When the French Army Invaded Germany in 1939 to Support Poland, All Did Not Go As Planned

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When The French Army Invaded Germany in 1939 To Support Poland, All Did Not Go As Planned

Feb 17, 2018 Andrew Knighton

French soldier at the German village of Lauterbach in Saarland. Hohum - CC BY-SA 3.0

Germany was not the first country to go on the offensive on the western front of World War Two. That first attack came from France, which launched a brief and ineffective invasion of Germany in September 1939. This

1 That first attack came from France, which launched a brief and ineffective invasion of Germany in September 1939. This attack, intended to help the far-away Poles, became an embarrassing defeat and a harbinger of what would follow when Germany invaded France.

The Aim of Operation Saar

Following the First World War, both France and Poland had reasons to fear future German military aggression. Since Prussia united the fractured German states under its leadership in the 1860s, German leaders had used military action against their neighbors to the east and west both as routes to territorial aggrandizement and a way to keep Germany united. Germany was a nation with a reputation for belligerence, whose troops had marched through both countries in the First World War.

To counter this German belligerence, the French and the Polish governments agreed to a military treaty in 1921, binding them to support each other in any war against Germany. It was on the back of this treaty that, two days after the German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939, France declared war on Germany.

At the time, the declaration of war was a largely symbolic act. Like Britain, which had declared war on the same day, France was too far from Poland to offer real aid in driving back the invaders.

But one possibility offered itself. An invasion of western Germany by French troops might draw soldiers away from the attack on Poland. Failing that, it would at least give France a head start in the war that must inevitably come her way.

2 The Saar Offensive

French soldier at the German village of Lauterbach in Saarland. Hohum – CC BY-SA 3.0 What followed was Operation Saar, an invasion of the German region of Saarland. Unfortunately for the French, the restrictions that bound them to this plan would also ensure its failure.

The French did not want to violate the neutrality of Belgium by taking armed forces across its territory. As a result, they could only attack Germany along a limited front. This front had been defined 125 years earlier, during the peace process following the Napoleonic wars, when the rest of Europe was concerned with containing French aggression. It gave the Germans the advantage of the defensive high ground.

3 German artillery on Siegfried Line. Bundesarchiv- CC-BY-SA 3.0 de. Still, the French had made a promise to Poland, and they lived up to it. On 7 September they invaded Saarland with a limited force, which was due to be followed by a full-scale invasion a few weeks later. Forty divisions were sent in, with 4,700 artillery and 2,400 tanks. Facing them were 22 divisions and less than 100 artillery pieces of the German 1st Army.

4 The Advance Stalls

September 1939: french R-35 tanks (5th BCC) in the Warndt forest, during the short-lived offensive in the Sarre. The French advanced five miles into Germany, taking a few towns and villages. The Germans had evacuated this territory, pulling back to the prepared defenses of the Siegfried Line. They left behind minefields and booby-trapped houses to slow down and damage the advancing French. The French came unprepared, lacking mine detectors.

Part of the problem was the French mobilization plan. They had been expecting to face an attack by Germany and were prepared for this. But despite their commitment to the Poles, they lacked an adequate plan for taking the war to Germany.

5 Maurice Gamelin, French Commander in Chief in 1939. What plans the French did have were outdated, relying on the strategies of the First World War, the slow and bloody advance of trench warfare and protracted bombardments. But as the Germans were showing in the east, this was a new age of warfare. Victory now relied on fast advances and swiftly flowing forces, using hard-hitting, swift-moving tanks and transport vehicles that had not existed during the First World War.

Even for the plans they had in mind, the French mobilization system was outdated. They lacked the ability and the will to swiftly mobilize a large army and put it to effective use. The first steps towards mobilization had only started on 26 August, and full mobilization on 1 September, following the German invasion of Poland.

As the French army dragged itself into action, its advancing formations came within artillery range of the Siegfried Line. Here they discovered the effectiveness of the German defenses and the ineffectiveness of the guns they had brought. 6 To fire on the Siegfried Line they had to bring their artillery within range the answering German firepower. The French had far more guns, and their bombardment fell both accurately and rapidly on the German positions, but the guns could not penetrate those defenses.

