PLAAF IS NOT INVINCIBLE IN By Gp Capt GS Sharma, VSM (Retd)

One can not really pinpoint the real reason for the Chinese incursion at multiple locations in Ladakh. There could be several reasons such as; force India to shun improvement of border roads; deny occupation of areas which could possibly be used by India for interference in Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) a President XI Jinping key BRI project, or occupy Ladakh which it considers as one of the perceived five fingers of its palm (Tibet) and even working towards a strategy to project itself as an undisputed leader of Asia. The strategists also speculate that with intrusions on Indian LAC, China may even be signalling US which sees India as its lynchpin to balance China. Aggression on the India- China borders may even be a sequential next step towards its planned journey for establishing Chinese domination on the world, other being South China sea where it has carried out extensive reclamation of land from Sea and built up military infrastructure with almost no serious challenge posed by the littoral states who also claim the portion of the sea but, do not have the gumption to stand 2

against China. The blame should also land with United states and its allies who have not taken any serious action to challenge Chinese assertiveness in South China Sea.

Clearly China is a expansionists power who wants the world to acknowledge its greatness. It often bullies Japan, Vietnam, Philippines and Taiwan by its abominable and aggressive display of strength. Now, China has turned its attention to India with whom it has intentionally kept the border issue unresolved to build up pressures at an opportune time which it perceives has arrived when world including India are preoccupied battling the coronavirus pandemic which originated from China. Coronavirus has ravaged the world economies. Economist have forecasted that India too will suffera negative 4.5% growth. China has chosen this trying time to hackle India on the borders. Deception, concealment and surprise often accompany Chinese actions, it was no different this time too. Despite itself being the victim of coronavirus though on smaller scale (many analysts believe that coronavirus is China’s Bio weapon which escaped inadvertently from Wuhan laboratory), it moved its forces from the ongoing exercise in the TAR region along with Indian Northern border and have intruded at several places in Ladakh region unexpectedly. Surprised though India would prefer to negotiate at the military and diplomatic level and persuade PLA to withdraw and avoid military altercation but, at the same time be prepared to teach China a lesson if war is forced on us.

A careful observer would have noticed that China for past few years has been carrying out military exercises in the TAR region. Many times,in past, it had retained military deployment even during the winter seasons as well, probably in an effort to gain all-round operational capability in Tibet. Along with it, there has been substantial increase in transgressions in various sectors on India-China LAC year after year. In some cases, like at 3

Dokalam, the transgression resulted in a prolonged standoff with Indian Army and withdrew after 73 days after hard military and diplomatic negotiations.

Thus, Knowing Chinese expansionist mindset, the Chinese transgression in Ladakh is not a matter of surprise.

PLAAF Challenge in TAR?

Over past few years, we are witness to a significant PLAAF fighter aircraft deployment of the . Earlier air fields in the TAR region were activated during the summer months but, for last few years Sukhoi-27 and J-10 fleets are being deployed even during winter months in an effort to gain a year-round capability. Further unlike in 1980-90, the China now has largely a modern air force which is rated second in the world in both qualitatively and in terms of number of combat air aircraft.

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The side which will present better performance can be surmised only after evaluation and impact of the local factors at the place of deployment? Such as number of the airfields/ staging areas, infrastructure for aircraft operations, combat force that can be deployed, geographic location and topography, availability of sustained logistic support besides the number and quality of the air craft and the training status of the air crew.

Air Fields

PLAAF is known to have 14 air fields opposite our Northern, Central and Eastern region. However, several civil air fields are being readied in TAR by the PLAAF for its use. The focus is on dual use air fields that can be used by both civil and military. These airstrips would be of use for China only in the case of a conflict with India as the latter is the only potential adversary for China in the region.1 These airfields are at an average height of 4,000 metre. Elevation of the area affects the performance of aircraft. Planes operating out of these heights have to trade-off with fuel and payload. The air ports have unusually long runways 4-5 Km long, necessitated due their high elevation. This feature probably is also meant to cater for continued aircraft operations in case of damage.

