Contesting in the electronic public sphere

Juli L. Gittinger

Faculty of Religious Studies

McGill University, Montreal

April 2015

A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment

of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

© Juli L. Gittinger, 2015

Gittinger 0

Table of Contents

Introduction 1  Methodology 8  Sources and field of data 13  Authority and authenticity 16  Chapter summaries 18  Contributions of this thesis 20

Chapter One – Literature Review and Definition of Terms  Introduction 24  ‘Religion’ and ‘World Religion’ 26  Defining ‘Hinduism’ 31  Hinduism as a political category 36  Globalization and intensification 38  Common culture and digital divides 46  Conclusion 51

Chapter Two – The idea of a Hindu community  Introduction 53  Community and Nation 55  ‘Hindu community’ 63  and 68  Production and consumption of Hindu media 71  English language and the Indian public sphere 75  Forging a Hindu community: the Ram Janmabhumi movement 86  Conclusion 93

Chapter Three – The idea of a ‘Hindu nation’ in nationalist rhetoric

 Introduction 94  A ‘digital hermeneutic’ 95  The discursive construction of a Hindu raṣṭra 101  The (re)telling of history 112  Conclusion 122

Chapter Four – The tensions of authority and authenticity  Introduction 125  Authority of the ‘insider’ 126

Gittinger i

 Authority/authenticity through replication and repetition 133  ‘Authentic’ Hinduism 137  Online/Offline influences: “Western Universalism” and Hindu Nationalism 144  Case study: the “Internet ” 154  An interview with an Internet Hindu 164  Conclusion 173

Concluding Thoughts 175

Bibliography 181

Appendix: Data and surveys 196

Gittinger ii

List of figures

Figure 1 Screenshot of homepage of , January 2015 97

Figure 2 Screenshot of web crawling graphs of Hindu Unity website by year, with 2001 highlighted 103

Figure 3 Screenshot of web crawling frequency of Hindu Unity website after September 11, 2001 103

Figure 4 Screenshot of web crawling traffic for VHP-America after September 11, 2001 104

Figure 5 Home page of BJP website, 1996 105

Figure 6 Hindutva page of BJP website, 1999-2000 107

Figure 7 Home page of BJP website, 2011 to 2013 108

Figure 8 “Hinduism is…” Anonymous search on Google, 2013 175

Gittinger iii

Abstract (English)

Defining terms such as ‘religion’ or ‘Hinduism’ for academic disquisition has been and continues to be a highly contested process. Hinduism in particular, with its plurality of traditions and enormous history, resists concrete categories and definitions. Yet, in the electronic public sphere, ‘Hindu’ and ‘Hinduism’ are not merely contested as academic descriptor terms which are sedimented with Orientalism, universalism, and/or idealism, but are signifiers which are very consciously presented, promoted, and managed by Hindu nationalist groups in effort to control the discourse on Hinduism in both and abroad.

This dissertation raises several questions: How is the problematic category of

Hinduism contested in the electronic public sphere, and by whom? What does the presentation of ‘Hindu community’ presume? How have media contributed to the discourse of an

‘authentic’ Hinduism? How are claims of ‘authenticity’ and ‘authority’ made? How is Hindu cyber activism, which is responding to these claims, bolstered by Hindu nationalist discourses?

This research is framed by an engagement with existing scholarship on “Hinduism” as a problematic category, and tracing the development of the (English speaking) public sphere in India through the rise of various media. Contemporary examples of these tensions, such as the recent Wendy Doniger controversy, will be visited throughout to further highlight the importance of this analysis. This research exposes tensions in the English-speaking public sphere of the Web and thereby calls for and facilitates a deeper appreciation of the importance of online discourse in Hinduism in shaping contemporary nationalist discourse on Hinduism.

Gittinger iv

Résumé (français)

Définition des termes tels que «religion» ou «hindouisme» pour dissertation académique a été et continue d'être un processus très contesté. L'hindouisme en particulier, avec son pluralité des traditions et une énorme histoire, résiste catégories concrètes et définitions. Pourtant, dans la sphère publique électronique, «hindoue» et «hindouisme» ne sont pas seulement attaquée termes descripteurs universitaires qui sont sédimentées avec l'orientalisme, l'universalisme, et

/ ou l'idéalisme, mais sont signifiants qui sont très consciemment présentés, promus, et géré par groupes nationalistes hindous dans le but de contrôler le discours sur l'hindouisme en Inde et à l'étranger.

Cette thèse soulève plusieurs questions: Comment la catégorie problématique de l'hindouisme est contestée dans la sphère publique électronique, et par qui? Qu'est-ce que la présentation de «communauté hindoue» présume? Comment les médias a contribué au discours d'un «authentique» l'hindouisme? Comment revendications de «l'authenticité» et

«autorité» sont faites? Comment l'activisme de cyber hindoue, qui répond à ces demandes, est soutenue par des discours nationalistes hindous?

Cette recherche est encadrée par un engagement avec la bourse existante sur

"l'hindouisme" comme une catégorie problématique, et retraçant l'évolution de la sphère publique (anglophone) en Inde à travers la montée de divers médias. Des exemples contemporains de ces tensions, telles que la récente controverse Wendy Doniger, seront visités tout au long de souligner davantage l'importance de cette analyse. Cette recherche expose les tensions dans la sphère publique anglophone du Web et de ce fait demande et facilite une meilleure appréciation de l'importance du discours en ligne dans l'hindouisme dans l'élaboration de discours nationaliste contemporaine sur l'hindouisme.

Gittinger v

Acknowledgments

This dissertation and my time at McGill would not be possible without the generous financial support from McGill University (the Provost’s and the President’s Doctoral Fellowships), from the Faculty of Religious Studies (Graduate Excellence Fellowships), and from the

Eugene McBurney Foundation Fellowship. I am also grateful to the Tony Blair Faith

Foundation’s “Faith and Globalization Initiative” with whom I have worked for three years as both project assistant and teaching fellow.

I would like to thank my advisor, Davesh Soneji, who has proved to be an invaluable model for my doctoral process and is a brilliant and inspiring scholar. His wealth of knowledge on post-colonial and contemporary issues in India has been very helpful, and I am privileged to have worked with him at McGill. I would also like to thank Andrea Pinkney for her attentive guidance and thoughtful insights on the final editing process.

I have also had the pleasure of learning from wonderful professors in Montreal, including Victor Hori, Leslie Orr, Davesh Soneji, Lara Braitstein, Jim Kanaris, and Narendra

Subramanian. I can confidently say they each influenced my education in profound ways.

Other friends and colleagues who have offered guidance, read through early drafts, shared their own work, collaborated, or contributed to my professional development at this phase in my academic career include: Daniel Cere, Patricia Kirkpatrick, Arvind Sharma, Fatima

Seedat, Richard Greydanus, Shital Sharma, and Shayna Sheinfeld.

I cannot express how eternally grateful I am to Ellen Aitken, the Dean of the Faculty of

Religious Studies during my time at McGill, who was my professional mentor and cheerfully supported me in my many endeavors in her department. By including me in the Faith and

Globalization Initiative at McGill, she introduced me to a new area of scholarship and

Gittinger vi discourse that is now an important part of my work. I feel fortunate to have been at McGill during her time, and it is with great sadness that I take my final steps in the PhD process in her absence.

Most of all, I thank my family who have stood by my decision to return to school and pursue a PhD at a late age, and who have been my cheering section since I returned to school in 2002. It was a monumental decision, and one that has not come without a price. They have enthusiastically supported the choices I have made and I could not have done this without them.

Gittinger vii

Introduction

Dear Hindu Brethren, Nowadays, Hindus are often being humiliated by Politicians, Muslims, and Christians. Also, some of the organizations related to , which instead of promoting welfare of dalits (who are also Hindus), are spreading hatred about Hinduism. Bharat is a secular country, but politicians support the minorities and adopt anti-Hindu policies… If we wish that this situation should change, then we need to awaken Hindus and make them aware of such facts and gear them up for action. Thus, the need to start a Cyber Activist Group. We need to stand united to save and culture. The Internet is the best medium to reach the youth. You can join our group of Hindutva Supporters, if you wish to actively participate in this noble task…. “Call to join Cyber activist group,” Hindu Janajagruti website, 2012.

The message is clear: Hinduism is under attack. Perhaps not from proselytization (as during the British colonial era), nor from conversion (as during Mughal periods), but from the media who are responsible for “ongoing conspiracies to destroy their [Hindus’] existence.”

According to its website, the (“Committee for the Hindu

Renaissance,” or HJS) was established in October 2002 for “Education for Dharma,

Awakening of Dharma, Protection of Dharma, Protection of the Nation and Uniting Hindus”

(hindujagruti.org). As a right-wing group, its information campaigns and protests focus on and what it perceives as anti-Hindu elements such as LGBT tourism, ‘’

(inter-community marriage of Hindu girls to Muslim boys),1 conversion, and cow slaughter. It appeals to those who identify as Hindu and urges them to be active in protecting and preserving the Hindu Nation, with the promise: “If you participate in this religious task by devoting as much time as is possible for you, it will be a sacrifice for Dharma (or God) and it

1 It should be noted that Hindu boys marrying Muslim girls is not seen as threatening. For groups such as the BJP in Uttar Pradesh (where ‘love jihad’ has become a political issue), a Muslim taking a Hindu wife is seen as an example of forced conversion.

Gittinger 1 will also accelerate your individual spiritual progress” (hindujagruti.org/hindurashtra/what- hjs-is-doing.html). Central to establishing a national unity is the project of clearly defining

‘Hindu’ and ‘Hinduism’. Understanding that much of the battle is against the media and its representations or presentation of Hindus, it makes sense that the call to action would be one of cyber activism. It is here—in news feeds, websites, and social media, as I document in my research—where a vigorously-contested and politically influential campaign for a Hindu raṣṭra (nation) is underway.

The term ‘Hinduism’, as it is encountered online, reflects wider tensions of how this abstract term is simplified or universalized into a category that becomes a member of the problematic family of ‘world religions’. The mere suggestion of a ‘real’ or ‘authentic’

Hinduism—as presented in Hindu nationalist rhetoric, for example—reveals a defensive posture that disallows contrary or competing narratives. What is at stake when such narratives challenge or critique politically invested religious discourses? Is the public sphere in which these tensions play out truly an unrestricted and democratic sphere (as Habermas idealized it to be), or are there conscious efforts to ‘manage’ the definition of ‘Hindu’ online?

The discourses around authenticity and authority may be occurring in new media, but have an impact on all forms of media, including print. In early 2014, a new book by

University of Chicago professor Wendy Doniger was recalled in India, with calls for existing copies to be destroyed. This recent controversy over free speech and publishing in India provides a useful introduction to some of the issues of authority and authenticity. As I address in this dissertation, authenticity is a very sensitive issue in Hinduism at present, complicated by the ability to so quickly and widely disseminate (mis)information across new media. The book, titled The Hindus: An Alternative History, was criticized as being unflattering and

Gittinger 2 inaccurate by groups such as the HJS and hardliners among the (an umbrella term for the major Hindu nationalist groups, to which I return fully later). As a result of the pressure, Penguin Books agreed to withdraw all published copies from India and destroy them.

The book is criticized on a number of points, ranging from inaccuracy of dates and maps, to a misplaced application of Freudian psychoanalysis. The greatest criticism, however, is the accusation that Doniger selected incidents and tales for analysis that “conveniently fit a narrative of an erotic, exotic, mythologically rife Hinduism whose portrayal is actually alien, and often insulting, to adherents of that tradition” (“Indian Censorship…” Huffington Post

February 2, 2014).

Professor Doniger’s broad-ranging scholarship on Hinduism covers many mythic and erotic themes. However, she made no claims for strict, textual interpretations or comprehensive historical surveys, or that her book is the authoritative text on Hinduism.

Rather to the contrary, she offered an alternate history, which anticipates controversy in its core engagement with the issue of ‘authenticity’. Groups such as the Hindu Janajagruti, quoted at the beginning of this introduction, actively launch campaigns to engage Hindu transnational communities online in an effort to shape awareness of issues of authority and authenticity that serve their interests.

This dissertation will consider the following: How does ‘Hinduism’, as encountered online in Hindu nationalist rhetoric (on party websites, and in online spaces where members can openly debate), provide insight into the contested nature of this category in the electronic public sphere? What is at stake with such representations—for Hindu nationalism, for web users, or even for scholars? How are these contestations, which might be dismissed as too

Gittinger 3 peripheral or too polemical to be included in a serious discussion of Hinduism, actually quite influential and contribute to our understanding of Hinduism in contemporary discourses?

I argue that the impulse to ‘manage’ definitions and presentations of Hinduism as something eternal, timeless, benevolent, and pluralistic emerges from a history of India understood as constantly victimized by invaders and aggressive proselytization. This narrative is inculcated through Hindu nationalist rhetoric and through defensive commentaries found across news sites, blogs, and social media. As Muslims in particular are seen as embodying the qualities that are opposite Hindu qualities, any sympathy towards or intimation that

Hinduism may share similar qualities (e.g., of intolerance, violence) are vociferously challenged. To support this argument, I raise several research questions:

RQ1: How is authority and credibility established to speak on behalf of Hinduism?

RQ2: What are the principal lines of reasoning or arguments used? What rhetorical techniques are employed in media by the speaker(s) in order to defend their position (emotion, history, aggression)?

RQ3: What does the nature of such discourses reveal about the culture, values, politics, or other elements which are understood to be at stake?

My hypotheses are drawn from an analysis of Hindu nationalist websites (and their manifestos, vision documents, etc.) that I have studied over a period of ten years (2004-2014), and from more dynamic rhetoric of a group of online activists who identify as ‘Internet

Hindus’. I am also drawing from surveys with Hindu university students that I conducted electronically in 2013 and follow-up correspondence on the subject of ‘authenticity’ and

Hinduism in the global arena.2

H1: Authority emerges from positionality as insider (as Hindu), from repetition, and from eschewing ‘Western’ influences such as secularization.

2 The data from these 100 surveys (80 from the US, 20 from India) are included in the Appendix.

Gittinger 4

H2: The most consistent and effective tools employed in the texts I examine appeal to emotional patriotism, romanticization of history, and a valorization of “Hindu-ness” as a model of universalism.

H3: Such discourses highlight the tensions around the term ‘Hinduism’ and its relationship to colonialism, and the efficacy of the electronic public sphere in disseminating or promoting particular ideas of authenticity.

Why is this research valuable? The field of Religion and the Internet has maintained a sustained discussion since 1998, with early scholarship addressing community and networking;3 later scholarship has branched out in the ever-growing technology to address social media, the role of technology in religious practice, virtual rituals, and so forth. Among this growing area of inquiry, there are only a handful of scholars who are studying Hinduism online—notably Heinz Scheifinger, Nicole Karapanagiotis, Madhavi Mallapragda, and

Christopher Helland. To date, the emphasis has been on the fascinating field of Hindu ritual

3 This epoch is marked by a burst of scholarship on the Internet coming mostly from the social sciences, just as personal computers were making their way into homes and access to the Web was becoming widespread. Howard Rheingold’s seminal The Virtual Community (1993) is considered to be one of the earliest investigations into the social structures found on the internet, and how this might shape society in the future. Steven Jones (1998) and Barry Wellman (1999a) addressed entirely new questions about communication, identity, and community. Jones’ Cybersociety (1995) and subsequent Cybersociety 2.0 (1998) investigate computer-mediated communication (CMC) as a key factor in community and identity formation in the age of the Web. Such works led to further evaluation of the ‘virtual community’, such as Wellman and Gulia’s “Virtual Communities as Communities” (1999b), along with Wellman’s Networks in the Global Village (1999a) which introduced important rethinking of community as something socially-defined rather than spatially-defined. The scholarship on the general growth of Internet, CMC, and its cultural impact includes Castells (2000) who argues that communication networks have a cultural dimension all their own, Gillies and Cailliau (2000) who detail the birth of the Internet with insights from the medium’s brilliant developers and pioneers, Rheingold (1993/2000), Slevin (2000), and Wellman and Haythornthwaite (2002). Slevin’s book, The Internet and Society (2000) makes important contributions theoretically as he surveys the history of the Internet and its impact on modern culture. Hadden and Cowan’s volume, Religion on the Internet: Research Prospects and Promises (2000), is recognized as one of the first significant academic contributions which surveyed and addressed different theoretical approaches to studying religion online. Drawing largely from the field of sociology, its contributing scholars include Lorne Dawson and Christopher Helland, both of whom have made influential contributions to the field. Helland (2000) is noted for his distinction between ‘religion online’ and ‘online religion’—a delineation which is repeated by many subsequent scholars—in which he outlines the different ways certain religions use the Internet in promulgating their faith. “Ritual” in Digital Religion (2012) and “(Virtually) been there, (Virtually) done that” (2010) draws special attention to the concept of virtual ritual, and issues concerning authenticity and cyberspace.

Gittinger 5 online and whether such practices are valid, authentic, or ontologically sound (see

Karapanagiotis 2010, 2013; Mallapragada 2010; and Scheifinger 2010, 2013). This scholarship takes academic debates around Hinduism into account (as I discuss in chapter one), but it does not look at the tensions inside India which contribute to a very public and interesting contestation of how Hinduism is defined in online spaces. To my knowledge, there is currently no scholarship addressing online formulations of “Hinduisms” as being influential upon and influenced by Hindu nationalist discourse. In my research, I suggest that this is a crucial part of understanding Hinduism’s dynamism and flexibility that allows it to adapt to online rituals or promotion of sacred texts online.

The Doniger case stands as a very recent example of the tensions around Lorne

Dawson’s ‘crises’ of religion as it is encountered online (which I discuss in a moment),4 but is only a small part of the debate about how ‘Hindu’ is defined—culturally and religiously. This project seeks to add to the discussion by exploring the dynamism of religious traditions/culture online and in new media, and the ways in which information is manipulated or controlled. By looking at Hindu nationalist groups’ rhetoric, we can see tensions of authority, an urgent or defensive posture against certain discourses found in media, issues of censorship, and new questions about how we encounter ‘religion’ online. Hindu nationalism is generally discussed as its own phenomenon, emerging out of religious ideologies and social movements, but as I will argue, it makes a substantial contribution to online, global discourses on Hinduism. Given the way ‘Hinduism-as-world-religion’ is dissected, critiqued, glossed,

4 Canadian sociologist Lorne Dawson observed that religion went from being exclusively relegated to the offline world to having a strong presence in the online world, and that shift “indicates two very important social consequences of the Internet: a crisis of authority and a crisis of authenticity” (Dawson 2004, 2).

Gittinger 6 nuanced, and qualified in academia, the influence of Hindu nationalism and new media on our understanding of Hinduism is conspicuously absent.

I therefore begin with a review of the important discussions regarding religion, world religion, and Hinduism as categories of analysis and how they have been problematized. From there I look at Hindu nationalism as a cultural context which cannot be divorced from the

‘religion’. I draw upon my own research and an analysis of the websites of the BJP and VHP,5 utilizing propaganda I have collected over ten years as well as from webarchive.org which allows me to revisit archived versions of websites back to 1996. Through the presentation and discussion of this material, I establish rhetorical tropes which have influenced and shaped

Hinduism on the global stage.

Lastly, I show that these contestations are visible in a very dynamic and unfiltered electronic public sphere. The cyber-activists who identify as “Internet Hindus” actively participate in this process through blogs, social media, and by responding in the comment- sections on the webpages of major news outlets. As many of these activists are members of the BJP, and the BJP (along with ) has such an adept IT team, the politicization of religion and religious identity is an important part of my larger hypothesis.

As Andrea Pinkney points out, two approaches to the word “Hinduism” may be usefully contrasted: as a category of religion it may be a viable lens through which the wide variety of Indian religious traditions are analyzed, hence its continued use in academia. At the same time, however, it may more efficient to employ a rubric of “Hindu traditions” to act as a framework that allows for more consideration of the historical, social, and local nuances

5 The Bharatiya (BJP) and Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) are discussed in more detail in chapter two.

Gittinger 7

(Pinkney 2014, 34). While Hinduism’s polyvalence is apparent when surveying the wealth of websites dedicated to the subject, it is frequently presented as a historically ossified category, something eternal and unchanging, by self-proclaimed Hindu nationalists who feel it is incumbent upon them to protect a particular ideological understanding of the tradition. To contribute to this conversation as it exists in religious studies and on the Web, my goal is twofold: First, to demonstrate how political Hindu groups actively contribute to the discursive presentation and management of Hinduism online through an analytical and hermeneutical approach to online discourse/rhetoric. Second, I argue that the contestation of these definitions affects how Hindu culture is encountered and understood more widely, through the prioritization of certain discourses over others in the electronic public sphere.

Methodology: Internet as discourse, websites as text

A clarification of terms is in order: while many scholars use the terms ‘Internet’ and ‘Web’ interchangeably, they are technically two distinct terms. The Internet is the framework, the system on which the World Wide Web (henceforth, simply the Web) and other networks reside.6 The Web is the largest network in the world, linking together billions of websites.

6 To present its history briefly (for more history, see Rheingold 2000, introduction), the Internet was not created with the purpose of fostering global communications and information sharing as we use it today; it possesses distinct national origins and was developed by the US Department of Defense. The first incarnation of the Internet was ARPANET, created in the 1970s for the US government with the purpose of building a computer network for DOD-sponsored researchers who had the intention of developing a “prototype of national defense, data-communications systems, that would be immune to and survive the devastation of nuclear aggression” (Gunkel 2001: 84). In other words, the Internet is very much a child of the Cold War, and “traces its genealogy directly to one of the primary agents of American hegemony, and the effects of this paternity can still be read in the very structure and content of the ‘global network’” (84). Funded by both private companies and the National Science Foundation in the 1980s, eventually it drew international support for the development of new networking technologies which would act as ‘commercial backbones’. By the 1990s, it was commercialized into a series of international networks, including the World Wide Web (WWW or Web) which is only one of many services on the Internet. The Web consists of a multitude of documents, pages, services, and so forth which are interconnected via hyperlinks.

Gittinger 8

Thus the ‘Web’ is a well-named network of ideas and communities which crisscross the

Internet countless times a day. I have attempted to adhere to the distinctions between these two terms.

I would also acknowledge the variance across disciplines as to how ‘discourse’ may be defined. Discourse can be described as a multidimensional social phenomenon; as theorist

Teun van Dijk states that “a more or less complete ‘definition’ of the notion of discourse would involve many dimensions and consists of many other fundamental notions that need definition, that is, theory, such as meaning, interaction, and cognition” (Wodak 2009, 67). Or, to use Foucault (1972), discourse is a body of thought and writing united by common objects, terms, and ideas that are expressed in a clearly identifiable manner of locution. Rhetoric, subsequently, is the art or employment of discourse to persuade or motivate its audience. I examine rhetorical devices found in Hindu nationalism as displayed on the websites and electronic publications.

Another term to define here is my use of the word ‘text’ in reference to the Web. Here,

I feel the simple definition of ‘printed or written word’ is not sufficient to capture the multimodality of the webpage.7 As the Web is a collection of multimodal texts, it provides levels of information through multiple semiotic modes or channels of communication.

Decentralization is a primary architectural feature of the Internet; the networks that are distributed globally are interconnected yet autonomous, and without a central governing body. To have interoperability, the principle name spaces and identifiers of the Internet (domain names, IP addresses, port numbers, and other parameters) are administered by ICANN, or the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, based in Marina del Rey, California. It has a board of directors which draws from an international body of communities: technical, business, academic, and other non-commercial entities. It was revealed in March 2014 that the US is relinquishing its oversight of ICANN, which is creating concern and speculation over what sort of new organization will manage the Internet, although there is nothing to suggest that the Internet will become more censored or privatized. 7 Modality can refer to both the grammatical system of existential stances or to the presence (or uses) of modes of communication. Multimodality, in this context, refers to the multiplicity of interactions that occur simultaneously, allowing for an analysis of what has been termed ‘context’ in traditional discourse analysis (see Norris 2004).

Gittinger 9

However, very few websites are cul-de-sacs; that is, hyperlinking is a staple feature of the webpage which leads to portals either within the webdomain or externally. For this reason, I view the webpage not as an independent disquisition, but rather a part of a much larger web of symbols, languages, and images. The webpage is merely a singular node in a wide and intimately connected dialogue. The power of a website is not merely the words displayed on the page but the images, symbols, presentation, hyperlinks, and context are all contributors to the final presentation of ‘text’ which is consumed by the web user.

It is a worthwhile project to bringing an analysis to the ‘text’ in digital media, for further examination of how religion is represented online, discursive production of authenticity, and for questions of authority. As my methodological approach is drawing from these traditions rather than being executed strictly within the frameworks of discourse analysis in the precise manner of linguistic scholarship, my system of inquiry—what would best be termed ‘rhetorical analysis’—is as follows. I draw upon Foucault’s discussion on the formation of enunciative modalities (1972, 50-55), which is the classification of propositions based upon an assumption of their content or characteristics and how these classifications are articulated. Through evaluation of these modalities, three questions can be raised:

1. Who is speaking for Hinduism? 2. From what institutional sites is the discourse emerging (and thereby deriving its claims of legitimacy)? 3. What is the situation that makes it possible for the subject to be defined, and in which the subject occupies in relation to other domains and objects?

Like many other categories and questions raised in this project, these are not independent of one another, and are informed or connected in surprising ways. For the purpose of clarity, however, I briefly address them one by one here and expand on how they might be used in the context of religion online.

Gittinger 10

The first question is one of the fundamental inquiries of discourse theory and introduces questions of power:8 Who is doing the speaking? And, by the same token, what voices are excluded? These two sides of the proverbial coin reveal the power of speech, and the ever present silence which is both concealing and revealing. A discourse in which a power presumes to have the authority of knowledge (religious and cultural knowledge, in this instance) at the same time negates the power of an alternate source of knowledge. The authority, through its claim of legitimacy, creates a discourse that will respond aggressively to challenges and do its best to suppress alternate ideologies which will, in turn, be denounced as heretical, unpatriotic, or nefarious. As Brian K. Smith observes, the question of “Who speaks for Hinduism?” is not only who speaks with recognized authority, but also which audience confers that authority (2000, 742).

The second question again relates to authority (and to a lesser degree, authenticity).

The hyperbolic “if it’s on the Internet, it must be true” is only a joke to those who understand the falsehood of the statement; for too many people, any official looking website or URL is thought to be authoritative, and thus any person—qualified or unqualified—can discuss a particular subject as if coming from a position of legitimacy. The structurally democratic nature of the Web allows for anyone with the appropriate technology to step up to the podium, and for anyone on the Web to listen. At its most simple level, the question of authority is one of who has the microphone.

8 Arising from a symposium titled “Who speaks for Hinduism?” the Journal of the American Academy of Religion devoted an entire issue to this very subject in 2000. See the pieces by Brooks, Hawley, Lopez, and Smith.

Gittinger 11

At a more complex level of conversation, the question raises concerns about power, hierarchy, and the public sphere.9 This is where the ideology of Hindu nationalism can distinguish itself from other rhetoric by having a position of insider knowledge and knowledge of religious practice—thereby conferring legitimacy—against the mleccha or foreigners who didn’t even understand India when they were occupying it.10 Voices of Hindu literati challenge imperialism, Orientalism, and Western hegemony, and therefore develop authoritative voices in the public sphere which appear to be juxtaposed against the colonial.

Lastly, we must investigate the circumstances that make it possible for the subject to be defined, as well as its relation to other jurisdictions of power and to other objects. The subject, in this case, is the reader or the web user who encounters the discourse on the Web.

The question therefore asks what sort of perceptual situations the subject can occupy in the information networks—computer-mediated communications in the form of writing or images, as emitter and receiver of observations, theoretical propositions, and histories—and how is it contextually defined by these networks which are articulated through modes of power.11

What is starting to emerge is something along the lines of ‘digital hermeneutics’.

Rafael Capurro is perhaps the first scholar to introduce this idea and has begun to outline how

9 By ‘public sphere’, I am using the phrasing of Jürgen Habermas who defined it as an arena where individuals can come together freely to discuss contemporary issues and politics with the goal of reaching a public consensus. As I discuss in chapter two, the Web would seem to embody Habermas’ ideal, but in truth is a problematic example. 10 The practice of decrying scholarly criticism of Hindu nationalism is extremely common. After receiving my first hate mail for an article I published, I had the pleasure of meeting and asked if he had ever experienced the same. He said “Yes…all the time!” Other white scholars have been attacked as anti-Hindu, while Indian scholars are publically condemned as traitors. The website of the Bajrang had a page titled “The Black List: Enemies of Hindutva Exposed!” which has a list of names of popular figures and their “crimes” that includes: Sonia Gandhi, the Pope, Dawood Ibrahim, Shabana Azmi, Deepa Mehta, Vijay Prashad, and so forth. Scholars which have been vilified across websites and forums include: Madhav Deshpande, Patrick Olivelle, Romila Thapar, Wendy Doniger, and Jeffrey Kripal—many of which for simply discussing non- mainstream aspects of Hinduism or concentrating on alternate ritual practices. 11 Foucault was working within the framework of medical and clinical discourses in this example, but its theoretical application is possible towards religious discourse as well.

Gittinger 12 such a hermeneutical approach would operate (2010, 35-42). Capurro explores Heidegger’s concept of Dasein (“being-in-time” or “presence”) as shaped by digital technologies, and this is an extremely provocative territory to explore in relation to media and culture. For my present interests, however, I turn to Gadamer who is especially useful in thinking about the last of the three Foucauldian questions I just presented (regarding the subject and interpretation). I will revisit this hermeneutical approach in chapter three when I begin to analyze websites of Hindu nationalist organizations.

Sources and field of data

Methodologically, I combine insights from my review of secondary scholarship on theories of

‘community’ and the rise of new media with analysis of my own original data, which covers survey- and interview-derived information. My initial survey data was collected from 20 university students from Banares Hindu University and Delhi University, and 80 American university students who identify as Hindu.12 The survey was an inquiry into the ways in which the students encounter Hinduism online including Twitter feeds and Facebook pages to gather insight into public and private discussions on the subject of Hinduism as it is discussed in the electronic public sphere. Follow-up interviews were conducted through email or video conferencing with a dozen students who agreed to further questioning, with whom I broached topics related to globalization, ‘authentic’ Hinduism, and authority to speak on Hinduism’s behalf.

I have also taken advantage of the readily available source of social media, which includes Twitter, Facebook, and public forums in which more liberal or secular

12 See Appendix for more details on my original survey.

Gittinger 13 representations of Hinduism are being challenged or debated. Such open contestations over definitions of ‘Hindu’ or ‘Hinduism’ provides a field of meta-discourse to explore not only how ‘Hindu’ is defined, but who has authority to make such definitions, and how those claims are legitimized. I argue that Hindu nationalist groups such as the BJP have effectively co- opted these discursive spaces in attempt to control or manage how Hinduism is defined in this global arena of the (English speaking) Web.

Finally, I completed a long-term diachronic analysis of two major Hindu nationalist websites, BJP and VHP, from the period of 2004-2014, using my own archived data and online computing resources to access and analyze changes over time in historical web discourse and rhetoric. I have thus attempted to synthesize a wide variety of material for analysis of public discourse on the subject of Hinduism and Hindu culture—a subject that, I argue, is shaped online by Hindu nationalist discourse.

It is important to make a note about this kind of research, which not only relies on printed scholarship found in books and journal articles, but upon an extensive study of material found on the Web. The medium is dynamic and constantly evolving, and methods which were used even a few years ago among scholars (such as reporting the number of ‘hits’ from a search parameter) are invalid with the advent of algorithms which greatly influence how one browses the Web and to what information one is given access. Social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter have become valuable sources for witnessing discourse and are unhindered by ethical constraints of copyright as they are public spheres with open access.

Such sites however, require a great deal of time and no shortage of skill to sift through and

Gittinger 14 compile any data or testimonials for analysis.13 Although it may seem novel compared to traditional modes of academic research, those employed in any exploration or analysis of web-content are tasked with establishing legitimacy of web-as-text, virtuality as reality, and methodologies which are adapting to new frontiers. To study discourse and representations, as

I am doing in this project, I am attempting to pin down what Christine Hine would call “a moving target” long enough to discuss it. Hine addresses many of these concerns in her book

Virtual Ethnography (2000), and in Virtual Methods: Issues in Social Research on the

Internet (2005a). For example, she makes the following case for virtual ethnography:

I believe that we are still in the process of having to legitimize cyber ethnography and that multi-modal approaches are a worthy goal for virtual ethnography. The key challenge here is in understanding how to do multi-modal studies. This is especially challenging since the ethnographer’s toolkit changes with every new setting. We don’t know what that toolkit consists of because every time we do a new study, we have to choose what combination of sites, methods, writing practices and techniques we need to use.14 The same case could be made for any research that is relying upon the Web as a site or source of data and evaluation. If we consider that Facebook began in 2004, YouTube in 2005,

Twitter in 2006, and the first iPhone in 2007, it is clear that these new media demand that scholars adapt and invent new methodologies. The mere fact that ten years seems archaic reveals the dynamic nature of the Internet, and how quickly research seems outmoded in this field.

13 While these sources are advantageous in that they are public and often unfiltered, they do create their own problems with the sheer amount of information that must be gone through during research processes. I have estimated that I have read over 1200 tweets, 450 comments posted to news websites or forums, and read through six months of member-posts on four different Facebook groups associated with the Internet Hindus. 14 “Christine Hine on virtual ethnography’s E3 on the Internet,” interview November 29, 2013. http://ethnographymatters.net/blog/2013/11/29/christine-hine-on-virtual-ethnographys-e3-internet/. Accessed November 2014.

Gittinger 15

Furthermore, since anyone can make a website, online sources require scrutiny and must be considered in relation to the networks in which they are situated: whose view is being represented, what sites link to/from them, the amount of web traffic they have, and their prioritization in search engines. Social media is the newest frontier in which to explore discourse, often unfiltered and anonymous. My methodology for this project is sensitive to these issues and utilizes tools of the Internet (such as Skype and email interviews, e-surveys, web archives, and so forth) and approaches the Web as a sphere of discourse which can be observed, managed, and/or analyzed.

Authority and Authenticity

That there are multiple understandings of what ‘Hindu’ or ‘Hinduism’ might entail, the diversity of the traditions on the ground, and the problematization in even using such labels all suggest that somewhere in that multiplicity of Hinduisms there must surely be an

‘authentic’ Hinduism. That is, if the term is challenged as not being fully representative, historically accurate, or culturally appropriate, then an assumption is made that a sound, stable definition exists and is being defended by some person or party invested in this discourse.

Whether such claims should be accepted or challenged points to the validity of the speaker and their presumed authority. As the Doniger case suggests, both authenticity and authority may be related to insider/outsider tensions.

What Canadian sociologist Lorne Dawson calls “a crisis of authority and a crisis of authenticity” (2004, 2) is an event arising from religion’s shift from being exclusively relegated to the offline world, to having a strong presence in the online world. As a result, the

Gittinger 16 crises of authority and authenticity emerge as two very important social consequences of the

Internet. These crises are not isolated, but are connected and respond to mutual challenges.

Dawson initially highlighted three areas in which religious authority is challenged by online religious mediation: 1) the potential for misinformation and disinformation (either through malice or ignorance), 2) the loss of control over religious materials, and 3) decentralizing authority by enabling ‘grassroots witnessing’ and giving more power to community members (2000, 43-44). In other words, the proliferation of the Internet and its accessibility allows for the possibility for authorities within religious institutions to be challenged, circumvented, or undermined in that they no longer exclusively control symbols, information, or dialogue within the community.15 Furthermore, such representations in media can displace power and provoke shifts in the authority of religious institutions.16 This is but one way to discuss authority in this medium; another approach to the ‘crisis of authority’ is to look at the Web as text and employ strategies of rhetorical analysis. That is to say, who is claiming authority, what legitimates such claims, how is authority established on the Web, and how is it tied to authenticity (of a religious tradition)? It is in this second approach that I am most interested, and will be analyzing some of the discourse found on the Web in later chapters.

15 While authority is especially related to the challenges to traditional religious authorities, some scholars have argued that the Internet may empower religious authorities (see Barker 2005). 16 To properly investigate this shift, an examination of what Campbell (2007) called “multiple layers of authority” is required. Working in the context of the Abrahamic faiths, Campbell lists these layers as: religious hierarchy, religious structures, religious ideology, and religious texts (2007, 148). Each of these layers interfaces with Internet technology in slightly different ways, as does each religious tradition. She demonstrates, through interviews with members of different religious communities, that the approach to authority on the Internet is multilayered and responsive to different online contexts and religious contexts. There is substantial scholarship on this aspect of mediated authority (also see Cheong et.al. 2013; Hoover 2006).

Gittinger 17

Subsequently, authenticity is often derived from authority. The authority of the website which presents a particular religious idea or tradition is making claims of authenticity, which are legitimized through different means: quoting doctrine or scripture, social position of the speaker (professor, scholar, priest, and so forth), insider/outsider, presentation of material (an ‘official’ looking website, say, over a poorly done amateur site), affiliation with established groups or institutions (as with the BJP website), and repetition of information in multiple places. Authenticity is therefore not fixed, but rather discursively constructed through a multiplicity of contextual relationships which affect the claims made about the religion or culture at hand.

Jean François Bayart has similarly problematized authenticity—particularly in the instance of cultural authenticity—by questioning the criteria by which something is considered ‘authentic’: “Authenticity is not established by the immanent properties of the phenomenon or object under consideration. It results from the perspective, full of desires and judgments, that is brought to bear on the past, in the eminently contemporary context in which one is situated” (Bayart 78). In other words, authenticity is constituted by exterior factors rather than arising out of inherent qualities, and these exterior factors are necessarily influenced by those who are doing the evaluating.17 If authenticity is a social construct, referencing a practice or tradition that partially deforms the past (as Bayart argues), then authority is similarly subjective and contextual. I will revisit these two “crises” that Dawson highlights throughout the dissertation.

17 With regard to religion, authenticity has multiple meanings. Hobsbawm’s differentiation between modern ‘invented traditions’ and ‘genuine traditions’ (1983, chapter 1) is one distinction; literalism and textual-doctrinal traditions are another way in which religion is gauged in authenticity. Purity of a tradition, or its supposed lack of external influence is sometimes a hallmark of authenticity, as are traditions which are legitimated by institutional or clerical power. Additionally, authentic religious experience could be distinguished between agents of belief and actors who are merely ‘performing’ (Radde-Antweiler 2008, 89).

Gittinger 18

Chapter summaries

The first chapter introduces the problem of categories like ‘religion’, ‘world religion’, and

‘Hinduism’ as they have occurred in scholarship, in order to foreground some of the major issues which arise in the debates I follow on the constitution and presentation of Hinduism in online media. An important part of this discussion is the role of the electronic public sphere— which in the scope of this thesis, is restricted to an English-language speaking sphere—and how such contestations around these problematic categories are shaped by these arenas of discourse.

The second chapter introduces the concept of community both as it has been considered by theorists of nationalism and by more contemporary scholars in the field of media/communications. I discuss Hindu community as imagined in Hindu nationalism and the idea of the Hindu ‘nation’ (raṣṭra) which relies on the conceiving of community in a particular way entirely reminiscent of Benedict Anderson’s ‘imagined communities’. I am working through the lens of Anderson’s theory as foundation for my discussion of contemporary discourse online on the definition of Hinduism, which has particular applications to nationalism but has also been widely appropriated by other fields in the humanities. As a illustrative example, I discuss the rise of Hindu media (print and television) and its role in forging an identifiable ‘Hindu community’ which will later be politicized through nationalism, using the instance of the Ram Janmabhumi controversy as an example of how such communities may be formed through religious ideologies.

In the third chapter, I take a close look at Hindu nationalist websites and propaganda which have furthered an ideology in which authentic Hindu religion and culture is timeless,

Gittinger 19 ancient, and untarnished by outside influences. I propose a hermeneutic that draws from

Gadamer and McLuhan. Through the manifestos, polemics, and histories presented on Hindu nationalist websites, I illustrate that Hinduism is understood as something stable, contiguous, or even monolithic as it is discursively iterated across Hindu nationalist websites and propaganda. It is this rhetoric, I argue, that informs the more dynamic and contentious debates that the cyber-activists promote.

Lastly, the fourth chapter looks at two influences on this process of presentation and management: “Western universalism,” and Hindu nationalism. Such presentations reveal nodes of political power, contestations of religious and cultural authority, and the exclusion of discourses which may be contrary, “Western-influenced,” or outsider. I conclude with an interview with a member of the “Internet Hindus,” a group which has become increasingly vocal online. Looking at cyber-activism and how the Internet is being used to promote a very narrow, nationalist definition of ‘Hindu’ highlights the politicization of these efforts to manage or maintain idealized representations of Hinduism in the electronic public sphere.

Contributions of this thesis

As the Wendy Doniger controversy demonstrates, this is a debate that has very real world effects—especially for academics. The question of insider vs outsider positionality is one of the most frequently invoked challenges to defining Hinduism, as is the influence of Western universalism, Orientalism, and secularism. The rise of Narendra Modi is starting to reveal that this conversation will only become more important, as he is a deft user of media and very skillfully uses social media, as do his following of cyber activists who are happy to get into verbal brawls on his behalf. The issue of censorship—that is, protecting a particular vision of

Gittinger 20

“Hinduism”—in itself suggests that there is a claim that there is something authentic which needs protection from corruption or distortion.

The debates surrounding “who speaks for Hinduism?” and “what is Hinduism?”

