1995 (32nd) People and Technology - The Case The Space Congress® Proceedings For Space
Apr 25th, 2:00 PM - 5:00 PM
Paper Session I-A - Space Shuttle to Reusable Launch Vehicle
Jacob E. Huether Rockwell Aerospace, Space Systems Division
James M. Spears Rockwell Aerospace, Space Systems Division
Carey M. McCleskey National Aeronautics and Space Administration, John F. Kennedy Space Center
Russel E. Rhodes National Aeronautics and Space Administration, John F. Kennedy Space Center
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Scholarly Commons Citation Huether, Jacob E.; Spears, James M.; McCleskey, Carey M.; and Rhodes, Russel E., "Paper Session I-A - Space Shuttle to Reusable Launch Vehicle" (1995). The Space Congress® Proceedings. 6. https://commons.erau.edu/space-congress-proceedings/proceedings-1995-32nd/april-25-1995/6
This Event is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Space Congress® Proceedings by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Space Shuttle to Reusable Launch Vehlc"le
Jacob E. Huether James M. Spears Carey M. McCleskey Russel E. Rhodes Rockwell Aerospace Rockwell Aerospace National Aeronautics and National Aeronautics and Space Systems Division Space Systems Division Space Administration Space Administration Cape Canaveral, Fl Downey, Ca John F. Kennedy Space John F. Kennedy Space Center Center
ABSTRACT VISION
The National Space Transportation Reliable and affordable access to space Policy "establishes national policy, is the stated goal of future space guidelines, and Implementing transportation vehicles. From an actions for the conduct of National operational perspective, we believe that space transportation programs that this goal can be achieved qnly when will sustain and revitalize U.S. space system operational functloris drive transportation capabilities .••". The vehicle design. Research should be direction to the National focused on those areas which minimize Aeronautics and Space the number of subsystems & fluids used, Administration (NASA) is to the total parts count, and the amount of "provide for the improvement of testing required to valic;late system the Space Shuttle system focusing integrity. · on rellablllty, safety, and cost effectiveness." as well as "be the 'In the development of the Reusable lead agency for technology Launch Vehicle (RLV) a joint development and demonstration Government/Industry Operations for next generation reusable space Synergy Team (OST) was commissioned transportation systems, such as to ensure that lessons learned from the single-stage-to-orbit concept." prevlOus space transportation programs were applied to RLV. The OST has With this vision, NASA has Initiated developed a vision concept which Is Cooperative Agreement Notices directly applicable to RLV and any next between NASA and the private generation space transportation vehicle. sector for X-33 (Reusable Launch This vision concept is based on the Vehicle-Advanced Technology findings of the Access To Space Demonstrator) and X-34 (Reusable Advanced Technology Team (Option 3)1 Launch Vehicle-Small Reusable and the vast experience base from Booster) which would provide previous programs. The Advanced Insight to a decision by December Technology Team findings are contained 1996 to proceed with sub-scale in four basic requirements: flight demonstration to prove the single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) Define the mission narrowly to concept. This paper deals with transportation only. operational Issues which must be Apply modem advanced technology dealt with In order to achieve SSTO to design a simple vehicle with less goals of reliable low cost space complex subsystems and fewer transportation and order of elements. magnitude reductions in operating Avoid flight-to-flight certification costs. through a prototype development and flight test program. Adopt a management philosophy that empowers individuals to make
Canaveral Council of Technical SocieUes - Thirty·Second Space Congress
1-21 decisions at the lowest possible level Reduce operations and hardware replacing today's committee and complexity for maximum utilization of duplicative review process. resources and reduce opportunity for human-induced system failures: Less Building on this, the OST developed an Mhands-on", less human factor. RLV Operations Concept "Vlsion" which Employ near ~ ground comprised ten goals focused on management planning at top levels. operational improvements which are Focus on automatic Interactive geared towards mlnlmlzJng ground test schedullng of flight vehicle, ground time and resource dependence while support facilities, and support maximlzJng vehfde self-diagnosis, logistics. dependability and mirVnl.m servicing Adapt minimum standardized requirements2: payload Interfaces to assure maxirum flexibility and affordability. Provide a simplified, ~ The most affordable vehicle will be automated vehicle enabling blind to payload needs; like a truck, minimum periodic and repetitive not a hospital life support system. maintenance (aircraft-like) and Eimilate payload Impact on the resultant short turnaround time launch vehicle system infrastructure. between missions (hours, not Ensure joint participation Nil months). application of the synergism available Strive to isolate vehide ground between Operations, Avionics, processing from dependence on Propulsion, Payloads, and Vehicle facilities and