Some fired 155mm shells, not heavy enough to make a real impression on the concrete bunkers. Those firing 220mm and 280mm shells might have done better, but their ammunition did not have delayed fuses, and so exploded on impact rather than penetrating the outer casements first. Explosives were hurled against the German line to little effect.

Withdrawal

9th of September 1939: French soldiers of the 42nd infantry division in the German village of Lauterbach. On 12 September, the British and French met. They already believed that Poland was a lost cause, and so decided to halt all operations while a long-term plan was developed. Advancing troops stopped short of assaulting the Siegfried Line. The Poles, who had not been consulted on the decision, were told that the full assault on the western front was to be delayed until 20 September.

On 17 September, the invasion of Poland by Russian forces ended any small hope that remained for the Poles. French forces withdrew from Saarland, leaving only a small holding force. The full assault was canceled. 7 With Poland defeated, German troops were sent west, and on 16 October they launched a counter-offensive in Saarland. As planned, the French troops withdrew, leaving the Germans to retake the captured territory. The French pulled back to defensive positions along the ill-fated Maginot Line.

Little blood had been split over Saarland to distract the Germans. Even less effort had been expended. The French had shown that they were not prepared for an offensive war, and settled into a defensive position that they would also soon lose.

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The Maginot Line – 11 Fascinating Facts About France’s Great Wall by MilitaryHistoryNow.com • 7 May, 2017 • 3 Comments FacebookTwitterGoogle+RedditPinterestStumbleUponLinkedInEmailPrintFriendly 2

“Build a wall!” was more than just a 2016 presidential campaign slogan. It was in effect France’s military strategy for the years between the two World Wars.

8 “The Maginot Line has come to symbolize everything wrong with the Allied strategy in the years leading up to the Second World War… But was it really the disaster many have suggested?”

WORLD WAR ONE shattered France.

German troops invaded the country within weeks of the opening of hostilities in 1914. For the next four years, the enemy occupied roughly 8,000 square miles of French territory — an area roughly the size of Massachusetts and one that contained a quarter of the country’s steel manufacturing capacity, 40 per cent of its coal reserves and a whopping 64 per cent of pig iron production.

Eight million citizens were mobilized to drive the Germans from France; an estimated 52 percent of them became casualties. In fact, fully five percent of the country’s total population perished in the war. Many of the conflicts’s deadliest battles, like the Somme, Verdun and Germany’s 1918 Spring Offensive were fought on French soil.

Following the Armistice, France was determined to be ready for future wars. As the Weimar Republic began to rearm Germany in the late 1920s — a policy that later only accelerated under the Nazis — the French government set to work constructing an enormous defensive barrier along its eastern border to deter invasion. It was to be called the Maginot Line.

A map of the Maginot Line. (Image source: WikiCommons)

9 Named for André Maginot, the French war minister who during the 1920s pressed the government to allocate money to border defences, this 280-mile long network of concrete bunkers, pill boxes and underground casemates certainly appeared formidable upon its completion. But it would turn out that France’s fixed defences, menacing as they were, would be famously outflanked by Germany’s Panzer divisions in 1940, who attacked France by way of neutral Belgium.

Since then, the Maginot Line has come to symbolize everything wrong with the Allied strategy in the years leading up to the Second World War. But were France’s defences really the disaster many have suggested? Here are 10 facts about one of military history’s most impressive yet regrettable engineering feats.

The Maginot Line was a 900-mile long network of underground bunkers, tunnels and concrete retractible gun batteries. Its heaviest defences were located along the 280-mile long border with Germany (Image source: WikiCommons) It was one of the most formidable military projects in history

France’s Commission d’Organisation des Régions Fortifiées (CORF) spent 10 years designing, laying down, improving and extending the border fortifications that would eventually become known as the Maginot Line. Work began modestly in 1929 with a series of simple concrete gun emplacements along France’s frontier with the demilitarized Rhineland. Improvements and expansions would continue into the 1930s. Although the ultimate goal was to have the defences one day stretch the full distance of the border from the Swiss Alps to the English Channel, the most densely fortified section of the line sat on France’s 300-mile long frontier with Germany. The national government spent an estimated 3.3 billion Francs on the project. Its 142 bunkers, 352 casemates and 5,000 blockhouses were built using 1.5 million cubic meters of concrete and 150,000 tons of steel – enough to build 5,300 Char B1 tanks or five Richelieu- class battleships.

