among the first comparative studies were those conducted as part of
Training Course in 1920 and 1921. These studies examined the doctrines. 307 principles, and methods of war and training practiced by selected nations.
Sources included foreign manuals, tables of organization and equipment, and writings of major military figures. The amount of translated material increased throughout the period. In the first year after the war, students studied the training systems in France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, and
Switzerland. The next year, the course added Belgium to the list while dropping Great Britain and Japan since the preparation of the RED-ORANGE
(Great Britain-Japan) War Plan already required close examination of the two island powers. In 1922, G-4 committees studied principles of supply deducible from British experience in the Sudan, South Africa, and in France; the
Franco-German War of 1870; and the Russo-Japanese War. The War Plans committees examined the British, German, and French war plans of 1914. In addition. Marshal Foch and the Chiefs of Staff of the French and Italian
Armies lectured at the school. The prominence of foreign studies in the
Army War College curriculum demonstrated that the faculty clearly understood the importance of studying foreign armies.
The comparative studies conducted during the G-3 Course represented the most in-depth and thorough examinations of foreign military systems. In
1922, the War College added the comparative studies program to the course because "it is not believed that any officer or board of officers can draw up a tactical organization on theoretical considerations only. To arrive at the best we must apply the results of accumulated experience. In brief, comparative 308
studies, organizational and historical, are alwaysnecessary."^ The first comparative studies only addressed organization. By the end of the decade, student committees were comparing doctrines, training, technological developments, mobilization plans, staff procedures, and military histories in search of ways to improve the United States Army. The War College curriculum continued to include comparative studies throughout the interwar period. The committee reports provided outstanding descriptions of senior American Army officers' views on foreign military systems.
A quantitative analysis of the comparative studies (Table 4) conducted during the interwar years provides interesting insights on American military thought. That the Army conducted the studies at all demonstrates its recognition of the importance of foreign military systems; the great quantity of comparative studies is in itself significant. Between 1919 and 1940, G-3 committees conducted 53 comparative studies, 16 in the first half of the period and 37 after 1932 (Table 4 and Figure 3). The increase in the number of studies in the latter half of the period underscores the War College's acceptance of their value as vehicles for student instruction and sources of potential improvements in the American military system. The shifting focus of the studies also parallels the growing threat presented by the modernization of several of the world's major armies.
^C. E. Kilboume, "Period of Informative Studies," Lecture delivered to Army War College G-3 Course 1922-23, Document #1,11 Nov 1922, TMs. 309
Table 4. Frequency of Inclusion in War College Comparative Studies
1920-31 1932-40 1920-40 TOTAL» PERCENT^ TOTAL PERCENT TOTAL PERCENT
TOTAL 16 100% 37 100% 53 100%
FRANCE 15 94% 33 89% 48 91% GERMANY 5 31% 30 81% 35 66% GREAT BRITAIN» 13 81% 31 84% 44 83% JAPAN 13 81% 24 65% 37 70% ITALY 1 6% 20 54% 21 40% SOVIET UNION 1 6% 20 54% 21 40% OTHERS^ 3 19% 1 3% 4 8%
»TOTAL= Number of comparative studies conducted during the period *’PERCENTAGE= Percentage of total number of comparative studies conducted during the period. Figure 3 graphically compares the numbers of studies conducted on each of the major countries. "^Sometimes including Canada, Australia, and New Zealand ‘‘Belgium, Mexico, Switzerland______
**********************************************
35 T m 1920-1931 0 1932-1940
E 15
FRANCE JAPAN GERMANY FFALY SOVIET OTHERS UNION
Figure 3. Frequency of Inclusion in War College Comparative Studies 310
The frequency of a foreign country's inclusion in the comparative studies is a measure of the importance attached to it by the War College. The committees frequently studied the major military powers: France, Germany,
Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union. They occasionally included countries with unique military systems, like Switzerland, regardless of their ranking among the world's armies. France and Great Britain consistently received the most attention, appearing in over three-fourths of the studies.
Interest in Japan peaked in the 1920s, but declined dramatically during the thirties. War College studies almost ignored postwar Germany until 1932.
However, the ensuing nine years witnessed a sixfold increase in studies of the
German army, making it one of the most studied armies during the 1930s.
Italy and the Soviet Union also received scant notice until the thirties.
While measuring the frequency of inclusion in comparative studies identifies potentially influential countries, it does not necessarily reveal the extent of the subject country's influence on American military thought. A qualitative examination of the committee reports is a better measure of a foreign army's influence on the American Army. The following qualitative analysis summarizes by country the most common conclusions and recommendations contained in the committee reports. Each section begins with a description of the committee members' perceptions of the subject nation's military goals and capabilities followed by an examination of their assessments of the subject nation's military doctrines and organizations. In many cases, unique national character and policy shaped military systems to such a degree that War College students concluded that the organizations and doctrines were only effective under special conditions. The officers' 311 perceptions of the adaptability of foreign practices to American conditions also influenced their assessments.
The comparative studies committees followed several general principles based on American organizations and doctrine when examining foreign systems. The ideal organization facilitated "discipline, control, and administration; mobility and development of maximum firepower in battle; elasticity for expansion of [the] peace establishment; and prompt combinations of arms and units incam paign."^ The Army sought powerful, mobile, and flexible divisions. Apowerful organization could weather sustained combat for several days. A mobile organization could deploy a division in a single day. Aflexible organization could tailor itself to meet the requirements of specific situations by combining self-contained units into corps and army configurations. Key features of mobile and flexible organizations were the absence of excess overhead and units not required for routine operations.® Sound doctrine emphasized the tenets of open warfare; offensive action, the human element on the battlefield, initiative, mobility, maneuver, and combined arms operations. These key features of American institutions and practices shaped War College committee assessments of foreign military systems.
^"Comparative Studies of Armies of United States, Japan, France, and Great Britain," Army War College G-3 Course 1924-25, Document #12,1 Dec 1924, TMs, p. 1.
®"Comparative Studies of Armies of United States, Japan, France, and Great Britain," Army War College G-3 Course 1924-25, Document #12,1 Dec 1924, TMs, p. 1; "Comparative Studies of Organization of the Armies of the United States, Japan, Great Britain, France, and Pre-war Germany," Army War College G-3 Course 1922-23, Document #12,27 N ov 1922, TMs, p. 1. 312
FRANCE
War College students believed that fear of attack from Germany, great industrial strength, and limited manpower shaped French military policy, doctrine, and organizations.9 Despite these qualifying factors, American assessments of French postwar doctrine were usually negative. France's staggering loss of manpower in the trenches of the Western front had, by the end of 1917, silenced the doctrine offense of à outrance (all-out offense) and replaced it with the doctrine of methodical battle described in Chapter VIII.
Simply put, artillery firepower replaced manpower as the critical element on the battlefield. This practice, roundly denounced by General John J. Pershing and the American Expeditionary Forces General Staff, continued after the war; as did American criticism. As early as 1920, an Army War College committee noted the French tendency toward caution and well-prepared advances "rather than toward the old dash and coup de main."^0 The committee report highlighted the positioning of artillery in defensive echelons and the failure to teach the aggressive use of tanks, as in Great
Britain and the United States, as indicators of waning enthusiasm for the
^"Comparative Studies of Organization of United States, Japan, France, Great Britain," Army War College G-3 Course 1923-24, Document #8, 28 Nov 1923, TMs, pp. 1-2; "Comparative Studies of Armies of United States, Japan, France, and Great Britain," Army War College G-3 Course 1924-25, Document #12, 1 Dec 1924, TMs, p. 17; "Indoctrination as a Basis for Military Training," Army War College G-3 Course 1924-25, Document #13, 2 Dec 1924, TMs, p. 8; "Training the United States Army," Army War College G-3 Course 1927-28, Document #17,10 Nov 1927, TMs, p. 3.
^^"French Army," Army War College Training Course 1919-20, Document #20,23 Apr 1920, TMs, p. 3. 313 offensive.A similar study, conducted the following year, mirrored these f i n d i n g s . ^2 j n 1 9 2 2 , a G-3 Course committee again criticized French methods of employing their forces. The committee members believed France's emphasis on perfect plans and the subordination of infantry to mechanical means of obtaining a decision sapped the vital offensive spirit from their army. The committee noted that, while official publications may have stressed the offensive, "any French doctrine that appears aggressive in form, in so far as any major effort is concerned is at heart defensive and will probably remain so for some time to come." Unlike the reports of previous committees which had praised French emphasis on morale, the 1922 report thought little of an army which supposedly accentuated morale yet failed to stress the weapon which best embodied fighting spirit — theb a y o n e t .
The negative assessments of French doctrine continued throughout the interwar period. In 1923, a committee comparing doctrine and methods of war found the French increasingly relying on mechanical means to conserve manpower. Artillery, tanks, airplanes, and automatic weapons formed the basis of a doctrine which stressed the methodical, scientific application of force. Infantry remained the basic arm, but the French placed the automatic weapon at center stage, not the infantryman with rifle and
"French Army," 6; 11.
12"A Staff Paper On the Following Armies: Swiss, French, Belgian, and German," Army War College Training Course 1920-21, Document #23,28 Apr 1920, TMs, pp. 1-2.
^^"Comparative Studies of Organization of the Armies of the United States, Japan, Great Britain, France, and Pre-war Germany, " Army War College C-3 Course 1922-23, Document #12, 27 N ov 1922, TMs, pp. 12-21. 314
bayonet.^4 jn the opinion of American officers, the human element had begun to fade from the French conception of war.
A 1924 committee report found that France's doctrine prescribed aggressive infantry action only in theory and that the Army remained defensively oriented in practice. The French emphasis on fire over movement reduced the offensive spirit of the infantry. Caution and conservatism were the commander's watchwords. Two serious weaknesses stemmed from this approach to combat. In the defense, the French surrendered the initiative by waiting for the enemy to reveal its intentions.
In the attack, overcaution and meticulous planning reinforced the wartime practice of limiting objectives, a practice strongly condemned by General Pershing during the war. The committee concluded that French military doctrine lacked stability based on the country's history of decisive offensive combat; that they placed too great an emphasis on automatic weapons at the expense of individual initiative; and, by returning to the principle of limited objective, turned their backs on the war's l e s s o n s .
By the mid-twenties, technological developments were bringing war- based American axioms into question and softening attitudes toward foreign developments. The comparative studies conducted in 1925 indicate the first recognition of French efforts to employ tanks as "dreadnoughts on land."
The report noted, however, that official doctrine remained mute on the
"Doctrine and Methods of Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and United States," Army War College G-3 Course 1923-24, Document #10,30 Nov 1923, TMs, pp. 4-6.
^^"Indoctrination as a Basis for Military Training," Army War College G-3 Course 1924-25, Document #13,2 Dec 1924, TMs, p. 8,22-24. 315
subject and was far from being solidified. The official doctrine continued to
prescribe the use of tanks in mass, on special occasions, and in support of
infantry. 16 in 1926, a committee report suggested that the French technique of
attacking sequential objectives provided "much food for thought" and
warranted further investigation. The same report rejected the French practice
of building infantry groups around an automatic weapon,however.In short, American officers still rejected French practices, but not without reservations. The trend in the studies toward a more critical view of American doctrine and, accordingly, greater acceptance of foreign practices, accelerated after 1932. Americans paid more attention to French emphasis on firepower.
A committee studying tactical doctrines in 1932 reported, "The French beliefs can be summarized by the statements that fire dominates all tactical procedures, it gives the defense a greater holding power than ever before, it causes a rapid attrition of all troops engaged than ever before, it is the master of the battlefield and the essential element in the defensive."l® As a result of their study, the committee recommended adding a light machine gun to the infantry squad, reevaluating the power of the defense, placing greater
^6"Comparative Studies of the Organization and Equipment of Armies of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan," Army War College G-3 Course 1925-26, Document #14, 21 Nov 1925, TMs, p. 9.
^^"Training the United States Army," Army War College G-3 Course 1927-28, Document #17,10 Nov 1927, TMs, pp. 5-7.
^6"Importance of Fire Power," Army War College G-3 Course 1932-33, Exhibit #5, Supplement #1, Document #8 ("A Comparative Study of the Tactical Doctrines of America, England, France, and Germany"), 26 Sep 1932, TMs, p. 3. 316
emphasis on terrain analysis, and providing for more artillery support during
the approach march. Nevertheless, the American Army's increased interest
in firepower stemmed less from French insistence on its supremacy than the
growing acceptance of its predominance by other major armies. Because
France based its military system on unique strategic, economic, and social
characteristics, American officers were hesitant to adopt French practices
without additional proof of their correctness.
As late as 1935, War College committees observed little change in
French doctrine since the First World War. France still professed an
offensive doctrine, but advocated cautious advance supported by massive
artillery support. The French extensively motorized the army to enable rapid
reinforcement of a defensive line, not for offensive operations. They
employed their few mechanized units for cavalry reconnaissance missions rather than to spearhead the infantry advance or for deepa t t a c k . 1 9 The shift
from the offensive clearly diminished American estimates of French doctrine. In 1937, a War College committee recommended that "before following the lead of the French in any current trend, that trend be evaluated in the light of American characteristics and the needs of the Army of the
United States, which are believed to be quite different in many respects from
those of the French."20 The next year a committee criticized French tank doctrine for being "emphatically defensive," yet pointed out in the same
^^"Modernization of Tactical Doctrines and Tactical Organization; Development of Weapons," Army War College G-3 Course 1935-36, Document #13,25 Sep 1935, TMs, p. 92.
20"jrends in Tactics and Techniques," Army War College G-3 Course 1935-36, Document #13,25 Sep 1935, TMs, p. 92. 317 report that American tank doctrine most closely paralleled the French methods. In both armies, tanks still accompanied infantry, the battalion was the largest administrative unit, and neither country considered the use of tanks as an independent enveloping force.
On the eve of the Second World War, the French expression, "lavish with steel; stingy with blood," summarized the approach to war they had followed for the preceding twenty years. A 1938 committee report echoed a previous 1920 finding in underlining France's deliberate and cautious nature and its supplanting of man with firepower as the most important element in battle.21 Simply put, the French approach to war, essentially unchanged for two decades, failed to impress the Americans despite the use of the French- based Manual for Commanders of Large Units for portions of the
Leavenworth instruction.
Some French tactical organizations also appealed to American officers.
In 1922, a committee compared the French division to the newly revised
American division. The triangular French division was stronger in artillery firepower and more maneuverable, but could not match American strength in infantry firepower or the number of motorized units. Despite the
American superiority in motor vehicles, its large overhead hindered its mobility. While agreeing that the American division possessed greater striking power, the committee praised the triangular organization and
21 "Trends in Tactics and Techniques," Army War College G-3 Course 1938-39, Document #19,10 Oct 1938, TMs, p. 58,112. 318
absence of tank units at divisionl e v e l . 2 2 A 1924 study concurred with these findings, adding that France's inclusion of a cavalry unit in the division provided an important reconnaissance element that the American division lacked.23 Despite praise for these features of French military organizations, the Americans consistently rejected adoption of French organizations in the early twenties because they were "inappropriate" for Americans.
By 1926, Americans were becoming more receptive to French organizational concepts. While the committee report for that year still concluded that French practices were not worthy of adoption, it recommended close observation of French developments in artillery and aircraft technology.24 But, a comparative study of war strength divisions in
1931 recommended the adoption of leaner, triangular divisions, rather than merely noting their advantages. Subsequent reports during the thirties continued to compare favorably France's smaller, triangular division to the
United States larger, less mobile, square division. By 1936, committees recommended testing infantry and cavalry divisions to gather data from which to develop new organizations.25 Most committees during the thirties
22"Comparative Studies of Organization of the Armies of the United States, Japan, Great Britain, France, and Pre-war Germany, " Army War CollegeG-3 Course 1922-23, Document #12, 27 Nov 1922, TMs, p. 12-18.
23"Comparative Studies of Armies of United States, Japan, France, and Great Britain," Army War College G-3 Course 1924-25, Document #12,1 Dec 1924, TMs, p. 17.
24"Comparative Studies of the Organization, Training, and Equipment of the Armies of Designated Countries," Army War College G-3 Course 1926-27, Document #15,9 Nov 1926, TMs, pp. 15-16.
25"A Comparative Study of the War Strength Divisions of the Armies of the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan," Army War College G-3 Course 1931-32, Document 319 recommended adoption of the triangular division, elimination of the tank company, and addition of a divisional reconnaissance element. But, as with foreign doctrine, a single country's peacetime organizational experimentation provided insufficient evidence for a major change in American practices. In summary, French doctrine and organization remained largely unchanged for the duration of the interwar period. American attitudes toward French institutions and practices also varied little. The American
Army rejected French doctrine with its defensive orientation and subordination of man to machine. French organizations, particularly the presence of reconnaissance units and lack of tanks in the division, held greater appeal and may have contributed to the American conversion from the square to the triangular division organization. Overall, however, French practices exerted little positive influence on American doctrine and organization.
GREAT BRITAIN
The second most studied military system belonged to Great Britain.
Unlike France, Great Britain shared many historical, political, social, racial, cultural, economic, and strategic similarities with United States. Not surprisingly, British military doctrine and organizations were more acceptable to Americans than those of any other country.
British and American doctrines were remarkably similar in both theory and practice after the war. Both agreed that the destruction of the enemy
#15, 29 Sep 1931, TMs, pp. 7, 15-16; "The Army of the United States," Army War College G-3 Course 1936-37, Document #17,21 Oct 1936, TMs. 320 forces was the ultimate goal, accepted the same principles of war, and stressed offensive action to gain a decision. The infantry remained the basic arm, infantry-artillery cooperation was vital to success, tanks accompanied infantry in assaults of fortified positions, and the cavalry moved on horse, but fought on foot. War College committees in 1922 and 1923 comparing doctrines spent little time analyzing the British approach because it so closely mirrored the American approach in theory.26
Minor, but important, differences in doctrine did exist, however. The
Americans believed British modifications to an essentially offensive doctrine detracted from its effectiveness. A comparative study conducted in 1924 highlighted several aspects which weakened British doctrine. The report criticized British acceptance of limited objectives, failure to teach aggressive offensive action, assignment of equal weight to offense and defense, and lack of emphasis on concentration of effort at the decisive point. The report concluded that, while Great Britain was returning to open warfare methods as demonstrated in its newly issuedField Service Regulations (1923), it still had not fully learned the First World War's lessons. The report blamed the sluggish response on the conservative British national character which was
"often forced to make such changes by bitter experiences on the battlefield
^^''Comparative Studies of Organization of the Armies of the United States, Japan, Great Britain, France, and Pre-war Germany, " Army War College G-3 Course 1922-23, Document #12, 27 Nov 1922, TMs, p. 10; "Doctrine and Methods of Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and United States," Army War College G-3 Course 1923-24, Document #10,30 Nov 1923, TMs, pp. 3- 4; "Indoctrination as a Basis for Military Training," Army War College G-3 Course 1924-25, Document #13,2 Dec 1924, TMs, p. 6. 321 rather than by study and foresight."27 The following year, the doctrine committee added Great Britain's creation of an independent air force and separate tank arm to the list of practices to avoid. The committee members felt that the independence of these arms violated the principle of coordination and cooperation.28 War College committees also criticized the
British emphasis on automatic weapons. British preference for high volume rather than aimed fire distinguished it from American practices.29
The British never placed the same value on firepower as the French, but, by 1930, were not far behind them. The American Army, too, began to reevaluate the relative powers of machinery and man by the turn of the decade. Americans explained France's seemingly fanatical obsession with firepower as a shell-shocked nation's response to nearly four years of exposure to artillery pounding and machine gun fire. American officers were not as quick to dismiss the British assessments. In 1932, a committee noted,
"The English doctrine is emphatic. Fire is the predominant factor in modern war; the attack is based on fire which makes movement possible, the defense
^^"Indoctrination as a Basis for Military Training," Army War College G-3 Course 1924-25, Document #13,2 Dec 1924, TMs, pp. 6-8.
Study, Based Upon the Reports of Committees Nos. 3 and 4, G-3 Course, 1924-25, To Determine Those Doctrines, Principles, and Methods of Warfare, and of Training, of the Nations Reported Upon Therein, and To Make a Comparison, Thereof," Army War College G-3 Course 1925-26, Document #17,24 Nov 1925, TMs, p. 11.
^^"Training the United States Army," Army War College G-3 Course 1927-28, Document #17,10 Nov 1927, TMs, p. 4. 322 on fire that prohibits it/'^O The committee called for a major réévaluation of the destructive power of modern fire as a result.
American interest in tank experimentation swelled in the late 1920s as a direct result of Secretary of War Davis' observation of British tank maneuvers. A lecture delivered to the G-3 Course of 1927 credited Great
Britain alone with making "great strides in the development of tanks, cross country vehicles, and tractors.The same year a committee report demonstrated its cognizance of British developments in armored warfare, but also displayed American lack of familiarity with the subject, by referring to
Great Britain’s lead in "so called mechanized warfare." The report highlighted the organization of tanks into a separate corps, their use for special reconnaissance missions, and their role as a countertank measure in the defense. However, the committee concluded that "tanks in their present stage of development should be reserved for use against located objectives, and that their use against hostile tanks is justified only when other anti-tank weapons are not available." The committee saw greater immediate value in the armored car and suggested that Americans consider developing one of its ow n.32
39"importance of Fire Power," Army War College G-3 Course 1932-33, Exhibit #5, Supplement #1, Document #8 ("A Comparative Study of the Tactical Doctrines of America, England, France, and Germany"), 26 Sep 1932, TMs, p. 4.
31john A. Brockman, "Tanks and Armored Cars and the Trend of Their Development and Tactical Employment in Future War," Lecture delivered to Army War College G-3 Course 1927- 28, Document #5,27 Nov 1927, TMs, pp. 7-10.
32"Training the United States Army," Army War CollegeG-3 Course 1927-28, Document #17,10 N ov 1927, TMs, p. 4-6. 323
British advances in the development of armored vehicles and doctrine reached their zenith in the next few years launched by the establishment of an experimental mechanized force. War College studies of mechanization also increased with Great Britain at the center of attraction. The findings of a 1928 committee assigned to study mechanized forces reveals the extent of British influence on American thinking in the new field. The committee was "not in accord with the principle that this force should be an integral part of an infantry division" and reported that the "mechanization of a hard striking force of high mobility is practicable." It concluded that such a force should consist of track-laying vehicles, organized and trained as an integral unit, and assigned to the general headquarters reserve. Notably, Basil H. Liddell Hart's
Remaking of Modern Armies (1927) appeared in the committee report bibliography. The existing American experimental mechanized force, established only six months earlier, consisted of a mixture of experimental and World War vintage tanks. Varied capabilities and speeds prevented the force from developing meaningful tactics. The committee recommended appropriating five million dollars to organize and equip a force for the tactical and technical development of armored units.33
In 1929, one of the leading American tank enthusiasts, Adna R.
Chaffee, lectured to the G-3 Course on the status and trends of mechanized forces. He stressed that Great Britain was "carrying motorization as far as it can be carried in their divisional troops" and that they "seriously entertained
^^"The Composition, Organization, and Equipment of Mechanized Forces and Their Probable Tactical and Strategical Development in Future Wars," Army War College G-3 Course 1928-29, Document #22 A, 6 Oct 1928, TMs, pp. 2-10. 324 the thought that wars in the future will be fought with smaller armies, provided those armies are modernly equipped and make the most effective use of movable armor." He believed that the United States should follow their example.34
While the Americans closely monitored British developments and laid the groundwork for their own tests, they hesitated to commit their limited resources to an extensive mechanization program. The same committee which urged the establishment of an experimental force, concluded, "the mechanization of a large part of the combat forces is impracticable, as mechanized forces are weapons of opportunity." The committee members reflected the conservative views of most American officers regarding mechanization when they wrote, "Mechanization is in its infancy. Therefore, any statement as to the degree to which the present infantry division may be mechanized is but prophecy limited only by the speculative ability of the prophet."35 In a lecture on the status of mechanization presented to the G-3
Course in 1933, a War College instructor told students, "The most intensive work as to Mechanized Forces has been done by Great Britain and it might be summed up by saying that though they started with the idea that perhaps their entire army might be mechanized their experiments, experience, and
^'^Chaffee, Adna R., "The Status of the Mechanized Combat Organization and the Desired Trend in the Future," Lecture delivered to Army War College G-3 Course 1929-30, Document #7, 19 Sep 1929, TMs, pp. 3,10; Timothy K. Nenninger, "The Development of American Armor, 1917- 1940," Armor 78 (May-Jun 1969): 35.
^^"The Composition, Organization, and Equipment of Mechanized Forces and Their Probable Tactical and Strategical Development in Future Wars," Army War College G-3 Course 1928-29, Document #22A, 6 Oct 1928, TMs, pp. 2-10. 325
expense have brought them to a sanerv i e w . " 3 6 The lecturer presented the various viewpoints of Britain's leading tank proponents — Pile, Gwynn, Martel, Fuller, and Liddell Hart. He labeled Fuller and Liddell Hart as extremists. In 1938, a committee gleefully reported the British rejection of
Fuller's all-armored force theory:
The incorporation of riflemen indicates a drift not only from the theory of an exclusively mechanized war but also is an appreciation of the value of a combat team of all arms. The introduction of trucks as a means of transport for the riflemen represents the theory that complete tactical mechanization should be sacrificed and that strategical mechanization only should be maintained, in order to make available on the battlefield a force from each of the essential combat arms.3^
By the end of the decade, American doctrine for the employment of tanks had changed little despite the close observance of British developments. In 1939, a committee comparing tactics and techniques of the major armies concluded,
"Our doctrine and instruction as to the use of tanks to support the Infantry is considered sound and adequate."38
War College studies generally favored British tactical organizations. In
1922, a comparative study on organization favorably noted the absence of tanks and the advantages of Britain's smaller, triangular division over the
^*^Oswald H. Saunders, "Status of Mechanization — 1933," Lecture delivered to Army War College C-3 Course 1933-34, Document #5,18 Sep 1933, TMs, p. 13.
^^"Mechanization and Defense Against Aviation," Army War College G-3 Course 1938-39, Document #17,7 Oct 1938, TMs, p. 59.
