DOCSLIB.ORG

Notes for a Theory of Constrained Balancing in First Amendment Cases: an Essay in Honor of Tom Emerson

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Notes for a Theory of Constrained Balancing in First Amendment Cases: an Essay in Honor of Tom Emerson Case Western Reserve Law Review Volume 38 Issue 4 Article 15 1988 Notes for a Theory of Constrained Balancing in First Amendment Cases: An Essay in Honor of Tom Emerson Burt Neuborne Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Burt Neuborne, Notes for a Theory of Constrained Balancing in First Amendment Cases: An Essay in Honor of Tom Emerson, 38 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 576 (1988) Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol38/iss4/15 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. NOTES FOR A THEORY OF CONSTRAINED BALANCING IN FIRST AMENDMENT CASES: AN ESSAY IN HONOR OF TOM EMERSON* Burt Neuborne** FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY is torn between an under- standable desire to minimize the capacity for subjective decision- making inherent in unconstrained judicial balancing and a nagging suspicion that subjectivism cannot be exorcised from the judicial process in first amendment cases, no matter how elegant the sub- stantive theory.' I have spent much of my career as a lawyer asking judges to intervene on the side of first amendment values in contexts including street demonstrations,2 coerced political contributions,3 speech in the classroom,4 flag desecration,5 censorship of foreign * Copyright 1988 by Burt Neuborne. ** Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; B.A., Cornell University (1961); J.D., Harvard Law School (1964). Professor Neuborne served as Legal Director of the American Civil Liberties Union from 1982-1986. 1. For a highly idiosyncratic sampling of helpful theoretical writing in the first amend- ment area, see L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986); F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982); Blasi, The Checking Value in FirstAmendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521; Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amend- ment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1985); Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in FirSt Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975); Karst, Equality as a CentralPrinciple in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20 (1975); Monaghan, FirstAmendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1970); Scanlon, A The- ory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972); Shiffrin, The First Amend- ment and Economic Regulation: Away From a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1212 (1983); Stone, Content Regulation and the FirstAmendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983). 2. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984), rev'g, 703 F.2d 586 (1983). 3. Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3266 (1987). 4. James v. Board of Education, 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972). 5. Cahn v. Long Island Vietnam Moratorium Committee, 437 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'd, 418 U.S. 906 (1974). 1988] A THEORY OF CONSTRAINED BALANCING speakers,6 pornography,7 offensive speech,8 and advertising. 9 I have experimented with first amendment theories stressing interpreta- tion, categorization, process, psychology, political theory and epis- temology in search of a vocabulary that would promise significant protection for free speech values, while limiting the degree of choice open to judges. Two theories, Tom Emerson's seminal perception that free speech, as an aspect of human dignity, is a function of institutional interplay, t0 and Alexander Meiklejohn's success in linking free speech with democracy,'1 are two theories that have provided law- yers and judges in first amendment cases with an indispensable in- tellectual matrix within which to consider whether a given communication is insulated from government suppression by the cryptic language of the first amendment. At their strongest, though, both the Emerson and Meiklejohn theories provide lawyers and judges seeking guidance with an elegant compass, not a detailed road map, and certainly not a street address. While both theories have been enormously valuable in identifying and deciding the "easy" cases and in setting general directions for "hard" ones, I do not believe that either theory has eliminated the reality of significant judicial choice in the decision of difficult first amendment cases. Judges and lawyers invoke Meildejohn and Emerson to help define categories or as a guide to interpretive analysis. In the end, how- ever, the elements of choice play a role in the definitional, cat- egorizational, or interpretive process in hard cases. While the reality of judicial choice is often submerged in the rhetoric of logic, definition, categorization, interpretive analysis, or ipse dixit, it is, in my experience, never far below the surface in any difficult first amendment case. A generation of first amendment scholars, inspired to no small degree by Tom Emerson's example, are now seeking to stand on Tom's shoulders in an effort to see farther into the realm of self- 6. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 108 S. Ct. 252 (1987). 7. Hudnut v. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 8. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 9. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1980) (decision without published opinion). 10. See generally T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966). 11. See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOv- ERNMENT (1948); A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Cr. REV. 245. CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:576 applying first amendment theory. Until they succeed though, law- yers are condemned to confront judicial choice as an inevitable as- pect of the process of applying necessarily abstract theory to maddeningly diverse fact. For me, the lesson of Tom Emerson's mastery of structural and systemic interplay is not to leave that in- evitable judicial choice wholly to chance. If judicial choice has not yet been, and perhaps never can be, eliminated from first amend- ment jurisprudence, I believe that its exercise can be channelled in ways that provide enhanced institutional protection for first amend- ment values. Since I believe that, under the current state of knowl- edge, a degree of often unarticulated, even unconscious, balancing takes place in difficult cases, I prefer to flush the balancing into the open. I seek to constrain