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Yes, But... Some Skeptical Remarks on Realism and Anti-Realism Author(S): Howard Stein Source: Dialectica, Vol. 43, No. 1/2 (1989), Pp

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Yes, But... Some Skeptical Remarks on Realism and Anti-Realism Author(S): Howard Stein Source: Dialectica, Vol. 43, No. 1/2 (1989), Pp Yes, but... Some Skeptical Remarks on Realism and Anti-Realism Author(s): Howard Stein Source: Dialectica, Vol. 43, No. 1/2 (1989), pp. 47-65 Published by: Wiley Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/42970610 Accessed: 22-11-2015 14:14 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/ info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Wiley is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Dialectica. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 171.67.34.69 on Sun, 22 Nov 2015 14:14:03 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Yes, but. Some Skeptical Remarks on Realism and Anti-Realism byHoward Stein * Summary Thispaper argues that the much discussed issue between "scientific realism" and "instru- mentalism"has not been clearly drawn. Particular attention is paid to the claim that only real- ismcan "explain" the success of scientific theories and - moreespecially - theprogressively increasingsuccess of such theories ina coherentline of inquiry. This claim is used to attempt to reacha clearerconception ofthe content of the realist thesis that underlies it;but, it is here con- tended,that attempt fails, and the claim itself hangs in the air. A seriesof increasingly sophis- ticatedversions ofthe "instrumentalist" thesisis considered, and both these and the contentions ofrealism are placed in relation both to particular examples of scientific development andposi- tionshistorically maintained byphilosophers and by scientists. The author's conclusion is that, whenthe positions are assessed against the background ofthe actual history ofscience, (a) each ofthe contrary doctrines, interpreted with excessive simplicity, is inadequate as a theoryof the dialecticof scientificdevelopment; (b) each,so interpreted,has contributedin important instancesto actualdamage to investigationsbygreat scientists (Huygens, Kelvin, Poincaré); whereas(c) inboth the theoretical statements and the actual practice of (in the author's opinion) themost sophisticated philosophers/scientists, important aspects of realism and instrumentalism arepresent together insuch a waythat the alleged contradiction between them vanishes. Résumé Onoppose souvent leréalisme scientifique etl'instrumentalisme. Maisl'alternative n'est pas clairementformulée. On insiste particulièrement surla thèse que seul le réalisme peut «expliquer» lesuccès des théories scientifiques etplus spécialement lesuccès grandissant avec le temps de ces théoriesdans une ligne cohérente derecherches. Cetargument estutilisé dans le but de clarifier la positionréaliste, mais - ainsique le montrel'auteur - ce butn'est pas atteint etla thèseelle- mêmereste suspendue enl'air. Une série de versions deplus en plus sophistiquées dela thèse«ins- trumentaliste»sontexaminées etces versions - ainsi que les prétentions duréalisme - sont con- frontéesd'une part à desmoments particuliers dudéveloppement scientifique, d'autre part à des positionsqui ont été défendues par des philosophes etpar des scientifiques. L'auteur conclut que, lorsqueles positions sont évaluées sur la basede l'histoire réelle de la sciencea) aucunedes deux doctrinescontraires, interprétée avec une simplicité excessive, nerend adéquatement compte de la dialectiquedu développementscientifique; b) chacune d'elle, interprétée ainsi, a eu desconsé- quencesnéfastes sur les recherches degrands savants (Huygens, Kelvin, Poincaré); alors que c) aussibien dans les énoncés théoriques que dans la pratiquedes philosophes/savants considérés parl'auteur comme les plus subtils, des aspects importants deréalisme etde l'instrumentalisme sontsimultanément présents detelle manière que la soi-disantcontradiction entre eux s'évanouit. * TheUniversity ofChicago, Department ofPhilosophy, 1050 East 59th Street, Chicago - Illinios60637 USA Dialéctica Vol.43, N° 1-2(1989) This content downloaded from 171.67.34.69 on Sun, 22 Nov 2015 14:14:03 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 48 HowardStein Zusammenfassung Indiesem Papier wird dafür argumentiert, dassder vieldiskutierte Streitfall zwischen «wis- senschaftlichemRealismus» und «Instrumentalismus» nichtklar beschrieben worden ist. Beson- dereAufmerksamkeit wirdder Behauptung geschenkt, dass nur Realismus den Erfolg wissen- schaftlicherTheorien und insbesondere denständig wachsenden Erfolg solcher Theorien ineiner kohärentenUntersuchungsfolge «erklären» kann. Diese Behauptung wird verwendet, um