'Tactics and Technique," Army War College G-3 Course 1939-40, Document #22,12 Oct 1939, TMs, p. 130. 326
American square organization. The next year, a committee compared the performances of Japanese, French, and British organizations in the initial battles of recent wars. It found that only the British army possessed the flexibility to adapt to unforeseen circumstances without making major organizational changes. The British designed the army to meet varying needs; they did not focus on specific scenarios as did other nations. Basing its report primarily on the characteristics of the British division, the committee concluded that flexibility enhanced the transition to war and strength should not compromise mobility. It added that a division should not exceed 16,000 men. The committee went so far as to recommend adoption of the British style division, but the reviewing committee unanimously dissented from the finding.39 in 1924, the organization committee concluded that the British
105mm howitzer provided important mobility and high-angle fire capabilities lacking in the American division artillery. While noting the advantages of the triangular division, the majority report for this committee did not recommend changing the American division organization. A lengthy minority report, however, kept the debate alive by calling for the adoption of the triangular system.^O
39"Comparative Studies of Organization of the Armies of the United States, Japan, Great Britain, France, and Pre-war Germany, " Army War College G-3 Course 1922-23, Document #12, 27 Nov 1922, TMs, p. 10; "Doctrine and Methods of Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and United States," Army War College G-3 Course 1923-24, Document #10,30 Nov 1923, TMs, pp. 3- 4; "Comparative Studies of Organization of United States, Japan, France, Great Britain," Army War College G-3 Course 1923-24, Document #8, 28 Nov 1923, TMs, pp. 1-2, 13, 15; "Coordination of the Committee Reports," Army War College G-3 Course 1923-24, Document #19,6 Dec 1923, TMs, p. 17.
^^"Comparative Studies of Armies of United States, Japan, France, and Great Britain," Army War College G-3 Course 1924-25, Document #12,1 Dec 1924, TMs, pp. 8.5,31,34-36. 327
As with attitudes toward French military organizations, Americans viewed Britain's small, flexible, mobile divisions with increasing interest after 1925. The committee studying organization that year noted the British tendency toward greater dispersion and depth in response to the potentially devastating effect of gas on large concentrations. Significantly, the committee pointed to the British example to support every one of its recommendations for improving American organizations. The 1925 comparative study concluded that the United States Army should adopt the triangular division equipped with mobile howitzers and antitank guns, eliminate tanks and aircraft from the division, increase pack artillery in the corps, develop a better tank, adopt a .50 caliber machine gun for air defense, and only use a corps headquarters when employing multiple divisions.^! In 1931 and 1932, War
College committees recommended the addition of light machine guns to the infantry company, another British practice. The report reiterated previous arguments in favor of adopting the triangular division, divisional howitzers, antitank guns, and the elimination of tanks from thedivision.^2 Again, in
1933, the comparative studies committee on organization and equipment found the British Army especially appealing — the most "well-balanced fighting machine" of the armies studied by the committee. The United States
"Comparative Studies of the Organization and Equipment of Armies of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan," Army War College G-3 Course 1925-26, Document #14, 21 Nov 1925, TMs, pp. 3,5,12-13.
^2"A Comparative Study of the War Strength Divisions of the Armies of the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan," Army War College G-3 Course 1931-32, Document #15, 29 Sep 1931, TMs, pp. 4, 15-16; "Organization and Equipment," Army War College G-3 Course 1932-33, Document #12,30 Sep 1932, TMs, pp. 2-3,22-24. 328 showed less interest in adopting the Great Britain's fully motorized and centrally controlled transportation units. The War College committees rejected such measures because much of North America lacked roads and
American command procedures stressed decentralized operations.
Similarities between the United States and Great Britain enhanced
American interest in and receptiveness to British military institutions and methods. Americans paid close attention to few trends in doctrine and organization unless the British were among the subscribers. The French, for example, had stressed the dominance of firepower during and after the war. Only after the British admitted that man was no longer the dominant element did the Americans even consider reevaluating their position. The
War College committees did not accept all British theories, however. Great
Britain's drive to mechanize and motorize fully the army met with American disapproval. The committees praised many British organizational practices, especially the triangular division and absence of divisional tanks. Overall,
American practices reflected more British doctrinal and organizational features than those of any other nation.
GERMANY
German military successes over the last sixty years attracted American attention despite differences in national character. The influential American military theorist Emory Upton, writing in the late nineteenth century, modeled his proposals for reform of the United States defense establishment on the Prussian system. The War Department based its General Staff on the
Prussian example. General Dickman basedField Service Regulations 1905 on 329 the equivalent German manual. American interest in German practices and institutions continued during the war. A report conducted in 1920 aptly described American respect for the German system:
We cannot deny that the Germans, both before and during the World War, had the clearest grasp of the true principles and methods of offensive warfare, and were superior to all other armies in the minute and complete training of troops and staffs, on sound lines, for such warfare. [And]. . . for offensive tactics, built on and around strong and dominating infantry, we practically adopted the German thought, and we have no reason to regret the choice. Further, it cannot be denied that after our entry into the World War, G.H.Q. and especially G-5 and the Army General Staff College, obtained from the German Army, more than from any other source, the supplemental knowledge of the true nature of combat, and especially of attack, [that] decided many of the details of the training of the A.E.F. To cite an example: The German document on the Battle of Riga, and other detached items, published by G-2, G.H.Q., some weeks before the German attack of March 21, 1918, revealed a marked development in attack methods along lines so obviously fundamental and sound that our own tactical instruction in the Staff College was materially modified as to details of attack. Likewise, the captured document outlining the training of the 28th Division (German).43
The report concluded, "Although the German Army is a defeated army, the future military literature, tactical doctrine and training in Germany will be more useful to us than that of any other country."44 The committee
43"German Army," Army War College Training Course1919-20, Document #21, 26 Apr 1920, TMs, pp. 2-3.
44"Cerman Army," Army War College Training Course1919-20, Document #21, 26 Apr 1920, TMs, pp. 2-3. 330 members expected German officers would continue producing "outstanding analytical works" especially suited for American adoption since both countries maintained small armies of long-term volunteers. The report cautioned against allowing prejudice to blind Americans to the value of
German military literature.^5 in spite of these wise words of warning, the
War College virtually ignored the German Army for the next twelve years.
The Army War College included Germany in less than one-third of the
G-3 Course comparative studies conducted before 1932. Limitations imposed by the Versailles Treaty reduced the German Army to a 100,000 man force, limited to 5,000 officers and prohibited from forming a general staff or possessing modern arms. The limitations prevented meaningful, large-scale, field training but promoted the intellectual development of the officer corps.
As previously mentioned, similar conditions existed in the United States, but as a result of self-imposed limitations. The Americans ignored postwar
Germany's actual military practices preferring to study its military theories.
The major focus, however, remained prewar and wartime doctrines and organizations.
Early reports comparing wartime German and current American doctrines continued to praise German achievements. A 1922 study of the
German Army echoed the 1920 committee report:
While the German Army had its weak points which were brought to light during the war, the mere fact that it fought practically the whole world for over four years, is proof of the
45"German Army," Army War College Training Course 1919-20, Document #21, 26 Apr 1920, TMs, pp. 2-3. 331
fact that it had the clearest grasp of the true principles and methods of offensive warfare, and were superior to all other armies in the minute and complete training of troops and staffs, along sound lines, for such warfare. Neither can it be denied that prior to the war, our conceptions of military art, were, in great part, borrowed from the Germans, and that during the war, we accepted more of the German principles, than of any of our allies, and the memorandums, etc., of Ludendorff were considered the last word in training and tactics.'^^
Despite the American acknowledgement of Germany's leadership in military thought before and during the war, German theories received little attention during most of the postwar years.
American officers believed they had already incorporated the correct and rejected the faulty German doctrines. In 1921, a committee found no changes in German doctrine and reported that the United States was current on German advances made during the war.^^ Subsequent War Gollege studies reinforced American doctrine by highlighting the many similarities between it and German doctrines, particularly the emphasis both placed on the offense and the primacy of infantry. On the other hand. War Gollege committees blamed the German Army's defeat on its adherence to practices which differed from American doctrine. In 1920, a committee identified
German obsession with envelopments, the inviolability of the front, and retreat to a defensible position in the face of defeat as key features of German
'^^"Comparative Studies of Organization of the Armies of the United States, Japan, Great Britain, France, and Pre-war Germany," Army War College G-3 Course 1922-23, Document #12, 27 Nov 1922, TMs, pp. 6-7.
^^"A Staff Paper On the Following Armies: Swiss, French, Belgian, and German," Army War College Training Course 1920-21, Document #23,28 Apr 1920, TMs, p. 4. 332 doctrine.48 One committee reported, two years later, that Germany's blind application of these rules during the war led to its defeat on several occasions.49 in 1923, a comparative study again reported no substantial difference between American and German doctrines. The committee noted that Germany continued to train for offensive action despite treaty limitations and continued to emphasize the decisive role of envelopment. It also noted that the light machine gun was the chief infantry weapon, not the rifle and bayonet as in the United States Army.50
The War College did not conduct another comparative study of
German doctrine and organization until 1932, nearly ten years later.51 The
1932 study underlined Germany's elevated opinion of firepower. Germany, like Great Britain, did not exalt firepower to the same extent as France.
However, the Germans clearly believed that fire was the predominant feature of modern war. The committee reported that the Germans "wanted an automatic weapon for every infantryman." It quoted a "qualified" German officer's statement, that "we all know that the effect of modern weapons is
48"German Army," Army War College Training Course 1919-20, Document #21, 26 Apr 1920, TMs, p. 1.
49"Comparative Studies of Organization of the Armies of the United States, Japan, Great Britain, France, and Pre-war Germany, " Army War College G-3 Course 1922-23, Document #12, 27 Nov 1922, TMs, p. 7.
^^"Doctrine and Methods of Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and United States," Army War College G-3 Course 1923-24, Document #10,30 Nov 1923, TMs, pp. 7-8.
Committees studied the German war plans in 1914 (1927, 1928, 1930), school system (1931), and general staff organization (1931). The War College included Germany in a study of war- strength divisions in 1931. But, the committee dismissed the requirement because it believed that treaty limitations excluded the German Army from comparison. 333 extraordinarily great in war and that the machine weapons rule the battlefield," to exemplify the German position on firepower.52
In 1935, the War College committee reports began to treat Germany as a major power. A committee report for that year noted that German military thought remained faithful to its founders: Clausewitz, von Moltke, and von
Schlieffen. The report concluded, "Modern views show no marked departure from these historical conceptions, although the Germans propose to exploit all resource of science and modern technical equipment."53 During the remainder of the 1930s, German tactical and technical developments supported the committee's finding and increasingly drew the interest of
A m ericans.
A comparative study conducted in 1937 noted the following trends in tactical developments in the German Army: increased strength in aircraft, increased cooperation between observation aircraft and ground units, increased emphasis on air support for ground troops, fixed air defense installations and improved guns, increased motorization and mechanization of forces, abandonment of horse cavalry for tactical reconnaissance, and unit responsibility for local security. Of these trends, the committee recommended adoption of "the peacetime concentration of all infantry tank units for tactical and technical experimentation" and "greater dependence on artillery and
52"Importance of Fire Power," Army War College G-3 Course 1932-33, Exhibit #5, Supplement #1, Document #8 ("A Comparative Study of the Tactical Doctrines of America, England, France, and Germany"), 26 Sep 1932, TMs, p. 4.
^^"Modernization of Tactical Doctrines and Tactical Organization; Development of Weapons," Army War College G-3 Course 1935-36, Document #13,25 Sep 1935, TMs, p. 102. 334 infantry supporting weapons to gain fire superiority in attack. . . ."54 The same year, a committee studying mechanization noted that Germany possessed three panzer divisions described as powerful, mobile, striking forces augmented by strong, mobile holding forces. Germany planned to use this force to conduct "a combined air andmechanized ground attack which will strike hard enough and far enough into enemy territory to force an early victory." The report continued, "Whereas German sentiment regarding the handling of mechanized units is not crystallized, it appears that the use of tanks to break a front line position is considered faulty. The use of tanks en masse as a major weapon in the main effort is approved. This is probably the idea behind the formation of the Mechanized Corps."55 Unlike the first committee, the mechanization committee urged the continuance of the
American policy of decentralized development begun under MacArthur.
Both committees reported that American developments conformed to "those of importance" in foreign armies.
Again, in 1938, the War College committees demonstrated their interest in and knowledge of German capabilities. The committees noted
Germany's large mechanized forces and the intent to employ them on independent and semi-independent missions. This time, however, the committee heeded the developments and recommended converting the
American mechanized cavalry brigade into a mechanized division. German
54"Trends in Tactics and Techniques," Army WarCollege G-3 Course 1937-38, Document #20,21 Oct 1937, TMs, pp. 42-47.
55"Mechanization and Defense Against Aviation," Army War College G-3 Course 1937-38, Document #21, 21 Oct 1937, TMs, pp. 104-105. 335 doctrine, the report stated, oriented on offensive actions; stressed rapidity of movement, surprise, and deception to seize and maintain the initiative; tactical self-sufficiency of combat units; close-in envelopment; a combination of the triangular form for fire and movement and the square organization for shock; powerful tank forces; an elaborate air intelligence net; increased efficiency in artillery-infantry coordination; mechanization; and demanded that the infantry be able to advance without tank support.56
When the War College class of 1939 compared German and American tactical trends, it noted the German reduction of horse cavalry and increased use of mechanical means for reconnaissance and security. Nevertheless, the student committee concluded that the reconnaissance of many types of North
American terrain still required horse-mounted cavalry and justified the retention of both horse and machines in the American cavalry. The report also denounced the German practice of limiting horse cavalry to reconnaissance and security missions, believing that, in the United States, the horse cavalry was still well-suited for independent missions. The committee also saw "little practical use" for parachute troops, a recent innovation in the
German Army. The War College committee stated that American theory was in accord with other German practices, such as close cooperation between ground and air units, support of mechanized forces with independent air units, and the employment of mechanized units against mechanized units.
56"Trends in Tactics and Techniques," Army War College G-3 Course 1938-39, Document #19,10 Oct 1938, TMs, p. 81. 336 but still needed work in practical application.^^ in short, Americans favored
German trends which mirrored those demonstrated by most of the other major armies. They eyed innovative, but unproven, tactics and techniques with caution.
As with German doctrine, Americans studied pre-war and wartime, rather than postwar, German organizations. In 1922, the first G-3 Course comparative study reported, "it is easy to imagine the present U.S. Division as a development of the pre-war German division in which no fundamental weakness had been found, but which has been modified to meet the requirements brought about by the improvement of old and the development of new weapons."58 But, the report noted that both divisions were too large and unwieldy. A later report explained that the four-unit organization lent itself to penetration. In Germany, the field army was the unit of maneuver, so the division's lack of maneuverability was not a problem .59 The 1922 report was the last study of German tactical organization for over ten years.
In 1935, a comparative study on modernization noted German trends toward the organization of mechanized-motorized forces, increased number of automatic weapons, substitution of motors for animals, and increases in the air component. These trends paralleled developments in France, Great
^^'Tactics and Technique," Army War College G-3 Course 1939-40, Document #22,12 Oct 1939, TMs, pp. 130-132.
"Comparative Studies of Organization of the Armies of the United States, Japan, Great Britain, France, and Pre-war Germany, " Army War College G-3 Course 1922-23, Document #12, 27 Nov 1922, TMs, p. 4.
^^"Comparative Studies of Organization of United States, Japan, France, Great Britain," Army War College G-3 Course 1923-24, Document #8,28 Nov 1923, TMs, pp. 1-2. 337
Britain and the United States. The emergence of Germany as a major military power did not surprise the Americans. As early as the mid-1920s. War
College intelligence committees reported the survival of the German General
Staff in violation of treaty terms and German experimentation with mechanized forces in Sweden, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union.
To summarize, Americans recognized German leadership in military doctrine and organization before and during the World War. Nevertheless,
War College committees turned away from the study of Germany after the war believing that the Americans had already adopted the best features of the
German military system. German rearmament rekindled American interest by the mid-thirties. German trends in modernizing tactics and equipment, in particular, were the subject of War College studies. The German adoption of triangular organizations, infantry formations based on the light machine gun, extensive motorization and mechanization, close air-ground cooperation, tactically self-sufficient combat units, and independent mechanized forces captured American interest.
JAPAN
American interests clashed with a major power only in China and the
Western Pacific. Consequently, the War College named Japan as the principal threat to American security during each of the interwar years. The ORANGE war scenario dominated planning in War College courses and within the
War Department General Staff. As a result, Americans closely followed
Japanese military developments. But, because Americans hesitated to grant the Japanese Army status equal to that of the Western powers, many Japanese 338 advances passed unnoticed. War College studies of Japanese doctrine and organizations actually decreased as a percentage of all comparative studies in the 1930s when, ironically, the threat of Japanese invasion was greatest.
In many respects, Japanese doctrine resembled American doctrine more than any other. Japan was the only major army, other than the United
States, to retain the rifle and bayonet as the primary infantry weapon. The
1920 War College study noted a major portion of the Japanese infantry drill regulations were nearly identical to the American regulations.60 The
Japanese stressed the offense and movement to the same degree as the
Americans, but placed more importance on surprise. Both shared the belief that man was the most important element in battle and resisted trends to subordinate the human element to firepower and machinery. These similarities touched the heart of American doctrine.
In many important respects, Japanese doctrine significantly differed from American and European doctrine in 1920. Japan trained for night attacks more than any other army, in keeping with its belief in the element of surprise and its relative lack of firepower. Japanese cavalry had not followed the trend of the other major powers and still relied on shock action as its major combat function. Though the Japanese trained for open warfare, they paid little attention to coordination between infantry and artillery, a major lesson of the First World War. A committee report in 1923 flatly stated, "The
Japanese do not yet appreciate the supreme importance of the closest possible
60"The Japanese Army," Army War College Training Course 1919-20, Document #23, 28 Apr 1920, TMs, p. 9. 339 cooperation between the infantry and artillery, the necessity for thin lines, and great depth in the attack; the importance of mechanical means, and the detailed and minute preparation and control sometimes necessary in the attack." In the early twenties, Americans noted that the lessons of the Russo- Japanese War still dominated Japanese military thinking.61 These observations formed the basis for the American officers' low opinion of
Japanese military capabilities.
The negative assessment of the Japanese military system remained unchanged for the duration of the interwar period. A comparative study conducted in 1924 summarized Japanese doctrine by stating that it overemphasized closing with the enemy, underestimated firepower, and stressed secrecy, surprise, and night operations. The report noted that Japan was currently revising its doctrine to reflect the lessons of the World War.
The study concluded that American doctrine, compared to that of Japan and the other nations in the study, was sound.62 The study in 1926 highlighted the Japanese use of darkness for cover in lieu of firepower and their skill in night combat, but still decided that they had nothing new to offer American doctrine.63 The next year the committee reported that, although the
61 "The Japanese Army," Army War College Training Course 1919-20, Document #23, 28 Apr 1920, TMs, p. 12,14; quotation from "Doctrines and Methods of Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and United States," Army War College G-3 Course 1923-24, Document #10,30 N ov 1923, TMs, pp. 10-11.
62 "Indoctrination as a Basis for Military Training," Army War College G-3 Course 1924-25, Document #13,2 Dec 1924, TMs, pp. 22-24.
63"Comparative Studies of the Organization, Training, and Equipment of the Armies of Designated Countries," Army War CollegeG-3 Course 1926-27, Document #15,9Nov 1926, TMs, pp. 4,15-16. 340
American and Japanese doctrines were basically the same, the "human bullet" idea prevails in Japan due to abundant manpower and few material resources. This condition also accounted for the lack of emphasis on motor transport, tanks, heavy artillery, and mechanization.64 Three years later, in
1930, the War College students reported that the policy of making up for the lack of material resources with manpower still formed the basis of Japanese doctrine.65
Americans never seriously considered adoption of Japanese military practices. As late as 1937, a study of tactical trends in the major powers produced no recommendations for the adoption of any feature of the
Japanese system.66 The studies conducted in 1938 found the same characteristics emphasized as in previous years — offense, night operations, small divisions, flank attacks and wide envelopments, the bayonet, and intentional neglect of the defense. Reports highlighted Japan's lack of doctrine for the employment of mechanized forces and failure to stress infantry-artillery coordination. The tactics committee concluded that Japan was "far behind the armies of the great powers and in general not to be compared with them."67
64"Training the United States Army," Army War College G-3 Course 1927-28, Document #17,10 Nov 1927, TMs, p. 4.
65"Organization and Equipment of the United States Army," Army War College G-3 Course 1930-31, Document #14,29 Sep 1930, TMs, pp. 28,33.
66"Trends in Tactics and Techniques," Army War College G-3 Course 1937-38, Document #20,21 Oct 1937, TMs, p. 76.
67"Trends in Tactics and Techniques," ArmyWar College G-3 Course 1938-39, Document #19,10 Oct 1938, TMs, pp. 88-89. 341
In form, the Japanese and American divisions were similar. Japan was the only other major power to employ the square division organization after the war. It was smaller than the 20,000-man American division numbering
16,000 men.68 The similarities ended there, however. The Japanese army had no tanks, limited quantities of motor vehicles, and no corps organization.
But, the War College committee study in 1922 noted that Japan had not completed its study of the WorldW a r .69
The comparative studies committee reports cited several advantageous features of Japanese organizations. In 1925, a committee applauded the lack of tanks or air service in the Japanese division. It also concluded that a single reinforced division did not require a corps headquarters between it and the controlling a r m y . 7 0 in 1930, the committee noted that, while Japan was the only nation without a cavalry division, its infantry division included a cavalry regiment which provided a reconnaissance capability lacking in the
A m erican division.The 1931 study found advantages in Japan's smaller division, absence of tanks and heavy artillery, and standardized means of transportation, for combat in eastern Asia. But, it concluded, "a study of the
68"Comparative Studies of Organization of the Armies of the United States, Japan, Great Britain, France, and Pre-war Germany," Army War College G-3 Course 1922-23, Document #12, 27 N ov 1922, TMs, p. 22.
69"Comparative Studies of Armies of United States, Japan, France, and Great Britain," Army War College G-3 Course 1924-25, Document #12,1 Dec 1924, TMs, pp. 12-13.
^^"Comparative Studies of the Organization and Equipment of Armies of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan," Army War College G-3 Course 1925-26, Document #14, 21 Nov 1925, TMs, pp. 12-13.
^^"Organization and Equipment of the United States Army," Army War College G-3 Course 1930-31, Document #14,29 Sep 1930, TMs, p. 33. 342
Japanese division gives us practically no ideas that could be used to improve or strengthen the American division."72 This conclusion epitomized the
American view toward Japanese organization.
The first American study to report the modernization of the Japanese
Army did not appear until 1932.73 Even then. War College committees continued to dismiss Japanese military practices. In 1933, a committee summarized Japanese operations in China by cautioning that "experience in specific campaigns be not given too great weight in determining types of organization and equipment for the United States."74 Success against an inferior enemy was not a good indicator of overall military effectiveness.
In summary. War College studies consistently maintained that
American doctrine and organizations were superior to the Japanese and, in the event of war in either Asia or North America, the American practices were sound.75 The committees consistently rejected unique Japanese military practices. Strong perceptions of differences in national character as well as the recognition that Japan focused on fighting an inferior enemy during most of the period clearly influenced American assessments. Ironically, Japanese
72"A Comparative Study of the War Strength Divisions of the Armies of the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan," Army War College G-3 Course 1931-32, Document #15,29 Sep 1931, TMs, pp. 11-12.
73"Organization and Equipment," Army War College G-3 Course 1932-33, Document #12,30 Sep 1932, TMs, pp. 11-12.
74"Organization and Equipment," Army War College G-3 Course 1933-34, Document #12,29Sep 1933, TMs, p. 8.
73"Comparative Studies of Organization of the Armies of the United States, Japan, Great Britain, France, and Pre-war Germany, " Army War College G-3 Course 1922-23, Document #12, 27 Nov 1922, TMs, p. 25. 343 doctrine and organization closely resembled American standards in many respects. No other major powers held the rifle and bayonet in as high esteem as the Americans and Japanese. The human element was clearly the dominant factor in the Japanese conception of war. Japan, like the United
States, maintained a square division organization throughout the interwar years. War College committees downplayed similarities and highlighted
Japanese deficiencies with increasing frequency as the pace of modernization quickened. By the late 1930s, American officers continued to view the
Japanese as a second-rate army with nothing to offer the United States in terms of its ability to wage modern war.
SOVIET UNION AND ITALY
War College studies did not treat the Soviet Union as a major military power until 1933. A few lectures addressed military developments in the
Soviet Union and committees regularly estimated Soviet capabilities as part of the G-2 Course. Nevertheless, prejudice toward communism and the difficulty of penetrating the Soviet cloak of secrecy hindered in-depth study of the Soviet military system. As a result, the Soviet influence on American military doctrine and organization was minimal.
Studies conducted in 1933 and 1934 addressed organization, equipment, general staffs, mobilization plans, and training. None cited any Soviet practices worthy of American adoption. The Soviet military system did not attract attention until 1937 and, then, only as an "honorable mention." A study of "the war making agencies of Germany, Russia, and Japan" highlighted their superior organizations for industrial mobilization. The 344 report noted, however, that these peacetime organizations were "permitted by national policies and forms of government which differ from American political concepts."76
Similarly, most Soviet doctrinal and organizational developments viewed favorably were those demonstrated by several other countries as well.
For example, the Soviet Union was but one of several countries increasing its air strength, stressing closer cooperation between ground and air components, and mechanizing its forces in the thirties. In 1939, the study of tactical trends found the Soviet modernization in step with all of the major powers in most areas. Notably, the Soviets still maintained large independent horse cavalry formations. The Soviet adoption of the triangular formation and possession of organic machine gun companies in infantry battalions supported trends in American thought.
The committees gave several Soviet military innovations a mixed reception. The committee report in 1937 recommended further study of the
Soviet deep, combined arms attack and parachute infantryconcepts.The
1939 study concluded that parachute troops were of little use, but recommended gathering more information on their use by the Germans in
Poland before passing final judgment. In 1938, a committee studying mechanization recorded the existence of large mechanized forces in the
Soviet Union and Soviet intention to use them for independent or semi-
^^"The War Department," Army War College G-3 Course 1937-38, Document #16,16 Oct 1937, TMs.