Retractible steel and concrete gun batteries were hallmarks of the Maginot Line. (Image source: WikiCommons) The defences were many miles thick

At its broadest, the Maginot Line was more than 16 miles deep and was made up of a series of separate defensive layers. These included camouflaged observation points positioned right along the German border. To the rear were anti-tank, mortar and machine gun emplacements; underground infantry bunkers or casemates. Father to back was a patchwork of small and large ouvrages featuring retractable 75- to 135-mm gun steel domed cloches or bell turrets. In all, there were 142 artillery forts, 352 casemates and 5,000 smaller fortifications, many of which were laid out across the landscape to create interlocking fields of fire. Installations were also linked by a labyrinth of tunnels allowing personnel to move from position to position. Supporting the line was a network of mobile rail guns that could bring extra fire to bear where needed. Overseeing the entire chain was a string of 78 of hilltop fire control decks that enabled observers to direct artillery fire onto enemy troop and vehicle concentrations. The whole system was linked by its own self-contained telephone and wireless communications infrastructure.

A field of tank obstacles. (Image source: Youtube) It had a series of hidden surprises

If the Maginot Line’s guns, mortars and machine gun nests weren’t enough to break up an attack, engineers added a host of additional obstacles to stop the enemy outright or detour them into pre-sighted killing zones. Minefields dotted the approaches to the various strongholds, while fields of iron girders protruding vertically from the ground created wide impassable barriers for tanks. Elsewhere, dams and levees were built that could be opened in an emergency to flood large swaths of the countryside. Engineers designed the bunkers with forward facing 12-foot thick concrete walls, but relatively thin defences in the rear, so that any positions captured in frontal assaults could be easily retaken by French counterattack.

French soldiers moved to their posts by way of a Maginot Line underground subway system. (Image source: Youtube) Accommodations seemed lavish

Living conditions appeared quite comfortable for the half-million infantry, artillerymen and engineers who permanently manned the Maginot Line. The sprawling underground casemates were home to barracks, mess halls, hospitals and even recreation areas. Each ouvrage had its own power generator, hot and cold running water and was stocked with enough food and supplies to withstand a lengthy siege. Soldiers could even commute to and from their forward positions by way of a self-contained, narrow-gauge subway. The ventilation system kept the air in the in the passageways filtered and even pressurized to protect the soldiers within from gas attacks. Yet despite all the amenities, life underground was not always pleasant for the soldiers. The passageways were notoriously damp and cold and the sewage system was prone to backups.

France hoped the Maginot Line would prevent a frontal assault by Germany and instead divert an attack through Belgium. (Image source: WikiCommons) The Maginot Line masked a somewhat underhanded strategy

On the surface, the Maginot Line was engineered to blunt a direct German attack into France, while safeguarding vital industries situated in the contested Alsace and Lorraineregions. But the Maginot strategy also concealed a Machiavellian streak. Defence planners imagined that the menacing barrier might compel Germany to avoid a frontal assault and instead attack by way of Belgium. Such a move would no doubt draw other European powers, namely Great Britain, into a conflict and arouse world opinion against Berlin. It was hoped that in such a scenario, the invaders would be defeated by an Allied army in Belgium.

A fanciful cutaway of one of the Maginot Line’s underground complexes. Maginot Mania gripped France

The Maginot Line quickly became the pride of the French people. Newsreel footage of its impregnable bunkers and powerful guns contributed to feelings of national invincibility. Tragically, the defences so impressed voters, many resisted the idea of strengthening the country’s field army to match Germany’s modern mechanized war machine.

