A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge Ebook

EPISTEMOLOGY: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE PDF, EPUB, EBOOK

Shaun Nichols , University of Utah with S. Suppose I merely see the bird but pay no attention to it because I am utterly intent on what we are discussing. Sign in to Purchase Instantly. Kulkarni, S. And how can I know the many things I need to know in life, such as that my family and friends are trustworthy, that I can control my behavior and can thus partly determine my future, and that the world we live in at least approximates the structured reality portrayed by common sense and science? Greenough University of St. In clear, masterful prose, Audi covers all the main topics in epistemology If I know that something is so, then, of course, it is true, whereas I can justifiedly believe something that is false. Lopes and M. Josh rated it it was ok Apr 08, Mele, eds. Gendler, J. Preyer and G. Suppose I see the bird so briefly and distractedly that I do not see it as anything in particular; still, my visual impression of it has some feature or other by which I am justified in believing something of the bird, if only that it is a moving thing. Michael A. Greenough, eds. Chignell, A. This point presumably explains why my visual experience— what occupies my visual consciousness—is the same whether I am hallucinating the field or really seeing it. Keim-Campbell, M. Nov 18, Farhan Niazi rated it it was ok Shelves: philosophy-textbooks. Unlike the latter, it denies that all sensory experience is of some object. Appraisal of the sense-datum approach Let us focus first of all squarely on the argument from hallucination, whose conclusion suggests that what is directly seen in visual perception of external objects is a set of sense-data. Some features of the site may not work correctly. I could also still believe, regarding the field I see—and perhaps conceive as sand artificially covered with something green—that it is rectangular. Hatzimoysis, ed. I want to discuss further what perception is first and, later, to illustrate in new ways how it grounds what it does. It is justificationally grounded in that experience because the experience, or at least some element in the experience, justifies my holding the belief. Other Editions Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge Writer

Kunke This leads to the disc Some sections were dense sledding, like the one on sense perception. In many parts of the book, justification and knowledge are discussed separately; but they are also interconnected at many points. Just a moment while we sign you in to your Goodreads account. As we shall see in Chapter 7, these structural questions take us into the area where epistemology and the philosophy of mind overlap. NYU also has some other outstanding philosophers who, though epistemology might not be among their current main area of research, would be very good to work with there. This is an object of or about which I believe something, say that it is rectangular. Moreover, the sense-datum view postulates the same sort of direct object for ordinary perception, illusion, and hallucination, whereas the theory of appearing does not offer a uniform account of their direct objects and must explain why entities like sense-data do not occur in normal perception as well as in empty hallucination. Other Epistemology sites 1. Knowledge of facts, or propositional knowledge, can be contrasted to practical knowledge, which includes knowledge of how to drive a car or knowledge of how to play baseball. Kim , Epistemology: An Anthology Blackwell, This suggests another visual principle, which might be called an epistemic principle, since it states a condition for the visual generation of knowledge: at least normally, if I see that a thing such as a field has a property say is rectangular , I visually know that it has it. Imagine that we are talking excitedly and a bird flies quickly across my path. For one thing, it incorporates much reflective common sense. The writing is intended to be as simple and concrete as possible for a philosophically serious introduction that does not seek simplicity at the cost of falsehood. Finally, consider my belief that if the spruce is taller than the maple and the maple is taller than the crab apple, then the spruce is taller than the crab apple. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. One may prefer as some philosophers do to say that we do not see such things but are only visually acquainted with them. It seems altogether natural to believe these things given the kind of experience I had, and I think I justifiedly believed them. To appreciate it better, let us first consider how it takes perception to be indirect. Trivia About Epistemology: A C However, as we just said traditionally the focus of epistemology has been on propositional knowledge. There are also some subsections that most readers can probably scan, or even skip, without significant loss in comprehending the main points of the relevant chapter. Sep 18, Muhammad Shemyal Nisar rated it really liked it. These sources are commonly taken to provide raw materials for inductive generalizations, as where observations and memories about roses yield a basis for generalizing about their needs. Jul 29, Landon W rated it it was amazing. James R. Here the main question is what constitutes perception, philosophically speaking. Preston, ed. So can our senses always be trusted? Skip to search form Skip to main content You are currently offline. Shelves: philosophy. Books by Robert Audi. Westphal, ed. The theory also does justice to the view that things are not always as they appear. Unlike the latter, it denies that all sensory experience is of some object. If I can see a bird without believing anything about or of it, I still can see it to be something or other, and my perceptual circumstances are such that I might readily both come to believe something about it and see that to be true of it. After all, just because, when I do see something, I see it by seeing some property or aspect of it, we may not conclude that I see it as having this property or aspect. Erneling and D. Pojman, ed. Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge Reviews