^^"Trends in Tactics and Techniques," Army War College G-3 Course 1937-38, Document #20,21 Oct 1937, TMs, p. 84. 345 independent missions. The same report also noted the Soviet's belief that the best defense against a tank was another tank. This observation did nothing to change the American opinion that antitank guns were the solution to tank attacks.78
The Soviet military system escaped American notice until late in the
1930s. Because many Soviet military trends paralleled those in several other foreign countries, American adoption of similar practices does not indicate
Soviet influence. Parachute forces are the clearest examples of the American acceptance of a military technique pioneered by the Soviet Union. However,
Americans were much more familiar with German and Italian experiences with airborne forces and, as a result, learned more from the these armies than from the Soviets.
Italy, like the Soviet Union, did not attract American attention until
1932, when the War College faculty included it in a comparative study of organization and equipment of foreign armies. Before then, the only mention of Italy in the G-3 Course curriculum was a single lecture which addressed developments in military aeronautics. Generally, Italian military developments paralleled those in Germany. The Italians followed the trend toward increasing motorization, mechanization, and use of aircraft in support of ground troops.
Italy's greatest contribution to the development of American doctrine and organization was its combat experience in Ethiopia and Spain. A study in
^^"Mechanization and Defense Against Aviation," Army War College G-3 Course 1938-39, Document #17, 7 Oct 1938, TMs, pp. 52,95. 346
1938 noted that Italy turned away from total mechanization toward a motorized-mechanized mixture of forces following its experience in Ethiopia.
The Italians decided that small, fast, hard-hitting divisions of two infantry regiments were superior to the totally mechanized forces they employed in
Africa. The Italians also determined that support of ground and naval forces was the principal mission of the air component.^9 These findings supported trends in American military thinking.
ASSESSMENT OF FOREIGN INFLUENCES
A comparison of foreign and American military systems indicates that no single foreign system exemplified the American ideal. The Army War
College committees dismissed many admirable features of foreign systems if they did not suit the American environment or only fit the unique characteristics of the particular country. For example, France's strategic focus on defending against Germany and Japan's martial culture tempered
American assessments of those nations' military systems. Differences between American republican government and the autocratic political systems in Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union worked against the acceptance of several desirable features of their military systems. As a result, countries which most closely resembled the United States psychologically, strategically, politically, socially, economically, and militarily were most likely to influence American military developments. Great Britain met these
79"Trcnds in Tactics and Techniques," Army War College G-3 Course 1938-39, Document #19,10 Oct 1938, TMs, p. 100. 347 requirements better than any other single major power and, consequently, possessed the most favored military system. The new American organizations shared more characteristics with British organizations than those of any other army. Yet, in spite of an obvious preference for the British system, Americans tended to avoid uniquely British features.
The committees were more likely to recommend the adoption of features exhibited by more than one country, regardless of its national characteristics. Americans only adopted organizations and doctrines which clearly reflected the majority of world military opinion. By the 1930s, most
American officers acknowledged the general trends toward greater mobility, firepower, flexibility, and range of action in modern battle. The United States
Army sought the best methods of achieving these capabilities in accordance with resource availability and unique American needs. The 1939 triangular division mirrored many foreign trends in organization, but displayed none directly attributable to a specific nation.
Similarities between American and foreign organizations in 1939 indicate that Americans accepted some trends in foreign armies.
Triangularization and elimination of tanks from the division were the two most frequently mentioned foreign organizational characteristics deemed worthy of adoption. Most committee reports believed that the enhanced mobility and flexibility provided by these features were essential on the modern battlefield. Every major nation except Japan had adopted the triangular formation by 1930 and Japan followed suit before 1939. The United
States, in 1939, was the last major nation to abandon the square organization and remove tanks from the infantry division. The unanimity of foreign 348 armies in adopting these features undoubtedly influenced Americans to reorganize.
Mobility was a major concern of all armies in the 1920s. Motorization, not mechanization, was the leading trend with the Japanese being the usual exception to the rule. The American Army actually led most countries in motorizing its forces, which is not surprising given its lead in motor development for non-military uses and the vast expanses of the continental
United States. Still, the anticipation of fighting the next war in areas inaccessible by motor vehicles led Americans to focus on the amount and distribution of horses required for such operations. The Army cited foreign examples more often in defense of the horse rather than in support of increased motorization. The trend toward motorization was so obviously logical that it needed no justification by foreign example. Arguments for greater mobility pointed, instead, to the lower overheads and smaller support organizations found in most foreign armies.
Other organizational changes supported by the weight of foreign opinion included: the addition of a reconnaissance troop in the division, addition of separate anti-tank units, increases in the size of divisional artillery pieces, replacement of flat-trajectory with high-trajectory weapons in divisional artillery, and retention of mixed horse-mechanized cavalry forces.
Popular foreign organizational characteristics rejected by the United
States Army were just as significant. The American approach to increasing infantry firepower differed from that in most foreign armies. The major
European armies built infantry squads around light machine guns. The
Americans increased firepower by improving the infantryman's rifle. 349 preferring to rely on individuals instead of a crew at the lowest level. In the new division, the light machine guns first appeared in the heavy weapons platoon, not as an integral part of the squad. The Army continued to allocate one Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) per squad. The BAR was not a light machine gun even though it substituted for one in the heavy weapons platoon until 1940. The Americans also rejected the foreign trend toward providing the infantry with accompanying artillery preferring to rely on radio communication for liaison.
American officers were more hesitant to accept foreign combat doctrines. They recognized the trend toward a unified view of doctrine in the immediate postwar years, but detected significant differences in the way armies implemented it. In 1924, the Army War College committee conducting a comparative study of doctrine noted, "A nation's officially accepted and professed doctrines of war result from its decisions as to the most effective methods of utilizing its military and economic resources in the prosecution of war. The methods actually employed in its military operations may indicate doctrine which is at variance with the doctrines it has endeavored to inculcate. In other words there may be essential differences between theory and practice."80 The report noted that the "present professed doctrines of the principal military powers bear a marked similarity, one to another. In studying the development of doctrine in military nations and the soundness of existing accepted doctrines, we find, as is to be expected, that the
^^"Indoctrination as a Basis for Military Training," Army War College G-3 Course 1924-25, Document #13,2 Dec 1924, TMs, pp. 2-3. 350
World War has crystallized the strategical and tactical doctrines and contributed to uniformity in practice as well astheoryHowever, it added,
"when, the external conditions imposing uniformity relax, the national characteristics come to the front a g a i n / ' 8 2 While acknowledging essential similarities in American doctrine and that of France, Germany, Great Britain, and Japan, War College committees found disturbing differences in practices which diverged from American interpretations.
The United States Army was slow to accept the dominance of firepower on the modern battlefield. Untouched by the carnage of 1917, American losses in the World War were not sufficient to shake the commitment to pre war conceptions of the offensive, a doctrine based on man, morale, and the rifle and bayonet. Every major army professed an offensive doctrine. But, in every nation, except Japan and the United States, firepower matched or surpassed the importance of man on the battlefield. Japan and the United
States were the last of the major powers to acknowledge the ascendancy of firepower. Notably, Japan did not participate in the war and the United States saw comparatively limited action. The American Army never dismissed the increased importance of firepower; they simply argued that it had not reduced the importance of the human element. War College committee criticisms of armies that stressed firepower over movement or machines over man peaked in the early twenties and then rapidly declined, but never completely
"Indoctrination as a Basis for Military Training," Army War College G-3 Course 1924-25, Document #13,2 Dec 1924, TMs, pp. 2-3.
82"Indoctrination as a Basis for Military Training," Army War College G-3 Course 1924-25, Document #13,2 Dec 1924, TMs, pp. 2-3. 351 subsided. Nevertheless, attitudes softened considerably after 1925 as the euphoria of victory faded and new weapons appeared which could awe even the most "gung-ho" grunt.
By 1932, committee assessments of firepower had begun to change.
That year, a committee reported, "Where France considers fire as the dominating phenomenon in all tactical procedure, Germany that the fire of machine weapons rules the battlefield, and England that fire is the predominant factor in modern war, we do not in our teachings give it any such importance. We do not draw attention to its destructive power, and as a result we do not consider that the defense can hold by fire alone."^3 The committee concluded "that considering the state of training of the troops we will have at the outbreak of war, under our present doctrines of attack of defensive positions, we will suffer extensive losses, in many cases out of all proportion to the results attained."84 It recommended a réévaluation of the destructive power of fire, reduction of the density of formations, artillery accompaniment for infantry as a normal procedure, and increased emphasis on terrain analysis.85 in the ensuing years, recommendations for organizational changes which added automatic weapons, larger artillery.
83"A Comparative Study of the Tactical Doctrines of America, England, France, and Germany," Army War College G-3 Course 1932-33, Document #8 , 26 Sep 1932, TMs; "Importance of Fire Power," Exhibit #5, Supplement #1, p. 4; Supplement #2, pp. 11-12.
84"A Comparative Study of the Tactical Doctrines of America, England, France, and Germany," Army War College G-3 Course 1932-33, Document #8 , 26 Sep 1932, TMs; "Importance of Fire Power," Exhibit #5, Supplement #1, p. 4; SupplementU2, pp. 11-12.
85"A Comparative Study of the Tactical Doctrines of America, England, France, and Germany," Army War College G-3 Course 1932-33, Document #8 , 26 Sep 1932, TMs; "Importance of Fire Power," Exhibit #5, Supplement #1, p. 4; Supplement #2, pp. 11-12. 352 replacement of shrapnel with high explosive shell, improved communications between supporting and attacking units including forward observers equipped with voice radios, and better antitank weapons supported this trend in thought at the War College. American organizational changes in 1939 reflected this reassessment of firepower; changes in doctrine were not evident until 1941.
The Army was equally slow to follow trends in mechanization and, at the end of the period, still did not possess doctrine and organizations fully compatible with independent armored operations. But, Americans carefully observed foreign experiments with mechanization. Noting French and
British tendencies toward increased use of mechanized forces in 1927, a War
College committee concluded, "In our own tactical doctrine there is no necessity for going to extremes. We have ample manpower but have no desire to waste it; our people are mechanically inclined and our army is much interested in mechanized warfare, but our most likely battlefields are on the
American continent in many parts of which roads are still poor."86 British experiments, in particular, failed to convince the Americans to mechanize large forces. The maneuvers at Salisbury Plain did, however, prompt the
War Department to establish its own experimental armored force in 1928.87
American attitudes toward mechanization did not significantly change until after 1939. War College committee reports regularly reported the
86"Training the United States Army," Army War College G-3 Course 1927-28, Document #17,10 N ov 1927, TMs, p. 4.
87Tlmothy K. Nenninger, "The Development of American Armor, 1917-1940," Armor 78 (May- Junl969): 33. 353 activities of mechanized forces in France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and
R u s s i a . 8 8 The findings of the 1937 committee aptly summarized American views during the entire period concluding that:
1. ... there is nothing to indicate that mechanization has or will revolutionize the conduct of war. The influence of the combat car and tank has been to extend the range of action and to reduce the time-space factors. 2. The present day tank or combat car is still in process of development. From the viewpoint of the gun-armor race the gun is ahead. 3. In view of the above a conservative position on the extent of commitment to the present day tank is warranted.89
The committee recommended continuing decentralized development of mechanized vehicles to take advantage of a broad base of ideas. The next year, the mechanization committee recommended increasing the sole mechanized cavalry brigade to division size, but remained committed to an infantry-based unit rather than endorsing the independent force concepts emerging in
Germany, Soviet Union, Italy, and Great Britain. The committees pointed to the lessons of Spain and Ethiopia, where armored forces remained closely tied to infantry and artillery support, to illustrate their conclusions. As late as
1939, the War College committee comparing tactics and techniques would conclude, "Our doctrine and instruction as to the use of tanks to support the
88"Trends in Tactics and Techniques," Army War College G-3 Course 1937-38, Document #20,21 Oct 1937, TMs, p. 44; "Mechanization and Defense Against Aviation," Army War College G-3 Course 1938-39, Document #17,7 Oct 1938, TMs, p. 52.
89“Mechanization and Defense Against Aviation," Army War CollegeG-3 Course 1937-38, Document #21,21 Oct 1937, TMs, pp. 48-49. 354
Infantry is considered sound and adequate/'^O Americans fully embraced
independent armored operations only after Germany's panzer divisions had
proven their viability in combat. Assessments of foreign developments prior
to 1939 did not support a major mechanization effort by the United States
A rm y.
The closer integration of air and ground combat units was another major foreign trend which gained only cautious acceptance in American doctrinal literature. American aviators, in practice, followed the trends in
Italy and Great Britain toward "strategic" bombardment which meant operating beyond the range of artillery fire, rather than closely supporting ground troops. The Germans and Russians, on the other hand, stressed the close relationship of the air and land battles. The American Army accepted the latter group's views in theory, but not in practice.^^
INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN DEVELOPM ENTS
The comparison of War College committee reports on foreign armies with later developments in the United States Army supports several conclusions about the evolution of mainstream American military thought during the interwar period. First, American Army officers recognized the value of studying foreign armies. The practice of learning from another nation's military forces predated the Civil War. During World War 1,
^O'Tactics and Technique," Army War College G-3 Course 1939-40, Document #22,12 Oct 1939, TMs, pp. 130-132.
House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare, 77. 355
Americans had learned new tactical techniques and had received their first exposure to most of the modern machines of war under French and British tutelage. While some American officers insisted that they had mastered all that the Allies and Germans had to offer by 1919, none denied the importance of closely monitoring future developments in foreign armies. War College classes extensively studied foreign military systems to improve the American military system. Initial studies focused on the World War experience and tended to herald American performance rather than seek better methods of waging war. Chauvinistic attitudes began to change by 1925, however. The quantity of comparative studies increased as the waves of modernization eroded the validity of the World War's lessons. More significantly, the quality of the studies improved as American officers became more critical of their own system and more receptive to foreign ideas. By the mid-thirties, outright condemnation of American methods and high praise for foreign trends was common.
Second, countries similar to the United States and potential enemies were most frequently studied. France, Great Britain, and Japan were the foci of most studies for obvious reasons. In the twenties, these countries represented the greatest potential threats to American security as well as possessing the most powerful military forces in the world. Great Britain and
France also attracted American attention because of their political and cultural similarities with the United States. Germany, Russia, and Italy did not attract American interest until after 1932. None of these countries developed notable armies prior to the that time and, even then, differences in political and economic systems curbed consideration of many aspects of their 356 military systems. The possibility of having to fight Germany, Russia, or Italy did not appear to be a major concern. War plans addressed combat in defense of North America, not major deployments to the European mainland. Japan was the only nation consistently portrayed as a potential enemy.
Nevertheless, the United States thought little of the Japanese Army despite its regular inclusion in comparative studies.
Third, eventual changes in American practices and organizations reflected trends identified in more than one country. While American officers favored the British Army more than others, the United States Army did not adopt any uniquely British practices. Most changes in American doctrine and organization — triangularization, increased emphasis on air support of ground forces, increases in automatic weapons, motorization, growth of high-angle artillery fire, increased use of mechanized forces, and adoption of a more sober view toward man's ability to stand against modern weapons — paralleled developments in nearly all of the major armies.
Fourth, Americans did not change their military methods until they could test new ideas. Lack of resources partially explains the failure to adopt new weapons, organizations, and doctrine during most of the period. But, even after military spending increased in the late thirties, the Army would make few changes before completing extensive maneuvers to validate proposed organizational and tactical concepts. Foreign innovations stimulated thought and provided evidence to support American experimentation. The results of foreign peacetime military experiments alone, such as those conducted by Great Britain's experimental mechanized force, did not alter American practices. 357
Fifth, Army officers valued combat as the ultimate test for new doctrine and organization. They were reluctant to change battle-tested methods and organizations. This tendency stifled progress in the aftermath of World War I, but accelerated the adoption of new techniques on the eve of
World War II. In the early twenties, committees typically praised the
American military and criticized foreign armies. Having just proven the soundness of American military methods, few officers saw any reason to change. During the next 15 years, debate raged over the proper doctrine and organization for combat in the next war, but the War Department changed little. The 1939 revision of doctrine was a tentative interpretation of modern developments in warfare. The new manual contained most of the ingredients for blitzkrieg-style combined arms warfare, but straddled the fence between the past and future battlefields. A clear vision of modern combat was beyond the doctrine writers' capabilities. To be sure, American officers valued the lessons taught by combat actions in Manchuria, Ethiopia, and
Spain. But, in these cases, the inferiority of the enemy diminished the value of the lessons. The Germans provided the answers shortly afterwards. The lessons taught by the Germans in 1939 and 1940 were real. They needed no
American revalidation. Within two years, the Army was able to revise the deficientField Service Regulations 1939 and produce a significantly improved doctrine manual prior to its entry into the war. Such was the power of lessons written in blood.
These conclusions drawn from the contemporary assessments of foreign military developments speak volumes about the state of American military thought during the interwar period. Officers actively sought to 358 advance the Army's capabilities in spite of the inability to implement changes. Open-minded, although not always far-sighted, committees assessed foreign military developments in the absence of meaningful experimentation at home. The committees were more likely to recommend further study of trends exhibited by more than one country rather than to urge adoption of a specific foreign army's organization or method. Economy-driven limitations on training and testing in the United States and the lack of any battlefield prevented the American Army from proving the worth of new ideas. This conservatism characterized the implementation of change, but not the consideration of new ideas. When finally given the resources to modernize.
Army officers had already completed much of the mental groundwork for the revision of new doctrine and organizations. German operations in 1939 provided the combat lessons needed to solidify American thinking and the impetus to act. The United States Army was not alone in its last-minute scramble to find the keys to success on the future battlefield. The Germans, too, returned to the drawing board after the invasion of Poland in order to refine and revise their doctrine and organizations. Through the study of foreign military systems and combat experiences, the Army identified trends in tactics and organization which facilitated its transition from a 1918-vintage force into a modern combined arms army in a relatively short period of time.
While the act of studying foreign developments at the Army War College in itself is noteworthy and the conclusions drawn by the committees help to explain some of the doctrinal choices revealed inField Service Regulations
1939, the Army's failure to translate these thoughts to action requires further examination. CHAPTER XI
ROOTS OF DEFICIENT DOCTRINE
Money rules the roost and fiscal considerations are paramount in times of peace. — Brigadier General Frank M. Andrews^ WDGS G-3
Field Service Regulations 1939 clearly proved that the Army's official operations doctrine had failed to keep pace during the interwar years. If the
United States Army had not been among the victors in World War II, the manual might have stood as stark testimony to the Army's intellectual bankruptcy. But, the Army won, its officers performed well in most instances, and the doctrine deficiencies of the preceding two decades were forgotten or forgiven. Indeed, improvisation, unpredictability, perseverance, and, above all, the ability to learn characterized the Army's performance during the war. These are the traits of an organization that may lack structure and a coherent operational doctrine, but not intellectual vitality. What then explains the deficient doctrine Field in Service Regulations 1939? The explanations are many and range from the readily apparent stifling effect of budget limitations and the Army's well-documented decisions concerning the
^Brigadier General Frank M. Andrews, "The Organization and Functions of the G-3 Division, War Department General Staff," Lecture delivered to Army War College G-3 Course 1939-40, Document #3, 18 Sep 1939, TMs, p. 3, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
359 360 expenditure of its meager appropriation to less obvious internal institutional behaviors and arrangements.
NO MONEY
First and foremost, budget limitations explain the Army's failure to develop an adequate doctrine during the interwar years. Without money, the
Army could not afford the men and material required to conduct meaningful training. The inability to train deprived the Army of opportunities to test new tactics and techniques. The stagnation of doctrine accompanied the resulting deterioration of Army training and readiness described in Chapters
VI and VII. The Army realistically could do little to overcome the hurdles to doctrine development caused by the lack of money unless it neglected its responsibilities under the National Defense Act. The Army mortgaged the future to meet the expenses of the present. The War Department would find little support for increased military spending for most of the interwar years.
Public attitudes were clearly against military spending during the interwar years. Having just won the "war to end all wars," it was difficult to convince an economy-minded public of the need to spend large sums of money defending a nation bordered by two vast oceans in the east and west and non-threatening neighbors to the north and south. Disarmament, not rearmament, characterized popular sentiment. This attitude prevailed throughout most of the interwar period. The first changes in attitude were recorded in a 1935 Gallup poll that reported Americans would support larger 361 appropriations to fund military readiness. Nevertheless, Congress would not reflect the slowly growing popular concern until 1938.2
The drive for economy in government, defined by a balanced budget and limited involvement in business, translated to minimal federal expenditures in all areas, but especially for military appropriations.
Government hesitancy to increase military appropriations continued even after public attitudes had begun to change. The Nye Committee investigations and popular literature suggesting the existence of military- industrial conspiracies worked against spending for military modernization and shaped Congressmen's attitudes. Instead of increasing military preparedness spending in the face of aggression abroad. Congress responded by passing the first Neutrality Act in 1935.3 Congressional budget decisions were understandable in view of the national security situation and domestic economic concerns. Moreover, the
Army still possessed large World War I stockpiles of munitions and equipment during the greater part of the interwar period. Congress viewed the surplus as a source of cost savings, not an excuse for manning a larger army. Among the items in storage were one million rifles, 58,000 automatic rifles, 118,000 machineguns, fifteen hundred 37mm guns, 11,000 artillery
2 Mark S. W atson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, United States Army in World War II Series (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1950), 15-17; Constance M. Green, Harry C. Thomson, and Peter C. Roots, The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War, United States Army in World War II Series (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955), 52-53; Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Arm y (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 418-419.
^Watson, Chief of Staff, 15-17; Green, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department, 52-53; Weigley,United States Army, 418-419. 362
pieces, and 12,000 vehicles.^ Congress saw no reason to buy new equipment
as long as the surplus weapons were serviceable. As a result, some types of
1918-vintage arms and equipment were common sights on Army posts as late as 1940.5
The Army's share of the federal budget declined and its general
condition deteriorated despite consistent and occasionally accusatory
lamentations from the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, and other officers.
Neither the Harding nor Coolidge administrations tolerated the expression of
dissenting views outside of official channels, however. First the
administration and then the War Department itself clamped down on
dissenters. In 1922, Secretary of War Weeks wrote in theNew York Times
that active duty officers should resign before publicly criticizing the
administration and that he would punish those who violated the policy.
Five years later. President Coolidge recalled then Chief of Staff General Summerall to Washington after learning of critical remarks made by him in a
speech to the San Diego Chamber of Commerce.^ Within official channels,
budget legislation specifically prohibited officers from requesting more money
from Congress than that allocated in the federal budget. Officers who
challenged the president's budget might be viewed as demonstrating a
dangerous lack of discipline and disloyalty to their commander-in-chief. This
^Green, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department, 59-64.
^Watson, Chief of Staff, 33.
^David E. Johnson, "Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers" (Ph. D. diss, Duke University, 1990), 132- 39. 363 restriction did not apply to requests for a larger appropriation from the War
Department slice of the budget, however.^ As a result of these attitudes toward dissent. Army leaders tried to make do with what they were given while keeping the President informed of the deteriorating condition of the
Army. Generals MacArthur and Craig, for example, asked for sums that they thought they could get, not what they needed. Repression of criticism extended to the service journals. Authors had to receive approval from superior officers before submitting articles for publication and then had to pass the the scrutiny of the journal's editor.
Infantry Journal bluntly stated that it would carefully review any articles that might hurt morale by highlighting deficiencies in American equipment. The
Chief of Infantry, Major General Charles S. Farnsworth, would not permit
Infantry officers to criticize official Infantry policy. Dwight D. Eisenhower recalled some fifty years after the event that General Farnsworth had silenced him for his advocacy of an independent mission for tanks in the early 1920s.
George S. Patton, Jr. had received an similar warning. Farnsworth even published an article inInfantry Journal in August 1922 promising to censor articles by officers. The result of these policies was the gradual disappearance of critical articles in the service journals.® Resigned to maintaining the Army within the fiscal limits established by Congress, the Army leadership turned to the difficult task of allocating its scarce resources.
^Watson, Chief of Staff, 21-22.
®Timothy K. Nenninger, "The Development of American Armor, 1917-1940" (MA thesis. University of Wisconsin, 1968), 61; Johnson, 139-146,159. 364
NO MEN
Although the Army chose to fund the largest force possible with available funds, it never had enough money to approach personnel strength objectives established by the National Defense Act of 1920. The situation in the Infantry branch illustrates the difficulties imposed by the manpower shortage. The authorized strength of regular infantry had fallen from 110,000 men in 1920 to 40,331 in 1932. Of sixty-five infantry regiments, the Army inactivated at the end of the war. Of the remaining thirty-eight, fourteen consisted of only two battalions. All but two regiments had headquarters detachments instead of companies and only one regiment had a full howitzer company, the rest having howitzer platoons. Rifle and machinegun companies had two instead of three platoons. At best, companies could muster one war-strength platoon for training.9
Where were all of the troops? The War Department distributed its manpower in support of the many and varied tasks assigned by the National
Defense Act. The Regular Army's missions remained unchanged throughout the interwar period. In his final report as Chief of Staff, General Summerall summarized its many missions as follow:
To furnish the necessary garrisons for our overseas possessions, including both mobile and harbor defense troops. To provide a well-balanced mobile force in the continental United States which shall furnish the troops
^John K. Mahon and Romana Danysh,Infantry, Part I: Regular Army (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), 49. 365
required for an expeditionary or striking force and for the constitution of covering forces during mobilization. To furnish garrisons for the harbor defenses in the continental United States. To furnish the forces required for dealing with internal emergencies. To provide the personnel for the operation of the service schools. To provide the personnel and establishments necessary for the prosecution of new developments, such as the mechanized force and other experimental forces. To keep alive the the practice and study of the military art and establish the standards of training for the entire Army of the United States through the operation of the service schools and the maintenance of combat units at sufficient strength to conduct effective training. To maintain the necessary overhead for the administration of the entire military system in time of peace and the framework for the administrative establishments and the expansion required by mobilization.10
Unfortunately, the Army could not accomplish these missions at less than the strength authorized by the National Defense Act of 1920 and, as a result, readiness suffered. In 1929, the War Department General Staff conducted a study to determine the ability of the Army to execute its mission. The available strength of the Regular Army for immediate service on 30 June 1929 was a meager 89,453 men.H This dire state prompted the Army to prioritize manpower requirements above all other needs. Equipment procurement, training, and modernization initiatives suffered accordingly.