A segment of Germany’s “Westwall.” (Image source: WikiCommons) Many nations followed the France’s lead

Maginot Line propaganda made an impression on more than just the people of France – other world powers took note as well and were soon investing in their own copycat fortifications. Beginning in 1936, Greece began work on a 100- mile long Maginot knock-off along its frontier with long-time foe Bulgaria. It was dubbed the Metaxas Line after the country’ prime minister. Similarly, Czechoslovakia assembled its own network of bunkers, pillboxes and artillery forts on its border with Nazi Germany as early as 1935. Even the Third Reich constructed fortifications opposite the Maginot Line in the two years leading up to the outbreak of the war. Dubbed the “Siegfried Line” by the Allies, Hitler’s “Westwall” as it was officially known was far less ambitious than its French counterpart, consisting mainly of fortified gun emplacements and tank obstacles including, ditches, concrete dragon’s teeth and steel hedgehogs.

Charles de Gaulle (right). Not everyone was impressed with the Maginot Line

Despite the stock France placed in fortifications, the entire concept was not without its critics. The hawkish and thoroughly anti-Nazi politician Paul Reynaud lobbied his party to abandon the works and invest instead (like Germany) in a strong air force and tanks. It was an opinion shared by a young up-and-coming French officer by the name of Charles de Gaulle. The First World War veteran and author of the 1934 book Vers l’Armée de Métier or “Toward a Professional Army” proposed France depart from strategies of defence and build its army around the principles of mobile warfare and the decisive use of tanks. Few in France paid much attention to de Gaulle, but his book was ominously successful in Germany.

Germany never launched a full-fledged frontal assault on the Maginot Line. They drove around it. (Image source: WikiCommons) The Maginot Line was easily outflanked

Despite the time, effort and money that went into the Maginot Line, it saw relatively little action during the war. Hitler’s army bypassed it entirely in May of 1940 and (as predicted) invaded France by way of Belgium. By June, Nazi panzers had swept south from the Ardennes, outmaneuvered the French army and its British allies and cut off the Maginot Line from the rear. Early in the invasion, Wehrmacht guns bombarded one of the isolated Maginot fortifications along the Belgian border known le petit ouvrage La Ferté for four days. By the time it was overrun, the entire garrison of 107 were killed in the attack. Most suffocated when fire tore through the interior of the casemate. Its damaged turrets remain a national monument to this day. Further south, German units attempted to storm various points along the line in a series of frontal assaults throughout June of 1940. In most cases, the troops inside the Maginot Line held out and only emerged after France surrendered.

Parts of the Maginot Line have been preserved as historic landmarks. (Image source: WikiCommons) It continued to be manned after World War Two

Blitzkrieg didn’t spell the end for the Maginot Line. French troops reoccupied it after VE Day and many of the fortifications were repaired and even upgraded. In the years following 1945, a number of the largest and deepest bunkers became NATO command centres. By the time France withdrew from the alliance in the late 1960s, most of the facilities had been closed, abandoned and auctioned off to wine makers, farmers and housing developers. A number of installations remain as historical landmarks and tourist attractions.

American GIs retake a section of the Maginot Line. (Image source: WikiCommons) Historians have reconsidered the Maginot Line

Some argue that despite being outflanked by the German army, the Maginot Line did actually fulfil its mission. It kept the German army from invading directly and safeguarded the coveted Alsace–Lorraine territories. Defenders of the

20 fortifications point out that it was France’s field army that failed to stem the Nazi onslaught through the Ardennes. It’s this fiasco that ultimately led to the fall of France.

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• On This Day The Norway Campaign in World War Two By Dr Eric Grove Last updated 2011-03-30

The battle for Norway cost Germany and Britain dearly. A prime minister, naval strength and even the ability to mount an invasion of Britain were among the casualties. Eric Grove considers the consequences of the campaign's strategic failures. On this page

• Hitler's gamble

• German troops land

• Attack and counter-attack

• Narvik 21 • Evacuation

• Britain's strategic failure

• Find out more

• Print this page Hitler's gamble

A few months into World War Two, in April 1940, Adolf Hitler made a huge strategic gamble. He and his strategists knew that Norwegian coastal waters were vital for the transport of Swedish iron ore via Narvik to German blast furnaces. And, more generally, recognised that German control of Norwegian waters would make breaking the Allied blockade of Germany a little easier.