(discussed in chapter one) need to take the electronic public sphere into account, in addition to

India’s history and the role of colonialism. Religious studies has been slow to embrace the conversation on new media, although there is no shortage of Religion and Media scholarship now. The scholarship has been dominated by the disciplines of sociology and media/communications. There are comparatively few religious studies scholars who are in this field.

As I already noted, there are very few scholars in the field of Religion and Media who are focusing on Hinduism. These scholars are looking at Hindu ritual online, and how

Hinduism as an orthopraxy may be more amenable to online rituals and representations. My interests certainly intersect with these conversations, but at this point, I am more interested in the discursive production of Hinduism online, and (returning to my initial research) how this may inform Hindu identity in the diaspora. To my knowledge, no one has pursued this field of research.

This also adds to the scholarship on Hindu nationalism, which has been researched and written about as a social, religious, and political phenomenon. Christophe Jaffrelot dominates this field, with Martha Nussbaum, Peter van der Veer, and others also making important contributions. While Jaffrelot published a brief article called “Shakha 2.0” on the

RSS’s paramilitary training camps extending into online domains, there is little if any conversation about the influence of Hindu nationalism on global discourses of Hinduism in the electronic public sphere. This issue overlaps with many of the conversations around

Gittinger 21 globalization, and whether culture/religion becomes abstracted, simplified, westernized, or distorted through the mass media of the web.

Therefore, this work fills gaps in the contemporary discussion of Hindu nationalism, the definition of “Hinduism” as a religious/cultural category, and in the Religion and Media field. The discussion of Hinduism as a discursively managed enterprise will further contribute to the scholarship engaging Hindu practice online, as types of rituals and pilgrimages offered electronically could also be argued to adhere to a particular, singular understanding of

Hinduism. It seems that Hindu religious practice on the Web (such as e-ritual would provide)18 is challenged less frequently than how Hinduism (as a culture, as a religion) is understood discursively. Theoretically, Hinduism would seem to have a natural affinity towards electronic media; the lack of central institutional authority allows for more participatory discourse, the diversity of Hinduism as practiced ‘on the ground’ should allow for more variations to be promoted and accepted on the Web. Hindu civilization is frequently claimed to exhibit ancient technology and advances, and (as Scheifinger has argued) Hindu culture has demonstrated an adaptability that makes it amenable to new mediums.

The pressing question remains as to who gets to speak on behalf of Hinduism and with what authority: “Westernized” professors? Hindu nationalist groups like the BJP? Why are some histories valorized and not others? Are we to understand Hinduism through the lens of

Swami Vivekananda or Jawaharlal Nehru? And when such people speak, are they making claims of an ‘authentic’ Hinduism? The anxieties around defining ‘Hinduism’ and the claims of authority and authenticity are intimately connected. To investigate ‘Hinduism’ as a

18 Rituals such as pūja (adoration of the deity) and darśan (seeing and being seen by the deity) are prototypical rituals of Hinduism, but practiced with increasingly frequency and acceptability through electronic media such as smart phone applications or through websites. See Karapanagiotis (2010, 2013) and Scheifinger (2008, 2010).

Gittinger 22 problematic category which perhaps engenders such contestations, we must first consider categories of ‘religion’ and ‘world religion’ before moving onto how media are used in shaping the discussions around such definitions.

Gittinger 23

Chapter One

Literature Review and Definition of Terms Hinduism means the ‘ism’ of the Hindu; and as the word Hindu has been derived from the word Sindhu, the Indus, meaning primarily all the people who reside in the land that extends from Sindhu to Sindhu, Hinduism must necessarily mean the religion or the religions that are peculiar and native to this land and these people. If we are unable to reduce the different tenets and beliefs to a single system then the only way would be to cease to maintain that Hinduisms is a system and to say that it is a set of systems consistent with, or if you like, contradictory or even conflicting with each other. But in no case can you advance this your failure to determine the meaning of Hinduism as a ground to doubt the existence of the Hindu nation itself. V.D. Savarkar, “Who is a Hindu?” (1923, 104)

As the above excerpt from V.D. Savarkar’s book on Hindutva highlights, the very word

‘Hinduism’ is problematic. In fact, the very first line of his treatise presents the

Shakespearean query: “What is in a name?” As the father of modern Hindu nationalist ideology—an ideology that is ethno-centric rather than explicitly religious—Savarkar knew well the problems of trying to define ‘Hinduism’. The term is loaded with a geography, history, religion, and civilization, and thus, as an ‘ism’, it is an unstable word referencing to

(what he argues to be) a stable identity known as ‘Hindu’.

Hinduism is not an a priori category. It has been historically constituted in opposition to the ‘other’; it has been constructed as a colonial category of identification, and it continues to be reclaimed and redefined in the contemporary landscape of politics in India. It is both global and intensely local. Hinduism is multivalent. It is cultural, religious, and political.

What, precisely, one accepts as ‘authentic’ Hindu culture/religion is constantly challenged and competes with reoriented definitions or presentations, and such claims of authenticity (or inaccuracy) only reveal that ‘Hinduism’ is an unstable category in itself.

Gittinger 24

Examining Hinduism as it is encountered online—that is, how Hinduism is presented, managed, and encountered on the World Wide Web—is challenging in that it is decentered, ethnic, and transnational. Such an ‘online Hinduism’ becomes decentered from its geographical locus and takes form as a discursive construction. The cultivation of a particular understanding of Hindu tradition is important to Hindu nationalist organizations both inside

India and to members of the diaspora who have increasing interaction with Hindu culture, religion, and politics in digital spaces as well as in their local immigrant communities.

How is this contested category of Hinduism encountered online, and what is at stake when contrary or competing narratives challenge or critique politically invested religious discourses? And what systemization of religion/culture do such narratives and definitions serve?

In order to explore the instability of Hinduism as a category, we must also decide how to define religion in such a way as to effectively explore the definitional discourses found online. Thus, it is also worthwhile to discuss world religion as an academic category in which

Hinduism plays an important role. Therefore, to begin this chapter, I start with a brief examination of religion, world religion, and Hinduism as constructed categories which are not fixed, but rather continually rearticulated in scholarship and in the public sphere. How

Hinduism is defined for the purpose of this dissertation also requires some clarification on how globalization is understood in this project. As Hinduism is often argued in nationalist discourse to be corrupted by colonial influence (thus requiring a reclaiming or revival of the authentic tradition), such online discourses attempt to suppress other presentations of

Hinduism which are argued to be ‘false’ or ‘corrupted’ understandings due to ‘Western’ influence and Orientalism. The justifications of such claims draw from three theoretical

Gittinger 25 concepts which are contextual in nature: globalization, Americanization, and imperialism. In examining these three influences on how one encounters religion and/or culture online, we discover new discursive processes that are emerging online. It is for this reason that the World

Wide Web, as a public sphere of discourse, provides an insightful platform for the analysis of this contest.

‘Religion’ and ‘World Religion’

The legitimacy of religion as a category of analysis has been debated by scholars throughout the academy of religious studies, offering multiple definitions and/or challenging its status as a sui generis taxonomic category. Influential discussions have notably included Wilfred

Cantwell Smith who is viewed as providing one of the earliest critiques of the concept of

‘religion’.19 Smith eschewed the use of the word ‘religion’, stating that to do so only further reified a process which tended take the external manifestations of religion—observable aspects such as myth, ritual, and so forth—as the whole of religious experience. As Russell

McCutcheon notes, the critical camps in this academic debate tend to either concede that

‘religion’ is (for better or worse) a taxonomic tool that allows the scholar to label, abstract, or describe behaviors and beliefs (as Jonathan Z. Smith does) or, on the other hand, take an essentialist position (as Cantwell Smith does) which maintains that “the focus of research on religion somehow ought to transcend (or, in the least, not be confused with) human, historical categories of thought and communication” (McCutcheon 1995, 287). McCutcheon argues that the former position is far too broad to be comparatively useful, and the latter too narrow.

19 See Wilfred Cantwell Smith The Meaning and End of Religion 1963.

Gittinger 26

Scholarship concerning anthropological approaches to the study of religion also reflect the ambivalence in using such categories. It was Clifford Geertz who argued that religion was

‘cross cultural’: that is to say that religion is an identifiable system of symbols, myths, outward markers, rituals, and conceptions of the world which can be used as a template to scrutinize traditions across different locations, cultures, and times. Such approaches presume a stability of the category ‘religion’ and ultimately follow a European construction of religion which is not contextually responsive. Critiquing Geertz’s approach, Talal Asad argued that that to claim there is a universal definition of religion ignores the historically specific constituent elements and relationships and denies that the definition itself is “the historical product of discursive processes” (1993, 116). Rather, Asad defines religion as an anthropological category that scholars may attempt to define as a trans-historical and trans- cultural phenomenon, but that must be separated out from power.

One primary critique of religion as an ontological framework is that it is not a cross- cultural category—held to be particularly evident in discussion of ‘Hinduism’ and ‘religion’ in colonial India, as I detail in a moment. As such, this problematizes the subsequent category of ‘world religions’, which presumes the ability to identify a variety of non-Western religions through the application of similar criteria used to define Western ones. Tomoko Masuzawa notes that such categorizations arose with an increasing global awareness; one of the consequences of the new discourse of ‘world religions’ was that it displaced the preoccupation with ‘primitive’ religions and the discourses on the ‘origin of religion’ that were dominant post World War I (2005, 41-42). As primitive religions had supposedly experienced little historical transformation, the world religions each had their own history and were arranged by systems of classification which invariably did little other than distinguish

Gittinger 27

“the West from the rest” (Masuzawa, 2). The list of eleven major world traditions20 delineated during this period of scholarship more or less remains unchanged to this day, often further distinguished as “living religions.” I would note, however, that this list is more problematic than helpful. African religions, for example, are conspicuously absent, and “primitive” is unclear as to whether it is pre-literate (as with Australian aboriginal religion) or ancient (as with Mesopotamian or Egyptian) or animistic (as with some Native American traditions).

Thus the whole enterprise of ‘world religion’ can best be seen as a starting point for the study of religion rather than an effective framework by which to study religion globally.

Hinduism is perhaps the most glaring example of a ‘religion’ that doesn’t conform to the frameworks that rose out of the Abrahamic traditions, and thus is often highlighted as exemplary of why ‘world religions’ is problematic. As Timothy Fitzgerald notes, the nature of

Hinduism itself as a complex and diverse collection of traditions requires a broadly sociological approach to make it intelligible to Western students, but such an approach is less likely to lead to a fictional construction of Hinduism than when relying on a more theological or comparative approach (1990, 101). He critiques Ninian Smart’s conceptualization of the

“six dimensions of religion” as scientifically objective categories, stating that they still have theological underpinnings. Fitzgerald’s critique of the world religion category argues that a sociological approach to Indian religion would be more analytically fruitful than the ‘world religion’ approach which, he argues, obfuscates rather than illuminates (1990).

Smart’s dimensions of religion, however, do attempt to provide “functional definitions” to act as a “practical checklist” by which traditions can be classified under the

20 These are: Daoism, Confucianism, Shinto, Hinduism (Brahminism), , , Zoroastrianism, , Judaism, Islam, and —with ‘primitivism’ sometimes added as a twelfth category (Masuzawa 2005, 44 footnote 17).

Gittinger 28 category of religion (Smart 1996). Katherine Young critiques the absence of criteria by which traditions are often identified as ‘religions’, and seems to be in favor of what Smart is attempting to do. In her essay “World Religions: A category in the making,”21 Young raises a concern about how various traditions such as Buddhism or Hinduism are presented as ‘world religions’ without the having an explanation of the criteria by which these traditions or collection of traditions were labeled as ‘religion’. That is to say, the absence of a standard paradigm that Buddhism or Hinduism would fulfill jeopardizes their ability to fit neatly into the world religions categorical model. Young argues that, broadly speaking, ‘world religions’ seemed to be traditions which had the vague features of being historically enduring, large in number, and could be further identified into working categories such as ‘prophetic’ or

‘primitive’ faiths (1992, 112-113). Young proposed an alternate method of categorization which would group religions by “clusters of characteristics, all of which need not be present”

(127), thereby discussing religions by features they exhibit in themselves (much in the way

Smart’s “dimensions” are proposed) rather than sorting them into a ready-made framework of presumed conditions and features thought to be definitive of a ‘religion’.

In constructing Hinduism as a world religion, the neo- movement has played a central role. Popularized largely by (1888-1975) who was one of

India’s most influential scholars of the twentieth century, neo-Vedanta Hinduism was characterized as having “a higher brand of universality that rebukes the exclusivity of ‘High-

Church-Episcopalian-Protestant-Christianity’” (Pinkney 2014, 35). This universality and the

21 From the 1989 Canadian conference on Religion in History. Young attributes earliest academy categorizations of ‘world religions’ to Wach (1951), H. Smith (1958), and Zaehner (1959). Masuzawa puts the category of ‘world religions’ even earlier, in volumes written in 1933 and 1934 (2005, 38).

Gittinger 29 promotion of Vedanta in America and Europe contribute to the understanding of this movement as a transnational one.

Neo-Vedanta’s universalist presentation of Hinduism is quite visible not only in the

Introduction to Religion classroom, but across Hindu nationalist rhetoric as early as the

Independence movement. Neo-Vedantic philosophy draws from such fathers of nationalism as

Ram Mohan Roy (1772-1834), Vivekananda (1863-1902) who was a disciple of

Ramakrishna (1836-1886), and Aurobindo Ghose (1872-1950)—all of whom propagated an understanding of Hinduism as sanātana dharma, or ‘eternal truth’.

Roy’s views were informed by his contact with Baptist missionaries and through his own comparative studies of Islam and Christianity which contributed to his pan-Indian, monotheistic universalism (see Lipner 2001; Zastoupil 2010). His equation of truth with

Vedanta, understood as the teachings of the Upaniṣads, allowed him to reject other articulations of Vedanta philosophy as it developed during earlier post-Vedic and classical periods (Hatcher 2008, 24). Similarly, Aurobindo also espoused a universalist vision of

Hinduism, most notably in his famous Uttarpara Speech in 1909.22 Emphasizing the concept of sanātana dharma, he presented Hinduism not merely as a world religion, but as the religion for the world.23

22 The Uttarpara Speech was delivered upon Aurobindo’s release from prison. He had been held as an accused suspect in a politically motivated bombing. Up until then he had been active in agitations against the British, even joining Tagore’s more radical nationalist organization in Kolkata. His release from prison and this speech mark his transition from the political arena to a more spiritual one, after which he settled in Pondicherry and became a . 23Aurobindo’s view of Hinduism was that it was superior in that it was non-exclusionary and non-sectarian. According to him, these were markers of an inferior (limited) religion: “...it is not circumscribed by the confines of a single country, it does not belong peculiarly and for ever [sic] to a bounded part of the world. That which we call the Hindu religion is really the eternal religion, because it is the universal religion which embraces all others. If a religion is not universal, it cannot be eternal. A narrow religion, a sectarian religion, an exclusive religion can live only for a limited time and a limited purpose. This is the one religion that can triumph over materialism by including and anticipating the discoveries of science and the speculations of philosophy” (Aurobindo 1909).

Gittinger 30

I would argue, as other scholars have (Isherwood 1948; McDermott 1975; Vertovec

2000), that no one did more towards the promotion of Hinduism as a ‘world religion’ than

Swami Vivekananda, who is responsible in many ways as being the first ambassador of

Hinduism to the West. Requested by to institutionalize his legacy (Beckerlegge

2004, 296), in 1893 Vivekananda spoke to the Parliament of the World’s Religions in

Chicago and delivered a brief, but famous speech in which he promoted a central message of universalism.24 Masuzawa notes that Vivekananda’s presentation of Hinduism as the “religion of the ” only furthered an all-encompassing definition of Hinduism (2005, 264). In such ways, Masuzawa argues, the list of traditions that filled ‘world religions’ was not merely a project of European scholars, but a responsive and contextual development that intertwined with various discourses emerging (in this case, from India) at the time.

Defining ‘Hinduism’

Just as ‘religion’ and ‘world religion’ are contested terms which should be used with caution and in full knowledge of the debates surrounding them, ‘Hinduism’ is even more fraught with peril having to negotiate its status as a religion, a world religion, and as the -ism of India.

Russell McCutcheon makes the observation that ultimately such debates may have more to do with theoretical and political issues relevant to scholars and their institutions than finding an accurate correspondence between concept and reality (1995, 294). In the scope of this project, however, my analysis is focused on the struggle to define Hinduism not only as a scholarly endeavor, but as a hotly contested debate in the public sphere, conducted by Hindus, many of

24 For more details on this interpretation, and the full presentation of his welcome speech, see chapter five when I revisit Vivekananda in the context of Hindu nationalism.

Gittinger 31 whom have much at stake in claiming the authority to define Hinduism in a ‘true’ or

‘authentic’ way.25

In deference to this ambiguity, my own use of the term ‘Hinduism’ is not only responsive to these debates, but is understood as religious, cultural, and political. This is, in part, due to the ongoing academic debate on whether to even use ‘Hinduism’ as a term at all, as it has been argued that the label became crystallized during the colonial period and therefore should be understood as a colonial construction.26 Others, David Lorenzen (2006) in particular, have challenged the notion that Hinduism was fabricated post-1800, noting that the constructionist argument implies Hinduism was invented by British scholars and administrators and that the religious tradition did not exist in any identifiable or consistent form prior to this time.27 Another position, as argued by Robert Frykenberg (1993) and Peter van der Veer (2001), holds that a recognizable Hindu religious tradition could be identified during the Mughal period by 1500 CE, even if the members of the tradition did not self- identify as ‘Hindu’.28 Historians such as Romila Thapar similarly assert that ‘Hindu’ as a term of designation crystallized in the Mughal era when Hindu generally meant ‘not Muslim’,

25 An entire issue of Journal of the American Academy of Religion (JAAR) focused on the issue of scholarship and ‘Who speaks for Hinduism?’ in 2000, including noted scholars: Douglas Renfrew Brooks, John Stratton Hawley, Donald Lopez, Vasudha Narayanan, Brian Smith, and others. This view of Hinduism as a necessary (if historically problematic) umbrella term for a plurality of traditions was consistently presented. 26 See Bloch et.al. 2009, Dalmia 1995, Frykenberg 1989, Hawley 1991, Lorenzen 2006, and Vishwanathan 2003. 27 Lorenzen further argues that the Hinduism whose theological or devotional emphasis was grounded in texts such as the Bhagavad Gītā or the Purāṇas “acquired a much sharper self-conscious identity through the rivalry between Muslims and Hindus” during the Mughal period (2006, 2), although there are certain aspects of Hinduism which may have become crystallized during the British colonial period due to a prioritization of certain texts and Brahmanic influence. Also see Dirks 2009, B. Metcalf 2006, T. Metcalf 1997, and Parsons 1999. 28 This further evidenced by the existence of organized sampradāyas or communities, which I discuss on page 62.

Gittinger 32 referring to anyone who practiced non-Muslim traditions.29 For this reason, ‘Hindu’ often encompasses Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs, , Adivasis, and other variations of traditions which are considered to be ‘native’ to India;30 therefore ‘Hindu’ as a category of designation was continued in subsequent colonial occupations as those in power continued to reiterate those terms.

Whether there was nascent self-identification as ‘Hindu’ at this time or if the label was externally ascribed to the natives by foreign occupants, it seems a body of religious traditions could be identified. Brian Pennington argues that despite Orientalists such as Sir William

Jones (who described Hindu religion as a “virtually impenetrable ‘cloud of fables’”), the subsequent generation, influenced by Protestantism, insisted that “Hindu traditions operated with clear, regular, and sinister principles that demanded disclosure” (2005, 3). This,

Pennington notes, motivated Hindus toward new efforts at self-representation, demanding a homogenous identity vis-à-vis the Muslim other, resulting in a “reconstruction of the coherence and nobility of their traditions” (3). Thus the colonial period is seen not as the era of ‘inventing’ Hinduism, but rather the circumstances which allowed for the formulation of

Hinduism into a world religion, exhibiting features and characteristics found in other major faiths. This is similar to van der Veer’s more holistic position in which he describes Hinduism as “a product of the encounter of Orientalism, and the colonial imaginary, and Indian beliefs

29 Thapar (1989, 224) states that the collective use of ‘Hindu’ as a community or in self-reference can be found no earlier than fifteenth century in non-Islamic sources. The term was further crystalized through Western perceptions of religion and Orientalist writing which ascribed “Hinduism” to the collective body of diverse practices found in the Indian subcontinent. 30 Such groupings of Indian traditions as ‘Hindu’ remain in contemporary writings, such as in Savarkar’s Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? and across Hindu nationalist websites, usually to bolster the argument that Islam and Christianity are not native to India and therefore not part of the idealized hinduraṣṭra (Hindu nation).

Gittinger 33 and practices” (1999, 420). Again, as I noted in Masuzawa’s discussion of world religions, this was a responsive and contextual process.

Other categories are sometimes used, such as ‘Vedic Hinduism’ or ‘Brahminic

Hinduism’, which emphasize texts such as the Vedas and Manusmṛti and have very - oriented stratification; primary deities such as Viṣṇu or Śiva tend to be and the center of these forms. Conversely, there are labels such as ‘popular Hinduism’ and ‘ Hinduism’, which refer to vernacular forms31 that acknowledge the diversity of traditions—including very regional variations which may not favor anything textual at all, but instead rely upon performance or oral traditions. The localized traditions may also have a more regional, non- mainstream deity at its center (for example, the goddess Kamakhya who is specific to

Assam),32 or may have rituals which are unique to the region.33 Further diversity is evidenced by the view of the deity or deities which may be monotheistic, monistic, or polytheistic depending on the sect; philosophies range from an atheistic Sāṃkhya to the dualistic Dvaita.

For these reasons, ‘Hinduism’ remains a term of convenience (however problematic that may be) for a range of traditions which are understood as not easily sorted and labeled.34

31 Scholars who have distinguished between formal/textual and vernacular/devotional forms include Wendy Doniger, Christopher Fuller, David Kingsley, Vinay Lal, June McDaniel, and David Gordon White. 32 After the goddess Satī was burned, Śiva carried the body of his beloved across India, where various body parts fell to earth and became sacred sites of worship. Her (female genitalia) fell in what is present day , and is the site of the tantric goddess Kamakhya who is associated with Satī and Kālī. She is celebrated by a festival that coincides with a flooding and influx of iron oxide into the local river, believed to represent the goddess’ menstrual cycle. While Kamakhya is mentioned in the Kālikā Purāṇa, she belongs to the tantric tradition, which is considered to subvert the Vedic paradigm. 33 During the three days of the Ambubachi Mela, which celebrates Kamakhya, the temple is closed and rituals/, the reading of texts, and any digging into the earth (as with farming) are disallowed until the goddess’ ‘menstrual cycle’ is complete. Afterward, devotees are permitted into the temple. 34 One persistent view of Hinduism that is sometimes charged with bearing colonial origins is the modern understanding of the caste system. While the narrative of the four varṇas (often mistaken as the caste system) was present in Vedic and Purāṇic literature, the division of caste/jāti was related to occupation, endogamous trade groups, and social classes in far more nuanced and mobile ways in pre-colonial eras. British colonial policy crystallized the caste system in two ways: 1) through the need to categorize and politicize, thereby delineating

Gittinger 34

Discourse in the scholarship of Hinduism which states that the category of ‘religion’ was an imported term is related to our earlier problematization of ‘religion’ as a cross-cultural framework into which Hindu traditions were made to fit. Not to say that an extant collection of beliefs did not exist prior to the British or even the Mughal colonial periods, but rather that the imposition of the term ‘religion’ onto the collection of practices across the Indian subcontinent was in itself a presumption of a single conceptual category of sects, doctrines, and customs presumed to have an essential commonality. Thus the label of ‘Hinduism’ is a product of such an impossibility. As W.C. Smith noted in The Meaning and End of Religion

(1962): “As an ideal ‘Hinduism’ might conceivably be defined (though only by a Hindu), but not as an historical reality…‘Hinduism’ refers not to an entity; it is a name that the West has given to a prodigiously variegated series of facts” (cited in Lorenzen, 5).

Although religion does not succeed as a cross-cultural category of analysis, religion is often seen as a constituent part of culture, or in the case of Hinduism, inseparable from it. In such examples, ‘Hindu’ as an identity marker does not necessarily imply a claim of religious affiliation, but has ethno-national overtones. Thus an argument can be made for Hinduism as

‘cultural’ practice specifically in reference to identifying as Hindu against other identifiers such as Christian or Muslim. The discourse of cultural identity as being something which must be constituted against an ‘other’ is pervasive across many sources. Theorists such as

Jean François Bayart states that identification is always “contextual, multiple, and relative”

(2005, 92). Ernest Gellner argues that ethnic and nationalist ideologies stress “the cultural similarity of its adherents and, by implication, it draws boundaries vis-à-vis others, who social groups in a way which increased conflict, and 2) through the prioritization of certain upper-caste texts like Manusmṛti by which caste was legitimated religiously (see Dirks 2011; Rao 2009). Scholarship has done little to change this; as Nicholas Dirks argues, “The academic study of India, it seems to me, unwittingly furthered a colonial project” (1989, 43-44).

Gittinger 35 thereby become outsiders” (1983, 10). Jawaharlal Nehru who notes in Discovery of India:

“The essential unity of that group becomes apparent when it is compared to another national group” (1946, 62). Thus Hinduism—if understood as a cultural or religious category of analysis—could be said to have developed in response to the presence of the ‘other’ in various historical contexts and narratives. Hindu culture therefore becomes constituted by what it perceives it is not: that which exhibits intolerance, exclusivism, imperialism, or theocracy.

Much of the rhetoric I examine in this project juxtaposes Hinduism—either blatantly or in a roundabout way—with Islam which is accused of or insinuated as possessing these very characteristics. This comparison to the ‘other’ is a key feature of how Hinduism and Hindu culture is established in nationalist discourse, as we will see further on when we look at Hindu nationalist websites and user comments in social media.

Hinduism as a political category

One could argue that to be ‘Hindu’ is to be tied to a specific geography and narrative about

India as a country and as a civilization. The three most populous religions in the world are

Christianity (2.2 billion), Islam (1.6 billion), and Hinduism (1 billion).35 Unlike the adherents to the other major religions which are spread around the world in higher populations, Hindus are highly concentrated to the Indian subcontinent, with 94% of the world’s Hindus living in

India.36 India’s geography as one of the world’s “cradles of civilization” substantiates the nationalist mythology that Hinduism is ‘ancient and timeless’, thereby allowing for a cultural

35 “The Global Religious Landscape.” The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life. Pew Research center. http://www.pewforum.org/2012/12/18/global-religious-landscape-exec/ Accessed November 2014. 36 99.3% of all Hindus in the world live in in the Asia-Pacific religion, with India having 94%. Remaining Hindu population worldwide is: 0.2% Middle East/North Africa, 0.2% Sub-Saharan Africa, 0.1% Europe, 0.1% Latin American/Caribbean, 0.2% North America (Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life: Global Religious Landscape, December 2012).

Gittinger 36 and religious narrative to be presented as contiguous. From this account, another chronicle emerges which tells of occupation, invasion, and subjugation by numerous parties but most notably the Muslims. This history, and the manner in which it is presented, plays a crucial role in political conflict in India.

Narratives of India, which edify a constitution of Hindu identity vis-à-vis the ‘other’, have been central to its imagining and its movement towards independence. For the secular and pragmatic Nehru, for example, the question of India was one of how it would be defined and seen in the landscape of modernity:

What is this India, apart from her physical and geographical aspects? What did she represent in the past? What gave strength to her then? How did she lose that old strength? And has she lost it completely? Does she represent anything vital now, apart from being the home of a vast number of human beings? How does she fit into the modern world? (49)

Although Nehru, like Gandhi, resisted invoking religion in his nationalist rhetoric, he saw in

India a “continuity of a cultural tradition through five thousand years of history.” Much of this history and narrative was historically instituted by the nationalist imagination of the nineteenth century. “The exact form this reality [India] took was one among many historical possibilities in that situation, though the fact that only this line of possibility came to be realized is so overwhelming that it is now difficult even to conceive of some of the others”

(Kaviraj 2010, 167). In the cresting and culmination of the independence movement between

1920 and 1947,37 this ‘reality of India’ could be seen in at least two forms of nationalism.

First, the of Nehru, Gandhi, and the , which prioritized independence from British rule and whose civil disobedience was couched in

37 1920 is often noted as being a turning point for Indian nationalism as Gandhi officially stepped into the political arena with his movements of non-violent resistance in the wake of the Jallainwallah Bagh of 1919.

Gittinger 37 social and economic issues. Second, a growing Hindu nationalism which responded to the perceived power of the Muslim League and formed a more religious and ethno-nationalist ideology, found in the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and ideologues like Nathuram Godse,

Subhas Chandra Bose, and Keshav Baliram Hedgewar.

Hindu as a political category is critically important to the tensions around ‘Hinduism’: this is similar to my delineation of Hindu as a cultural category—that is, not tied to religion explicitly, but used as an identifier vis-á-vis the ‘Other’. Sudipta Kaviraj argues that not only was there a pre-existing cultural identity, but also a political identity that preceded the colonial era. For example, there are Indian narratives which, through their storytelling, can be used to manipulate boundaries between internal and external communities by relating the other culture’s deities as demons or villains, thus drawing out the political character of traditional stories (2010, 169).38

Today ‘Hindu’ is situated in a discordant and polyphonic history of ancient civilizations, colonial occupations, and post-Partition identities. Accordingly, ‘Hindu’ and

‘Hinduism’ signify cultural, religious, and political understandings (including nationalist) which are continually negotiated and contested in the public sphere. One such arena, the electronic public sphere, highlights the instability of these categories by the very manner in which they are debated.

Globalization and Intensification

The contention over ‘religion’, ‘world religion’, and ‘Hinduism’—which do not have clear definitions or sufficiently act as taxonomic categories—also reflect tensions of modernity.

38 ’s Rāmāyaṇa would be an example of this, and I will revisit this at the end of chapter two.

Gittinger 38

Anthony Giddens, a scholar of globalization, describes modernity as:

...a shorthand term for modern society, or industrial civilization. Portrayed in more detail, it is associated with (1) a certain set of attitudes towards the world, the idea of the world as open to transformation, by human intervention; (2) a complex of economic institutions, especially industrial production and a market economy; (3) a certain range of political institutions, including the nation-state and mass democracy (Giddens 1998, 94).

Giddens argues that as a result of these characteristics, modernity is vastly more dynamic than any earlier social order. It is a society that is focused on the future, rather than the past, and composed of a complex network of institutions. Globalization, he suggests, is a consequence of modernity.

Globalization emerges as a meta-narrative lacking definition despite its wide use.39

Among other things, one aspect of globalization theses posits that networks of social communication are now worldwide and increasingly compressed. In other words, people, cultures, societies, and civilizations that were previously isolated from one another are now in routine, if not inescapably constant, contact with each other. Peter Beyer states that there are two results emerging from this exposure: On the one hand, intra-group conflicts are more visible, arising out of diversity and often contradictory cultures within a single social unit. On the other hand, socio-structural and cultural forces that are globalizing provide a common context that weakens the perceived differences among varying ways of life (Beyer 1994, 2).

At its most fundamental, globalization is defined as the compression of time and space—a compression which is understood to be amplified by new technologies. The perception of a shrinking world, through contact with distant cultures and societies, has only

39 The word ‘globalization’ appeared in the social sciences as a neologism in the early to mid-1980s (see Beyer 1994; Levitt 1983; Robertson 1992). It was widely used in reference to modern developments in global capitalism, “especially the interconnectedness of markets and investment as well as the global operations of many transnational corporations” (Beyer 2007, 444).

Gittinger 39 increased as our capacity for travel and communication has grown, promoting the crossing of boundaries and sharing of information. My analysis of Hinduism online—its production, presentation, and contestation—is necessarily affected by globalization in that the medium of the Internet is, at present, a relatively unmediated and vigorous forum of discourse.

Giddens (1990, 64) offers one of the most referenced and staple definitions of globalization, as an “intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa.”40 In the context of technology and computer-mediated communication in online Hindu discourse, the term ‘intensification’ is especially salient. The intensity by which we feel connections is facilitated by new technology, which allows for instantaneous sharing of ideas, culture, economies, politics, ideologies, languages, and many other facets of our existence with people around the world. This, along with the sense of ‘borderlessness’ that globalization promotes, makes for a potential immediate arena of multiculturalism41—that is, in the geography of online space, cultural diversity is easily encountered and normalized in a way that may not reflect the offline geographic space of the computer user. Online, one can encounter other cultures and traditions or communicate across transnational communities regardless of his or her physical proximity to such communities and cultures in the offline world.

40 Much in the same vein, Roland Robertson (1992) defines globalization as “both the compression of the world and the intensification of the consciousness of the world as a whole,” and similarly Will Kymlicka (2007) states it is “the intensification of interactions across national boundaries particularly in the areas of trade and investment, but also the transfer of technology, the movement of peoples, and the global diffusion of a Western consumer lifestyle.” 41 Generally, is understood as diversity within a single demographic or society; a medium such as the Internet is argued to transcend ordinary boundaries of continent and culture to allow for an instant interfacing with the diversity of the world online. This may not be reflected in actual users, if we consider the digital divides and which ethnic or cultural groups have access to the Internet, but rather in the ability to encounter (via websites, news, social media, and so forth) the plurality of cultures worldwide.

Gittinger 40

If one of the effects of globalization is that it creates new temporalities and new spatialities, then this is especially true in light of new communication technologies:

…the new communication system radically transforms space and time, the fundamental dimensions of human life. Localities become disembodied from their cultural, historical, geographic meaning, and reintegrated into functional networks, or into image collages, inducing a space of flows that substitutes for the space of places. Time is erased in the new communication system when past, present, and future can be programmed to interact with each other in the same message. The space of flows and timeless time are the material foundations of a new culture that transcends and includes the diversity of historically transmitted systems of representation: the culture of real virtuality where make-believe is belief in the making (Castells 1998, v1, 374-375).

The description of the local becoming “disembodied from their cultural, historical, geographic meaning, and reintegrated into functional networks, or into image collages” can also be applied to the presentation of Hinduism found on many of the websites that I will be engaging. Such presentations include narratives which stretch from a historical point of ‘time immemorial’ to the present as if representing an unbroken line of culture, geography, and symbols. Rather than creating temporality, however, these narratives attempt to create a historicity which is timeless; similarly, the spatiality of Hinduism has the illusion of being global. In the presentation of Hinduism as transcending geography and time, as often done in political rhetoric, computer-mediated communication (CMC) eliminates territorial boundaries and allows for an immediacy which facilitates a sense of connectivity between users. This creates what Benedict Anderson described as “imagined communities”: networks of people who share a perceived commonality and identify as members of a community. Such communities, as I discuss in further detail in the next chapter, are able to rely on the common geography of digital space rather than face-to-face relationships, thereby creating transnational communities.

Gittinger 41

In casting further light on the tensions found in the discursive construction of

Hinduism, the tensions around globalization must also be further defined. The concept of globalization has been contested in scholarship, particularly post 9/11,42 and is now seen as something with positive potential, or alternately as potentially destructive, or again as a false conceptual framework entirely. It has been identified as coming in three overlapping but distinctive waves: the hyper-globalist, the skeptical, and the post-skeptical (Holton 2005; Held et.al. 1999). The skeptical, or what might be viewed as an anti-globalization position, critiques the growing power of corporations which not only influence politics, trade, and labor worldwide, but sees them as imposing cultural homogenization.43 In contrast, the hyper- globalist theorizes and debates about the dynamics and potential of globalization for worldwide change (see Giddens 1990; Robertson 1992), while at the same time exploring its transformative, progressive, and emancipative potentialities. Examples may include ecological globalization which emphasizes the need to consider worldwide climate changes, food production, and sustainability, or cultural globalization in which languages, cultures, and traditions are shared in order to foster deeper understanding and tolerance of other peoples.

Globalization remains central to any account of the extant global condition; it is an idea which legitimates and frames social and political change in order to provide social meaning.

42 There are some scholars who argue that, post 9/11, we are now in an epoch of de-globalization which marks a disintegration rather than integration of global cultures and economies. See Ferguson 2005 and Rosenberg 2005. Held and McGrew argue to the contrary that globalization “has proven much more resilient or socially embedded than critics believed or many desired” (2007, 4). 43 Terms such as ‘Americanization’, ‘McWorld’, or ‘Starbucks-ification’ have been employed by those who take umbrage with the influence of Western culture imposed upon other parts of the world (see Barber 1992; Chiu and Cheng 2007; Galtung 2002). This expresses a fear that globalization is somehow hastening a loss of culture and producing homogenization. One goal which might emerge out of this point of view would be to identify the relevant domains of ‘culture’ at stake in globalization, and how the Internet works to produce uniformity in these domains (Grewal 2008, 266).

Gittinger 42

In his famous book Blowback (2000), Chalmers Johnson refers to globalization as “an esoteric term for what in the nineteenth century was simply called imperialism.” There are multiple forms of imperialism, not the least of which includes an economic form and a cultural form of imperialism, as well as religious imperialism. Similarly, the authority of a nation is frequently extended in the name of religion, and for this reason imperialism is important to considerations of religion in the global sphere and on the Web. For the purpose of this discussion, I concentrate on the spectre of cultural imperialism inherent in globalization , although I fully acknowledge that these categories are not discrete and are often intimately connected with each other both in influence and by-product.44

As such, the next question that arises is whose globalization is being promoted? Johan

Galtung, in his article “Americanization versus Globalization” (2002, 280), argues quite pointedly that the two terms are synonymous, that globalization does not exist in an idealized form of shared meta-culture, but rather as ‘americanization’ that pushes out parts of cultures—either deliberately or unintentionally—not only among elites but within entire nations.45 If this claim is true, however, then it would be difficult for a non-American culture to assert itself in the domain of the Internet and claim any degree of cultural authenticity without the ‘contamination’ of Western frameworks.46 Rather than discuss this process as a

44 As Tomlinson discusses as length, ‘culture’ is bracketed off as separate from the usual categories of political and economic spheres of life (see Tomlinson1991, chapter 1). 45 The effect of this process is hypothesized as occurring in three ways: (1) as welcomed by some cultures (what Feuer (1989) would describe as ‘progressive imperialism’), (2) as having general acceptance and low protest by other cultures (where local or national culture may be weak, as in the case of smaller nations), or (3) as reinforcing existing identities by still other cultures which will create deep resistances—particularly with the excluded Abrahamic religion, Islam, but also with Eastern religions, or with class-based resistance such as poverty-laden cultures) (280, 287-288). 46 Peter Beyer rejects the conflation of globalization and Americanization: If globalization were indeed just another word for Western expansion, then we might be dealing with nothing more than the building of yet another historical empire, larger but not

Gittinger 43

‘pushing out’ or overwriting of American culture onto other cultures, it is perhaps more useful to consider to what degree imperialism may or may not be exercised online.47

Relative to my area of research, I raise two questions: What does analysis of the discourse around Hinduism reveal about globalization and imperialism? And does the influence of a ‘Western’ framework affect the authenticity of a religion? These two conditions are analytically fruitful in my research, as they relate specifically to the public sphere of discourse (which is English and global), and because of the manner in which Hindu nationalist movements attempt to legitimate their authority as uncorrupted and authentic sources for the negotiation of Hindu identity.

Although I will go into more detail to account for the role of language in these processes of forging Hindu community in chapter two, a few points are worth noting here. It is possible that the inclination towards ‘Americanization/Globalization’ occurring via the

Internet may be due to the fact that the Internet was not only invented in and is managed by the US, but that English is the most dominant language of the Web by a rather large margin.

The prevalence of English on the Web is not only evident by the fact 55.8% of all websites

fundamentally different from others based in China, the Middle East, or Europe. Globalization, however, is more than the spread of one historically existing culture at the expense of all others. It is also the creation of a new global culture with its attendant social structures, one which increasingly becomes the broader social context of all particular cultures of the world, including the West (9). This idea that new cultures are being created is compelling. Beyer seems to suggest that rather thinking of many separate cultures becoming blended together in one indistinguishable mass which subsumes the individuality previously cherished (the anti-globalization argument), that globalization may create hybrid forms—new global cultures—which exist alongside their parent cultures but also generate new cultural contexts of a more global scope. While I would argue that globalization and inter-cultural contact inevitably influences and effects (to some degree) discrete cultures in ways which require definitions of ‘authenticity’ to be dynamic, I concur with Beyer that there are new forms of culture (and religion) which emerge as distinct and are made to exist as ‘global’ entities. 47 For a more in-depth qualification of regressive vs. progressive vs. systemic imperialism, and the role of intention, see my article: Juli Gittinger, “Is there such a thing as ‘cyberimperialism’?” Continuum (May 2014): 1-11.