^^u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1930 (W ashington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1930), 91.
^^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1929 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1929), 101-109. 366
NO MATERIAL
The lack of equipment severely curtailed the Army's ability to develop modern doctrine. World War I stocks provided an adequate source of material for training through the first half of the interwar period, but conditions rapidly worsened during the second decade as the stocks diminished and the Army failed to replace aging, obsolete, and broken material. The need for new, improved, equipment increased at the very time when the existing stocks had become virtually useless. By 1935, new technology significantly enhanced communications, mobility, firepower, and command capabilities and clearly warranted the revision of World War I doctrine.
Three decisions explain the Army's lack of modern equipment during the crucial latter half of the interwar years. First, the Army chose to maintain its personnel strength instead of buying new equipment believing that it lacked sufficient manpower to accomplish the missions prescribed by the
National Defense Act of 1920. In essence, the Army chose to fund men before material. Second, the Army chose to produce only pilot models of new equipment rather than fully equipping tactical units. While this decision facilitated industrial mobilization and the assumption of wartime production on the eve of war, it left the Army without the means to practice with the new equipment and develop applicable doctrine to guide its employment.
Even long-serving Regulars would not have seen many of the new weapons and equipment developed during the interwar years until after 1941. Third, when funds were available the Army chose to produce the existing 367
Standardized pilot models at the expense of additional research and development on new types. The Army felt it was more important to revitalize training by equipping units with new equipment of existing types than to delay several more years while awaiting development of marginally superior equipment. These decisions curtailed and degraded the quality of training and stifled the development of modern doctrine.
The percentage of the War Department budget allocated to the
Ordnance Department, the organization charged with procurement of new equipment and weapons, illustrates the magnitude of the fiscal paucity. From
1923 through 1926, the Ordnance Department's total annual appropriations were smaller than in any of the seven years preceding American entry into
World War I and the Ordnance Department's percentage of the total appropriation for the military activities of the War Department did not rise above pre-war levels until 1939. In both absolute and relative terms, spending for new weapons and equipment occupied a low priority in the Army budget. ^2
The Ordnance Department had proposed a modest rearmament program in 1925 that would equip the Regular Army with modern artillery over a period of ten years. Budget reductions gutted the program. Seven years into the ten-year program, the Army had neither produced nor appropriated funds for any of the 58 medium and heavy artillery pieces and had provided for less than half of the 276 light guns, mortars, and
^^Green, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department, 40-41. 368
h o w i t z e r s . The Army strove to revitalize the rearmament program in 1932 and 1935 by initiating a six-year program designed to equip the initial protective force. The War Department's procurement priority was 1) antiaircraft guns, 2) tanks, 3) combat cars, 4) semiautomatic rifles, 5) railway artillery, and6 ) antitank guns. Still, the Ordnance Department rarely received more than half the amount of money projected in the six-yearp l a n . 14 in short, the Army could never afford sufficient modern material for use in developing new doctrine.
NO MANEUVERS
The inability to conduct tactical training hindered the development of operations doctrine. In the few instances when an organization could muster sufficient men and material for collective training, lack of training funds reduced the exercise to a march to the training site, bivouac, and return to garrison. Meaningful exercises involving combined arms organizations, live- fire exercises, and evaluation procedures did not occur until late in the period. The few opportunities to bring units together became major training highlights for the year. The first postwar combined exercises did not occur until 1927. The major training exercise that year was the the maneuver of the
2nd Division with part of the 1st Cavalry Brigade and 201 aircraft of the Air
Corps. This exercise represented the largest concentration of tactical units of the Air Corps since the World War. The Chief of Staff reported, "It was the
l^Green, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department, 46-47. l^Green, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department, 47. 369 first attempt to demonstrate, through actual practice, that our theories as to the proper command relations between Army air units and other arms were feasible from the standpoints of both the Air Corps commander and the commander of groundtroops."^5 The Army made much more of these collective exercises than was warranted.
An Army-wide training program did not exist until 1941. Field army commanders and before them, corps area commanders, were responsible for training their commands.The army maneuvers heralded in the annual reports of the Chiefs of Staff and Secretaries of War amounted to little more than assembly exercises. Large-scale maneuvers conducted in the late 1930s, consisted of individual units, many at half-strength or less, training without critically important supporting units. As late as 1939, the First Army could muster only 23% of its war strength. The First Army's collected weaponry amounted to no 155mm howitzers, few antitank weapons, only6 % of its infantry mortars, one third of its machineguns, and 17% of its trucks. The results of these exercises offered little to support development of new doctrine. Worse, the inability to include modern weapons and equipment in the training led some participants to conclude that horse cavalry and World
War I organizations were stillu s e f u l . ^ 7
^^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1927 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1927), 52.
^^Christopher R. Gabel, The U.S. Army Maneuvers of 1941 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991), 15.
^ ^Martin Blumenson, "Kasserine Pass, 30 January-22 February 1943," inAmerica's First Battles, 1776-1965, ed. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1986), 229. 370
The lack of funds to man, equip, and train the organization prescribed in the National Defense Act of 1920 was unquestionably the root cause of
Army deterioration during the interwar years. The decisions to use the limited money to maintain a skeleton force, procure only pilot models of new equipment, and prioritize training of the citizen components were also critically important factors in the Army's general decline. But, several additional reasons help to explain the doctrinal stagnation that accompanied the overall decline. All of the remaining explanations for the deficiencies found inField Service Regulations 1939 ultimately point to failures of the
War Department General Staff. Ineffective arrangements for equipment procurement; foreign intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination; and doctrine coordination and integration contributed to the Army's fruitless effort to develop modern combined arms doctrine in the interwar years.
NO M ECHANISM S - THE PROCUREM ENT SYSTEM
The War Department's procurement system shared part of the blame for the deficiencies in American doctrine. The development of new doctrine required the production of sufficient quantities of modern equipment for use in field testing. The Army did produce several impressive pilot models in every category of armament and equipment during the interwar years. The
United States had indeed learned the importance of integrating industrial and military mobilization in order to produce the huge quantities of equipment required by modern industrial warfare. The existence of pilot models would significantly reduce the amount of time required to manufacture war 371 material by eliminating the long research, development, testing, and evaluation phase of procurement. However, the Army failed in nearly every instance to produce sufficient quantities of pilot models for the development of an associated tactical doctrine. Omnipresent budget limitations justify many of the shortcomings in the process, but other systemic problems also existed to reduce the effectiveness of procurement efforts.
The Army's equipment procurement system experienced fundamental change in the aftermath of World War I. Prior to 1918, the Ordnance
Department dominated the procurement process. The using arms could request equipment and often provided representatives to boards charged with examining new types, but the Chief of Ordnance ultimately determined the weapons characteristics and ruled on the effectiveness of the selected type.
This arrangement changed in 1918 as the Army and the nation sought solutions to the deficiencies that had resulted in the United States' inability to supply its forces during the war. The War Department developed procurement training and education programs for officers and enlisted men, established the Army Industrial College "to train Regular Army officers for duties pertaining to the supervision of procurement of military supplies and of assurance of adequate provision for the industrial mobilization of the country in a national em ergency,"^ 8 and implemented organizational changes within the Ordnance Department to improve the procurement process. Most significant, the service boards of the using arms gained a greater role in defining equipment characteristics to include holding final
^®U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1927, 34. 372 approval authority for new types — the Chief of Ordnance no longer dominated the procurementp r o c e s s . ^ 9
The National Defense Act of 1920 created a new framework for the procurement process. The Act established Chiefs of Infantry, Field Artillery,
Coast Artillery, Cavalry, Air Service, and Chemical Warfare Service to promote the technical and tactical advancement of the arms and foster close coordination among the new organizations and the Ordnance Department.
The Ordnance Department itself more than tripled the number of officers assigned to Ordnance to 350 and increased enlisted strength to 4500 men, although it never reached these strengths during the interwar period. The
Act also charged a new Assistant Secretary of War with "supervision of the procurement of all military supplies and other business of the War
Department pertaining thereto and the assurance of adequate provision for the mobilization of material and industrial organizations essential to wartime needs."20 While providing for a larger, more capable Ordnance
Department, diminishing single branch domination, and increasing user participation in the procurement process, the Act institutionalized inefficient and potentially counterproductive arrangements.
At the top, the War Department General Staff and Assistant Secretary of War each supervised critical phases of the procurement process. The
WDGS was responsible for developing a standardized model while the
Assistant Secretary of War was responsible for procuring it. Under the new
^^Green, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department, 21-29.
^^Statides at Large, 41, sec. 5a, 764-65 (1920). 373 organization, the Ordnance Department answered to the WDGS for the development of pilot models of new equipment and the Assistant Secretary of War for production models. The Ordnance Department found itself in the unenviable position of trying to satisfy two masters and its demanding, unsympathetic clients, the branches.
The Chiefs of Staff, in particular disliked the arrangement. General
Summerall complained mightily about the tendency for the Assistant Secretary to work directly with the supply bureaus and thereby undercut the
General Staff's ability to coordinate War Department activity. He wrote, "As a result there has grown up since 1920 a system containing all the evils the
General Staff law of 1903 was designed to correct.''^! General Craig also highlighted the standardization problem in his annual report, writing:
. . . for some time the lack of standardization of equipment of every variety in the Army is a distinct detriment to procurement as well as performance, and that standardization is an essential not only for efficiency but to counteract the mounting cost of production. In past years there has been too much of a tendency to delay adoption of an item pending further test and improvement. There is no question that this procedure has resulted in a delay in the procurement of essential items urgently required for the training of troops, especially in new doctrine and tactics. This is particularly true in the procurement of airplanes, tanks, motor vehicles, and automatic rifles.22
U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1930 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1930), 117.
22u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1936 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1936), 40. 374
General MacArthur partly alleviated the conflict by establishing the General
Council to improve coordination between his office and Assistant Secretary of
War in all areas.
Within the War Department, the Ordnance Department, remained the most important organization in the process even though it lacked the authority to coordinate all aspects of procurement. After intensive study.
Major General Clarence C. Williams, Chief of Ordnance from 1918 to 1930, shaped the Department into the form it would retain throughout the interwar period. The Ordnance Department consisted of two operating divisions, one for design and manufacture and the other for maintenance and distribution. A third division handled all administrative matters. The
Department also included a Technical Staff responsible for staying abreast of foreign and domestic technological developments and ensuring that
American designs were in keeping with modern trends. An Ordnance
Committee, composed of representatives from the using arms and services, advised the chief of the Technical Staff. The Ordnance Committee participated in all stages of procurement from inception through field testing and usually submitted the final recommendation concerning the disposition of a new item of equipment to the War Department General Staff. Unless a branch chief vehemently objected, the War Department automatically approved the Committee's findings v/ithout further review. The Ordnance
Committee's de facto domination of the process continued until 1939 when the War Department asserted its control.23
23(lreen, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department, 32-34. 375
The procurement process was long and complex even under ideal conditions. Major General J. E. Fechet, Chief of the Air Corps, explained the process to a meeting of the War Department Business Council on 3 October
1928:
Procedure in the development and supply of a type of equipment is briefly as follows: First, military need exists. The next step is to create and design an article of equipment that will best fulfill this military requirement. One or more of the articles are fabricated for experimental tests and if necessary the design is improved. Based upon the experimental design and tests, a limited number are produced and supplied to military units for actual service test. This service test usually results in certain undiscovered and unpredicted deficiencies and, in addition, suggest further improvements. Based upon the final satisfactory and accepted service test design and model, standardization and quantity production f o l l o w s . 2 4
Once in action, numerous problems arose in this seemingly simple, straightforward, procedure.
The requirements identification stage was often the root cause of procurement problems. The arms and services were chiefly responsible for identifying requirements. Theoretically, the War Department assigned proponency for each category of equipment to one of the branches. As long as all participants in the process acknowledged the branch's proponency and agreed with its recommendations, the initial step proceeded unencumbered by debate. In several instances, as in the development of common user items
^'^U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1929, 63. 376 like a cargo or utility truck, these preconditions for success did not exist and problems arose from the start.
Prototype development and testing was the most contentious step of the process. The Ordnance Department built the prototype to specifications determined in conjunction with the user. Disagreement between the
Ordnance Department and the user over equipment specifications could delay production of the pilot model for years. By increasing client participation in the standardization process, the War Department sought to improve equipment quality and satisfy the using branch. In many cases, client participation decreased efficiency as a result of arguments between the
Ordnance Department and the arms and services or between two or more services with an interest in the same type of equipment. The previously mentioned dispute between the Infantry, Field Artillery, and Ordnance
Department over the proper size for an antitank gun is but one example of the conflicts that occurred when the Ordnance Department and multiple users fought over the development of a weapon system. The results could be counterproductive as when War Department instructions assigning proponency for development of the 37mm gun to the Infantry hindered the development of alternative antitank weapons. The instructions clearly prohibited work on larger caliber weapons in 1939 and 1940 despite the protests of the Ordnance Department.25
Once the Army had finally perfected a pilot model, it recommended to the Assistant Secretary of War types of equipment for standardization. The
^^Green, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department, 184-85. 377
Assistant Secretary of War reviewed the recommendation to ensure that mass production was feasible. The Ordnance Department then delivered a standardized type with specifications sufficiently clear for production by a commercial manufacturer. After standardization, the Army computed the basis of issue and requirements for use in mobilization planning. Here again the Army's tendency to seek a perfect item of equipment delayed the procurement process. As a result, the Assistant Secretary of War often planned equipment procurement without waiting for adoption of a standardized type.26
Resolution of conflicts occurred at War Department General Staff level and, on occasion, fell upon the Chief of Staff himself because the Army lacked a central agency to coordinate the procurement process.27 The addition of the
Chiefs of Infantry, Artillery, Cavalry, and the Air Service was essentially another layer of bureaucracy to compete with the already existing Ordnance
Department, Quartermaster Corps, and Signal Corps in the development of new equipment. Although the Army formed these organizations to improve the acquisition process, the lack of a coordinating head for the increased number of competing agencies worsened the situation. An infantry officer wrote in 1929:
Our Army is lacking a suitable agency for general research, experimentation, and development. We have branch boards (Infantry Board, Tank Board, Air Corps Board, Field Artillery Board, and so on), each of which can make studies, within
26u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1936, 20-21.
^^Johnson, "Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers," 115. 378
limits. But these minor agencies are severely limited as to what they may do, and they have, individually, scant resources with which to operate. And, most important of all, they are isolated one from the other. . . . Criticism that attributes our slow progress to ultra-conservatism is unjust. The fault lies not there but in the lack of a suitable agency. The missing element should be supplied.28
The "missing element" remained missing for the duration of the interwar period.
An example of the problems arising from the lack of a coordinating head for procurement is provided by the early development of the medium tank. The Chief of Infantry and Ordnance Department shared responsibility for tank development. The Chief of Infantry appointed the Tank Board in
1926 to test and evaluate tanks produced by the Ordnance Department.
Problems came to a head when the Chief of Infantry opposed the Ordnance
Department's recommendation to adopt the Ml924 medium tank because it did not meet user requirements preferring instead the heavier M1921 tank.
The Ordnance Department countered that the faults found in the M l924 resulted from the requirement to stay within the fifteen ton weight limitation imposed by the maximum load-bearing capacity of Army bridging. The
Infantry then suggested that the Army develop bridging to accommodate heavier tanks. At this point, the Chief of Engineers entered the debate as the proponent for bridging. The Engineer sided with the Ordnance Department citing the origin of the fifteen ton load-bearing standard in a letter from the
^^Ralph E. Jones, "The Weak Spot in Military Progress,"Infantry Journal 34 (March 1929): 290; quoted in Johnson, "Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers," 116. 379
Adjutant General that indicated the Infantry's concurrence with the fifteen ton weight capacity for the divisional ponton bridge. The War Department backed the Ordnance Department and the fifteen ton bridge capacity remained a limiting characteristic. Arguments between the user and the provider continued throughout the twenties with the Infantry accusing the Ordnance
Department of ignoring tactical requirements and the Ordnance Department charging the Infantry with unrealistic specifications. As a result, the Army failed to produce a standard tank by the end of the decade. The Ordnance
Department could not satisfy the Infantry requirements for a tank capable of stopping a .50 caliber armor-piercing bullet and remain within the fifteen ton weight limitation without sacrificing so much engine weight as to leave the vehicle underpowered.29
Even under seemingly ideal conditions, the procurement process moved at a glacial pace. The search for a suitable semiautomatic rifle illustrates the slow standardization and procurement process. The semiautomatic rifle was mechanically simple, no debate over functional requirements clouded the design process, and all accepted the Infantry's proponency for the weapon's development. Under these ideal conditions, the delays in procuring the new rifle are difficult to understand. Although the effort to develop a semiautomatic rifle dated back to 1901, the initial purchase of twenty-four Garand rifles for service testing did not occur until 1923 after the Ordnance Committee completed nearly two years of competitive testing.
The Springfield Armory delivered the rifles in 1925. After further testing at
29johnson, "Fast Tanks and HeavyBombers," 166-72. 380
Aberdeen Proving Grounds and Fort Benning, the Army returned the Garand rifles to Springfield Armory for modification and then sent them to Fort
Benning and Fort Riley for new tests. Meanwhile, competing types continued to develop until, in 1929, the Army determined a second competition was necessary to determine the best semiautomatic rifle. The Garand .276-caliber rifle won again. However, by 1930, Garand had developed a .30-caliber weapon that was as light as the .276-caliber rifle. The new Chief of Staff,
General MacArthur, shifted the procurement effort to the larger caliber weapon and, by 1934, had produced 80 weapons for testing. Tests of the .30- caliber rifle by the Infantry and Cavalry Boards resulted in the weapon's redesign. The Army finally standardized the modified weapon as the Rifle,
Semiautomatic, M l, on 9 January 1936, thirty-five years after initiation of the project. Even then, the first production rifles were not in the hands of troops until August 1937 and would not completely replace the Springfield until after World War II began.30
The failure to produce modern artillery weapons in sufficient quantity for field training further illustrates the deficiencies in the procurement system. The most important material shortcoming exposed during the First
World War was the lack of effective modern artillery. The Westervelt
Board's report in 1919 had recommended upgrading the entire inventory of
American artillery hardware to include motorizing all weapons larger than
75mm and adoption of artillery tractors for cross-country travel. The thorough and authoritative report, submitted with the total support of the
^^Green, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department, 175-77. 381 artillery and ordnance communities, guided the bulk of procurement activity in the interwar years.3^ Despite enjoying the top procurement priority and uncomplicated by unsettling technological innovations, the Army could show little progress in its attempts to modernize guns and howitzers except in the lightest categories during the interwar years.
Army decisions concerning new model production contributed to the failure to develop better doctrine. Recognizing that it must operate under conditions of fiscal stringency, the Army sought to equip only a few forces with new and modern equipment. These forces were to have the latest model armament available for use in emergencies and to develop doctrine for the rest of the A r m y .32 Lack of procurement funds prevented the attainment of this modest objective forcing the Army to adjust its plans. The
Army chose as its procurement objective to stay abreast of current technology by producing state of the art prototypes that could be mass produced in an emergency.33 The development of pilot models would enable the Army to remain on the leading edge of technology and the placement of "educational orders" would keep ready civilian industry for wartime mobilization. The decision meant sacrificing the development of tactical doctrine, however.
Unfortunately, the sacrifice did little to attain the Army's other two procurement objectives.
31 Green, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department, 169-72.
32u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1930 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1930), 99-100.
33u.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Chief of Staff, 1933 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1933), 20, 27. 382
Congress did not allow educational orders until 1938 after the German
Anschluss with Austria. The Army had attempted to implement the educational orders program in the 1920s as a means of providing industry with experience in munitions manufacture. Without an industrial base familiar with the Army's requirements and possessing the machine tools required for mass production, only the few government arsenals would be ready for wartime production. Regardless, Congress repeatedly failed to support such legislation and removed a source of additional pilot models.34
By 1930, the need for new equipment was becoming critical. The War
Department General Staff conducted a study in 1932 seeking ways to improve the procurement process in view of the great likelihood that further reductions in appropriations would occur. The study concluded that procurement planning should project requirements for the next six years.
The Army subsequently designed the Six-Year Plan to equip the first million men to be mobilized under the 1933 mobilization plan. The planners optimistically called for thirty-four mobile antiaircraft artillery regiments, less than half of which would be achieved by 1939, and a 105mm gun to replace the 75mm piece in the infantry division.35 The Great Depression delayed the revitalization effort until 1935 and then the first requirement was quantity, not quality. The Army chose not to wait for new types of equipment to crawl through the procurement process. Instead, it opted for available standardized models many of which had already grown obsolete. The choice was between
^^Green, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department, 57-58; Watson, C h ie f o f Staff, 34.
^^Watson, Chief of Staff, 40. 383 a new, but obsolete, model or waiting for two or more years for a better model. With no suitable equipment with which to train while awaiting production of new models, the Army chose to equip the force with the latest available models. Having chosen the quickest solution for equipping the force, the Army could still only produce half of the material projected in its Six-Year Plan in any one year.36
Another procurement decision that shaped Army doctrine development was in the suballocation of funds earmarked for research and development. Maintenance of existing equipment and the Army's operating costs left little money for procurement. The General Staff chose to spread the meager sum among all arms and services instead of completely funding a single project. While this practice kept many projects alive, it also created an overwhelming backlog. Of the 224 projects in 1937, some had been active for over a decade and one-fourth of the works were less than ten percent completed. By 1938, the backlog of developmental projects for artillery and automotive items alone amounted to $10 million.37
The decisions the Army did not make were as detrimental to the development of doctrine as those that they did make. The War Department could have diminished the problems caused by the lack of a central body for coordinating procurement if it had provided better guidance to the Ordnance
Department, arms, and services. Instead, the General Staff conducted no
^^Green, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department, 46-48.
^^Green, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department, 204-206. 384 comprehensive study of armament and equipment requirements after the
W estervelt Board convened in 1919.
One of the most important contributors to the Army's procurement problems stemmed from its desire to field the best possible weapon system.
The search for perfection suffered from repeated delays as new technological developments or test results suggested modifications that would improve the weapon. The uncoordinated production of related items also caused delays as certain standardized end items stood incomplete while awaiting component items that had not yet been standardized. With few exceptions, notably the successful modernization of the .50 caliber machinegun, the Army standardization process hindered the development of new weapons and equipment.38 Even after standardization of a new model, the Army could not proceed with mass production due to fiscal limitations.
War Department policies, an inefficient procurement system, and meager appropriations left Army with old and, in many cases, obsolete equipment for much of the interwar period. The resulting equipment shortfalls in tactical units and at the service schools severely hindered training of any kind and prevented the advancement of doctrine. The United
States Army, unable to fund its own training or testing in search of new capabilities, had no choice but to rely on foreign experiences for evidence to support change. However, the assessments of foreign military systems conducted at the Army War College revealed American hesitancy to adopt foreign practices solely on the basis of observation and reports from abroad.
88creen, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department, 177-78. 385
This suggests that the evidence provided by the Army's intelligence system was unconvincing.
NO M ECHANISM S - THE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM
The military intelligence gathering agency of the War Department
General Staff was last in importance among the five staff divisions organized in 1921. For most of the interwar years, the Military Intelligence Division
(MID) was the only division headed by a colonel instead of a general officer.
This arrangement essentially relegated all aspects of military intelligence to a position of lesser importance in relation to personnel, operations, logistics, and war planning. The manning, funding, and performance of MID reflected its relatively lower priority. Total personnel assigned to the division declined throughout the period. Significantly, MID reached its lowest strength — 69 officers, enlisted men, and civilians — from 1936 to 1939 at the very time that the Army could have gained the most its services. The Intelligence Branch, charged with collecting and evaluating foreign intelligence, counted only eight officers as late as 1941. The MID budget appropriation also remained at a crippling level during the interwar years. The priority established by the War
Department indicated that it clearly did not appreciate the importance of peacetime intelligence operations. Nor did foreign intelligence operations receive the relatively greater emphasis it deserved when domestic conditions 386 diminished the Army's own ability to experiment with tactical and technical innovations.39
Military attachés were the principal source of foreign intelligence although the Army also gathered information from officers traveling overseas, other government agencies, American commercial firms with offices in foreign countries, and through translations of foreign military publications. The attachés produced mixed results depending on the reporting officer's quality and qualifications as well as the cooperation of the host nation. While the War Department could do little to encourage host nation cooperation, it controlled the selection, training, and assignment of attachés and observers. Still, the intelligence collection system suffered from a lack of officers to serve as attachés and observers.^O
Simple arithmetic explains part of the problem — the Army could not spare many officers for attaché duty. The small Army was in no position to provide observers for overseas duty when it could not man its own units.
The number of attachés was always small and declined throughout the interwar years. In 1922, the War Department had 30 attachés in as many countries. Four years later, the number dwindled to 22 attachés with responsibility for 45 countries. By 1933, the number fell again to 20 accompanied by a reduction in the number of officers attending Asian
39Bruce W. Bidwell, History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff: 1775-1941 (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, 1986), 256-259, 271, 408-09.
^^Bidwell, Military Intelligence Division, 263. 387 language schools from sixteen to twelve for a total of thirty-two officers on attaché duty The second aspect of the problem, officer selection, was more complex.
One of most important limitations on selection of officers for attaché duty was the officer's wealth. Simply put, an Army officer's salary was insufficient to meet all the official entertainment and cost of living requirements associated with attaché duty. One officer reported that the cost of serving in
London during the 1930s exceeded his Army salary$10,000.42 by As a result, the Army sought officers with substantial outside income for attaché duty.
This practice contributed to the attaché system's poor reputation as both civilian and military critics associated the duty with privilege and snobbery regardless of the officer's qualifications and performance. The establishment of attaché allowances in 1938 partially solved the problem, but not before the system had already fallen into low regard. Other criteria governing the selection of attachés included foreign language skills, technical knowledge not commonly possessed among the available officers, completion of the
Command and General Staff School, and an above average efficiency rating not to mention tact, personality, favorable appearance, and the desire to serve as an attaché. Frequently, the Army could not produce attachés that could meet all prerequisites. Outside income and language skills took precedence
4^Bidwell, M ilitary Intelligence Division, 380, 384; Miller, 50-52.
