Book of Abstracts
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BOOK OF ABSTRACTS International Conference “Philosophy of Science in the 21st century - Challenges and Taks” 4-6 December 2013 Faculty of Scence of the University of Lisbon Lisbon, Portugal Organized by Centre for Philosophy of Science of the University of Lisbon 2013 2 Scientific Committee Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen (University of Helsinki, Finland) Byron Kaldis (Hellenic Open University, School of Humanities, Greece) Christian Moeckel (Institut für Philosophie – Humboldt University, Germany) Daniel Andler (Université de Paris-Sorbonne, Paris IV, France) Dinis Pestana (University of Lisbon, Portugal) Hermínio Martins (Institute of Social Sciences – Univ. of Lisbon, Portugal) Jan Sebestík (IHPS, France) John Symons (University of Kansas, USA) Juan Manuel Torres (Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, Argentina) Luciano Boi (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris, France) Marcelo Dascal (Tel-Aviv University, Israel) Maria José Frapoli (Universidad de Granada, Spain) Mark van Atten (CNRS, France) Michel Paty (CNRS, France) Phillipe Artières (CNRS, France) Rasmus Tore Slaattelid (SVT, University of Bergen, Norway) Shahid Rahman (Université Lille 3, France) Organizing Committee Alexander Gerner Catarina Pombo Nabais Elena Casetta Gil C. Santos Lídia Queiroz Marco Pina Maria Estela Jardim Nuno Melim Nuno Nabais Olga Pombo (Chair) Ricardo Santos Secretariat Márcia Belchior Alexandra Padinha 3 4 Index Keynote speakers .................................................. 7 Sessions ................................................................ 15 Symposia .............................................................. 113 5 6 Keynote speakers 7 8 K1| Naturalism in the age of real science Daniel Andler (Université de Paris-Sorbonne, Paris IV, France) A realistic assessment of the scientific process, conducted over the last several decades, challenges the notion that science is on its way to provide a faithful and complete representation of the world. On the other hand, over the same period, large swaths of the humanities and the social realms have been brought under the purview of natural science. Scientific naturalism appears weakened from the first vantage point, and strengthened from the second. An arbitration will be proposed: it is not pragmatically acceptable to remain agnostic. * * * K2| Does sciences seek the truth? María José Frapolli (Universidad de Granada, Spain) General contents are essentially linked to the kind of practices that make us ra- tional beings. A background picture of the world, with the minimal stability re- quired to permit some trading with our surroundings, needs entertaining general thoughts. Truth is a means of dealing with them. The title of this talk, “Does sciences seek the truth?”, admits a short answer (Of course, they do! What else?) and a longer one. The longer answer will explain that truth ascriptions work as propositional variables, and that propositional variables are required to generalize over propositions. The sentence “sciences seek the truth” expresses a propositional generalization, which will be analyzed in the talk. * * * K3| Imagination and visualization of geometric and topo- logical forms in space: about some formal, philosophical and aesthetic features of mathematics and physics Luciano Boi (École des Hautes Études en Science Sociales, Paris, France) Our talk is aimed at studying some aspects of the imagination and visualization of geometric and topological forms, like non-orientable surfaces, knots and links. The objective is to show that this study may represent a logic and philosophical 9 powerful method allowing for describing and explaining new mathematical, physi- cal and perceptive properties of our surrounding space. We aim at showing that some “basic” operations likecut and glue can be composed in order to get more complex constructions or structures, such as connected sum and boundary surface, which show the existence of new mathematical properties. We will study some of these complex structures in relation with the processes of embedding and immersion of some families of surfaces and spaces. These proper- ties may be elucidated thanks to the concepts of homeomorphism and isotopy. The most relevant point, from the topological and philosophical points of views, is that two objects may have the same “form” and therefore correspond to (at least) two different graphic images. This fact shows first of all that the equivalence of forms has a topological meaning much more important than the simple equivalence of images. Thus, we will clarify this formal and physical difference with respect to two fami- lies of objects or surfaces, the first being knotted and the other being unknotted. In fact, the