Gittinger 44 are in English,48 but also by more background features and structural elements of the Web that reinforce English as a universal quality.49

I am not assuming English is the only language being used by Hindus and am aware that there are many other language-spheres of discourse, although they may be harder to find online. As English is a first or second language for middle- and upper-class Indians online,50 the dominance of English on the Web is not, particularly, an obstacle for members of these communities. According to the 2011 India Census, there are over 780 languages and 66 scripts in India.51 There are 22 scheduled languages as listed in the constitution, which include the dominant regional vernaculars (such as Punjabi, Gujarati, or Bengali). There are only two languages, however, which are the official languages of India: and English. Introduced as an administrative language by British colonialism, English has gained status as political language in India as it is, in many ways, a linguistic bridge between the Hindi-dominated

48 The next highest being German at 6.1%; no language comes close to the domination of English on the Web. W3Techs, “Usage of language content on websites.” Accessed June 2014 (data updated daily): http://w3techs.com/technologies/overview/content_language/all. 49 Taberez Neyazi notes that media imperialism may be true at the macro level, in terms of dominance of media business and US based media firms. He points out, however, that such views ignore local media producers who act with autonomy and incorporate many indigenously produced elements in global form, despite giving the contrary impression of reproducing global content locally (2010, 907). Despite claims made that mass media is a tool of American cultural homogenization (Herman and McChesney 1997), Appadurai has refuted such claims stating “the is no longer puppeteer of a world system of images, but is only one node of a complex transnational construction of imaginary landscapes” (1996, 31). 50 Middle class India is estimated to be 250 million or 20% of the population in 2015, according to a McKinsey and Company report, though how ‘middle class’ is established seems to vary across other economic data sites. India has halved its numbers of people living below poverty level since 1994, but access to basics such as water, sanitation, electricity, and Internet are factors which are used as determinants inconsistently. The Center for Global Development puts the numbers closer to 10% of the population. There are over 21 million non-resident Indians (NRI) living overseas according to Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (http://moia.gov.in) and most live at middle and upper class incomes, often having higher household incomes than the nationwide median of the host country. 51 The People’s Linguistic Survey of India report is scheduled to be released late 2014. See “780 languages spoken in India, 250 died out in last 50 years,” July 17, 2013. http://www.hindustantimes.com/lifestyle/books/780-languages-spoken-in-india-250-died-out-in-last-50- years/article1-1093758.aspx. Accessed July 2014.

Gittinger 45 north and the south which contains both Indo-Aryan and Dravidian tongues (see Brass 2005).

In this sense, Indians are uniquely poised to utilize the language of the Internet—English—in promoting their own arguments, culture, and histories in this global arena.

My investigation concerns the discourse that can be found online in the (English- language) public sphere, and there are pervasive links to colonial education in India that contribute to the subsequent pre-eminence of these groups’ descendants online. Colonial bilingualism shaped the emerging political hierarchy during the British Raj, and the ability to navigate and/or promulgate online texts in English continues a tradition of literary elitism.

The second chapter will further explore the role of English and the rise of print media in colonial India.

Common culture and digital divides

In order to discuss the electronic public sphere, we must not only consider the context (of globalization) in which such an arena emerges, but also the limitations of the medium. With the illusion of proximity and the collapsing of time and space that is characteristic of the globalization process also come assumptions about cultural homogeneity and equality. These conceptions of the Internet community reflect one of the pitfalls of new media in which everyone seems to be on a par with each other and all part of a global network of users who are idealized to experience the Web in the same way.

Marshall McLuhan presciently discussed the impact of electronic technologies on the global community, noting its ability to compress time and space and to create a sense of immediacy which heightened human awareness: “The new electronic interdependence recreates the world in the image of a global village” (1962, 41). McLuhan’s concept of a

Gittinger 46 global village brings to mind the theories of globalization and their impact on communication and social networks. It also conjures up, if we consider it in the context of the World Wide

Web, the image of a ‘virtual’ or online village in which one can conduct economic transactions, encounter world cultures, or build community formations.

Couched in this idea of a global village, new media (such as the Internet, television, etc.) are able to convey a ‘common culture’ that Stewart Hoover notes is, “both challenging and alluring” (2006, 267). Such a presentation is represented by symbols, ideas, events, and stories that are important to the broader social and cultural contexts that become part of a common cultural ‘currency’ (267). In this sense, ‘common culture’ implies homogenization in the form of Americanization (see Galtung 2002). Instead, the idea that common culture is a fountain of shared knowledge from which we may all drink has the ability to present culturally relevant material in powerful and personalized ways to the individual user. Not only is this evident in a website’s aesthetic presentation, but also in its ability to be easily navigated and as a portal to other relevant sites which the user is likely to follow via hyperlinks. Within such webs of linking, closed loops of information are formed that make it more difficult for the web-user to escape.52

It is also important to note that the electronic public sphere is limited to those who have access to it; such disparity reflects the ‘digital divide’.53 The phrase ‘digital divide’

52 This is discussed in detail in Eli Pariser’s The Filter Bubble: How the new personalized Web is changing what we read and how we think (2011). In this book, Pariser describes the dozens of algorithms employed by search engines, social media, and news sites which make true ‘anonymous browsing’ impossible. Furthermore, as he argues, the idea of the Internet as a buffet from which we can choose innumerable dishes is an illusion; every click of a hyperlink we make creates filters of what information we are thought to want, therefore we are directed quite deftly towards our interests and those who share those interests—i.e., closed loops of information. 53 From a purely numerical point of view, it can be argued that the discourse of religion online is shaped by the digital divides or cleavages in society which limit access to the Internet, thereby limiting who or what can speak. Taking into account questions of authority, authenticity, and filtering, it ultimately comes down to numbers— starting with the 81% of Americans using the Internet versus the 12% in India—but also considering the

Gittinger 47 refers to the inequality of access to the Internet, challenges claims that online spaces are

‘socially leveling’, and points to imbalances of discourse. Digital divides occur at two levels: global and local.54 Global digital divides reveal differences in wealth and inequality of access to technology between geo-polities. On the simplest level, the countries with the largest number of Internet users would seem to dominate the Web. To provide some statistics from the International Telecommunication Union (www.itu.int/en), the top three countries for number of Internet users in 2012,55 by sheer number of consumers, are China (568,192,066), the United States (254,295,536), and India (151,598,994). A new report released by Internet and Mobile Association of India (IAMAI) in November 2013 indicates that India’s Internet users have now passed the 200 million mark, and may overtake the US for the number two spot by early 2015, putting their saturation at 16% (see Internet in India 2013 Report,

November 7, 2013). For the purpose of this dissertation, I refer to the 2012 data unless otherwise noted. The ‘global digital divide’ reveals a disparity that is geographic; in other words, the Internet and its access has developed unevenly around the world, directly affecting other technology, education, economy, and so forth.

Local digital divides occur within a single country and demonstrate internal disparities between social groups; rather than the number of users, it is the percentage of population economic classes and educational levels of who is able to access the Web, and the privileged status that may be assigned to that ability. 54 There is another definition of ‘digital divide’ in scholarship as well, although not related to this topic. Bauerlein’s edited volume Digital Divide (2011) discusses the divide between ‘digital natives’—younger people who have lived with electronic media and technology since the day they were born—and ‘digital immigrants’ are people (like me) who have acquired fluency in the ‘language’ of new media but still retain the ‘accent’ of our old lives: saying things like “dial that number” or “I taped a show last night” which reveal our ties to the pre- computer age. The book reveals how this difference between generations is problematic, especially in the realm of education, and calls for a better understanding of how computer-mediated communication has actually changed the way people think and process information, thereby changing society at large. 55 Internet users are defined as any person using the Internet in the last 12 months from any device, including mobile phones.

Gittinger 48 which uses the Internet that reveals such internal cleavages. In China only 42.3% of the population has access, 81% in the US have access, and only 12.6% for India.56 In the US, where over 75% of American households have a computer, the divides tend to break down across economic and ethnic groups,57 similarly represented in India with the divides echoing a disparity between urban and rural populations.58 Relating to the earlier discussion of the

Indian English-language public sphere, the digital divides reveal that the idealized

Habermasian public sphere is unrealistic (I discuss Habermas’ public sphere in chapter two).

In fact, I suggest that the Indian public sphere has become more fragmented not only as a result of these economic, technological, and educational disparities, but also in the way religious and political communities square off with one another in the public arena of the

Web. The Hindutva movement has certainly contributed to these tensions in India’s online public sphere with its divisive and polemical rhetoric.

As an illustrative aside, a fascinating and parallel discussion to the online public sphere is a discussion of cell phones in India. The 2014 Congress party slogan har haath main fon (a phone in every hand) reflects the rising popularity and necessity of mobile networks in

India.59 A report that was released in November 2013 by the Internet and Mobile Association of India (IAMAI) shows that there are more than 919 million mobile phone subscribers

56 It is worth noting that out of the projected 7.1 billion people on the planet in 2013, only an estimated 39% are Internet users. 57 According to the US Census “Computer and Internet Use” report 2011, Internet use by ethnicity was as follows: 58.3% Hispanics, 56.9% Black, 76.2% non-Hispanic White, and 82.7% Asian. Regrettably, the category of ‘Asian’ does not further distinguish between East, South, South-East, and so forth. However, Indians are the most educated and highest earning immigrant group in the US. 58 Only 2% of rural India has access to the web—a small percentage considering 70% of the population lives outside an urban polis. 59 In the wake of the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) report for 2015 and the IMAI telecommunications report in December 2013, it has been widely reported that households with mobile phones greatly outnumber households with toilets—indicating that a mobile phone is more of a necessity than a luxury.

Gittinger 49 creating a teledensity (phones per 100 citizens) of over 74%, and 346 million Indian mobile users have subscribed to data packages, with 59% of all internet users in the country accessing the web via their mobile phone. This suggests that the use of mobile phones offers the greatest likelihood for narrowing the digital divides in India.

Even with such new numbers indicating a potential reduction of the digital divide, it is important to keep in mind that all discussions regarding Internet behavior, trends, and discourse be wary of these divides:

Everything said about the social significance of the Internet is qualified, however, by the implicit phrase “in the developed world.” It is all too easy to forget that we still live in a world where most people do not have regular access to a telephone, let alone a computer capable of surfing the World Wide Web...In the United States, by far the most ‘wired’ nation on the planet, the best estimates are that only about a third of the population has regular access to the Web (Dawson 2000, 27).

An optimistic view of the Web as a public sphere is that it does have the ability to connect people from a wide range of backgrounds and provide forums for political and cultural discussion. The potential for rationality and diversity is seemingly unbounded, but as access is not consistent across even single nations much less globally,60 such a utopian vision of the

Internet as potentially democratizing sphere (as Elin and Davis 2002, Negroponte 1998, and

Rheingold 1983 have proposed) remains untenable.

Inequalities such as those found in the digital divides affect discussions of authority and authenticity in online religious discourse. It has been noted that part of the inequality in the technological gap is that the person who has the ability to go online and represent his or

60 It has been noted that even if the Internet becomes widely available in the developing nations, it is unlikely to be readily accessible to people who may benefit from it the most. Internet service is a commercial activity; therefore even inside of those nations, it is more likely to be located where telecommunications infrastructures are available and in good working condition. Because profitable businesses and middle-class markets in the developing nations are generally located in urban center, this eliminates rural areas—and important distinction, since 63% of the people in the developing world live in rural areas (Ebo 2001, 2).

Gittinger 50 her ‘culture’ on the web is often seen as emblematic of that people or culture or ethnicity.

This prompts individuals or organizations (who, by some claim to authority, attempt to highlight which accounts are ‘authentic’ and which are ‘distorted’) to make accusations of gross misrepresentation. While the Web can be a space for the small marginal voices to be heard, it is the large voices which dominate. These can be the privileged, or the highly motivated.61 This is phenomenon has been present, to lesser degrees, since the time in which literate cultures evolved producing the emergence of classes that read—often priestly or privileged classes—and who then took it upon themselves to speak for those who were not literate. Therefore, a digital divide ultimately reflects not only a portion of the world population which has access to the Internet, but who have access to a potential power in the form of global discourse.

Conclusion

Defining Hinduism in such a way as to provide a stable category of analysis is, as I have shown, impractical. However, it is in the very instability and contestation over the term which allows us to look at how discourse attempts to constitute Hinduism, and this battle is taking place in the electronic public sphere. In analyzing this discourse, we can ask what is at stake for a movement such as Hindu nationalism and how members legitimate authority and authenticity in the process of that negotiation. Regarding how various Hinduisms are

61 An example of the ‘highly motivated’ would be a group who have a stake in making their point, and thus aggressively push their way into the public sphere in effort to steer or represent their community in a desired direction. Fundamentalist or radical groups are examples of ‘highly motivated’ groups.

Gittinger 51 constituted, disseminated, and encountered online, this prelude on the subject of globalization is useful.

To posit that a culture, tradition, or even history is invented as Lorenzen or Bayart has argued, the question of ‘authenticity’ becomes central to these discussions. In the context of globalization, the challenge of a persistent ‘Americanization’ or even imperial influence on the Web affects further considerations of how Hinduism may be constituted on the Web and to what degree its ‘authenticity’ is affected. As I will discuss in the next chapter, scholarship in English language has occasionally distorted or misinterpreted texts (allowing for the authenticity or authority of the translation to be questioned), therefore the discussion of

English as a language of power is worth bearing in mind. My forthcoming discussions of the

Indian public sphere (and how English rose to the prominence and eminence it holds in India today) reveal tensions between Hindi and English languages.

Lastly, the challenges of digital divides reveal not only a limitation of access, but a limitation of discourse. As a feature of modern communications technology, globalization is understood as a context which enables the dominance of contested discursive constructions religion or culture to exist on the Web. As the Internet is the very model of “compression of space and time” it is the vehicle of globalization. Such compression and sense of the world as a ‘global village’ allows for modern constructions of communities which take advantage of the medium to bridge geographical distances. The next chapter will establish the variations and role of community as it is relevant to this research.

Gittinger 52

Chapter Two

The idea of a Hindu community

The essential unity of Philosophy, Religion and Culture among the Hindus in Hindusthan and abroad is in need of an urgent awakening. The standing need of our times is to establish a Central Organisation to maintain contacts, to imbue them with the pure spirit of the Hindu way of life and make it possible for all of them from all the countries to draw inspiration from the fountain head of their spiritual heritage. The object and function of this Convention and the Center proposed to be evolved out of it, is to build up a Hindu solidarity and encourage the Hindus in other parts of the world to make an indelible impression on the environments amid which they live; and to enrich the culture of the countries of their adoption. (Excerpt of a letter from S.S. Apte, calling for the formation of the Vishva Hindu Parishad in 1963)

The technology of the Internet has amplified the globalization process, facilitating communication between distant communities and generating a canvas of world cultures for the Internet user to explore. When concepts such as ethnicity, culture, or religion are presented on the Web, such presentations carry claims to certain understandings of those categories which are often contested and unstable. Hinduism, as I have argued in the first chapter, is one such category that lacks clear definition from scholars and practitioners alike.

Its very instability is what makes it a particularly interesting case study of discourse in the electronic public sphere as claims of authenticity and authority of tradition reveal modes of power.

To investigate this instability, this chapter will briefly address some of the conceptualizations of community which are tied to the concept of ‘nation’. The ideal of a

‘Hindu nation’ is important to the project of managing how Hinduism is presented or encountered online, as will be discussed further in this dissertation. The word ‘community’

Gittinger 53 possesses a plurality of contextual meanings, with historically sedimented interpretations that are constantly being challenged by new technologies and understandings. I also explore the idea of a ‘Hindu community’ as it is conceived historically and discursively—also a central pillar of Hindu nationalist ideology. The second part of this chapter briefly traces the rise of print media in India and the subsequent rise of television as vehicles for articulating and contesting what ‘Hindu’ means in the public sphere. Historical background on the Hindu nationalist movement and primary organizations will also be discussed, as I argue that it is these groups which are invested in the promotion of ‘authenticity’—in community, print media, and to control the public sphere. I conclude this chapter with a case study which effectively demonstrates how a Hindu community can be discursively constructed around a nationalist ideology, establishing a particular presentation of Hinduism in the public sphere.

For similar reasons, the idea of the ‘nation’ also changed with time, political context, and social shifts. The notion of community undergirds not only the sociological and anthropological aspects of these discussions, but also features prominently in the discussions of nationalism and of religious identity to come later.

The chapter’s introductory excerpt from Apte, who would become one of the co- founders of the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP, or ‘World Hindu Council’) alongside Swami

Chinmayananda and Master , illustrates what the council saw as a pressing need to unite a Hindu community (in India and abroad) on the premise of a common spiritual heritage and culture. His letter indicates a presumption of an “essential unity” that extends beyond the borders of India and that can be tapped into or stirred into action, yet the conceiving of such a unity of philosophy, religion, and culture ignores the disparity and diversity of Hindu traditions. The fountainhead of spiritual heritage is something proposed to be both inspiring

Gittinger 54 and a useful tool to enrich the culture of the diaspora’s host countries. While the very name of the organization suggests an interest in a global community of Hindus, this imagining of a cohesive, historically contiguous, traditionally authentic Hinduism was a project of the BJP,

RSS, and other nationalist groups in the Sangh Parivar (“family of organizations”) as well—a project that continues with undiminished fervor today. Why is this idea of ‘community’ (often called ‘nation’) so central to Hindu nationalism, and how are theoretical conceptions of community—both on and offline—relevant to this narrative of the Hindu nation?

Community and Nation

To begin with what was perhaps the earliest writings on the subject, Ferdinand Tönnies’

Gemeinschaft und Gessellschaft (Community and Civil Society1) was written in 1887 and is considered to be a seminal text for theories of community and civil society. It traces the earliest development of this understanding of community, which he saw as necessarily exclusive and embodying conceptions of rationality, property, and individuality (trans. Harris

2001, x). Community, or Gemeinschaft, is defined as “all kinds of association in which natural will are predominant” and association, or Gessellschaft, is described as associations which are “formed fundamentally conditioned by rational will” (trans. Loomis 1955, 17). This early treatment of community is viewed as coming together quite naturally as commonalities are identified, while association or society is a voluntary, willful alliance which requires a conscious effort.2

1 Also translated as “Community and Association,” depending on translation. Two translations of his work are used in this discussion, as different notes and expositions appear between volumes. 2 These efforts, it is understood, are through face-to-face contact. The social bond that comes from the relationship itself, which involves “some kind of balance between unity and diversity” as well as “mutual encouragement and the sharing of burdens and achievements” (17) are seen as an expression of individual

Gittinger 55

One of the distinguishing characteristics for Tönnies in choosing to analyze eine

Verbindung (translatable as union, fraternity, association, connection, alliance, etc.), is that his investigation concentrates on relationships that are based on positive mutual affirmation

(trans. Harris 2001, 17). That is to say, that there is recognition between members of the community and an acceptance of the fellow member as part of the community—this is a transaction which does not, it should be noted, require face to face contact. The best example of this is nationalism, in which members of country share a feeling of commonality and community despite the fact that they will never meet—or even know the names of—most of the other ‘members’ of that community. Tönnies’ idea of ‘positive mutual affirmation’ is perhaps the earliest forerunner to what would become the theory of ‘imagined communities’ as conceived by Benedict Anderson in the late 20th century.

It is worth highlighting that Tönnies also observed a primal communal feature that begins to evolve in 19th century theories in which community is not only spatial, but relative:

The more the group is threatened from outside, the deeper the bonding will become “because circumstances impose the need to stick together, to fight and act collectively” (24). This trope was noted earlier in the prior chapter, and is familiar in theories in nationalism—notably found in the writings of Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson3 —pointing to a more

energies and wills. In this sense, the community (Gemeinschaft) is conceived as having real organic life, a living organism in its own right; examples of this sort of community formation include relationships between siblings, between mother and child, between authority and subject, within a household or neighborhood, and so forth. Conversely, society (Gesellschaft) exists in the mind and is a purely mechanical construction or aggregate (17, 19). In Gemeinschaft individuals remain more or less united in spite of all their separating factors, whereas in Gesellschaft they are essentially separated in spite of uniting common factors (trans. Loomis 1955, 74). In Gesellschaft no actions are derived from an a priori unity, no actions manifest the will and spirit of unity, and no actions—even if performed by the individual—take place on behalf of those united with them; here, everyone is by themself and isolated (74). 3 We see this move particularly in Hindu Nationalism, where being ‘Hindu’ is constructed in direct opposition to ‘Muslim’: the claims of tolerance, plurality, secularism as inherent qualities of Hinduism, as opposed to intolerance, exclusivism, and theocracy of Islam, as post-9/11 discourse would suggest. The word ‘Hindu’ itself,

Gittinger 56 fundamental psychological tendency to self-identify vis-à-vis the ‘other’. That is, the construction of identity is often made in opposition to another: e.g., male (not female), vegetarian (not meat-eating), Protestant (not Catholic), and thereby one constructs multiple identities that are contextually responsive. Such is the nature of community (in this project,

Hindu), which also becomes more cohesive and whose borders are more clearly defined when juxtaposed with a different or opposing community formation (in this project, Muslim or

‘Western’).

As community became tied to conversations of nationalism, such debates were tied to definitions of nation-state—that is, a sovereign territorial unity delineated politically or geopolitically, as well as by culture and ethnicity. A nation-state was understood as having both the conceptual features of the nation and the practical features of the state coinciding geographically. Ernest Gellner, also writing in 1983, says: “Nationalism is primarily a political principal, which holds that the political and the national unity should be congruent”

(Gellner 1983, 1).

Nation-state has two components which are often defined on their own. Gellner turns to Weber for a well-worn definition of ‘state’: a community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory—what is often referred to as “the monopoly of violence.” Further explained:

The idea behind this is simple and seductive: in well-ordered societies, such as most of us live in or aspire to live in, private or sectional violence is illegitimate. … Violence may be applied only by the central political authority … by one special, clearly identified, and well organized, disciplined agency within society. That agency or group of agencies is the state (Gellner 1983, 3). although etymologically tied to ‘Sindu’ and other regional terms for the Indus river (and subsequently, the people of the Indus valley), it came to popularity during the Mughal era of India, when ‘Hindu’ referred to anyone who was ‘not Muslim’. For this reason, it remains an umbrella term for Indians who are also Sikh, Jain, or Buddhist in both colonial and post-colonial-nationalist literature.

Gittinger 57

As Gellner points out, however, there are also institutions which might be called part of the

‘state’ that do not monopolize legitimate force within the territory, even though they effectively control it. “In brief, there are states which lack either the will or the means to enforce their monopoly of legitimate violence, and which nonetheless remain, in many respects, recognizable ‘states’” (3-4). The ‘nation’, on the other hand, is more difficult to define as Gellner admits. The problem of nationalism, he says, is that “[h]aving a nation is not an inherent attribute of humanity, but it has now come to appear as such” (6). In other words, nations are contingent rather than universal, existing neither in all times nor in all circumstances. While one can exist without a ‘state’, it is difficult to imagine a person without a ‘nation’; it is a nebulous classification, tied to ethnicity and culture (problematic in its own right).

Gellner offers two ideas of the nation which attempt to highlight and resolve this difficulty:

1. Two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating.

2. Two men are of the same nation if and only if they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation. … It is their recognition of each other as fellows of this kind which turns them into a nation, and not the other shared attributes, whatever they might be, which separate that category from non-members (7, emphasis mine).

Therefore, according to Gellner, nationalism demands a cultural homogeneity, imposed by the objective of creating a ‘nation’, and these shared qualities must be recognized and accepted between its members.

Nationalism has also been discussed in less idealized tones. Noted historian Eric

Hobsbawm, a contemporary of Anderson and Gellner, rejects an overarching, mythical idea of nationalism and asserts that it is in every way a modern construction (see Hobsbawm 1992).

Gittinger 58

Hobsbawm states that identification with the ‘nation’ became a political force, and made “its multifarious expressions extremely difficult to define, even when they claimed to be specifically nationalist or patriotic” (144). That is, identification with the nation became a priority for political mobilization, especially as nationalist and patriotic ideologies became central to the political right. Perhaps reflecting such reservations, Gellner states that historically, “nationalism has often not been so sweetly reasonable, nor so rationally symmetrical,” and even worse, that there are general considerations “tied to the specific nature of the world we happen to live in, which militate against any impartial, general, sweetly reasonable nationalism” (Gellner 1983, 2). He credits this with the sheer number of potential nations in the world, and his assertion that not all nationalisms can be satisfied—at least certainly not at the same time.

Where Hobsbawm and Gellner maintain a rather negative view of nationalism,

Benedict Anderson sees it as a positive feature of modernity. This departure is an important turn in the study of nationalism and understanding its application to broader sociological fields. Anderson’s definition of the nation as presented in Imagined Communities (1983) holds three conditions: 1) it is limited, in that it has finite boundaries which, although flexible and permeable, are well defined when they run into the ‘other’ nations, 2) it is sovereign in that it is free under God, not subject to a divinely-ordained, dynastic hierarchy, and 3) it is a community, in that it “is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (7). In other words, the imagined community of Anderson’s theories is a real alliance perceived between members who may never actually meet face-to-face, but are bound by common ‘culture’ in a

Gittinger 59 horizontal fraternity.4 Additionally, communities are defined not only by what they are, but what they are not; flexible, permeable boundaries are often crystallized only when bumping into the ‘other’. As Tönnies pointed out, group bonding and formation is strongest when responding to external threat or conflict. Now, applied to theories of nationalism, we can already see how such a definition—separated from the more sinister motives of the ‘state’— would appear more ‘utopian’.5 Anderson’s theories are broader than that of just nationalism, however, conflating the ‘nation’ with ‘community’ in general. For this reason his theories of

‘imagined community’ have been successfully applied to other studies of social groups, such as gender identities and in discussions of globalization. The overlapping categories of

‘nationalism’ and ‘community’ are useful for my interest in Hinduism online as the rhetoric I analyze in the following chapters relies on a superimposition of both terms.

The formation of groups and understanding such associations between individuals is a central concern in sociology. Heidi Campbell notes: “The concept of community emerged as a way to describe societal organizations and relationships” (Campbell 2005, 27). She points out that the definition of ‘community’ is varied, even within sociological traditions, and is often argued as product of modernity—much like Hobsbawm contends regarding ‘nation’. That is to say, community became an idea that was separate from society; it was marked by the attributes of being a common project of modernity, as well as exhibiting institutionalization,

4 We could very well argue, as James Slevin does, that there is a principal sense in which all communities are imagined, “given that their very production and reproduction always presumes the employment of a range of symbolic devices” (Slevin 2000, 93). 5 Benedict Anderson is quoted as stating in an interview: “I must be the only one writing about nationalism who doesn’t think it ugly. If you think about researchers such as Gellner and Hobsbawm, they have quite a hostile attitude to nationalism. I actually think that nationalism can be an attractive ideology. I like its Utopian elements” (Khazaleh 2005).

Gittinger 60 appearance of proximity, and forms of open or unmediated communication (27).6

Furthermore, the term seems to always be used favorably; Raymond Williams (2011) has argued more recently that community is often a “warmly persuasive word” which may have emerged out of the cultural zeitgeist of the civil-rights and student movements of the 1960s.

It has been argued that community is best seen as a network rather than as a local group (Hampton and Wellman 2002, 346). As social entities, communities bear two elements:

On one hand, it is “a web of affect-laden relationships among a group of individuals, relationships that often crisscross and reinforce one another”; on the other hand, it is a level of commitment to “a set of shared values, norms, and meanings, and a shared history and identity—in short, a particular culture” (Etzioni 2003, 225). The concept of a ‘web’ or network of people who are connected across space and time is particularly salient with regard to the conceptualization of the World Wide Web. As other scholars have noted, most of the social support, the information, and the resources that people require to function in their everyday lives comes from sources outside of their own local setting. Therefore the idea of community need not be seen as a solid block of people within arms’ length of each other, but rather as diffuse but connected. It is a web or network of people who are connected across space and time, with “relationships that often crisscross.”7 Thinking about community as networks allows us to problematize the formation of such networks in online/offline spaces.

6 For more on this, see Andre Lemos, “The Labyrinth of the Mintel,” in Cultures of the Internet, ed. Rod Shields (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1996), 33-48. 7 Wellman argues, however, that many assertions about virtual/online community are anecdotal rather than drawing upon a more sociological examination of how networks are formed in ‘real life’ communities (1999, 334). He proposes the application of detailed ethnographic studies of online communities (including who/how connected, why, and how long) to supplement ‘germane anecdotes’ from ‘our own experiences’. This would, Wellman argues, create a more rounded and more scholarly discussion of online communities.

Gittinger 61

What constitutes a community is largely one of social relationships that rely upon psychology rather than proximity. As Benedict Anderson has succinctly presented, a community needs not be geographically bounded, or attached to a state. It can be delineated in relation to other communities with which it comes in contact (physically or discursively), and its members need only to be bound by the ‘horizontal fraternity’ by which they imagine themselves to be connected. As Wellman observes: “Companionship, emotional support, services and a sense of belonging are abundant in cyberspace” (Wellman 1999, 353). That is, the medium eliminates many of the material challenges that make ‘real world’ community so difficult to fulfill; in fact, such communal resources are easy to find on the Internet (Barney

2004, 47). “Those who study social networks suggest that spatial personal networks comprised of ties of varying degrees of intimacy and activity provide the very communal resources and experiences that local neighborhoods do not: support, sociability, information, and a sense of belonging” (37).

Equally appropriate for either online communities or nationalist ideologies, I would like to propose a further requisite for ‘community’, one that is also drawn from theories of nationalism and may be a crucial component for a successful mobilization of a transnational community. Carlton Hayes, a pioneer in the field of nationalism, wrote his Essays on

Nationalism in 1926. In discussing the constitution of the term ‘nationalism’, he mentions a key feature that has not been discussed by either Anderson or Gellner: the element of emotion.

There must be something more than a philosophy, something more than a doctrine and an historical process, about modern nationalism. This something is obviously an emotion, and emotional loyalty to the idea of the fact of the national state, a loyalty so intensely emotional that it motivates all sorts of people and causes them to subordinate all other human loyalties to

Gittinger 62

national loyalty. In modern national states, of course, individual citizens still retain many if not most of the emotional loyalties to particular persons, specific places, and peculiar ideas that have marked the human race since the dawn of its history. …the individual is commonly disposed, in case of conflict, to sacrifice one loyalty after another, loyalty to persons, places and ideas, loyalty even to family, to the paramount call a nationality and the national state. This is nationalism, and surely it must have a richly emotional content to predominate over all emotional loyalties of the present generation (Hayes 1937, 94-95).

The idea that emotion is a requisite should be obvious—that is, a perceived or even imagined emotional connection—yet it is not explicitly discussed in contemporary theories of

‘community’, although examples are often presented which exhibit precisely that. Nationalist movements have long relied upon emotion to conjure a sense of community and pride—one only has to listen to a national anthem sung at a sporting event to witness this in action. Hindu nationalism, for example, draws heavily upon emotion in its video campaigns and in the language of its rhetoric, intending to provoke sense of anger, sadness, or pride. The later chapters will explore this more, particularly in the retelling of Hindu history and civilization, but at this juncture I will simply point out that community is also bound by this element of emotion.

‘Hindu community’

The need for establishing a definable Hindu community arose out of political mobilization against the British in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (what might be called

‘Indian nationalism’), as well as a post-Partition effort to make a distinction from Muslim interests (‘Hindu nationalism’). We can look at the formation of Hindu ‘community’ in multiple contexts. In this project, I consider Hindu community in the following ways: 1)

Hindu community as a colonial and post-colonial construct, 2) Hindu community as

Gittinger 63 nationalist ideology, and 3) online community as forged by common interests or goals.

An understanding of ‘Hindu community’ as something that can be evaluated is complicated by the multiple colonial presences in India and the disparity of traditions. In the preceding chapter I addressed the tensions within scholarship as to how ‘Hinduism’ as a religion came to be identified; along similar lines, but with less disagreement, we can look at the evolution of ‘Hindu community’ conceived as something uniform and cohesive. Indian identities were disjointed featuring multiple communities who were identified by language, caste, occupation, and locality. The notion of ‘community’ as a uniform, religious community was absent until the Mughal period, when ‘Hindu’ community referred to anyone who was not Muslim (Lorenzen 2006). The term ‘Hindu’ as a collective identity became more visible under the British colonial period, as the Raj felt it was imperative to count, catalog, and label colonial populations.8

There is considerable scholarship which argues that the ‘civilizing mission’ of the

British administration created categories which only furthered tensions and into which Indian culture was made to fit (Appadurai 1993; Cohn 1970; Dirks 2001; Freitag 1980; Jalal 2000;

Kaviraj 1999). The British administration in India undertook a massive project of census taking and mapping the population of India not only to break the country into manageable districts for governance, but also in attempt to organize a civilization of disparate identities into more identifiable categories. Nicholas Dirks sums it up in his foreword to Cohn’s volume:

Colonialism was made possible, and then sustained and strengthened, as much by cultural technologies of rule as it was by the more obvious and brutal modes

8 Also see Benedict Anderson’s “Imagined Communities: Census, Map and Museum,” (1991) which discusses the role of these instruments in the imperial civilizing mission.

Gittinger 64

of conquest that first established power on foreign shores The cultural effects of colonialism have too often been ignored or displaced into inevitable logic of modernization and world capitalism; but more than this, it has not been sufficiently recognized that colonialism was itself a cultural product of control. Colonial knowledge both enabled conquest and was produced by it; in certain important ways, knowledge was what colonialism was all about. Cultural forms in societies newly classified as ‘traditional’ were reconstructed and transformed by and through this knowledge, which created new categories and oppositions between colonizers and colonized. (Dirks, foreword, ix).

While one of the great transgressions of orientalist scholarship was the reiteration of caste

(which crystallized the more fluid, pre-existing divisions not only administratively, but in the popular imagination; see Dirks 2001), it was even more precarious to categorize Hindu or

Hinduism as a cohesive, bounded religious community.9

While not applicable in a broad sense across all levels of the population, there are some ways in which Hindu communities have been coalesced. One such example of community formation is the sampradāya system. While “Hinduism” per se does not have a singular teacher or founder, canon, or institutionalization, these elements are found in the sampradāyas: the religious tradition can often be traced back to a first teacher or founder, there is a lineage of transmission for the canonical texts or doctrines, the tradition is often institutionalized in temples or monasteries, and there is a framework of traditional duties and prescriptions (Jacobsen et.al. 2009, 156). It is argued that this organizational structure has been an important element in Hinduism for centuries, and is instead a defining, structural feature of Hinduism’s many decentralized and diverse traditions. Derived from a verbal compound meaning ‘to hand over’, sampradāyas emphasize a particular handing down of

9 Anderson makes an interesting observation, prompted by Macaulay’s ‘Minute on Education’ which stated: “No Hindu who has received an English education ever remains sincerely attached to his religion. It is my firm belief [so they always were] that if our plans of education are followed up, there will not be a single idolater among the respectable classes in Bengal thirty years hence” (cited in Anderson 1983, 91). Anderson notes that the British effort, from the perspective of administrators, was not to religiously ‘convert’ Hindus to Christians, but culturally ‘convert’ Hindus to English “despite their irremediable color and blood.”

Gittinger 65 knowledge through the teacher to the student/disciple. Authority of the knowledge transmitted in sampradāyas relies on the teacher who is taken as an expert in the texts of that community.

It should be clarified that a sampradāya is not a sect.10 Each sampradāya has a distinct set of authoritative texts which it accepts as canon (for example, the Bhagavad Gītā or the

Viṣṇupurāṇa). The communities reflect a variation of sociological relationships, informed by caste as well as regional cults (156). The successful institutionalization of temples and patronage with the lay community is intimately connected with the emergence of sampradāyas as a “characteristic and persistent element of Hinduism” (Jacobsen, 157). Yet, while these are distinguishable communities, the sampradāya does not reflect the ideological

‘Hindu community’ which Hindu nationalist rhetoric strives to establish.

Modern Hindu rhetoric can very well be said to draw its inspiration from late nineteenth century conceptions and groupings, when the British Raj distinguished a wide range of experimental definitions of Hindu (and Muslim) community:

By the second decade of the twentieth century these community identities had taken on a reality which could be expressed in a newly developed vocabulary or idiom drawing heavily on religious symbols. In the process, however, the need to use the idiom to express the common denominator among a variety of beliefs and practices meant that the symbols became largely divorced from their original significance. And once that divorce was complete, it became possible in the 1920s and 1930s to infuse a political meaning into the now real community identity (Freitag 1980, 598).

The bifurcation of the Indian population into ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ created tensions (not the least of which was from the Sikh population, which was lumped in with ‘Hindu’ and denied its own sovereignty), but allowed for budding Hindu nationalist movements to conceive of a

Hindu culture that was pan-Indian and sought to present a particular construction of history:

10 Jacobsen reminds the reader that ‘sect’ is derived from the Latin verb meaning ‘to split away’ which implies the existence of an orthodoxy from which an individual group separates itself (158).

Gittinger 66

The new Hinduism which is now sought to be projected as the religion of this community is in many ways a departure from the earlier religious sects. It seeks historicity for the incarnations of its deities, encourages the idea of a centrally sacred book, claims monotheism as significant to the worship of the deity, acknowledges the authority of the ecclesiastical organization of certain sects as prevailing over all and has supported large-scale missionary work and conversion. These changes allow it to transcend caste identities and reach out of larger numbers (Thapar 1989, 228).

Once Independence was achieved, the conceiving of ‘Hindu’ as a collective identity shifted from a project to confront imperial powers to the imagining of a newly independent India— one that had been born out of a devastating fracture of geography and population. The

Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), one of the oldest Hindu nationalist parties which I will discuss in a moment, emerged post-Independence amidst controversy for their relationship to

Nathuram Godse, the man who assassinated . Despite other controversies that followed,11 the RSS has remained one of the more vocal organizations in maintaining

‘authentic’ definitions of “Hindu-ness”, as well as the definition of ‘secular’, in opposition to their sibling organizations VHP and BJP.12 While ‘Indian nationalism’ was a growing sentiment against the British government in the last phases of the Raj, the RSS maintained a

‘Hindu nationalism’. That is to say, rather than join the larger anti-British movements (they saw themselves as ‘non-political’), their leader, Keshav Baliram Hedgewar, worked favorably with the British administration and preferred the narrow ethno-nationalism of ideologue V.D.

Savarkar.

To summarize, the notion of a ‘Hindu community’ may make necessary departures from other models of religious communities in that, historically, it did not exist as a cohesive,

11 They were also disbanded during Emergency in 1975-1978 and in 1992 for their involvement with the destruction of the . 12 The , or BJP, has been criticized by the RSS for pedaling ‘soft Hindutva’.

Gittinger 67 distinctive community, but rather smaller, discrete communities in the form of the sampradāya. Furthermore, there is a politicization of ‘Hindu community’ found in the ideology of nationalist movements; the project of defining what ‘Hindu’ means has been a central concern for Hindu nationalism whose ideology is directed at a transnational community as well as the native Indian audience.

Hindu nationalism and Hindutva

The Sangh Parivar (“family of organizations”) contains over twenty different Hindu nationalist organizations, ranging from small local unions to politically dominant electoral parties. There are three parties in the Parivar, however, who are considered to be the prongs of the Hindu nationalist trident: the RSS, the BJP, and the VHP.

As noted earlier, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS, “National Volunteers’

Organization”) was the earliest of these parties, forming in 1925 against the landscape of the

British Raj and growing dissatisfaction with an administration lacking Indian representation.

Their party ideology revolves around service to the nation, unity of the Hindu community, and bears a distinctly anti-Muslim hue. Criticized for their paramilitary camps and masculinized Hinduism, they rally around the principle of ‘Hindutva’ as undergirding the philosophy of the party.

The term ‘Hindutva’ has been nuanced in different ways throughout the decades and in response to changing political climates. The word is a Sanskrit neologism meaning ‘Hindu- ness’, and was coined by V. D. Savarkar in his 1923 treatise Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu? A seminal text for modern Hindu nationalism, it presents ‘Hindu’ as a cultural distinction, rather than religious (including Jains, Buddhists, and Sikhs among the ranks) by delineating three

Gittinger 68 essential qualities: jāti (race),13 rāṣṭra (nation), and saṃskṛti (civilization). Savarkar’s historical narrative affirms an Aryan-migration theory rather than invasion, portraying them as settling and contributing to the “noble bloodline” of Indians today:

But monotheists or atheists—we are all Hindus and own a common blood. We are not only a nation but a Jati, a born brotherhood. Nothing else counts, it is after all a question of heart. We feel that the same ancient blood that coursed through the veins of Ram and , Buddha and Mahavir, Nanak and Chaitanya, and Madhava, of Rohidas and Tiruvellavar courses throughout Hindudom from vein to vein, pulsates from heart to heart (Savarkar, 89).

Despite the emphasis on the bloodline, the priority is ultimately on rāṣṭra which, further glossed, includes fatherland-holyland implications:

Ye, who by race, by blood, by culture, by nationality possess almost all the essentials of Hindutva and had been forcibly snatched out of our ancestral home by the hand of violence—ye, have only to render whole-hearted love to our common Mother and recognize her not only as Fatherland (Pitribhu) but even as a Holyland (punyabhu); and ye would be most welcome to the Hindu fold (115).

This sentiment, along with the three essentials, is the crux of the Hindutva argument. As long as one’s loyalty is ultimately to another land (Rome, Mecca, Palestine) then one cannot fully be Hindu, even if one qualifies racially and culturally. This concept has been present in early forms of media employed by Hindu nationalist organizations, but has been presented in multiple ways and with increased foregrounding.

Today Hindutva refers to a more militant right wing brand of Hindu nationalism, in which the RSS is certainly seated. The ambitions of the Hindutva movement are well suited to globalization, attempting to universalize a pan-Indian Hindu identity that supersedes local identities that may be more syncretistic, ‘corrupted’, or Westernized. “As an ideology of

13 Savarkar uses jāti to mean ‘race’. Jāti is more commonly understood in reference to an occupational community association which is often inherited by birth. It is sometimes used interchangeably with caste, or used as a subcategory of caste.