42Creen, Thompson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department, 208. 388 over competence in some cases. Nevertheless, most military attachés were intelligent officers with successful Army c a r e e r s . ^ 3
The War Department did little to assist the attaché. Newly-appointed attachés did not attend an orientation course concerning their duties and responsibilities until 1931 and at no time received formal intelligence training.44 American officers also lacked guidance from the War Department.
The General Staff did not task the attachés to provide information about specific weapons, equipment, or doctrinal trends. Nor in the area of technical intelligence did a two-way exchange of information between the Ordnance
Department and the attaché or observer exist. The reports from overseas generated few questions from the General Staff or the using arms and services. Whether this lack of interest stemmed from failure to appreciate the value of the attaché's work, the knowledge that budget limitations would prevent exploitation of any new information, or conscious discarding of the information is unknown. Regardless, it left the attaché without direction and discouraged aggressive pursuit of intelligence. Another complication existed because most American developments were described in open sources eliminating the attaché's ability to trade information.45 In this area, too, the
War Department offered no assistance as public suspicion toward military- industrial collaboration reached its height during the interwar years.
'^^Bidwell, Military Intelligence Division, 381, 390, 411; Kim M. Juntanen, "U.S. Army Attachés and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939: The Gathering of Technical and Tactical Intelligence" (MA thesis. Temple University, 1990), 10-11.
^^Bidwell, Military Intelligence Division, 266; Juntanen, 11.
“^^Green, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department, 209,214. 389
The reports submitted by attachés and observers were of mixed quality.
The attaché's competence was a determining factor, particularly in the collection of technical intelligence. Technical intelligence was of special importance during this period when all major armies possessed equipment of similar quality. The nation that first achieved a technological breakthrough in any one of several important categories of munitions would enjoy a significant advantage over its adversary. Accordingly, technical expertise was an important criteria for selection of attachés and observers. As noted earlier, however, this criteria was less important than personal wealth and language proficiency. The Ordnance Department, the branch best-qualified to evaluate technical developments, provided only two foreign observers during the critically important years between 1930 and1 9 4 0 .^ 6 As a result, this important aspect of foreign intelligence was weakly rooted.
Direct evidence of attachés and observers influencing either tactical or technical developments in the American Army is difficult to find. Among the notable reports are those of the Ordnance liaison officer in London,
Captain René R. Studler. Captain Studler submitted approximately 300 reports covering developments across Western Europe from July 1936 to
October 1940. His report of the German trend toward adoption of larger caliber antitank guns in August 1937 stimulated American interest in the development of its own antitankw e a p o n . 4 7 Captain Townsend Griffiss, the assistant attaché for air in Paris, provided technically detailed and thoroughly
^^Green, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department, 208.
^^Green, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department, 208-11. 390 analyzed reports on aviation developments during the Spanish Civil War.48
Despite these few successes, the overall product of the attaché system was poor. As late as June 1940, the Army lacked basic information on the major
European armies much of which was unprotected inform ation.^^
Failure to act on the intelligence provided by the attachés and observers was another deficiency of the system. Part of the problem stemmed for the tendency of G-2 officers to place higher security classifications on documents than were necessary. MID did not downgrade the classification of its biweekly
Intelligence Summary from "SECRET" to "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY" until
1928. Even then, recipients of the information could not reproduce it until late 1939 and then only with the approval of the G-2.50 This limited dissemination of foreign intelligence diminished its usefulness to officers in the field.
The processing of intelligence reports also contributed to the problem.
MID received the reports and routed them to the other staff divisions and the chiefs of arms and services. Then, the staff directors and chiefs directed the information to interested parties within their organizations. In some important cases, the information never reached the agency with the greatest interest in the topic. For example, the Army's antitank weapon developers never saw Captain Studler's report on German antitank developments. Even if a designer had seen the report, no efficient mechanism for providing quick
^®Juntanen, "U.S. Army Attachés," 13.
4^Crcen, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department, 260.
^OBidwell, Military Intelligence Division, 266, 409. 391 bottom-up feedback existed. The process was altogether too lengthy, bureaucratic, and not conducive to obtaining results.51 The entire routing process took a full year in some c a s e s . 5 2 To complicate further, MID distributed the information to the arms, services, and schools without analysis or evaluation.53 Analysis by other organizations rarely occurred since most lacked intelligence sections until the War Department finally directed the chiefs of all arms and services to establish them in late1 9 4 0 . 5 4
Foreign battlefields provided the best evidence of the current state and future trends in warfare. Accordingly, the Army sought opportunities to observe foreign hostilities whenever possible. Sino-Japanese hostilities, the
Italian-Ethiopian War, and Spanish Civil War were the major conflicts attracting American attention prior to 1939. The Spanish Civil War was the most important conflict for the collection of foreign military intelligence prior to 1939. The War Department's experience collecting intelligence during the war illustrates the faults in the system.
The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939, was the proving ground for weapons developed in the interwar years. The results of this great field test provided many lessons for the participants and observers. The war showcased new German, Italian, and Soviet weapons and, to a lesser extent, those of France, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, and Switzerland. It was, in
51 Green, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department, 209,211, 215.
52creen, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department, 215.
53Bidwell, Military Intelligence Division, 267.
54Bidwell, Military Intelligence Division, 305. 392 the words of Colonel Stephen O. Fuqua, the American military attaché to
Spain, "a 'dress rehearsal' for the nextw a r . " 5 5
The men reporting on the Spanish Civil War were high quality officers. Of the ten officers who submitted the most reports, all but one were college graduates, one had a master's degree, nine were Leavenworth or
Army War College graduates, two had attended foreign military schools.
Colonel Fuqua was a former Chief of Infantry, six would retire as brigadier generals, and two would retire as majorgenerals.56 Despite their impressive qualifications, the conditions under which the attachés operated hindered the development of accurate intelligence.
Several factors worked against effective intelligence assessment in addition to the previously mentioned organizational hurdles. The War
Department denied Colonel Fuqua permission to locate himself with a
Spanish army in the field citing concern with the perception that American presence might create. The distance between the battlefield and his place of duty at the embassy, however, reduced the accuracy and value of his observations. The War Department also limited the attachés to gathering
^^Quoted in Juntanen, "U.S. Army Attachés," 3.
^^Juntanen, "U.S. Army Attachés," 11-12. College attendance was a significant indicator of the relative quality of the attachés considering that one-quarter to one-third of all Army officers lacked undergraduate education. See Edward M. Coffman and Peter F. Herrly, "The American Regular Army Officer Between the World Wars: A Collective Biography,"Armed Forces and Society (Fall 1977), 55-73, for a description of the average Army officer during the interwar years. 393 information through official military channels and overt contacts with potential sources of information.^^
Despite these handicaps, the attachés reported frequently and sometimes with impressive foresight. They clearly recognized that the war was a testing ground for new weapons, organization, and tactics. In the air, the attachés reported constant improvement in aircraft speed and armament.
The reports stressed the improved performances of pursuit aircraft and noted that, when combined with powerful antiaircraft weapons, the two systems could significantly reduce the effectiveness of bombers. Captain Griffiss, specifically recommended the employment of pursuit aircraft as escorts for bombers and the close integration of ground- and air-based air defense systems. The German performance in particular attracted the attaché's attention. Captain Griffiss reported the German efficiency in adjusting air tactics to overcome evolving technological challenges. He also highlighted the effectiveness of German air-artillery-tank-infantry integration in the attack, recommended dedicating aircraft and air units for close air support operations, and stressed the importance of training in air-ground coordination in response to the German successes.58
On the ground, the principal interest was in mechanized, antitank, and antiaircraft tactics and weapons. The attachés concluded that light tanks employed during the war by the Germans and Italians were inefficient — they lacked armor, armament, and were unreliable. They were vulnerable to
^^Juntanen, "U.S. Army Attachés," 14-17.
^®Juntanen, "U.S. Army Attachés," 57-58, 87-91,131-32. 394 destruction by both heavier tanks and increasingly powerful antitank guns.
Medium and heavy tanks were clearly superior, but neither was a match for the large-caliber antitank guns. Nevertheless, the belligerents would fight successfully in the opening years of World War II using the light tanks tested in Spain.59 The difference in later years was in the method of employment, not in the technology. The attachés reported nothing new in mechanized or combined arms tactics. Their reports echoed lessons for tank warfare that were not much different from those derived from World War I experiences: employ tanks in mass supported by infantry, artillery, and aviation to suppress antitank weapons. The MID prepared a report based on attaché reports from Spain citing failure to mass tanks, lack of artillery and infantry support, insufficient armor, inadequate reconnaissance, poor training and discipline, and weak maintenance as the reasons for tank failures in Spain.^O
Antitank weapons attracted the most attention. The attachés found German antitank weapons to be very effective. Colonel Fuqua concluded that antitank weapons had surpassed tank development and that the trend toward heavier tanks could be countered by a heavier antitank gun.61 He believed that an infantryman with an antitank weapon need not fear a tank.62
The intelligence gathered by observers of the Spanish Civil War appeared to have had little effect on American doctrine. The Army made no
^^Juntanen, "U.S. Army Attachés," 97-98.
^Ojuntanen, "U.S. Army Attachés," 97-98,124.
^Ijuntanen, "U.S. Army Attachés," 116.
*^2juntanen, "U.S. Army Attachés," 113. 395 significant progress toward integration of air and ground forces. The trend toward strategic bombardment and an increasingly independent air force continued in spite of the reports from Spain. On the ground, the war bolstered arguments for heavier tanks, but did not change doctrine for tank employment. To be sure, the performance of antitank weapons during the
Spanish Civil War spurred procurement of the 37mm gun, but the War
Department did not promulgate an accompanying antitank doctrine until
1941. Although not fully appreciating the qualitative superiority of the
German forces, the Spanish Civil War helped the American intelligence system to identify the German Army and Air Force as its most important subject. The German war machine had undeniably captured the interest of the
American intelligence community before, during, and after the Spanish Civil
War. The Army increased the number of attachés, military students, and liaison officers assigned to Germany in the 1930s. The American military attaché in Germany from 1935 to 1939 was Colonel Truman Smith. He had served as a civil affairs officer in Coblenz on occupation duty after World War
I and for four years as an assistant attaché in Berlin from 1920 to 1924. He had observed German army maneuvers in 1932 as a guest of the German War
Ministry. Two other officers as well as American officers attending the two- year course offered at the Kriegsakademie in 1935 and 1936 assisted the military attaché. Colonel Smith submitted several studies on German military developments including German Anti-Tank Units (prepared by
Captain Albert C. Wedemeyer), German Engineer Battalion (prepared by First 396
Lieutenant Paul Thompson^S), German Infantry Battalion (prepared by Major
Herman Kramer), German Field Artillery Battalion (prepared by Major Percy
Black), and German Maneuver Umpiring System (prepared by Smith).
Colonel Smith provided a detailed record of German achievements in ground warfare during the critical last half of the 1930s.64 Colonel Smith's assistant attaché for air. Captain Theodore Koenig, lacked equivalent access to the Luftwaffe and, although he was an aviator, lacked the knowledge to evaluate technical developments in aviation. Some of the most profitable sources of information were Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh's visits to
Germany between 1936 and 1939. Captain Koenig accompanied Colonel
Lindbergh on tours of German air installations. Their reports underlined the rapidly advancing combat capabilities of German aircraft and stimulated interest in the United States.65
The American failure to develop a better understanding of German tactical and operational methods, in spite of recognizing that they were rapidly becoming the world's leading military power, underlines the inadequacy of the intelligence system. The panzer division and blitzkrieg operational concepts were not German state secrets. The fundamentals of
German panzer warfare were available to Americans through open source
^^Lieutenant Thompson was later selected to train the first wave of combat engineers responsible for clearing obstacles from OMAHA beach during the Normandy invasion on the basis of his knowledge of German engineers. He commanded an engineer brigade during the D- Day invasion and was wounded and evacuated on the afternoon of 6 June.
^^Bidwell, Military Intelligence Division, 269.
^^Bidwell, Military Intelligence Division, 269-270. 397 documents. Germany had developed panzer divisions in 1935. They built these combined arms divisions around the tank with all components possessing the tank's level of mobility, not that of the infantryman. The divisions fought in regimental combat teams calledKampfgruppen tailored to specific missions. Combined arms teams of tanks, artillery, and infantry existed down to company level. The operational concept called for the division to penetrate deeply with tanks supported by artillery and aircraft while employing infantry to secure the flanks and lines of communication.
The United States Army would not adopt similar organizations and tactics until 1940 and even then the American armored division was years behind its German counterpart in operational and tactical capabilities.^^
The German use of airpower also seemed to have been overlooked or misinterpreted. The German air forces were a full, if not the most important, partner in the blitzkrieg. The Luftwaffe first attained air superiority by destroying the enemy air force and production facilities, then supported the ground attack by supplementing and extending the range of artillery fires in the close attack and disrupting enemy forces in depth. Despite their claims, the Army Air Corps could not compare to the Luftwaffe in its ability to perform as part of a combined arms team. The crucial mission of close air support was missing in practice if not in doctrine as indicated by the Air Corps failure to practice close air support or procure aircraft designed for the ground support mission.67
^^Gabel, Seek, Strike, and Destroy, 4, 24-29.
^^Gabel, GHQ Maneuvers, 38-39. 398
The American intelligence system provided little information that influenced the development of doctrine in the interwar years. All phases of the process from collection through analysis to dissemination and action were inadequate. Too few and untrained attachés and observers, an undermanned and underfunded Military Intelligence Division, and the lack of a coordinated evaluation and dissemination process left the American research and development effort without benefit of the signposts of foreign development or central guidance provided by a directing head within the system. The Army-wide failure to act on the intelligence reflected attitudes shaped by the lack of money available to exploit the information, the difficulty of operating within the intelligence-procurement bureaucracy, and simple ignorance of the significance of foreign developments. Altogether, failures in the intelligence system contributed in a major way to American doctrine deficiencies in 1939.
The Army faced nearly insurmountable odds in its efforts to modernize doctrine without benefit of money, men, material, and maneuvers to drive the experiments required to develop and validate new theories. When combined with an inefficient material procurement system and the failure to exploit fully the experiences of foreign armies, the Army's ability to keep pace with doctrinal change grew even more improbable.
However, had all of these shortcomings not existed, the Army would still have lacked an effective mechanism for integrating each of these processes and coordinating the entire doctrine development process. CHAPTER XII
NO M ECHANISM S ~ THE DOCTRINE DEVELOPM ENT SYSTEM
Certainly if there is any function that can be definitely ascribed to the General Staff and which it cannot abdicate without discredit to its own capacity, it is that of preparing the basic tactical directive for the training and operations of the Army. — Major General George A. Lynch 1 Chief of Infantry
The institutional arrangements prescribed by the National Defense Act of 1920 account in part for both the Army's sixteen year delay in publishing a revised capstone doctrine manual and the inadequacy of the final product.
The National Defense Act of 1920 complicated the task of doctrine development with the creation of the chiefs of arms and a Chief of the Air
Service. These powerful officers and their staffs, together with the heads of the already existing Quartermaster Corps, Signal Corps, and Ordnance
Department, constituted separate bureaucracies with vested interests in the development of their respective branches. The intent of the legislation was to provide the using arm with a voice in the development of branch specific areas of interest by assigning a respected major general as branch chief and giving him direct access to the Chief of Staff. In some important areas, this
1 Major General George A. Lynch, Final Report of the Chief of Infantry, 30 Apr 1941, pp. 71-72, George A. Lynch Papers, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
399 400 new arrangement was successful. For example, by increasing branch involvement in the staffing process the legislation ended the Ordnance
Department's pre-World War I domination of the material procurement process. However, the chiefs' responsibilities expanded beyond material development to include promulgation of branch doctrine, all aspects of branch training and education, and personnel management. The new decentralized arrangement facilitated the advancement of the separate arms, but hindered interbranchcooperation. 2 This arrangement was especially counterproductive in the area of combined arms doctrine development.
The War Department General Staff was responsible for coordinating and harmonizing all activities involving more than one branch. Under the initial postwar organization of the General Staff, the War Plans Division was responsible for doctrine coordination. General Pershing's reorganization shifted the task to the Operations and Training Division, G-3, where it remained for the rest of the period. Neither division, however, could dedicate the manpower nor time required for the task without passing a major portion of the work to the Leavenworth staff and faculty at some point.
As noted earlier, a Leavenworth board wrote the entire first draft ofField
Service Regulations 1923 before the War Department General Staff formed a team to write the final revision. Although the G-3 revision team produced an outstanding manual, the effort drew three valuable officers away from routine duties. This practice grew prohibitively difficult as the War
^David E. Johnson, "Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers" (Ph. D. diss, Duke University, 1990), 115- 17. 401
Department General Staff became increasingly involved in the administration of the Army.
Within the G-3 Division, the Training Branch was responsible for doctrine coordination. It exercised this responsibility primarily through review and staff coordination of all publications prepared by the chiefs of arms and services. In addition to its responsibility for training publications, the branch supervised training of the Regular Army, Organized Reserves,
Reserve Officers Training Corps, Citizens' Military Training Camps, and
National Guard forces; demonstrations; maneuvers; athletics; all Army schools; and the Army-wide development of mechanized and motorized capabilities. Although the Training Branch was the largest branch, controlling over half of the approximately twenty officers assigned to the division, it was too small to execute effectively all of its many responsibilities and, as a result, its members neglected the doctrine coordination function.^
To be sure, the War Department had established an Educational
Advisory Board in 1926 to coordinate instruction at the general and special service schools. The board, consisting of the commandants of the Army War
College, Command and General Staff School, selected special service schools, and the superintendent of the United States Military Academy, was to meet annually to "suggest policies and to submit recommendations as to school
^See the "Annual Reports, Operations and Training Division, G-3,1921-1940," TMs, Entry #213, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C., for summaries of major activities conducted by the Training Branch during the interwar years. 402 methods and the courses of instruction."^ The WDGS G-3 was also to participate in the board proceedings and then periodically inspect the schools to ensure that instruction was uniform and coordinated. Unfortunately, the board met but once between its establishment in 1926 and 1939 because it was too "top heavy and ponderous"^ to accomplish anything. Despite the
Educational Advisory Board's uselessness, the War Department retained the provisions for it in the 1936 revision of the Army regulation that originally created it.6
The 1930 publication of conflicting doctrine in theManual for
Commanders of Large Units underlined the War Department's failure to perform as the Army's doctrine coordinating agency. Major General Lynch wrote, "Instead of modernizing and harmonizing the training doctrine of the
Army, annual War Department training directives gave the publications of the service schools the character of training directives, thus transferring the duty of modernizing tactical doctrine from the General Staff to the schools."^
Disagreements among the service schools led to further confusion and the introduction of nonstandard terms and practices like "wide envelopments,"
"shuttling," and the use of "combat teams."8 Lynch was more concerned with
4"Tactics and Technique," Army War College G-3 Course 1939-40, Report of Committee #7, 12 Oct 1939, TMs, p. 28, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
^"Tactics and Technique," 12 Oct 1939, TMs, p. 28.
^"Tactics and Technique," 12 Oct 1939, TMs, p. 29.
^Lynch, Final Report, p. 9.
®Lynch, Final Report, p. 9. 403 the lack of a single uniform doctrine to guide the Army's preparation for war than the actual content of the doctrine. He told the 1938-1939 Army War
College class, "If we are going to talk a clear understandable military language
— if our schools and our regiments are to teach in harmony and achieve a definite result — there must be a well understood basic military philosophy underlying all our tactical instructions."^ The Chief of Infantry was not alone in his frustration with the diverse doctrines being taught in the Army and with the War Department General Staff's failure to address the situation.
By the mid-1930s, students at the Army War College studying
American and foreign tactical doctrines expressed dissatisfaction with the doctrine development system. In 1934, the Army War College directed a committee to examine United States Army doctrine and procedures for its development. The committee's report was a scathing, but accurate, assessment of deficiencies in the doctrine development process. The committee reported that the Army had "no announced policy for coordinating the tactical doctrines developed by the separate arms in the combined arms team, and the teachings of the special service schools for a particular arm may or may not be accepted by the Command and General
Staff School."^0 Concerning the doctrine itself, the committee found that
Field Service Regulations 1923 was perfectly adequate for armament currently
^Major General George A. Lynch, "The Infantiy," Lecture delivered to Army War College G-3 Course 1938-39, Document #5, 20 Sep 1938, TMs, p. 19, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
^^"Development of Weapons and Means of Communication. Training Doctrines.," Army War College G-3 Course 1934-35, Report of Committee #4, 2 Oct 1934, TMs, p. 8, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 404 available, but added that doctrine for neither combined nor separate arms had kept pace with weapons developments and that attempts to modernize doctrine had been ineffective. Current theories were "of doubtful value because we have never given them thorough nor extensive field tests."
The report noted that bothField Service Regulations 1923 and theManual for
Commanders of Large Units needed revision. Specific material in both manuals had grown obsolete and, in theManual for Commanders of Large
Units, there was "considerable duplication of the matter contained in the
Field Service Regulations."^^
The committee blamed the War Department General Staff for the unsatisfactory state of American doctrine. Lack of ideas was not the problem.
The committee claimed that officers in the field and in Army schools thought, talked, and wrote about doctrinal issues. Articles in service journals, the contributions of Army school faculty members, and the reports of branch boards provided ample evidence of the rich and voluminous production of ideas. But, without War Department sanction, these ideas stood little chance of flourishing and eventuallydisappeared.^3 The committee's report stated;
We believe the Army has made no productive attempt towards the careful study and coordination of our efforts and ideas which might lead to definite progress in keeping our
^^"Development of Weapons and Means of Communication. Training Doctrines.," 2 Oct 1934, TMs, p. 8.
^ ^"Development of Weapons and Means of Communication. Training Doctrines.," 2 Oct 1934, TMs, p. 11.
^^"Development of Weapons and Means of Communication. Training Doctrines.," 2 Oct 1934, TMs, p. 12. 405
tactical doctrines in step with progress which is being made in armaments and communications. This lack of progress along tactical lines is entirely due to the lack of a suitable agency of the War Department specifically charged with the function of assembling the more meritorious of these ideas for study and test.^4
The committee concluded, "Lack of satisfactory progress is due to the fact that there is no adequate responsible agency with an adequate set up and system to give impetus, direction, and authority to the development of our tactical doctrines." The committee recommended establishing a "Combat Planning
Section" in the War Department General Staff dedicated to coordinating material and doctrine modernization. Further, the committee recommended that the doctrine section should have a field laboratory available for testing tactical doctrines.^^ The following year, the Army War College again directed a committee to examine the Army's tactical doctrine, organizations, and weapons development procedures. And again, the committee cited the War
Department General Staff for coordination failures and allowing official doctrine to lag behind tactical developments. The committee noted that the
G-3 Division, due to lack of personnel and pressure of other duties, was
^^"Development of Weapons and Means of Communication. Training Doctrines.," 2 Oct 1934, TMs, p. 12.
I ^"Development of Weapons and Means of Communication. Training Doctrines.," 2 Oct 1934, TMs, p. 11.
I ^"Development of Weapons and Means of Communication. Training Doctrines.," 2 Oct 1934, TMs, p. 2. 406
"unable to give mature consideration to the ideas presented"^^ and added,
"Except in special cases these reviews are at best perfunctory and in many important ones non-existent."^8 As a result, the staffing process was slow, degraded by lack of continuous coordination with the schools, and subject to cursory review by the G-3 action officer.^9 As late as 1935, the War
Department had neither published nor approved the 1930 editions of basic branch manuals for the Coast Artillery and Cavalry. Moreover, Infantry and
Air Corps manuals remained in draft form awaiting publication of revised
Field Service Regulations. Indeed, the only official combined arms doctrine publications were Field Service Regulations 1923, the Manual for
Commanders of Large Units (Provisional), and a letter of instruction addressing antimechanized defense published in 1935. Other than the mechanized cavalry, no field unit existed for testing tactical organization and doctrine. The committee concluded that the War Department could not meet its responsibility for doctrine coordination and recommended the establishment of a "General Service Board" at Fort Leavenworth "reporting directly to the Chief of Staff, for the review and formulation of tactical doctrine and tables of organization."20
^^"Modernization of Tactical Doctrines and Tactical Organization; Development of Weapons," Army War College G-3 Course 1935-36, Report of Committee #4,25 Sep 1935, TMs, pp. 2-15.
^^"Modernization of Tactical Doctrines and Tactical Organization; Development of Weapons," 25 Sep 1935, TMs, pp. 2-15.
^^"Modernization of Tactical Doctrines and Tactical Organization; Development of Weapons," 25 Sep 1935, TMs, p. 19.
^^"Modernization of Tactical Doctrines and Tactical Organization; Development of Weapons," 25 Sep 1935, TMs, p. 2. 407
In 1936, an Army War College committee studying formulation of tactical doctrine repeated the findings of the two preceding committees concerning the deficiencies in the Army's doctrine development process. The committee reported that . . the tactical training of the Army as a whole, using War Department publications, is based to a large degree on obsolete or obsolescent tactical doctrines which might not be usable in an emergency.
Further, the multiplicity of types of tactical regulations now published has resulted in confusion throughout the service and inability to keep them up to date and coordinated is general."^^ The report explained that much of the delay in the promulgation of revised doctrine resulted from the "usual lag for test" associated with changes in organization, weapons developments, and experimentation with motorization and mechanization.22 it also cited personnel shortages and the tendency to wait for a perfect solution as factors contributing to the lack of an updated doctrine. Nevertheless, these explanations did not excuse the fact that the Army's doctrine was inadequate.
The committee concluded:
The tactical doctrines as issued to the Army through War Department publications are neither complete, up to date nor in harmony with the trends of development of weapons and other means of warfare. The tactical doctrines as issued to the Army through War Department publications are not in harmony with the present instruction at the general and special service schools.