eine klarereKonzeption vom Inhalt der ihr zugrundeliegenden realistischen These zu erreichen;aber eswird hier behauptet, dass der Versuch fehlschlägt und die Behauptung selbst in der Luft hängt. Einewachsende Reihe hochentwickelter Versionen der «instrumentalistischen»Thesewird betrachtetund sowohl diese Versionen als auchdie Behauptungen des Realismuswerden zu speziellenBeispielen wissenschaftlicher Entwicklung, sowie zu historischvon Philosophen und vonWissenschaftern vertretenen Positionen in Beziehunggesetzt. Die Schlussfolgerungdes Autorsist, dass - wenndie Positionen vor dem Hintergrund der aktuellen Wissenschafts- geschichtebeurteilt werden - (a) jededer beiden gegensätzlichen Doktrinen bei einer übermässig vereinfachtenInterpretation als Theorie der dialektischen Wissenschaftsentwicklung inadäquat ist;(b) jede - so interpretiert- massgeblich zu tatsächlichen Schäden an denUntersuchungen grosserWissenschafter (Huygens, Kelvin, Poincaré) beigetragen hat; wohingegen (c) sowohl in dentheoretischen Aussagen als auchin der aktuellen Praxis der (gemäss Meinung des Autors) tiefsinnigstenPhilosophen/Wissenschafter Aspektedes Realismusund des Intrumentalismus gemeinsamvorhanden sind, und zwar so, dassder angebliche Gegensatz zwischen ihnen ver- schwindet. By theword "skeptical" I do not mean to suggest,primarily, disbelief; my ideal skepticis Socrates,not Pyrrho.Among the claimsput forwardin recent yearsin the name of "scientificrealism" thereare manythings I agree with; but thereis also an admixtureof what seemsto me unclearin conception,or unconvincinglyargued. This is not so verydifferent from what I thought,in mystudent days, about thedoctrines of logical empiricism- whichhave since been prettyharshly dealt with. In the latterproceeding, I believe that some rathervaluable philosophical lessons have been (at least partly) lost or obscured;and I fearthat unless a sufficientferment of Socraticskepticism is culturedwithin the realistbrew, it will go stale and its vogue too will soon pass. Indeed,it maybe late in theday to expresssuch a fear;the pendulum has by now swungperceptibly in the otherdirection; and yetI hope thatit may be possible to regainhold of what was of positiveworth in positivism,and to retainpossession of whatis of real value in realism. One of the criticalpoints on whichI feelmyself at odds withthe contend- ers forrealism concerns the characterizationof thecentral contrast under dis- cussion- thatbetween a "realist" and an "instrumentalist"view of theories. It seems to be widelyassumed that this contrastis tolerablyclear. I, on the otherhand, do not see the issue betweenrealism and instrumentalismas well- joined at all. This opinion may strikeyou as having about it a smack of Carnap and of ErnestNagel; and that, in turn,may suggestthat I myself, afterall, am an instrumentalist(since I believethat realists do so classifyboth Carnap and Nagel). Well, I have alreadytold you thatlogical empiricismhas strongmerits in myeyes; but partof myplea is: let us not be hastyin applying labels. This content downloaded from 171.67.34.69 on Sun, 22 Nov 2015 14:14:03 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Yes,but. - SomeSkeptical Remarks on Realism and Anti-Realism 49 I shall invoke another honored empiricistname (and nostalgic remi- niscence): Friends of mine, when I was a student,had taken a course of Hempers at Queens College in New York; and theyreported that Hempel had discusseda pair of relatedfallacies, which he called "the fallacyof nothing but", and "the fallacyof somethingmore". My friendsdid not elaborate;but thisterse fragment seemed intellectually nourishing, and I stillsnack upon it. How, then, is one to understandthe position that theoriesare "mere instruments"- thatthey are "nothingbut" instruments?First of all, instru- mentsfor what? One not infrequentlyreceives, from physics students who have been indoctrinatedwith a crude versionof positivism,the formulation - intendedto debunkphilosophical questioning - thata theoryis "nothing but" an instrumentfor calculatingthe outcomes of experiments.The tacit implicationhere is that the experimentsin question forma ratherspecial domain: both restricted- so that theoriesare quarantinedfrom any com- mercewith our views of "what the world reallyis"; and technical- so that (to putit in itsmost banal form)to understanda theoryis "nothingbut" to be able to calculatethe solutionsto examinationexercises. But thetacit implica- tionis false. I once heardEugene Wignermake the pointmost elegantly, in a lectureon philosophicalproblems of quantummechanics and quantumfield- theory:He remarkedthat it is oftenclaimed that all one everdoes in quantum theoryis calculatethe resultsof scatteringprocesses. But, said Wigner,while this is
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