its exercise, rather than to rely on substan- tive doctrines that purport to supplant balancing, but that merely drive it underground. My response, therefore, is to attempt to forge a theory of constrained balancing in first amendment cases. Unconstrained judicial balancing has been subjected to deserved academic criticism,12 especially in first amendment cases, 13 because it licenses a judge to engage in overtly subjective decision-making that replicates, and occasionally displaces, identical thought- processes already carried out by a politically responsible official. When a judge's proclivities are favorable to first amendment values, unconstrained balancing provides a formula for effective, if transi- tory, protection of free speech.14 When, however, a judge's values are less first amendment-sensitive (or when a judge believes herself institutionally incapable of second-guessing the factual or legal ba- ses for the political branch's decision to censor), the net result of unconstrained balancing is the collapse of effective judicial protec- tion of free speech. 5 Unconstrained balancing is, as Tom Emerson 12. Recent criticism of unconstrained balancing includes: Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987); Kahn, The Court, the Community and the JudicialBalance: The Jurisprudenceof Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. I (1987). See also C. DUCAT, MODES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, 116-92 (1978); Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: ConstitutionalBalancing, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1022 (1978). For a spirited de- fense of balancing, see Judge Frank M. Coffin, James Madison Lecture at New York Univer- sity School of Law, Judicial Balancing: The Protean Scales of Justice (scheduled for publication this year in N.Y.U. L. REV.). 13. Criticism of balancing in first amendment cases is summarized in Aleinikoff, supra note 12, at 972-95. 14. Justice Harlan's opinion in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) is a classic exam- ple of expansive protection of speech through sympathetic balancing. 15. See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Communist Party v. Subver- sive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). 1988] A THEORY OF CONSTRAINED BALANCING has shown, a feast or famine gamble, with the judicial outcome as dependent on who the judge is as on what the law requires. It is possible, though, to think about balancing as a more princi- pled judicial technique, subject to genuine constraints designed to protect significant values like free speech. For example, when a jury engages in the open-ended process of "balancing" conflicting evi- dence in order to find adjudicative fact, we seek to constrain the process in certain settings involving values of constitutional signifi- cance by instructing the fact-finder about the level of certainty that must exist before the balance can tip toward a particular finding.16 Moreover, we expect a trial judge, in deciding whether to allow a case to go to a jury or whether to allow a given verdict to stand, to determine whether a reasonable jury could have attained the re- quired level of certainty in order to assure that a pre-determined degree of error is deflected in favor of significant values.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Serving the Syllogism Machine: Reflections on Whether Brandenburg Is Now (Or Ever Was) Good Law
    SERVING THE SYLLOGISM MACHINE: REFLECTIONS ON WHETHER BRANDENBURG IS NOW (OR EVER WAS) GOOD LAW Burt Neuborne∗ I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS THE SOURCE OF THE SUPREME COURT’S POWER TO DECIDE BRANDENBURG? ...................................................... 1 II. MARBURY V. MADISON: A CONSTITUTIONAL FARCE IN THREE ACTS .... 5 A. Prelude to a Farce ........................................................................ 5 B. Building the Set: A Large Patronage Trough ............................. 12 C. Enter the Players ......................................................................... 15 1. Act I: The Disappearing Supreme Court Term ................... 19 2. Act II: How Not to Find Facts ............................................. 21 A Short Musical Interlude .................................................... 26 3. Act III: Find the Missing Court ........................................... 26 D. Requiem for an Epilogue ............................................................. 28 III. THE DIRTY LITTLE SECRET ................................................................. 30 IV. JOHN MARSHALL’S MIRACULOUS SYLLOGISM MACHINE .................. 32 V. ERROR DEFLECTION: A LEFT-HANDED REPAIR MANUAL FOR THE BROKEN MACHINE .............................................................................. 41 A. Screening for Bad Motive............................................................ 47 B. Deflecting Error on Justification or Consequence ..................... 48 VI. THE LEFT-HANDED REPAIR MANUAL IN OPERATION: ERROR- DEFLECTION
    [Show full text]
  • Tribute to Norman Dorsen
    TRIBUTE TO NORMAN DORSEN I am honored to have the opportunity to write about Norman Dorsen. My relationship with Norman began when I was a law stu­ dent. I am one of some 200 people who have been Arthur Garfield Hays fellows (or fellowettes), a program created by Norman Dorsen at New York University School of Law. When I was a "Hays," Nor­ man ran the program with Professor Sylvia Law; more recently, they have beenjoined by Professor Helen Hershkoff. I am therefore the recipient of a very special education, and I will sketch briefly some of what I have learned as a student of Norman's. A word of explanation is in order about the Hays Fellowship. In 1958, a fund was endowed at NYU School of Law in honor of Arthur Garfield Hays, the great civil libertarian. Since then, a small number of third-year NYU students annually are chosen as "Hays Fellows." As a Hays, one receives money towards tuition as well as course credits, and one does a mixture of academic research and hands-on work on issues such as free speech or welfare rights. Hays fellows have helped on many cases that went to the Supreme Court (such as Flast v. Cohen,l the Pentagon Papers litigation,2 and United States v. Nixon3 ) , as well as on thousands of lawsuits in the lower courts, on topics from discriminatory denial of homeowners insur­ ance, to unlawful limitations of access to abortion, to refusals to treat HIV patients. While I was a Hays, in 1974-75, I worked on a First Amendment book burning case, under the tutelage of Burt Neuborne and Alan Levine, who were then at the American and the New York Civil Lib­ erties Unions.