21 "Tactical Doctrines/' Army War College G-3 Course 1936-37, Report of Committee #3, 20 Oct 1936, TMs, p. 7, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
22"Tactical Doctrines," 20 Oct 1936, TMs, p. 7. 408
The present system of development, coordination, and promulgation of tactical doctrines by the War Department is faulty.23
For the second year, the Army War College committee studying tactical doctrine recommended fixing the faulty doctrine development process by formally charging Leavenworth with responsibility for combined arms doctrine. Colonel Gruber, chief of the G-3 Training Branch responsible for doctrine coordination, was present when the committee presented its findings to the class. During the discussion period that followed the briefing.
Colonel Gruber stated that he intended to ensure that the Command and
General Staff School participated in the pending review ofField Service Regulations 2923.^4
In 1937, the G-3 Division began to play a more active role in doctrine development and coordination. General Craig's July memorandum, in which he expressed his concern with the existence of "diverse doctrines," propelled the revision of the Field Service Regulations to the top of the
Training Branch's priority list. As a result. Brigadier General Tyner, WDGS
G-3, mentioned for the first time in his annual address to the Army War
College class that the revision and consolidation of theField Service
Regulations andManual for Commanders of Large Units was one of the
23"Tactical Doctrines," 20 Oct 1936, TMs, p. 8.
24"Tactical Doctrines," 20 Oct 1936, TMs, p. 14. 409
Training Branch's most important tasks.25 However, the resumption of the
G-3 Division's active participation in the development and coordination of doctrine, for the first time in over a decade, exacerbated many of the existing deficiencies in the process even though its intent was to restore order. During the next three years, officers continued to divide between those believing the
War Department should control combined arms development and those preferring the establishment of a separate organization to execute the task.
The Army War College's 1937 study of "Trends in Tactics and
Technique" broke with previous recommendations to shift responsibility for combined arms doctrine development from the War Department General
Staff to the Command and General Staff School. The committee report echoed past findings that the Army lacked an agency specifically charged with development and coordination of combined arms doctrine, but recommended implementing procedures to strengthen the G-3 Division's ability to control the process rather than passing the responsibility to the schools or a special board. The committee recommended changing Army regulations to specify that the WDGS G-3 was responsible for not only coordinating but also developing combined arms doctrine. The committee also recommended requiring submission of annual reports on trends in tactics and technique prepared by branch chiefs for use in developing combined arms doctrine and the War Department annual training
25Brigadier General George P. Tyner, "The Organization and Functions of the G-3 Division, War Department General Staff," Lecture delivered to Army War College G-3 Course 1937-38, Document #3, 30 Sep 1937, TMs, p. 5, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 410 directive.26 A separate committee studying military education fell in step with the shift and recommended assigning additional officers to the G-3
Division to ensure coordination of doctrine among the general and special service schools.27
In 1938, the Army War College committee studying "Trends in Tactics and Techniques" again blamed the War Department General Staff for delays in the doctrine development process that were "seriously impeding the development of tactical and technical doctrine in our army."28 Specifically, the committee pointed to the lengthy time required to obtain War
Department approval of doctrine manuals and new tables of organization. By the time the War Department approved new doctrine and organizations, the schools had often implemented major revisions and, in many cases, were already instructing from the modernized versions of the doctrine. The committee stressed that the crux of the problem was the War Department's inability to keep pace with the schools. The same year, a second committee studying the Army's military education system also concluded that the War
Department General Staff was responsible for the problem and recommended, "That the G-3 section of the War Department General Staff
26"Xrends in Tactics and Technique," Army War College G-3 Course 1937-38, Report of Committee #5, 21 Oct 1937, TMs, pp. 1-3, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
22"Military Education," Army War College G-3 Course 1937-38, Report of Committee #8, 22 Oct 1937, TMs, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
28"Trends in Tactics and Techniques," Army War College G-3 Course Committee Report 1938-39, Document #19, 10 Oct 1938, TMs, p. 1, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 411 take steps to insure more positive and effective coordination of instruction at the general and special service schools."29 The problem still persisted one year later.30
The broken doctrine development process continued to draw criticism from Army War College committees even as the War Department began distributing the revised Field Service Regulations in October 1939. That month, the committee studying tactics and techniques reported that the
American system "is slow in operation and needs acceleration and more effective coordination."31 The committee recommended formation of a War
Department Tactical Board consisting of the Commandant of the Army War
College, the assistant commandants or one faculty member from each of the schools, and a specially selected officer from the War Department General
Staff to serve as the secretary and resident member of the board. The functions of the board would be "to study the tactical trends in service schools, field maneuvers, and other military training activities, both foreign and domestic, and recommend to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations and
Training Division, War Department General Staff, coordinated tactical
29"Military Education," Army War College G-3 Course Committee Report 1938-39, Document #14, 4 Oct 1938, TMs, p. 1, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
30"The Organization and Functions of the G-3 Division, War Department General Staff," Lecture delivered to Army War College G-3 Course 1939-40, Document #3,18 Sep 1939, TMs, p. 6, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
3^'Tactics and Technique," Army War College G-3 Course 1939-40, Document #22,12 Oct 1939, TMs, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 412
doctrine and technicalprocedure."32 The committee proposed that the War
Department Tactical Board replace the dormant Educational Advisory Board.
The committee recommended replacing school commandants with assistant commandants since the assistants usually focused on the school curriculum while garrison command responsibilities engrossed the commandant.
Notably, four members of the committee dissented insisting that the WDGS
G-3 had the necessary assets and power to coordinate doctrine. All agreed that the doctrine development process was broken. The split within the committee was representative of the continuing Army-wide disagreement over proper responsibility for the doctrine development process and the measures required to fix it. The emergence of the schools as key doctrine development and coordination agencies resulted from the failures of the War Department
General Staff and the staffs of the branch chiefs to exert control over the process. A 1939 study conducted at the Army War College concluded:
. . . the system of developing tactical doctrine in the Army is one which leaves the initiative with the chiefs of the arms and services, under the supervision of the Chief of Staff, of course. In practice, this has become a rather hit or miss affair. The development of tactical doctrine is a small part of the duties assigned to the chief of a branch, and as a result, it is usually subordinated to matters of routine that must be met daily, or delegated in toto to the branch school. Very little original thought and research is undertaken in the chief's office itself. For similar reasons, the General Staff has given little of its time
'Tactics and Technique," 12 Oct 1939, TMs. 413
and effort towards supervising tactical development. In other words, there has been meager impetus from the top.33
In the absence of direction from the War Department General Staff or the branch chiefs, the schools drew upon the expertise of staff and faculty to fill the growing gaps in Army doctrine. This state of affairs was not necessarily unproductive since the school faculty members immersed themselves in the subject through study of foreign developments, teaching, and discussion with staff, students, and other faculty members. On the other hand, members of the War Department General Staff and the staffs of the branch chiefs were far too busy with routine duties to dedicate much time to the study of doctrine.34
The quality of the school products varied, but most were better than the aging official publications. Committees studying tactical doctrine consistently concluded that the instruction provided by the schools was satisfactory. The same committees concluded equally consistently that the greatest deficiency in the existing arrangement was in the area of combined arms doctrine due to lack of coordination between the schools and the Army's failure to assign responsibility for combined arms doctrine development to a single institution.
The Army War College committees in 1935 and 1936 had based their recommendations to shift responsibility for combined arms doctrine from the
War Department General Staff to the Command and General Staff School on the belief that "coordination of school thought on tactical instruction is
33"Tactics and Technique," 12 Oct 1939, TMs, pp. 25-26.
34'Tactics and Technique," 12 Oct 1939, TMs, p. 28. 414 obtained almost entirely through instructors from various branches at the general service schools and by direct correspondence between the general and special service schools."35 However, both committees also noted that "the efficiency of this system is directly dependent upon the personality and judgment of the officers concerned and varies from year to year."36 Without a central agency to coordinate doctrine between the special and general service schools, effective cooperation relied too much on personality, a tenuous arrangement that prompted one officer to write, "The last real exponent of cooperation passed when 'Stonewall' Jackson died at Chancellorsville on May
2, 1863. More positive coordination by the War Department is indicated."37
As late as 1939, the War Department had still failed to exercise "more positive coordination." Without firm direction from a higher authority, proactive instructors in the Army schools addressed the tactical questions posed by modern battlefield conditions and, not surprisingly, their solutions often varied from that espoused by aging official doctrine.
The Command and General Staff School was at the center of the debate over doctrine and its development. Differences between official War
"Tactical Doctrines," Army War College G-3 Course 1936-37, Report of Committee #3, 20 Oct 1936, TMs, p. 8, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
36"Xactical Doctrines," 20 Oct 1936, TMs, p. 8; "Modernization of Tactical Doctrines and Tactical Organization; Development of Weapons," Army War College G-3 Course 1935-36, Report of Committee #4, 25 Sep 1935, TMs, p. 15, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
^^"Military Education," Army War College G-3 Course 1937-38, Report of Committee #8,22 Oct 1937, TMs, p. 14, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 415
Department doctrine and that taught at the school had been a source of confusion and frustration among Army officers since the early 1930s. An
Army War College committee studying tactical doctrines in 1932 reported that
. . although our Field Service Regulations prescribe sound tactical doctrine, the teachings of our Command and General Staff School and various schools are faulty in regard to certain points. These faults in teaching cover in general methods and means of application of the broad principles set forth in the Field Service Regulations."38 part of the problem of diverse doctrines stemmed from the Command and General Staff School's publication of pamphlets for instructional use. These pamphlets, widely distributed among both resident and correspondence course students, lacked War Department approval and often reflected the ideas of the current faculty rather than official doctrine. Without War Department approval, the doctrine taught by
Leavenworth instructors was subject to frequent criticism; field commanders often rejected the unofficial teachings outright.39 An Army War College committee noted, "Many a recent Leavenworth graduate has come to grief by not too tactful reference as to how they do it at Leavenworth."^0 Yet, the
38"A Comparative Study of the Tactical Doctrines of American, England, France, and Germany," Army War College G-3 Course 1932-33, Report of Committee #3, 26 Sep 1932, TMs, pp. 10-11, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
39"Development of Weapons and Means of Communication. Training Doctrines.," Army War College G-3 Course 1934-35, Report of Committee M, 2 Oct 1934, TMs, p. 12, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
^^"Modernization of Tactical Doctrines and Tactical Organization; Development of Weapons," 25 Sep 1935, TMs, p. 15. 416
Leavenworth teachings became increasingly attractive as official War
Department publications slipped into obsolescence.
The Command and General Staff School's role in the Army's effort to modernize doctrine was a controversial topic among officers during the
1930S.41 As the institution charged with instructing the Army's officers in the employment of combined arms, the Command and General Staff School could and did influence the tactical thought processes of a generation of Army leaders. The school enjoyed a good reputation with most officers during the interwar years, but was not without its c r i t i c s . ^2 Contemporary critics complained that Leavenworth instructional methods overemphasized formal staff routines and school solutions. Criticisms of the instruction itself ranged from claims that it was too conservative and had not moved beyond the trenches of the Western Front to more commonly voiced opinions that the Leavenworth teachings reflected too much of the individual faculty members' personalities and was out of step with official doctrine. Nearly all criticisms, including the most extreme opinions, contained elements of truth.
Lessons and examples drawn from World War 1 experiences figured
Historians of the interwar army continue to debate over the relative quality of the instruction provided at the Command and General School and its importance in developing the Army's leaders in World War II. Most recently. Dr. Timothy K. Nenninger argues that Leavenworth's instructional methods and curriculum content prepared its graduates to contend successfully with the challenges of large-scale operations and evolving tactics and technology during World War II. In his article, "Leavenworth and Its Critics: The U.S. Army Command and General Staff School, 1920-1940," The Journal of M ilitary History 58 (April 1994): 199-231, Dr. Nenninger addresses the works of Leavenworth's modern critics — Boyd Dastrup, Martin Van Creveld, Martin Blumenson, D. K. R. Crosswell, and Charles E. Kirkpatrick - and convincingly parries each thrust at the effectiveness of the Command and General Staff School.
42t\Jenninger, "Leavenworth and Its Critics," 203-207. 417 prominently in course instruction throughout the period. And, faculty members did steer some school solutions to tactical problems toward their personal views.
The presence of personal interpretation in the instruction of Army doctrine was a source of great concern among the critics, especially when the interpretation was not in consonance with official doctrine. In 1937, the Army War College committee studying trends in tactics and techniques found.
The major deficit in our system of developing tactics and technique appears to be one of 'personal equation.' The instruction given in our service schools is too often influenced by the personality of a single individual. This has resulted in many of our officers going out into the service highly indoctrinated with a single idea but with a lack of thorough knowledge of other subjects of equal importance.^^
In 1938, an officer at the Army War College confirmed the committee's finding. Although the officer believed that theField Service Regulations recognized the wide envelopment, he thought the Command and General
Staff School stressed it at the expense of other forms of maneuver. In a more telling remark, he noted, "Prior to last year, we were not allowed to mention the F.S.R. from the platform."44
43"i’rends in Tactics and Technique," Army War College G-3 Course 1937-38, Report of Committee #5, 21 Oct 1937, TMs, p. 11, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
"Trends in Tactics and Techniques," Army War College G-3 Course 1938-39, Report of Committee #7, 10 Oct 1938, TMs, p. 5, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Lieutenant Colonel Weart made this comment during the discussion following the presentation by Committee #7. 418
The "single idea" that most often raised eyebrows was the concept of
"wide envelopment." The wide envelopment was nothing more than a bolder variation of the traditional envelopment, the Army's preferred form of maneuver. In the wide envelopment, the attacking force simply extended the distance at which it passed around an enemy flank and increased the depth at which it struck the enemy's vulnerable rear a r e a s . jhe Command and General Staff School began teaching wide envelopments in the early
1930s during Colonel W. B. Burtt's tenure as assistant commandant in an effort to make officers more maneuver minded. Colonel Burtt explained to a student at Leavenworth that the school emphasized the wide envelopment because it was the most difficult maneuver and believed that if students could execute i t , then they could execute less ambitious operations.'^ 6 The
Command and General Staff School's use of the wide envelopment continued under the stewardship of Brigadier General Charles M. Bundel and his assistants, especially Colonel James A. McAndrews, through 1938.
The association of personality with school doctrine was neither uncommon nor viewed by all as the cause of the Army's problem with diverse doctrines. Major Cooke, an Army War College, student remarked in response to a frustrated classmate's query as to where he might find the
Army's doctrines:
45The Command and General Staff School heavily emphasized maneuver in warfare during the 1930s. The school's concepts for maneuver warfare were by no means the equivalent of the German Army's blitzkrieg, but (need Jun 1937/Sep 1937 issues of MR to complete).
46"Xrends in Tactics and Techniques," Army War College G-3 Course 1938-39, Report of Committee #7,10 Oct 1938, TMs, p. 12. Based on comments made by Major Lewis A. Pick during the discussion following the committee report. 419
[Our tactical doctrines] are in the personalities of individuals in key positions. Colonel McAndrew, as a Lieutenant Colonel, scattered the wide envelopment throughout our army. Whether it is good or bad is relative; the fact that it was thought of, I believe, is good. At Benning, for a while, it was prep school for Leavenworth. The instructors came from Leavenworth, took out their mimeographs and changed G-3 to S-3, and put it out, because they were preparing those youngsters to go to Leavenworth. ... I have watched individuals come down in the schools and the changes that come in the schools depend on the individual and the position he holds, and I believe that is where our tactical doctrines are.'^^
Major Cooke, like many others, recognized the influence of personality in school doctrine and believed that much of the instruction had value. Indeed, the Command and General Staff School's generation of unofficial doctrine may have been part of the problem. But because the Leavenworth product was more up to date than that in War Department publications, the recommendations to shift responsibility for doctrine from the War
Department General Staff to the Leavenworth staff and faculty were omnipresent throughout the interwar years. Nevertheless, the onus for coordinating doctrine remained with the War Department General Staff.
Army War College students discussing doctrine and its development in 1938 focused on the influence of personality on instruction at the
Command and General Staff School. The student committee report on
"Trends in Tactics and Techniques" concluded, "The Command and General
Staff School studies and formulates doctrine for the employment of the
^^"Trends in Tactics and Techniques," 10 Oct 1938, TMs, p. 12. 420 combined arms, but these doctrines, although taught at the school, are not always given the approval of the War Department General Staff.'"^® As a result, Leavenworth graduates could spread confusion by using terms and techniques, like wide envelopment, not found in official publications. To prevent this from happening, the committee had recommended that the War
Department approve all doctrine to ensure uniformity and harmony.
The War Department General Staffs mechanisms for coordinating instruction were completely ineffective. Each school furnished publications and schedules for War Department review prior to the opening of the course.
In many cases, the schedules lacked sufficient detail to represent accurately the course content. Furthermore, by the time the undermanned G-3 Training
Branch discovered discrepancies in doctrine or instructional emphasis, the course was well underway and corrective action wasim practical.^^ Periodic visits by G-3 representatives were no more successful in shaping school programs of instruction. A more radical, but no more effective, means of influencing doctrine taught at the schools was by controlling the assignment of staff and faculty members. Colonel Gruber, who had accompanied
Brigadier General Beck to assist with his annual lecture to the Army War
College class on the G-3 Division, explained that the War Department attempted to select assistant commandants whose views reflected official
48"Trends in Tactics and Techniques," 10 Oct 1938, TMs, p. 1.
49"Trends in Tactics and Technique," 21 Oct 1937, TMs, p. 12,. 421
policy as a means of exercising control of the schools.^O The inadequacy of
these measures goes far to explain the War Department's slow reaction to
changes at the schools.
In a formal discussion period following the presentation of the doctrine committee's findings in 1938, an Army War College student asked
why the War Department General Staff had taken five years before officially
challenging the doctrinal basis for the wide envelopment. Major Charles L.
Mullins, Jr., a member of the Army War College committee studying doctrine
in 1938, explained that he believed the long delay was:
largely due to the personal views of the commandant and assistant commandant of the Command and General Staff College. It may be the War Department General Staff lags in its condemnation of any teachings at the Command and General Staff College because they believe this assistant commandant has another year or two more to do and that the next one they appoint will not have those beliefs and the instruction will become more stabilized and more in accord with our War Department doctrines.^l
Captain Gallagher, an officer in the audience, responded, "I think we should be able to put some kind of a system in force which will move from year to
^O'The Organization and Functions of the G-3 Division, War Department General Staff," Lecture delivered to Army War College G-3 Course 1938-39, Document #3, 17 Sep 1938, TMs, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
"Trends in Tactics and Techniques," 10 Oct 1938, TMs, p. 2. 422 year, that the General Staff should lead in it, and not have some individual who has some fancy idea going to that school and changing thedoctrine."52
Major General DeWitt, the school commandant and former member of the WDGS committee that conducted the final review ofField Service
Regulations 1923, was also present at the briefing. He remarked, "I think an effort was made in 1936 to meet that question, but it has gone intod i s c a r d " 5 3 adding that such a system had not met during his tenure as commandant.
DeWitt stated that he believed that doctrine development and coordination was a War Department General Staff responsibility and that "these questions would never arise if the Training Section of G-3 actually did the job they were created to do, have these commandants on this board meet annually, have these questions brought up and have a committee of the General Staff visit the schools to iron out any differences and see that the proper cooperation and coordination exist between the schools and that established doctrines are properly permeating the educational system of the army. I think the fault lies right in the General Staff."54 The discussion continued with officers alternately testifying to the quality of the schools and criticizing the ineffectiveness of the War Department General Staff's ability to coordinate doctrine. At the end of the discussion period. Major General DeWitt reiterated:
52"Xrends in Tactics and Techniques," 10 Oct 1938, TMs, p. 3.
53"Trends in Tactics and Techniques," 10 Oct 1938, TMs, p. 3. Major General DeWitt was referring to the Educational Advisory Board organized in1926 and revalidated in 1936.
54"Trends in Tactics and Techniques," 10 Oct 1938, TMs, pp. 3-4. 423
. . . the coordination of the military education system through the army should be controlled by the agency created by law to do it, and I don't think the general staff is keeping itself sufficiently informed of what is going on to do it. ... Don't let us restrict our schools in their teachings at all, but let us be sure the responsible agency and the Chief of Staff and his advisers know what the schools are doing so that the education given the officers of all branches may be coordinated into a complete and finished whole.5^
Major General Lynch summarized the prevailing opinion in his annual report as Chief of Infantry. He wrote:
This problem cannot be solved by delegation to the service schools. It is not the proper function of the schools, whose business it is to teach doctrine by application — not to develop doctrine. The schools can greatly aid in the task, but they cannot properly take over the War Department function of deciding the training doctrine of the Army. The basic directives of the Army should be prepared by its directinghead. 56 (underlined by Lynch)
Despite the repeated conclusion that the War Department General
Staff's doctrine had failed to coordinate combined arms doctrine, the G-3
Division made no organizational or operational changes to enhance its ability to either coordinate or develop doctrine. When the Army chief of staff tasked to revise Field Service Regulations 1923 and resolve conflicts in Army doctrine, the G-3 Division responded by merely increasing the priority
^^"Trends in Tactics and Techniques," 10 Oct 1938, TMs, p. 17.
^^Lynch, Final Report, p. 71. 424 assigned to the task. No manual warranted more of the G-3 Division's attention. Major General Lynch reflected in his annual report in 1941,
"Certainly if there is any function that can be definitely ascribed to the
General Staff and which it cannot abdicate without discredit to its own capacity, it is that of preparing the basic tactical directive for the training and operations of the Army. It is no less certain that the many months spent by the General Staff in the detailed review of the tactical regulations prepared by the chiefs of branches could have been devoted with much greater advantage to the fulfillment of the essentially General Staffm ission."57 Still, the project remained but one among many within the Training Branch.
The War Department General Staff's failure to produce an updated capstone doctrine manual effected training in field units and hindered the development of doctrine for the separate arms. At least one field commander took steps to clarify doctrine by producing a composite manual for use by subordinate units within his command. While commanding Sixth Corps
Area and then Third Army, Major General Frank Parker compiled a 2" thick
"Manual for High Command" to:
give the high commander a practicable method for conveying immediately to his command his ideas and desires By this Dossier the high commander can be assured of uniformity of doctrine and procedure in both the arms and services throughout all echelons of his command. With it and the arms
^^Lynch, Final Report, pp. 71-72. 425
and service manuals, the high commander has all the military library that he will need in campaign.58
Major General Parker revised the document in 1936 and sent it to the WDGS
G-3 explaining that "while we have always had manuals for each arm and service, we have never had a manual for the combined arms and services, that is to say, for application of general tactics."59 His "dossier" was meant to fill the gap. As a reminder of Parker's position concerning the utility of the
Field Service Regulations compared to the provisional M anual for
Commanders of Large Units, the former manual was noticeably absent while he included the latter in his dossier. The Chief of Infantry was especially frustrated by the lack of modern doctrine with which to guide the development of infantry doctrine. Major General Lynch attributed the absence to the War Department General Staff's failure to assign the project the high priority he felt it deserved. In particular, he disagreed with the placement of the project in the hands of junior officers.
He expressed his dissatisfaction at length in his final report as Chief of
Infantry:
. . . the influence which a modernized Field Service Regulations would or should exercise on the various aspects of military activity is not at all appreciated in the War Department. With nothing to serve as a basic guide and orienting doctrine, innumerable decisions are daily being made in which tactical
^®Major General Frank Parker, Commander, Third Army, to Major General John H. Hughes, WDGS G-3, 10 Sep 1936, File #118-74, Military History Research Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
^^Parker to Hughes, 10 Sep 1936. 426
consequences are implicit but which, not being referred to any approved body of doctrine, are necessarily empirical in character and frequently inconsistent. These piecemeal decisions can never give us a a duly proportioned modern military force but will necessarily distort the whole fabric of military organization. It seems needless to add that a directive of such far-reaching effect cannot be prepared by delegation to a group of junior officers. The clean break with tradition that must be made involves decisions that can only be made by the high command of the Army. The failure to give this matter the attention it deserves has imposed on the War Department the necessity for making individual decisions outside the general context of military operations (e.g. antitank defense), and this, together with its absorption in matters of administration, has preoccupied the high command with details which some attention to the preparation of a basic directive might have avoided. A Field Service Regulations prepared by junior officers without the directing hand of the high command — the contents and import of which were in the past frequently unknown to it — can never have the authority requisite to an instruction issued for the general guidance of all forms of military activity.^^
Lynch's criticism of the doctrine development process was but part of his general disdain for War Department General Staff procedures that allowed the recommendations of junior officers to override branch chiefs. He complained that the American system was the only one "where a junior officer sits in judgement on the recommendation of his own chief of branch, on a subject relating to the interior functioning of the branch.''^! He argued that the chiefs of arms had "now only an advisory function; the actual decision is made by a junior general-staff officer, who frequently compromises between a recommendation from the field and the conclusions
^0Lynch, Final Report, pp. 74-75.
Lynch, Final Report, p. 119. 427
of the chief of arm, supported by his technical board and service school."62 He continued, "Certainly the details of every project for the development of the branch should not be subjected to habitual review by a group of junior officers
not versed in the technique of the branch or its state of developm ent."^^
Worse yet. Lynch believed that General Staff officers regarded branch chiefs as proponents of special interests and, therefore, viewed branch chief recommendations with closed minds. He reported that "contact between chiefs of branches and the general officers heading the general staff divisions is practically non-existent."64 Failure to draw upon the expertise of the branch chiefs and "the lack of a fundamental tactical doctrine and the absence of tactical studies as the basis for the great projects of army organization and expansion, . . ., must indeed have made it a difficult matter for any junior staff officer to become clear in his own mind as to what the merits of a proposal might be, and an empirical decision was often his only resource."65
He pointed to Field Service Regulations 1939 as a prime example of the deficient doctrine development system. After savaging the tentative manual during the initial review, the Chief of Infantry recommended the establishment of a mechanism that
would allow parallel development of the Field Service Regulations and doctrine for the separate arms. Lynch proposed:
62Lynch, Final Report, p. 124.
63Lynch, Final Report, p. 124.
64Lynch, Final Report, p. 126.
65Lynch, Final Report, p. 126. 428
A special organization should be set up at once under the immediate direction of the Chief of Staff to push this matter to the earliest possible conclusion. It should be headed by a senior general officer of the line in whose ability in this particular direction the War Department has most confidence, regardless of the duty to which he may now be assigned. With should be associated the Chiefs of the Combat Branches, with such assistants as may be required. He should be authorized to call upon Commandants of Service Schools and any other agencies under the control of the War Department for such expressions of
view or statement of fact as he may d e s i r e . ^ 6
The War Department took no action on the recommendation, but admitted that the increasingly heavy burden of mobilization planning demanded a change in method.