Gittinger 69 cultural rejuvenation and national distinction, it offers the protection of an age-old identity in a newly uncertain environment while in many ways advancing the entry of transnational business interests, often at the expense of indigenous interests” (Rajagopal 2000, 468-469).

To nationalists, caste/jāti, class, gender, and familial identities are subordinate to ‘Hindu’ identity which—despite its variations—is presumed to have a distinct culture and common interest. Hinduism is also presumed to be a phenomenon which is understood as sui generis, isolated from political and economic processes (Searle-Chatterjee 2000, 498).

The second prong on the Sangh Parivar trident is the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP,

“World Hindu Council”). Also espousing a strong Hindutva ideology, its brand of ethno- nationalism is more diffuse since its primary concern is the Hindu community worldwide.

This pan-Indian umbrella organization (both secular and religious) takes advantage of globalization in presenting the public face of Indian immigrants who most effectively codify the ethnicity of the ‘Indo-American’ or ‘Indo-European’, for example, and allow for the dualism of Indian and host identities. The VHP claims to represent the entire Hindu world, inside and outside of India, being the keeper of Hindutva or ‘Hindu-ness’ and making sure

Hindus in the diaspora remember what ‘true’ Hinduism is.14 The main objective of the VHP is

“to organize, consolidate the Hindu society and to serve, protect the Hindu Dharma.” For this reason, they are very active in the diaspora and in trans-national communities.15

14 The VHP has branches in North America as well as in Europe, Africa, and Asia. Their subsidization, publication, and dissemination of Explaining Hindu Dharma: A Guide for Teachers (1996) as a Hindutva catechism is an attempt to have the Hindutva world-view accepted among teachers and in classrooms (see Mukta 1997; Jaffrelot 2011). 15 Fundraising in the diaspora for projects in India is serious business. In 2001, $315 million dollars came from US immigrants to India, funding disaster relief, temple building, and public service projects. The VHP is known as one of the most effective fundraisers for temple building projects.

Gittinger 70

The last and most powerful party among the Sangh Parivar is the Bharatiya Janata

Party (BJP, “Indian People’s Party”) which now dominates the Lok Sabha (parliamentary house) and whose favored candidate, Narendra Modi, was elected as Prime Minister of India.

The BJP has been the major opposition party to the India National Congress (the party of the

Nehru/Gandhi dynasty) since its inception in 1980, its popularity rising and falling in some part due to how they utilized Hindutva rhetoric. Examining the Ram Janmabhumi controversy as a case study, as I do at the conclusion of this chapter, will provide a more contemporary example of how this ideology could be used in various media to great effect.

Long before definitions of ‘Hindu’ were contested in the electronic public sphere, however, the medium of print was a vehicle in which tensions between vernaculars, authenticity, and power were visible. I now move to a discussion of the rise of print media and transition to new media in India, and how this contributed to the ongoing project of “Who is a

Hindu?” Out of these processes we will see discourses of authenticity emerge, and examine the authority which claims to speak for Hinduism.

Production and consumption of Hindu media

How might we look at older forms of media, such as printed materials, to understand how definitions of ‘Hindu’ and ‘Hinduism’ are contested in later forms of new media? Jeremy

Stolow states that there is a myth in which modern media is credited as having a key role in the historical dislodging of religion from public life, and its relocation to the private sphere.

This myth, he argues, tends to reflect a sense of loss of meaning or moral crisis that comes with “the dematerialization of palpable structures of religious authority” (2005, 122).

Conversely, it can be read as a story of empowerment, with small social groups challenging

Gittinger 71 the authority and institutional elements of the Church. “Print culture in particular is said to have enabled this empowerment in so far as private acts of reading, scrutinizing and deliberating are aggregated into collective acts of opinion-making and debate”—as in the case of the Habermasian ‘modern public sphere’ (122). Stolow points out that both narratives reveal an oft-held assumption that the expansion of modern communication technology is proportionate to the dissolution of religious authority and fragmentation of religious identity.

This assumption is a false one, much in the same way the rise of secularism was feared to be proportionate to the decline of religiosity. While new media in India did not cultivate

Hinduism in the sense of proselytization or the formation of an ‘orthodoxy’ (although one could argue that the printing and promotion of certain Sanskrit texts during the British Raj contributed to a mainstream conception of ‘Hinduism’ as a ‘religion’), it has had continuing impact on Hindu culture and in negotiating Hindu religion and identity in the global public sphere.

Print media was an enterprise in that reflected the varied interests of multiple parties and languages in the colonial period. Printing was introduced by the Portuguese in the sixteenth century to the southern Indian peninsula, used especially by European missionaries for Christian proselytization.16 The indigenous printing and publishing industry, however, took off in the first half of the nineteenth century in Bengal, becoming the seat of the first

16 There was a long existing tradition of literacy and scribal culture prior to the advent of the printing press in South India, which was seen as a new ‘vehicle’ for an already established literary tradition. After the first printing press was brought to in 1556, a robust Tamil publishing industry can be found as early as mid- 1700s, with Tranquebar as the seat of south Indian publishing (as Bengal would later become the center of north Indian publishing). Tied to missionary knowledge production at first, such as the Bible or Tamil-English dictionaries in transliterated Tamil, local publishing eventually incorporated Tamil characters into the moveable type. The indigenous print publishing was supported largely by patronage of zamindars, royalty, and upper caste literati, until the late nineteenth/early twentieth century when the rise of the novel allowed for public market support. See A.R. Venkatachalapathy, 2012.

Gittinger 72 established vernacular press.17 Although early publishing cultivated the modern Bengali language out of a more colloquial blend which carried Perso-Arabic influences, early printed literature was still controlled by European missionaries and administrators for the better part of the nineteenth century (Ghosh, 26).18

Publishers across North India followed the Bengali presses’ lead, starting with the publication of popular religious and mythical works such as the Rāmāyaṇ or commentaries such as the Mānashaṃs bhūṣaṇ (published in 1866), and eventually published secular works such as collections of bhakti poetry (Stark 2007, 397-401). By mid-nineteenth century hundreds of thousands of printed books were recorded in Hindi and Urdu. Stark reports that fifty private and commercial presses were operating across the north-western provinces by

1868, and by 1888 the number had more than doubled (65).19

In such ways the Hindu middle-class and literate elite were as much influence on the press as the Europeans in India, trying to fashion an identity for itself against the backdrop of

Victorian morality and the perceived depravity of the ‘native’ culture. From the eighteenth century onward, Urdu had gained momentum as the lingua franca of the educated classes, gaining further prestige when it replaced Persian in 1837 as the court and administrative

17 For a more detailed account of the rise of print media in Bengal, see Ghosh 2003, and for a broader historical overview of India’s print industry during colonial eras, see Stark 2007. 18 In addition to refining the language out of its hybridity, both European and Bengali literati worked to generate a new style of literature which would be distinguished from the lower form of language which was “allegedly polluted by rusticity, loose colloquial form, and an abundant sexuality” (Ghosh, 28). This also reflected a growing impulse to ‘purge’ Indian literature of obscenity and create a new ‘appropriate and civilized’ aesthetic in fashioning a modern collective Hindu identity. Charu Gupta’s chapter, “Redefining Obscenity and Aesthetics in Print” (2000), is a detailed and provocative look at the rise of print literature in Uttar Pradesh in the 1800s, and tensions around obscenity, sexuality, and representation in literature of the period. 19 Stark is quick to note that the printed book did not replace oral traditions so much as it came to flourish in, coexisted alongside, and interacted with the older oral cultures which remained vigorous (2007, 5).

Gittinger 73 language across the north-western regions of India (Stark, 31).20 Furthermore, as books began to be printed in the Indian languages, the printed textbook became of significant importance.

Formal education was seen as part of the ‘civilizing mission’ and thus it was urgent that written instructional materials be produced in the regional languages.21 As a result, the nationalist agenda in the late nineteenth century came to focus on a particular goal: it was imperative that Hindi, written in devanāgarī script, be awarded official status and unseat the popularity of Urdu in the north and western provinces (see Dalmia 1997, chapter 5; Everaert

2010). By the 1920s and 1930s there was a surge in non-periodical nationalist Hindi literature—from the Congress party as well as opposition groups—in the form of pamphlets, leaflets, posters and so forth (Pandey 1975, 211).22

The process by which Banaras emerged as an important city for Indian religious learning was directly related to the rise of the literati. Banaras played a leading role in the process of delineating carefully cultivated dialects of Hindi and Urdu (which eventually became tied to Hindu and Muslim religions respectively) which were not the vernacular of the marketplace, but rather languages associated with government workers and the literate elite.23

20 It is little surprise that the early twentieth century saw an emergence of political groups taking interest in the production of literature, ranging from the ’s efforts to develop Hindi among urban educated groups and as an administrative language, to the shifts in female representation (moving from erotic and sexual literary figures to the glorification of the virtuous Hindu wife and mother). 21 Stark points out that traditional forms of Indian education centered on the teacher, while colonial education was focused on textuality, thereby giving prime importance to the role of the printed textbook (229). Also see Everaert 2010, for further discussions on the marginalization of Urdu in government-sponsored textbooks. 22 A marvelous case study of the nationalist and religious sentiments attached to language can be found in Christopher King’s examination of a late nineteenth century play featuring ‘Begum Urdu’ and ‘Queen Devanagari’ (King 1999). The one-act play by Datta highlights sexuality and propriety of women, Hindu doctrine (such as the four āśramas), and a very upper caste social model. 23 I point to Benedict Anderson’s discussion of print capitalism. The cultivation of print-language as a basis for national consciousness occurred in three ways: first, it created unified fields of communication above the spoken vernaculars; second, it gave a fixity to language which “helped to build that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation” (especially in the case of Hindi, which was purging its Perso-Arabic elements in

Gittinger 74

In such a way, Banaras emerged as a center for ‘authentic’ Hindu tradition in all its mythical imaginings, mutually reinforced by Western perceptions of the holy city and indigenous ritual and practices (Dalmia 1997, 58; also see Eck 1983). Banaras became symbolic of the ‘pan-

Indian and ageless Hinduism’, and it was against this backdrop, Dalmia argues, that the

‘creation’ of the Hindu tradition took place.24 Partly due to a Puranic tradition coined by

Brahmins, Banaras was considered the foremost seat of ritualistic and traditional learning

(94). “In an era which could be considered almost obsessed with the antiquity of tradition and its textual fixation as accessible in Sanskrit, learned continued to be sought out as the fountainheads of knowledge in all religious matters” (338). Patronized by both Rajputs and Mughals, Brahmins constituted twelve percent of the population.

The city became known as a center of Sanskrit learning, and was recognized by the

British as a locus of scriptural authority. Yet, the rise of print media also yielded a shift in authority; where authority of face-to-face transmission of religion was exemplified by the /disciple relationship, the authority of the printed word replaced that chain of transmission, allowing for more individual consumption and transferring power to the text as authoritative source. By 1914, Banaras was recognized as a major center for Hindu languages, with Hindi publications more than doubling the number of Urdu (King 1999, 194).25

favor of a ‘purer’ Sanskrit derivation), and third, the establishment of these languages created ‘languages-of- power’ (Anderson 1983, 44-45). 24 Vasudha Dalmia’s research on the nationalization of Hindu traditions focuses on one figure, Hariśchandra of Banaras (1850-1885), who was influential in the religious and cultural movements that acted in response to colonialism. Known as the father of modern Hindi literature, Hariśchandra also shaped views connected to questions of political and national identity. He was not only a poet, but also an editor connected to a wide range of associations and institutions. He was a respected public figure and considered a person of great authority. As such, played a pivotal role in constructing the canon of classical Hindi literature alongside the British (for a thorough history of Hariścandra and discussion of his role in nationalizing Hinduism, see Dalmia 1997). 25 The relation between English and vernacular languages has always been a crucial element of Hindu nationalism, which had to wait for the emergence of ‘cultures of vernacular assertiveness’. Furthermore, language points to tensions between the national identity and regional identities: “the absence of a spontaneous

Gittinger 75

The idea of ‘managing’ a particular understanding of Hinduism was present in these early stages of public media, when print was the dominant medium. For example, it was thought by the British that authentic Hindu culture and lore was in danger of being subsumed by more revisionist interpretations, and thus pandits served as undertaking the “proud task of reviving Sanskrit literature” (Dalmia, 100). This not only prioritized a Sanskritic type of

Hindu practice, but also allowed the British to retain their power under the aegis of ensuring that ‘native’ traditions would be protected (and molded into a recognizable form of

‘religion’).

English language and the Indian public sphere

When we look at discourse online, in what sort of public sphere are we participating and who is invested in the management of such discourse? Regarding Hinduism online, the electronic public sphere is a theater in which ‘Hindu’ (identity) and ‘Hinduism’ (religion, culture, political ideology) is contested openly.

The phrase ‘public sphere’ is associated with Jürgen Habermas, although his definition is entirely problematic in the context of new media. However, Habermas is invoked either consciously or passively when the phrase is employed, therefore I will address it briefly. In the ‘public sphere’, discourse is the medium through which political participation is enacted.

As Habermas states, “A portion of the public sphere is constituted in every conversation in which private persons come together to form a public” (1991, 398). To speak (and perhaps more importantly, to be heard) is a fundamental element of the public space in which ordinary

community with those speaking the same language, a major source of strength of nationalism in the European context, becomes a source of weakness in the Indian subcontinent” (Kaviraj 2010, 98).

Gittinger 76 citizens can discuss common affairs. In its imagining, the public sphere is accessible to all, and presents an arena of unrestricted rational discussion of all topics which are pertinent to the public.26 Ideally, inequality of social status would be irrelevant; all participants would partake in the discussion as peers, resulting in a product called “public opinion” which would contain a consensus about the common good.27

Although the concept of the public sphere was imagined as a site of democratic discourse, this conceptualization is utopic. Early critiques of Habermas’ rational public sphere pointed to a decline of the ‘great public’ that Habermas described occurring in the 17th and

18th century, brought on by the industrialization of society. Critics such as Lyotard argued that

Habermas’ conceptualization excluded women and non-landed classes, thus being a privileged male space. In the context of globalization, the Habermasian model seems to be elusive if not downright impossible. The argument is that, “despite the rhetoric of publicity and accessibility, that official public sphere rested on, indeed was importantly constituted by, a number of significant exclusions” (Fraser 1990, 59) such as gender, class, and race. It is from such critiques that such models emerge and consider that multi-cultural societies cannot produce a singular, comprehensive “public sphere,” but rather produce multiple

26 It is suggested that only when people can communicate freely and in groups publicly, that they can govern themselves—which is why the First Amendment of the US Constitution lays out these rights of speech, assembly, and press. There is no public sphere without such rights, and as the Internet is presently decentralized and unencumbered by local governments (with the exception of where it is outright banned), it appears at least superficially to be the epitome of such rights. 27 If we apply the Habermasian model of public sphere (arena of discourse that nurtures critical opinion and questions authority, removed from the regulating control of the state) to the current political landscape in India, then one could well argue that such a model is disintegrating under Modi’s regime, where Hindutva ideology is becoming more central and outright censorship of discourse, media, and scholarship has already become more frequent.

Gittinger 77 counterpublics in which discourse arises in discrete places which are in turn embedded within ambits of power.28

Online or digital space would also be subject to the limits of the medium and those who effectively participate. If the World Wide Web is serving as a public sphere, in which multiple counterpublics exist rather than a rational consensus as idealized by Habermas, it is worth examining the ‘space’ in which these spheres operate. That is to say, subaltern spheres and counterpublics—no matter who or what they represent—must still operate within the framework and by the rules of the larger sphere in that language: the arena of public discourse, media production, images, and network of sites which we call the Web.

Here again one may ask: “is the Web a Western/American space?” This is relevant because to talk about communities, conversations, and culture on the Internet takes for granted the overarching liberal democratic principles that the Web exhibits. Any voice which speaks on the Web enjoys the default position of ‘freedom of speech’ and ‘freedom of expression’—the liberal-democratic context required for the public sphere to arise29—and the voices which are ‘heard’ are subject to power structures which decide what news story leads.

Institutions of power also design algorithms for search engines, and they use economic influence to promote particular ideas or images. That is not to say that there are not exceptional moments on the Web, in which grassroots movements or the subaltern rally and

28 Scholars such as Garhnam (1992) take a more generous reading of Habermas, arguing that his ideal and stoic vision of an ideal bourgeois public sphere pointed to a rationality which was recognized as impossible, but still worth striving towards. An entirely different view is held by scholars such as Carey (1995) and Putnam (1996) that even if multiple public spheres now exist, the public no longer matters. That is to say, because our structures and institutions of public communication are inherited, we continue to construct, distribute, and consume symbolic forms within their inherited frameworks—and these institutions are themselves undergoing a profound change; this change is represented by a shift from mainly national to mainly international markets in the informational and cultural spheres (Garhnam 1992, 362). 29 See Habermas The Public Sphere (1964).

Gittinger 78 alter the course of history.30 However, by and large, the voices of the minorities are swallowed up in the special interests of controlling governments or are marginalized to activist or academic audiences instead of entering the main stream of flow.31

There are other concerns about an idealized Habermasian sphere: The Indian public sphere in which my analysis takes place is not only an online or ‘electronic’ public sphere but also an English-speaking sphere. Therefore, this notion of a public sphere is important when considering how Hinduism is contested in these spaces: Who has the ability (and the access) to speak in this sphere? Who is the audience that is driving and participating in the simultaneous consumptions of this ‘public opinion’? When a religion or culture is presented as ‘authentic’ in the public sphere, how might counterpublics challenge or change ‘common concerns’?

During the British Raj, vernacular publics consolidated through the emergence of new forms of communication, the formation of political associations, and the reorientation of various literary communities. The concept of a national language was introduced by the

British who found no single language which could claim national status. The closest thing to a national language seemed to be the Hindustani composite language which developed under

30 Two instances immediately come to mind. The first is the phenomenon of Egypt’s “Arab Spring,” in which mobilization was organized via social networks, and an arguably Habermasian sphere—in the shape of Tahrir Square—formed to create a consensus not only once to oust Mubarak, but a second time to depose Morsi (see Nunns and Idle 2011 for an interesting case study in social media). The second instance is the example of the Falun Gong, who on April 25, 1999 astonished Chinese officials when ten thousand members of Falun Gong gathered in Tiananmen Square to protest the regime’s motion to outlaw Falun Dafa meditation movement—a protest which was organized largely through email. In the wake of the protest, the movement was banned outright, but continued to flourish via virtual networks such as Internet, pagers, and pay phones (see Lum 2006). Karaflogka (2006, 68) speculates that one of the consequences of the 1999 demonstration was an increase of internet users in China from 8.9 million in 1999 to 16.9 million by mid-2000. Underlying internet’s capacity for individual political expression as well as collective. 31 By ‘main stream of flow’, regarding the Web, I refer to popular media sites such as Yahoo! On such websites, world news is reduced to headlines sandwiched in between reports of pop stars, celebrity arrests, and diet fads. Instead of asking “can the subaltern speak?” as Spivak did, perhaps we should also be asking “can the subaltern be heard above the din of popular media?”

Gittinger 79 the Mughals and which was understood to some degree across the continent (Dalmia 1997,

146). Dalmia argues that the development of Hindi as a national language was not separated from its cultural and religious ties to the Hindus. It was, however: 1) a dichotomization from

Urdu, 2) standardized through grammars and primers as a means to cultivate autonomy (in relation to Urdu which was seen as Islamic), and 3) historicized through its standardization, establishing historical links with great ideological movements of the past through its connections to Sanskrit and the Aryans (148). For such reasons the Indian public sphere is discussed as a ‘political sphere’ in which “[m]ass politics, indigenous languages, popular participants, counter symbols, and counter authority began to play an unprecedented role”

(Orsini 2009, 121).32

Veena Naregal argues that the construction of colonial power was founded on the ability of the bourgeois imagination to make connections between the Western and non-

Western societies, conceived largely as an intercourse between the two languages which were seen as being in dialogue despite their cultural and linguistic differences (2001, 103).

On the one hand, native languages were placed in a relation of direct subordination vis-à-vis English and, on the other, colonial translation made it appear as though, in principle, English and vernacular publics could be endowed with symmetrical expressive and cognitive repertoires… Thus, despite the apparent homology that official policy sought to establish between English and the vernacular, there remained an inherent contradiction between the modern, universalist norms upon which English sought to base its claims of superior rationality and the circumscribed English-knowing audience (103-4).

32 Francesca Orsini notes that there were tensions between the literary and political spheres, complicated by the fact that Hindi was by 1920 an official language of India but not all politicians were Hindi speakers. As a result, the nationalist public sphere was a very Hindi one, evidenced today still by the prominence of ‘ belt’ politics. See Orsini’s The Hindi Public Sphere 1920-1940: Language and Literature in the Age of Nationalism, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Furthermore, it has been argued by Neyazi that the rise in Hindi newspapers at this time reveals a sort of ‘media imperialism’ occurring within the vernacular languages of India, in which Hindi publics dominated (see Neyazi 2010).

Gittinger 80

Despite the popularity of vernacular languages in the political press, it became clear that it was essential to learn English since it contained much needed technical knowledge of manufacturing and warfare (Dalmia 1997, 206). Although it placed them at odds with their own native social world, English-language knowledge introduced Indian intellectuals to a horizon of new intellectual, cultural and political choices, (Naregal 2001, 104). An Indian,

English-language public sphere developed alongside colonial education and missionary efforts.33

The coinciding development of such a sphere of discourse and the shifts in language education reflect a prioritization of certain languages over others. Benedict Anderson’s famous discussion of ‘print-capitalism’ will be helpful here, to make a brief digression. To make ‘horizontal-secular, transverse-time’34 communities possible, Anderson argues that three things occurred historically (in Europe). First, there was a shift in the style of Latin being used, and second, Reformation and the popularization of vernacular in print occurred simultaneously (Anderson 1983). The third historical event that he highlights—which is relevant to the topic at hand—was the slow and geographically uneven spread of vernaculars which emerged out of well-positioned polities and became “instruments of administrative centralization” (40). Anderson points out here that the universality of Latin in medieval

Western Europe was never tied to a political system, but remained tied to religious authority

33 Paul Brass makes an additional point regarding language: “In fact, language in north India has generally played a secondary role to religion as a source of social and political differentiation. Yet it would not be correct to conclude from these cases that religion is inherently a more powerful motive force in identity formation than language because elsewhere in the world, and in India itself, in Europe, and in Africa, it has been more common for language to provide a basis for nationalism in religiously diverse societies whereas, in north India, religion has united linguistically distinct peoples, particularly the Muslims” (2005, 404-405). 34 This is Anderson’s reglossing of Walter Benjamin’s concept of ‘homogenous, empty-time’. Moving from Benjamin’s discussion of simultaneity, Anderson frames this to fit his own conception of the community as ‘horizontally imagined’.

Gittinger 81 without true political analogue (40-41). Europe experienced many administrative languages in the 14th through 16th centuries, including Latin, Norman French, Anglo-Saxon, and German.

In every instance, the ‘choice’ of language appears as a gradual, unselfconscious, pragmatic, not to say haphazard development. As such it was utterly different from the selfconscious language policies pursued by nineteenth-century dynasts confronted with the rise of hostile popular linguistic nationalisms. One clear sign of the difference is that the old administrative languages were just that: languages used by and for officialdoms for their own inner convenience. There was no idea of systematically imposing the language on the dynasts’ various subject populations. Nonetheless, the elevation of these vernaculars to the status of languages-of-power, where, in one sense, they were competitors with Latin (French in Paris, [Early] English in London), made its own contribution to the decline of the imagined community of Christendom (42, emphasis in original).

Print-capitalism created languages-of-power; that is, languages which were different from the old administrative vernaculars, but closer to the dominant form of printed language. Thus as capitalism and print technology coincided, the diversity of human languages came to its unavoidable fatality.35 The death of certain languages and the rise of others created “the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation” (46).

Gauri Viswanathan has argued that the discipline of English came into its own in the age of colonialism through the adaptation of English literary content to the administrative and political colonial imperatives, and that these imperatives subsequently gave that content a

“radically altered significance, enabling the humanistic ideals of enlightenment to coexist with and indeed even support education for social and political control” (1989, 3). I am not going to go into the history of English language education in India, as there are several writers

35 Anderson notes that death and language are inextricable, and while languages may die or be wiped out, at the same time there is no hope of humanity’s linguistic unification.

Gittinger 82 who have gone into great detail on the subject.36 For the sake of brevity, however, I will note that it has been argued that the processes of discursive control would not have been possible without print, and English education was certainly part of this process. In the colonial imagination, education assumed a system of learning that relied on print and focused on individuated reading practices. “Education policy was in that sense a rubric for a whole set of inter-related assumptions and practices about knowledge, cultivation, textuality and identity inherent within Western modernity and necessary to the elaboration and maintenance of colonial power” (Naregal 2001, 145).

The political public sphere in India, as I mentioned earlier, is an English-speaking sphere first (as necessitated by the use of English as a ‘bridge language’ across Indo-Aryan and Dravidian vernaculars), and a Hindi sphere second (with the argument that it has close ties to Sanskrit, the original language of the Vedas)—the latter of which alienates southern voting districts and gives preference to the ‘saffron belt’ region in the north (i.e. Hindi language belt). In such a political sphere, rights-bearing individuals would theoretically battle for recognition of their ideas and convictions; in India, however, clearly there are large numbers of people in society who are only nominally rights-bearing (women, children, tribals, dalits, etc.) and therefore are not allowed or are even capable of accessing discursive space

(Alam 2005, 354). These public spheres of discourse do, however, have heavy representation from the literate elite (upper caste and middle- to upper-class) and from Hindu nationalist groups who are concerned with how Hindu culture is presented in new media. This makes

36 Gauri Viswanathan (1989) argues that rather than violate their promise to remain ‘religiously neutral’ in their governance of India—thereby disallowing Christian teaching in the classroom—they instead undertook a curriculum steeped in English literature, much of which had more subtle Christian images and morals. While colonial education in India included learning English language and grammar, as well as literary devices found in poems and prose, Viswanathan argues that the project to create an educated elite was ultimately a project to cultivate morality.

Gittinger 83 sense, given the historic rise of print technology, but the perpetuation of English language programming and the American domination of the Internet are mutually reinforcing.

English has therefore become, quite inadvertently, a language of power not because of

American military superiority or economic superiority, but through technological superiority.

We live in a print-dominated world, with news feeds and webpages providing the collective

‘act of reading’ that newspapers once shared in creating the Habermasian ‘public sphere’. The

Web is the new vehicle for languages of power, and that language is English. Thus, the sharing of religious cultures and traditions are often, by necessity, forced through the lens of

“Western” culture and English-dominant vernaculars. The mere fact that ‘religion’ has been problematized as ineffectively imposing a (colonial) framework upon other religious traditions demonstrates that language is an obstacle which must be negotiated in this analytical process.

It is not only among other South Asian languages that alternate spheres of discourse may be found; Lorenzen points out that during colonial periods in India, there were bodies of scholarship in other European languages discussing Hinduism that were not entrenched in

British Orientalism:

Early European missionaries who wrote on Hindu religion before 1800, mostly in languages other than English, are of particular interest to our discussion since their observations were often recorded in territories outside the direct influence of colonial rule and since post-1800 British Orientalists who supposedly invented Hinduism were almost entirely unaware of what these missionaries had written about Hindu beliefs and practices (Lorenzen 2006, 16).

Thus multiple public spheres, in which the definitions of ‘Hindu’ have been contested, have existed simultaneously for centuries and were hardly introduced with the technology of

Gittinger 84 computer-mediated communication—although certain spheres of discourse may more easily dominate through the new medium.

While the role of print media has not altogether diminished as a domain for control, as evidenced by the recent Wendy Doniger controversy, visual media has no doubt played a more central role as technology becomes more readily available and widespread across the varied economic sectors. Arvind Rajagopal argues “Television stitches together a plurality of fields through a currency of images, instituting a system of representation that cuts across society. Within it, the distinct symbols of each social field can be ‘realistically’ portrayed in all their uniqueness, while ignoring their constitution within a newly homogenized system of representation” (2001, 11). A visual medium, such as television, is able to transcend the barriers of literacy and is not burdened with the same ‘digital divides’ that newer technology exhibits. Television is able to give the epistemological limits of the word and image a “most potent expression, raiding the interplay of image and instancy to an exquisite and dangerous perfection…there is no subject of public interest—politics, news, education, religion, science, sports—that does not find its way into television. Which means that all public understanding of these subjects is shaped by the biases of [the medium]” (Postman 1985, 78). An extremely salient example of a medium (television) influencing public opinion by way of its characteristics (immediacy, availability, non-literate/visual) is the broadcasting of Sagar’s

Ramayan in 1987-1988. The example is particularly interesting as its momentum moves through channels of media in an unexpected order: first television, then print media, and lastly digital/online media.

Gittinger 85

Forging a Hindu community: Ram Janmabumi movement

One of the most overt examples of influence on popular Hindu religion and culture from

Hindu nationalist movements is the valorization of Rāma. Rāma (or Ram) was the central figure in the great epic Rāmāyaṇa, but really emerged as a cultural hero in the twentieth century. Countervailing a persistent colonial narrative of the ‘effete’ Indian male, Ram assumed the status of martial hero, epitome of masculinity and kingship, and eventually became the rallying point around which the Ram Janmabhumi movement coalesced.

There is a universalist aspect to Ram which transcends religion and draws together individual ideas about Indian history and Hindu culture:

Some said they did not believe in religion but were inspired by the prospect of unifying Hindus, many dwelt on the history of the mandir/masjid, others extolled the divine virtues of Ram. What appeared to tie together all these meanings was the commitment to the principle of universalism that, on the face of it, enabled everyone to cherish their own meanings. This belief, in fact, constituted the primary aspect of Ram (Datta 1991, 2517).

The ability to unite such disparate religious traditions through a singular understanding of a

(religious) hero is a feat that may have only been possible through broadcast television.

Today, Sagar’s presentation of the Ramayan is the most widely known version of the narrative in North India (Bakker, 130) and now considered, for better or worse, to be a standardization of the text (Lutegendorf 1998, 246).

Even before the airing of Sagar’s elaborately costumed seventy-eight-episode

Ramayan television serial, the authenticity and historicity of as the actual birthplace of the God-King Rāma was already a subject of contestation.37 Ayodhya was long considered

37 The most thorough historical account of Ayodhya, its geography, archeology, history, and relation to the epic can be found in Hans Bakker, Ayodhya: The History of Ayodhya from the 7 th Century BC to the Middle of the 18 th Century (two volumes, 1986).This topic of Ayodhya as a politically charged topic in

Gittinger 86 to be the historical setting of the Rāmāyaṇa, but it was also the location of a mosque built by the first Mughal emperor in 1528.38 In 1853, a group of ascetics made the first formal claim that the mosque was built on the birthplace (janmabhūmi) itself, and to quell tensions the local magistrate issued a compromise which would allow Hindu pilgrims to worship Ram on the adjacent platform just outside the mosque. The issue resurfaced again in 1949 when someone stole into the mosque and placed idols of Rāmā and Sītā on the —a serious insult to Muslims. Proclaiming the ‘appearance’ of the idols a miracle, thousands of pilgrims gathered outside the mosque and recited the Rāmcharitmānas for days on end, demanding that a Ram Janmabhumi mandir (temple) be built. To prevent further controversy, the gates to the complex were sealed off with chains and no one was allowed to enter the premises.

The issue made a full revival in 1989 when L.K. Advani, the leader of the BJP, made the building of a Ram temple a central platform of his campaign. With the fallout in 1986 over the Muslim Women’s Protection of Marriage Act, the airing of the television serial

Ramayana in 1987-1988, and the rising power of the BJP, it was an easy political move to declare a need to ‘reclaim’ Ayodhya as a point of national pride, and to build a Ram Mandir upon the site. In 1990 Advani undertook a Ram Rath (chariot procession) across the country to gather bricks for the foundation of the new temple and to incite a general fever around the issue, which inevitably left a wake of communal discord. The Ram Janmabhumi became a theatre of Indian history and politics designed to evoke a sense of emotion—a key feature of nationalism and community-forging as I noted earlier. I argue that emotional nationalist movements has been detailed by many scholars. See Datta 1991, Jaffrelot 1999, 2009, Nandy 1995, Pandey 1994, and Rajagopal 1994. 38 During Mughal history, mosques were built all over India, sometimes adjacent to existing temples, other times destroying and replacing Hindu sites of worship. Despite numerous archeological surveys done by parties of wide political interests, there is no evidence that a Ram temple ever existed on the site—although there may very well have been.

Gittinger 87 responses were generated through several means. First, a constant promotion of Ram took advantage of the widely broadcast Ramayan television serial.39 Second, the iteration of Indian history recalled the of particular Muslim rulers, thereby necessitating the defense of the site as a central aspect of Hindu identity, and lastly, the appropriation of religious symbols and gestures (such as Advani’s Toyota truck “chariot”) into what was clearly a political discourse. As a result, the veneration of Ram surpassed that of religion into national frenzy—culminating in the destruction of Babri Masjid on December 6, 1992. In a prime example of ritualized performance, the deftly wielded religious images and tropes throughout media to mobilize the karsevaks (“volunteers”) made it clear that Hindu culture/religion was under attack.40

While this movement gained great strides through broadcast media, it was the Hindi press that initially tapped into the nationalist sentiment in the wake of the Ramayan broadcast in 1987-1988. Through print media, debates on the Ram Janmabhumi movement—and the inseparability of Hindu religion from Indian nation—intensified and the BJP exploited growing tensions between the English language press and the Hindi press (Rajagopal 2001,

16). The circulation of Hindi newspapers grew 35% between 1988 and 1992, from 2.6 million a day to 3.2 million a day (177). They were not only the disseminators of rhetoric, but of images as well. Photos were carefully crafted to accompany the narrative of religious and

39 The watching of the Ramayan television show was a national event as entire communities paused, stores closed, and government meetings were rescheduled to accommodate the watching of the program. It was quite easy for groups such as the BJP to tap into the nationalist sentiment and reverence of the Ram narrative after that. For more on the influence of the television serial in India, see Lutegendorf 1995. 40 See Peter van der Veer’s : Hindus and Muslims in India (1994) for more on how the rhetoric of Hindutva was utilized in this period. Although Hindutva was initially conceived as an ethno-cultural movement, the BJP has never shied away from the religio-cultural component despite its avowal to the contrary.

Gittinger 88 cultural pride: BJP leader L.K. Advani posing as Ram with bow and arrow drawn, saffron draped and marigold draped devotees, symbols such as tridents or bow-and-arrow to evoke the deities, and raised fists in defiant anger/pride of the Motherland who must be protected from Islam and “pseudo-secularists.”

How is this movement sustained and maintained today? There has been a substantial body of scholarship written on this phenomena and the role of media in the promotion of the

Ram Janmabhumi temple (Datta 1991; Lutgendorf 1990; Pandey 1994; Rajagopal 1994; Rao and Reddy 2001). There is little—if any—scholarship on the role of the Internet in the sustaining of this movement. While this may seem an obvious incongruity with the Ayodhya incident happening in 1992 and the Internet’s epoch being 1995 onwards, the issue is still very present in the modern day Hindu nationalist agenda and is still discussed in the electronic public sphere, especially in social media.41

Ayodhya represented a Hindu community/nation whose wholeness was violated by

Mughal occupation and by the destruction of temples, thus remaining a rallying point for

Hindutva ideology. The BJP has tried to move away from highlighting religious issues on its websites, focusing more successfully on governance, anti-corruption, and infrastructure, but the Ayodhya issue makes a quiet appearance on the last page of their online 2014 election manifesto, under the heading ‘Cultural Heritage’ stating: “BJP reiterates its stand to explore

41 On the anniversary of the destruction of the Babri Masjid this past year (December 6, 2014) there were no less than 180 tweets with the hashtag #Ayodhya linking to various stories and recollections. Often a news story or popular editorial was repeatedly linked or retweeted for others to see. Other popular hashtags on December 6th were: #shauryadiwas (a regional holiday in Ayodhya and Faizabad which celebrates the destruction by raising saffron flags across the twin towns); #ramtemple, #ramatemple, or #rammandir (often hyperlinking to recent articles in which Modi has promised to build a Ram Janmabhumi); or simply #JaiShriRam. Tweets ranged from secular encouragement for discussion, links to articles about the history of the controversy or to the destruction of the original temple, to more nationalistic jabs at Muslims and the Indian National Congress (known for their more moderate/left politics).

Gittinger 89 all possibilities [of a Ram Mandir] within the framework of the constitution.” The manifesto was not released until the first ‘poll day’ in the 2014 election, on April 7th. Such a delay in the release provoked questions as to what the manifesto would reveal—or camouflage—about the ideology of the party. The core Hindutva issues, which have the Ram Janmabhumi at the top of the list, have not changed since their 1996 campaigns.42

The RSS and VHP are not electoral parties in the way the BJP is, and therefore issue no manifestos or vision documents, but they do keep the topic of building a Ram Janmabhumi alive on their websites. The RSS, for example, has two resolutions discussing the topic formally. The first is dated 1991—prior to the destruction of the mosque—in which the call to battle is quite clear:

It is now amply evident that every one posing hurdles in the way of construction of the temple whether a political leader, party, saint or a section of the society - have been cast aside by the vigilant people who are in no mood to tolerate them any more. However the Hindu Society should unitedly and resolutely march ahead ceaselessly without pause or rest till the final goal is achieved to facilitate the construction of the Ram Temple in Ayodhya (1991 APBS Resolution 1).

The second resolution is from 2001

The Akhil Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha43 heartily endorses the decision of the Dharma Samsad called by Vishwa Hindu Parishad taken at Maha Kumbh, to go ahead with the building of Ram Mandir at Ayodhya on a grand scale in place of the present day one. The ABPS also welcomes the wise decision of the Dharma Samsad to allow sufficient time for the Government to do away with the hurdles which have been needlessly obstructing the temple construction over almost a decade… In the meanwhile, the ABPS calls upon the general mass of our patriotic Bharatiya population, and Sangh Swayamsevaks in particular, to fully participate in the various step-by-step programmes planned by the Dharma

42 These issues are: to build a Ram temple in Ayodhya, to preserve the Ram Setu (bridge) between India and Lanka, the abrogation of Article 370 (Jammu-Kashmir special status), promotion of a Universal Civil Code, and banning of cow slaughter. 43 The APBS is the highest decision making body of the RSS.

Gittinger 90

Samsad aimed at mobilisation of public opinion in this regard. The ABPS is confident that with such a massive manifestation of nationalist aspiration, the dream of countless heroes and martyrs who have suffered and sacrificed for this holy cause will be fructified (2001 ABPS Resolution 2).

The language of these resolutions is clearly one that shows no remorse for the events of

December 6, 1992, stating that the building of a Ram temple should be a central concern for all Hindus and should proceed without hindrance. Those who were killed in the riots are valorized as ‘martyrs’ and ‘heroes’ who sacrifice for a ‘holy cause’.

Unlike the BJP and RSS, who are still campaigning for a Ram mandir but minimalize the visibility of such opinions, the VHP has its campaign front and center. A link from the front page of the website will take you to a collection of hyperlinks on articles about

Ayodhya, many of which address the 2010 ruling of the Allabhad High Court which split the

Babri Masjid site among three organizations: the , the Nirmohi Akhara (the original group of ascetics who proclaimed the site sacred in 1853), and the Sunni Waqf. There are numerous articles in both English and Hindi which argue archeological evidence supports a claim that Babur had destroyed an original temple on that site prior to building the mosque.

The movement brought several contradictions to light: contradictions between the claims of secular nationhood and overt religious nationalism, claims of the English-language media to speak on behalf of the nation as a whole, and claims of religious neutrality by the state despite the indulgence it showed towards illegal actions of Hindu militants (Rajagopal

2001, 210). The discourse around the Ram Janmabhumi temple is not exclusively restricted to the Sangh Parivar party websites; more and more Indians are reading their newspapers online, and English language papers are among the top readership. The marriage of print media and electronic media is evident: a report was released in October 2013 that showed a 34% increase in daily readership of online newspapers and growth of 9.4 million new visitors across the

Gittinger 91 sites they monitored.44 led the numbers, with 12.7 million unique visitors in August 2013 alone. Other sites ranked in the top five included: Yahoo!/ABC network,

Hindustan Times, India Today, and India.com sites.45 Of the top twenty listed, all but four were English-language publications (Bhaskar.com, , and Navbharat Times are in Hindi, and OneIndia.in has multiple options for regional languages). As Rao and Reddy argue, mobilization around the issue of the Ram temple continues to further communal tensions and continues to occur through mass media with regularity now (2001, 155).

Therefore the Ram Janmabhumi issue, while no longer a central part of party platforms, it is still visible online and continues to be contested and debated in the public sphere. The images of Advani’s Rath Yatra and pictures of RSS karsevaks joyfully dancing in the ruins of Babri Masjid still pervade Indian media, although now in electronic form and spread widely across the Web. The Ram Janmabhumi movement is an example of a very conscious presentation of a particular understanding of Hinduism actively managed by the nationalist parties. By invoking Hindu raṣṭra (nation) as a community bound by a particular historical narrative, religious culture, and imagining of India as proudly defiant in the shadow of remnants of Mughal rule, the Ram Janmabhumi becomes a rallying point around which an ideology of ‘Hindu’ forms. As a result, the constitution and establishment of Hindu community against the ‘other’ is tied to a historical narrative of occupation and an idealization of the past in which only Hindus, not Muslims, were the victims of destruction or violence.

