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How Ukrainians Perceive European Values Main Results of an Empirical Survey

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How Ukrainians Perceive European Values Main Results of an Empirical Survey STUDY How Ukrainians Perceive European Values Main Results of an Empirical Survey MATTHES BUHBE (ED.) September 2017 n Ukraine’s »Revolution of Dignity« led to a pro-European government. In this context, Europe is viewed not only as a geographic area, but above all as a value space. n Both supporters of Ukraine’s European integration and many of its opponents be- lieve that European values serve as a foundation for a successful society. However, »Euro-sceptics« consider it impossible to build a Ukrainian society on the same foun- dation. n Ukrainians in the east are more inclined to believe that European values shared by Ukrainians should be »implemented from the outside« and »installed by the state«. Respondents in the west believe that they should be practised by each citizen and the state alike. n »Euro-optimists« often have a more coherent and consistent view of European val- ues, whilst Euro-sceptics tend to have a more fragmented perception of these values. n The majority of Ukrainians believe that Ukraine should integrate into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Nonetheless, there is a rising attitude that Ukraine should be neither a member of the European Union nor of the Eurasian Economic Union led by Russia. n Gaining knowledge about European values is not a systemic process. Ukrainian TV and social media dominate, and talks with relatives and friends are also important. The respondents probably underestimate the issue of manipulation through Russian media. MATTHES BUHBE (ED.) | HOW UKRAINIANS PERCEIVE EUROPEAN VALUES Contents Why an Inquiry into European Values 2017? . 2 Methodology . 2 Main Findings . .2 Some Values of Ukrainian Society with Relevance to European Values . 4 How Ukrainians Perceive European Values (Qualitative Measurement) . .10 How Ukrainians Perceive European Values (Quantitative Measurement) . .12 Formation of Perceptions about European Values . .15 Recommendations to Foster European Integration . .15 Annex . 17 2 MATTHES BUHBE (ED.) | HOW UKRAINIANS PERCEIVE EUROPEAN VALUES Why an Inquiry into cept the occupied territories – the Crimean, Donetsk, European Values 2017? and Luhansk oblasts. A macro-region quota was first de- veloped based on state statistics (Central, Eastern, West- During winter 2013–2014 a second Maidan uprising ern, Southern, Northern), then on administrative units, took place, which Ukrainians call the »Revolution of Dig- and in the last stage on villages . The quota also took into nity« . The »European Choice« was seen as an irrevers- account the gender and age of the respondents . The ible political decision supported by the majority of the error of representativeness of the study does not exceed Ukrainian citizens . In this context, Europe is viewed not +/– 2 .2 per cent . only as a geographic area, but above all as a value space . During the analysis of the survey results, the surveyors In June 2017, the pro-European government finally conducted a cluster analysis . Two clusters were obtained achieved visa-free travel to Europe’s Schengen Area . At with »Euro-optimists« and »Euro-sceptics« . Some of the the same time, Ukrainian society’s value choice has al- data from this analysis can be found in the annex . ways been accompanied by heated debates inside the country . Ukrainians’ ideas about European values often comprise stereotypes and erroneous beliefs rooted in Main Findings propaganda, manipulation by political forces, or other external factors . The survey, which was prepared with focus group dis- cussions and carried out with 2,000 face-to-face inter- So, what do Ukrainians believe about European values? views, shows that Ukrainian citizens who have positive Do they share the basic principles of the European insti- attitudes towards European integration are more likely tutions? What is the relationship between region or age to have more coherent and consistent ideas about Euro- to views on European values? Is a person’s idea of Euro- pean values than those who are sceptical about Europe- pean values linked to the type of international relations an integration . this person supports? What are the sources that shape Ukrainians’ ideas about European values? Has there The latter are more inclined to fragment values and fo- been an increase or decrease in supporting the Europe- cus on those aspects that cause controversy in Ukrainian an Choice in the last three years? society . A typical example is equating support for human rights with the view that values such as tolerance for To answer these and other questions, the Gorshenin In- other cultures and social minorities, and the protection stitute – in partnership with the Kyiv Office of the Frie- of