Anthropology of East Europe Review

VISION IMPAIRED: THE CULTURAL OF EVERYDAY LIFE IN

Daphne Winland York University

The January 2000 elections in Croatia deficit" evidenced in documented cases of, for produced an almost tangible (albeit short-lived) example, violations of human rights (Karatnycky feeling of buoyancy reminiscent of the euphoria et aI, 1997), the suppression of freedom of the surrounding independence from in press (Thompson, 1994, Perusko- iEulek, 1999), 1991. The processes that have characterized this the expansion (and abuse) of constitutional and recent political shift from the authoritarian and presidential powers (Sekulire and Sporer, 1997), ultranationalist regime of the late Franjo Tudjman and Croatia's interventionist (and some even say, and the HDZ, to the present center-left coalition imperialist) pro-Herceg-Bosna policy. Major are symptomatic of the political and socio­ discrepancies have existed between state rhetoric economic uncertainty that has characterized the concerning guarantees of civic freedoms and fledgling state since 1990. 1 Since the early 1990's minority rights and the actual development and/or ethnonationalism has been the prism through enforcement of existing legislation in these areas. 3 which much commentary and analysis on the Ethnonationalism quickly became the dominant former Yugoslavia has been filtered. This comes rubric through which Croatian identity was partly in response to the self- evident realities of configured by the new state (Malesevire and ethnic conflict and political rhetoric in the , Uzelak, 1997: Hayden, 1992). This is epitomized, but more so, it marks the rush to fashion a new for example, in the exclusionary criteria of the conceptual geography of Eastern Europe. The Law on Croatian Culture and Citizenship (Hayden, continual upheaval in the region has produced a 1996): the acceptance of Croatian culture, large body of literature and commentary primarily proficiency in and Latin script, focussed on or informed by concerns with (ethnic) and exemptions for returnees in Croatia. In Croatia, much of the and their descendants. There are no similar scholarly attention since independence has provisions for those who are not members of the focussed on the numerous impacts of war (e.g. Croatian ethnonation (defined as substance rather displacement and trauma, reintegration and than citizenship ).4 Cultural policies are generally minority issues), and on recovery and nation neoconservative in orientation reflecting state building (e.g. processes of democratization and commitment to those cultural activities that are civil society, political and economic integration considered to be supportive ofnational identity into the EU). This paper draws attention to the and cohesion. Research institutes in Croatia need for more research into issues of emergent receive grants to carry out research identities in Croatia as well as the politics of and offer programs on Croatian cultural heritage representation by focussing on some of the and history and state-run television and radio also nuanced ways in which Croatians have been regularly broadcast programs featuring regional (re)negotiating the cultural logics of being and folklore, customs and religious celebrations. The belonging in the face of socio-political changes in rapid process of language fragmentation (ie. from the rapidly transforming Croatian state.2 Serbo-Croatian to Serbian, Croatian or Bosnian) The Context: Croatian Independence and its has meant calls for a return to Croatian literary forms (reavakian, kajkavian and stovakian) and Aftermath regional dialects. Croatian independence has, as in many post­ communist successor states, inevitably created the The vision for the new Croatian republic promulgated by the Croatian political leadership conditions for radical and often convulsive has blended ethnonationalist rhetoric with changes in the social, political and economic fabric principles ofsocial authoritarianism centered of society. Despite having emerged from the around the discourse of traditional (Catholic) shadow of communist rule, Croatia remains saddled with numerous problems, many of which morality and the preservation ofthe Croatian have been exacerbated by a legacy of policy nation from the dangers of cultural decline. The decisions ofthe late Franjo Tudjman and his ruling essence of Croatianess has thus been constructed party, the HDZ (Uzelak, 1998). These "growing as ethnically "pure," systematically eliminating pains" have been characterized by a "democratic references to the complex historical, socio-cultural