The Army clearly recognized that its combined arms doctrine development mechanism was ineffective. Students of the problem proposed various solutions ranging from shifting responsibility for combined arms doctrine development to Fort Leavenworth to creating a separate agency within the War Department General Staff. The formation of a special committee working directly for the Chief of Staff may have been feasible in
1923, but the volume of work occupying the WDGS in the 1930s was simply more than the G-3 Division could handle. As result, doctrine development beyond that promulgated by the separate arms occurred without central direction or official sanction. The Army's failure to exercise effectively this
^^Lynch, Final Report, pp. 69-70. 429 function was the single most important reason for the combined arms doctrine deficiencies of the interwar years. CHAPTER XIII
CONCLUSION
The United States Army's experience with doctrine development between the World Wars is a story of success and failure. Two of the Army's capstone doctrine manuals, the 1923 and 1939 editionsField of Service
Regulations, provide substantial evidence to illustrate the rise and fall of
Army doctrine during the interwar years.Field Service Regulations 1923 was an outstanding doctrine manual which integrated the lessons of the First
World War, correctly assessed the current capabilities of technology, and suited the Army mission defined in the National Defense Act of 1920.Field
Service Regulations 1939 was far less successful. Major military developments occurred during the interwar years that changed military doctrine from one built on infantry-artillery coordination to one based on a highly mobile combined arms team. Field Service Regulations 1939 neither acknowledged the existence of the new organizations nor addressed accompanying changes in doctrine. The revised manual virtually ignored close air support, underestimated the capabilities of mechanized forces, did not recognize the full potential of new forms of special operations, and inadequately addressed antimechanized and antiaircraft defense operations.
The contrast between the two manuals offers a case study in doctrine development.
430 431
The Army wrote Field Service Regulations 1923 while richly endowed with recent combat experience gained during the First World War. Between the time of the manual's publication and the end of the war, no technological advances in military hardware had occurred that would significantly alter the war's lessons. Boards of experienced and knowledgeable officers had convened to determine these lessons in the months immediately following the Armistice. Many of the most influential boards met in Europe near the battlefields and concluded their work while the smell of cordite and carnage were fresh memories. The findings of the various boards, though not always unanimous nor uniformly accepted by the officer population, represented some of the best available thought on current capabilities and future trends in warfare. The lessons of the war, as interpreted by the postwar boards, shaped the revision of the Field Service Regulations.
Writing the manual was a relatively simple chore given the ample evidence provided by the recent war. The War Department General Staff, charged with responsibility for Army training, instruction, and publications, assigned the task of writing the manual to the Leavenworth staff and faculty.
The Commandant of the General Service Schools appointed his Assistant
Commandant to chair a Field Service Regulations Board with full-time responsibility for the revision. While the Leavenworth manuscript drew criticism for straying beyond the bounds of an operations manual and its poor style, the manual's content was not a major issue as most officers agreed with the recent, widely published, findings of the postwar boards. The Chief of
Staff formed a committee consisting of senior representatives from the G-3,
War Plans, and Military Intelligence divisions to conduct a final review and 432 edit the manual before publication. When the manual reached the field, it found few critics. The doctrine inField Service Regulations 1923 rem ained valid until technological advances, particularly in the areas of air and ground mobility, suggested the need for revision. Recent, abundant, combat experience and the high priority given the work by both the General Service
Schools and the War Department General Staff were important factors in the successful completion of the Field Service Regulations 1923. Neither of these conditions existed during the writingField of Service Regulations 1939.
The Army faced more difficult challenges in modernizing doctrine in the latter half of the interwar years. For most of the period, the Army lacked money with which to fulfill its routine missions let alone modernize doctrine. Conditions at home and abroad contributed to the shrinking military budget for most of the period. Increasingly disillusioned with the outcome of the "war to end all wars," Americans turned from concern for preparedness to isolationism, belief in the feasibility of international disarmament, and pacifism. On the domestic front, the drive for economy in government, public suspicion of military-industrial conspiracy, and the Great
Depression worked to pare military appropriations below levels adequate to sustain the force prescribed by the National Defense Act of 1920. Under these conditions, the Army made difficult decisions concerning the use of its meager budget.
The Army's decision to fund manpower over material fundamentally influenced its ability to modernize. The Army based the decision on the belief that its first and most important mission was to ready the civilian components for mobilization. The decision did not necessarily mean 433
abandonment of all modernization efforts, but did limit procurement to pilot
models. Unfortunately, the procurement cycle crept at a snail's pace and few
models were available to support field experiments in sufficient quantity required to develop tactical doctrine to accompany the new equipment. To be sure, each arm procured sufficient pilot models for field testing and some experimentation at small unit level. But, large-scale combined arms exercises employing the latest weapons and equipment never occurred. The power to be found in combination of new capabilities on land and in the air remained a mystery until the Germans demonstrated blitzkrieg in 1939 and 1940.
The Army's choice of manpower over material still did not provide enough personnel to man full-strength combat divisions. The competing demands of the many missions prescribed by the National Defense Act and the top priority given to training the citizen components resulted in the scattering of Regular Army personnel throughout the United States. The cost of these decisions was the virtual elimination of Regular Army training beyond platoon level in stateside units. Without money, men, or material, the Army was hard-pressed to conduct any kind of maneuvers let alone dedicate a portion of its thinly spread forces to experimentation. Indeed, the only test organization that lasted more than a few months during the entire twenty year period was the 7th Mechanized Cavalry Brigade. Simply put, the raw material for development of new doctrine — field exercises and battlefield experience — was nonexistent. Although the budget limitations lie at the heart of the problem, several other factors contributed significantly to the fall of Army doctrine as reflected inField Service Regulations 1939. 434
Ineffective mechanisms for material procurement; intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination; and doctrine development vyorked against the successful revision of the Army doctrine. The Army failed to produce sufficient quantities of new equipment for the advancement of tactical doctrine. While budget limitations figured prominently in this state of affairs, the procurement system itself was a major factor in the failure. The absence of a single agency to direct an Army-wide modernization program enabled the many players in the procurement process to act without coordination or unity of effort. Division of responsibility between the
Assistant Secretary of War and the War Department General Staff, the influence of branch chiefs, and the Ordnance Department's diminished authority contributed to the rudderless organizational arrangement. Even the most important projects suffered from the lack of focus and failure to prioritize the procurement effort. As a result, the Army not only lacked sufficient pilot models for testing new doctrine, it could not produce many standardized items in mass before 1941. The inability to remain at the forefront of technology and doctrine should have turned American eyes to the study of foreign armies.
The Army's system for intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination was undermanned and inefficient. A handful of attachés produced the bulk of the foreign intelligence reports. These reports were of uneven quality and generally reflected the qualifications of the author. More important, the closely guarded reports often failed to reach agencies that could benefit the most from the intelligence. The Army's attitude toward foreign developments went far to explain the neglect of the intelligence system. The 435
United States Army had underestimated foreign military developments at least since the First World War. American leaders during and after the war believed American methods, material, and men were superior to all. This attitude shaped the development of doctrine and technology. General
Pershing's insistence on use of American open warfare tactics and Brigadier
General Drum's proud claim that the Leavenworth schools teach only the
"American doctrine" reflected this attitude toward doctrine. In the realm of material development, Americans followed a similarly ethnocentric path.
After the Westervelt Board's survey of artillery developments in 1919, the
United States failed to constitute another board to study foreign ordnance developments. The comparative studies conducted by Army War College committees throughout the interwar years highlighted the general lack of appreciation for foreign developments. A weak, uncoordinated, intelligence system hindered attempts to learn from foreign armies and ongoing wars in
Europe, Asia, and Africa. Consequently, ignorance of many foreign innovations would cost Americans dearly in the opening battles of World
War II.Ï Not surprisingly. Field Service Regulations 1939 reflected few foreign developments in doctrine.
It is true that the Army wrote Field Service Regulations 1939 under much more challenging conditions than those found in the immediate postwar years. The availability of money, manpower, and material for use in doctrine development was not an issue with which the author's ofField
^Constance M. Green, Harry C. Thomson, and Peter C. Roots, The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War, United States Army in World War II Series (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955), 28. 436
Service Regulations 1923 had to contend. The First World War provided ample evidence to support doctrine choices. Likewise, the existence of abundant World War I stocks, still modern at the time, nullified the flaws in the procurement system. And, first hand experience in combat with and against the world's major armies diminished the importance of foreign intelligence during the period of doctrine revision. Deficiencies in these areas were major causes of the Army's difficulty in writing Field Service
Regulations 1939, however. After twenty years, the First World War was still the most recent combat experience and it offered little to support the major changes indicated by technological advances. At best, the American experiences in the First World War supported the status quo rather than providing evidence for change. The Army faced the challenge of overcoming resistance to change and abandoning comfortable reliance on the lessons of a bygone war. However, it lacked both the resources with which to develop evidence to support change and the intelligence system required to tap the experiences of foreign nations. To be sure, resource limitations and faulty systems do not bear all of the blame. The Army did make conscious decisions to forego modernization of doctrine to support immediate mission requirements and its procurement and intelligence systems did produce some notable work. Nevertheless, to change the way the entire Army operated on the battlefield required impetus from the top and a centrally directed effort that integrated the separate training, doctrine, intelligence, and procurement mechanisms.
The most important institutional deficiency was the Army's lack of a tightly-run, well-coordinated, doctrine development process. Although 437 nearly every Army War College study had recommended improving coordination of the process, the War Department General Staff's phlegmatic handling of the matter impeded implementation of more efficient and more effective procedures. In this area, the Army's experience writingField Service
Regulations 1923 was significantly better.
The high priority given the project in 1923 stands in stark contrast to the relative neglect it received in the 1930s. For the 1923 revision, the War
Department General Staff formally tasked the General Service Schools with responsibility for the first draft. In 1939, the Command and General Staff
School was but one of many agencies that commented on drafts prepared by the WDGS G-3 Training Branch. In 1923, the Commandant of the General
Service Schools formed a full-time board chaired by the Assistant Commandant to rewrite the manual. The board drew upon the expertise of staff and faculty to include branch liaison officers assigned to the school. The
Chief of Staff himself appointed the committee for final review and editing of the manual. In 1939, a single officer in the WDGS G-3 attempted to update the old manual using standard staff coordination procedures. While appropriate for obtaining consensus on minor changes, this technique buried the staff action in the War Department bureaucracy. It became one of many important actions passed from one desk to another. The head of each agency that received the action determined its importance. As a result, comments from reviewers ranged from the insightful to the trivial. In 1923, the writers drew upon the findings of high-level boards convened by the War
Department General Staff and Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, in revising the manual. At no time did the War Department General Staff 438 convene a board to study changes in combined arms doctrine that might warrant inclusion in the 1939 manual. The speed with which the Army completed the 1923 revision testified to the high priority given the project by the War Department General Staff and the Leavenworth staff and faculty. On the other hand, the 1939 revision took twice as long to complete despite the frequent claims that it was one of the most important projects in the WDGS G-3 division.
The final products reflected the external and internal influences acting on the revision processes. Field Service Regulations 1923 was truly a revised manual that clearly marked the Army's shift from a frontier constabulary to a force capable of modern combat. The doctrine stressed the skillful combination of all arms in support of the infantry attack to destroy the enemy force. Although the infantry remained the principal arm, it no longer represented the rifle and bayonet alone. Tanks, mortars, machine guns, and accompanying guns greatly increased the capabilities of the infantry in effect transforming it into a small-scale combined arms team. Beyond the infantry formation, infantry-artillery coordination was the critical pairing in the combined arms team. Tanks and airplanes were not yet capable of independent action and remained auxiliaries to the infantry fight. The doctrine remained maneuver-oriented emphasizing the envelopment of enemy forces over frontal attack and eschewing stabilized warfare in favor of
"open warfare" techniques. Field Service Regulations 1923, developed in the immediate aftermath of a major war, contained sound doctrine that accurately reflected the capabilities of American arms and the lessons of the recent combat. 439
Field Service Regulations 1939, at best, represented the lack of a doctrine development system; at worst, it suggested the stagnation of intellectual activity within the United States Army. The Army schools and branch journals provide ample evidence to refute the latter conclusion, but an explanation for the lack of a functioning doctrine development system is more difficult to find. After a decade and a half without combat experience or meaningful training exercises, the Army found little on which to base a revision of its doctrine. As a result, the new manual represented a collection of the tactics for the employment of each arm rather than a truly integrated combat doctrine. The manual did illustrate advances made within each separate branch, but an understanding of the methods used to combine the power of the arms was missing. Without money, manpower, and material for experimentation and hamstrung by the lack of effective mechanisms to overcome these shortages, the Army essentially rewrote World War I doctrine. These resource limitations and institutional deficiencies were the principal reasons that the Army found itself with obsolete doctrine on the eve of war.
The publication of Field Service Regulations 1939 did not end the
Army's effort to revise doctrine during the interwar years. In the two years remaining before American entry into World War II, the Army took giant strides toward the development of a viable fighting force. The inflow of money, men, and material enabled the Army to establish organizations and training programs that would provide some of the hard evidence on which to base changes in doctrine. Less than two years after distribution of the 1939 manual, the War Department published Field Service Regulations 1941 (FM 440
100-5, Operations) based on additional information received from the world's battlefields and the Army's own growing experience with large scale exercises.
The new manual was a vast improvement over its predecessor if only because it more accurately reflected current technological capabilities and represented a truly revised doctrine. Though finally rich in the resources long denied by Congress and the American public, the Army now lacked the time required to rebuild itself. In spite of impressive mobilization and readiness measures, the Army could not completely close the wide gap that existed between its doctrine and the contemporary capabilities of mobile, combined arms forces. Ultimately, the North African battlefield exposed the shortcomings of the Army's crash course in modern warfare.^ There, and in subsequent actions, the Army would learn from its defeats and eventually emerge from World War II as the most skilled and powerful fighting force of the war. But, the price exacted in soldiers' blood for the neglect of peacetime training, equipment modernization, and doctrine development was high.
Today's Army must overcome challenges similar to those it faced over half a century ago. The United States has won the latest "war to end all wars."
With the fall of the Soviet Union and the absence of a readily apparent military threat to national security, the United States has significantly reduced the size of its armed forces. After forty years of world leadership, the voices of
2por a detailed analysis of the Army's initial defeat in North Africa, see Martin Blumenson, "Kasserine Pass, 30 January-22 February 1943," inAmerica's First Battles, 1776-1965, ed. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1986), 226-65. 441 isolationism have returned. The economy and crime top a long list of domestic concerns that have rapidly eroded commitment to defense spending. Indeed, many seek to derive from reduced defense spending a
"peace dividend" for reinvestment in a variety of domestic programs.
Meanwhile, American military policy requires its armed forces to maintain the capability to respond to conflict ranging from large-scale, high-intensity war to the many, complex, varieties of peace operations. As operations and maintenance costs consume an increasingly greater portion of a shrinking budget, the Army will have less money for other critical investments. The
Army must make difficult decisions concerning personnel, force structure, and doctrine under conditions reminiscent of those its leaders faced during the in ter war years.
The study of the United States Army's experience with doctrine development during the interwar years offers useful insights for today's
Army leaders as they face the challenge of modernizing organization and doctrine in peacetime. Two aspects of the challenge are beyond the direct control of military leaders: national military policy and Congressional appropriations. While the Army can indirectly influence these critical factors in the force modernization and doctrine development process, the ultimate decisions reside in the hands of civilian leaders. The Army's role in the process is to express clearly capabilities and requirements in support of the national military policy. Once the civilian leadership has prescribed the
Army's missions and appropriated funds for military use, the Army can take a more direct role in the modernization process. 442
First among the keys to successful modernization is the procurement of enough equipment for tactical experimentation. Spending for research, development, testing, and evaluation fell far behind operation, maintenance, and personnel expenditures during the interwar years. As a result, the Army produced too few pilot models for meaningful tactical experimentation.
Successful modernization requires production of sufficient numbers of equipment to support doctrine development and training at Army schools.
The great expense associated with equipment procurement leaves little tolerance for waste. Cognizance of foreign military developments and sensitivity to the military potential of emerging technology are important aspects of efficient modernization.
Collection, analysis, and dissemination of foreign intelligence is another key to successful modernization. The intelligence system provides the information from which the nation and the military determine strategy and develop modernization programs. Foreign intelligence can also minimize modernization costs by allowing the Army to draw from the efforts of other military forces. The poor intelligence system that existed during the interwar years contributed little to the Army's modernization effort nor did it have an appreciable influence on Army war plans. Failure to understand developments in foreign armies was a major factor in the Army's doctrinal stagnation. The Army must closely monitor advances in military technology to prevent erosion of the relative superiority it now enjoys in nearly all categories of equipment.
The establishment of an organization dedicated to monitoring and accommodating change is the most important element in successful 443 modernization. Such an organization should integrate foreign intelligence; research, development, testing, and evaluation of new equipment; and doctrine development processes. The organization should develop and test tactical theories through practical application. A dedicated combined arms unit for tactical experimentation, of at least brigade size, with the capability to simulate higher echelon units should be available to the organization. And, the Army should commit funds to the operation of the organization at the expense of immediate requirements. The possession of an organization fully focused on the horizon and beyond enables the Army to stay abreast of change and ensure that it does not mortgage the future in pursuit of near-term goals. The Army has paid the price for failing to pursue aggressively a program for weapons, organization, and doctrine modernization already this century. Similar international and domestic conditions steered the nation and its Army away from investment in costly modernization programs during the interwar years. Today, the unchallenged supremacy of American armed forces strengthens the argument against spending large sums for modernization. Nevertheless, the lessons of the past suggest that the Army must have a high priority, integrated, modernization process that addresses weapons, organizations, and doctrine if it is to avoid stagnation and stay abreast of technological change. The Army can pay cash today to remain on the cutting edge of military developments or it can pay with the blood of
American soldiers at a later time on a yet unknown field of battle. CHAPTER XIV
EPILOGUE: FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS 1941
The publication of the proposed manual has the great advantage of providing the Service in one compact text at the time most needed, the doctrines which form the basis of our training and preparations for effective combat operations by the combined A rm s. — Brigadier General Harry L. Twaddle^ WDGS G-3
German victories in 1939 and 1940 ended much of the debate over methods of war. With the blueprint for modern war provided by the German operations, the United States Army raced to revise its doctrine. The result was Field Service Regulations 1941 (FM 100-5, Operations). The new, battle- tested prescriptions for successful combat erased doubts about trends in modern warfare and swelled the new manual to twice the size of its predecessor. The biggest difference between the 1939 and 1941 editions of the
Field Service Regulations was in emphasis on armored and air operations.
The use of air and tanks, as well as means for antitank and antiaircraft defense, dominated the work. Fire superiority, previously a function of infantry-artillery cooperation alone, now hinged on the integration of combat
^U.S. War Department, Memorandum from Brigadier General Harry L. Twaddle, WDGS G-3, to Army Chief of Staff, "Publication of FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations," 22 Apr 1941, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
444 445 aviation and tanks into the partnership. The final revision of American doctrine prior to entering the war also addressed the use of independent armored formations, air transported troops, and special operations in jungles, arctic environments, towns, mountains, and deserts. Less than two years of combat in Europe distilled twenty years of speculation and prophesying about the future of war.
The Army's doctrine development methods improved with the increased sense of urgency spurred by the declaration of a "limited emergency." Major Andrew D. Bruce was now the WDGS G-3's primary action officer for the Field Service Regulations having assumed the responsibility after Colonel Gruber's departure in September 1939. Major
Bruce would later lead the Army's effort to develop antitank doctrine in
World War II and eventually attained the rank of general.
The War Department General Staff's workload increased significantly in late 1939 in response to the outbreak of war in Europe. As a result, every officer detailed toField Service Regulations work found himself frequently pulled away to deal with staff emergencies. The G-4 division had already failed to produce the initial draft ofFM 100-10, Field Service Regulations,
Volume II, Administration citing personnel turbulence and an increasing number of higher priority tasks for the delay. When Major Bruce pressured the G-4 for an estimated completion date, it became clear that Volume II was far from being ready for publication. Brigadier General Tyner, the former G-3, was now the G-4 and was familiar with the great amount of effort required to produce the revised manual. He recommended that Brigadier General Frank
M. Andrews, the WDGS G-3, assign responsibility for the revision to the 446
Command and General Staff School. Since the G-3 division's ability to continue working onFM 100-5 appeared headed for similar difficulties, Bruce supported Tyner's recommendation and sought to shift the task of writing
Field Service Regulations to the service schools to alleviate some of the burden on the General Staff.2
Similar to the procedure used to write the 1923 manual. Major Bruce recommended that the staff and faculty at Fort Leavenworth assume responsibility for writing FM 100-5 Operations andFM 100-10 Administration and that the Army War College prepareFM 100-15 Larger Units.^ The school committees would forward the drafts to the General Staff for editing before submitting the final draft to the Chief of Staff for approval. Simply put.
General Staff officers were unable to devote the continuous effort required to write the manuals under the current conditions. While the officers at
Leavenworth were undoubtedly busy, the academic environment and the nature of their work were more conducive to doctrine writing than the
"strained atmosphere of the General Staff."^
^U.S. War Department, Memorandum from Major A. D. Bruce to Lieutenant Colonel Woodruff, Chief of Training Branch, WDGS G-3, "Field Service Regulations," 14 Sep 1939, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; U.S. War Department, Memorandum from Major A. D. Bruce, "Preparation of Field Service Regulations by agencies other than the General Staff," 23 Sep 1939, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
3Although still collectively known as theField Service Regulations, field manual numbers 100- 5 (Operations), 100-10 (Administration), and 100-15 (Larger Units) replaced Volumes I, II, and III respectively in 1939. Both titles remained in common usage through 1940.
^Bruce to Woodruff, 14 Sep 1939; Bruce, "Preparation of Field Service Regulations by agencies other than the General Staff," 23 Sep 1939; U.S. War Department, Memorandum from Major A. D. Bruce to Colonel Woodruff, "Field Service Regulations," 27 Nov 1939, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 447
Major Bruce had discussed the possibility of the Command and
General Staff School assuming responsibility for the Field Service
Regulations with the Commandant, Brigadier General McNair. Bruce believed that McNair was "extremely well qualified for the direction and supervision of the task of writing Field Service Regulations."^ Moreover, the
Command and General Staff School had recently provided detailed comments for use in the revision of Field Service Regulations 1923, so the topic was still fresh in the minds of the Leavenworth staff and faculty. Most important, McNair took a keen personal interest in the manual and was willing to accept the assignment. The Army War College was less inclined to accept the additional chore, but conceded that the school's focus on the activities at army and general headquarters level made it a likely candidate for the work. Preparation of FM 100-15 could not begin until after completion of the other two manuals anyway, so the assignment of responsibility for it was not yet critical. The Army War College's indifference toward the project would later affect work on FM 100-5. Lieutenant Colonel Woodruff, the
Training Branch Chief, postponed a decision on the action until he could better determine the size and scope of the task. He intended to base his decision on the responses to the recently distributed tentative manual.^
^Bruce, "Preparation of Field Service Regulations by agencies other than the General Staff," 23 Sep 1939.
^Bruce to Woodruff, "Field Service Regulations," 27 Nov 1939; U.S. War Department, Memorandum from Brigadier General F. M. Andrews through The Adjutant General to the Commandant, Command and General Staff School, "Field Service Regulations," 29 Nov 1939, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 448
The WDGS G-3 consolidated input from the reviewers during the winter months. Only a few comments trickled in through January, then as the 1 March suspense date neared, the reviewers rushed to comply with the tasking. Still, all individuals and agencies named for mandatory comment had not responded on time. In late February, Brigadier General Andrews decided to shift the task of revising the manual to the Command and General
Staff School since the early graduation of the 1939-1940 class would make available the school's staff and faculty to work on the project. He established 1
June 1940 as the completion date for the revision to take advantage of available funding before the end of the fiscal year and to permit use of the manual during the 1940-1941 academic year. In March, the Command and
General Staff School formally assumed responsibility for FM 100-5 and The
Adjutant General began routing all comments concerning the manual to Fort
Leavenworth. The G-3 submitted a final call for input and then closed the action by authorizing the Commandant to disregard any input received after 1 A pril.7
By April, the Leavenworth writing team was well into the work of revising the manual. Based on comments from the outside reviewers, the faculty, and his own assessment. Brigadier General McNair concluded that
^U.S. War Department, Memorandum from Brigadier General F. M. Andrews, WDGS, G-3, through The Adjutant General to Commandant, Command and General Staff School, "FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations," 28 Feb 1940, Adjutant General File 062.11 FM 100-5 , Record Group 407, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; Twaddle to Army Chief of Staff, "Publication of FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations," 22 Apr 1941. 449
the manual needed "a pretty complete overhauling/'^ He requested from the
WDGS C-3 additional time to produce a manual "which needs no apology."^
He presumed that General Marshall had approved the manual in tentative
form because of its imperfections. McNair believed the heavy pressure to
publish a revised Field Service Regulations was to blame for most of the
previous manual's shortcomings. Therefore, he sought to defer publication
until the next fiscal year to allow more time for a quality revision.^0
Andrews, having seen the voluminous and substantial comments from reviewers criticizing Field Service Regulations 1939, agreed with McNair. He
established 1 January 1941 as the new suspense for the Leavenworth draft
manuscript and asked McNair to assign the work on it andFM 100-10 "the
highest priority in the preparation of any publications at the Command and General Staff School.''^
Brigadier General Andrews understood that delaying publication of the
Field Service Regulations meant delays in the publication of many
supporting field manuals. He rationalized that delays in other important
^Lesley J. McNair to F. M. Andrews, 6 Apr 1940, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
^Lesley J. McNair to F. M. Andrews, 6 Apr 1940.
^^Lesley J. McNair to F. M. Andrews, 6 Apr 1940.