Opposite Ladakh, Ngari Gunsa a dual-use military and civil airport serving the town of in Ngari Region can be used for fighter operations. Since the last major standoff between China and India at Doklam in 2017 military presence at the Ngari Gunsa Airport has been expanded and fighters have been stationed. The airport is 200 kilometres from , Ladakh

1https://www.indiatvnews.com/news/india/chinese-army-building-27-airstrips-in-tibet-raw-report-800.html 5

Hotan, Yarkant and Kashgar are the other air fields North of Ladakh which can be used by PLAAF. Hotan is nearly 390 km far from Leh whereas, Kashgar is further 500Km NW of from Hotan (607 km from Leh). Yarkant lies in between Kashgar and Hotan and is 405 km from Leh. All these could be used by PLAAF for defence of the southern border, primarily the Karakoram Pass to the west and disputed Aksai Chin region. Far location of these airfields naturally will impose limitations in fighter operations by PLAAF. These may also may also serve as bases for bomber operations and large cargo aircraft such as military transport ferrying heavy equipment, artillery and in case of war with India. The air fields are so far off from each other that these cannot mutually support each other which is vital in fighter operations. In case of war with china, it will spread to other areas and not remain restricted to Ladakh region. Compared to the North, the Eastern sector opposite Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh are better served by air fields. But mutual support to other sectors is not feasible.

An open source data indicates that China has 60 Sqns. Not all Chinese sqns can be deployed against India due to the lack of aircraft protection infrastructure at many airfields and also that China cannot deplete all resources from other theatres and are retained to meet any contingency of emerging threats from US and its allies. This threat looks potent nowas US Secretary of States has declared recently on redeployment its forces from the Europe to the Indo-Pacific region to deter China from any mis adventure with India. Its three-carrier task force have already come in the Pacific Ocean after Chinese display of aggression in Ladakh.

Opposing PLAAF strength, India has depleted strength of only 30 Sqns. Despite this, IAF still has a largest air force among Asian democracies which will not only match PLAAF but, even can come out a 6

winner.2Pakistan’s current economic situation does not permit it to join in the imbroglio but, being opportunistic PAF may join in to take advantage of situation. In that case, IAF would need to tackle both. Predictably one could expect US to check Pakistani misadventure.

Assessment

As per an estimate, China has 2100+ fighters and bombers as against India’s 550 but PLAAF can deploy only the limited number of these. A recent Howard Kennedy school study (March 2020) concludes that in the Western theatre command China could deploy a total of 157 fighters and varied types of drones of recce, EW and precision attack class. In that, China has a total of 101, are 4th generation fighters. Against this, India can deploy 122comparable 4th gen aircraft solely directed against China in its total deployment of 270 fighters and 68 ground attack air craft. This deployment is dictated by the number and locations of suitable air fields in the area which can participate in ensuing battle. Unlike China, India is not constrained in operations by the airfields. The Chinese fighters are essentially J-10s, J-11s and SU-27s. Of these, J-10 is comparable to the Mirage 2000 whereas, SU-30MKI superior to all other Chinese fighters deployed in the Western theatre, including the J-11 and Su-27 models. While this may be an estimate in the study but, it does state the facts plausibly.

The paper also surmises that higher elevation of these air field will limit the Chinese aircraft ability to carry only their half payload and fuel, unless PLAAF resorts in flight refuelling which as routine is not practicable as refuelers and fighters are vulnerable during refuelling. It clearly means

2https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/significant-increase-in-chinese-aircraft-in-tibet- autonomous-region-iaf-chief-b-s-dhanoa/articleshow/63929299.cms?from=mdr 7

that China would need to launch twice the number of sorties to achieve the results as against India which does not suffer this limitation at all. Further, except for the handful, most airfields don’t have hardened shelters or blast pens for protection of aircraft thus, making them vulnerable to the dedicated Indian air strikes. India in comparison do not suffer these limitations hence, IAF would be in position to achieve air superiority. The PLAAF limitations will also affect its ability to support the ground forces. The study visualises that to over come its weakness PLAAF will seek rear support but, this would once again limit the aircraft strike ranges. Rearward logistic support would also get restricted due to the vulnerability of their rail road links to Indian Air strikes which will not find it difficult to identify and target them in clear obstruction free plateau. However, Chinese are known to hold 30 days reserve hence, it may not have impact in short duration conflict.