Vol. 18, No.2 Autumn 2000, Page: 31 Anthropology ofEast Europe Review and political conditions that have, over the years, include the largely worsening socio-economic marked the physical and conceptual terrain of conditions, shifts in class boundaries and relations Croatian identity. Metaphors of nation, and the changing significance of regionalism and Catholicism, family and the "Croatian way" have locality as well as the continuing and ubiquitous become the centerpieces ofCroatian political and presence, involvement and scrutiny of numerous religious programs. Among the desired qualities of external interests (international economic, political the New Croatian are traditional family values, and humanitarian agencies, Croatian diasporas, exalting motherhood as a vocation, espousing pro­ etc.). These, combined with the devastating and life values, fiercely attacking gay/lesbian lifestyles disruptive effects of war, have had a tremendous and relationships and vilifying feminism (personal impact on the politics of identity and communication, Ela Grdinire , Judge, County representation for Croatians in the new state. The Court, and LEGALINA Project, Zagreb examples below illustrate both reactions to elite­ and Maja Mamula, Counsellor, LEGALINA directed discursive closure on Croatian identity Project) .5 For example, a recent headline (e.g. the "good Croatian") and the invocation of (December 20, 1999) in the pro-government various cultural logics in the creation and newspaper laments the continued use of reaffirmation of a sense of belonging. "abortion as a method of birth control." Although contemporary political (and some intellectual) Croatianess and/or Locality discourses on Croatian identity often valorize What became almost immediately Croatian culture and heritage in the interest of apparent over the course of this research was the promoting a distinctively Croatian national centrality of cultural logics, forms and practices to identity, there is also a large body ofcommentary Croatian efforts to make sense of their lives and and research from vocal critics both within and struggles amidst enormous changes. For example, outside the country. Unlike the largely state-owned although nationalism often stimulates the search broadcast media there is a popular, often critical for identity, it is often contained and mediated independent and sometimes irreverent press (Feral through subnational categories such as region and Tribune, Novi List, , ). community and in local traditions and experiences. Locality and memory and their contingent socio­ While the decidedly ethnonationalist cultural manifestations and expressions have project of the state (during the 1990's) provides an always been and continue to be central to Croatian indispensable backdrop to the examination of configurations of identity. Being a Trogirani, identity and nation-building strategies. Here Dalmatiani or even a "snob from Zagreb" (the however, I focus neither on the official latter, a term of derision among Dalmatians), has perspectives ofthe state's numerous and often as much or even greater quotidian significance for self-selected interlocutors nor on its detractors and Croatians than the often strident nationalist critics, but rather on Croatians I have worked with pronouncements of politicians and others. The war who have not been directly linked to political, in Croatia and the former Yugoslavia has academic, social justice, media or like institutions irrevocably changed the demographic and interests. My goal here is to illustrate how characteristics ofmany communities, especially identities continue to be socially constituted and rural ones, and has inevitably fomented and contested through the gaps and silences of official exacerbated the Serb-Muslim-Croat axis of hate. (nationalist) discourses. However, I found that the rhetoric of ethnic Croatian Politics of Representation on the homogeneity is not as widely accepted or practiced Ground as Croatian nationalist ideology would suggest. Locally-specific cultural logics, memories and Quite apart from the plethora of practices continue to inform and mediate responses measurable macro-level indicators of ethnic to often chaotic changes and challenges faced by attitudes in Croatia typical ofpolitical and Croatians. Recent research on the integration of economic analyses (both inside and outside of Croatian refugees from Bosnia and Voivodina into Croatia), are the cultural politics ofeveryday life. communities in Croatia confirms the For example, identity struggles have been based predominance of regional over nationallY­ less on the most heavily cited ethnic and national constituted Croatian identities and the problems criteria (i.e. self-identification as a Croat, Serb, associated with these efforts (see JEapo JEmegare , etc.) than on a complex combination of factors 1999, Grbire , 1997). The significance oflocality as reflecting the "hypermobility of postmodern the primary factor in assessing the past, present capital and ideas" (Mishra, 1996:424). These and the future was clearly evoked in numerous