    [Show full text]
  • Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School Of
    ABOUT THE BRENNAN CENTER The Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law is a non-partisan public policy and law institute that focuses on fundamental issues of democracy and justice. Our work ranges from voting rights to campaign finance reform, from racial justice in criminal law to presidential power in the fight against terrorism. A singular institution – part think tank, part public interest law firm, part advocacy group – the Brennan Center combines scholarship, legislative and legal advocacy, and communications to win meaningful, measurable change in the public sector. ABOUT THE MONEY & POLITICS PROJECT To promote more open, honest, and accountable government, and to ensure that each citizen’s voice is heard in our democracy, laws governing money and politics must put the voter squarely at the center of the electoral process. The Brennan Center’s Money & Politics project supports grassroots/small donor public funding systems that enhance voters’ voices, as well as disclosure requirements and contribution limits that mitigate real and perceived excessive influence on elected officials. We are a leader in defending federal, state, and local campaign finance and public financing laws in court. In addition, we provide legal guidance to state and local officials and advocates, and publish reports and submit testimony in support of reform proposals. To restore the primacy of voters in elections and the integrity of the democratic process, the Brennan Center is responding to the Citizens United decision with a multi-pronged effort that endorses public financing of elections; modernizes voter registration; demands accountability in corporate political spending; and with this symposium, is beginning a multi-year effort to promote new jurisprudence that advances a voter-centric view of the First Amendment.
    [Show full text]
  • The Norman Dorsen Brief
    No. 18-422 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States dROBERT RUCHO, ET AL., Appellants, —v.— COMMON CAUSE, ET AL., Appellees. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA BRIEF OF COLLEAGUES OF PROFESSOR NORMAN DORSEN AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES BURT NEUBORNE Counsel of Record 40 Washington Square South New York, New York 10012 (212) 998-6172 [email protected] Attorney for Amici Curiae Colleagues of Professor Norman Dorsen i QUESTION PRESENTED Whether an extreme partisan gerrymander that intentionally pre-selects the overwhelmingly likely winner in each of North Carolina’s 13 Congressional Districts violates the First Amendment by: 1. discriminating of the basis of viewpoint; 2. imposing depressed levels of campaign fund- ing, speech, and electoral activity typically associated with non-competitive elections; and 3. denying voters of all political stripes the ability to exercise a meaningful personal choice over who is to represent them in the legislature? ii TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE QUESTION PRESENTED ................. i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................ iv INTEREST OF AMICI ..................... 1 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............. 2 ARGUMENT— THE FIRST AMENDMENT BARS THE NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATURE FROM: .................................. 7 (1) DISCRIMINATING ON THE BASIS OF VIEWPOINT IN DRAWING VIRTUALLY UNCONTESTABLE DISTRICT LINES CONCEDEDLY DESIGNED TO FAVOR A SINGLE POLITICAL PARTY; (2) LOCKING AS MANY VOTERS AS POSSIBLE INTO VIRTUALLY UNCON- TESTABLE ELECTION DISTRICTS CHARACTERIZED BY DEPRESSED AND UNEQUAL LEVELS OF CAMPAIGN SPENDING, DIMINISHED LEVELS OF POLITICAL SPEECH AND ASSOCIATION, AND DISAPPOINTING LEVELS OF VOTER PARTICIPATION; AND (3) DENYING NORTH CAROLINA VOTERS A MEANINGFUL PERSONAL CHOICE CONCERNING WHO WILL REPRESENT THEM IN CONGRESS Introduction and Factual Summary .......