Germany had also seen the signs that the British would not necessarily be bound by Norway's neutrality, and could hinder the process if they were so minded. The British position was made fairly clear when Royal Navy seamen boarded the German naval auxiliary Altmark, in Norwegian waters, to free the prisoners on board, and the Allies had indeed for some time been making plans for aggressive action to plug the gap in their blockade.

Germany's navy was greatly inferior to the Royal Navy in all categories ...

Hitler's plans in the face of this situation were decisive. The idea was that the whole strength of the German navy was to land powerful forces all the way along the Norwegian coast, from Oslo to Narvik, to protect the coastal waterways along which the iron ore was transported.

This was risky in the extreme. Germany's navy was greatly inferior to the Royal Navy in all categories, and even if the troops succeeded in getting ashore, helped by the element of surprise, it was quite possible for them to be cut off subsequently.

Only one thing might prevent disaster - German air power, in the shape of Fiegerkorps X. This unit contained about 400 bombers, whose crews had been specially trained in maritime operations, and it was hoped that these could keep the British at bay.

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German troops land

Delays to the German occupation of Oslo enabled Royals and politicians to escape ©By April the British had changed their plan, and reduced it to a relatively less complex mining operation. Then, as luck would have it, both the British and German operations went ahead at almost the same time. British mine-laying began early on 8 April, but was disrupted by news of major German fleet movements. 22 The Admiralty, on its own initiative, decided that all strength should be diverted to dealing with the German fleet at sea, and troops already aboard British cruisers and intended for the likely landings were disembarked. Hitler's troops landed on Norwegian soil the following day.

The German operation was generally successful, but did not go entirely according to plan.

The German operation was generally successful, but did not go entirely according to plan. At Oslo the brand new heavy cruiser Blucher was sunk by Norwegian coast defences in Oslo Fiord. This delayed the occupation of the capital, and allowed the members of the Norwegian government and royal family to escape.

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Attack and counter-attack

Blucher's sister ship, Hipper, was also damaged when she was rammed by the British destroyer Glowworm, but she was still able to help take the city of Trondheim. The light cruiser Karlsruhe led the assault on Kristiansand, but was sunk later that same day by the British submarine Truant. Her sister ship, Konigsberg, was damaged by Norwegian shore batteries at Bergen, and was finished off by British Skua naval dive bombers flying from the Orkneys the next day. She was the first major warship ever to be sunk by aircraft.

... German destroyers were able to get their troops ashore, sinking two Norwegian coast defence vessels in the process.

In the far north, at Narvik, the ten most modern German destroyers were able to get their troops ashore, sinking two Norwegian coast defence vessels in the process. The senior British officer in the area was WJ Whitworth, Vice Admiral of the Battlecruiser Squadron in HMS Renown. He had fought a fleeting engagement with the German fast battleships Scharnhorstand Gneisenau early on the 9th but the Germans, after being hit several times, had used superior speed to get away.

Unfortunately the Admiralty did not give Whitworth the opportunity to mount a powerful counter attack on the Germans at Narvik, and only a single destroyer flotilla was ordered in by London on 10 April. This consisted of Captain BAW Warburton-Lee's five 'H' class vessels.

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Narvik

These sank two of the German destroyers in Narvik harbour and damaged three others, but were engaged by the remaining five German ships. The British flotilla leader Hardy was sunk (Warburton-Lee was awarded the first Victoria Cross of World War Two) as was HMS Hunter. Whitworth led in a more powerful force in the battleship Warspite three days later. She and the nine accompanying destroyers annihilated the rest of the German flotilla.

Whitworth had this kind of freedom of action because German air power had still not reached so far north. Less happy was Admiral Sir Charles Forbes, Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet, who first encountered Fliegerkorps X on the afternoon of 9 May, off southern Norway. Although during this attack only one ship, the destroyer Gurkha, was sunk, Forbes thought that the danger was such that he could not

23 operate his surface forces in these waters. His carrier Furious had no fighters, and the anti-aircraft guns of the fleet provided insufficient protection, contrary to what pre-war thinking had led him to expect.

