Nationalism and Transnationalism in Modern and Contemporary Korea 越 境、他者の抱擁−−近現代コリアの国民主義と超国民主義
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Volume 10 | Issue 7 | Number 3 | Article ID 3691 | Feb 11, 2012 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Transcending Boundaries, Embracing Others: Nationalism and Transnationalism in Modern and Contemporary Korea 越 境、他者の抱擁−−近現代コリアの国民主義と超国民主義 Vladimir Tikhonov the main discursive force behind the creation of an all-inclusive democratic vision of modern Transcending Boundaries,“Koreanness”. From the very beginning of the Embracing Others: Nationalism and modern age, defining all Koreans as first and Transnationalism in Modern and foremost Koreans became possible precisely in the nationalist context. Contemporary Korea1 Another aspect of nationalism’s pivotal role in Vladimir Tikhonov Korea’s modern age is its function as the guardian of Korea’s modern identity against Nationalist internationalism in modern Korea external challenges. North Korea’s official ideology of chuch’e, so often discussed in the If we wish to define Korea’s twentieth century Western media, owes much of its legitimacy in in a word, “the century of nationalism” would the eyes of the North Korean population (and be the most plausible definition.2 From the its few isolated South Korean sympathisers) perspective of Korea’s internal socio-political exactly to its (not necessarily unfounded) claim situation, nationalism, as Andre Schmid aptly to protect an essentialized “Koreanness” from observed, from the very beginning provided the all foreign threats, notably those originating in legitimising framework for the modern concept the “imperialist” countries. But the spectrum of of equal, universal citizenship. Former slaves, a defensive, self-protective nationalism is much members of discriminated hereditary broader in modern and contemporary South professional groups (butchers etc.), women – all Korea than its contemporaneous North Korean were to be accepted as equal “nationals” since variety. As modernity’s onslaught, in the form national salvation, prosperity and eventual of imperialist invasions, the almost greatness required national cohesion and 3 uncontrolled influx of foreign goods, cultural everyone’s contribution to the national cause. forms and ideas, seemed to endanger the very Ethnic nationalism is hardly a popular concept foundations of “Koreanness”, nationalism came now anywhere, including South Korea (which, to be seen as an essential condition for the at least in theory, switched from the early survival of any collective “Korean” identity – 2000s to multiculturalism, and strives now to one might say as an existential necessity, as integrate its ethnic minority populations), but, fate. as Henry Em argues, the concept of Korea’s ethnic nation (minjok) did possess democratic Every socio-political, cultural or religious trend meaning in the early twentieth-century context. that would enter Korea and develop there had The historiography which focused on the to “nationalise” in order to exert societal progressive development of the ethnic nation influence. In a way, both Communists and was able to do away with traditional patterns of right-wing cultural nationalists, who sometimes dynastic history.4 In a word, nationalism was collaborated but mostly sharply clashed in 1 10 | 7 | 3 APJ | JF 1920-30s colonial Korea, were to some degree construction projects, all-out war mobilization, nationalists. They just adhered to different modernized Confucian rituals and state- visions of nation, the Communist one closely promoted “physical culture” and sports linking national liberation with the prospects (“nationalization of the body”), was perhaps the for socio-economic liberation for the majority.5 most important prototype of Park Chong Hee’s In the same way, in the stormy late 1980s – own version of the developmental barrack early 1990s, when Seoul streets were filled state.10 Another main protagonist of with acrid tear gas and expert knowledge of the authoritarian industrialization drama, technology and use of Molotov cocktailSamsung’s (Samsŏng) founder Yi Pyŏngch’ŏl production was de rigeur for any self- (1910-1987), famed for his annual New Year respecting activist college student, twovisits to Tokyo, largely copied the way pre-war versions of the nationalist creed clashed – Mitsui organized itskeiretsu (networked establishmentarianism of a conservativecompanies) in a vertical order in his own developmentalist sort, and anti-business empire.11 establishmentarian underpinned by anti- imperialist zeal, passion for building a pan- While for 1960-80s South Korea it was mainly peninsular nation state (“Unification”) and Japan that played the roles both of a competitor social concern.6 The two versions shared to surpass and a model to follow, North Korea’s certain similarities – a