    [Show full text]
  • The Nylon Curtain: America's National Border and the Free Flow of Ideas
    William & Mary Law Review Volume 26 (1984-1985) Issue 5 Article 3 June 1985 The Nylon Curtain: America's National Border and the Free Flow of Ideas Burt Neuborne Steven R. Shapiro Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons Repository Citation Burt Neuborne and Steven R. Shapiro, The Nylon Curtain: America's National Border and the Free Flow of Ideas, 26 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 719 (1985), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol26/ iss5/3 Copyright c 1985 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr ARTICLES THE NYLON CURTAIN: AMERICA'S NATIONAL BORDER AND THE FREE FLOW OF IDEAS BURT NEUBORNE* and STEVEN R. SHAPIRO** When Winston Churchill coined his inspired bit of rhetoric some forty years ago, he shaped the perceptions of a generation. By characterizing the Soviet empire as encased in an iron curtain,1 Churchill projected the essence of a closed, totalitarian regime bent on manipulating its citizens through controlled information flow; a regime that could never risk the free exchange of informa- tion, values, and ideals with competing social systems. More than any other phrase, "iron curtain" has symbolized for many of us in the postwar West the specter of whole nations turned into prisons, with national borders acting as walls to keep ideas out and citizens in. Like most rhetoric, even Churchill's tended to be one-dimen- sional, blinding many in the West to the existence of indigenous popular support for socialist societies premised on values different from our own, and grossly oversimplifying the problem of our rela- tionship with the Soviet world.
    [Show full text]
  • Burt Neuborne Is a Litigating Academic, a Pragmatic Liberal, and an Inquisitive Teacher
    oof: 2 • 7/18/04 • dn File: LSMGNEU05 • Pr Burt Neuborne is a litigating academic, a pragmatic liberal, and an inquisitive teacher. He sees himself, simply, as an imaginative lawyer. 16 THE LAW SCHOOL AUTUMN 2004 oof: 2 • 7/18/04 • dn File: LSMGNEU05 • Pr Illustration by Goro Sasaki CREATIVE COUNSEL BY JOSEPH BERGER o understand how Burt Neuborne has managed to win so many watershed constitutional Tcases and harvest billions of dollars for families of Holocaust survivors around the world, all while being a faculty star at the New York University School of Law, it helps to reach back to his days as a gangly youngster on the postwar streets of Jamaica, Queens. As dusk would fall, young Burt would be out playing stickball with the rest of the neighborhood kids and the receding light would make the spaldeen (as the pink Spalding rubber ball was known) hard to pick out. His less relentless buddies were ready to call it a day. Not Neuborne. “When it would get dark and I was losing, I would always say, ‘We can play another inning,’ ” he remembers. Now fast-forward to the Vietnam War era to roughly 1970, when Neuborne, a lawyer for the New York Civil Liberties Union, was defending an artist who had been arrested for sewing a 7 1/2 foot-long American flag into the shape of a penis, stuffing it, and displaying it near the window of AUTUMN 2004 THE LAW SCHOOL 17 a Madison Avenue gallery. A three-judge criminal court panel con- around a few signature themes like the First Amendment and civil rights.
    [Show full text]
  • Supreme Court of the United States
    No. 16-1161 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States dBEVERLEY R. GILL, et al., Appellants, —v.— WILLIAM WHITFORD, et al., Appellees. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN BRIEF OF COLLEAGUES OF PROFESSOR NORMAN DORSEN AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES BURT NEUBORNE Counsel of Record NORMAN DORSEN (1930-2017) 40 Washington Square South New York, New York 10012 (212) 998-6172 [email protected] Attorneys for Amici Curiae Colleagues of Professor Norman Dorsen QUESTION PRESENTED Whether a massive partisan gerrymander that entrenches the transient majority’s political control of the Wisconsin legislature for the foreseeable future, and virtually eliminates genuinely contestable legislative elections from Wisconsin political life, violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments? i TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE QUESTION PRESENTED ..................................i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................. iii INTEREST OF AMICI ....................................... 1 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ............................. 4 ARGUMENT ...................................................... 7 SYSTEMATIC POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING THAT DENIES VOTERS A FAIR OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE IN GENUINELY CONTESTABLE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT .............................................. 7 A. The Impact of the Wisconsin Gerrymander on Genuinely Contestable Legislative Elections .......... 10 B. The Scope of the First Amendment Right to Participate in a Genuinely Contestable Legislative