GSE. Routine, Design to the preliminary scheduled turnaround should archltecturelvehicle concept, and replenish consumables only_ operations development process {i.e. Promote vehlcle health Integrated Product Tea'Tl - IPT). This monitoring/management systems entails Identification of and self-test at a level which supplies technologlH that can enable only operations and maintenance development of a vehicle system (O&M) anomaly related Information meeting attributes of the National that requires corrective action prior to Space Transportation Polley'. next flight. Let the vehicle •talk" to the The role of engineering (concept, ground remotely for processing and development. and technology) during maintenance needs. Incorporate the operatlonal era will be to special vehicle engineering perfonn continuous Improvement instrumentation only on specifically and technology advancement for assigned technology demonstration future market driven needs vehides (i.e. X-33). (retain X-33 capability). Elmnate "flight readiness-style• vehicle certification for every flight. The goal of driving the total Provide alrcraftMstyle vehlcle-type transportation system design rather than certificate for repetitive oommerdal reacting to the vehide design shoukt flight operations. result In the realization of overaH Design-In performance margins economic goals associated with future and flight hardware allowances to space transportation systems. We are eliminate proceHlng Impact, i.e., losing today's market as international strive to elimlnats unplanned work. competition continues to drtve reduced Mission design and flight operations cost of annual mass to orbit. Vehide sizing should be optimized around are ~ autonomous by design. No dedicated software identified POTENTIAL. pa)ioad user maintenance function is required to requirements and not focused on a support operations. single user's needs. In order to promote Canaveral Counclf or Technlcal Societies - Thirty-Second Space Congress
1·22 domestic launch opportunities (market SHUTTLE EVOLUTION growth) we must rethink our current mind set and approaches to vehicle During the Apollo Lunar Exploration certification which are currently Program it became apparent that the next measured in months rather than hours. step was a trip to Mars. ln order to go to Mars, man needed to gain a thorough During the course of the Commercial understanding of living in space for Space Transport Study (CSTS) the longer duration's than a moon flight. A industry alliance recognized that aEarty manned space station in earth orbit identification and definition of system seemed to be the answer; however, the attributes and requirements is essential cost of access to space in support of a to ensuring the transportation system space station was not supported by meets the user's needs."". Table 1, NASA's projected annual budget. The Common CSTS Attributes, is an solution was an inlefim space station, overview of identified attributes which Skylab, and the development of a must be found in the next generation reusable space transportation system, launch system as identified in CSTS Final the Space Shuttle. · · · Report in order for the system to be both operationally & economically feasible. The economic plan used to develop the operations scenario for the shuttle was Table 1 - Common CSTS Attributes a five orbiter fleet with a projected flight rate of forty flights per year from the John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Catenorv Attribute and an additional twenty flights per year Dependability High probability of from Vandenberg Air Force Base Launching on (VAFB). Early analyses confinned that Schedule Schedule Minimum Advanced forty flights from KSC could only be Bookino Time achieved if vehicle ground turnaround Reliability >Current Systems could be completed within 160 hours, Cost Minimum Cost Per hence the 160 hour turnaround Launch allocation. The 160 hour allocation Operations Standardized and processing timeline included initial Simplified Payload operations and sating, orbiter test Interfaces operations, post flight trouble-shooting, Capabilities Support Multiple Space Shuttle Main Engine/Main Payload Classes Propulsion System (SSMEJMPS) Provide Deliv"ery to Multiple operations, cargo operations, Thermal Destinations Protection System (TPS) maintenance & Provide On-Ortll repair, maintenance & servicing, element Rendezvous and integration, fluid servicing and Docking countdown. Allocations were also Capabilities developed for facility maintenance and Provide Delivery turnaround. These timelines were and Return Ca nab ii Wes accepted and used as PrOgram Availability High Probability requirements/goals and assessments of System Will Be In An the allocated timelines were perfonned. Operational Rather The process used to focus Than a Standdown improvements at the launch site and to State provide visibility to the shuttle program Responsiveness Minimum Respoll5e Time for Launching On manager was the Shuttle Turnaround Noed and Analysis Report (STAR). This report was updated on a quarterly basis by the