convicts’ rights are not inherent in Ukrainian society . drich-Ebert-Stiftung – conducted a nationwide opinion At the same time, there is a significant share of respon- poll during spring 2017 . The main results are presented dents in both groups who focus mainly on personal in this paper . A more complete Ukrainian version is also well-being . Consequently, they selectively choose values available . from opposite national development models – e .g . a pa- ternalistic (state-led) model or one aimed at developing an independent personality (liberal model) – depending Methodology on which ones seems to offer more beneficial outcomes. In April 2017, Ukrainians aged 18–65 were invited to Both supporters of Ukraine’s European integration (Eu- participate in six focus groups . Each group consisted ro-optimists) and many of its opponents (Euro-sceptics) equally of men and women . Two groups – those in fa- believe that European values serve as a foundation for vour of European integration and those opposing it – a successful society, and thus perceive them as wor- were invited in each of the three cities: Kyiv, Lviv, and thy guiding principles . However, Euro-sceptics consider Dnipro . The results were used in the development of a it impossible to build a Ukrainian society on the same questionnaire for the nationwide Ukrainian poll . foundation and do not believe that these principles could be applied in their country . Typically, they claim From May 26 to June 6, 2,000 respondents aged 18–65 that it is impossible to overcome corruption and nepo- were interviewed by quotas in all regions of Ukraine ex- tism, or to have a tolerant attitude towards homosexual 2 MATTHES BUHBE (ED.) | HOW UKRAINIANS PERCEIVE EUROPEAN VALUES marriages in Ukraine . They believe that in the face of nians’ ideas about European values are fragmentary and high poverty, corruption in the central and local author- contradictory, although Ukrainians largely share the ba- ities, and the disappointing results of the Revolution of sic values of European institutions . This hypothesis has Dignity, Ukraine has acquired an imitation democracy been fully confirmed. that is ill-suited for Ukrainian society . Focus group participants and face-to-face respondents In general, integration with the European Union (EU) said that Europeans share values that serve as the basis is supported by an absolute majority (51 6. per cent) . In for the well-being of European residents . Both support- view of former studies, however, it is noteworthy that ers and opponents of European integration as a whole the share of people who do not want their country to share European values – such as freedom of religion, integrate – either with the EU or the Eurasian Econom- the rule of law, democracy, personal freedom, peace, ic Union (EAEU) – has increased from 7 2. per cent in human rights, equality, self-realization, solidarity, toler- 2014 to 25 4. per cent in 2017 . The respective surveys ance, and the value of human life . There were no cases show that the largest number of such respondents live in which researchers encountered respondents who re- in Southern Ukraine (33 9. per cent) . In addition, roughly jected these values . 30 per cent of those surveyed in the Central, Northern, and Eastern Ukraine gave the same answer . Possible ex- At the same time, there is a somewhat paternalistic planations include the following: attitude towards these values in Central and especially Southern and Eastern Ukraine . The respondents often (i) the inability of political leaders – both those who claimed that it is the government that must ensure hu- share Western-oriented views as well as those who man rights, everyone’s equality before the law, possibili- support Ukraine’s eastern integration – to overcome ties for self-realization, etc . Thus, respondents in Eastern social and economic misery; Ukraine are more inclined to believe that values shared by EU-Europeans and most Ukrainians should be »imple- (ii) the belief that the question of close integration with mented from the outside« and »installed by the state« . Europe (EU) or Russia (EAEU) splits the country and Respondents in Western Ukraine have a more complete increases hostility; picture of the values shared by the EU-Europeans and believe that they should be taken seriously and practised (iii) disappointment with the EU’s reaction to Ukraine’s by citizens and the state alike . European Choice, including delays in the ratification of the association agreement and granting of vi- Hence, the majority of respondents from Southern and sa-free travel – which was actually granted after this Eastern Ukraine have a distorted perception of values, survey was completed on 11 June 2017 – and the re- which makes them believe that democracy and tol- fusal to voice EU membership prospects for Ukraine erance are more applicable to EU-Europeans than to (the
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