But I might just as easily slump back in my chair and mumble that I wish I had seen it. My underlying belief here is that if one thing is taller than a second and the second taller than a third, then the first is taller than the third. Epistemological problems and theories are often interconnected with problems and theories in the philosophy of mind; nor are these two fields of philosophy easily separated a point that may hold, if to a lesser extent, for any two central philosophical fields. This suggests another visual principle, which might be called an epistemic principle, since it states a condition for the visual generation of knowledge: at least normally, if I see that a thing such as a field has a property say is rectangular , I visually know that it has it. And do I not know these things—say that there is a lawn before me and a car on the road beyond it—on the same basis on which I justifiedly believe them, for instance on the basis of what I see and hear? Art thou not, fatal vision, sensible To feeling as to sight? Get a FREE membership video! Tooley University of Colorado, Boulder Phil. PHGA My perception of the bird gives me a ready basis for this much knowledge and justification, even if the perception occurs in a way that does not cause me to believe say that there is a bird before me. Hoffmann, ed. In exploring these domains, Chapter 9 in effect applies some of the epistemological results of the earlier chapters. It is a perceptible object. Chisholm Open-Court Add to Wishlist. Other Epistemology sites. Moreover, the field apparently must cause my visual experience if I am to see it. George Alcaraz rated it really liked it May 27, It will, however, help non-professional readers prepare for a critical study of that literature, contemporary as well as classical. Surely I could have maintained, regarding each of the things I have said I justifiedly believed through perception, that I also knew it. But where an unobtrusive object I see—as opposed to one blocking my path—has no particular relation to what I am doing, perhaps my visual impressions of it are simply a basis for forming beliefs about it should the situation call for it, and it need not produce any belief if my concerns and the direction of my attention give the object no significance. There is a great deal more to be said about each of these sources of belief, justification, and knowledge and about what it is for them to ground what they do ground. If you haven't heard of record-smashing singer and songwriter Mariah Carey, is there any hope for you? Sosa, ed. Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge Read Online

References Publications referenced by this paper. We cannot have a justified belief without being in a position to have it. There are better texts on the subject, but it is a great gateway resource for writing papers and a more in-depth text than most others I've seen. Stich, J. I owe special thanks to the philosophers who generously commented in detail on all or most of some version of the manuscript: John Greco, Louis Pojman, and Matthias Steup. It is justificationally grounded in that experience because the experience, or at least some element in the experience, justifies my holding the belief. In relation to some of the main problems treated in the book, I have learned immensely from many other philosophers, including Frederick Adams, Robert Almeder, David Armstrong, John A. My belief that the roses will not grow well without abundant water is called inductive because it is formed and held on the basis of a generalization from similar experiences with trees. If the belief arose, in the normal way, from my seeing the field if I believed it is there simply because I saw it there , then the belief was true, justified, and constituted knowledge. Academy of Ideas Membership Become a member and gain access to exclusive member videos. Olsson, ed. Erneling and D. I needed perception to learn these things about roses, and I need memory to retain them. The Problem the subject in one volume. I wish the PGR would report the actual means, rounded to three significant digits e. In exploring these domains, Chapter 9 in effect applies some of the epistemological results of the earlier chapters. Those who believe that this is the main way people obtain knowledge are called empiricists. These kinds of perception might therefore be called cognitive, since belief is a cognitive attitude: roughly the kind that has a proposition something true or false as its object. This is visual propositional perception: perceiving that. Belief justification, then, is more than the situational kind it rests on. Phenomenalism If some philosophers have thought that perception can be understood without appeal to sense-data, others have conceived it as understandable in terms of sense-data alone as its objects. In the light of the special case of empty hallucination, then, the sense-datum theory may seem the most plausible of the three. Hale and A. Martin, eds. If there is not too much color distortion, I may still both know and justifiedly believe it to be dark. Updated and expanded, Epistemology remains a superb introduction to one of the most fundamental fields of philosophy. Still, seeing an object as having a certain property— say, a stick in the water as bent—does not entail that it has the property. Salerno, ed. Very poorly written, which I will typically forgive when it comes to treatments of complex topics, but in this case the writing is so imprecise and sloppy that it borders on seeming laziness. Alvin I. Alston, Syracuse University. First, why must anything be seen at all in a hallucination? The belief is thus true or false depending on whether the proposition that the field is rectangular is true or false. I could certainly still see the green field, and from a purely visual point of view it might look the same to me as it does now. The theory I am describing is a version of a sense-datum theory of perception. Rood and R. Mele, eds. But as we have seen, although hallucinatory experiences can be intrinsically indistinguishable from perceptual ones, all that can be assumed is that they are sensory experiences. Again, however, we can alter the example to bring out how knowledge and justification may diverge: the belief might remain justified even if, unbeknownst to me, the grass had been burned up since I last saw it, and there were now a perfect artificial replica of it spread out there in grassy- looking strips of cloth perhaps the owners refuse to look at the ugly charred ground. Unlike propositional beliefs, objectual beliefs have a significant degree of indefiniteness and so are best not viewed as true without qualification; they are accurate or inaccurate, depending on whether what one believes of the object such as that it is rectangular is or is not true of it. A superb introduction. We tend to have situational justification for vastly more justified beliefs than we actually have—or need. The students were a bunch of freshmen who are either taking epistemology to get there one philosophy requirement or taking it because they are at the beginning of studying philosophy in school. I simply see the field, and it is as it appears. Sosa and J. Posted on August 30, I also benefited much from the papers given to the seminars or institutes by among others Laurence BonJour, Fred Dretske, Alvin Goldman, Gilbert Harman, Keith Lehrer, Ruth Marcus, and John Perry, with all of whom I have been fruitfully discussing epistemological topics on one occasion or another for many years. Matthew Weiner , University of Vermont. This review is from the perspective of a general reader, not someone specializing in philosophy.

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