Vol. 18, No.2 Autumn 2000, Page: 32 Anthropology of East Europe Review interviews. The use ofethnicity as a marker was in Since 1991, discourses on identity in some cases used to underscore the similarities Croatia have often invoked the highly charged between people who would be, in the language of question: What is a "good Croatian?" While ethnic nationalism, bitter enemies, i.e. Serb and several key indicators have been proffered (e.g. Croat. For example, while in Knin, I spent some patriotism, (Catholic) religiosity), the bulk of time with a local Croatian and his Serb friend Croatian opinions I have recorded point to a visiting from England who had returned (after preoccupation with those characteristics that may fleeing during the war) to visit his few remaining label one as a "bad" Croatian. For example, (elderly) Serb relatives. In the time I spent with Croatians who are not solidly behind efforts to them, they were busy (re )creating a (familiar) reimagine the new Croatian state in ways that cultural space built on shared experiences, valorize selected elements of the Croatian past and memories and opinions. For example, on one present have been variously referred to by some as occasion, the better part of several hours was spent "unpatriotic," "unCroatian," "Yugonostalgic," discussing their disdain for the "ignorant" and "Yugo-zombies" or as "enemies of the state" (the "uncivilized" Bosnian who had resettled in latter two characteristically have been directed at Knin after the war in Bosnia. According to the vocal critics like Siavenka Drakulire and Dubravka Croatian: "We can sell them any old garbage and UgreSire by official or elite circles). In response to call it wine. They don't know the difference". my queries concerning views on state efforts to shape post-independence Croatian identity, most This sentiment is clearly reflected in either directly or indirectly mentioned the issue (of Croatian opinions and attitudes concerning the "good Croatian") and treated it either intraethnic relations in Croatia. For example, some dismissively (as inconsequential in their day to day of the most negative comments I encountered lives) or as a source of concern. For those who did concerned not Serbs and Bosnian Muslims but not subscribe to these visions of the new ("good") Bosnian Croats from Herzegovina and (overseas) Croatian, they felt that, at some level, others may diaspora Croatians, the two groups most valorized and this sometimes affected how they dealt with by the Tudjman government and by Croatian people (acquaintances, employers, coworkers, nationalist elites for their ethnic "purity" and etc.). This was most often expressed as having to patriotic fervor. Croatians, for example, have think about the consequences of publicly generally responded negatively to the huge influx condemning nationalist discourses, for example, of Herzegovinian Croats into Croatia and to what the possibility of being overlooked for promotions is widely regarded as their corrupting influence on at work. It is, however, important to note that the Croatian politics and the economy. Herzegovinian Croatians who commented on this facet of Croats have been a major presence in Croatia since Croatian identity politics pointed out that there is a the war, not just as refugees (from Bosnia and distinction between the nationalist discourses and Herzegovina) but as new members of the political images promoted by the government and a more and business elite. But while complaints about general, less political and arbitrary sense of taxation subsidies and corruption among them patriotism and pride. Most had been deeply and abound, most emphasize the deep cultural divide personally affected by the war and stated that they that exists between them. The Croatian overseas felt a strong sense of pride in being Croatian quite diaspora also invites a certain degree of scorn and distinct from nation-building rhetorical strategies. disdain from homeland Croatians. What comes The state has thus expended a great deal of effort through in the responses of Croatian nationals I to provide fixed parameters for the discourse of have interviewed is resentment and ambivalence Croatian national identity. At the level of toward the diaspora for a variety of reasons. These interpersonal communication however, the effects include the purported retention by diasporic Croats of this effort were manifested in a certain level of of a vulgarized and romanticized ethnic culture suspicion, caution or ambivalence for many who and obsolete political ideals, their exploitation of have rejected, been uncomfortable espousing these investment opportunities of questionable benefit to forms of self-representation, or who were homeland Croatians and meddling in Croatian concerned about the consequences of being viewed internal political affairs (Winland, 1998).6 One or labeled a "bad Croatian." My current research informant asked: "Are these returnees the best and focuses on the impact of the recent social and the brightest that diaspora has to offer?" political changes on the emergence ofnew discursive spaces and forms. The "Good Croatian"