The troops had to be evacuated, with two Allied destroyers, one British and one French ...

The main Allied counter-attack came at Trondheim, with a two-pronged attack from Namsos in the north and Andalsnes in the south. But reinforced by Stuka dive bombers, Fliegerkorps Xdominated the region, supporting the better equipped German ground forces in defeating the Allies. The deployment of fighters from the carriers Glorious and Ark Royal, as well as RAF Gladiator fighters from a frozen lake, could do little to help. The troops had to be evacuated, with two Allied destroyers, one British and one French, being sunk off Namsos and a British sloop at Andalsnes.

It was still hoped that northern Norway might be held, to deny the Germans their iron ore. Narvik was occupied by a mixed force of mountain troops, reinforced by the crews of the destroyers that had landed them, and a parachute battalion dropped in from the air. An Allied force of British, French, Norwegian and Polish troops was built up, and land-based air cover was provided by a squadron of Gladiators and one of Hurricanes, flown from carriers.

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Evacuation

Despite successes, Allied forces withdrew from Norway in 1941 ©After delays caused by divided counsels, Narvik was finally taken on 28 May, but the decision to evacuate it had by that time been made. The German victories of that month in France and the Low Countries had transformed the strategic situation, and had left the Allies with little alternative. In any case, the withdrawing Germans had done a comprehensive job of destroying the iron ore facilities. The evacuation was marred by the loss of the British aircraft carrier Glorious which, with an escort of two destroyers, was returning ahead of the rest of the fleet carrying evacuated Hurricane fighters. The carrier was caught by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and sunk with gunfire, although Scharnhorst was torpedoed and seriously damaged by the escorting destroyer Acasta.

... by the end of the campaign the German navy had only three cruisers and four destroyers operational.

Shortly afterwards Gneisenauwas also torpedoed by the submarine Clyde, and by the end of the campaign the German navy had only three cruisers and four destroyers operational. This was not a force that could

24 contest the command of the Channel to cover a cross-Channel invasion, and in this way the Norwegian campaign probably helped save Britain.

Although Germany succeeded in pushing back the British blockade line, it never found Norway to be the asset it had hoped for. And although the territory later provided a base from which to attack Allied Arctic convoys to the USSR, Norway's defence tied down more forces than the country's strategic usefulness merited.

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Britain's strategic failure

Norway was, however, also a major strategic failure for the British. This was a campaign that should have played to British strengths. Instead it brought out one of the major weaknesses of the contemporary Royal Navy - its incapacity to contest command of the air off a distant shore, due to its lack of radar control and high performance fighters.

In addition to the other losses, the cruiser Effingham was wrecked and the anti-aircraft cruiser Curlew bombed and sunk near Narvik, while a French cruiser was seriously damaged. A total of seven British destroyers was lost, plus one French and one Polish. Given Allied superiority in numbers these losses were not too serious, but the sense of failure was real.

A total of seven British destroyers was lost, plus one French and one Polish.

Even before the campaign was over, it was perceived to have gone so badly that there was a vote of no confidence in the British Parliament. The government suffered a reduced majority, and Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain resigned.

The main architect of the Norway campaign, the British First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill, who had been responsible for many of the mistakes of the campaign, was the main beneficiary of these political events. He was the favoured candidate to take over as prime minister, and thus became Britain's war leader. Such are the ironies of history.

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Find out more

Books

Naval Operations of the Campaign in Norway edited by D Brown (Frank Cass Publishers, 2000)

The Campaign in Norway by TK Derry (Imperial War Museum , 1985)

Narvik, Battles in the Fjords by P Dickens (Naval Institute Press, 1996)

Norway 1940 by F Kersaudy (St Martins Press, 1991)

Norway 1940, The Forgotten Fiasco by J Kynoch (The Crowood Press, 2002)

25 The Norwegian Campaign of 1940 by JL Moulton (Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1966)