Canaveral Council of Technical Societies - Thirty-Second Space Congress Shuttle Turnaround and Analysis Group long-tenn operationa; benefits, most (STAG). recommendations for a more supportive design were not adopted . Therefore, The goal of operational efficiency was supporting the design was not visualized in concept development of the compatible with allocated timelin~. or shuttle and the STAR. This is illustrated reaching the mission cost goal of $15 in Figure 1, Artist Concept - Shuttle million/flight. Mating With Payload. In order for a space transportation architecture to be affordable, vehicle design architecture must be driven by operations functions so that operations requirements are well understood before the concept is frozen. This will allow a complete understanding of operational requirements/economics which are required to provide program affordability. In the case of the shuttle, the operations concept was frozen before operational requirements/economics were understood and compromises to the concept were pennitted well into the production phase in order to 1) try to reach system performance goals, 2) reduce vehicle weight, and 3) reduce development cost through utilization of old technologies from previous programs to minimize development risk in schedule and hardware. Each of these Figure 1 Artist Concept - Shuttle Mating compromises resulted in changes to With Payload flight and ground hardware as well as This concept, dated April 8 '74, stressed the shuttle operations concept. In order the use of mobile platfonns to gain for RLV to achieve its stated goals, access to the crew compartment and similar compromises must be eliminated. payload bay areas for reconfiguration of If in the case of RLV, operational the vehicle. Additionally, the original compromises are allowed, one might shuttle concepts recognized the benefits expect that the outcome would be similar of reduced recurring costs. This can be to that illustrated in Figure 2, Shuttle seen in the limited number of personnel Orbiter Columbia In Workstand. supporting ground turnaround operations in the orbiter processing facility (OPF). Since 1979 five vehicles have been The space shuttle transportation processed through launch facilities at economics was detennined using an KSC. In that time the average turnaround operations scenario that was based on time for vehicle processing through the previously mentioned allocation timelines. OPF has been approximately sixty days Assessments of the design highlighted (3 shifts/day), five days through the incompatibilities with the allocation Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) (3 timelines which required system shifts/day), and twenty-two days at the modifications. However, because 1) launch pad (3 shifts/day). Due to the non-recurring cost, 2) Design, complexity of the vehicle and Development, Test, and Evaluation connections to ground support (DDT&E) schedule, and 3) weight equipment, multiple vehicle service pei"lalties were a higher priority than umbilicals are required. Connection and verification between the vehicle and the Canaveral Council of Technical Societies - Thirty-Second Space Congress
1-24 the design ap·proach drove a large ground infrastructure resulting in high recurring costs and lengthly processing times measured in months rather than hours.
In other words, this vehicle is highly dependent on ground connections and support services to perfonn ground procedures. The vast majority of these test procedures are required servicing, irrespective of scheduled maintenance or in-flight fallures. As stated earlier, future space transportation systems should strive to isolate vehicle ground processing from dependence on facilities and GSE. By adopting th1s, the cost of recurring operations will be significantly reduced thereby achieving the stated goal of reliable and affordable Figure 2 - Shuttle Orbiter Columbia In access to space. Workstand EVOLUTIONARY CONCEPTS corresponding facility to insure safety of personnel, facilities, and equipmenl Since 1984 the government has Eadl of these vehicle service umbilicals investigated numerous concepts for the provide some combination of fluids, development of a replacement to the gases, ground power, and data to the shuttle. Each of these concepts vehicle enabling ground test capabilities, focused on the vehicle only and did not safing, operations and servicing. address the entire flight and ground systems. Major emphasis was placed These vehicle service umbilical on the reduction of flight element connections are connected immediatety production costs and retained the after landing at either Edwards Air Force support the design approach, starting Base (EAFB) or KSC. A set of dedicated with the rocket engines, then the vehicle, vehicle service umbilicals are connected and then the ground facilities and at each ground station as the elements support equipment required. It was are processed through the respective recognized that operations experience facilities (i.e. Shuttle Landing Facility, was needed to evolve to a more Orbiter Processing Facility, Vehicle operable approach for the future. Assembly Building, Launch Pad, etc.). However, due to priorities at the launch Eadl time an element is moved between operations center, personnel with ground stations, the vehicle service hands-on experience were not actively umbilical must be disconnected from one involved in these advanced study facility and reconnected at the next. n efforts. In many cases the concept was addition, system integrity must be targeted to replace shuttle; however, verified at each facility before any there was no definitive plan to bridge the processing operations can take place. gap from shuttle until the new program 1he vehicle is dependent on these was certified as operational. vehicle service umbilicals until T-31 Additionally, the lack of definition of a seconds at which time the vehicle is mission mcx:lel in many cases led to the operating on internal power controlled premature termination of each effort. by on-board computers. This support