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Conclusion occupied and well maintained. These images invariably speak to a recent past of coexistence or, Although Croatian nation-building efforts at the very least, mutual tolerance, reflecting have provided the conditions (through histories, memories and locally specific logics that ideologically-driven discourses and policy have been deeply shaken but can not be erased by measures) for the creation of a Croatian national the rhetoric of ethnic or national homogeneity. prototype, these efforts continue to have mixed results. Ambivalence, disdain, resentment, patriotism, optimism and pessimism, as well as confusion are among the sentiments and emotions Bibliography that characterize Croatians' day to day reactions to LEapo megare, Jasna. 1999. ""We are Croats. It is the discursive strategies of nationalist elites. Thus, not our goal to be set apart from our own while critics like Dubravka Ugresire (1998) people": A Failed Attempt at Firmer acerbically denounce the political and cultural Incorporation of Croatian Migrants" in perversions of the new Croatian regime and its Ethnologica Balkanica (3):121-139. elites (examples are plentiful, such as the fetishization of President Tudjman and a lucrative Grbire , Jadranka. 1997. "Searching for the industry in kitschy Croatica), it is not clear that the Familiar, Facing the Foreign: Dimensions of success of strategies that have been unleashed in Identity of the Croats from Bosnia­ the name of Croatian nationalism and statehood Herzegovina" Narodna Umjetnost 34(1):7-23. are as ubiquitous as has been suggested (or Hayden, Robert. 1996. "Imagined Communities feared). While it is true that Croatians have been and the Real Victim: Self-determination and inundated with nationalist ideology, many are still Ethnic Cleansing in Yugoslavia" American inherently suspicious ofor ambivalent towards Ethnologist 23(4):783-801. state-driven messages and measures (through political, media, institutional and other channels), Hayden, Robert. 1992. "Constitutional an attitude cultivated during the socialist era of Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Yugoslavia and reinforced during the past the Republics" Slavic Review 51 :654-673. years under the HDZ. While it is rare to find a Karatnycky, Adrian, Alexander Motyl, and Boris Croatian without strong political convictions or Shor. 1997. "Croatia" in Nations in Transit opinions, I have found few that expressed their 1997. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Pub: views using the exclusivist and nationalist rhetoric 96-117. of the state. Most are concerned with the ways in which the war and changes since independence Keams, Ian. 1996. "Croatian Politics: the New continue to affect their day-to-day lives. For Authoritarianism" The Political Quarterly. example, many I spoke to are concerned about Magas, Branka. 1993. The Destruction of corruption, the collapse of the banking system, an Yugoslavia London: Verso. unemployment rate (officially) hovering at 30%, the decline in the quality of health care and the Malesevire, S. and Uzelak, G. 1997. "Ethnic high cost ofliving.7 Distance, Power and War: The Case of Croatian Students" in Nations and Nationalism The following observations made over the 3(2):291-98. course ofmy fieldwork perhaps further underscores the need for research that focuses on Mijatovire, Antun. 1997. "Democratic Political identity as lived experience. The images I recall Culture as a Prerequisite of Multiculturalism" most from the train and bus trips I took between pp. 29-46, in Vjeran Katunari re (Ed.) Zagreb in the north and Split on the southern Multicultural Reality and Perspectives in Dalmatian coast, were of the odd look of villages Croatia Zagreb: Interkultura. that had been under Serb control from 1991 to Perusko-LEulek, Zrinjka. 1996. "Central European 1995 in what was called the Republic of Serb Media Policies: The Context ofTransition in Krajina. The widespread looting and burning of, the New Democracies" The Culturalldentity of first, Croatian (1991) and then Serb property Central Europe Proceedings of the Conference: (when in 1995, the 200,000 strong Europe of Cultures: Cultural Identity of Central captured Serb-held Krajina territory in "Operation Europe (Zagreb) 95-104, November 22-24. Oluja" (Storm)), left a strange patchwork of destruction. Houses, some burned or demolished, Perusko-LEulek, Zrinjka. 1999. Demokracija i stood alongside others that were unblemished, Medija Zagreb: Barbat.