^^U.S. War Department, Memorandum from Brigadier General F. M. Andrews, WDGS G-3, to Commandant, Command and General Staff College, "FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations," 10 Apr 1940, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; U.S. War Department, Memorandum from Brigadier General F. M. Andrews, WDGS G-3, to Commandant, Command and General Staff College, "FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations," 17 Apr 1940, Adjutant General File 062.11 FM 100-5 , Record Group 407, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 450 decisions, particularly those concerning major organizational changes, had already set back the Field Manual Project, so the additional delay would not make matters much worse. He sanctioned the publication of interim manuals to guide training until the War Department finalized organizational changes and doctrine. Andrews requested that McNair submit an outline of the proposed revision highlighting recommended changes requiring a decision by the War Department. He intended to distribute the outline to the schools for use in coordinating their publications with theField Service
Regulations as much as possible.^2
Major Bruce met with McNair and key members of the writing team^3 at Fort Leavenworth on 11 May 1940. The Leavenworth team informed
Major Bruce that they were considering expanding the scope of the manual to include discussion of guerrilla, desert, and winter warfare. Additionally, they contemplated expanding the section covering mountain warfare and returning material dealing with warfare on a stabilized front deleted during the last revision. Major Bruce stressed that "the door was wide open"^^ as far as the WDGS G-3 was concerned. The group also discussed the language of the Field Service Regulations. While all agreed that simple, interesting.
^^Andrews to Commandant, Command and General Staff College, "FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations," 10 Apr 1940; F. M. Andrews to Lesley J. McNair, 11 Apr 1940, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Croup 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
Ï^The following officers attended the conference on 11 May 1940 at the Command and General Staff School: Brigadier General McNair, Colonel Edmunds, Lieutenant Colonel Boyd, Lieutenant Colonel Underhill, Lieutenant Colonel Williams, and Major Bruce.
^^U.S. War Department, Memorandum For Record, WDGS G-3, "FM 100-5, 100-10, and 100-15, Field Service Regulations," 13 May 1940 , Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 451 language was desirable, they concluded that condensing doctrine to
"expressions of one syllable" was not possible in all cases and that the historic practice of selecting "one man who has the gift of writing to take the material furnished and prepare the regulations" was the best solution. ^ 5
The Leavenworth team had expected to receive an outline of FM100-15 from Brigadier General Philip B. Peyton, Commandant of the Army War
College, by 15 May for coordination with the other two volumes of the Field
Service Regulations.^^ The Army War College missed the 15 May deadline.
Worse, only two days prior to the suspense date the WDCS C-3 received
Peyton's recommendation for abandonment of FM100-15 as a separate volume and inclusion of the material dealing with larger units in FM100-5.^’^ The Army War College Commandant and his staff did not share the WDCS
C-3's sense of urgency in completing theField Service Regulations project and continued to believe that publication of FM100-15 was unnecessary.
Brigadier General Andrews reiterated the requirement to produce an outline in a terse memorandum to the Commandant. He stressed that the lack of the
Army War College product was delaying work on FM100-5. The WDCS C-3
^^WDGS G-3, "FM 100-5,100-10, and 100-15, Field Service Regulations," 13 May 1940.
^^U.S. War Department, Memorandum from Lieutenant Colonel W. M. Grimes, Acting WDGS G-3, through the Adjutant General to Commandant, Army War College, "FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units," 6 Apr 1940, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; U.S. War Department, Memorandum from The Adjutant General to Commandant, Army War College, "FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units," 13 Apr 1940, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
^^U.S. War Department, Memorandum from Brigadier General P. B. Peyton, Commandant, Army War College, to The Adjutant General, "FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units," 1st Indorsement (11 May 1940), 13 Apr 1940, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 452 found the Army War College's failure to produce the outline of FM 100-15 acutely irritating since the G-3 Training Branch Chief had previously discussed the manual with the Commandant and members of the Army War
College faculty. While some officers opposed proceeding with the work, the
WDGS G-3 decided the outline was necessary and directed its completion.^ 8
The late discovery of the Army War College's inaction frustrated progress on the project. Meanwhile, the Leavenworth committee, without benefit of
Army War College input, completed their tentative outline of FM 100-5 and forwarded a copy to Bruce in late May.^^
Brigadier General McNair submitted a progress report to the WDGS G-
3 in mid-June. A dedicated committee, led by Lieutenant Colonel Lewis K.
Underhill, had reviewed all outside comments and amassed additional comments from Leavenworth staff and faculty members. The committee grouped the comments by paragraph and then indicated next to each comment a recommendation for disposition. McNair's report contained comments on all chapters except the most important ones, those prescribing doctrine for security, offense, defense, and special operations. The report also included recommendations for a new outline, title, and format. With these recommendations McNair sought "not only to facilitate comprehension, but
^®U.S. War Department, Memorandum from Brigadier General F. M. Andrews, WDGS G-3, through The Adjutant General to Commandant, Army War College, "FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units," 17 May 1940, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
^^Lewis K. Underhill to A. D. Bruce, 28 May 1940, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 453 more especially to avoid the numerous repetitions which characterize the tentative manual/'20
The Army War College committee, consisting of Lieutenant Colonel R.
M. Howell, Lieutenant Colonel R. G. Tindall, and Captain Lyman L.
Lemnitzer, a future Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, finally completed the outline for FM 100-15 in mid-June. On 15 June, the Army War College committee submitted the outline for FM 100-15 and an outline for a manual that combined FM 100-15 and FM 100-5. The committee also provided comments on the Leavenworth outline of FM 100-5. Howell, Tindall, and
Lemnitzer begrudgingly supported publication of FM100-5 and FM100-15 in separate volumes but only "as an expediency to meet present conditions."
They urged combining the manuals "as soon as time and money are available."^^ Despite their obvious displeasure with the decision to continue work on FM 100-15, the committee contributed a thoughtful and sound review of the Leavenworth outline of FM 100-5. Most notable, the committee believed the revised manual contained inadequate discussion of parachute and anti-parachute operations, close air support, depth of antitank defenses, and employment of armored, mechanized, and motorizeddivisions.22 The committee members had clearly noticed the German operations in Europe.
20u.S. War Department, Memorandum from Brigadier General L. J. McNair, Commandant, Command and General Staff School through The Adjutant General to WDGS G-3, "FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations," 14 Jun 1940, Adjutant General File 062.11 FM 100-5, Record Group 407, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
21r . M. Howell, R. G. Tindall, and L. L. Lemnitzer to A. D. Bruce, 15 Jun 1940, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
22howo11, Tindall, and Lemnitzer to Bruce, 15 Jun 1940. 454
Major Bruce sent the Army War College committee's outlines to the
Command and General Staff School for comment on 25 June. He also requested Leavenworth's position on the proposal to combine the two volumes.23 Bruce received Leavenworth's response to both the proposal to combine the manuals and the Army War College committee's outlines one month later on 22 July. Brigadier General McNair strongly disagreed with the
Army War College's recommendation to combineFM 100-5 and FM 100-15.
He specified that FM 100-5 should deal with combined arms whileFM 100-15 should address "the higher and broader aspects of military operations''^^ including the role of armed forces, strategy, organization and operations of major commands and tactical units down to division level, and large unit preparation for campaigns. He was particularly critical of FM 100-15's "undue encroachment in the tactical sphere."25 McNair agreed, however, with the
Army War College committee's recommendations for more extensive treatment of parachute, antitank, armored, and motorized operations in FM
100-5. McNair requested the WDGS G-3 decide on the scope of FM100-15 as
23u.S. War Department, Memorandum from Lieutenant Colonel W. M. Crimes, Acting WDGS G-3, through the Adjutant General to Commandant, Command and General Staff School, "FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations," 21 Jun 1940, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; U.S. War Department, Memorandum from The Adjutant General to Commandant, Command and General Staff School, "FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations," 25 Jun 1940, Adjutant General File 062.11 FM 100-5, Record Group 407, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
24u.S. War Department, Memorandum from The Adjutant General to Commandant, Command and General Staff School, "FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations," 1st Indorsement (22 Jul 1940) 25 Jun 1940, Adjutant General File 062.11 FM 100-5 , Record Group 407, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
25The Adjutant General to Commandant, Command and General Staff School, "FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations," 1st Indorsement (22 Jul 1940) 25 Jun 1940. 455 soon as possible to prevent duplication of effort in the writing of the two manual.26
The WDGS G-3 concurred with all of McNair's recommendations and comments except for the proposed change of title which he deemed potentially confusing due to the extensive use of the current title in cross- references. The WDGS G-3's letter confirmed the plan to publish theField
Service Regulations in three separate volumes as originally proposed and approved the final outline for FM 100-5. The WDGS G-3 also tasked the
Commandant with preparing portions ofFM 100-15 pertaining to air, armored, and mountain divisions. To this end, the WDGS G-3 authorized the Commandant to send officers directly to tactical units to obtain necessary information about evolving operational capabilities and announced the visit of a liaison officer from the Army War College to coordinate work on the two manuals. He urged the Commandant to expedite work on the manuals as the pace of mobilization and war preparations quickened with the fall of France.
Brigadier General Andrews letter stressed that "FM100-5 must not be delayed."27 in closing, he advised the Commandant to proceed without complete information on the new units ifnecessary.28
26The Adjutant General to Commandant, Command and General Staff School, "FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations," 1st Indorsement (22 Jul 1940) 25 Jun 1940.
27u.S. War Department, Brigadier General F. M. Andrews, WDGS G-3, through The Adjutant General to Commandant, Command and General Staff College, "FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations," 1 Aug 1940, Adjutant General File 062.11 FM 100-5 , Record Group 407, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
28Andrews to Commandant, Command and General Staff College, "FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations," 1 Aug 1940; U.S. War Department, Memorandum from Brigadier General L. J. McNair, Commandant, Command and General Staff School through The Adjutant 456
With the temporary suspension of the Command and General Staff
Course in 1940, the WDGS G-3 instructed the Commandant to assign top priority to completion of the Field Service Regulations and related manuals.
The Command and General Staff School also assumed greater responsibility for assisting the Army War College with FM 100-15 since the latter school had reduced the manual writing committee from three officers to one.29 The
WDGS G-3's spur to action could not have come at a worse time. The
Leavenworth committee lost many of its most experienced members over the summer; only Colonel Kinzie B. Edmunds, the Assistant Commandant, remained from the original team.30 in his mid-June progress report, McNair had advised the WDGS G-3 that the original committee would disband during the summer because most of its members had completed their tour of duty with the school. He explained that he had originally formed the committee with the expectation that its work would be completed by 1 June as specified in the G-3 memorandum. Accordingly, he assigned his "most competent and experienced"^! officers to the work. Unfortunately, their
General to WDGS G-3, "FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations," 1st Indorsement (1 Aug 1940) 14 Jun 1940, Adjutant General File 062.11 FM 100-5 , Record Group 407, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
29u.S. War Department, Memorandum from Lieutenant Colonel R. B. Woodruff, Chief, Training Branch, to Brigadier General F. M. Andrews, WDGS G-3, "Use of Faculty during suspension of the Command and General Staff School Regular Course," 26 Jun 1940, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
^Ohesley J. McNair to A. D. Bruce, 29 Jul 1940, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
^!u.S. War Department, Memorandum from Brigadier General L. J. McNair, Commandant, Command and General Staff School through The Adjutant General to WDGS G-3, "FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations," 14 Jun 1940, Adjutant General File 062.11 FM 100-5 , Record Group 407, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 457 experience was commensurate with length of tour at Leavenworth and these were the officers due for reassignment in summer of 1940. McNair, himself, reported for duty on 3 August 1940 as General Marshall's chief of staff in the recently activated General Headquarters (GHQ). Meanwhile, the new officers designated to resume work on the manuals project were observing summer maneuvers or taking leave and not expected to return before September.32
Progress on the manual project ground to a halt.
When he received word of the cessation of work on the manuals, newly promoted Lieutenant Colonel Bruce acted quickly, in the absence of the
WDGS G-3 and Training Branch Chief. He wrote an informal letter to
Colonel Edmunds, then Acting Commandant, "to explain more fully the desires of the Chief of Staff"33 concerning theField Service Regulations. His words underlined the high priority accorded the completion of the manuals by the War Department;
In a conference with General Andrews at which I was present, the Chief of Staff indicated that the early publication of all parts of the FSR and SOFM is urgently required. He intimated that the date of January 1, 1941 for submitting the draft was entirely too late in view of the present situation. The preparation of the indicated manuals is now, therefore, of first priority. Accordingly, should any War Department instructions or orders be received which would operate to take away any of the officers engaged in the preparation of FM 100-5 or FM 101-10, it is suggested that you radio C-3. I believe General Andrews will
^^U.S. War Department, Memorandum For Record, Training Branch, WDGS G-3, "Publication of FM 100-5-100-15, Field Service Regulations," 22 Apr 1941, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
33A. D. Bruce to K. B. Edmunds, 16 Aug 1940, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 458
take steps to coordinate the matter here in conformity with the indicated desire of the Chief of Staff.34
Lieutenant Colonel Bruce enclosed advance copies of the armored corps and division Tables of Organization for use in writing the manuals. He also advised Edmunds that the Army War College would send a liaison officer to
Fort Leavenworth to coordinate with theFM 100-5 committee on or around 3 September.35
Colonel Edmunds understood Bruce's very clear message and energized the manual writing committee. Edmunds named Lieutenant
Colonel Floyd R. Waltz to lead the FM100-5 (Field Service Regulations)
Revision Committee, but lost him less than a month later, to the newly formed Headquarters, Armored Force, in Washington, D. C. Lieutenant
Colonel Charles D. Y. Ostrom replaced Waltz and remained Chairman of the
FM 100-5 (Field Service Regulations) Revision Committee through the winter of 1941.36 The committee reviewed the previously received comments from the Army, considered new information from military attachés and the WDGS G-2 concerning recent foreign military combat experiences, and sent members to Fort Knox, Fort Benning, and Washington,
D.C. to collect information on armored, mountain, and parachute units and operations. Colonel Edmunds also sent representatives to a conference on
34Bruce to Edmunds, 16 Aug 1940.
35Bruce to Edmunds, 16 Aug 1940.
36ployd R. Waltz to Lloyd H. Cook, 9 Sep 1940, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; Charles D. Y. Ostrom to A. D. Bruce, 30 Sep 1940, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 459
Air Corps organization and tactics held in September. Waltz's committee completed its work in early November. On 8 November, Brigadier General
Edmund L. Gruber, the principal author ofField Service Regulations, 1939 and McNair's successor as Commandant of the Command and General Staff
School since October, mailed 50 copies of the revised manual to The Adjutant General.37
Meanwhile, work on the other two volumes of the Field Service
Regulations moved quickly through the draft writing stage. The
Leavenworth committee finished work onFM 100-10 in early summer and sent the draft to the War Department General Staff for final revision. The
War Department approved FM 100-10 Administration on 28 October and anticipated publication and distribution to begin by the end of ythe e a r . 3 8 At the Army War College, Lieutenant Colonel Lloyd H. Cook had assumed the task of writing FM 100-15 and coordinating with the Leavenworth committee since June. Cook, working closely with Bruce and the Leavenworth writers, completed the first draft of FM 100-15 and mailed it to the War Department
^^U.S. War Department, Memorandum For Record, Training Branch, WDGS G-3, "FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations (Radio fr. 'Edmunds,' Ft. Leavenworth, Kans. to TAG, 8- 31-40)" 5 Sep 1940, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; U.S. War Department, Memorandum from Commandant, Command and General Staff School to The Adjutant General, "Revision of FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations - Operations," 8 Nov 1940, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; U.S. War Department, Telegram from Colonel K. B. Edmunds, Commandant, Command and General Staff School, to The Adjutant General, 5 Sep 1940, Adjutant General File 062.11 FM 100-5 , Record Group 407, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
^^A. D. Bruce to E. L. Gruber, 28 Oct 1940, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; U.S. War Department, Memorandum For Record, WDGS G-3, "FM 100-5, 100-10, and 100-15, Field Service Regulations," 13 May 1940 , Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 460 on 9 October.39 The War Department heldFM 100-15 until the WDGS G-3 could coordinate the draft withFM 100-5 and ultimately suspended work on the rnanuaL^O
FM 100-5 received much closer scrutiny than either of the other two manuals, however. The Adjutant General, acting upon instructions from the
WDGS G-3, distributed the manuals to the chiefs of all arms and services,
GHQ Chief of Staff (McNair), and the commanding generals of all armies, tactical corps, 1st and 2nd Cavalry Divisions, and 4th Division. The WDGS G-
3 established 20 December 1940 as the suspense date for comments or concurrences from the reviewers.^l
The G-3 Training Branch began the final revision of the manual upon receipt of comments from the reviewers. Major Harlan N. Hartness and
Lieutenant Colonel Colbern practically rewrote the manual based upon extensive study of intelligence reports on the war in Europe. Major Hartness was a former Leavenworth instructor and graduate of Germany's
Kriegsakademie. Lieutenant Colonel Colbern, a field artillery officer, served as a military attaché in Poland and Holland during the German invasions.
Lloyd H. Cook to A. D. Bruce, 9 Oct 1940, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C
^^U.S. War Department, Memorandum from Lieutenant Colonel A. D. Bruce to Colonel Huebner, "Status of Manuals in Publications Section," 3 Apr 1941, Box 2, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; U.S. War Department, Memorandum from Lieutenant Colonel A. D. Bruce to Colonel Huebner, "Status of Manuals in Publications Section," 5 May 1941, Box 2, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
^^U.S. War Department, Memorandum For Record, WDGS G-3, "Revision of FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations - Operations," 12 Nov 1940, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 461
Other WDGS G-3 division personnel reviewing and commenting on the draft were Lieutenant Colonel Rufus S. Ramey, Lieutenant Colonel Bruce, and
Lieutenant Colonel Clarence R. Huebner, the Training Branch Chief.
Lieutenant Colonel Ramey, a former Leavenworth instructor, was a long time supporter of air and armored operations. He brought his experience in preparing training circulars on armored force, antitank, and air units to the review of FM 100-5. Lieutenant Colonels Ramey and Bruce conducted the final review. Lieutenant Colonel Huebner was also a former Leavenworth instructor and possessed extensive combat experience. Bruce sent the final draft to McNair for review. McNair made several comments. Then, Bruce mailed the page-proofs to Brigadier General Gruber at Leavenworth and informed him that the Command and General Staff College would receive top priority for distribution.^^
Lieutenant Colonel Bruce, who had shepherded the effort for nearly two years, recognized that the manual was not perfect and that developments in Europe and within the Army itself could warrant changes in the near future.43 Still, the Army needed the most up-to-date doctrine available and it needed it soon. On 22 April 1941, the new WDGS G-3, Brigadier General
Harry L. Twaddle, sent the draft manual to the Chief of Staff for approval. In the forwarding memorandum. Twaddle emphasized:
42A. D. Bruce to E. L. Gruber, 14 May 1941, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
^^Bruce to Gruber, 14 May 1941. 462
Careful analysis has been made of C . reports on the operations in Europe during 1939-1940 and the tactical lessons learned from these operations have been incorporated. The combined employment of ground and air forces and particularly the tremendous power of combat aviation and mechanized forces has been stressed.^*^
The memorandum also highlighted the importance of the new sections addressing antimechanized defense, expanded coverage of special operations, air task forces, employment of airborne troops, and the new types of divisions. Twaddle further noted that the manual provided "the Service in one compact text at the time most needed, the doctrines which form the basis of our training and preparations for effective combat operations by the combined Arms."^^ The Chief of Staff approved the revised editiono f FM
100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations on 30 April. The War
Department published the manual on 22 May and began distribution before the end of the month.46
Although repeatedly acknowledged as the top priority publication, the
War Department had still taken nearly two years to publish its capstone manual. This was still much quicker than the time taken to produce either of
^^U.S. War Department, Memorandum from Brigadier General Harry L. Twaddle, WDGS G-3, to Army Chief of Staff, "Publication of FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations," 22 Apr 1941, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
45Twaddle to Army Chief of Staff, "Publication of FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations," 22 Apr 1941.
4&C. R. Huebner to E. L. Gruber, 7 May 1941, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; R. S. Ramey to G. L. King, 30 Jun 1941, Box 7, Entry #210, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; Twaddle to Army Chief of Staff, "Publication of FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations," 22 Apr 1941. 463 the two preceding manuals. Though not perfect, it was a great improvement over Field Service Regulations 1939 if only because it contained truly new doctrine rather than rehashing the methods of the First World War. The doctrine development process, too, was still far from perfect. But, with sufficient emphasis from the highest echelons within the War Department and fueled by abundant resources and threat of war, the Army produced a respectable capstone doctrine manual in a brief period of time. BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Bland, Larry I. and Sharon R. Ritenour, eds.The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Vol. 1, The Soldierly Spirit, December 1880-June 1939. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981.
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Cline, Ray S. Washington Command Post: The Operations Division. U.S. Army in World War II. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1951.
Coffman, Edward M. and Peter F. Herrly. "The American Regular Army Officer Between the World Wars: A Collective Biography." Armed Forces and Society (Fall 1977): 55-73. 468
D astrup, Boyd L. King of Battle: A Branch History of the U.S. Arm y's Field Artillery. Fort Monroe, Va.: Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1992.
Doughty, Robert A. The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-1976. Fort Leavenworth: Com bat Studies Institute, 1979.
The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939. Hamden, Connecticut: Shoestring Press, 1985.
Gabel, Christopher R. The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941. Washington, D.C.: G overnm ent Printing Office, 1991.
Seek, Strike, and Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II. Leavenworth Paper No. 12. Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Arm y Com m and and General Staff College, 1985.
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Gillie, Mildred. Forging the Thunderbolt. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Military Service Publishing, Co., 1947.
Green, Constance, Harry C. Thomson, and Peter C. Roots.The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War. U.S. Army in World War II. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955.
Griffith, Robert K., Jr. Men Wanted for the U.S. Army. W estport: Greenwood Press, 1982.
Herbert, Paul H. Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William H. Dupuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations. Fort Leavenworth: C om bat Studies Institute, 1988.
Herr, John K. and Edward S. Wallace.The Story of the U.S. Cavalry. Boston: Little, Brown, and Com pany, 1953.
Holley, Jr., I. B. Ideas and Weapons: Exploitation of the Aerial Weapon by the United States During World War I: a Study in the Relationship of Technological Advance, Military Doctrine, and the Development of Weapons. N ew Haven: Yale University Press, 1953.
House, Jonathan M. Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization. Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Arm y Com m and and General Staff College, 1984. 469
Kahn, E. J., Jr. McNair: Educator of an Army. Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal, Inc., 1945.
Kennett, Lee. "Developments to 1939." InCase Studies in the Development of Close Air Support, ed. Benjamin Franklin Cooling, 13-70. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990.
Krepinevich, Jr., Andrew. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns H opkins University Press, 1986.
Lupfer, Timothy. The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War. Leavenworth Paper No. 4. Fort Leavenworth,: Combat Studies Institute, 1981.
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March, Peyton C. The Nation at War. Garden City: Doubleday, Doran, and Com pany, 1932.
McKenney, Janice. "More Bang for the Buck in the Interwar Army."Military Affairs 42 (1978): 80-86.
Millett, Allan R. "Cantigny, 28-31 May 1918." InAmerica's First Battles, 1776- 1965, ed. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, 149-185. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986.
______. Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman. "The Effectiveness of Military Organizations." InMilitary Effectiveness: The First World War. ed. Allan R. Millett and W illiamson M urray, 1-30. Winchester: Allen and Unwin, 1988.
Moenk, Jean R. A History of Large-Scale Maneuvers in the United States, 1935-1964. Fort Monroe, Virginia: Historical Branch, Office of the Chief of Staff for Military Operations and Reserve Forces, U. S. Continental Army Command, 1969.
Nenninger, Timothy K. "Leavenworth and Its Critics: The U.S. Army Command and General Staff School, 1920-1940."The Journal of Military History 58 (Apr 1994): 199-231.
'The Development of American Armor, 1917-1940." Arm or 78 (Jan-Feb 1969): 46-51, (Mar-Apr 1969): 34-38, (May-Jun 1969): 33-39, (Sep-Oct 1969): 45-49. 470
O'Connor, Raymond G.American Defense Policy in Perspective: From Colonial Times to the Present . New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965.
Pappas, George S. Prudens Futuri: The US Army War College, 1901-1967. Carlisle Barracks: The Alumni Association of the US Army War College, 1967.
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Rainey, James W. "Ambivalent Warfare: The Tactical Doctrine of the AEF in World War I." Parameters 13 (1983): 34-46.
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Spiller, Roger J., Joseph G. Dawson III, and T. Harry Williams, eds.Dictionary of American Military Biography. 3 Vols. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984. van Creveld, Martin. Fighting Power: German and US Arm y Performance, 1939-1945. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982.
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W eigley, Russell F. History of the United States Army. 2nd ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986.
______. "Mobility Versus Power" Parameters 11 (1981): 13-21.
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. "Shaping the American Army of World War II: Mobility Versus Firepower." Parameters 11 (September 1981): 13-21.
DISSERTATIONS. THESES. AND PAPERS
Broom, John T. "'It Isn't Doctrine Until They All Understand It:' FM 100-5 Field Service Regulations, 1941; the A rm ored Force, and the Conduct of the 1944 Cam paigns." Paper presented at W orld W ar II: 1944-1994, A 50-Year Perspective Conference, Siena College, New York, 3 June 1994, TMs in author's possession.
Greenwald, Bryon E. "The Development of Antiaircraft Artillery Organization, Doctrine, and Technology in the United States Army, 1919-1941." MA thesis, Ohio State University, 1991.
Johnson, David E. "Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: The United States Army and the Development of Armor and Aviation Doctrines and Technologies, 1917 to 1945." Ph. D. diss., Duke University, 1990.
Juntanen, Kim M. "U.S. Army Attachés and the Spanish Civil War, 1936- 1939: The Gathering of Technical and Tactical Intelligence." MA thesis. Temple University, 1990.
Kirkpatrick, Charles E. "Filling the Gaps: Reevaluating Officer Professional Education in the Inter-War Army, 1920-1940." Paper presented at the 1989 American Military History Institute Annual Conference, Lexington, Va., 14-15 April 1989, TMs in author's possession.
Miller, Charles E. "United States Tank Developments Between the Wars." MA thesis, Duke University, 1968.
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