Canaveral Council of Technical Societies - Thirty-Second Space Congress
1-25 The following is a brief overview of with existing shutUe infrastructure some of these concepts: and offered a heavy-lift capability (up to 150K lbs. to low earth orbit) within The Space Transportation a four year window. In the spring of Architecture Study (STAS) 1989 a Shuttle-C Users Conference recognized the need for an affordable was sponsored at Huntsville, space transportation system capable Alabama to enlighten the user of adlieving lower life-cycle costs community of system capabilities and with simplified and streamlined detennine a preliminary mission model. operations. STAS focused it's efforts The then Space Station Freedom was in five areas: (1) logistics support targeted at that time as a potential systems (ground & space), (2) user in the space station assembly spacecraft modularization, (3) launch sequence and the logistics resupply vehicle & orbit transfer systems, (4) missions. Due to sharing the technology assessment & development costs, the space station development programs, and (5) community was not ready to c:ommil mission control systems. Eadl of to using the Shuttle-C. The message these areas drove architecture from other potential users was ·build synthesis and systems development it and we will come·; however, no INhile STAS attempted to drive system one was willing to step up and commi design, the evolutionary architecture to Shuttle-C. With no clear definition approach encompassed as many as of annual utilization the program was four different architectures over a ultimately terminated. fifteen year period while each one The National Launch System addressed upwards of four vehides. (NLS) consisted of three vehicle The operations concept for each of configurations (1 ) a two stage these candidate architectures was heavy-lift launch vehicle (HLLV) complex and neither user friendly nor capable of delivering 135K lbs. to low operationally efficient. earth orbit -- NLS1 , (2) a 1.5 stage The Advanced Launch System vehicle capable of delivering 50 K lbs. (ALS) architecture allocated a goal to low earth orbit -- NLS2, and (3) a for cost to orbit. Unike STAS which single stage vehicle capable of was a combination of reusable CWld delivering 20K lbs. to low earth orbit -- expendable vehicles, the ALS NLS3. NLS1 and NLS2 utilized a architecture was comprised of common core and a corrmon expendable vehicles. ALS stressed propulsion module. NLS2 and NLS3 high reliability, robustness, flexibility utilized a common upper stage. NL.S and cost. The ALS technology was a design to cost approach based demonstration program was focused on allocated cost targets. NLS cost on reducing system complexity white models used cost estimating significantly reducing program cost. relationships (CER's) which had been With ALS being a DoD effort CWld in use for years. The lesson learned Shuttle-C being a NASA effort in NLS was, in order for true cost congesstonal support was limited. savings to be realized, these CER's One program was ac.ceptable but the must be evaluated against adlieved development of both was unrealistic. actuals (i.e. Shuttle, Delta, etc.) so In the case of ALS, the emphasis on that the differences can be both the reduction of flight e'8ment understood and accounted for. If not, production costs did not necessarily the goal of low recurring costs will be equate to.reduced operations costs. projected, but are not likely to be Shuttle-C was envisioned to fiU the achieved. Throughout NLS concept gap between shutUe and ALS5. Using development a new Space an unmanned cargo carrier in place of Transportation Main Engine (SlME) the orbiter, Shuttle-C was compatible was under development. SThE Canaveral Council or Technical SOOeties - 7hirty-Second Space Congess
1-26 concept developers recognized the The Reusable Launch Vehicle need for product development teams (RLV)IX-33 is.an outgrowth of Option and STME development was 3 from the Access to Space Studies. structured around this approach. In the observations and conclusions Interaction between each of the AJT's section of the report NASA states • .. . helped to maintain focus of system an architecture featuring a new capability design goals. Again the advanced technology single-stage-to lack of a market and utilization goals orbit pure-rocket launch vehicle was was a limiting factor in concept recommended as the most attractive development option. It has the greatest potential Access to Space was • ... a study for reducing annual operations costs responding to a Congressional as well as life-cycle costs, it would request in the NASA FY1993 develop important new technologies Appropriations Act. "5. "The goals of with dual-use in industry (such as the study were to identify the best composite vehicle structures for cars vehides and transportation and airplanes), it would place the U.S architectures to make major · in an extremely advantageous reductions in the cost of space position with respect to international transportation (at least 50 per cent), competition, and would leapfrog