    [Show full text]
  • Supreme Court of the United States
    Nos. 06-969, 06-970 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, Appellant, v. WISCONSIN RIGHT TO LIFE, INC., et al., Appellees. McCAIN, Appellant, v. WISCONSIN RIGHT TO LIFE, INC., _______________________________ Appellee. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF NORMAN DORSEN, ARYEH NEIER, BURT NEUBORNE, AND JOHN SHATTUCK IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS BURT NEUBORNE Counsel of Record DEBORAH GOLDBERG DAVID GANS BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT NYU LAW SCHOOL 161 Avenue of the Americas 12th Floor New York, New York 10013 (212) 998-6730 Attorneys for Amici Curiae TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Authorities…..…………………………………….iii Statement of Interest……………………………………….. 1 Summary of Argument…………………………………….. 1 Argument…………………………………………………... 4 I. This Court Should End the Strategic Game Played by Both Sides in the Litigation Leading to this Appeal………………………………………. 4 II. WRTL’s Advertisements Do Not Qualify for an As-Applied Exemption from Section 203’s Ban on Corporate Funding of “Electioneering Communications”………………… 7 A. The District Court Plainly Erred in Refusing To Consider the Factual Context of the Advertisements………………….8 B. The District Court’s Refusal To Consider Factual Context Was Not Required by Administrative Necessity or a Concern with “Chilling” Corporate-Funded Political Speech………………………………..10 1. Courts Are Competent To Consider Context in Evaluating As-Applied Challenges…………………………..….11 ii 2. Consideration of the Factual Context Does Not Threaten Constitutionally Protected Issue Speech…………..………………..14 C. Viewed in Factual Context, WRTL’s Advertisements Do Not Qualify for an As-Applied Exemption from Section 203’s Ban on Corporate Electioneering………........…14 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Law School’S Vision
    IN THIS ISSUE Furman Hall Opens: The Architecture of a Law School’s Vision. The Creative Counsel: Professor Burt Neuborne reflects on his NYU career as a litigating academic. Law School Top Criminal Minds: THE MAGAZINE OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY A world-class faculty makes the case for NYU. SCHOOL OF LAW AUTUMN 2004 Partners in Crime On Our Cover Criminal Law Personified: Here’s how to make a professor proud. NAACP Legal Defense Fund law- yer, Vanita Gupta (’01), the subject of Turning the Tables in Tulia, on page 53, confers with co-coun- sel during the course of her high-stakes bid to free 35 wrongly-convicted citizens of Tulia, Texas. The lawyer facing Gupta in the sketch is another NYU School of Law graduate, Adam Levin (’97), who took the case pro bono for D.C. firm Hogan & Hartson. Levin is now one of the firm’s senior associates. Artist Marilyn Church has covered famous court- room spectacles including trials involving Robert Chambers, John Gotti, and Jean Harris of Scars- dale Diet fame—since the seventies. Her work is often on ABC and in The New York Times, and has been published in Fortune, Esquire, Time, and Newsweek. Message from Dean Revesz he Law School continues to astonish me with its vitality. Having completed my second year of stewardship as dean, I feel so grateful for the privilege of learning and interacting with the various communities that comprise the T NYU School of Law. In one extraordinary week last spring, for example, I first welcomed James Wolfensohn, the president of the World Bank, to an important conference on Human Rights and Development.
    [Show full text]
  • Convention Schedule
    CONVENTION SCHEDULE Thursday, June 11 1:30–3:30 p.m. Student Retreat ................................................................K&L Gates, 1601 K St, NW 2:00–3:30 p.m. Media and Op-Ed Training ................................................... South American B Room Garrett Epps, Contributing Writer at The Atlantic and Professor of Law at University of Baltimore School of Law 3:00–9:00 p.m. Registration Open .........................................................................Capital Terrace 4:00–5:00 p.m. Speed Networking ........................................................ Congressional/Senate Room 5:30–6:30 p.m. Attendee Welcome Meet-Up ...........................................................Capital Terrace 5:30–6:45 p.m. VIP Reception* ..................................................................South American A/B Room 7:00–9:00 p.m. Gala Dinner ........................................................................... Presidential Ballroom Remarks by ACS President Caroline Fredrickson Presentation of the David Carliner Public Interest Award Keynote Address by Former Attorney General Eric Holder Closing Remarks by ACS Board Chair David Brodsky 9:30–11:00 p.m. Student Chapter Happy Hour ..................................... Black Finn Saloon, 1620 I St, NW Friday, June 12 7:15 a.m.–6:00 p.m. Registration Open .........................................................................Capital Terrace 7:30–8:45 a.m. Judicial Nominations Task Force Breakfast* .......................South American A/B Room 7:45–8:45
    [Show full text]