knotted-like form is a property that essentially depends upon the kind of three-dimensional space in which these knotted or unknotted objects or surfac- es are imbedded. Our hypothesis is that the study of objects and of the spatial environment in which they allow for different types of deformations is deeply correlated with the understanding of the dynamic transformations and the new emergent properties and behaviours of these objects and spaces. This is a point of paramount importance for our deep philosophical understanding of the different structures of space, which can be grasped only if we develop a dynamic and rela- tional vision of space and its structures. * * * K4| The Autonomy of the Special Sciences Byron Kaldis (Hellenic Open University, Greece) The recent debate in philosophy over the validity of the supervenience argument (SA) and, what is more, of the threatening possibility that it may be seen to gener- alize at all levels of reality (whereby higher order properties turned out to be epi- phenomenal unless they are reduced) thus rendering the special sciences redun- dant, has been at the centre of the more general field of discussions regarding the autonomous or not status of the special sciences (and the causal role or independ- ent causal efficacy of their principal items). The different viewpoint adopted in this talk puts to the forefront two things: first, it focuses on the higher special sciences, those squarely social, namely, those situated at levels above psychology, stressing the need for the discussion to move on to those levels where social action 10 takes place, while second, it introduces a crucial element in this analysis: the ex- tended mind thesis and distributed cognition. The latter is shown to play a pivotal role in the analysis of the uniqueness of the protagonists of those higher levels of the (explicitly social) special sciences, i.e. joint actions (especially those carried out by organized groups, i.e. institutions and other structured social wholes). Joint or shared action, widely construed to stand for a certain, central, kind of social wholes and social events (‘wholes’ and ‘events’ here used purportedly in the strict ontological sense) instantiates one of the more promising cases of extended and distributed cognition. Supervenience is a relation that leads to causal inefficacy whereby the supervenient (non-physical) properties allow their subvenient (physi- cal) base to carry all the causal weight itself; hence the former add nothing to the causal pool, i.e. nothing special of their own, since causation is taken care by the items at the base (e.g. group properties or mental ones vs. individual members’ properties or brain ones, respectively). This places the special sciences (employing non-physical or superveneient properties as explanatory) in jeopardy. Their auton- omy is compromised. In the standard discussion of the Supervenience relation reality is divided into, on the one hand, a hierarchy of levels of part/whole rela- tions or mereological relations of macro-micro levels and, on the other, a hierarchy of orders couched in terms of second-order properties of some object and their realization by first-order properties of the same object (e.g. mental states vs. brain states). (i) The first part of the talk deals with the discussion of the level-hierarchy and examines how particular criticisms voiced against the strategy of uncoupling su- pervenience from the macro-micro property relations, fare with respect to the case of joint action. (ii) The second part of the talk challenges the dominant assumption that the sec- ond, the orders- hierarchy, is irrelevant in our domain. * * * K5| La reconstitution, une pratique savante? Philippe Artières (LAHIC, IIAC, CNRS/EHESS, France) La communication s’attachera à montrer comment et pourquoi la pratique de la reconstitution, issue du monde judiciaire et largement présente dans l’art contem- porain, peut constituer un nouveau moyen d’intelligibilité et de connaissance en sciences humaines. A partir de notre propre expérience, on interrogera cette pra- tique du «roleplay» et on se demandera dans quelle mesure cette expérimentation a du sens en recherche fondamentale. 11 K6| Diagrams, Information and the Visual Claude Imbert (ENS, Paris, France) I first recall Frege’s endeavour, including its graphic details and his daring use of new dimensions. It soon became a stumbling block, and a matter of discussion with psychologists, anthropologists, logicians and philosophers. The problem remained on the agenda during half a century, till a mathematical logic got its explicit transformation laws and (by the way) its options. In the same time, Fre- ge’s diagrammatic syntax suggested a rough draft for an electronic net. So, Frege’s case is now part of a visual challenge to which epistemology has been confronted