militaristic view of relations with its foreign Others were more masculinity, for example, and a predominantly complex. In fact, by the late 1960s, both China ethnic, “bloodline”-based concept of nation.7 and the USSR, North Korea’s main foreign These were among the common denominators patrons, became simultaneously positive and for South and North Korean versions of negative models for the Pyongyang leadership. developmentalist nationalism which crystallized Both Cultural Revolution and de-Stalinization à by the early 1970s. Both were militantly anti- la Khrushchev were to be prevented at all individualistic and essentially culturallycosts, since they could threaten the stability of 12 conservative, and both were underpinned by the indigenous power hierarchy. In fact, the the modernized version of the Neo-Confucian foreign people mentioned in the most positive ethical codes.8 way in the official Explanations to Kim Il Sung’s (Kim Ilsŏng, 1912-1994) report to the Fifth Where they significantly differed – aside from Congress of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party more autarkic economic ideals in Pyongyang (1971), were the “struggling” Vietnamese, and Seoul’s firm intention to integrate itself Laotians and Kampucheans – the fellow victims into a US and Japan-centred international and of US aggression. regional capitalist order – was the international models adopted by each nationalism, that is, the pictures of foreign Others through which they tended to define themselves. South Korea’s President Park Chong Hee (Pak Chŏnghŭi, 1961-1979) tended to look to Meiji Japan, post-war West Germany and, interestingly, Israel, as sources for his developmentalist aspirations.9 Less acknowledged, but no less important was Park’s Manchurian connection from the early 1940s – Manchuguo, with its five-year development plans, state-controlled large-scale 2 10 | 7 | 3 APJ | JF Indochina, although Palestine was also specially mentioned), Africa and Latin America helped Kim Il Sung give the impression of lesser reliance upon China and the USSR, with whom North Korea maintained close ties. Learning from Others, Solidarity with Others While South Korea’s official nationalism operated with images of foreign Others as models, North Korea’s state discourse emphasized solidarity with fellow victims of imperialism – and fellow antagonists of imperialism. What is noteworthy here is the Kim Il Sung meeting Che Guevara in Pyongyang, fact that both ways of treating the images of December 1960. Support for the Cuban revolution, foreign Others is deeply ingrained in the together with a variety of other anti-imperialist modern Korean nationalistic tradition. Big movements in the Third World, was a major issue for powers (especially Japan, US or Germany) and North Korean diplomacy at that time. small but independent states (Switzerland or Their struggle was understood to be waged in Denmark) alike were treated as models from the name of world peace and for the protection the late nineteenth century by Korea’s of the whole socialist camp – thus, one of the modernist intelligentsia – and at the same time most important tasks of “South Koreanthe plight and struggle of Vietnam or the revolutionaries” was to stop the Park Chong Philippines were deeply sympathised. The Hee “puppet clique” from sending “cannon cases in which the independence struggle fodder” (South Korean troops) to Southseemed to have been long lost – typically Vietnam.13 When Park began in earnest to send Poland – were negative models. Korea, if it was South Korean military units to South Vietnam to survive, had to strugglenot to follow 16 in 1965, North Korea issued a lengthyPoland’s example. What has to be noted here memorandum (January 22, 1965) whichis that “benchmarking” Japan did not accused the “Park clique” of complicity with automatically indicate a pro-Japanese stance. the “insidious American plot to make Asians Bona fide anti-Japanese patriots too had good fight other Asians in the course of expanding reasons to turn to Japan in their search for the US aggressive wars in Asia.”14 While South secrets of proverbial “wealth and power”. Korea was participating in the American Enemies or not, the Japanese in Meiji and after invasion of Vietnam, in 1967 North Korea visibly succeeded in fending off foreign expressed solidarity with the embattled adversaries, something Korean patriots had Vietnamese by sending a number of pilots from reason to aspire to . A renowned patriot, who the Korean People’s Liberation Army (Northern later would voluntarily exile himself to China Korean army) to North Vietnam to provide and devote the rest of his life to the political training and to participate in combatstruggle for Korea’s liberation, Pak Ŭnsik operations alongside the pilots of the People’s (1859-1925), contrasted in his famed 1908 Army of Vietnam.15 Liberation of