PLAAF will not be able to deploy all resources to the Western theatre especially in view of perceived threat in the Eastern sector especially as US has indicated it is redeploying the forces in view of Chinese massing of troops and belligerence on the Indo-China border.

Employment of J-20 in the Conflict. PLAAF has unspecified number of J-20 fifth generation stealth fighters. Though J-20 stealth fighter are claimed to have a generational advantage over Indian aircraft but, its stealthy characteristics is suspect primarily due to its design and inability to super cruise. Super cruise (supersonic speed) could make ac detection difficult. These aircraft are known to be deployed 9th air brigade at Wuhu Air Base in Eastern Chinese theatre to keep a tab on Taiwan and against air activity of US and Japan. Due to distant location, J-20 can not directly join operations from Eastern china hence, these would have to be located in vicinity of the active area which will make them vulnerable to our air strikes. With claimed stealthily characteristics and armed with Beyond visual range 8

AAM, J-20 may be used to target our AWACS/ AARs. Acquisition of S 400 from Russia is therefore a right choice but is not available to India in short term. SU 30 MKI possibly could also effectively counter J-20 threat if used. Open source indicates that, Chinese have also located H-6 bombers to confront India. These are capable of carrying huge weapon pay loads but, will be vulnerable to our air defences.

Missile Threat. The Chinese could use missiles to attack air bases and other infrastructure but, the Howard study assesses that at least 220 missiles are required to keep one air field down for twenty-four hours. This will not make any difference to IAF operations in the East or in the West since the IAF has a large number of other operational airfields to operate from and also possess capability of quick rehabilitation in case of their damage. China’s stock of 1,000-1,200 MRBMs/SRBMs will be over in less than two days in attacking just three airfields, with out being offensive on the other major target systems like Command and Control (C2) centres or Air Defence.

Nevertheless, India needs to pay greater attention to the safety of AD and C2 centres. The other areas needing attention is the threat from drones as China has the assortment of these for EW, recce and precision targeting but, these too have limited ranges. Still anti drone measures must be planned.3

Training and Air Crew Ability. The study points at shortcomings of PLAAF pilots operational training and experience compared to the Indian air crew ability and training status.4This could tilt the results in our favour.

3https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/strategic-postures-china-and-india-visual-guide#toc-6-0-0 4 Ibid 9

Air defence. The mountainous terrain in the North will cause radar screening effect for both sides hence, AWACS/AEWs could play a major role in detection across own area hence, these must be targeted, at the same time safety of own resources is of paramount importance. Tibet being a flat plateau, we can expect formidable air defence on the Chinese side. Thus, we must make extensive use of deception and EW for successful conduct of air operations.

Conclusion

In any India-China conflict, the PLA cannot launch an attack without the support of the PLAAF. If PLAAF capacity is dented then it will be lot easier for our ground forces to fight PLA. Strangely most of the Eastern air fields do not have infrastructure/ blast pen for air craft protection. To counter that, PLAAF is expected to deploy formidable air defence and rely on electronic warfare to deter penetration of their air space. It seems that Chinese would depend on their maritime strategy of Anti access and Anti denial even on the land borders as well. We must circumvent it by deception and use of EW to exploit their other weaknesses.

PLAAF will also make extensive use of drones in ISR and strike role. These are not expected to carry autonomous operations hence, we must devise options to inhibit their command and control while protecting our own.

Though Pakistan being in economic shamble it may still come in support of China and torment India. We had an indication of Pak activity on LOC during Chinese incursions in Ladakh and two Pakistani Military divisions are now reportedly deployed in POK. Hence. probability exists that India may confront both adversaries simultaneously along with terrorists 10

Tenjims who operate on Pakistani beck and call. A recent media news stated that PLAAF IL 76 refueler had landed at Skardu. While we may be reading too much in the incident but, possibility of Chinese using Pakistani air fields in POK can not be ruled out. We have mutual deterrence in nuclear and space domains hence, in this arena we are well matched.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of CENJOWS.