44 ComScore Inc. (Nasdaq: SCOR) is a leading Internet technology company that provides analytics for digital world. They monitor 172 countries and estimate 1.5 trillion interactions captured monthly. http://www.comscore.com/About-comScore/comScore-Fact-Sheet. 45 See “ComScore Top 20 – August 2013” table at: http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Press- Releases/2013/10/Indias-Daily-Readership-of-Online-News-and-Information-Jumps-34-Percent-in-the-Past- Year. Accessed July 2014.

Gittinger 92

Conclusion

This chapter has clarified the concept of community, how it has been presented historically, and its modification as it came in contact with new technologies which allow for community formation online. Benedict Anderson’s conceptualization of ‘imagined communities’ is perhaps the most important and most versatile, relevant to discussions of online community and to nationalism.

The first part of the chapter emphasized that a community is ‘imagined’ in the sense that it is conceived by its members as having shared commonality and that it does not have to rely on face-to-face interactions. Online communities operate as networks of community formation which form transnational communities—the extension of an ‘imagined community’. The latter part of the chapter illustrated how the production and management of a ‘Hindu community’ in media was crucial to the colonial government of India, as well as to the newly emerging nationalist project after Partition. The rise of print media shows us how these early machinations succeeded in generating multiple contestations of Hinduism which would play out in the English language public sphere. The brief case study the role of media in the Ram Janmabhumi movement illustrates how such ideas are contested in the public sphere. I will proceed now to relate these discussions to the issues of ‘authenticity’ and

‘authority’ in the following chapters, beginning with Hindu nationalist websites and propaganda.

Gittinger 93

Chapter Three

The idea of a ‘Hindu nation’ in nationalist rhetoric

Hindus generally are not present or only feebly present, apologetic or half- hearted in their self-presentation in the information field. The image of Hindus and of Hinduism that prevails in the information age is created by non-Hindus and by anti-Hindu forces, not only by intention but also by default because Hindus themselves seldom challenge wrong views or provide an alternative. In this way Hinduism is being eroded, particularly in the minds of young Hindus, who seldom find their religion represented, or who find it denigrated in the media world around them that is rapidly becoming their reality.

“A Call for an Intellectual (Bauddhika) ,” 2007

David Frawley occupies a dubious position as a non-scholarly contributor to the academic discourses. As a prolific writer on Hindu tradition, he is frequently cited as a scholarly and authoritative source on Hindutva-toned websites. In this excerpt, Frawley raises the concerns of insider/outsider positionality and how ‘authoritative’ tracts prevail online that may not be authoritative (or authentic) at all. He sees a greater problem, however, in that Hindus themselves seem content with this disparity, and calls upon them to challenge the ‘erosion’ and ‘denigration’ of the tradition as it is presented on the Internet. The invocation of

“intellectual Kshatriya” is a call for a warrior who will bring an intellectual scrutiny to bear upon such representations of Hinduism and prevent the ‘media world’ from further damaging young Hindus.

Thus the arena in which Frawley and others imagine this battle for Hinduism to take place is an online arena, one that is constituted as an electronic public sphere and is the site where one can witness the discourse unfold and tense. This chapter demonstrates how the

Hindu raṣṭra (nation) may be argued to be discursively constructed through the rhetoric of

Hindu nationalist ideologies and through the activity of defining ‘Who Is a Hindu’ in the

Gittinger 94 propaganda of parties such as the BJP, the RSS, and the VHP. This analysis draws from

Hindu nationalist websites and propaganda which are spread across the Web, highlighting that the electronic public sphere is a growing arena of contestation in this wired world. I present screenshots of websites as well as excerpts from their manifestos and articles which are analyzed as online texts.

At this time, I suggest a formulation of a digital hermeneutic which may be used in assessing the websites and rhetoric. There are two points I am considering: first, the issue of interpretation through a reader’s “projection” which draws lightly from Hans-Georg

Gadamer’s theories in Truth and Method (1975). The second point locates digital media as something akin to orality in its dynamism and fragility. Both of these applications are fruitful as we look at the websites I have selected, their messages, and their interpretations.

A ‘digital hermeneutic’

Rafael Capurro, a theorist working with the concept of ‘digital hermeneutics’ states:

The Internet’s challenge for hermeneutics concerns primarily its social relevance for the creation, communication, and interpretation of knowledge. This challenge implies a questioning of the pseudo-critical rejection of hermeneutics with regard to technology in general and digital technology in particular (2010, 35-36).

Capurro expresses a concern for the impact of the Internet on all levels of society and at all levels of self-understanding.1 I would add to this and note that the key feature of digital media that prompts a reconsideration of traditional hermeneutic methods is the multimodality of the webpage, and thus a hermeneutical issue emerges: how do we understand digital technology

1 Our thoughts, beliefs, and desires inform the way we perceive reality and, Capurro argues, our reality and thoughts we develop are shaped hermeneutically by our digital technologies (and vice versa); “it can be inferred that digital technologies have to adapt to the ways we perceive and interpret reality, otherwise they will be irrelevant to our purpose and, in the worst case, dangerous” (2010, 37).

Gittinger 95 in ways similar (but not identical) to other media? The issue of multimodality is what impels me to consider not only Foucault, but also Marshall McLuhan and Hans-Georg Gadamer. I am not claiming to apply strict hermeneutical methodologies (ala Gadamer or Heidegger) here, but as I am ‘reading’ the website as text—and analyzing its rhetoric, structure, and semiotics—I feel the conversation around a digital hermeneutic is worth having.

It was Gadamer who wrote that “[l]anguage is the fundamental mode of operation of our being-in-the-world and the all-embracing form of the constitution of the world” (1980,

128). This is most certainly true with respect to the website, where all modes of interaction are mediated by and through the digital world of the Web. The website or webpage not only has text to read but images, hyperlinks, and aesthetic presentations that in themselves form a system of semiotics which inform modality and representation.2

I would interject another theorist in here at this juncture, Marshall McLuhan, who famously argued “the medium is the message.” For McLuhan, the medium (e.g., print, television, and Internet) unavoidably carries other media (language, sound, images) which inform the recipient just as much as the content does.3 For this reason, digital hermeneutics are extending beyond the task of classical hermeneutic theories of interpretation and resemble

2 It could be argued, as Saussure did, that things do not exist independently of the words/signs/symbols that we use. Reality, therefore, is created by the media which seem simply to represent it. Ideas are not formed until language; there are no pre-existing categories in the world until we name them. Therefore ‘reality’ is ‘represented’. 3 Marshall McLuhan begins his 1964 Understanding Media with his primary philosophy: In a culture like ours, long accustomed to splitting and dividing all things as a means of control, it is sometimes a bit of a shock to be reminded that, in operational and practical fact, the medium is the message. This is merely to say that the personal and social consequences of any medium - that is, of any extension of ourselves - result from the new scale that is introduced into our affairs by each extension of ourselves, or by any new technology (7). McLuhan proposes that the content of the medium (which emerges out of a cultural matrix) often blinds us to the character of the medium. That is to say, a website may be presented as a source of information (its ‘content’), but its function may not be to inform, but to actively change political opinion, religiously convert, or to discredit another contrary discourse (its ‘character’) and this function may be unintentional.

Gittinger 96 a theory of messages. The ‘theory of messages’, what Capurro called angeletics, is the hidden dimension of digital hermeneutics: there is no interpretation without a message (Capurro

2010, 39). And if “the medium is the message,” then the hermeneutical approach must engage the inherent media (as content) of the medium. We aren’t merely interpreting words on the page, but the page itself, the language of the words, the script, and the context.

This is perhaps something that bears serious consideration, given that the source of our communications, information-sharing, and information-acquiring is now so digitized. Reading a physical newspaper and reading an electronic newspaper are activities with entirely different hermeneutic processes going on. This might be best illustrated by working through how one might encounter a website. As a very basic example, let us consider the homepage of the

Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP):

Figure 1: Screenshot of homepage of the Vishva Hindu Parishad, January 2015.

Gittinger 97

The first thing the web user might assume as a result of his or her first glance at the site may be that the organization is very “official” looking—an aesthetic impression that will influence the reader’s overall perception. The website is tidy and organized. That there are no advertisements suggests that the site is serious and that the organization does not have to rely on ads to fund its digital endeavors. The reminder that the organization is celebrating its 50th anniversary also shows stability and continuity. Efforts are clearly made by the designer of the website to establish a legitimacy so that the reader—whether they are familiar with the VHP or not, or agree with their politics or not—will take the site seriously as a source of authority.

Further semiotics are used: the Sanskrit word , recognizable as a very universal symbol to the point of becoming a pictogram, and the tree which speaks perhaps more to a Hindu audience who would associate it with the Bhagavad Gītā and Kṛṣṇa. The saffron color of the banner is also relevant: Hindu nationalist movements have used saffron as a political identifier since before Partition. Lastly the picture of is presented, here as

“Bhārata Mātā,” the personification of India in the form of a goddess. This is an image that also emerged pre-Partition, towards the end of the 19th century. She represents an ancient spiritual essence as well as the spirit of nationalism and strength.

These elements are used very consciously and to great effect by the VHP, and serve to shape that initial “projection” that instantaneously manifests when encountering the website.

But the structure of the website and the hypertext are also an important part of interpretation, which is where digital media make a departure from the printed page. This is most notably found in the list of hyperlinks which serve as bundles for cultural categories invested with particular ideological assumptions (, cultural heritage, movements, Hindus abroad) in which entire sets of ideas are located. Through these links one encounters more

Gittinger 98 information and often further links which may extend outside of the domain of the VHP and into ideologically adjacent websites.

Lastly, the digital medium offers a replication of the printed medium in the form of their e-magazine. In this instance, the VHP’s e-magazine is offered in nine popular regional languages such as Hindi or Marathi, and can be accessed and read online in a PDF format that looks just like a printed magazine (in this instance, it even has advertisements). All of these ingredients—images, texts, hypertexts—combine and contribute to the process of interpretation.

Interpretation is subjective, however, therefore an organization such as the VHP can only direct or influence the reader’s perception the best it can. Unlike a written text on a page, which has only words to use, the multi-modality of digital media offers more opportunity to influence the reader’s perception. This multi-modality, as I suggest, can lend itself to more control over possible interpretations through the process of limiting and directing readers to particular links that serve to reinforce the central message of the hosting website.

For Hindu tradition, and historically speaking, I suggest the medium that supersedes all others is not a written medium, but an oral one. The narrative (historical or mythological) has played a central role in the formation of Hindu identity from its earliest periods. Itihas or

‘history’ is understood as occurring during an actual time period, but these time periods can be more mythic in their formulation (occurring during Treta-yug, for example). That is, history can occur in the time that is outside time, an ahistorical time, the time of the gods. As such, history and mythology are not dualistic, but synonymous.4

4 One could also argue that there is a hermeneutic process of demythologization that occurs—the Ramayana being an example of this—in which a mythology is interpreted as history through a systematical process of commentary, analysis, interpretations, and so forth.

Gittinger 99

There is, of course, great respect for text in Hinduism, notably the Vedas which are considered divine revelations (śruti, as opposed to ‘remembered’ or ‘inspired’ texts, smṛti).

However, it is the knowing of the Vedas and other classical texts which is important, not the reading of them. As Jessica Frazier argues:

Throughout its history India has overwhelmingly been a culture of non-literate peoples: most genres of Hindu text were originally oral, either taking the form of versified and performed material that was passed on through specialists such as Brahmins or storytellers in a set format, or of folk or practical knowledge that was later collected in written form, as in the fragmentary spells and stories that are found in certain Vedic texts (207-208).

The spoken word requires less interpretation because (as Gadamer argues) it interprets itself to a degree, through the speaker’s tone, diction, tempo, volume, as well as the circumstances in which he or she speaks. Furthermore, orality, as Walter Ong (1982) argues, is “evanescent” while print, on the other hand, seems permanent and unchanging. In this sense, there is a multi-modality that speech offers that a written text in a book does not. For this reason, I argue, that digital media (such as a website) returns to a sort of orality not because it is heard, but because it too has a number of features that affect the presentation (and thereby the interpretation) of the material. The hypertext in particular is “evanescent” in that it is dynamic and open-ended. If orality is “empathetic and participatory” compared to the written text which is “objectively distanced” (Ong, 45), then the website has more in common with orality than with the static nature of the book, magazine, or journal that it may or may not be trying to replace. The oral performance is in many ways authorless, as is the website, in that the speaker supersedes the source. In many ways, the speaker (or website) then becomes the source; for this reason, I consider digital media to have more in common with oral media than with the printed.

Gittinger 100

Most importantly, for an organization like the VHP which considers itself to offer a brand of transnational Hinduism, the digital medium shares another feature with oral media in that it creates community. Printed media encourages individual consumption. The coffee houses and cafés in which Habermas saw the bourgeois public sphere forming were in response to individual reading practices—a public sharing of private consumption. On the other hand, online texts generate a sense of community in their location (being on the “World

Wide Web,” which suggests the participant is a member of a global community), their connectivity (hyperlinking to other sources and immediacy of information), and the opportunities for social interaction (in the form of comments, forums, feedback, and social media).

Another part of the hermeneutic process is to analyze the rhetoric being employed and to identify tropes which are used to reify specific narratives or convince the reader of a particular point of view. Just as print media and television contributed to promoting particular representations of Hinduism in the 20th century, the arena in which 21st century discourses compete and conflict is a digital one. To continue, I outline my methods of analysis and the aspects of the rhetoric with which I am most concerned, and highlight the manipulation of concepts such as ‘tolerant’, ‘ancient’, ‘eternal’, and other emotive language used in Hindu nationalist propaganda.

The discursive construction of a Hindu raṣṭra

The process by which I undertake this analysis draws from an ongoing interest in rhetoric and nationalism. I have been studying Hindu nationalist groups such as the Bharatiya Janata Party

(BJP), Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), and the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) for a

Gittinger 101 decade, and have already observed shifts in discourse and presentation over this time. Using a feature of the Internet called the “wayback machine” (web.archive.org),5 I have been able to access pages of various Hindu nationalist organizations from previous years, and analyze their content year to year. The BJP launched its website in 1996, with the RSS piggy-backing until

1999 when it got its own website. While the sites were crawled infrequently in their early life, it is still possible to see many of the early incarnations of their mission statements and ideology.

The methods by which the web is catalogued electronically are improving almost daily, although webcrawling is not an exact science. Bots that collect data from across the enormous expanse of the Web do so by systematically browsing through URLs in order to create an index. As less than half of the indexable Web is regularly searched, the goal is to index the most relevant and highly trafficked sites rather than collect a random sampling.6 The more frequently a website is visited or a hyperlink is clicked, the more likely it is to move up the list of prioritization for the webcrawler to browse.

We can start simply with an examination of traffic patterns on websites which promote more aggressive religio-nationalist attitudes. Web.arhive.org allows one to look at a specific

URL and see how frequently it was crawled, which in turn provides some indication of how frequently the site was trafficked. For example, the radical website HinduUnity.org was taken

5 This is a neutral, non-profit organization which provides a service enabling users to see archived versions of web pages from previous years. This service uses an Internet bot called a ‘web crawler’ to systematically browse pages across the Web for the purpose of indexing. By going to this site, one can enter in the URL of a particular website and, if they have been around for a while, there should be at least a few days a year that the site was ‘crawled’ and archived for later viewing. The name ‘Wayback Machine’ is a reference to a cartoon segment on the The Rocky and Bullwinkle Show. In the program, the characters routinely used a time machine called the ‘WABAC machine’ (pronounced ‘Wayback’) to observe famous historical events——often participating or altering them in the process. 6 For a very detailed and lucid explanation of how webcrawling works and the algorithms implemented to effectively index online content, see Olston and Najork 2010.

Gittinger 102 offline in mid-2013. This website was the host domain for the , the radical arm of the VHP, as well as linking to other militant and Hindutva sites. The propaganda on the site made no attempt to veil its blatantly anti-Islamic position, warning of global Islamicization and calling upon Hindus to fight to protect their religion. We can observe, however, its general popularity by its web traffic and frequency of webcrawling. The spike in highlighted year of 2001 reveals a particular interest post 9/11:

Figure 2: web.archive.org snapshot display of Hindu Unity website traffic, with 2001 highlighted.

The shaded circles indicate the days the website was crawled, a minimum of one snapshot during that day for the smallest sized circle, and then only a few times a month. Notice the webcrawler frequency below:

Figure 3: Screenshot of web crawling frequency of Hindu Unity website after September 11, 2001.

Gittinger 103

Feeding on anti-Islamic sentiment post 9/11, HinduUnity.org pulled in enough web traffic to be crawled almost daily, with peak indexing at 6 times in one day.

Even traffic patterns on websites which were not blatantly anti-Islamic revealed a growing concern for Hindu identity against the rising visibility of Islamic at the time. The VHP-America, located in the US, is another organization that shows a significant traffic spike at this time, with the highest frequency of crawling being 14 times in one day.

Figure 4: Screenshot of website traffic for VHP-America after September 11, 2001.

Rather than fuel anti-Muslim rhetoric, VHP-A “strongly condemns” the terrorist attack and calls upon Hindus as those who “have also suffered at the hands of terrorism” to contribute to aid the victims’ families: “We hope it strengthens America’s resolve to eradicate terrorism globally by joining India and other nations in the fight against this global plague.” The comparison is drawn between the attack on the WTC and the attacks on “tens of thousands” of civilians in Jammu Kashmir, however, still vilifying Islam as the instigator of violence.

Gittinger 104

Web archiving in these instances not only allow us to review an actual webpage from the past, but gives us insight into the role these websites may be playing the public discourse online.

Sometimes the manner in which a particular ideology is presented or highlighted reveals more about the sentiment of the organization than the actual ideology itself. An interesting example of this is the presentation of Hindutva ideology over the years on the BJP website. Their site is webcrawled with some frequency, with obvious spikes during campaign months. One of the more interesting observations has not been the traffic rate on the BJP website, but rather the role of ‘Hindutva’ on the websites, whose position and hyperlinking indicate the prioritization of the ideology over the years. Hindutva has been visible from the start of Hindu nationalism’s online presence, but has been presented in multiple ways and with increased foregrounding.

The BJP website was created in 1996 (bjp.org registered in December 1995) and looked like most other sites at the time, awkward and basic, with hyperlinks to other pages:

Figure 5: Home page of BJP website1996

Gittinger 105

From the link ‘main contents’, one was led to sets of topics organized under subheadings such as “General Elections 1996,” “Current Issues & Events,” or “Policies and Issues.” Under a special subheading, we find a link to the first thoughts on Hindutva as publically expressed by the party: Hindutva: The Mascot of the BJP. From this link, a collection of articles are listed and have not changed almost two decades later. Clicking on the hyperlink “Main Contents” we can find the Election Manifesto from 1996. Like manifestos to come in the following years, it had sections of Education, Women, Electoral Reforms, and so forth—each with only a brief explanation. The subheading “Hindutva” has far more detail:

The BJP will retain its cutting edge, Hindutva, which gives the party its distinct ideological character. The Manifesto states this unequivocally: “The BJP is committed to the concept of one nation, one people, one culture,” and asserts that its nationalistic vision is defined by the nation's ancient cultural heritage. “From this belief flows our faith in cultural nationalism which is the core of Hindutva. That, we believe, is the identity of our ancient nation - Bharatavarsha.”

Ram Temple: The BJP reiterates its commitment to facilitate the construction of a magnificent Ram temple at Janmasthan in Ayodhya on coming to power as “this dream moves millions of people in our land; the concept of Ram lies at the core their consciousness.” 7

While the phrase cultural nationalism is a softer approach to, say, Hindu nationalism (which by its very language excludes Indian Muslims and Christians), that phrase is overwhelmed by two other stronger points: the nationalistic vision of “one nation, one people, one culture”

(which does not exactly sound like Nehru’s model of secular diversity), and the push for a

Ram temple at the site in Ayodhya.

7 https://web.archive.org/web/19961030090645/http://www.bjp.org/bjp/manifesto96.html. Accessed December 2014.

Gittinger 106

The website got a major revamp in 1999, when the party’s presence in the Lok Sabha seemed to have peaked and the BJP realized that Hindutva-centered politics no longer had momentum.8 Hindutva is then softened in its presentation, falling under the ‘philosophy’ hypertext, and the concept of cultural nationalism is foregrounded as the true definition of

Hindutva:

Figure 6: Hindutva page from BJP website, 1999-2000

Although bearing the heading: “Hindutva (Cultural Nationalism)…It must be noted that

Hindutva is a nationalist, and not a religious or theocratic, concept,” the same collection of articles are available. This softening of Hindutva, with “Indian nationhood” sounding more

8 It is worth noting the rise of the BJP to power in the Lok Sabha. Prior to 1989, they won only 2 seats actually losing 10 from the prior election. It was around this time that the airing of the Ramayana, aided by Advani’s Ram Rath Yatra, began to fuel a fevered religious nationalism surrounding the issue of Ayodhya. In 1989, the party won 89 seats, and in 1991 they won 120. After the Babri Masjid destruction, the BJP continued to increase representation in the Lok Sabha, peaking at 189 seats in 1999. Their numbers were steadily decreasing until this past election in 2014. It has been speculated that in the wake of 9/11, Hindutva politics puts too much focus on divisive religious issues and not enough on practical economic issues, thus the party had been in crisis in the new millennium as it tried to figure out the role that religion played in their platform.

Gittinger 107 inclusive, was a necessary move in the wake of the Ayodhya incident, which remained a hot political issue for years to follow. By invoking the concept of Cultural Nationalism, the BJP was consciously attempting to distance itself from the hindutvawalle who identified as religiously national and openly militant.

In a more recent version of the website, Cultural Nationalism makes it to the front page, now a central feature of the party’s ideology and exhibiting a non-religious tone which is important for their rhetoric on secularism:

Figure 7: Home page of BJP website, 2011 to 2013.

While the links still go to the same collection of Hindutva articles that first appeared in 1996, the manner in which this ideology is both presented and concealed reveals the fragility of the

Gittinger 108 term in a post-9/11-world where religious extremism is eschewed.9 Furthermore, as the slogan advertises, there is a prioritization of identity—the Hindu national identity being at the top of that list. In this simple instance of placement and foregrounding (or obfuscating) the concept of ‘Hindutva’ on the website and in published items like manifestos and vision documents, we can observe a very conscious and attentive management to an ideology whose placement is by no means accidental.10

How do these shifts in presentation relate to the production of religious discourse in

India and abroad? The Indian political parties, both Congress-aligned and more right-wing organizations, are in many ways the promoters of Hindu authenticity. Couching rhetoric in historical narratives, issues of ‘Hindu pride’, and a call for India to assert itself on the global stage are all responses to colonial influences. When power transitioned from the British Raj to the Indian National Congress, the stories and idea of India—as imagined, written about, and molded under colonial rule—needed to be reclaimed. Thus the backward gaze to the classical,

Vedic, or even ancient India was necessitated in the search for this ‘authentic’ India which had been sanitized or erased under centuries of imperialism. The construction of what it means to be Hindu has been central to Indian politics ever since, and has been reworked in response to both local and global political climates.

9 The BJP website was just changed again at the start of 2014 as the BJP was campaigning heavily for Narendra Modi. The website continues to be a mélange of social media buttons, links to speeches, and information on how to join the campaign, but now seems to be a secondary site to Modi’s stunning and incredibly high tech website (with far too many scripts for a screen shot to do justice) which provides the party platform on reform, economics, technology, religious inspiration, and a number of other rhetorical nodes. Like a delicious spun sugar candy, it is impressive and pleasing to encounter, but gives very little substance. 10 Compare this to how the VHP defines Hindutva and its more defensive tone: “Hindutva is synonymous with nationality and Hindu society is undisputably the main stream of Bharat. Hindu interest is the national interest. Hence the honour of Hindutva and Hindu interests should be protected at all costs.” (http://vhp.org/organization/org-hindu-agenda. Accessed January 2015).

Gittinger 109

Authenticity, as we will see with further examples, relies upon history—or how history is interpreted through the lens of the present. The authorities that speak to Hindu authenticity are established by modes of power found in government, education, and high- caste literati, thereby deriving claims of legitimacy through positions which were (ironically) crystallized during the Raj: officials, Sanskritists, pandits, and so forth.11 Therefore to presume any true ‘authenticity’ or return to a pure Hinduism is to ignore the lens through which history is gazed. Authenticity results from a perspective containing idealizations and judgments which is brought to bear upon the past, and this perspective is colored by the contemporary context in which one is situated.

Hindu nationalist websites, such as those of the BJP and the VHP, are designed for

Hindus living in the West as much as for Hindus in India. They are in English, although alternate languages are sometimes offered in election documents (usually Hindi)—as opposed to more localized organizations such as the , whose website is in Marathi. The mainstream parties bear a ‘.org’ suffix, rather than a ‘.in’ suffix,12 giving them an international appeal. Websites of political parties are intended to be used as a guide for Hindu diaspora, offering instant answers to questions a Hindu living abroad might encounter, as demonstrated by webpages detailing “Eternal Hindu Values” or “Hindu Customs” (Jaffrelot

2007, 287).13 In other words, political organizations are propagating particular versions of

11 Many surveys of India under the British Raj discuss the attention given to creating administrative positions and their roles in the formation of ‘Hinduism’. See Dirks 2009, B. Metcalf 2006, T. Metcalf 1997, and Parsons 1999. 12 Narendra Modi’s website (narendramodi.in) or Samajwadi Party (samajwadi.in) are examples where emphasis on the local is more important, and thus perhaps an Indian suffix is more appropriate. 13 Websites are just the latest medium for disseminating propaganda to overseas Hindus. M.S. Golwalkar’s famous book, Bunch of Thoughts, devoted an entire passage to overseas Hindus, calling upon them to act as ambassadors for their nation and to serve ‘the Cause’ abroad (Jaffrelot 2007, 280).

Gittinger 110

Hindu religion through their rhetoric and through avenues of discourse such as hyperlinks or scholarly writings by those who share their particular idea of ‘who is a Hindu’.

The illusion of cultural homogeneity is ever-present in Hindu nationalist discourses.

Sudipta Kaviraj observes that nationalism relies on a false consciousness: “If there is any field about which nationalist thought establishes plausible but misleading narratives, it is about the society it tries to bring under its political control and its historical self-representation” (2010,

87). A complementary quote that is also pertinent to the discussion is from Jean François

Bayart:

[In effort to understand] the dynamics of homogenisation as well as those of ‘heterogenisation’, culturalism cannot help us, for it commits three methodological errors: it maintains that a culture is a corpus of representations that is stable over time; it sees this corpus as closed in on itself, and it assumed that his corpus determines a specific political orientation. The time has come to refute each of these assertions. (2005, 65)

The control over the presentation of history is the control over cultural presentation, and that control is predicated upon the assumption that history is stable, closed, contiguous, and— perhaps most importantly—that it manages to remain undistorted when viewed through the lens of the present.

The presentation of history is central to how Hinduism is constituted on nationalist websites. As the VHP website makes clear with its byline “Unite Hindus – Save Humanity,” it is incumbent upon nationalist groups to “protect, develop and spread the Hindu value—ethical and spiritual—in the context of modern time” and “to establish and strengthen contact and help all Hindus living abroad.” This is done by reiterating a particular historical narrative of the Indian people, clarifying what should be understood as the true role of Hinduism in the world, and purging it of foreign influences—including ‘pseudo’ secularism.

Gittinger 111

It makes sense that Hindu nationalist organizations would seek not only to gain party favor in India, but to cultivate a unified Hindu attitude among the diaspora. “It is easier to transcend regional and sectarian differences in the US than in India, where particular identities and rivalries are more entrenched” (Jaffrelot 2013). Thus, the VHP’s “standardized catcheism” promotes a unity among immigrants in the US that it cannot achieve in India.

What remains is therefore a version of Hinduism which is embraced by the diaspora and by globalized discourses of religion and culture.

The (re)telling of history

The greatest congruity across these sites is that they are replete with the grand narrative of

India as “a great civilization”, “an ancient people” with a “rich cultural heritage” who

“weathered the storms” or “suffered under repeated assault” of invaders. Indian people are represented as skilled workers, intellectuals, artists, and pioneering technological advances.

As Amartya Sen notes, the determination to retain the voluminous Indian identity that emerges out of historical narrative is strengthened by “the deep sense of tragedy” from

Partition and the pride that, despite the tensions of the time, the majority of Muslims in newly independent India chose to remain rather than move to Pakistan. This is understood as emblematic of the inclusiveness of Hindu culture, which “embraced the internal heterogeneity and celebrated the richness of diversity” of modern India (Sen 2005, 51).

From a rhetorical point of view, the tale of history is enthymematic: ancient Hindu civilization was great, diverse, spiritually rich, and inherently tolerant despite the repeated invasions by outsiders. The unspoken part of the syllogism is that the outsiders—and here, it is usually the Mughals being referenced—are the antithesis to the diversity, tolerance, and

Gittinger 112 greatness of Hindu civilization. In setting up Hinduism as an ancient tradition that was characterized by a purity of tradition and a resilience to foreign influences, Hinduism is able to be shaped into something very precious and vulnerable—and that must be protected at all costs. If the past is fragmented by numerous invasions, an interruption of civilization

(Harappa to Vedic), and the sheer diversity of tradition, then interpreting the past through a hermeneutic lens of “Hindu history” knits together the disparity.

In order to maintain a sense of historical cohesiveness, Hinduism has to be a tradition which can rise above the changing landscape of imperialism. Britain was blamed for the

‘divide and rule’ mentality which was counterproductive to Gandhi’s ideology that “There is in Hinduism room enough for Jesus, as there is for Mohammed, Zoroaster and Moses.” If

Hinduism could be summed up in one phrase, for Hindu nationalism it would be sanātana dharma or “eternal truth,” an amorphous homogeneity which Halbfass called the “self representation of Hinduism which grew out of its encounter with the West” (1988, 344).14

While appearing in numerous sources including the Bhagavad Gītā, I noted in the first chapter that the term is especially cited in reference to Aurobindo Ghose’s famous Uttarpara Speech given in 1909:

…What is this religion which we call Sanatana, eternal? It is the Hindu religion only because the Hindu nation has kept it, because in this Peninsula it grew up in the seclusion of the sea and the Himalayas, because in this sacred and ancient land it was given as a charge to the Aryan race to preserve through the ages. But it is not circumscribed by the confines of a single country; it does not belong peculiarly and for ever [sic] to a bounded part of the world. That

14 On the subject of sanātana dharma, Vivekananda’s guru and teacher, Ramakrishna, is quoted as saying on one occasion in 1884: “The various creeds you hear of nowadays have come into existence through the will of God and will disappear again through His will. They will not last forever. Therefore I say, ‘I bow down at the feet of even the modern devotees.’ The Hindu religion has always existed and will always exist” (Sharma 2013, 91). Jyotirmaya Sharma notes that the tenor and spirit of the quote sounds more like Vivekananda, who considered only Hinduism to be worthy of the term ‘religion’, and less like Ramakrishna who was known for his ‘catholicity’ and doctrinal generosity.

Gittinger 113

which we call the Hindu religion is really the eternal religion, because it is the universal religion which embraces all others. If a religion is not universal, it cannot be eternal. A narrow religion, a sectarian religion, an exclusive religion can live only for a limited time and a limited purpose….

It is not unusual to find this cited on nationalist websites because it emphasizes two things: that ‘Hindu’ is tied to a particular geography and people that are sacred and ancient, and that

Hindu dharma (as a religious tradition) is universal, embracing all other religions. It occupies a unique position in modern Hindu social and political history in that despite its ambiguous use in contemporary Hinduism, it is also a signifier of Hindu orthodoxy.

This establishment of Hindu religion as eternal, and Hindu culture as noble and ancient, is a crucial element of the foundation of Hindu nationalism and their ideology, as the eternal nature of Hinduism is closely tied to the narrative of India and of Hindus as a people.

This begins to emerge in the Party History section of the BJP’s webpage (1999):

History is the philosophy of nations. And the Sangh Parivar [family of Hindu nationalism] has a very clear and candid conception of Indian history. Here was a great civilization whose glory spread from Sri Lanka to Java and Japan and from Tibet and Mangolia to China and Siberia. While it weathered the storms of Huns and Shakas and Greeks it wilted before the Islamic storms of the Turks. However, a 1000-year resistance saw this country bloodied but unbowed. Its civilization survived through the heroic efforts of the Vijayanagar Empire and of Shivaji, Rana Pratap and Guru Govind Singh and countless heroes and martyrs (bjp.org/history/history.html).

This rhetoric is fine-tuned and eventually becomes central to the party’s manifestos as the

BJP’s power begins to decrease. Note the language and imagery of the prose of the 2009

Manifesto:

BJP Manifesto: Lok Sabha Elections 2009 TO BUILD A PROSPEROUS, POWERFUL NATION, RECALL INDIA’S PAST Indian civilisation is perhaps the most ancient and continuing civilisation of the world. India has a long history and has been recognised by others as a land of great wealth and even greater wisdom. But India has also experienced

Gittinger 114

continued foreign attacks and alien rule for centuries and this has resulted in a loss of pride in India and its remarkable achievements. Indians, particularly educated under the system of education imposed by the Britishers, have lost sight of not only the cultural and civilisational greatness of India, but also of its technological achievements and abounding natural resources.

In its introductory paragraph, the Manifesto has already drawn upon several tropes widely utilized in Hindu nationalist writings. First, the notion of Indian civilization is conceived as ancient, contiguous, and wise. Secondly, there is a history of repeated invasion which is blamed for a “loss in pride” and a lapse in memory regarding the nation’s great technological achievements. It is not much further down that it moves to its rhetoric of technological advancement:

Indian advancements in astronomy, mathematics, chemistry, physics and biological sciences have been documented and recognised all over the world. Contributions in the field of medicine and surgery are also well known. and are the best gifts from India to the world in creating a healthy civilisation. India knew plastic surgery, practised it for centuries and, in fact, it has become the basis of modern plastic surgery. India also practised the system of inoculation against small pox centuries before the vaccination was discovered by Dr Edward Jenner.

The narrative of India as a scientifically, mathematically, and/or technologically advanced civilization is another theme that appears frequently in nationalist rhetoric. It is seen as a source of Hindu pride, and is arguably a natural response to the colonial representations of

Hindus as ‘backwards’ or ‘uncivilized’. To expand on the references to Ayurveda and Yoga here, there follows a discussion of a “well organized health care system” in India, as well as a

“functioning indigenous educational system” which included an “impressive number of lower caste students, Muslims, and girls.”

Gandhi was absolutely right in saying that India was more illiterate in 1931 compared to its state of literacy 50-60 years ago, i.e. in 1870. India had also an expertise in ship building, as also in extensive manufacturing and uses of dyes, and also in manufacturing paper.

Gittinger 115

The British are again blamed for robbing the country of its self-reliance both in literacy and production. The accusation arises in reference to Macaulay’s speech (February 2, 1835 speech to British Parliament) in which he stated: “I have travelled across the length and breadth of

India and I have not seen one person who is a beggar, who is a thief, such wealth I have seen in this country, such high moral values, people of such high caliber, that I do not think we would ever conquer this country, unless we break the very back bone of this nation, which is her spiritual and cultural heritage, and therefore, I propose that we replace her old and ancient education system, her culture, for if the Indians think that all that is foreign and English is good and greater than their own, they will lose their self esteem, their native culture and they will become what we want them, a truly dominated nation.” It is surmised that this policy was implemented for the purpose of creating an English educational system which would make

Indians “ignorant” about themselves.

The appeal of emotion is another rhetorical device. While the Mughal empire marginalized Hindus, it was the British empire that emasculated Hindus. The rise of a martial and muscular nationalism is a post-colonial response, and the language of ‘loss of self- esteem’, ‘Hindu pride’, and ‘resilience’ is an appeal which is designed to stir religio- nationalist patriotism in the Hindu citizen.15

There is an emphasis on the spiritual nature and wide reach of Hinduism that makes it amenable on a global scale:

The civilisational consciousness of India has been well defined by the sages and philosophers and has its roots in Bharatiya or Hindu world view. This world view is holistic and spiritual. It accepts that diversity is inherent in the

15 The emotional appeal to ‘Hindu pride’ is especially prevalent in the discourse around the Ram Janmabhumi issue, where the justification of the Babri Masjid’s destruction was that it was a constant reminder of Mughal occupation and an insult to Hindus if it remained standing.

Gittinger 116

scheme of creation; it is the manifestation of the same cosmic entity in different forms. Hence it not only accepts diversity but respects it and even more celebrates it. Hindu or Bharatiya view of life seeks unity in diversity. It is an inclusive approach and one can say that Hinduism is the most ennobling experience in spiritual co-existence. The Bharatiya mind has contemplated beyond national boundaries and the Vedic Rishi declared in the hoary past ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbukam’ – that the world is a family. The horizons of India’s worldview are known to have extended from Bamiyan / Kandahar to Borobudur / Indonesia on the one hand, and Sri Lanka to Japan on the other.

This paragraph begins to position India as a global influence, with its philosophies extending worldwide, with the proclamation that “the world is a family.” This is the rhetoric of diversity and holistic spirituality. It draws from the Vedic ṛṣis (seers) who, they claim, held the unique feature of Hindu thought in that there was an essential unity of mankind “Ekaṃ Sadviprā

Bahudhā Vadanti (truth or reality is one but wise men describe it in different ways).” Perhaps most importantly—and I would argue this is a distinguishing feature of the BJP versus the more conservative RSS—they claim that this thinking displays “secular thought in the real sense of the term because it accepts that one can follow his own path to reach the ultimate.”

Consistent presentation of history does not mean that all definitions and ideologies are definitionally rigid. Going back a decade earlier and looking at the BJP’s 1998 Election

Manifesto, we can find a more universal tone than present Hindutva ideology. Also called the

“10 Point Freedom Charter,” it starts with a Sanskrit :

Sarve bhavantu sukhinah May all live happily. Sarve santu niramayah May all enjoy good health. Sarve bhadrani pasyantu May all see auspiciousness. Ma kaschit dukha bhag bhavet! May none experience distress. Om Shanti! Shanti! Shanti! May peace prevail everywhere!

Immediately noted as a “timeless motto of universal happiness and peace,” the motto is said to be the heritage of “this ancient Indian civilization,” which, it is also noted, “existed long before the ideas of civilization evolved elsewhere.” Again, the language of the nation as

Gittinger 117

“ageless” and “ancient” are found throughout the introduction, as well as reference to

Aurobindo’s concept of sanātana dharma which is said to be synonymous with Indian nationalism. It is important here to highlight the use of the word nation, not country or people or culture; the concept of a Hindu rāṣṭra (nation) is integral to the teleological conceiving of

India and its cohesive identity. Again, this may have been a response to the fallout from the

Ram Janmabhumi controversy and an attempt for the BJP (who were accused of being complicit in the destruction of the Babri Mosque) to backpedal in their ideology.

The 1998 Manifesto then moves onto themes of universalism, again including

Abrahamic faiths but in a way that portrays India as a safe harbor of tolerance in a world of conflict:

The well-being of all, in short, is the Indian mission. It is not limited to the residents of Bharat or the adherents of any particular faith or creed. That is why Bharat received with open arms all faiths and people fleeing persecution—whether it was the Jews, Parsis, Muslims or Christians——and preserved and protected them long before any other civilization could think short of exterminating those who differed from the ruling faiths and people. Israeli society has openly acknowledged that out of over a hundred nations in which Jews sought refuge, only in Bharat they were received and treated well. It is because religion in ancient India meant faith in general and not any particular faith (chapter 1).

The inclusion of Israel specifically, and reference to the pre-WW2 sentiments which culminated in the Holocaust and exile from Europe, is not an accident. Hindu nationalist rhetoric has long aligned with the Jewish diaspora, seeing itself as another victim of the missionary and colonial projects, and in later iterations begins to find in Zionism a shared

Islamophobia which is socially acceptable. The inclusion of the other traditions underscores diversity as an “inseparable part of India’s past and present national tradition.” At this time,

Vivekananda and Mahatma Gandhi are introduced as repositories of “ancient Indian wisdom” which is rejected by the post-independence movements, thereby creating a cultural disconnect

Gittinger 118 from the past. It is at this point the Manifesto introduces a five-fold concept of governance:

“Shuchita (probity in public life), Suraksha (security), Swadeshi (economic independence),

Samajik Samarasata (social harmony) and Hindutva (cultural nationalism).” Hindutva, despite being nestled among other qualities, is still very present.

The BJP is not the only organization to utilize such discursive techniques. Identical tropes run through VHP’s web page as early as 2000, “The Origin and Growth of the Vishva

Hindu Parishad” (vhp.org/englishsite/a-origin_growth/origin.htm):

Bharat is a very ancient nation with a glorious past and great achievements. Because of its great spiritual knowledge and the most ideal character it has attained the status of Jagadguru i.e. World Leader. The time cycle eroded its physical power and we have become ineffective in the face of the barbaric attacks and aggressions of the foreigners. While the Muslim invaders tried to assert their authority with the sword, the Britishers acted with cunning diplomacy. The Britishers noted that this nation can be conquered, not merely by the military might, but by deHinduising the nation and they resorted to strategies of eroding the socio-cultural supremacy of the Hindu society in this land. They began attacking the culture and tradition of the Hindu society. They disputed and challenged the very existence of the age-old Hindu nation of this land.

Again, the language of ‘ancient’, ‘glorious’, and ‘great’ is used, this time immediately tying it to an idea that Hindu culture is a model for the world. Muslims are aggressive and violent;

British are cunning and manipulative. The idea that India is one nation, extending in a continuous, unbroken line back into antiquity, is present but a distinction is also made between ‘nation’ and ‘state’, which carries with it a critique of the British colonial policy of categorizing religious and ethnic communities into tidy labels:

They sought to confuse this nation by confusing the concepts of nation and state. In fact nation is a cultural concept, while state is a political concept….The results of this malicious conspiracy of the British have permeated into our national life as we witness today. (By including Hindus, Muslims, Parsis, and Christians all alike in the nation concept, they sowed seed of territorial nationalism.)

Gittinger 119

The Hindu nation as a mere community, the great Hindu nation which conquered the hearts of the world with its noble culture was equated with the Muslims and Christians who came here as invaders and aggressors and the Parsis and Jews who came here as refugees being driven away from their respective homelands. Consequently, any thing [sic] Hindu or of national origin is branded as communal and harrow and only things accepted by Muslims and others are considered as national. Thus the prestige and pride of Hindu was undermined in the very land of its origin.

There are several things going on here. First of all, the British have often been accused of

‘divide and rule’ tactics, from the famed tallow-grease incident that spurred the Sepoy Mutiny in 1857, to the manner in which religions, , and jātis were numbered, labeled, and sorted through extensive census projects late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The critiques take several approaches. First, that Christians, Muslims, Parsees, and Jews are all foreign to

India, but they differ in their arrival—Christians and Muslims entered through invasion,

Parsees and Jews came to seek refuge. Secondly, by creating categories, Hindus are forced by default as ‘communal’ when emphasizing their religion or heritage. Third, as discussed further on, there is also an issue with the Jains, Buddhists, and Sikhs separated out from

Hindus, which is seen as divisive (all three of those religions are often seen as part of the

‘Hindu dharma’ family). Last, the classification systems extended into sub-sects “in the name of Arya, Dravida, Brahmin, non-Brahmin, depressed class and caste Hindus etc., cutting at the very root of the oneness of the Hindu society.” In other words, the fundamental unity of

Hindu society was shattered in the project of highlighting diversity.

It is for this reason that the constant repetition of India as an ancient, cohesive, advanced, glorious, and unified civilization is found across every single Hindu nationalist iteration. The historical presentation of India and its people is one of the most fundamental and manipulative aspects of Hindu nationalist ideology. Furthermore, it is this presentation which is bolstered continually in the electronic public sphere (consciously managed or

Gittinger 120 replicated organically through the medium), and is the backdrop against which the academic debates discussed in my first chapter are asserting themselves. Anyone who has visited India or has personally interacted with Hindus can quickly deduce that the tradition is not monolithic; yet the nationalist rhetoric is persistent in its claim that there is an idealized Hindu identity and tradition which remains consistent, authentic. By establishing this particular version of history, several things are presumed as true: 1) Hinduism is universal by nature, 2)

Hinduism is superior and should be a spiritual beacon for the world, and 3) the Nehruvian vision of India—which was a ‘patchwork quilt’ of different, discrete cultures—highlights division rather than promoting secular unity. Furthermore, Hindus are the audience for this message—both in India and abroad. The reification of timelessness, invasion, spirituality, and tolerant worldview is to buttress the Hindu ego that was damaged under British rule, and to generate a sense of religio-national pride on the global stage. The idea of a historically consistent and uniform culture allows for a critique of any system that does not promote the absorption of ‘Other’ identities (such as Muslim) into the Hindu nation. Subsequently, the

Hindu rāṣṭra can be proposed as a solution, returning India to its classical past.

Further analysis of these discourses also reveals hidden relations of power. In

Foucault’s discussion of enunciative modalities he emphasizes the need to consider the institutional sites from which discourse is being made. Institutional sites (such as schools, hospitals, governmental divisions, and so forth) bear general frameworks and functions which shift or change over time. To understand the power asserted by an authority of an institution one must know the function of that institution in the context presented in the discourse.

Furthermore, if power is legitimized through institutional affiliation, over what (or whom) is it exercising power? In the case of Hindu nationalism, the British Empire was a necessary foil

Gittinger 121 against which claims of authority and authenticity were established. Once the colonial powers were removed, the institution of nationalism shifted and positioned itself in contrast to

Western scholarship, as well as to Muslims in general. And perhaps the least visible mode of power, right-wing Hindu nationalists have the goal to define Hinduism for all Hindus, despite nationalism’s masculine, upper-caste, and brahminic formulation. Such claims of unity across traditions conceal disparity of caste, religious sects, and gender.

In digital space, history can be presented and repeated until tempered into something new. The new Hindu history asserts itself against the long trajectory of colonial histories, the

‘pseudo-secular’ agenda of the Indian state, the flagrance of Pakistan’s existence, the Western contempt for Hindu culture, and the perceived intellectual and moral cowardice of the Indian academy (152). It is constantly rearticulated through the lens of the present, both reshaping and responding to contexts and events. The recapitulations circulate freely and rapidly across the Web, making it an ideal vehicle for maintaining narratives and connecting disperse groups across the world.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that Hindu nationalist websites (as vehicles of their party’s platforms) illustrate a conscious effort to present and manage a specific understanding of Hinduism. We can detect this discursive process through analytical and hermeneutical methods which identify the rhetorical tools used and how future interpretive horizons may be shaped. The website is a ‘text’ that informs the person reading the website through a multi-modality that shares features with traditions of orality. A repetition of themes and tropes engenders a sense of timelessness and continuity of history that allows for the rhetoric of authenticity to

Gittinger 122 flourish—as well as a monopolization of authority to speak to authenticity of tradition. As

Foucault argues, with regard to the notion of tradition,

it is intended to give a special temporal status to a group of phenomena that are both successive and identical (or as least similar); it makes it possible to rethink the dispersion of history in the form of the same; it allows a reduction of the difference proper to every beginning, in order to pursue without discontinuity the endless search for the origin; tradition enables us to isolate the new against a background of permanence, and to transfer its merit to originality, to genius, to the decisions proper to individuals (1972, 21).

The Indian political parties, both Congress-aligned and more right-wing organizations, are in many ways the promoters of Hindu authenticity. Couching rhetoric in historical narratives, issues of ‘Hindu pride’, and a call for India to assert itself on the global stage are all responses to colonial influences.16 When power transitioned from the British Raj to the Indian National

Congress, the stories and idea of India—as imagined, written about, and molded under colonial rule—needed to be reclaimed. Thus the backward gaze to the classical, Vedic, or even ancient India was necessitated in the search for this ‘authentic’ India which had been sanitized or erased under centuries of imperialism. The construction of what it means to be

Hindu has been central to Indian politics ever since, and has been reworked in response to both local and global political climates. As I noted earlier, the authorities that speak to Hindu authenticity are established by modes of power found in government, education, and high- caste literati, thereby deriving claims of legitimacy through positions established during the

Raj. Therefore to presume any true ‘authenticity’ or return to a pure Hinduism is to ignore the lens through which history is gazed.

16 This can be easily seen in the BJP 2014 election manifesto, which had the following recipe ‘to build a better India’: “The best foundation = Our own culture. The best tool = Our own hands. The best material = Our own aspirations” (http://www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/BJP4India/new-new-election-manifesto-07042014/2).

Gittinger 123

What makes it possible for the subject (the audience for which this rhetoric is intended) to be defined? The repeated narrative of certain aspects of India’s past—namely the subjugation by imperial powers, invasion (and often religious oppression) of Muslims, and psychological trauma of Partition are to remind the subject that they are, on one hand, a historically maligned people whose culture and identity have repeatedly come under attack.

This collection of suffering allows for the question “Who is a Hindu?” to be relevant. On the other hand, and in response to this question, narratives of a great noble history, timeless civilization, and cultural pride are presented in a salvific manner in which ‘Hindu-ness’ is the ultimate source of pride. This process of presenting a history of greatness-victimhood- greatness is a tale of the phoenix rising from the ashes, a backward look towards a great history that becomes a point around which modern identities are rallied. The use of computer- mediated communication is the ultimate tool for such discourses, as it relies on varying degrees of community: the imagined community of nationalism, the virtual community of diasporic and trans-national Hindus, and the historically contiguous community of Hindu civilization which is, as I have argued, illusory.

The next chapter will more fully engage the tensions between authority and authenticity in the discourses found outside of the Hindu nationalist websites, and how the debates that take place are referring back to the histories and ideologies that were discussed in this chapter.

Gittinger 124

Chapter Four

The Tensions of Authority and Authenticity

Freedom meant that as the shackles of imperial dominance were lifted, the newly freed people would not simply absorb foreign ideas, they would share their own as well. In India, something went wrong. The freedom from Britain was supposed to result in a two-way thinking that meant that non-Indian ideas would be accepted and that Indian ideas would be presented to the world. So long as the part of India giving to the world was suppressed, the freedom was only illusory and the aspirations of the freedom-hungry would continue to rise in temperature. “Hindutva: The great nationalist ideology,” philosophy section of the BJP website, 1998-present.

The previous chapter reviewed websites of Hindu nationalist organizations in order to demonstrate how particular ideologies and narratives are presented and re-presented across various sites and over a period of several years—most notably, narratives of India’s history.

To demonstrate how the rhetoric used in Hindu nationalism ripples into more dynamic and contemporary discourses around Hindu tradition, identity, and culture, this chapter has two components. The first half focuses on how Hinduism is contested as authentic or corrupted in other (non-nationalist) online representations. Such discursive productions and presentations of Hinduism, I argue, are actively engaged through Hindu nationalist claims of authenticity and authority. As suggested in the article cited above, there is a sentiment expressed that

British (read: “Western”) thinking dominates Indian discourse—and for that, the great ideas of India are suppressed, diminishing the ‘freedom’ that was so hard won. Hindu nationalist ideology has striven to correct that problem through their attentiveness to discourse and by promoting ideas of India and Hindu-ness. The second half of this chapter will look at the

“Internet Hindus,” a cyber activist community, as a case study to explore how the dominant

Gittinger 125 tropes found in nationalist rhetoric find their way into popular discourses, and as an example of a current effort to ‘manage’ how Hinduism is represented in the electronic public sphere.

Authority of the ‘insider’

One of the central concerns of this section is the question of authority: Who is speaking for

Hinduism? How is their voice legitimized as an authentic voice? One of the most persistent challenges in religious studies is the tension between insider/outsider knowledge, and ideas of objectivity, subjectivity, authority, and authenticity. The Internet complicates this further, as the identity of the author (or source) is often hard to determine. Thus, issues of positionality, power, knowledge construction, and representation are all present in these discussions.

The manner in which Hinduism was encountered and understood in the colonial period had a strong impact on its presentation to audiences outside of India. As I discussed in my section on print media, the colonial period did much to ossify ideas like the golden age of the Vedas, caste as scripturally legitimated, and Hinduism as a religion in the same sense

Christianity is a religion. Orientalist inventions became largely accepted by educated Indians and were eventually reworked to serve nationalism. (see Heehs 2003; van der Veer 1994). In the case of India, there is justifiable concern over the control of discourse. For decades during the British colonial period, the presentation of Hinduism to the European reader lay exclusively with Orientalist scholars who tended to present Hindus as a ‘barbaric’ or

‘backward’ civilization, Hinduism as a ‘heathen’ religion, and Indians in general as effeminate and ignorant. The most notorious of these were William Jones (1746–1794),

Thomas Macaulay (1800-1859), Max Weber (1864-1920), and James Mill (1773-1836), all of whom contributed to the colonial project, ranging from expositions about caste to legitimation

Gittinger 126 of colonial rule over a native population that was deemed racially and civilizationally inferior

(Said, 14).

Orientalism was not exclusively a product of ‘occidental’ scholars. Ethnologist J.

Jouhki argues that, in addition to the relationship between Orientalism and colonialism, Indian

Brahminical authority and Indo-Orientalism supported each other in creating the discourse of

Hindu authenticity:

Brahmanism-informed Orientalist discipline created an unchanged written canon to replace various oral traditions in Hinduism. Also scriptures like became canonized by Orientalism, and spiritual leaders Gandhi made the text a fundamental scripture of Modern Hinduism. Orientalism helped created the concept of ‘decline of Hindu society’ by emphasizing the Aryan (Western) and Vedic past that was almost destroyed by foreign Muslim invasion (2006, 8-9).

This enabled Hindu nationalist movements to construct the cornerstone of their ideology: the glorious Hindu past, rich with ancient philosophy. It also allowed for the construction of the defensive narrative which recounts the numerous invasions India has endured, and establish the true foreignness of the Muslim. In this way, Orientalist discourse has aided the essentialization of Hindu ideology (Jouhki, 9).

The residue of Orientalism and colonialism has left a bitterness among Hindu nationalists, who seek ever to correct the histories and presentations of the past. I refer again to the Wendy Doniger controversy. Below are parts of a filed document which outlines the legal demands of Mr. Batra, the man who campaigned to have her book banned.1 The document is long and extensive, and there are plenty of points to discuss throughout its list of grievances. However, I will present a few points most relevant to the current discussion:

1 The legal notice sent by Dina Nath Batra to Wendy Doniger, Penguin Group (USA) Inc. and Penguin Books India Pvt. Ltd Case Ref No.254/LN/0310. Dated: 03.3.2010. Accessed May 2014: http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?289468.

Gittinger 127

LEGAL/DEMAND NOTICE Under instructions from, for and on behalf of my client Sh. Dina Nath Batra, Convener of Bacho Andolan office at Lajpat Nagar, , aged 58 years, I serve upon you this legal notice for the following reasons and purposes: 1. That my client is an educationist and is associated with many religious, educational and social institutions and organizations and institutions. 4. That my client has read the book authored by you namely the Hindus: An Alternative History. That after reading the book my client found it to be a shallow, distorted and non serious presentation of Hinduism. That it is a haphazard presentation riddled with heresies and factual inaccuracies. 5. That after reading the said book my client is of the opinion my client states that the aforesaid book is written with a Christian Missionary Zeal and hidden agenda to denigrate Hindus and show their religion in poor light.

The argument is quite simple: the accuser (Batra) is ‘an educationist’ and ‘associated with many religious and educational institutions’, thereby legitimizing his grievance as one who is not only an insider, but a presumed authority on the subject (point 1). As a result, the book greatly offended him because it is “distorted” and a “haphazard presentation” filled with inaccuracies (point 4). The reason for these distortions—according to Batra’s logic as presented in the document—is because Doniger is coming from an outsider perspective and applying “a Christian Missionary Zeal” to the subject which denigrates Hindus as a result

(point 5).

The direct assault on a publication which is perceived as offensive provides insight into the tensions around defining ‘Hindu’ and ‘Hinduism’. While this is a simple analysis of one document, the controversy generated and news outlets that featured this story across India

(as well as in the academy) demonstrated how the discourse of authenticity is central to how

Hinduism is discussed in the public sphere. The fact that this issue was taken up rapidly by

Hindutva-wallas only further illustrates that this is a dynamic and unfiltered battle which can be witnessed online.

Gittinger 128

On March 1, 2014, the India Times ran the article “Another book on Hinduism by

Wendy Doniger under attack” which related the controversy for its readers.2 In the comments section following the story, the readers voiced their opinions, often using profanity or calling

Professor Doniger names. There were a few voices of reason and tolerance among the responses (Rajeev, New York: “Hindus are supposed to be tolerant. I cannot believe the nasty vitriol in these comments. Someone is even offering a bounty for murder of the author. What has become of India?!? Shame!!!”), but the majority were defensive, critical, or even hostile.

A question arises as to whether such comments foster or hinder a productive discussion, and to what extent they may influence the reader’s perspective. The psychology of online comments has been studied and most notably presented by University of Wisconsin researchers in the Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication in 2013.3 The team argued that even a fractious minority of uncivil comments can influence or skew the reader’s perception of an article or story, which can hinder democratic discourse (also discussed by

Papacharissi 2004). When the Los Angeles Times announced in 2011 that they were shutting down their commenting forums, the online editor posed the question: “Will this move be a

‘troll-killer’ or will it make our blogs seem hollow?” (Santana 2014). The question as to whether print media needs to be a two-way dialogue rather than a one-way dissemination of information or opinion in order to be valid is something that has arisen with the Web and its features of forums, social media, bulletin boards, and so forth.

2 http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Another-book-on-Hinduism-by-Wendy-Doniger-under- attack/articleshow/31230610.cms. Accessed December 2014. 3 See Anderson, A. A., et. al. “The ‘Nasty Effect:’ Online Incivility and Risk Perceptions of Emerging Technologies.” Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication (2014) 19: 373–387.

Gittinger 129

Arthur Santana’s study (2014) in which he hypothesizes that anonymity increases uncivility indicates that anonymous commenters were “significantly more likely to register their opinion with an uncivil comment than non-anonymous commenters.” 4 Using the characteristics of ‘civil’ and ‘uncivil’ employed in his study,5 I applied a similar analysis to the Times of India story on Doniger’s book. Looking at all 151 comments (as of December

2014), I categorized them accordingly: 63 comments were “civil”, 48 comments were

“uncivil”, and 40 were “neither/nor” (there was a great deal of random quoting of the Gita, ranting about the greatness of Bharat, or unrelated topics). It is not surprising to me, as someone who has studied the rhetoric around Hindu nationalism for a decade, that the many of the comments were indeed civil (although perhaps defensive) and attempted to present a reasoned argument:6

HK Gowda

how can aforeigner understand the hindu/ indian culture just looking some books, Hinduism is not like traditional religions that is christianity and islam. christianity and islam religions are with one holy propet, holy book and one set of rules to life. it will be very easy to understand and analyse them, but Hinduism never claims superiority of any propet and there is no such propet to claim his supiriority. In Hinduism Carecter [character] matters, with good carecter and kind behaviour any human being can attain status of guru or god. there are thousands of books along with vedas and , it is not so easy to read all this books to analyse or write some thing on Hinduism. many Hindus dont know the names of these books, but these seculars and writers even not knowing 1% on hindu samskruti writing dirty claiming they are capable. Europians understanding of Hinduism is according to their understanding of christianity

4 A Pew study indicates that 25% of Internet users have posted comments under anonymous identities,4 and other studies (Hlavach and Freivogel 2011; Santana 2013) concur that anonymity encourages incivility. 5 A ‘civil’ comment (as per Santana’s study) is defined as: rational, well reasoned, and free of insults. It also has to be respectful, courteous, considerate, and tolerant (2014, 25). Uncivil was the inverse. A third category of “neither/nor” was used for comments that were not particularly civil or uncivil—coarse language, off topic or random, emotive comments like “LOL”, or an indeterminate tone of the comment would fall into this category. 6 Comments are presented with grammatical and typographical errors as originally posted.

Gittinger 130

Akarsh

I think it is because Hindus are tolerant that ppl start writing whatever comes to their mind. 1st Macaulay destroyed our ancient scriptures and tried to manipulate them because we were silent. Now, in the guise of freedom of speech, these new breed authors have started doing that. Doniger should stop misunderstanding our Hindu tolerance for cowardliness. If we allow for such books to be released, it wouldn't be a surprise that our future generations read such useless duplicates and forget the original Vedas, Upanishads and Darshanas.

Manikant Shah

Instead of attacking people and books and things, why do we not present a stronger counter argument that earns respect all around. Perhaps the way we have evolved under our institutions, we do not have the skills and excellence to do so. The way our lives have been guided, we are bound to be seen as degenerates. No amount of protests in whatever form will cause truth to be accepted. Its only thru excellence as a Nation, with all cultures and religions, we can beat the rest. But do we care about excellence

The most common criticism by far (expressed in 42 of the comments), however, was that

Professor Doniger is an outsider (“How can an American Jewess be an authority on

Hinduism?”) or that the book reflected a pervasive mischaracterization of Hinduism in

Western scholarship.

The tension between insider/outsider is a contentious subject that is widely discussed in religious studies. Some scholars have come to view it as a ‘pseudo problem’ that is not useful in academic thinking (Jensen 2011) or, as Russell McCutcheon notes: “The insider/outsider problem is therefore a stop-gap technique, a debate inserted into a potentially troublesome empty space that might serve as a bridge between what are, possibly, utterly irreconcilable choices, identities or desires” (2003, 339). Yet it is clearly an issue in the public sphere of electronic media (think of FoxNews anchor Lauren Green’s now notorious

Gittinger 131 interview with Reza Aslan in 2013, when she asked: “You’re a Muslim, so why did you write a book about the founder of Christianity?”). Assumptions are made that an outsider is more likely to skew, distort, or outright malign a religion than one who grew up in the tradition themselves. Authenticity is often derived from authority; conversely, the authoritative voice is the voice which can authentically identify with the culture for which it speaks.

Insider/outsider, therefore, is one of the primary ways in which Hindu nationalists establish their right to speak on Hinduism’s behalf, and challenge or censor opposing views.

Being an insider, however, does not necessarily guarantee your opinions will be amenable to your ‘native’ audience. A popular Hindu portal whose theme is “What is

Authentic Hinduism?”7 presents information from Swami Prakashanand ’s book The

True History and Religion of India (2001) which “reveals the true theme of our scriptures” and describes the history and religion of India over “its 155.521972 trillion years along with a review of the growth and the development of western civilizations.” It is praised for its extensive and thorough discourse (it is a voluminous book of over 800 pages), supposedly correcting hundreds of years of misinformation:

In the last 200 years such despisations [sic] were much greater when the English regime, with the aid of the British diplomats and the Orientalists of the 18th, 19th and the early 20th centuries, tried to destroy the culture and the religion of India by deliberately producing inaccurate literatures comprising of fictitious theories and disparaging dogmas that resulted into an unauthentic and demeaning view of Hinduism. Such literatures continue to confuse and misguide the world about the authentic teachings of Hinduism. Its effects have gone so deep into the educational systems of India that it has prompted even

7 Further information about their motives is elucidated on the site: “Although Hindu presence and influence is visible everywhere, misconceptions about India in general and about Hinduism and Hindus in particular prevail among the general public as well as in academic settings. Hindu Educational Foundation, an educational project by concerned Indians and Hindus in the USA, strives to replace these various misconceptions with correct representation of Indian and Hinduism. Such a true representation becomes necessary in a changing world that continues to be plagued by religious misunderstanding, intolerance, hate, and violence” (http://www.hindueducation.org/about-us.html).

Gittinger 132

Hindu scholars and writers to publish writings along the same lines over the last two centuries. As a result, most of the existing literatures on Hinduism, especially those appearing in the English language, do not represent the correct view of total authentic Hinduism.8

The argument that even insiders (Hindus) could incorrectly represent their own tradition reveals a tension between ‘competing insiders’, and will be especially visible in the forthcoming discussion of the ‘Internet Hindus’ later in the chapter.

Authority, in this instance, seems to be a question of positionality, that is, where one stands in relation to the ‘Other’. If the insider is presumed to have the authority to speak, then we might ask: ‘inside what?’ For the authority of Hindu tradition, here the voice must not only speak from inside the culture, but more importantly from inside the religion. Indian scholars who are ‘culturally Hindu’ but identify as belonging to Muslim or Christian religions are challenged.

There are multiple ways to establish authority and/or authenticity online, some of which have been noted already: the website belongs to a recognized institution or organization, the site is ‘official looking’ and uncluttered, or if symbols and images are used which immediately appeal to the reader, informing their ‘fore-grounding’ as they encounter the website for the first time. Another way in which authority and authenticity are established, in a way that is quite particular to digital media, is through repetition.

Authority/Authenticity through replication and repetition

8 http://www.thevedicfoundation.org/authentic_hinduism/what_is_authentic_hinduism.htm. Accessed September 2014. Emphasis mine.

Gittinger 133

A saying that is often attributed to Joseph Goebbels states that if you repeat a lie enough times, then people will believe it.9 In the context of online information, repetition of information often appears to be self-replicating.10 This concept is not foreign to the Web, which hosts phenomena such as the ‘viral video’ or the ‘meme’—both of which are spread through repeated hyperlinking by the user population. Furthermore, because of the way search engine algorithms work, the more popular a link is, the more likely it will be highlighted in news feeds, searches, and social media. Thus, a meme or viral topic is only furthered by its own popularity, which dominates its networks until replaced by a new meme or viral trend.

However, its replication is not independent from context; that is to say, the utterance—even when reproduced exactly like the original—is subject to context and politics of the presentation. Who, how, why, and where are the context and politics, and this may be difficult to discern online.

Again, as Bayart noted (1996, 83), authenticity is not synonymous with historical truth, but rather it is culturally constructed both by its promoters and by the audience. This

‘truth through repetition’ can occur in two ways. First, it can be a very conscious construction of a particular narrative which is repeated over and over and across numerous sources

(websites) in order to establish a sense of continuity and authenticity in its telling. This is very

9 Samuel Weber also makes an excellent point about the process of repetition, not only observing that repetition creates prominence, but that it also marks a blockage. He draws from Deleuze’s Différence e Repetition (Difference and Repetition) to distinguish between artificial blockage which is purely a logical difference between the moment of self-identity and its generality, and natural blockage which develops from a certain positioning of way of situation the concept. “What distinguishes the ‘natural’ from the ‘artificial’ blockage of the concept, then, is the degeneration of the generality of the concept into an irreducible proliferation of atoms, or better, words” (Weber 2001, 44). In behavioral psychology, this kind of cognitive bias is called ‘availability cascade’ and is defined as a self-reinforcing process in which a collective belief gains truth-value through repetition in public discourse (see Kuran and Sunstein 1999). 10 The concept of self-replication draws most commonly from biology, in which a system yields an identical construction of itself, as in the case of cell division or a virus. On a technological level, computer viruses exhibit this exact behavior, reproducing using the existing hardware and software of the host computer.

Gittinger 134 much the case of how history is presented across Hindu nationalist websites, as illustrated in the previous chapter. The second way is perhaps more ‘accidental’, a byproduct of a medium that thrives on lack of context and anonymity of sources. In such instances, the construction of culture derives from historical narrative and presentation, but also from perception and interpretation. When perception and interpretation are uninformed, it produces the potential for crises of authenticity and authority to manifest.

This can be illustrated with an example: A few years ago The Atlantic (A. Taylor

2012) ran a story on the Hindu festival of (Dīpāvali or Divāli), with a slide show of artful photographs taken of some of the traditional ritual performance and practices. One picture showed a man at a temple altar, with an iPad and laptop set among the other items and offerings. The caption read as follows:

An Indian trader worships an iPad and other electronic gadgets including laptops and mobile phones in New Delhi at the start of Diwali, November 13, 2012. The worshiping of account books has historically been an essential part of Diwali for the business community in India, to promote the prosperity of their trades. Signifying the modernization of the retail trade in India, some traders are now including the worship of electronic gadgets (caption 15).

Another picture showed a similar scene with followers’ hands folded in prayer:

Indian members of a local trading organization celebrate Diwali by chanting as they worship electronic gadgets including iPads, laptops and mobile phones on Diwali, in New Delhi, on November 13, 2012 (caption 16)

The first issue with these pictures and their descriptions is that they misrepresent what is actually occurring. Diwali is known as the ‘festival of lights’ and is one of the most important holidays of the . It also marks the beginning of the financial year for most

Indian businesses, and for that reason ledgers and account books were traditionally brought to the temple for blessing or consecration. Appealing to the goddess Lakṣmi, who is associated with wealth, such would hopefully bring good fortune and commerce to the

Gittinger 135 tradesman. As most bookkeeping is now done electronically, computers have replaced the hand written ledgers, and hence those items—laptops and tablets—are similarly brought to the temple for blessing, not worship.

We can foresee the effects of misinterpretation at work here. The problem with incorrect captions such as those cited above—which state that “they worship electronic gadgets” ––is that it is both conspicuously wrong and furthers the belief that Hindus engage in

‘idol-worship’. The slideshow was hyperlinked and being discussed on a blog titled

“Technology worship: signs of the times” where the author states:

I found the above cringe-inducing images here [link provided]. I find it fascinating, that modern-day Hindus in India have added worship of electronic gadgets to all the other things, gods, people, and creatures they worship.11

This is just one community’s blog, but it illustrates the ease by which these distortions emerge. Widely circulated and popular links or posts create their own bodies of discourse, which then have the potential to subsume smaller voices.12

Authority, or the presumption of authority, is demonstrably visible in this process of media consumption. The mistaken perception that Hindus were worshipping an iPad exhibits both ignorance about a particular ritual (not understanding what was actually happening), and misrepresentation of Hinduism more broadly (that Hindus are ‘idol worshippers’). There are three ‘crises of authority’ in this example: 1) The Atlantic is a respectable national magazine,

11 From the blog site “Patriactionary”, a portmanteau of ‘patriarchal’’ and ‘reactionary’. Described on the site as “Christian men who reject modernity, feminism, and churchian weak-sauce.” Posted by Will S., November 15, 2012. 12 I also found the Atlantic pictures and captions linked on Pinterest and on Facebook. The Washington Post ran a similar slide show at the same time, also saying the devotees were worshiping electronic gadgets, but partially qualifying that the gadgets were instruments of modern business. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/diwali- the-hindu-festival-of-lights/2012/11/12/f661a456-2cd3-11e2-a99d-5c4203af7b7a_gallery.html. Accessed December 2014.

Gittinger 136 and thus operates as a mode of authority,13 2) cross linking to other sites contributes to repetition and the illusion of a multiple-sourced authority, and 3) with a minimum of description on the primary source, and the subjective commentary of the secondary source, the context is entirely absent.

‘Authentic’ Hinduism

To further this discussion of authenticity in Hinduism, I present some responses from a body of data I collected during a parallel research project (the details can be found in the

Appendix). In a survey I posed to 80 Hindu students from American universities (in New

York, Wisconsin, California, and Texas) I asked some general questions about how they use the Internet and how they might negotiate their Hindu identities online. Some of that data is presented in this chapter. In addition to American students I surveyed, I also surveyed a small number of Indian students from University of Delhi and Banaras Hindu University. Questions of authenticity and globalization were among the queries posed to the Indian university students: 17 out of 20 thought that true authenticity of tradition lay exclusively with the classical/textual/Vedic texts, while the other three students held the more holistic view that included non-textual, devotional, and even Western-influenced variations of Hinduism. I also found that a little more than half of the Indian students thought one could encounter an

13 Answers.yahoo.com, Ask.com, and Quora are three forums which are notoriously culpable in spreading misinformation about nearly every subject that can be discussed. They each function as an open forum to ask questions, which could be an innocuous as “Can I drink the water if I’m staying on a resort in Mexico?” to a more inflammatory “Why do Muslims hate women?” The nature of these forums allows anyone to answer, and then answers are often ‘voted’ upon so that the ‘best’ answer rises to the top of the page. Perhaps more insidious than doing a search on Google, these answers are truly limited by the knowledge base of the respondents. However, they are not operating from a default position of authority (as The Atlantic does); yet, on forums asking about aspects of Hindu tradition, the top voted response is usually written by a person with an Indian name. This presumption of ‘insider authority’ is also present across blogs and articles—whether the person is well-informed or narrowly biased.

Gittinger 137

‘authentic’ Hinduism online, while the rest either felt that religion had to be engaged in real space rather than found online or that the Internet was just too Americanized to find authentic

Hindu culture at all.

Finding this to be perhaps the more provocative question than what I had initially proposed to the American students, I subsequently posed the question of authenticity in a follow-up survey to seventeen American Hindu students who had voluntarily provided their emails. One young woman, whom I will call S, expressed the following:

There is no authentic or fake Hinduism. It is what it is. You can take and follow the part you want out of it but the religion doesn’t change, it changes you with all the little things you take from it. Similarly parts of it are scattered all over the Internet, depends on who’s writing the story. It is based on faith in faith (if you know what I mean). There is no universal truth, even if you read the Bhagwat Gita or Ramayana or Shivpuran it depends on how you interpret those stories. And that’s the beautiful part of Hinduism and nothing on the web can change it….As it is the case with everything on the Web, you don’t really know what is genuine and what is not.

S is first generation, that is, born in India but later moved to the US with her parents. A student at a Midwestern University, she demonstrates a very open view of what may be considered ‘authentic’ Hinduism. Furthermore, as she also wrote, she felt that Hinduism was particularly suited to the Internet because of the sheer diversity in practices available to adherents.

The other respondents who emailed me held similar views, one even speculating that a new version of Hinduism was forming. One young man on a student visa in New York, whom

I will call A, says:

As I understand it, by its very nature Hinduism is fluid and ever-changing. It embraces other cultures and adapts itself to new circumstances and people….The spread and evolution of Hindu ideas itself is good, as long as it is beneficial to more people and spreads individual and collective peace and harmony.

Gittinger 138

Student A also made an apt metaphor of likening Hinduism to ‘open source software’; the appropriation of technological language for the religious tradition’s flexibility was something

I found interesting. He does say, on the topic of ‘authentic Hinduism’, that it may be harder to find on the Web and only then with some informed searching.

One final insight comes from student P, also first generation, who posits that a global

Hindu culture is forming outside of India. What he refers to as “pop-Hinduism” challenges ideas of authenticity:

But this form of Hinduism is mostly apparent in places where there are significant proportions of South Asians in the English speaking nations of the US, , and UK. I cannot think of it as a bad idea as long as South Asians are contributing to how it is portrayed in the media. If you only encountered Hinduism on the Web, it would be a different Hinduism than experiencing it face to face in India. But that doesn’t mean it’s not “real” Hinduism. Hinduism is very individualized, and it seems like the Web promotes that sort of expression.

Thus the idea of ‘authentic’ seemed to imply a limiting or narrow factor which, for these students, conflicted with their understanding of Hinduism as something more diverse and holistic. In asking if they thought a ‘global Hinduism’ was forming, they all responded that they already thought of Hinduism as global. Globalization conceived as a vehicle for culture- sharing and exchange is, in their opinions, one of the positive features.

If we argue that religion has engaged technological advances in communications for centuries, and that such advances have also contributed to the process of globalization historically, then we can deduce that questions of authenticity and authority have also been present through the ages. Whether removing textual authority from the clergy through dissemination of printed materials, or the ease with which to spread ideas on the Web,

Dawson’s “crises” have loomed large across history and might be better argued not as new

Gittinger 139 social consequences which have arrived with the Internet, but consequences which are historically consistent in religion and globalization—only now more urgent.

The questions I would pose at this juncture are as follows: Who is the intended audience for this ‘authentic’ version of Hinduism? Why is it important that such a version dominate the Web? What authorities are claiming to have insight into such authenticity?

Concerns of authenticity evidently prompt overt declarations that such clarifications are necessary. There is, in fact, a website titled “Encyclopedia of Authentic Hinduism”

(http://www.encyclopediaofauthentichinduism.org/) which is based upon the 800 page volume I mentioned earlier. It boasts between 5,000 and 10,000 visits per month,14 with a reported 51.74% accessing the website from the US, and 22.16% from India. The site has a number of sections designed to ‘correctly’ inform the web user on the subject of Hinduism.

Under the heading “Why this is the most important site on Hinduism,” we find a claim that the site provides “an accurate and authentic view of Hinduism.”

There is a long explanation of the site presented for the viewer, discussing its value, and why it is important. It starts with the claim that “The most amazing feature of this site is that it gives the total history of Hindu civilization for millions of years.” This introductory sentence not only lauds itself for the ‘amazing’ accomplishment of presenting a ‘total history’ of Hindu civilization, it reminds the reader that it is both timeless and ancient in the claimed time frame of ‘millions of years’. The ideas of ancient and timelessness of Hindu civilization,

14 As reported over the past six months (May-October 2014) by Similar Web, an information technology company founded in the UK, which provides services in Web analytics and data collation for international businesses. It uses Big Data technologies to collect, measure, analyze and provide user engagement statistics for websites worldwide. http://www.similarweb.com/website/encyclopediaofauthentichinduism.org. Accessed November 2014. Alexa, a competing data collection company also used in my research, has little data on this particular site, other than 23.1% visitors are accessing from the US.

Gittinger 140 and a continuity of tradition throughout history, are by far the most dominant tropes found across Hindu nationalist ideology.

The claim of authority quickly follows: “These web pages contain the Divine knowledge revealed by a most renowned Spiritual Master of India, His Divinity Swami

Prakashanand Saraswati, the author of ‘The True History and the Religion of India’.”

Therefore he is not only a Swami, but ‘His Divinity’, ‘Spiritual Master of India’, and author.

Swami Saraswati is of the Vaishnavite sect, drawing lineage from

(1486–1534). It is important that this point is conveyed, establishing him as both spiritual leader and academic. Vaishanvism is one of the largest sects of Hinduism, and worships

Vishnu (and his 10 avatars) as a form of henotheistic-monotheism. Vaishanvism has some differences with other sects of Hinduism (such as or Smartism) in that it frequently stresses the literal interpretation of the scriptures over philosophical interpretation. It is fair to say that while Swami Saraswati is an esteemed figure in India and Vaishnava sects, his singular definition of ‘authentic’ Hinduism is not going to line up with many of the other variations practiced in India and around the world today.15

A secondary exhibit of authority is the Swami’s very widely published and read book, titled The True History and Religion of India, “a one-volume condensed writing of the authentic truth of Hinduism” that “reveals all the aspects of Hinduism in a precisely concentrated manner and thus it should be regarded and studied as a textbook whose every sentence has its value.” It claims to detail “the complete history, philosophy and the knowledge of Bharatiya religion in a concise encyclopedic style for the first time in hundreds

15 Does authority have to be untarnished? Revered as a sant in Bengal, Swami Saraswati was accused and convicted of twenty counts of molestation in his US in 2011, escaping to India before his sentencing.

Gittinger 141 of years.” Despite its size (a length of over 800 pages), it is claimed that the volume is

“precisely concentrated” in such a way that “every sentence has its value,” and as such, should be the standard book for education of Hindu traditions. The phrase ‘Bharatiya religion’ both invokes the Sanskrit word for Indian and dodges the problematic term ‘Hinduism’ as an allegedly colonial construction. The claim that it is the first comprehensive history book on the subject in hundreds of years not only reiterates the vast time period over which Hinduism stretches, but also dismisses all the other volumes and scholarship on the as non-existent.

The exposition goes further to explain that there is “a dilemma that most of the existing books on Hinduism, especially those appearing in the English language, even if written by Indian scholars, bear the bias of western influence, and to date none of them represent the correct view of total authentic Hinduism.” In this statement, the following things are suggested: a) a book in the English language is less likely to have correct information, b) an Indian scholar will always give more weight of authority than a non-Indian scholar, c)

“Western” influence (education, so forth) inevitably produces biases, and thus corrupts authenticity, and d) scholarship today does not present ‘correct’ or ‘total’ information. That is to say, it is either non-comprehensive and does not prioritize the same details as the Swami’s volume does, or it offers biases/criticism/alternate histories and philosophies which he does not feel are correct. These points, in total, are taken as a great ‘dilemma’ in understanding a true version of Hinduism and which this website seeks to solve. It is insinuated further on that the majority of information found in academic sources—which would be understood to be the most authoritative and reliable sources (he does not mention popular magazines, television, or the Internet)—are wrong. Again, the fact that they are English sources suggests that they are

Gittinger 142 either irretrievably biased, or that someone has made a mistake in the translation and/or interpretation of primary texts.

Again, an invocation of ‘hundreds of years’ in which Hinduism has endured this trial of distortion and misrepresentation is claimed to be the result of misinformation; that is, a replication over and over through educational systems which draw upon incorrect information to construct new presentations of incorrect information. “You should know that since hundreds of years such misleading and derogatory texts about Hinduism are continuously being taught in the schools and colleges of the world. Indologists, orientalists, historians, professors of Asian studies and even some respected writers form Hindu institutions and religious organizations, study those derogatory and misleading books and form their opinion about Hinduism accordingly.” This is an interesting point in general, and one of the main points I am arguing in this section: that discourse is self-replicating, especially on a medium like the Internet.

Thus, the presence of inauthentic and non-authoritative expositions on Hinduism necessitates the production of his volume (and, therefore, the website):

Considering the seriousness of this situation there was an imperative need to break this veil of long- lived ignorance and reveal the authentic history and the teachings of Bhartiya civilization, which His Divinity Swami Prakashanand Saraswati has Graciously fulfilled. “The True History and the Religion of India” has been written with highest standards of logical investigation, displaying a high degree of scholarly competence in Indian and Western history, religion, philosophy and scientific theories. It is an invaluable asset to everyone desiring to learn about Hinduism and is the guideline to students, research scholars, open-minded historians and teachers as well. It is a Divine gift that can benefit the entire humanity.16

16 http://www.encyclopediaofauthentichinduism.org/why_this_is_the_most_important_site_on_hinduism.htm, paragraph 10. Accessed July 2014.

Gittinger 143

The answer to the dilemma of this “veil of long-lived ignorance,” and the process which has gone on for “hundreds of years,” are the ‘authentic’ teachings which the Swami has

“graciously” provided. The claim that it was written with “logical investigation” and a “high degree of scholarly competence” is designed to establish the Swami not merely as an insider who practices Hinduism every day, but as an objective author who, through a combination of

Hindu-guru and intellectual-scholar, has provided the ultimate and final word on what is

‘authentic’ Hinduism. His competence is noted to also cover ‘Western history’, ‘philosophy’, and ‘scientific theories’ which lends credibility to his authority as an intellectual-scholar, but he also notes that this gift is ‘Divine’ and thus, its production is a religious act.

By reading through and unpacking the claims made on such a website that actually poses as a bastion of authenticity, we can see that authenticity and authority are clearly at stake, and that there is an active effort to maintain or control the discourse in order to prevent further corruption, distortion, or misinformation. That an Encyclopedia of Authentic Hinduism website exists at all suggests that there is some idea of an ‘authentic’ Hinduism that people like Swami Saraswati feel needs to be reiterated and proven. The excerpts I have addressed reveal that authenticity and authority are being contested, and the Web is being used here as a viable sphere of discourse in which to assert these claims.

Online/Offline influences: “Western Universalism” and Hindu Nationalism

I have highlighted some of the methods and questions applied to how I will be looking at the discursive construction of Hinduism online: Who or what is claiming authenticity in defining

‘Hindu’, and how is their authority being legitimated? With regards to Hinduism online, I argue that the popular understanding of Hinduism, as it is encountered online, is shaped by

Gittinger 144 two forces in particular. The first is what I am calling “Western universalism,” a phrase that is used frequently, if problematically, in reference to a particular way Hinduism is shaped by

European and American discourses. To explore this idea, I examine Hinduism’s initial conscious presentation to the West by Swami Vivekananda, and how the idea of sanātana dharma became a central element of Hinduism on the global stage. The second force that is actively presenting and managing Hinduism online is, as I have already indicated, the strong presence of Hindu nationalism. Both of these influences assume a position of authority in the process of defining Hinduism on the Web as well as in the diaspora. These sources exhibit the crisis of authenticity/authority, and questions may be raised as to whether such representations of religion—whether positive or negative—foster global ecumenism or further disparity between religions or even within individual religious traditions themselves.

“Western universalism”

Western universalism is a controversial term, not only for the perilous assumptions the phrase makes in its very pairing of the two words, but also by those who are proponents of it. I am aware of its baggage, but nonetheless it remains a fruitful category (if understood as loaded) for this particular analysis. Two men in particular have expounded on ‘Western universalism’ in their scholarship: The first is Samuel Huntington, who is (in)famously noted for his essay

“The Clash of Civilizations.” Huntington’s theory, which made a revival post-9/11, argued that the primary source of conflict post-Cold War Era would arise out of cultural and religious identities. To further illustrate this point, he divide the world into several different identifiable

‘civilizations’ (‘Western’, ‘Orthodox’, ‘African’, and so forth) who were naturally inclined to clash over their cultural and religious differences. The manner in which he delineated his

Gittinger 145 various civilizations smacked of Orientalism, ethnocentrism, and a very ‘West versus the

Rest’ worldview. It has been critiqued repeatedly and generally stands as a model of how not to discuss culture and religion.

His exposition, however, relied upon the idea of a universalized cultural ‘normality’ which created tensions. The primary source of the Western-Islamic clash he attributed to

“Western universalism,” that is, the imposition of ‘Western’ values on Muslim societies which fanned the flames of fanaticism and religious radicalism. It is unclear whether he thought such universalism was a positive or negative idea.17

Drawing from this conceptualization, the other author who has raised the issue of

Western universalism in an Indian context is . Like Huntington, Malhotra sees the world in civilizations, arguing that each has their own ideas of truth, history, religion, and so forth—no single one having the claim to be the best one. The West, he argues, having colonized so much of the world and exerting so much power and influence on others, now sees their culture and language (English) as being universal. This, he explains, is only furthered by institutional mechanisms controlled by the West in education and media until the

‘Others’ don’t even realize it. “Just like a fish might not recognize water because it’s so immersed in it, we are so immersed in Western universalism—including Indians—that we might not even understand that such a thing exists.”18

Though the term itself may be loaded, the idea behind it is clear: he is talking about cultural imperialism, and in this regard a particularly deep imperialism in which the paradigm

17 Karen Armstrong, in her book Fields of Blood (2014), has raised similar arguments that secularism (and a very European idea of secularism at that) is what provokes religious radicalism and violence, not some inherent quality of any religion itself. In such arguments, it is the imposition of a ‘Western’ liberal ideology that instigates conflict. 18 University of Massachusetts television interview (March 2014). Accessed October 2014: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nHvwbrcaRxU

Gittinger 146 is altered in such a way that one doesn’t even notice that such imperialism is operating. This universalism, which could be glossed as a cultural imperialism (again, I argue that online this is a byproduct of the Web to some extent), is a contributing factor in shaping the discourse of how we define Hinduism. Therefore, it is perhaps less problematic to simply use the term

‘universalism’, although I have already argued that there is a presumption of ‘normality’ that draws from a very Americanized structure of the Web. As I am examining material from the

English-speaking electronic public sphere, I think “Western universalism” points to a specifically American/European influence that draws from Orientalism and colonialism.

How is Hinduism constructed online, as something universal, with respect to our earlier discussions of globalization? The attempt to universalize—through the means of simplification or reduction—produces abridged versions found widely across Western media and scholarship, which tend to represent a complex culture on a global stage. Globalization simplifies, making it more difficult to be aware of such complexities. With special regard to

Hinduism, I suggest that this is not merely an organic process (such that self-replicating discourse could be categorized), but also deliberately crafted and constructed—especially in the cases of “Western” universalism and Hindu nationalism. Furthermore, many discourses are still influenced by romantic Orientalism, liberal-democratic definitions, colonialism, and the problematic constructions of ‘religion’ which I discussed in the first chapter. In treating

‘religion’ as a universal category into which ‘Hinduism’ could be molded, the term ultimately fails to address the diversity and richness of tradition, instead achieving a perceived unity under a Western rubric.

I briefly noted in the first chapter that Vivekananda was in many ways the first ambassador of Hinduism to the West. In 1893 he spoke to the Parliament of the World’s

Gittinger 147

Religions in Chicago and delivered a brief, but famous speech. I will revisit his influence again here, as his message promoted a message of universalism that was influential in the formation of neo-Vedanta groups in the US as well as how Hinduism was understood as a

‘world religion’.

His message of universalism and tolerance had great appeal. The bulk of the speech is presented here, which I feel is important to review:

…We believe not only in universal toleration, but we accept all religions as true. I am proud to belong to a nation which has sheltered the persecuted and the refugees of all religions and all nations of the earth. I am proud to tell you that we have gathered in our bosom the purest remnant of the Israelites, who came to the southern India and took refuge with us in the very year in which their holy temple was shattered to pieces by Roman tyranny. I am proud to belong to the religion which has sheltered and is still fostering the remnant of the grand Zoroastrian nation. I will quote to you, brethren, a few lines from a hymn which I remember to have repeated from my earliest boyhood, which is every day repeated by millions of human beings: As the different streams having their sources in different places all mingle their water in the sea, so, O Lord, the different paths which men take through different tendencies, various though they appear, crooked or straight, all lead to thee. The present convention, which is one of the most august assemblies ever held, is in itself a vindication, a declaration to the world, of the wonderful doctrine preached in the Gita: Whosoever comes to Me, through whatsoever form, I reach him; all men are struggling through paths which in the end lead to me. Sectarianism, bigotry, and its horrible descendant, fanaticism, have long possessed this beautiful earth. They have filled the earth with violence, drenched it often and often with human blood, destroyed civilization, and sent whole nations to despair. Had it not been for these horrible demons, human society would be far more advanced than it is now. But their time is come; and I fervently hope that the bell that tolled this morning in honor of this convention may be the death-knell of all fanaticism, of all persecutions with the sword or with the pen, and of all uncharitable feelings between persons wending their way to the same goal.

According to Jyotirmaya Sharma, it is here that we find the ‘bare bones’ message of

Vivekananda’s guru, Ramakrishna, in the extolling of renunciation, devotion, and a love of all sects and religions. Upon further scrutiny, Sharma argues, “a very carefully doctored picture

Gittinger 148 emerges” (J. Sharma 2013, 99). First, the speech is placed in a context which contrasts the materialism of the West with the ‘glorious spiritual traditions’ of India. More importantly, they are placed in the context of the spiritual greatness of Hindu religion. Hindu ideals were always depicted as ones in which the quest for deep spirituality and holiness were ever present, and the ideals of India—that is, nationalist ideals—endured despite its encounters with Islam or the West. The theme of an ‘eternal India’ is a major contribution to the nationalization of Hinduism, as will be apparent in the last chapter when I look at the rhetoric of the Hindutva movement.

Vivekananda presents an interesting study in interpretation and reading. The simplification of his message allows for a universalism to emerge in which Hinduism is one of many religions who are all ‘streams leading to the same truth’. This message of love and tolerance is then seen as becoming distorted for the ‘diabolical political agenda’ of the nationalist movements; however, he is in truth both a father and preceptor of Hindutva (xv).

In creating Hinduism as the definitive religion of India, Hinduism and Hindutva become indistinguishable. His neo-Vedantism and efforts to ‘masculinize’ Hinduism are responsive to his tutelage under Ramakrishna and to the conceptualization of religion in the West.19 The

Vedas and the Upanishads were “masculine, robust and activity-oriented texts,” and furthermore exhibited a scientific mindset which Vivekananda thought was one of the best features of the West. However, in order to create a national religion of India, the Vedas and

Upanishads were not sufficient in privileging elements like masculinity. As Sharma argues

(153-154):

19 Ramakrishna’s worship of and embodiment of manifested in a praxic ‘feminization’ in which Ramakrishna took on the role of , the beloved of Krishna, and often took on womanly traits and clothing as part of his devotion (see Sharma 2013). After Ramakrishna’s death, Vivekananda rejected this path, believing that by emulating Radha’s love to Krishna “the whole nation had been made effeminate” (150).

Gittinger 149

Vivekananda needed a skeleton that would act as the necessary scaffold to support all the details of his conception of ‘our religion’. […] The skeleton he needed to fabricate, therefore, had to be ahistorical, emotive, and durable. What Vivekananda created in the end was a Hindu self-image that endures in its self-righteousness, revels in its ahistoricity, and remains smug in tis designer victimhood. It informs and irrigates versions of Hindu identity, especially as a smokescreen to politically dominant and assertive manifestations of that identity.

Thus Vivekananda could be discussed both in the context of “Western” universalism and in that of Hindu nationalism. While his influence is certainly present in the latter, his influence on the American and European perceptions of Hinduism—and how this perception came from a carefully crafted version of Hinduism—is very persistent on the Web. Vivekananda developed his ideas in response to his experiences in the West, the United States in particular, many of which have become pivotal to the form of Hinduism being developed in the US today.20 “Swami Vivekananda’s visit to the United States and particularly the experience of how negatively India was viewed in the popular press there led to a transformation of his message” (Kurien 2007, 122). When Vivekananda’s ideology challenged abuses such as the caste system or status of women, he argued that such abuses were: 1) not central to Hinduism,

2) introduced by foreign influences, 3) represented older thinking that had once served positive purpose, or 4) misinterpreted by Western critics (122-123). Therefore, he was actively working to present an ‘authentic’ representation of Hinduism, the true version, and as

Hinduism’s first global spokesperson coming from an insider perspective, his voice would carry authority. To further legitimize his position, Vivekananda drew from the ṚgVeda in conceiving “God is one, the sages call him variously” to situate Hinduism more comfortably within a monotheistic framework. This oneness of God and the universe leads to the concept

20 Several scholars have discussed how Vivekananda was influenced by Western ideas, possibly due to the contact between Unitarian missionaries and the . See Halbfass 1995, King 1999, and Rambachan 1994.

Gittinger 150 of the universality of all religions—very much a key point of his 1893 speech.21 He rejected bhakti, tantric, and dualistic forms of religion as superstitious in favor of Vedic-Vedantic forms in which God was one, universal, and supreme. Vivekananda went on to found the

Vedanta Society in 1894, which became influential in the dissemination and popularizing of

Hindu thought in the US and in Europe.22

Universalism may be an attempt to ameliorate tensions between transnational religions with their host countries. On the subcontinent, the tradition can be far more nebulous and varied without threat to identity; in the diaspora there is a need to formally coalesce into an identifiable religious community which can demonstrate a consistent and historical culture which distinguishes them from the host culture. At the same time, however, Hinduism cannot be so other-worldly as to appear as a threat to American culture; it must allow for dual- identity of both Indian immigrant and US citizen. Therefore, Hinduism benefits from having both a universal, tolerant appeal (in the apparent model of Vivekananda who, as a ‘native’ representative of Hinduism imparted both authority and authenticity), and as easily identifiable as a valid religious tradition (conforming to Western models of what a religion should look like).

Hindu nationalism

As I have indicated throughout this dissertation, Hindu nationalists (whether moderate or

21 Gandhi also presented Hinduism as universal, frequently quoting from the Bible, Qu’rān, Gītā, and other spiritual sources. Despite his pluralism, his expression was conspicuously Hindu and upper caste. The asceticism and non-violence made an impression on Western media, and those aspects became embraced as exemplary of true Hinduism. 22 Gavin Flood notes that Vivekananda was one of the first to suggest a dichotomy of western materialism and eastern spiritualism, enabling for a discourse to emerge in which India became the spiritual guide and light for the world (1996, 258).

Gittinger 151 radical) are perhaps the most invested in this battle to define ‘Who is a Hindu?’ and ‘What is true Hinduism?’; I argue that they are the most visible managers of these terms online.23 Their efforts rely on claims authenticity and authority, and Hindu nationalist organizations have long promoted a particular imagining of Hindu culture and religion which is visible in the

(English language) electronic public sphere, while at the same time they have appropriated the sanitized Western understandings back onto contemporary politics.24 Therefore we come back to the central questions of this thesis: How do Hindu nationalist groups produce, present, and manage a particular understanding of Hinduism? What discourses do they conceal in their presentation? And how does electronic media such as the Internet aid in the constitution of their ‘authentic’ and global Hinduism?

Nationalism relies on the concept of public culture. As Arjun Appadurai explains, public culture is not merely a rubric for thinking about the particular aspects of modern life in a collective sense, but something which seeks to coopt and reinvent local or regional cultural forms. This can be seen in commercial culture (like television or cinema) which popularizes

‘classical’ elements (such as the ghazal), uses folk idioms, or religious and historical motifs

23 Amartya Sen (2005, 142) discusses three approaches by which Indian tradition is understood in Western contexts: exoticism (focusing on the wondrous aspects of India), magisterial (sense of imperial superiority and guardian ship), and curatorial (attempting to classify, label, and exhibit differences in Indian culture). I would further argue that these approaches are also used by the Indian elite, especially among the Sangh Parivar. What Sen refers to as ‘internal identities’ that have been influenced “both collaterally and dialectically” by outside imagery (‘external identity’’) is not entirely one-way. As he suggests, there is a dialectical relationship between India and the West, and as such, there is a need to consider the role external images play in forming these ‘internal identities’. I concur with his argument that the West contributes greatly to these formations, but I think it is important to examine how these colonial processes have been replicated by Hindu nationalism and exerted over the population as well. 24 The most pertinent is the manner in which Indian history is presented, which allows for Hindu hegemony and legitimizes anti-Muslim sentiment. The narrative of invasion (Muslim, Scythian, Turk, Greek, Mongol, European, etcetera) is consistently present across Hindu nationalist websites and reiterates a defensive posture which legitimizes resistance (even violent) against Muslims specifically (see Bhatt 2001; Hansen 1999; Sen 2005). Militant and moderate groups alike refer to a golden Vedic Age and see India as a historically constituted and culturally coherent formation.

Gittinger 152

(1988, 6). Popularity of religious or cultural elements are not only capitalized upon for commercial reasons, but are further promoted by Hindu nationalist organizations to confirm that their Hinduism is the ‘real’ Hinduism that everyone knows and loves.25 Yet unlike public culture, Appadurai argues, national culture is itself a contested mode that is embattled with transnational cultural messages, while at the same time it endures indigenous critiques across differing sectors, threatening the “cultural hegemony of the nation-state” (6).

The process by which dominant discourses of culture or religion emerge is one that is actively and consciously undertaken. The activity of culture-making includes the attentive construction of national histories, the revitalization of various traditional identities, and the production of national folk symbols and rituals (Appadurai, 7). From these constructions, a particular rendering of Hinduism emerges. As a culture, ‘Hindu’ is presented as ancient, technological/scientific, and heroic. As a religion, it is presented as benevolent, tolerant/accommodating, non-violent, and highly ritualized. Any narrative that is contrary to this—such that Hindu terrorism would introduce—is quickly dismissed as inauthentic or false. Therefore, not all effort into managing and reinventing tradition comes from Western sources, but rather, such management is a process which occurs in India through the rhetoric of Hindu nationalist groups (see Jaffrelot 1993; Lal 1999, 2009; Sen 2005).

Controlling the discourse around Hinduism involves maintaining its universal appeal.

Despite the popularity of Vivekananda and the pervasive sentiment expressed in his speech, that Hinduism is intrinsically tolerant is a lovely fiction; it is made clear that in the same breath that nationalists praise this landscape of tolerance, that the Muslims are living in India

25 One of the most effective was the soap-drama serial of Sagar’s Ramayan, as mentioned in chapter three. Although there are supposedly 300 versions of the tale, including regional variations, Sagar’s interpretation is arguably now the most popular and most trans-regional version of the epic. See Lutgendorf 1995.

Gittinger 153 at the good graces of the Hindus. As Vinay Lal points out, the Hindutva proponents “have sought to shape their faith in the image of those very other faiths that they decry” (1999, 149).

Seeking to model Hinduism—which has suffered under the colonial portrayal of Hindu culture as effeminate—as a more militarized, masculine religion, it has glorified the epic martial heroes, such as Ram. Even Durga, the fierce and beautiful warrior goddess who bears each godly weapon, is frequently depicted as ‘Bhārat Mātā’ or Mother India in warrior form.

A history of cruelty, invasion, and colonial subjugation has only fueled the need to assert

‘Hindu’ as something that is virile and uncompromising.

Case study: the ‘Internet Hindus’

The rules for posting on the Facebook page of the Internet Hindus are clear and warn anyone who violates the tone of the page that they will be removed or blocked.

Firstly, secular pigs are strictly prohibited. And if you are a Hindu but enchanted by the leftist slogan 'Hindu faith is no different than any other faith', don't come here. If we find out that you are nothing but a Leftist/communist/secularist/Marxist/Hindu-hating who is only here to spread discord among fans, you will mercilessly be thrown out. You see the thing is, Hindus are normally very peaceful people and would not mind, but with that mentality we were turned into slaves for a 1000 years, not anymore. Pseudo- secularists/Sickularists and 'humanists' do not try to create any equivalency between Sanatana Dharma and other religions. You must be perverse to do so. On Internet pages, on the outside these other religions display high words of tolerance and multiculturalism (ignoring questions on their contradictory behaviour in countries of their dominance), but on the inside, Muslims and Christians are not at all apologetic in thinking of us as kafirs going to hell, why should we be apologetic in supporting the Hindu cause? It's something that has never caused tyranny in the world. Also, words like 'look above religion' will most definitely not be tolerated. This page is for proud staunch Sanatana Dharmis and people who completely support the Hindu cause, AND NOBODY ELSE. You may continue

Gittinger 154

destroying the country with your 'we are all the same' nonsense on the Indian secularism facebook pages but not through here.26

Such virulent tone and unapologetic right-wing stance is there for all to see, and those who belong to the page (nearly 5,000 members, whose joining must be approved by moderator) identify as sharing this worldview and political bent.

It is clear that community can be virtual in the sense that it occupies online space and whose members may never directly interact with one another beyond a forum message board or social media. It should not be concluded, however, that a group with a website automatically makes them a ‘community’ in the ways that were discussed in chapter two. The

Internet Hindus, however, may be argued to be a community that formed in response to being named a community. Therefore, my use of the Internet Hindus as a case study is to show how, through social media, an illusion of community can be generated and set up in opposition to another community, the imagined straw man of journalists and scholars who apparently seek to destroy or corrupt ‘authentic’ portrayals of Hindu religion and culture. This section will look at a more vitriolic and tenuous contest in the effort to maintain a particular definition of

Hinduism in the electronic public sphere, and the backlash against those seen as spreading misinformation or distortions—also reflecting tensions of insider/outsider authority. It will be evident that there is a cyber-activism closely tied to nationalism that has joined the campaign to moderate and manage how Hinduism and Hindus are discussed in the public sphere.

Cyber activism among such netizens, or at least the disparate group of people who attempt to counter negative discourses on the topic of Hinduism, has been given a name:

26 “About Us” on Internet Hindus Facebook page, https://www.facebook.com/thesanatanadharmis. Accessed May 2013.

Gittinger 155

Internet Hindus. Also referred to as ‘cyber Hindus’, the term was coined by journalist

Sagarika Ghose and refers to the right-wing bloggers and Twitter users who scour the Internet for hot button issues in order to “pounce” on any opinion with which they virulently disagree.

Ghose, who is deputy editor of CNN-IBN, has been particularly targeted, likening them to

“swarms of bees” (Overdorf 2012). Since Ghose’s initial branding of the group, they have claimed the term for their own and if anything, become more popular and more organized.

Estimated to be a group of approximately 20,000 people, this group has gained the attention of several media outlets and has found themselves in the middle of India’s censorship debate

There is a term used in computer-mediated communication called ‘trolling’. A ‘troll’ is a person whose sole purpose is to create discord and controversy on the Internet, often by

‘hijacking’ a discussion by posting something abusive, inflammatory, and often off-topic in order to provoke a reaction. Trolling has been appropriated by the media to refer to anyone who seeks out such confrontations and pursues a form of online harassment. Ghose has reported several times over the years that she has been trolled regularly, ranging from harmless but hostile tweets, to veiled threats.27

The Internet Hindus are a nebulous group of individuals, unified in political tone but not from any one part of society. An India Today article that ran in November 2013 discussed the rise of the ‘cyber Hindu’ which is described as “pro-Hindu, pro-BJP, pro-Narendra Modi, right-wing Internet community that dominates every social media discussion and every online

27 Trolling has been appropriated outside the context of the Web as well. In an article discussing vandalism against religious symbols, a cleric of a Russian Orthodox Church makes an interesting contribution to the definition, stating that trolling means “breaking into another person’s space of personal freedom in order to inflict maximum damage to people with opposing views” (http://rt.com/politics/trolling-russian-church-society- 405). An example of online-terminology crossing over into the offline-world, this also highlights the tenability that such borders between online and offline are non-existent. Religion, violence, and discourse cross these lines with ease, and thus online voices having offline effects happen regularly.

Gittinger 156 forum” (Pradhan and Sriram 2013). The BJP reportedly has an IT and social media management team28 of 100 members who are “an organic, uncontrollable, multi-faceted entity made up of people all around us. They could be in the next cubicle in your workplace or on the next desk in your classroom.” They are in constant contact with each other, scouring the

Internet on their smartphones, connected through an intangible network that draws people from a range of backgrounds. “They feel their voices are finally being heard, and amplified, by like-minded political activists who operate on social media.” This should not be surprising, as the BJP has aggressively pursued the use of new media since the 1990s, first registering their domain name (bjp.org) in 1995. The BJP’s IT Vision Document: Transforming Bharat was released in 2009 and highlights the party’s vision for utilizing new technology across a number of sectors: commerce, identification, language promotion, job creation, education, telecom networks, and so forth with the goal to “equal China in every IT parameter in five years.” This is may be a very realistic goal, as a November 2013 report released data that revealed that India would take over the #2 spot by late 2014 (bumping the United States) for number of Internet users, with China still in the lead. Increased investment in telecommunications infrastructure, popularity of mobile phones, and general projected population increase make this a distinct possibility.

The Internet Hindus have found themselves at the center of a current debate on India censorship law. India’s Information Technology Act of 2000 was updated in 2011 with the requirement that websites remove content that authorities deemed objectionable within 36 hours of being told to do so. This has particular ramifications for social media sites like

28 Narendra Modi in particular has been often lauded for his Internet savvy, putting two of India’s most famous dotcom moguls on his technology team: Rajesh Jain (who sold IndiaWorld to Sify) and BG Mahesh (founder of IndiaInfo and OneIndia). Modi also has a large Twitter following of over 11.2 million, and regularly blogs on his website www.narendramodi.in.

Gittinger 157

Facebook, where users frequently vent or opine controversial viewpoints, and there have been numerous cases already in which this censorship has been executed (Seiglebaum 2013).

According to the Times of India, out of 358 requests that Google received to remove content,

255 of those requests gave ‘criticism of the government’ as the reason for its censorship.

Why do such individuals feel challenged by these alternate points of view? As many members of the Hindu diaspora turn to news sites and social media for information about and contact with their native culture, it seems incumbent upon those who identify as Internet

Hindus to promote a version of Hinduism most amenable to the nationalist project. While the attempt to tighten the reins of public discourse is strongly political, there are always religious and cultural implications when the Hindu nationalist parties try to shape public opinion.

Foremost is the issue of religious tolerance, with the Muslim (and to a lesser extent, the

Christian) population as the potential target of restrictions or hostilities. Some of the religious political issues include reservations (an ‘affirmative action’ type of legislation which would guarantee government positions for religious minorities) and anti-conversion laws.29 More subtle is the issue of the ongoing project to define ‘Hindu’, which also includes a contestation over the definition of ‘secularism’ in India.30

29 Currently India has five states which have implemented anti-conversion laws: Arunachal Pradesh, , Himachal Pradesh, , and Chattisgargh. The first three have banned conversion outright, while the last two have implemented a law which requires anyone to wishes to convert to see the local magistrate and file for permission 30 days prior to the conversion. 30 Scholars such as Rajeev Bhargava, Shabnum Tejani, and Christophe Jaffrelot have argued that secularism has two faces in India: dharma nirapekshata, or ‘indifference’ towards religions, and sarva dharma sambhaava or ‘equality’ between religions. In the first instance—what is often called true secularism—secular society should not acknowledge or make allowances for different religions (as in the case of minority reservations). In the second definition, all religions must have equal say and opportunity, and therefore certain accommodations should be in place to ensure minority rights—this is also called ‘pseudo secularism’ by groups such as the RSS. The rules for posting on the Internet Hindus webpage reflect these tensions (see next footnote).

Gittinger 158

The voices of the cyber-activists are in many ways post-colonial voices, still trying to recover a sense of dignity and self-respect in the wake of imperialism and its legacy:

I want the Hindu dignity of India to be restored…We've had a glorious past but the Muslim invaders, the Mughals and the Brits destroyed our sense of pride. After independence, the [Congress] continued with that policy. It continued with laws and acts drafted by the British and never bothered to frame new laws which incorporated the spirit of Bharat [India]. It continued with blatant Muslims appeasement while Hindus were reduced to second-grade citizens in their own land” (22 year old Internet Hindu interviewed in Overdorf 2012).

As the person in the quote declares, the point of view of those who proudly call themselves

Internet Hindus are voices which have long gone unheard. A very popular website Haindava

Keralam (haindavakeralam.com),31 noted for its blogs by author and ‘political philosopher’

Dr. Vijaya Rajiva, ran a story about the Internet Hindus in 2010. It portrays Indian media as being exclusively catering to the English-educated elite, rejecting letters and stories from ‘the common, average, educated Indian’ who, according to the author, cannot match the linguistic skills to fight the ‘malicious campaign’ of the anti-Hindu agenda.

Rejected by the arrogance of [the] elitist creed, the internet comes with a fresh breath of air, providing a breaking space to the common man choking with indignation. With the advent of blogging, web groups, chat forums, free websites and social networking sites he gets an opportunity to express himself, gives vent to his thoughts which had been deliberately suppressed all these years. The voice that had been muted for so long is now vociferous (Rairikar 2010, np, emphasis in original).

It is being argued that the Internet has provided the formerly silent with a voice—not a voice marginalized by the digital divides discussed previously, so much as through a deliberate bias against the common Hindu. An interesting accusation, considering that the article paints the

Internet Hindus as too unskilled to enter the conversation through other media; other articles

31 I am grateful to Vasudha Naryanan for making me aware of this website.

Gittinger 159 report that the Internet Hindus are highly educated, middle class, and politically savvy which would contradict the image of the underdog this article narrates here.

Cyber activism has a noticeable impact in this instance. It is argued that “With the growing number of Hindus on the internet, it is becoming evident that majority Indians do not endorse the pseudo-secularism and minorityism that is being imposed upon them” (Rarikar

2010, np). The Internet Hindus, now labeled as activists, are quick to comment on news stories, blogs, Twitter feeds, and other forms of CMC to counter what they see as anti-Hindu

(Indian journalists Ashok Malik and Sagarika Ghose are frequent targets of their hostilities).

Their presence on the Internet has had real effect: even the Congress Party set up a 35 member team to counter the propaganda in social media, making efforts to “rope in twitterati like Shashi Tharoor, eminent personalities like Shah Rukh Khan and Shabana Azmi, other techno savvy leaders, and eminent personalities to spread its message” (D.K. Singh 2013, np).

Social media, such as Facebook, have become increasingly useful tools for activism as well as connecting like-minded individuals. The Internet Hindus have both a Facebook

‘community’ of over 3000 members, and a Facebook ‘group’ that boasts over 5000 members

(“We are now among the largest established Internet Hindu communities in the world!”). The words ‘community’ and ‘group’, it should be noted here, are Facebook’s distinctions and not mine. The first designation is interactive in that it can be joined and, once approved, members can share items or post on the timeline as they see fit; the latter is a ‘page’ (one-way information) in that it can be ‘liked’ but not ‘joined’. In other words, in the functionality of

Facebook, only the page moderator can post topics, updates, or articles, and anyone from the public can comment or ‘like’ the items that are posted.

Gittinger 160

The page is a public domain, thus anyone can see the conversation which is anti-

Muslim, pro-BJP, and reiterates many of the ideologies already discussed in the forthcoming chapter regarding a Hindutva-ized Hinduism. For example, in the span of a mere ten days, here is a sample of postings:

November 29, 2013: “One must wait for a moment to appreciate Bollywood's amazing ability to cleverly insert Allah in between every 4 lines in every song. That must take some serious skill. Is there an award for that?” November 28, 2013: “A 100 million Hindus have been killed by Muslims just till the 16th century only. And this is not even taking into account the ones killed by the Christians. (For comparison, the Jewish holocaust was only 6 million Jews, and is called the greatest tragedy of history. really?) And despite the growing deaths, the Hindus still have never waged a single war on anyone, have not torn down any mosques or churches. And you dare to call the Hindus fanatics? And that too while standing on Indian soil? Congress....your time is over.” November 27, 2013: “Varanasi is so old that when Buddha was visiting in 500 BC, he called it ancient city.” November 24, 2013: “Pride in being Indian means, for 99%, pride in Hinduism.…Most Western scholars positively dislike Hinduism when it stands up to defend itself. They prefer museum Hinduism or innocent Gandhian kind of Hinduism, and they readily buy the secularist story that an assertive Hinduism is not the ‘real Hinduism’. – Dr (Belgian historian)” November 22, 2013: “UP govt issues notification saying it'll give Rs 5 Lakh to all Muslim riot affected families who want to relocate away. Supreme court yesterday condemned the UP govt for issuing a communal notification ‘favoring a religious group’. Why are news channels not holding their usual focus group discussions on this? Because it’s anti-Hindu and not pro-Hindu? If the notice was the opposite, ‘Saffron ’’ and ‘Hindu oppression’ would already have been trending in the news. The govt’s obsession with minority appeasement is so high that the government doesn't realise when it's not following the law anymore. #Paidmedia #Pseudosecularism.” November 19, 2013: “Hindus have been so thoroughly brainwashed by the secularist propaganda that they themselves believe that they are valueless, principleless, and without ideals. Hence everything is respected because everything is correct and there is no such thing as a bad deed or bad philosophy. Anyone who disagrees with this nonsense is branded a fanatic for trying to destroy the ‘secular fabric’ of the country. The success of this ‘destroy Hinduism’ project has been tremendous.”

Gittinger 161

With just a handful of postings on the Facebook page, one can already see the overall tone of the group and their politics. The concept of India as an ancient civilization, the highlighting

(and exaggeration) of aggression against the Hindus, disdain for secularism, and anti-Muslim stance are proudly displayed for all to see—including quoting Koenraad Elst’s critique of the

West for buying into the ‘Gandhian kind of Hinduism’ and disregarding a more ‘assertive’

Hinduism. This is amusing because of the fine line ‘assertive’ Hinduism draws in nationalist discourse: on one hand, it speaks to a martial history, of the Rajputs and great warriors of

India, of a Hindu pride and eschewing of British emasculation; on the other hand, it bristles with outrage when accused of promoting violence or resorting to terrorist acts. This tension is the crux of the Internet Hindus.

Social media communities overlap with other communities of similar interests, often having the same members among its ranks. Groups I found that members of the Internet

Hindus were also frequently part of included:

 Aryavrata – Abode of the Aryans  I Hate Gandhi  Israeli Frontline  Bajrang Dal  at least six different pro-Modi sites  Hindu Mahasabha  Hindutwa Unites India  Voices of Jammu Kashmir

Even without the assistance of Internet algorithms, closed loops of information form easily in social media because one is likely to frequent or join pages and groups which reflect their own interest. As users post links to news stories, blogs, or organizations, networks form which perpetuate anti-Muslim, pro-Hindutva discourses.

Gittinger 162

In what appears to be an effort to seriously engage the Internet Hindus who so vehemently hate her, Sagarika Ghose wrote a piece discussing the crisis of , saying “It’s time to liberate Hinduism from politics.” She asks a worthwhile question:

Does Hinduism today permit any complex interrogation by those born Hindu? Is simply an RSS-style assertion of “national identity” taking the place of a realistic appraisal of what Hinduism means, what is should mean, in the modern era? After all, traditions are best kept alive if revitalised anew for newer generations. Apart from the politics, at an individual level, it seems as if we are still in search of the 21st century Hindu (Ghose, 14 August 2013).

Her argument, as her questions continue, is that the continued attacks on media, art, and literature which challenge the Hindutva brand of Hinduism may actually be preventing

Hinduism from being popularized among the newer, younger audiences. Reform is denounced as ‘anti-Hindu’; interfaith discussion and tolerance is denounced as ‘pseudo-secularism’.32

Ghose pleads, “surely there is a need to evolve a charter of the modern Hindu, for whom pride in his faith and traditions can co-exist with the needs of a modern multi-faith democratic society.”33

It may be argued that a community—especially a political community—can be forged simply out of a consensus expressed online. While the Internet Hindus may or may not be a community in the sense of my earlier discussions on the subject, they seem to identify as a community, imagining themselves as sharing the same ideology and working together

32 The definition of secularism is a fascinating but complicated discussion which is too elaborate to go into here. Suffice to say that there are tensions between a European definition which would keep religion out of the government, and the Indian definition which posits that Hinduism is inherently secular (read: pluralistic) and thus India should officially be a Hindu nation). 33 Needless to say, judging from the 553 comments on the blog, her plea went unheard. Ghose is claiming authority by being a respected journalist of major news outlets for 20 years, and by being a Hindu-Indian. This should allow her respect both as an informed professional and as a cultural insider. But the fact that she has been a target for criticizing right-wing politics (never more so than the year leading up to Modi’s victory) reveals that there is great effort to suppress what some see as ‘negative press’ on India, Hinduism, or the BJP. The Indian media thus becomes an adversary, intellectually corrupt and pandering to Western ideas of secularism.

Gittinger 163 towards the same goal (election of Modi, in this case). The hashtag #InternetHindus is consistently used by Twitter users to refer to this political community (Twitter feed accessed

May 2014):

Surbhit @surbhit10 May 16 #Results2014 #Elections2014 Dear fellow #InternetHindus we did it!!!!

Raman @being_delhite May 16 Thank You @sagarikaghose for Uniting #InternetHindus

Sourav_ghosh @souravg89 May 18 #YoSagarikaSoSecular that she invented a new caste #InternetHindus

Surbhit @surbhit10 May 16 Although Sagaraika ghose has blocked me dis is a msg 2 her. #InternetHindus have won!!!

While the initial backlash of the term ‘Internet Hindus’ vocalized a resentment at being lumped into one category (many argued at the time that just because someone was a Hindu— or even nationalist—and used the Web, it did not deserve the moniker), the formation of hashtags and groups on Twitter, Facebook, and other social media proved that such a community could be generated simply as posing in opposition to another community. In this case, the ‘other’ were pseudo-secularists, Muslims, and journalists or scholars who apparently sought to destroy or attack Hindu religion and culture.

An interview with an Internet Hindu

The primary goal of the community of cyber Hindus has been, in the past year, to influence the elections (both national and local). According to a survey put forth by the IRIS

Knowledge Foundation and the Internet Mobile Association of India (IMAI), social media was predicted to influence 160 seats in the 2014 elections (Pradan and Sriram 2013). As of

Gittinger 164

October 2013, about 42% of all urban voters who were online stated they were still undecided about who to vote for, and this vote bank was precisely who the Internet Hindus were courting.

Sagarika Ghose is not the only professional to have felt the wrath of this group of online activists. Ramachandra Guha has devoted an entire chapter of his book Patriots and

Partisans (2013) to what he calls ‘Hindutva hate mail’ in which he relates his encounters with

“a certain kind of Indian who gets up before dawn, has a glass of cow’s , prays to the sun god, and begins scanning cyberspace for the day’s secular heresies” (Guha 2013, 61).34

Although many Internet Hindus are business professionals and perhaps opt for coffee or tea rather than the glass of cow’s milk, the point is still aptly made.

Most of the Internet Hindus use pseudonyms and handles which conceal their identity, and their posting profiles are usually set to private so one cannot email them directly— understandable when posting heated opinions online. Through sending private messages directly to members of the Facebook Internet Hindu community, however, I was able to connect with one young man who was willing to speak to me via Skype about this subject. He was very concerned about his identity, which I assured him would remain anonymous. I will refer to him as Roy.

I began by asking him about the term ‘Internet Hindus’, and how it seems to have been proudly adopted by those who are actively voicing religious and political opinions on the

Web.

34 Guha goes on to note: “If a column I write touches in any way on faith, Hinduism, Hindutva, Guru Golwalkar, Gujurat or Ayodhya, by breakfast I would have in my Inbox—or perhaps in the ‘Comments’ section of the newspaper’s own website—mails which are hurt, complaining, angry, or downright abusive” (2013, 61).

Gittinger 165

Roy: Yes, we are proud to be Internet Hindus. She [Sagarika Ghose] makes it sound like a bad thing, but there is nothing wrong with speaking out against corruption and demanding changes. Most of us are moderate in tone, but there are others who are very angry. We have a right to be angry. We want to speak out about issues in our politics and our culture that news media get wrong. Me: Like what sorts of issues? Roy: Like that Congress has nurtured the corruption from the moment India got independence, and they all continue the dynasty of Indira Gandhi—Rahul, Priyank, all of them. Journalists are so quick to criticize Modi or the BJP, but do not turn that eye back onto their beloved Congress party. There is so much corruption in Congress, what we Internet Hindus are trying to do is unite Hindu voters and get them involved in the revolution. Me: You did, apparently. Modi won the election! Roy: Yes! And that is just the beginning. The time has come for India to move forward. Technology has a lot to do with it, will be crucial to this. IT infrastructure is going to get rebuilt and we will see India compete with China and America in these areas very soon. Me: Currently India has had a great boom in Internet access thanks to mobile telephones. Smart phones are allowing more people to get online. How do you think this will change whose voices we hear on the Internet? Roy: More voices of the Hindus, more cyber Hindus. The more people who exercise their right to speak out against corruption, against Muslim appeasement, against pseudo-secularism, against conversions, the more India will return to its Hindu history. We have a legacy of great culture here.

Like the social media of the Internet Hindus reflects, Roy had a lot of hostility towards the

Muslim population, echoing much of the rhetoric that can be found across Hindu nationalist websites which speak to a ‘history of Muslim invasions’ and stories of kidnapping women and forcing them to convert to Islam. There was also some resentment towards Christian missionaries.

Roy: Yes missionaries go to very poor villages. They say “Accept Jesus Christ and we will give you food and things” and most of these people are [backwards castes]. So they say yes and become Christian just so they can eat. But in their heart they are Hindus, and they are forced to give away the part of who they are, their culture in their blood.

Gittinger 166

Roy further observed that Hindus are divided by class, region, language, and many other factors, but on the Web they can act in a united voice to protect Hindu culture and against the biases of the media. Many of these Hindus live abroad as well, he notes, and they observe firsthand how other countries flourish socially and economically—but they also see how

Hindus are portrayed in the West and in western media. In response to that, I asked him about how he felt about non-Indian scholars (like myself) writing about Hinduism. “As long as scholars have studied our ancient history and texts and understand Hinduism, then they can write about it.” He also notes, regarding the popularity of Hinduism in American culture in particular, “if it is done with respect, then Hinduism can be popular and trendy. This is not a problem.”

Regarding scholars or journalists who aren’t, in his view, presenting Hinduism in a kind light:

Roy: Then if we can, we will challenge it. We can post responses or use social media. We have a hashtag for Twitter, with many lakh followers.35 This is specially important for Hindus abroad. They need to be connected to their culture and their motherland. They read everyday their newspapers online and watch BBC and American...um…CNN. When they see a story about a riot or a rape they think oh my god I can be ashamed to be from my country. All they see is the negative, Hindus as uncivilized people. We remind them that there is an agenda by the journalists and intellectuals who don’t understand Hindu culture or respect its history. And then there are all the Islamicists, who are the real problem. But you have to be careful [when you talk about Muslims] or you will be accused of . Me: It seems, from reading the comments sections in news stories which are either critical of some aspect of Indian culture, or of Modi, or stories that present an alternate version of Hinduism, that the Internet Hindus are very quick to respond and ‘correct’ misinformation. Or challenge the writer of the article.

35 In actuality, their numbers are much less then ‘many lakh’ (several hundred thousand). There are three Twitter accounts which are labeled ‘Internet Hindus’: @InternetHindus (5,700 followers), @Hindusonnet (14,200 followers), and @Internet_Hindus (13,200 followers)—still a significant presence on Twitter, however.

Gittinger 167

Roy: Journalists write propaganda to sell newspapers, and Indian reporters are the worst because people see their name and think they must speak for Hindus. Many of those reporters are Muslim or Congwalle [Congress people]. They aren’t balanced. For example, history shows that Muslim invaders destroyed thousands of temples, but we [Hindus] are seen as communal because we have destroyed maybe one or two of their mosques. Muslims are intolerant but Hindus welcome other religions because that is our way, sanatan dharma—do you know this meaning? We are there to remind people that they are only reading one side, and not hearing the Hindu voices.

Again, this idea of providing voices to the voiceless was a central concern. The invocation of sanātana dharma was not particularly surprising; the notion that Hinduism and Hindu culture is an intrinsically tolerant and eternal religion which offers universal truths is a well worn theme across all manners of Indian media.

Me: Internet Hindus have been most active and most outspoken when it comes to Modi. Especially when the press—western or Indian—have criticized him. Why are these attacks so personal to Internet Hindus? Roy: Modi is a true Hindu. India is a great nation with an ancient history and he wants to carry that flame into the future. He will restore India to its previous glory by giving the Hindus their pride back. Me: Why is their pride gone? Roy: We have pride, but it is weighed down by pseudo secular politics. Muslims get special treatment, or when there is violence against Hindus and Hindus strike back, we are called communal. Many of our traditions are getting lost, people don’t have time for them anymore. People don’t read the Gita. They want to study hard and get a job that pays a lot of money, that is all they worry about.

This issue of ‘pride’ is also a common trope found across Hindu nationalist discourse as a general response to India’s history, being ruled first by the Mughals and then by the British.

As a vague legitimizer of aggression towards the Muslims, the ‘history of invasions’ is a convenient and frequently employed discursive tool of the Hindu right.

Me: Would you say the Internet Hindus are a community? Roy: Yes, I mean we have organized on Facebook and Twitter and private forums.

Gittinger 168

Me: Do you know any fellow cyber Hindus in real life? Do you guys ever meet or talk or IM or anything? Roy: Yes, actually, there are a few chatrooms we go to, to talk about current issues or if there is a new article that some journalist wrote that we think is really off target. I have friends at work and at university who do a lot of posting as well. We text back and forth sometimes. My brother works at a webpage design company, and he is always on the Internet. He is the one who encouraged me to speak out online when I started becoming political. Me: Yes, I meant to ask you how you got started on all this. Roy: My brother joined the BJP when he was 19, I was 14 at the time. He was always very politically aware, always reading. My father is like that too. He owns an export business. He grew up in Gujarat, so he is a big supporter of Modi. So when I started university, I found other friends who had the same passions that I did, and we talked about the world and how India was finally becoming more modern. A lot of us work for IT and are online quite a lot. Me: Was there any particular article or event that got you speaking out online? Or what is your routine? Do you read articles every day or what? Roy: I think there were some discussions about Sonia [Gandhi] and Cong corruption on this forum we all read, and my brother was in a very heated argument with a well known blogger from a television station. I was following it because he [my brother] was on it, and then I joined in the conversation. Now I read the news daily, and I look at the articles linked by other Internet Hindus, and we keep an eye out for conversations that are distorted and one- sided. Then we jump in and try to balance the view. Me: Not all cyber Hindu activity is about politics though. I feel like there is a lot of policing—er, maybe that’s too strong a word—a lot of attention given to the management of Hinduism, how it is presented online. If someone comes along and posts something about Hinduism or Hindu culture that is controversial— Roy: [interrupts] like that we are all terrorists and start trouble with the non- Hindu communities. That is sheer Congress propaganda. You know they have a whole team who work for them on Twitter? India has always been a Hindu nation, and Hindus are the absolute majority here, but being ‘Hindu’ doesn’t mean you have to pray to Krishna or or wear a mauli [sacred thread]. Hindu is a cultural word. It is all people who live in India and embrace India’s great history and recognize its ancient culture. Parsee, Muslim, Christian can be ‘Hindu’ if they refuse to bow to communal politics and the divisive politics of Congress. They [the non-Hindus] cannot use violence and they cannot ask for special treatment. If they want to be equal they need to be part of the Hindu nation that is India first. Religion is secondary.

Gittinger 169

As Roy noted, it was his elder brother who introduced him to online activism. Roy introduced us via email and while his brother (who I will call Ajay) was not willing to talk with me via

Skype, he did answer a few questions for me. I invited him to tell me what his motivation was for being a cyber-activist and what he felt the role of the Internet Hindus was:

Those of us who were on the WWW at a younger age really saw its potential for broadcasting ideas and messages that we couldn’t do on T.V. I wrote for my university newspaper and helped them set up their first web-blog site, and one of our first stories was about how Hindu culture could thrive online.36 Hindus are so diverse, their practices and economic classes are spread out, but here was a format where people from different regions and background could come together and talk about how their culture was important to them. This was before many of the popular sites had sections for comments, so it was a one-way conversation. We had this idea to make as many Hindu web pages as there were Muslim or Christian pages, so we would have a representation in what was being said about our country and our culture. Now every website and newsite has a section for comments, and that is where the real work gets done. Instead of having a page that just presents a very biased image of Hindus, now there is a way to respond and provide a contrary voice. We are committed to finding every story and image on the WWW that insults Hindus or promotes sickuarlist agendas and making sure the Hindu voice is heard.37

Ajay now works for a web design company, which allows him to be online constantly and monitor websites that have been highlighted by fellow Internet Hindus as opportunities for challenging discourses they see as unfairly biased against Hindus or in favor of Muslims. 38

While the ‘Internet Hindus’ received a lot of attention in the press as a hostile mob of trolling thugs, other organizations were seeing the potential for creating a politically active

Hindu community online. As I discussed in the first chapter, the Hindu Janajagruti Samiti

36 I asked him if he still had this article but he said it was no longer on the website and that he did not have a copy. 37 Email correspondence, August 17, 2014. 38 Despite efforts to reach out to other members of the Internet Hindu community via social media, I was unable to persuade others to communicate with me through email or interview. I used a Facebook account which simplified my name to JL Gitting, stripped it of personal photographs, and toggled my gender to ‘male’ (there is no ‘other’ category in Facebook options) in effort to somewhat obfuscate my identity, but it did not seem to help.

Gittinger 170

(hindujagruti.org) is one such organization which is for the “establishment of the Hindu

Raṣṭra” and also has a popular website (offered in both English and in Hindi) providing news articles, a Hindu almanac, and information on dharma and spirituality.39 They work against media and pop cultural items which they see as Hindu defamation, and have in the last two years (coinciding with the rise of the Internet Hindus) called to organize a ‘Cyber Activist

Group’. Their document, “Protection of Dharma and Hindu unity through the medium of the

Internet” (hindujagruti.org/news/14188.html, May 3, 2012) provides detailed exposition on the dharmic responsibility of Hindus to engage issues online.

Reading the exposition from the website, the argument for using the Internet as a political medium is easy to reconcile. The merits of cyber activism are listed at the outset: unlike the manpower required to operate a newspaper or television channel, websites and other use of the medium is very cheap. It is also becoming widely accessible with the rise of mobile phones. The role of the Internet in the Arab Spring revolutions is pointed to as an example of social networking succeeding in creating political change. “In today’s times, mere awakening of Hindus will not suffice. It is necessary to unite them and motivate them to become active to serve the Nation and Dharma.” One of the ways to do this, the article suggests, is to create a Hindu blog. Hosting domains (such as Wordpress and Blogspot) are suggested, along with examples of successful blogs. The other method proposed for uniting

Hindus is the use of social networking sites. Facebook, Twitter, and Google Plus are specifically mentioned as venues for organization. Again, the example of the recent uprisings in Arab countries is referenced, along with a 2012 case in Andhra Pradesh in which a man by

39 According the web.archive.org and other statistical sites, hindujagruti.org has anti-bot scripts on the page that do not allow one to look at archived pages or traffic statistics. According to the webpage itself, it claims to have the following number of hits on these pages: News 12.8 million, Hindu scripture articles 210k, articles on ‘the glorious history of Hindus’ over 400k, and so forth.

Gittinger 171 the name of Thakur Raja Singh was arrested for trying to organize a grand procession of

Shrirmnavami at Bhagyanagar. Through an organized outcry on social media, Mr. Singh was released by the police and the rally went forward as planned.

This encouragement to utilize computer-mediated communication is to further the project of ‘protecting Hindu dharma and unity’. Referred to as prasār (meaning ‘network’), dharma prasār is a more elegant name for the cyber Hindus.

As per the quote, स敍घे शक्तिः कलौ युगे । meaning ‘in Kaliyug, true power lies in unity’, it is very important that for the establishing the Hindu Nation, all devout Hindus should remain united. Irrespective of which corner of the world we are in, we can always remain united through the medium of internet and can certainly write a new chapter in the progress of establishing the Hindu nation

That the Internet Hindus or cyber-Hindus are indeed forming an identifiable and recognizable virtual community is evident by their mutual self-recognition and common goals. One Twitter user referred to them as “the Intellectual Kshatriya” (possibly referencing the Frawley article cited in the previous chapter), which evokes the caste designation that is both martial and noble.40 As Roy and Ajay both argue, the contestation for what may be argued to be an

‘authentic’ representation of Hindus and Hindu religion/culture is occurring in the electronic public sphere, and is further politicized by the modes of power which dominate the discourse—in this instance, the mainstream media outlets and Indian National Congress. The

Internet Hindus see themselves as the ‘little guy’ whose voice has been excluded, even though large Hindu nationalist groups such as the BJP are incredibly effective (if not even more successful) in promoting their particular brand of Hinduism and Hindutva.

40 This is also referring to a David Frawley article which discussed that necessity of having warriors for the ‘information war’ that is occurring in new media (http://www.voiceofdharma.com/books/tfst/chi1.htm).

Gittinger 172

Conclusion

The challenges regarding authority and authenticity manifest in a variety of ways on the Web.

Like other media, the tensions between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ are ongoing, but the Web also has problems unique to the medium, such as the ability for information (correct or incorrect) to self-replicate through the processes of hyperlinking and algorithms, causing some discourses to be more prominent than others regardless of their apparent truth-values. On a larger scale, the idea of “Western universalism” continues to color the presentation of

Hinduism worldwide. While that would seemingly undermine the Hindu nationalist position, it is in fact working in tandem with it. Challenges to such definitions, such that the Internet

Hindus rise to meet, are seen as conflicts between insider/outsider or worse—a refusal to acknowledge a particular history of oppression and invasion from which the Hindu people have triumphantly emerged.

If community is understood in the Anderson-ian sense as a mutual recognition by its members and having a common ideology or worldview, then the Internet Hindus can indeed be classified as a community despite their decentralized and ad-hoc nature. Also in the tradition of nationalism, their identity is forged in response to a threatening ‘other’ who in this instance is the ‘sickularist’ straw man who is out to attack or misrepresent Hindus and

Hinduism in popular media. As they are web-savvy youth who are actively engaging the discourse around Hinduism in the electronic public sphere, they serve as a useful case study in the process of promoting and managing what they perceive as ‘authentic’ and challenge claims of ‘authority’ for those who raise opinions contrary to their own. Their understandings of history and authenticity are informed by the prevailing rhetoric of Hindu nationalism.

Gittinger 173

That religion and politics are entangled so easily may be another by-product of the

Internet. Rapidly circulated hate speech or polemical diatribes spread like fanned flames across social media and news outlets, replicating in spaces which supply new contexts and sometimes removing original context entirely. Religion is an easy banner to rally around, much like patriotism, whereby the critical parties are accused as heretical or traitorous. The

Internet Hindus function online very much in the same way that the radical right wing karsevaks of the Bajrang Dal function in offline spaces: the latter being the violent, militant arm of parent VHP to fight opposition on the ground, the former being the virulent, virtual activists of the BJP to fight opposition in discourse. Unclaimed officially by the Hindu nationalist parties, but clearly working from their rhetoric, the Internet Hindus discard the universalism that is used to appeal to global audiences, and maintain a narrow, Hindutva-ized version of religion that is a very noisy minority.

Gittinger 174

Concluding Thoughts

Figure 8: “Hinduism is….” Anonymous search on Google, December 2013.

How do we finish the sentence “Hinduism is…”? As this dissertation has made clear, to complete this sentence is to entangle oneself in a contested discourse which is still being addressed in academia. Furthermore, at the very moment that one defines Hinduism, one makes claims of authenticity and authority that are inherent in the legitimation of the presented definition. I have argued that these claims are often challenged quite publicly, and thus a struggle unfolds: How are claims of ‘authenticity’ and ‘authority’ made, and by whom?

What modes of power (economic, ethnic, national, institutional, etc.) are attempting to clearly but narrowly define ‘Hindu’ and ‘Hinduism’ in such ways that discursively reify ethno- nationalist tropes? I question whether we can understand how ‘Hinduism’ is defined without considering not only the breadth of printed scholarship, but the very real and dynamic discourses unfolding in the electronic public sphere. One might ask: Why do we care what the average Internet surfer thinks about Hinduism?

As Marshall McLuhan quite presciently observed, media are extensions of our selves.1

Not only technologies—such as the cell phone, which has been argued no longer to be merely a communication device but an extension of our social selves that is becoming increasingly

1 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (1994 [1964]).

Gittinger 175 necessary—but also the multimodality of digital media which alters our horizons of understanding and, in turn, influences our perceptions and interpretations. I have argued that these perceptions are subject to the hermeneutical process of “projecting” and “fore- grounding” which has an important relationship with rhetoric, whose epistemic function is to reify a particular understanding. Religio-political institutions (such as Hindu nationalist organizations) quite consciously, deliberately attempt to manage information in ways that alter or influence the formation of ideas around Hinduism through a persuasive rhetoric that relies on insider authority. Subsequently, individuals (such as cyber-activists) draw from the paradigms established by nationalist rhetoric in defending or re-presenting an ‘authentic’, insider view and challenge the contrary discourses.

In asking how this contested category of ‘Hinduism’ is encountered online (and what exactly is at stake when contrary or competing narratives challenge or critique politically invested religious discourses), I am highlighting the electronic public sphere as a dynamic, but important influence to the broader discourses around Hinduism. While Hindu nationalism is discussed thoroughly as a historical and political phenomenon, perhaps even more so now with the popular concern for Modi and BJP politics, to my knowledge the linking of Hindu nationalist rhetoric with global understandings of Hinduism is absent. There is no doubt that with the advent of Internet algorithms and ‘filter bubbles’,2 encountering Hinduism online becomes subject to these mechanisms of the medium, and thus who is ‘managing’ or challenging the public discussion, and how ‘Hinduism’ or ‘Hindu’ is presented online, becomes of paramount concern. To acknowledge the complicated colonial history of the word

“Hindu,” and influences of Orientalism and Western scholarship, but not address the

2 See chapter one, footnote 50.

Gittinger 176 discursive production of Hinduism in the electronic public sphere seems to be an incomplete understanding of the truly unstable nature of these terms and what they represent.

The manner in which religion is represented online is a persistent issue which has the ability to influence how that religion is understood (and the biases around such an understanding) in the wider public sphere. If one is unclear as to how popular or dominant presentations of a particular religion are formed online, consider how Islam has been portrayed on the Internet post 9/11. Antipodal to Islam’s recurring images of women in burqas, angry Imams, and raised-fisted terrorists, the presentation of Hinduism online is the world of Vivekananda, , colorful gods and goddesses, exotic music, and -laden ritual. It is the Hinduism of Gandhi, of the Beatles and Maharishi Yogi, of Eat, Pray, Love.

Hindu culture is further exotified and fetishized through the popularity of the Kāma Sūtra,

Bollywood, and yoga. A dichotomy emerges: the prevailing stereotype of Islam on the Web

(intolerant, violent, oppressive, barbaric) and the contrast of Hinduism (Vedic, colorful, non- violent, exotic). Such a rosy portrayal of Hindu culture is arguably more preferable than to the negative portrayal of global Islam, although it is equally problematic for the following reasons: 1) it excludes minority discourses (e.g. subaltern, local, tribal) in favor of upper caste discourse, 2) it disregards contrary narratives such as ‘saffron terrorism’ or radical Hindu nationalist politics, 3) it is partially couched in a colonial understanding of tradition, which is then presented as ‘authentic’, and 4) such understandings are shaped by Hindu nationalist discourse from within India. By running through media unchecked and unhindered, certain histories predominate while other histories are erased; this process is not always sinister and might arise quite organically through consumer trends or popular culture.

Gittinger 177

For this reason, I argue, that the discourses (which include text, image, and hyperlink) that prevail in an electronic public sphere such as the World Wide Web subsume alternate or even contrary presentations and narratives, thus having the potential for wider global influence on the perceptions of a religion or culture. In the case of Hinduism, these definitions and narratives are consciously presented and managed by Hindu nationalists who in turn affect or, in the case of Professor Doniger’s book, even limit alternative discourses which may seek to present Hinduism in a wider spectrum than nationalist ideologies allow.

When the battle for such terms—for which culture and religion are seemingly at stake—occur in the electronic public sphere, we have an opportunity to witness and analyze these contestations in order to understand how ideologies are disseminated, how communities are formed, and how modes of power are reiterated. As Lorne Dawson observes: “Media are not neutral or passive conduits for the transfer of information. They mold the message in ways that crucially influence the world views we construct. They adjust our self-conceptions, notions of human relations and community, and the nature of reality itself” (2004, 386). How

Hinduism is understood on the global stage is informed by the historical narrative of India and its people as articulated by Hindu nationalism, and by the Western audience which in which

Hindu tradition is both exotified and made to conform to our understanding of how a religion should function. The role of the Internet, in the replication and restriction of information, plays a much bigger part in this process than current scholarship is giving attention to, which will have to struggle to keep up with the constant changes of the medium. One thing is apparent: despite its decentralized architecture, the Web is not a purely democratic public sphere. The questions of authenticity and authority reveal power modalities (e.g., religious organization or structures which are separate from the institution, or in the semiotic sense by

Gittinger 178 which signs are transmitted by text or image), which dominate the production of discourse and regulate dissention. That there is a movement to engage in these electronic discourses through a call to cyber-activism (in the form of the Internet Hindus) is evidence that the electronic public sphere is considered a battleground in which time and energy must be invested to establish control of rhetoric.

This project contributes to a gap in scholarship in the present field of Religion and the

Internet. While there is a momentum in the field regarding Christianity online, how Eastern traditions like Hinduism and Buddhism are reconciled online have far less investigation at this time. While Heinz Scheifinger and Nicole Karapanagiotis have made great strides in discussing Hindu practice online (in the form of e-darśan or e-pūjā), I am raising a fundamental question regarding the discursive construction of religion online, and how it is already understood in its authenticity and authority of those who deem it so. In the case of

Hinduism, it is crucial to understand the role Hindu nationalism plays in this process, and the idea that Hindu culture is somehow at stake. This posture is couched in a particular narrative of India and of colonialism, which allows for a sense of urgency in preserving an idealized, nationalistic brand of Hindu tradition in effort to create a syndicated Hinduism worldwide.

Furthermore, how this ‘brand’ of Hinduism is encountered and consumed by Hindus in the

United States, and the role that the Internet plays in that process, will be a key part of understanding how diasporas may ‘culturally regroup’ in an era of modern technology—a future area of research interest.

This dissertation has attempted to contribute to these areas, through research and theoretical propositions, in effort to complement the sound scholarship already produced in the last decade with new questions that may or may not as of yet have answers. As Hinduism

Gittinger 179 is diverse and adaptable, the medium is dynamic, and the digital divide in India is starting to narrow, I expect these questions to continue.

Gittinger 180

Bibliography “780 languages spoken in India, 250 died out in last 50 years,” Hindustan Times July 17, 2013. http://www.hindustantimes.com/lifestyle/books/780-languages-spoken-in-india- 250-died-out-in-last-50-years/article1-1093758.aspx. Accessed July 2014. Adams, Paul C. and Rina Ghose. “India.com: the construction of a space between.” Progress in Human Geography 27.4 (2003): 414-437. Alam, Javeed. “A Look at Theory: Civil Society, Democracy and Public Sphere in India.” Civil Society, Public Sphere and Citizenship: Dialogues and Perceptions. 2005:348-364. Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. London: Verso, [1983] 1991. Anderson, A. A., Brossard, D., Scheufele, D. A., Xenos, M. A. and Ladwig, P. “The ‘Nasty Effect:’ Online Incivility and Risk Perceptions of Emerging Technologies.” Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication (2014) 19: 373–387 Appadurai, Arjun. Modernity al large: cultural dimensions of globalization. Vol. 1. U of Minnesota Press, 1996. ——— and Carol Breckenridge. “On moving targets.” Public Culture 2 (1989): i-iv. ———. “Why Public Culture?” Public Culture Vol. 1, No. 1 (1988): 5-9. Asad, Talal. Genealogies of religion: Discipline and reasons of power in Christianity and Islam. JHU Press, 1993. Bakker, Hans. Ayodhya: The History of Ayodhya from the 7 th Century BC to the Middle of the 18 th Century. Groningen: Egbert Forsten, 1986. Barber, Benjamin. “Jihad vs. McWorld.” The Atlantic Monthly 269.3 (1992): 53-65. Barker, Eileen. “Crossing the boundary.” Religion and cyberspace (2005): 67. Barney, Darin. “The Vanishing Table, Or Community in a World That Is No World.” In Community in the Digital Age, edited by Andrew Feenberg and Darin Barney Lanham, 31-52. MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004. Bauerlein, Mark, ed. The Digital Divide. New York: Penguin, 2011. Bayart, Jean-Francois. The Illusion of Cultural Identity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. Beckerlegge, Gwilym. From sacred text to internet. Aldershot, Hantz and Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2001. Beyer, Peter. "Religion and globalization." The Blackwell Companion to Globalization (2007): 444-460. Beyer, Peter. Religion and globalization. London: Sage Publications, 1994. Bhardwaj, Surinder, and Madhusudana Rao. “The Temple as a Symbol of Hindu Identity in America?” Journal of Cultural Geography 17.2 (1998): 125-143.

Gittinger 181

Bhatia, Sunil. American : Race, Culture, and Identity in the Indian Diaspora. New York: New York University Press, 2007. Bhatt, Chetan. Hindu nationalism: origins, ideologies and modern myths. Berg, 2001. Bhatt, Chetan and Parita Mukta. “Hindutva in the West: mapping the antinomies of diaspora nationalism,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 23.3 (2000): 407-441. Bloch, Esther, Marianne Keppens, and Rajaram Hegde, eds. Rethinking religion in India: the colonial construction of Hinduism. Routledge, 2009. Brass, Paul R. Language, religion and politics in North India. iUniverse, 2005. Brooks, Douglas R. Auspicious Wisdom: The Texts and Traditions of Srividya Sakta Tantrism in South India. SUNY Press, 1992. ———. “Taking Sides and Opening Doors: Authority and Integrity in the Academy’s Hinduism.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion. December, 68.4 (2000): 817-829. Campbell, Heidi A., ed. Digital Religion, Understanding Religious Practice in New Media Worlds. New York: Routledge, 2013. ———. Exploring Religious Community Online: We are One in the Network. New York: Peter Lang, 2005. ———. “Who’s got the power? Religious authority and the Internet.” Journal of Computer‐ Mediated Communication 12, no. 3 (2007): 1043-1062. Cantwell-Smith, Wilfred. The meaning and end of religion. Fortress Press, 1963. Capurro, Rafael. “Digital hermeneutics: an outline.” AI & society 25, no. 1 (2010): 35-42 Carey, James. “The Press, Public Opinion, and Public Discourse.” In Public Opinion and the Communication of Consent, edited by T. Glasser and C.Salmon, 373–402. NewYork: Guilford, 1995. Castells, Manuel. The rise of the network society: The information age: Economy, society, and culture. Vol. 1. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, 1998. ———. “Toward a sociology of the network society.” Contemporary sociology 29.5 (2000): 693-699. Chatterjee, Garga. “The rise and rise of portable religion.” DNA India. 23 June 2013. Accessed November 2013. http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-the-rise-and-rise-of-portable-religion- 1864356 Chatterjee, Partha. The nation and its fragments: Colonial and postcolonial histories. Vol. 11. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. Cheong, Pauline Hope. “Authority.” Digital Religion, Understanding Religious Practice in New Media World. Ed. Campbell, Heidi A. 72-87. New York: Routledge, 2013. ———, et al. Digital Religion, Social Media, and Culture. New York: Peter Lang, 2012.

Gittinger 182

Chiu, Chi‐Yue, and Shirley YY Cheng. “Toward a social psychology of culture and globalization: Some social cognitive consequences of activating two cultures simultaneously.” Social and Personality Psychology Compass 1.1 (2007): 84-100. Chopra, Rohit. “The Cyber Presence of Babri Masjid: History, Politics and Difference in Online Indian Islam,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Jan 19-25, 2008): 47-56. ———. Technology and Nationalism in India: Cultural Negotiations from Colonialism to Cyberspace. Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2008. “Christine Hine on virtual ethnography’s E3 on the Internet,” interview November 29, 2013. http://ethnographymatters.net/blog/2013/11/29/christine-hine-on-virtual-ethnographys- e3-internet/. Accessed November 2014. “Controversial book ‘The Hindus’ by religious scholar Wendy Doniger withdrawn by Penguin over lawsuit.” Report, Huffington Post (11 February 2014). Accessed February 2014: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/11/the-hindus-wendy- doniger-withdrawn_n_ 4769192.html Cowan, Douglas E. “Online U‐Topia: Cyberspace and the Mythology of Placelessness.” Journal for the scientific study of religion 44, no. 3 (2005): 257-263. Dalmia, Vasudha. The Nationalization of Hindu Traditions. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997. ———, and Heinrich von Stietencron, eds. Representing Hinduism: The construction of religious traditions and national identity. Sage Publications Pvt. Ltd, 1995. Datta, Pradip K. “VHP’s Ram at Ayodhya: Reincarnation through ideology and organisation.” Economic and political weekly (1991): 2517-2526. Davies, Madeline. “Google has replaced your grandparents’ wisdom.” Jezebel (1 March 2013). Accessed October 2013. http://jezebel.com/5987837/google-has-replaced-your- grandparents-wisdom. Dawson, Lorne L. “Researching Religion in Cyberspace: Issues and Strategies.” In Religion on the Internet: Research Prospects and Promises, edited by Jeffrey K. Hadden and Douglas E. Cowan, 25-54. Religion and the Social Order series, vol. 8. New York: Elsevier Science, 2000. ———. and Douglas E. Cowan, eds. Religion Online: Finding Faith on the Internet. New York and London: Routledge, 2004. http://www.digitalislam.eu/article.do?articleId=1877 Dirks, Nicholas B. Castes of mind: Colonialism and the making of modern India. Princeton University Press, 2011. ———. “The invention of caste: Civil society in colonial India.” Social Analysis 25 (1989): 42-52. ———. The scandal of empire: India and the creation of imperial Britain. Harvard University Press, 2009.

Gittinger 183

Doniger, Wendy. The Hindus: An Alternative History. Oxford University Press, 2009. Ebo, Bosah, ed. Cyberimperialism? Global Relations in the New Electronic Frontier. London: Praeger, 2001. Eck, Diana L. Banaras: City of light. Columbia University Press, 1983. Elin, Larry, and Steve Davis. Click on democracy: the Internet's power to change political apathy into civic action. Westview Press, Inc., 2002. Etzioni, Amitai. “Communitarianism.” In Encyclopedia of Community: From the Village to the Virtual World, Vol. 1, edited by Karen Christensen and David Levinson, 224-228. Sage Publications, 2003. Everaert, Christine. Tracing the boundaries between Hindi and Urdu: lost and added in translation between 20th century short stories. Vol. 32. Brill, 2010. Fairclough, N. and R. Wodak. “Critical Discourse Analysis.” In Introduction to Discourse Analysis, edited by Teun A. van Dijk, 258-284. London, 1997. Ferguson, N. “Sinking Globalization,” Foreign Affairs 84.2 (2005): 64-77. Feuer, Lewis Samuel. Imperialism and the Anti-Imperialist Mind. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1989. File, Thom. “Computer and Internet Use in the US.” Current Population Survey Reports 2011, P20-569. Washington, DC: US Census Bureau. Accessed July 2013. http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p20-569.pdf Fitzgerald, Timothy. “Hinduism and the ‘world religion’fallacy.” Religion 20, no. 2 (1990): 101-118. Flood, Gavin D. An introduction to Hinduism. Cambridge University Press, 1996. Foucault, Michel. The Archeology of Knowledge. New York: Pantheon Books, 1972. Fraser, Nancy. “Rethinking the public sphere: A contribution to the critique of actually existing democracy.” Social text 25/26 (1990): 56-80. Freitag, Sandria. “Sacred Symbol as Mobilizing Ideology: The North Indian Search for a ‘Hindu’ community,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 22.4 (1980): 597- 625. Frykenberg, Robert E. “The Emergence of Modern ‘Hinduism’as a Concept and as an Institution: A reappraisal with special reference to South India.” Hinduism reconsidered (1989): 29-49. ———. “Hindu fundamentalism and the structural stability of India.” Fundamentalism and the State, Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance,The Fundamentalism Project Vol. 3, Chicago (1993): 233-255. Fuller, C. J. The Flame: Popular Hinduism and Society in India. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Truth and method. New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1984 [1975].

Gittinger 184

———. Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy and Critique. Edited by Josef Bleicher. New York: Routledge 1980. Galtung, Johan. “Americanization Versus Globalization.” In Identity, Culture and Globalization. Edited by Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Yitzhak Sternberg, 277-289. Leiden and London: Brill, 2002. Geertz, Clifford. The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. New York: Basic Books, 1973. Gellner, Ernest. Nations and nationalism. Cornell University Press, 1983. Ghose, Sagarika. “In search of the modern Hindu.” Report, IBN-CNN. 14 August 2013. Accessed December 2013. http://ibnlive.in.com/blogs/sagarikaghose/223/64767/in- search-of-the-modern-hindu.html Ghosh, Anindita. “An Uncertain Coming of the Book: Early Print Cultures in Colonial India.” Book History 6 (2003): 23-55. Ghosh, Aurobindo. “Uttarpara Speech, 30 May 1909.” http://cw.routledge.com/textbooks/9780415485432/24.asp. Accessed June 2014. Giddens, Anthony. The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990. Gittinger, Juli. “Is there such a thing as ‘cyberimperialism’?” Continuum: Journal of Media and Cultural Studies 28.3 (forthcoming 2 May 2014). Guha, Ramachandra. Patriots & Partisans. Penguin UK, 2013. Gupta, Charu. Sexuality, Obscenity, Commuity—Women, Muslims, and the Hindu Public in Colonial India. New York: Palgrave, 2001. Habermas, Jurgen. “The Public Sphere.” In Rethinking popular culture: Contemporary perspectives in cultural studies, edited by Mukerji, Chandra, and Michael Schudson, 398-406. University of California Press, 1991. Hadden, Jeffrey K. and Douglas E. Cowan, eds. Religion on the Internet: Research Prospects and Promises. Religion and the Social Order, Vol 8. New York: Elsevier Science Inc., 2000. Halbfass, Wilhelm. Philology and Confrontation: Paul Hacker on Traditional and Modern Vedānta. New York: SUNY Press, 1995. Hampton, Keith and Barry Wellman, “The Not So Global Village of Netville.” In The Internet and Everyday Life, edited by Barry Wellman and Caroline Haythornethwaite, 345- 371. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002. Hansen, Thomas Blom. The saffron wave: Democracy and Hindu nationalism in modern India. Princeton University Press, 1999. Hawley, John Stratton. “Naming Hinduism.” Wilson Quarterly 15, no. 3 (1991): 20-34. ———. “Who Speaks for Hinduism—and Who Against?” Journal of the American Academy of Religion. December, 68.4 (2000): 711-720.

Gittinger 185

Hayes, Carlton. Essays on Nationalism. New York: MacMillan Company, 1937 [1926]. Heehs, Peter. “Shades of Orientalism. Paradoxes and Problems in Indian Historiography.” History and Theory 42 (2003), 169–195. Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton. Global Transformations. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999. Held, David and Anthony McGrew, eds. Globalization Theory: Approaches and Controversies. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2007. Helland, Christopher.“Online-religion/religion-online and virtual communitas.” In Religion on the Internet: Research Prospects and Promises, edited by Jeffrey K. Hadden and Douglas E. Cowan, 205-223. Religion and the Social Order, Vol 8. New York: Elsevier Science Inc., 2000. ———. “(Virtually) been there, (Virtually) done that: Online Puja and Virtual Religious Experience.” Online-Heidelberg Journal of Religions on the Internet 4.1 (2010):151- 178. Accessed July 2013. http://archiv.ub.uni- heidelberg.de/ojs/index.php/religions/article/download/9389/3267 Herrmann, Edward, and Robert W. McChesney. Global media: The new missionaries of global capitalism. Bloomsbury Publishing, 1997. Hiller, Harry H. and Tara M. Franz, “New ties, old ties and lost ties: the use of the internet in diaspora,” New Media and Society 6 (2004):731-752. Hine, Christine. Virtual ethnography. Sage, 2000. ———, ed. Virtual methods. Berg Publishers, 2005. Hlavach, Laura and William H. Freivogel. “Ethical Implications of Anonymous Comments Posted to Online News Stories,” Journal of Mass Media Ethics: Exploring Questions of Media Morality, 26.1 (2011), 21-37 Hobsbawm, Eric. The Age of Empire 1875-1914. London: Abacus, [1987] 1997. Holton, Robert. Making Globalization. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005. Hoover, Stewart M., Lynn Schofield Clark,and Lee Raine. Faith online. Pew Internet & American Life Project, 2004. Accessed October 2013. http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old- media/Files/Reports/2004/PIP_Faith_Online_2004.pdf.pdf ———. “Forward.” In Digital Religion, Social Media, and Culture. Edited by Pauline Hope Cheong, et al. vii-xii. New York: Peter Lang, 2012. ———. Religion in the Media Age. London/New York: Routledge, 2006. “Indian Censorship and the curious case of Wendy Doniger,” Huffington Post February 2, 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/murali-balaji/indian-censorship-and- the_b_4777117.html/. Accessed August 2014. “Internet in India 2013 Report.” Internet and Mobile Association of India. November 7, 2013. Accessed November 2013. http://www.iamai.in/rsh_pay.aspx?rid=0xVjWOWUhSU=

Gittinger 186

Isherwood, Christopher. Vedanta for the Western World. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1948.

Jacobsen, Knut A., ed. Brill's encyclopedia of Hinduism, v 4. Brill, 2009. ———. “Establishing ritual space in the Hindu diaspora in Norway.” Studies in the History of Religions (2004): 134-148. Jaffrelot, Christophe. “Hindu nationalism: Strategic syncretism in ideology building.” Economic and political weekly (1993): 517-524. ———, ed. Hindu nationalism: a reader. Princeton University Press, 2009. ———. The Hindu nationalist movement and Indian politics: 1925 to the 1990s: strategies of identity-building, implantation and mobilisation (with special reference to central India). Penguin Books India, 1999. ———. “The Parivar in America.” Indian Express. August 14, 2013. Accessed November 2013. http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/the-parivar-in-america/1155541/ ——— and Ingrid Therwath. “The Sangh Parivar and the Hindu Diaspora in the West: What Kind of ‘Long Distance Nationalism’?” International Political Sociology 1 (2007): 278-295. ——— and Ingrid Therwath. “Western Hindutva: Hindu nationalism in the United Kingdom and North America.” In and Globalization in South Asia and its Diaspora, edited by D. Heath and C. Mathur, 44-56. London: Routledge, 2011. Jensen, Jeppe Sinding. "Revisiting the insider-outsider debate: Dismantling a pseudo-problem in the study of religion." Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 23, no. 1 (2011): 29-47. Johnson, Chalmers. Blowback—The Costs and Consequences of American Empire. New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt and Company LLC, 2000. Jones, Steven., ed. Cybersociety: Computer-Mediated Communication and Community. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995. ———. Cybersociety 2.0. Thousand Oaks, CA and London: Sage Publications, 1998. Joshi, Murli Manohar, Chairman. Manifesto Committee. “BJP Manifesto : Lok Sabha Elections 2009.” Official website of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). April 3, 2009. Accessed December 2013. http://www.bjp.org/documents/manifesto/manifesto-lok- sabha-election-2009 Jouhki, J. “Orientalism in India.” J@rgonia – Elektroninen Julkaisusarja, 8 (2006). Karaflogka, Anastasia. E-religion: A Critical Appraisal of Religious Discourse on the World Wide Web. London: Equinox Publishing Ltd., 2006. ———. “Religious discourse and cyberspace.” Religion 32.4 (2002): 279-291.

Gittinger 187

Karapanagiotis, Nicole. “Cyber Forms, Worshipable Forms: Hindu Devotional Viewpoints on the Ontology of Cyber-Gods and-Goddesses.” International Journal of Hindu Studies (2013): 1-26. ———. “Vaishnava cyber-puja: problems of purity and novel ritual solutions.” Online- Heidelberg Journal of Religions on the Internet 4.1 (2010). Accessed November 2013. http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/ojs/index.php/religions/article/view/9391/3269 Kaviraj, Sudipta. The imaginary institution of India: politics and ideas. Columbia University Press, 2010. Kenniston, Kenneth. “Introduction: The Four Digital Divides.” In IT Experience in India: Bridging the Digital Divide, edited by Kenneth Kenniston and Deepak Kumar, 11-36. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2004. Khazaleh, Lorenz. Interview with Benedict Anderson. University of Oslo. December 15, 2005. Accessed August 2013. https://www.uio.no/english/research/interfaculty- research-areas/culcom/news/2005/anderson.html. King, Christopher R. “Forging a new linguistic identity: The Hindi movement in Banaras, 1868-1914.” In Culture and Power in Banaras: Community, Performance, and Environment, 1800-1980 (1989), edited by Sandra B. Frietag, 179-202. University of California Press, 1992. King, Richard. Orientalism and Religion: Post-Colonial Theory, India and the Mystic East. London: Routledge, 1999. Knott, Kim. Hinduism in Leeds: A Study of Religious Practice in the Indian Hindu Community and Hindu-Related Groups. Leeds: Community Religions Project, Univesity of Leeds, 1986. Kollock, Peter, and Marc Smith, eds. Communities in cyberspace. New York: Routledge, 1999. Kuran, Timur, and Sunstein, Cass. “Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation.” Stanford Law Review, 51.4 (1999). Kurien, Prema. A place at the multicultural table: The development of an American Hinduism. Rutgers University Press, 2007. Kurien, Prema. “Gendered Ethnicity: Creating a Hindu Indian Identity in the United States,” American Behavioral Scientist 42 (1999): 648-670. Kymlicka, Will. Multicultural odysseys: Navigating the new international politics of diversity. Vol. 7. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Lal, Vinay, ed. Political Hinduism: The Religious Imagination in Public Spheres. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Lemos, André. “The labyrinth of Minitel.” Cultures of Internet: Virtual spaces, real histories, living bodies (1996): 33-48.

Gittinger 188

Lipner, Julius. “A Remaking of Hinduism? or, Taking the Mickey out of Valmiki.” Religion and Media, edited by Hent de Vries and Samuel Weber, 3-42. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001. Lopez, Donald S. “Pandit’s Revenge.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion. December 68.4 (2000): 831-835. Lorenzen, David N. Who invented Hinduism: essays on religion in history. Yoda Press, 2006. Lum, Thomas. “CRS Report for Congress: China and Falun Gong.” US Department of State Foreign Press Centers. May 25, 2006. Accessed July 2013. http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/67820.pdf Lutgendorf, Philip. “All in the (Raghu) Family: A Video Epic in Cultural Context.” In Media and the Transformation of Religion in South Asia, edited by Lawrence A. Babb and Susan S. Vadley, 217-253. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1995. Lutgendorf, Philip. “Ramayan: the video.” TDR (1990): 127-176. Mallapragada, Madhavi. “Desktop deities: Hindu temples, online cultures and the politics of remediation.” South Asian Popular Culture 8.2 (2010): 109-121. Macaulay, Thomas B. "Minute on Indian Education, February 2, 1835."Postcolonialisms: An anthology of cultural theory and criticism (2005): 121-131. Masuzawa, Tomoko. The Invention of World Religions: or, how European universalism was preserved in the language of pluralism. University of Chicago Press, 2005. McCutcheon, Russell T. "The ideology of closure and the problem with the insider/outsider problem in the study of religion." Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 32, no. 3 (2003): 337-352. ———. Manufacturing religion: The discourse on sui generis religion and the politics of nostalgia. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. McDermott, Robert A. "Indian Spirituality in the West: A Bibliographical Mapping." Philosophy East and West (1975): 213-239. McLuhan, Marshall, ed. The Gutenberg galaxy: The making of typographic man. University of Toronto Press, 1962 ———. Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. Cambridge, England: MIT Press, 1994. Metcalf, Barbara D., and Thomas R. Metcalf. A concise history of modern India. Cambridge University Press, 2006. Metcalf, Thomas R. Ideologies of the Raj. