Yes, But... Some Skeptical Remarks on Realism and Anti-Realism Author(S): Howard Stein Source: Dialectica, Vol. 43, No. 1/2 (1989), Pp

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Yes, but... Some Skeptical Remarks on Realism and Anti-Realism Author(s): Howard Stein Source: Dialectica, Vol. 43, No. 1/2 (1989), pp. 47-65 Published by: Wiley Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/42970610 Accessed: 22-11-2015 14:14 UTC

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This content downloaded from 171.67.34.69 on Sun, 22 Nov 2015 14:14:03 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Yes, but. . . Some Skeptical Remarks on Realism and Anti-Realism

byHoward Stein *

Summary Thispaper argues that the much discussed issue between "scientific realism" and "instrumentalism"has not been clearly drawn. Particular attention is paid to the claim that only real- ismcan "explain" the success of scientific theories and - moreespecially - theprogressively increasingsuccess of such theories ina coherentline of inquiry. This claim is used to attempt to reacha clearerconception ofthe content of the realist thesis that underlies it;but, it is here con- tended,that attempt fails, and the claim itself hangs in the air. A seriesof increasingly sophis- ticatedversions ofthe "instrumentalist" thesisis considered, and both these and the contentions ofrealism are placed in relation both to particular examples of scientific development andposi- tionshistorically maintained byphilosophers and by scientists. The author's conclusion is that, whenthe positions are assessed against the background ofthe actual history ofscience, (a) each ofthe contrary doctrines, interpreted with excessive simplicity, is inadequate as a theoryof the dialecticof scientificdevelopment; (b) each,so interpreted,has contributedin important instancesto actualdamage to investigationsbygreat scientists (Huygens, Kelvin, Poincaré); whereas(c) inboth the theoretical statements and the actual practice of (in the author's opinion) themost sophisticated philosophers/scientists, important aspects of realism and instrumentalism arepresent together insuch a waythat the alleged contradiction between them vanishes. Résumé Onoppose souvent leréalisme scientifique etl'instrumentalisme. Maisl'alternative n'est pas clairementformulée. On insiste particulièrement surla thèse que seul le réalisme peut «expliquer» lesuccès des théories scientifiques etplus spécialement lesuccès grandissant avec le temps de ces théoriesdans une ligne cohérente derecherches. Cetargument estutilisé dans le but de clarifier la positionréaliste, mais - ainsique le montrel'auteur - ce butn'est pas atteint etla thèseelle- mêmereste suspendue enl'air. Une série de versions deplus en plus sophistiquées dela thèse«ins- trumentaliste»sontexaminées etces versions - ainsi que les prétentions duréalisme - sont con- frontéesd'une part à desmoments particuliers dudéveloppement scientifique, d'autre part à des positionsqui ont été défendues par des philosophes etpar des scientifiques. L'auteur conclut que, lorsqueles positions sont évaluées sur la basede l'histoire réelle de la sciencea) aucunedes deux doctrinescontraires, interprétée avec une simplicité excessive, nerend adéquatement compte de la dialectiquedu développementscientifique; b) chacune d'elle, interprétée ainsi, a eu desconsé- quencesnéfastes sur les recherches degrands savants (Huygens, Kelvin, Poincaré); alors que c) aussibien dans les énoncés théoriques que dans la pratiquedes philosophes/savants considérés parl'auteur comme les plus subtils, des aspects importants deréalisme etde l'instrumentalisme sontsimultanément présents detelle manière que la soi-disantcontradiction entre eux s'évanouit. * TheUniversity ofChicago, Department ofPhilosophy, 1050 East 59th Street, Chicago - Illinios60637 USA

Dialéctica Vol.43, N° 1-2(1989)

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Zusammenfassung Indiesem Papier wird dafür argumentiert, dassder vieldiskutierte Streitfall zwischen «wis- senschaftlichemRealismus» und «Instrumentalismus» nichtklar beschrieben worden ist. Beson- dereAufmerksamkeit wirdder Behauptung geschenkt, dass nur Realismus den Erfolg wissen- schaftlicherTheorien und insbesondere denständig wachsenden Erfolg solcher Theorien ineiner kohärentenUntersuchungsfolge «erklären» kann. Diese Behauptung wird verwendet, um eine klarereKonzeption vom Inhalt der ihr zugrundeliegenden realistischen These zu erreichen;aber eswird hier behauptet, dass der Versuch fehlschlägt und die Behauptung selbst in der Luft hängt. Einewachsende Reihe hochentwickelter Versionen der «instrumentalistischen»Thesewird betrachtetund sowohl diese Versionen als auchdie Behauptungen des Realismuswerden zu speziellenBeispielen wissenschaftlicher Entwicklung, sowie zu historischvon Philosophen und vonWissenschaftern vertretenen Positionen in Beziehunggesetzt. Die Schlussfolgerungdes Autorsist, dass - wenndie Positionenvor dem Hintergrund der aktuellen Wissenschafts- geschichtebeurteilt werden - (a) jededer beiden gegensätzlichen Doktrinen bei einer übermässig vereinfachtenInterpretation als Theorie der dialektischen Wissenschaftsentwicklung inadäquat ist;(b) jede - so interpretiert- massgeblich zu tatsächlichen Schäden an denUntersuchungen grosserWissenschafter (Huygens, Kelvin, Poincaré) beigetragen hat; wohingegen (c) sowohl in dentheoretischen Aussagen als auchin der aktuellen Praxis der (gemäss Meinung des Autors) tiefsinnigstenPhilosophen/Wissenschafter Aspektedes Realismusund des Intrumentalismus gemeinsamvorhanden sind, und zwar so, dassder angebliche Gegensatz zwischen ihnen ver- schwindet.

By theword "skeptical" I do not mean to suggest,primarily, disbelief; my ideal skepticis Socrates,not Pyrrho.Among the claimsput forwardin recent yearsin the name of "scientificrealism" thereare manythings I agree with; but thereis also an admixtureof what seemsto me unclearin conception,or unconvincinglyargued. This is not so verydifferent from what I thought,in mystudent days, about thedoctrines of logical empiricism- whichhave since been prettyharshly dealt with. In the latterproceeding, I believe that some rathervaluable philosophical lessons have been (at least partly) lost or obscured;and I fearthat unless a sufficientferment of Socraticskepticism is culturedwithin the realistbrew, it will go stale and its vogue too will soon pass. Indeed,it maybe late in theday to expresssuch a fear;the pendulum has by now swungperceptibly in the otherdirection; and yetI hope thatit may be possible to regainhold of what was of positiveworth in positivism,and to retainpossession of whatis of real value in realism. One of the criticalpoints on whichI feelmyself at odds withthe contend- ers forrealism concerns the characterizationof thecentral contrast under discussion- thatbetween a "realist" and an "instrumentalist"view of theories. It seems to be widelyassumed that this contrastis tolerablyclear. I, on the otherhand, do not see the issue betweenrealism and instrumentalismas well- joined at all. This opinion may strikeyou as having about it a smack of Carnap and of ErnestNagel; and that, in turn,may suggestthat I myself, afterall, am an instrumentalist(since I believethat realists do so classifyboth Carnap and Nagel). Well, I have alreadytold you thatlogical empiricismhas strongmerits in myeyes; but partof myplea is: let us not be hastyin applying labels.

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I shall invoke another honored empiricistname (and nostalgic remi- niscence): Friends of mine, when I was a student,had taken a course of Hempers at Queens College in New York; and theyreported that Hempel had discusseda pair of relatedfallacies, which he called "the fallacyof nothing but", and "the fallacyof somethingmore". My friendsdid not elaborate;but thisterse fragment seemed intellectually nourishing, and I stillsnack upon it. How, then, is one to understandthe position that theoriesare "mere instruments"- thatthey are "nothingbut" instruments?First of all, instrumentsfor what? One not infrequentlyreceives, from physics students who have been indoctrinatedwith a crude versionof positivism,the formulation - intendedto debunkphilosophical questioning - thata theoryis "nothing but" an instrumentfor calculatingthe outcomes of experiments.The tacit implicationhere is that the experimentsin question forma ratherspecial domain: both restricted- so that theoriesare quarantinedfrom any com- mercewith our views of "what the world reallyis"; and technical- so that (to putit in itsmost banal form)to understanda theoryis "nothingbut" to be able to calculatethe solutionsto examinationexercises. But thetacit implica- tionis false. I once heardEugene Wignermake the pointmost elegantly, in a lectureon philosophicalproblems of quantummechanics and quantumfield- theory:He remarkedthat it is oftenclaimed that all one everdoes in quantum theoryis calculatethe resultsof scatteringprocesses. But, said Wigner,while this is almost true, it is not quite true; one also uses quantum theory,for example,to calculatethe density of aluminum. The triteform of debunkinginstrumentalism makes a falseestimate of the scope of a theoryas an instrument.There are, of course, broader and nar- rowertheories; but in principle,the scope envisagedby theoreticalnatural scienceas a whole has been, and is still,all the phenomenaof nature.Such a scope was envisaged,for instance, explicitly (and witheloquence) by Newton; and in our own timean enormousadvance has been achievedtowards its reali- zation, since the quantum theoryhas made possible an understanding,in fundamentalterms, of the quantitativeand qualitativeproperties of ordinary matter:the densityof aluminum,the magnetizabilityof iron, the colors of naturalbodies. Now, the expansionof scope beyondthat of "experiments"as narrowly conceived - to all of what in quasi-Kantianlanguage may be called "the worldof experience"- raises a certaindifficulty for the formulationof an instrumentalistview; for it is no longerappropriate to speak of simply"calculatingthe outcomes". In pointof fact,the problem arises already in thenar- rowerdomain, as criticaldiscussion of the "observational/theoretical"dicho- tomyhas made abundantlyclear. But thisdifficulty can certainlybe dealtwith

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- sinceit is infact dealt within scientificpractice (although perhaps not with the formalexactness that philosophersof science tend to prefer).I should like, for the presentpurpose, simplyto assume that a reasonable account of the relationof a theoryto phenomenais available, and to use the phrase"the theoryaffords a representationof thephenomena" forthat relation. Then the instrumentalist'sclaim can be read as: A theoryis "nothingbut" an instrumentfor representing phenomena. From the foregoingschematic formulationof a somewhat liberalized instrumentalism,I turn to the realistand ask, what is it thatyou demandof a theorybeyond this? - what "more" shoulda theoryafford than a representation - in a suitablesense correct,and in a suitablesense adequate - of phenomena?The standardresponse to thisquestion seems to me, I am afraid,no less triteand shallow thanthe triteand shallow versionof instrumentalism:it is that the terms (predicates, function-symbols)of the theory should "genuinelyrefer", its quantifiershave associated domains, and its sentences consequentlybe true or false (its asserted sentence preferablytrue). The troublewith this can be seen fromtwo sides. First,there is the classical philosophical problem of the epistemologyof transcendentmetaphysics - the problemthat Kant (we may say) posed to the ghost of Leibniz, and that led Kant himselfto the view that all theoreticalknowledge is of the phenomenal world:the world of experience.The nub of the mattercan be put verysimply: it is, How can you know that thingsare as you say theyare? If the claimed "reference"ofthe theoryis somethingbeyond its correctnessand adequacy in representingphenomena - if, that is, for a giventheory, which (we may suppose) does representphenomena correctly and adequately,there are still two possibilities:(a) thatit is (moreover)true , and (b) thatit is (nonetheless) false - thenhow in theworld could we evertell what the actual case is? I shall returnto thisquestion; but firstI want to describewhat I have referredto as the other side of the troublewith the appeal to reference.It is simplythat one can "Tarski-ize"any theorythat is constructedin thestandard way - thatis, withthe help of a metalanguageof suitablestrength, and also containingthe extra-logicalresources of the language of the theoryT under ' discussion,one can supplementT witha theoryof referencefor it, T ; and can do so in such a way thatwhenever 0 is a theoremof T, thestatement that 0 is trueis a theoremof T'. Thus, whereasthe Kantian criticalobjection seemed to put referenceand truthutterly beyond knowledge,the Tarskiantheory of referenceand truthin a ratherserious sense trivializesthe desideratumput forwardby the realists. (There is, of course, no paradox in this contrast: Tarski'stheory was neverintended to explicatethe Kantian "transcendent"or "noumenal" realm.)

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I believethat we are dealing here withsomething that has gone seriously wrongin thephilosophical tradition of recentdecades. Some thirty-eightyears ago Carnap offeredhis distinctionbetween questions of existence"internal" to a linguisticor theoreticalframework, and such questionsconstrued (as one mightsay) "absolutely" ("external questions of existence"); and discussed thatdistinction in a way thatmade reallyquite clear the situationI have just been speakingof. But at about the same timethere appeared Quine's attack upon Carnap's approach to the problemof "meaning"; and thetrend of phi- losophicalopinion wentincreasingly with Quine and againstCarnap, in par- ticularin preferring"reference" to "meaning" as a clearerand morereliable basis for philosophicalconsiderations, and also in rejectingCarnap's whole notionof a clearlydefined "linguistic framework" (a rejectionperhaps rein- forcedby the suggestionthat such a notionhas a taintof "relativism"and an affinitywith the views lateradvanced by Kuhn). I cannotdo morehere than barelyallude to thishistory, and suggestthat it is one of the developmentsin whichanalyses of genuinevalue by the logical empiricistshave gottenlost. (HilaryPutnam evidentlynoticed some yearsago thatthere is meritin those argumentsof Carnap.) So far,then, I maintain,no issue has been joined: referenceto reference has failed to stake out any claim to which a sophisticatedinstrumentalist shouldfeel a need to object. The pointcan be restatedthis way: The semantics of referenceand truth(for a giventheory) is itselfa theory. One who consid- ers theoriesin generalto be "mere" instrumentsneed have no hesitation,and " no qualms of intellectualconscience, in acceptingthis theory as an instru- " ment (thusthe innocuousnessof realismin its "internal"aspect). If, on the otherhand, the realistobjects thatthis is not what he meantby his realistic semantics;that he meant the semanticsnot as a mere instrument,but as genuinelygiving the real or truereference of the theoreticalvocabulary; then the attemptto explicatea clear issue has falleninto a clear circle:we are back in theproblem of thenoumena, or thefallacy of "somethingmore". But I have lefthanging the questionhow we could possiblytell whether a theory, beyond its presumed satisfactoryrelation to phenomena, is "moreover"true or not {morehaving been demanded- buta notclearly char- acterized"more" - how to tell whetherthe desired extra has been deliv- ered). On thisquestion a certainproposal has been made recurrently,and has been pursued with energyin recentyears by Richard Boyd: namely,the proposalthat consideration, not simplyof individualtheories in theirseparate relationto phenomena,but of the connectionsof theorieswith the ongoing process of scientificinquiry, can - and indeed does - affordevidence that our theorieshave not merelyinstrumental but also "real" validity.

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My own opinionis thatthis appeal to whatmay be describedas thehistori- cal dialecticof inquiry- and with"historical" explicitly understood to imply that the circumstancesappealed to are empiricalin nature - does indeed directphilosophic attentionto real and importantissues. With much that Boyd has said in detail on thistopic I stronglyagree. But as a mode of argu- mentfor "realism" over "instrumentalism",the attemptseems to me to fail completely.What the move does accomplishso far as thisideological issue is concerned- and accomplishwithout any need to arguein detail- is to point out that the instrumentalisthimself, if he wishes to do justice to the role actuallyplayed by theoriesin science,had betterextend still further his con- ceptionof whattheories are instrumentsfor, to includetheir role as resources forinquiry; especially as sources of clues in what Peirce called "abduction": thesearch for good hypotheses. Can an instrumentalistdo this?Boyd appears to believethat he cannotdo so successfully- thatthere are methodologicalprinciples of inquiry,fruitful in practice,that are in some sense available to the realistbut not to the instrumentalist.But this claim is caught in a dilemma: Eitherthe methodological principlesin question,and the factof theirsuccess thus far in the historyof inquiry,are susceptibleof clear formulationin terms of the relationsof theoriesto phenomena(and this,I think,is whatBoyd intends)- in thiscase, the instrumentalistought to adopt those principles,on the groundsof the evidencefor their instrumental success; or theyare not susceptibleof such formulation- but then,where is the argument?In short,the instrumentalist's own principlesentail no prohibitions:what the realistcan do, the instrumen- talistcan do also. To be sure,I have distortedBoyd's centralargument in an importantway. His own claim is that what the realistcan do and the instrumentalistnot is explainthe success of themethodological principles that he takesto be charac- teristicof realism.This raises some largeand complexquestions, to whichon thisoccasion I shall give the veryshortest shrift, (a) Argumentto a better,or the best, explanationis a doubtfulbusiness, which I should preferto view as abductive,or heuristic,or tentativeat best; and in the presentcase, I do not see what investigationsare to follow the abduction,(b) I do not believe the explanationdoes in fact explain. Aftersome labor at tryingto compressthe reasons for my doubts into a small space, thereoccurred to me a one-step proof: namely,that until we have succeededin attachinga clear sense - not the bare noumenal one - to the realistthesis, that thesiscannot serve as a basis forthe explanation of anything. Well, I am afraid that may sound unfair- that it may seem question- begging.But the situationis this: We are seekingclarification of the realist

This content downloaded from 171.67.34.69 on Sun, 22 Nov 2015 14:14:03 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Yes,but. . . - SomeSkeptical Remarks on Realism and Anti-Realism 53 claim. Boyd suggestsa case forrealism - namely,that evidence for it is to be foundin therole theories play in inquiry.We are consideringhis argumentsin a dialecticalspirit, hoping fromthe suggestedcase for realismto arriveat a clarificationof the contentof the thesis being argued for. An example in whichan analogous strategysucceeds is that of Newton's argumentagainst the "absolute rest" of eitherthe earthor the sun: a carefulconsideration of the evidenceand argumentsdoes in fact lead to genuineclarification of the veryconcept of restand motioninvolved. In the presentinstance, however, the strategyfails, because the allegedevidence in favorof the realistthesis - thatit providesa valuable explanation- itselfremains unintelligible until the realistthesis is clarified.Indeed, the attributesour theoriesmust possess for themto serveas resourcesfor inquiry are all attributesthat concern the logical structureof thetheories and theirrelation to phenomena.Hypostatizing enti- tiescannot be of any help in formulatingthese attributes or in explainingtheir usefulness, unless those entities are putin relationto phenomena.But thenthe entitiesare postulatedwithin a natural-scientifictheory, and we are back in theold dialecticalcircle. To explaina littlefurther what I mean about the futitilityof "hypostatizing", letme discusstwo cases - one directlyrelevant, the other obliquely so.

(1) Recurrentlysince the Greek atomists, whether things "really have" the veryqualities we perceivein themhas seemeda problem(and therehas been, correspondingly,recurrent malaise in the face of the presumedteaching of physicsand/or philosophy that "the grass isn't reallygreen" - as if physics told us thatgrass is somehowblack, or ghastlygray, or perhapsinvisible). But suppose that, to rescue the comfortableimage of a lovely world, it were argued as follows: From the doctrinethat our perceptionsare the "mere" resultof exchangesof energyand momentumwith the environment,which give rise to the transmissionof nerve-impulsesto appropriateregions of the brain,we can never"understand" why our sensationshave the veryqualities theydo' and we are impotentbefore the question whetherany two of us experiencethe same qualities- since we can formno intelligibleconnection between,say, theparticular look of grass(I shouldsay, to a particularperson - or perhapseven to a particularperson at a particulartime) and the physiological process that either"constitutes" or "causes" or "occasions" the perception.But if we will only postulatethat the grass itselfreally possesses thequality we perceive,the difficulty disappears: we are able to "explain" the qualitywe perceiveby associatingit withthe verysame (or perhapsa "quite similar")quality in the grass; and we thenhave evidencethat we all perceive thesame (or similar)qualities - sinceour perceivedqualities are all the same

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as, or all similarto, the "real" color of the grass. It may even be urgedthat withoutsuch an explanation, the qualitative characterof our perceptions standsas a miracle. This mode of argumenthas fromtime to time made a powerfulimpres- sion, and I thinkthere is somethingpsychologically very tempting in it. But I submitthat it is in fact a snare and a delusion. (Note, by the way, its totally unacceptableconclusion that so-called "color-blind"people see false colors.) - Thereis perhapsmore than one thingwrong with the argument; but whatI see as its fataldefect is this:that the postulate in questiondoesn't explainany- thing.For we know - whateverthe truthmay be about the grass - thatwe actuallysee when certainnerve-processes occur, and thatthese processes are stimulatedby exchanges of energyand momentumwith the environment. Therefore,even if we do assume - whateverit may mean - that the grass "reallyhas" a color likethe quality we perceive,the factsof our perceptiondo not followfrom the postulatedproperty of the grass: betweenthe grassitself and our perceptionof it therestill intervene the veryphysical/physiological processeswhose connection with the quality is allegedto be unintelligible. I call this case directlyrelevant because it is one in which a notion is introducedas "explanatory",which under examination is seen to be in effect disconnectedfrom its explanandum. (The positivistsliked to speak of pseudo- questions;here we have a pseudo-answer.)

(2) The second example comes from the historyof science: it is the attemptby a verygreat physicist, Christiaan Huygens, to "explain" thepheno- menon of weight,in accordance withthe metaphysicalprinciples shared by most "progressive"natural philosophersof the seventeenthcentury. (Huy- gens himselfrefers to "the philosophyof the presenttime" - or, as he also calls it, "the truephilosophy" - accordingto whichall naturaleffects are to be explainedas resultsof bodies in motionimpinging upon one another,and therebychanging one another'smotions; and he expressesthe opinion thatif we cannot providesuch explanations,all hope is lost of understandingany- thingin physics.) The theoryHuygens proposes, as in his opinion the only possible one to accounton such principlesfor the weightof bodies towardsthe earth,is this: There exists a verysubtle - i.e., finelydivided - mattersurrounding the earth,and movingvery rapidly in circulationabout it. Ordinaryterrestrial bodies do not participatein thiscirculatory motion; therefore the tendency of the swirlingmatter to recede fromthe centerhas the effectupon such ter- restrialbodies of tendingto sweepthem towards the center - thatis, towards the earth. But the tendencytowards the earth is sphericallysymmetric,

This content downloaded from 171.67.34.69 on Sun, 22 Nov 2015 14:14:03 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Yes,but. . . - SomeSkeptical Remarks on Realism and Anti-Realism 55 whereasan ordinaryvortical swirl is about an axis ratherthan a center;and moreover,if the swirlwere all in one direction,it could not fail eventuallyto be communicatedto ordinarybodies. For boththese reasons, Huygens says, it is necessaryto posit thatthere is not one singleswirling motion, but rathera complexof suchin whichswirling occurs in constantlychanging directions, so thatthe average state is sphericallysymmetric, and so thatordinary bodies do not have timeto be sweptone way beforethe directionchanges and theyare sweptanother way. The pictureis of a kind of rotationalBrownian motion; and Huygens mentionsthe analogy of heated dropletsthat are observe to executerotatory oscillations about constantlychanging axes. Afterhe had read Newton's argumentin the Principia for the conclusion that weight towardsthe earth (and towardsthe sun and all the otherplanets) varies in magnitudeinversely as the square of the distancefrom the center- an argu- menthe foundfully convincing - Huygensadded to his hypothesisthat the velocitiesof rotationof his vorticeswould have to varywith distance in sucha wayas to yieldthe Newtonian inverse-square variation of weight. Now, it is reallyquite extraordinarythat a man of Huygens'sgreat intel- lectual clarityand power should have been in any way satisfiedwith this "explanation". Let us set aside any qualms about thedynamical effects that a motionof the kindproposed would actuallyhave upon ordinarybodies; con- cedingall that Huygensasserts about this,let us just ask what in the world could cause the matterof Huygens's vorticesto behave in such an extraor- dinaryway? - One thinksof Byron'ssatirical lines on Coleridge: Explainingmetaphysics tothe Nation: I wishhe would explain his explanation!

Here, then,we have a case where- at least if we make some (possibly unjustified)concessions - a proposed explanatorycontraption might in fact have the consequencesrequired of it; but wherea judgmentnot seduced by the greatdesire to feel that it understands(an example of what I believe is sometimescalled "false consciousness") will regardthe explanationas quite arbitrary:as, so to speak, a quasi-pseudo-answer. What is commonto the two cases is a relaxationof intellectualstandards underwhat I maycall ideologicalpressure. Let me cite,by wayof contrast,an exampleof a problemthat does genuinelycall forexplanation by a naturalistic and evolutionaryepistemology such as Boyd advocates; a problemthat is almost surelynot ripe for attack, but on which one may hope for great enlightenmentsome day. This is the questionhow it is that our own natural endowment- whichhas evolvedfor its "instrumental"value in copingwith farmore immediate aspects of the world- has also provedto be an "instru-

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ment"capable, underfavorable circumstances, of (e.g.) discoveringquantum mechanics.One reason I thinkit importantto be charyof pseudo-explana- tionsis preciselythat they tend to mask real problems,and to dull thetaste for whatreal solutionsare like. I have said thatI thinkthere are genuinelyinteresting and importantissues concerningthe role of theoriesin the ongoing process of inquiry.I do not believethat these are issues thatdivide naturally along the line "realist"/"instrumentalist".Years ago, I wrotea paper - whichI have not published,but have read to a numberof audiences - discussingthe work of Poincaré on electrodynamics,and its relationto the special theoryof relativity.In that paper, I pointedout what I take to have been strikingfailings in Poincaré's viewof the properrole of theoriesin inquiry.Now, Poincaré was certainlyan instrumentalist;and in mydiscussion, I took himto task forunwillingness to regardcertain things as "real". At the end of the paper, however,I remarked that it should be evident to the audience that, despite my use of such "metaphysical" notions as "real", the whole analysis could be recast in methodologicalterms - in effect,that the true issue was not realism vs. instrumentalism.The situationin questionis a doublyironic one. To explain this,let me singleout just one of the pointsof physicaltheory involved. The contestedreality was thatof the ether;and Poincaré, because he regardedthe etheras a fictionrather than a reality,was unwillingto take veryseriously (althoughhe was willingto play with)the idea thatcharged particles exchange momentumwith the ether.This, however,is a veryodd positionfor an instru- mentalistto take (the firstirony); for there is no warrantat all in the instrumentalistview forgrading the entitiesof a theoryin degreesof realityor ficti- tiousness- regardingparticles as more real than the ether.This is a double standardthat recursin the empiricisttradition, but it is not itselfa genuine part of empiricismor of instrumentalism- it is, on the contrary,a bit of unregeneraterealism, doing the workof the Devil among the empiricistsand instrumentalists. The second ironyI had in mind is the circumstancethat Hilary Putnam, writingas an exponentof realism,has used thenotion of theether, in contrast withthat of atoms,as an exampleof a scientificterm that failed to "refer"- thereis no such thingas the ether,whereas there are atoms (note that this endorsesthe discriminationcommitted by Poincaré); and thatLarry Laudan has exploitedthis as one example among othersin an argumentagainst realism - namely,against the view thatthere is any strongconnection between "instrumentalsuccess" (here, of the wave theoryof lightand of Maxwell's electrodynamics,both of whichposited an ether)and "real reference".For my part, I throwup my hands at this: Why should we say thatthe old term

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"ether"failed to "refer"?- and thatthe old term"atom" did "refer"?Why, thatis, exceptfor the superficialreason thatthe word "atom" is stillused in text-books,the word "ether" not? - It would be possibleto do a lengthydia- lecticalnumber on this; but in brief:our own physicsteaches us thatthere is nothingthat has all theproperties posited by nineteenth-centuryphysicists for the etheror foratoms; but that,on the otherhand, in both instances,rather importantparts of the nineteenth-centurytheories are correct.For instance, so far as Poincaré's convictionthat momentumconservation must hold amongthe "particles"taken by themselvesis concerned,it is establishednow beyond a doubt that ordinarybodies do exchange momentumwith "the ether"- i.e., withthe electromagneticfield; and eventhat this field has to be regardedas the seat of a distributionof mass, and as participatingin gravita- tional interactions.The two cases - that of the etherand that of atoms - are, in myview, so similar,that the radical distinctionmade betweenthem by the referentialrealists confirmsin me the antecedentsuspicion that this concernfor reference- and associated withit, anotherQuinean motif,the concernfor what is called the "ontology" of theories- is a distractionfrom whatreally matters. I agree wholeheartedlywith Boyd that we have learned- thatis to say, scientistshave indeed learned,in theirpractice; and in our philosophicalre- flectionsupon science,we should by now have learnedexplicitly - thatsuc- cessfulscientific theories are to be takenvery seriously as clues to the deeper understandingof phenomena: i.e., clues in the search for betterand more fundamentaltheories. But this process of development,from the less to the morefundamental ( Tieferlegung der Fundamente,as, accordingto Hermann Weyl,Hilbert liked to call it) has verylittle to do withthe "referential"relationsof theoriesor withthe relationships of their"ontologies" in thesense of Quine. To borrowfrom the ancientphilosophical tradition, what I believethe historyof sciencehas shownis thaton a certainvery deep questionAristotle was entirelywrong, and Plato - at least on one reading,the one I prefer- remarkablyright: namely, our sciencecomes closestto comprehending"the real", not in its account of "substances"and theirkinds, but in itsaccount of the "Forms" which phenomena "imitate" (for "Forms" read "theoretical structures",for "imitate", "are representedby"). In mathematicsitself - concernedwith Forms withoutregard to phenomena- the deepestgeneral discoveryof the whole modern epoch, initiated by Gauss and notably advanced through the work of Galois, Riemann, Dedekind, Lie, Klein, Poincaré,Hilbert, and EmmyNoether, to an enormousflowering in our own time, is that in the Hilbertian"Tieferlegung" deeper understandingof the Forms or structuresof mathematicscharacteristically consists in theirbeing

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seenin unexpectedrelations to one another,or to newlydiscovered structures, whichplay a unifyingor generalizingor expandingrole in our understanding of the more familiarones (the Forms "participatein one another"). And in thedevelopment of physicsin thesame period- but above all in our own cen- tury- an analogous, in some ways even more astonishingdiscovery has emerged;more astonishing because it involvesour understandingof ordinary, familiarthings , and because the key to thisunderstanding turns out to lie in mathematical structures, and improved understanding in structural " deepening of just such kindas characteristicallyoccur in puremathematics itself.And, I should add, more astonishingnot least because of the cir- cumstanceI am hereconcerned to emphasize,that in thisstructural deepening what tends to persist- to remain,as it were, quasi-invariantthrough the transformationof theories- is on the whole (and especiallyin whatwe think of as the "deepest" - or most "revolutionary"- transformations)not the featuresmost conspicuous in referentialsemantics: the substancesor "entities" and theirown "basic" propertiesand relations,but the more abstract mathematicalforms. What I have just said is prettygeneral. Let me givetwo examplesof whatI mean: the firsta verysimple one, whichI hope willserve for clarification; the second,one of contemporaryrelevance.

(1) Newton shocked the naturalphilosophers of his timeby his claim to have discovered,and proved,that sunlight is a mixtureof physicallydistinct kinds of light. His formulationof this result was extremelycareful, and remainsentirely cogent today. The basic "entity"in his analysisis what he calls a "ray" - by whichhe meansnot (as we ordinarilydo) a line of propagation of light,but ratheran "elementarypart of light",conceived as spatially localized and as propagated along a definitetrajectory: sunlight, he says, contains rays of indefinitelymany distinctkinds, which may be separated fromone another,and whichprove to have distinctand immutablephysical properties;among these distinguishingproperties are distinctindices of re- fraction(for a given medium),powers of stimulatingsensations of distinct colors, and a certainquantity having the dimensionsof a length(which we knowas thewave length). Now light,as we have come to understandit, whetherwe "represent"it by means of the classical wave theoryof Fresnel,the electromagnetictheory of Maxwell,or (now mostfundamentally) by the quantumtheory of the electromagneticfield, does not have "parts" thatare propagatedalong definitetra- jectories.One cannot say, of the lightthat reaches a certainpoint P at a cer- taintime t , thatat an earliertime ť thissame bit of lightwas at a pointQ; the

This content downloaded from 171.67.34.69 on Sun, 22 Nov 2015 14:14:03 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Yes,but. . . - SomeSkeptical Remarks on Realism and Anti-Realism 59 notionof identityof localizedparts throughtime is simplyinapplicable at all to light. Therefore,one eitherhas to say thatNewton's term 'ray' failsto "refer", or one has to strainto findsome way to associate thatterm with an "entity" of one of the laterand deepertheories - at best a pedanticand unrewarding move. On theother hand, it is an essentialtask of physicalunderstanding, and a mostinstructive one, to exhibitthe formal relations of theNewtonian theory of rays to the later theories.One finds,when one does this,that thereare severaldifferent structural aspects of thelater theory, each of whichhas a sig- nificantbearing upon the successof thenotion of a rayin servingto represent the optical phenomenadealt withby Newton. Thus the principleof "cutting at thejoints" - a motifin recentrealism that I heartilyapplaud - seemsto indicatenot usingreferential semantics as thebasis of comparisonof theories (at leastin thecase cited;but I offerit as typical).

(2) A numberof attemptshave been made to give a so-called "realistic interpretation"of quantum mechanics.These have characteristicallytaken the formof specificationsof "realisticsemantics" for the theory.The results seemto me, in each case, not onlyunpersuasive, but - whatis muchworse - fundamentallyuninteresting. (The author of one of those theories once expressedto me the apprehensionthat his attemptmight be subject to the criticismsaid to have been pronouncedby Pauli on anotherproposal: Pauli' s remarkwas, "That theoryisn't even wrong!") My reason forregarding these essaysin quantumrealism as uninterestingis this:All the "realist"interpreta- tionstake it forgranted that certain specific constituents of the mathematical structureof the theory- the projectionoperators - are to be interpretedas standingfor attributesof certainbasic "entities"(particles); because that is whatthey correspond to in the classical theory.But if one examinescarefully how phenomena are "represented"by the quantum theory - and this requiresattention not only to what physicistssay, but to how the physics actuallyworks - thenprecisely this interpretation in termsof "entities"and "attributes"can be seen to be highlydubious. I do not claim to have a defini- tive formulationof the meta-physicsof quantum mechanics;but I believe ratherstrongly that the difficultiesit presentsarise fromthe fact that the mode in whichthis theory "represents" phenomena is a radicallynovel one. In otherwords, I thinkthe live problemsconcern the relationof the Forms - indeed,if you like, of the Instrument- to phenomena,rather than the relation of (putative) attributesto (putative) entities,and that the ideological motivesof "realism" have here served as a kind of scholasticdistraction, turningattention away fromwhat is "real" in thesubject.

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I have so far discussedat far greaterlength what I see as ideological and delusivein theclaims of recentrealism than I have thecorresponding faults of anti-realism;the latterI have only touched on in speakingof the shallower versionsof instrumentalism.Yet this last - a shallow instrumentalism- seemsto me no less inimicalto sound philosophicunderstanding. Since I have mentionedthe case of quantummechanics in the formerconnection, it is only fairto cite it again here. I have just referredto the "live problems"of philo- sophic understandingposed by quantum mechanics. There are those who have argued that no such problemsexist in fact - on the groundsthat, in concretecases, physicistsagree on how the theoryis to be applied to phenomena,and thatis all we are entitledto expectof a theory. It is certainlynot a contemptibleargument - not one to be dismissedout of hand. But it is necessaryto use some circumspectionin evaluatingit. The relevantquestion is closelyrelated to the criticismI have earliermade of the physicsstudent's charm against philosophy:How the theoryis to be applied to which phenomena? (There is a wonderfulstory - whethertrue or apocryphalI do not know - about a discussion betweena distinguished mathematicianand a very distinguishedphysicist on the problem of axio- matizingquantum field theory. The physicistsaid, so thetale has it: "Why do we need axioms? The job of physicsis to calculatethe resultsof experiments. If you describe an experimentfor me, I can perfectlywell calculate its outcome." To which the mathematicianreplied - in a Polish accent that helps the story- : "Dot's verynice, Dick; but vot vili ve do afteryou?" [a situationin which, lamentably,we now find ourselves].) The point is that quantum mechanics - or its more fundamental,but, to date, from a mathematicalpoint of view less clearlyformulated modification, relativistic quantumfield theory - is one of the two basic and universaltheories of con- temporaryphysics (general relativityis the other); its presumptivescope, therefore,is all the phenomenaof nature. But we genuinelydo not understand,not merelyhow in detailto applythis theory to all naturalphenomena, but in principlehow such applicationmay be possible; for instance,no one reallyknows how quantum mechanicscould be applied to the universeas a whole; and yetsuch applicationseems to be necessaryif thereis to be a uni- ficationof quantumtheory with general relativity. And thisdifficulty, which may well strikeyou as after all somethingquite technical that ought to concernphysicists rather than philosophers,is intimatelyconnected with the famousproblem of what is called the "reductionof the wave packet", which has been at the centerof philosophical discussion of the theoryfrom its beginning- and whichis preciselythe problemthat the instrumentalist move I have deprecatedis intendedto exorcise.

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Note again that - as in the case I have mentionedof Poincaré - the criticismI have just made need not be put in "realist"terms. For myself,I do tendto thinkin such terms- to ask whatthe theory implies about theworld's real constitution.But the problemsI have criticizedthe instrumentalistargu- mentfor evading are, if I am rightin regardingthem as real, thenreal instru- mentalistproblems. Indeed, I said at the outsetthat the issue betweenrealism and instrumentalismseems to me not to be clearlyposed; and what I really believeis thatbetween a cogentand enlightened"realism" and a sophisticated "instrumentalism"there is no significantdifference - no differencethat makes a difference.I shall try,in myremaining remarks, to clarifythis claim and make it plausible. Let us brieflyconsider the idealismof Berkeley:the doctrinethat what is real is just minds and theirperceptions, and that all our beliefsabout the physical world are just "instruments"for organizing and anticipating experience.Can thisdoctrine be refuted?Need thisdoctrine be refuted? It is an interestingpoint that we are unable to formulateour information about the world in a way that restrictsreference to thatwhich is - or even that which is possibly - perceived (the failure,more or less recognized eyentuallyby Carnap, of phenomenalismas a "basis" for a scientificlan- guage). But althoughthis is a factof greatimportance for the methodology of science and of philosophy, it does not refuteBerkeley. It can even be construedas implyinga peculiarityof our conceptualfaculty, rather than of "the world" (cf. Kant). Can we arguethat onlysome furthercontraption behind the appearances could - or could withany likelihood- produceregularities in phenomenaof the kind representedin our beliefs? Why is such an argumentany more plausible than that to a "mechanical" cause of gravitation,in the sense of Huygens;or to a materialether supporting the electromagneticfield? I have alluded to both these scientificissues earlier;although it may seem to be far removedfrom the questionI have raisedabout Berkeley,I shouldlike to dis- cuss theelectromagnetic case in just a littlemore detail now. When Maxwell proposed his greattheory, he called it a dynamicaltheory of theelectromagnetic field; and explainedthat he used thatterm because the theorypostulated the existenceof matterin motionin all the regionswithin whichelectrical and magneticinteractions occur - in the regions,that is, be- tweenand around the electricallycharged bodies and electriccurrents. In his firstattempts to workout a theoryof thiskind, he made, tentatively,detailed assumptionsabout thismatter, that is about whatwas called the "ether"; but he regardedthese hypotheses as mereaids to the developmentof the theory, not as plausibleproposals about the trueconstitution of the ether.When the

This content downloaded from 171.67.34.69 on Sun, 22 Nov 2015 14:14:03 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 62 HowardStein theorywas fullyworked out, Maxwell uncoupled it fromthe earlierdetailed ethermodel, and proposed instead - with some success - to subsume his theoryunder the principlesof the generalizeddynamics of Lagrange, which made it possibleto statedynamical laws fora systemwhose internalconstitu- tionwas not fullyspecified. (I say withsome success: Maxwellcarried out this programonly partially; his workwas laterextended, first by G. F. FitzGerald, and then,to itsfull completion, by H. A. Lorentz.) Now, Maxwell's own view of this situationwas unquestionablyrealistic. Here is what he says in the last paragraphof his Treatiseon Electricityand Magnetism, after reviewinga number of theories,alternative to his own, whichpostulated the transmission of energyin some formwith a finiteveloc- itythrough space fromparticle to particle:

Butin all ofthese theories the question naturally occurs: - If somethingis transmitted fromone particle to anotherat a distance,what is itscondition after it has left the one particleand before it has reached the other? ... In fact,whenever energy is transmitted fromone bodyto anotherin time,there must be a mediumor substancein whichthe energyexists after it leaves one body and before it reaches the other, for energy, as Tor- ricelliremarked, 'is a quintessenceof so subtilea naturethat it cannot be containedin anyvessel except the inmost substance of material things'. Hence all thesetheories lead to theconception of a mediumin whichthe propagation takes place, and ifwe admit thismedium as an hypothesis,I think it oughtto occupya prominentplace in our investigations,and that we ought to endeavourto constructa mental representation of all thedetails of its action, and this has been my constant aim in this treatise.

A bit confusingperhaps, since I have said that Maxwell eliminatedthe detailedmodel of the etherfrom his developedaccount of the theory.But the "detailsof its action" thathe means,in thisstatement, are thosedetailed con- cepts by which he representsthe state of the electromagneticfield itself- conceived, indeed, as representingthe state of the ether, but without a detailedaccount of how the fieldquantities are determinedby an underlying mechanicalmedium - and thosedetailed laws thatgovern the behavior of the field, and that express the kineticand potential energyof the presumed medium as functionsof the field quantities. This purgationof the theory fromother details about themedium, this rendering of it in a more "abstract" or generalform, was done by Maxwell because of anotherprinciple he cher- ished: that of distinguishing,as far as one can, betweenwhat is knownwith some security,or held at least withsome probability,and what is bare and even implausible conjecture. (This principle he explicitlyassociates with Newton.) I have alreadyintimated, in myearlier remarks about Poincaré, and about Putnam and Laudan, whatthe sequel was: The detailsthat Maxwell knewhe

This content downloaded from 171.67.34.69 on Sun, 22 Nov 2015 14:14:03 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Yes,but. . . - SomeSkeptical Remarks on Realism and Anti-Realism 63 didn't know provedto be impossibleto constructat all in a satisfactoryway on the basis of a mechanicalether in the traditionalsense; but those more abstractprinciples of dynamicsunder which Maxwell subsumedthe laws of the field have been taken over, firstinto the relativistic dynamicsthat essentiallyestablished the impossibilityof a traditionalone, and then into quantumelectrodynamics. Of the principlesof Lagrangiandynamics - that Form whichhas survivedthese radical transformationsof physics- White- head was moved to declare that "the beautyand almost divinesimplicity of these equations is such that these formulaeare worthyto rank withthose mysterioussymbols which in ancienttimes were held directlyto indicatethe SupremeReason at thebase of all things". Now, I have defendedthe "reality"of the ether- in a certainsense - againstthe claims both of Putnam as a realistand Laudan as an anti-realist; and I have quoted theundeniably realist sentiment of Maxwellon thesubject. Yet, as I have said, the physicistwho completedMaxwell's subsumptionof the laws of the field under the Lagrangian principleswas H. A. Lorentz. Lorentzdid thisin his celebratedmemoir of 1892 on electrodynamicpheno- mena in movingbodies - wherethe motivation he citesfor carrying out Max- well's programcan fairlybe describedas an "instrumentalist"one. He refers thereto thetheoretical work of HeinrichHertz on thesame subject;notes that Hertz hardlyconcerns himself with a mechanicalaccount of processesin the field(it should be rememberedthat Hertz said, in thisconnection, that "Max- well's theoryis Maxwell's systemof equations"); commentsthat this method has itsadvantages, but thaton theother hand "one is alwaystempted to revert to mechanicalexplications"; and thenmakes the crucialremark that his own purpose,which was to develop the theoryfor bodies thatmove throughthe etherwithout any entrainmentof thelatter, "seemed to me difficultto achieve . . . withouthaving as guide some theoreticalidea. The views of Maxwell [namely,on the Lagrangiandynamics of the field]may serveas foundation forthe theory sought". How does this"instrumentalist" view of theusefulness of theoreticalideas as guidesfor research - guides,it maybe noted,to be used opportunistically: Lorentzin no way impliesthat mechanical representations are a sine qua non, and on otheroccasions he deniesthis explicitly - how does thisview square withthe "realist" commitmentof Maxwell? Here is a methodologicalstate- mentof the latter,taken fromhis articleon "Attraction"in the ninthedition of theEncyclopaedia Britannica : [W]emust bear in mindthat the scientific or science-producingvalue of theefforts madeto answerthese old standingquestions is notto be measuredby the prospect they affordus ofultimately obtaining a solution, but by their effect in stimulating men to a

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thoroughinvestigation of nature.To proposea scientificquestion presupposes scientificknowledge, and the questions which exercise men's minds in the present state of sciencemay very likely be suchthat a littlemore knowledge would shew us thatno answeris possible.The scientificvalue of thequestion, How do bodiesact on one anotherat a distance?is to be foundin thestimulus it has givento investigationsinto theproperties of the intervening medium.

This dialecticaltension, as it maybe called, betweena realistand an instru- mentalistattitude, existing together without contradiction, seems to me char- acteristicof the deepestscientists. Besides Maxwell, whom I have quoted on bothsides, it is veryclearly manifested in Newton,for example - and in Ein- stein. I have already mentionedPoincaré as an example of a scientist- a greatscientist, and a philosopher- whose workin physicssuffered from an imbalanceon theinstrumentalist side. Two examplesof greatphysicists whose worksuffered to a degreefrom the opposite imbalance are Huygens- who could not accept Newton's theoryof gravitationbecause he saw no possibility of a satisfactory"mechanical explanation" of universalattraction, and Kelvin - Maxwell's good friend,closely associated with Maxwell's own developmentof his electromagnetictheory, who to theend of his life- in 1907,more than fortyyears after the firstpublication of Maxwell's theory,maintained a vacillatingand somewhatnegative attitude towards that theorybecause no satisfactorymechanical model of theelectromagnetic ether had been found. Back then,once more,to Berkeley.Can one arguethat if the natural world consistedin nothingbut the perceptionsof minds,it would be a "miracle" thatthese perceptions follow rules formulated in termsof the "entities"conc- eivedby science- or by ordinarycommon sense? Why should thisseem any moremiraculous than the universalgravitational attraction of bodies (which was, indeed, rejected by Huygens, and by Leibniz as well, on just such grounds)?Or how is it more miraculousthan the factthat such an apparently "abstract"thing as the electromagneticfield just does satisfythe equationsof Maxwell and the dynamicsof Lagrange, withoutanything more substantial that "underlies" it? Indeed, if one examines the explanation offeredby sciencetoday for the existenceand propertiesof aluminum(to revertto an earlierexample), it is hard not to feelthat this explanation, at least as muchas Berkeley's,grounds ordinary things upon a miracle.But the simplefact is that whateverour science adopts, perhaps provisionally,as its "ultimate" principles,just because theyhave no furtherground, remain "inexplicable"; and thefarther they are fromthe familiar,the more they will seem "miraculous". What we are left with is that other, provisionally,"ultimate" or unex- plained fact,that we do findourselves compelled to formulateour beliefsin non-phenomenalisticterms; and in thisprocess, atoms, electrons,fields, and

This content downloaded from 171.67.34.69 on Sun, 22 Nov 2015 14:14:03 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Yes,but. . . - SomeSkeptical Remarks on Realism and Anti-Realism 65 the like are in a case quite analogous to thatof chairs,tables, and the like in Berkeley.The justifiable claim to "reality" possessed be those "theoretical entities"is of the same kindas thejustifiable claim - not afterall deniedby Berkeley- of theseordinary objects. To hold thisis to rejectthe faulty-empi- ricistdouble standard; and "realism" in this sense I endorse unreservedly. Berkeley,at thispoint, in myview, has been, not refuted,but seento be irrele- vantto any real issue in theunderstanding of science.And mygeneral conclusion is: Realism- Yes, but . . . instrumentalism- Yes also; No onlyto anti- realism.

Dialéctica Vol.43, N° 1-2(1989)

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