the while at the same time increasing U.S. into a next-generation launch safety for flight crews for the existing capability: 5. The Cooperative shuttle option by at least an order Agreement Notices previously magnitude. In addition, vehicle mentioned are the . government's reliability was to exceed 0.98 percent, attempt to bring industry into a pro and, as important, the robustness, active role in the development of pad time, turnaround time, and other requirements and the direction this aspects of operability were to be concept will take. Additionally, vastly improved. The study examined industry is being tapped to share in three major optional architectures: (1) the cost of the X-33/RLV to insure retain and upgrade the Space Shuttle that vehicle designs indeed meet and expendable launch vehicles, (2) established goals of reliability and develop new vehicles using affordable access to space in an conventional technologies and international market place. transition from current vehides beginning in 2005, and (3) develop THENEXTSTEP new reusable vehicles using advanced technologies, and transition In response to the President's Space from current vehicles beginning in Transportation Policy, NASA and other 2008 ...e. Like shuttle, the advanced designated government agencies have technology option operations scenario responded by initiating three efforts: was built on allocated timelines and an assumed set of launch site In response to the challenge of single facilities (using existing facilities to the stage-to-orbit development, NASA greatest extent possible). The has issued NASA Research approach again was to support the Announcements (NRA's) and vehicle design and not design for C.ooperative Agreement Notices support. In the case of affordable (CAN's) with industry leading to the access to space, the question is, will development of a sub-scale SSTO a fifty percent reduction in recurring prototype known as X-33, ultimatety costs provide a competitive leading to industry's development and transportation system. Even more operation of a full-scale RlV. important, will the access to space h!ASA's Space Shuttle Program has concepts stimulate market growth in advocated the use of the shuttle as a domestic launch opportunities. Canaveral Council of Technical Societies - Thift.y-Second Spece Con{T8ss
1·27 flying test-bed for common candidate design concepts and asking technology demonstrations with the the following questions: RLV. The Department of Defense (DoD) What has changed in this design has initiated an evolutionary upgrade concept that realistically supports path for it's current fleet of CERprojections ? expendable laund'l vehides (EL V). What reductions/functions have been The ELV modernization program will minimized/eliminatedas a result of this play a helpful role in gaining analysis in comparison to previous experience in certain ted'lnologies transportation systems which support regarding flight experience required infrastructure simplification? prior to RLV operations. Based on the above, will the vehicle meet stated design and cost CONCLUSIONS objectives without comprom1smg either operability, maintainability, or In dosing we feel it is appropriate to supportability goals during system restate the experiences from previous operation ? laund'l programs which led to the development of goals in the OST RLV Some efforts for the RLV have started Operations Concept Vision: off using the same approach as shuttle, but the pre-eminent lesson learned from Reduce system integrity verification shuttle is to design for support and not impacts through automation. simply support the design. If you do Simplify and reduce support what you did before, you will get what equipment demands and functions. you got before. Strive for one time vehide certification. REFERENCES Eliminate payload impad to launch vehide system infrastructure and 1. National Aeronautics and Space operations. Administration, Access to Space Empower PT's to design ~ . January 1994. architectureJvehide concept with a 2. NASA/Industry Operations Synergy focus on reliability and affordability. Team, Operations Concept Vision and Optimize annual/mass to orbit and Operability Criteria Document, single vehide utilization and not November1994. cost/lb. to orbit in one launch. 3. Presidential Decision DirectiveJNSTL4, National Space Transportation Policy, Additionally, CSTS findings indicate that August 5, 1994. both domestic and international launch 4. Boeing, General Dynamics, Lockheed, matkets require a system focused on Martin Marietta, McDonnell Douglas, market needs rather than one whid'l is Rockwell, Commercial Space designed around one user and forced to fit all others. The CSTS final report also Transport Study Final Report, April highlighted the benefit for user's to be 1994. involved in up-front requirements 5. National Aeronautics and Space development and preliminary designs. Administration, SHUTILE-C:Using To reiterate, ~ ... the goal is to provide a existing systems to cut cost and system which meets all of the attributes improve access to space, April 1989 of the marketarea: 4 . 6. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Access to Space As advanced vehide concepts are Study - Summary Report, January developed, concept analysis should be 1994, pp. i, ii, 2, 8-58, 69. realistically evaluated by reviewing
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