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Pusire, Vesna. 1997. "Croatia's Struggle for Democracy" Revija za Sociologiju 28( 1-2):95­ Croatian Radio and Television Enterprise (HRT) 110. controls the only television source (HTV) with Pusire, Vesna. 1992. "A Country by Any Other nation-wide coverage. Croatian media critics Name: Transition and Stability in Croatia and continually complain that political party interests Yugoslavia." East European Politics and influence the awarding ofboth radio and television Societies (6):242-259. licenses. Journalists who take a critical stance are threatened with legal action (Perusko- .tEulek, Ramet, Sabrina. 1996. Balkan Babel: the 1999). In the area of minority rights, the Disintegration o/Yugoslavia/rom the Death 0/ government's record has lagged behind officially Tito to Ethnic War Boulder: Westview Press. stated goals and achievements. Dusko Sekulire and .tEeljka Sporer. 1997. "Regime 4The return of Serb refugees to Croatia remains an Support in Croatia" Revija za Sociologiju 27(1­ explosive issue, particularly in the regions of 2):35-60. Krajina and Eastern Slavonia Thompson, Mark. 1994. Forging War: The Media 5Feminist critics of government policies have in Serbia. Croatia and Bosnia and pointed to a general increase in the vulnerability of Herzegovina Avon: Bath Press. women to domestic or other forms of abuse (not directly influenced by the war) in post-communist Ugresire, Dubravka. 1998. Culture o/Lies: Croatia. See Slobodanka Bundalo "Images of Antipolitical Essays University Park, Pa: Women in Croatian Daily Newspapers" Women's Pennsylvania State University Press. Informational and Documentation Centre, Croatia, Uzelak, Gordana. 1998. "Franjo Tudjman's 1997; Silva Me)narire " and Nationalist Ideology" East European Quarterly Slovenia: a Case of Delayed Modernization" in 31#4:449-472. Marilyn Rueschmeyer (ed.) Women in the Politics 0/Post-communist Eastern Europe (New York: Winland, Daphne. 1998. "Croatians 'Here' and M.E. Sharpe Inc. 1994) 153-170. 'There': Diaspora and the Politics of Desire". 6 For example, in an interview with the Revija za Sociologiju, 29(1): 49-59. independent newspaper, the Feral Tribune, in Woodward, Susan. 1995. Balkan Tragedy: Chaos April 1997, a prominent Croatian sociologist and Dissolution after the Cold War referred to the Herzegovinian Croats as "Croatia's Washington: Brookings Institution. New Serbs" referring to the vilification of these newcomers by Croatian nationals. Herzegovinian Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, are allowed to hold Croatian passports and Notes identification, vote in Croatian elections, have Croatian license plates, fly the Croatian flag and use Croatian currency (kuna). Many attribute their 'Virtually all the recent attention has focussed on meteoric political and economic rise in Croatia to the national level political fallout ofthe election, the influence of hard-line Herzegovinians in key assorted exposes and scandals and the positions in President Tudjman's government. One disintegration ofthe ruling HDZ (which, according example of the influence ofthe now powerful to Hrvoje Sarinic, a close ally of Tudjman, Herzegovinian lobby in Croatia comes from the resembles "a pile of snow melting on the ground"). daily televised weather report, which displays a 2 The research on which this paper is based was regional map demarcating each of the former conducted during three field trips to Croatia Yugoslav republics with distinctive borders and beginning in the spring of 1997. colours, all with the exception of Bosnia­ 3 For example, during Tudjman's regime, the Herzegovina. Although the official Bosnia­ government retained controlling interest (or Herzegovinian border (with Croatia) is displayed, influence) in several daily newspapers (e.g. western and northern sections of Bosnia are Vjesnik), some weeklies and the country's only shaded in the same colour as the Republic of news agency, HINA. The most recent scandal in Croatia. Croatia concerns the discovery of discussions 7 A recurring theme in newspaper and television between Tudjman and his domestic advisor, Ivire coverage since the January 2000 elections Pasalire involving control over Vereernji List, one concerns the apportioning ofblame for the decline of Croatia's largest dailies. The state-owned in the standard of living on the HDZ and their

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allies, many of whom are seen as largely responsible for engaging in or condoning corruption and war-profiteering. Government leaders and politicians endlessly point fingers at each other over their alleged corruption during the Tudjman regime.

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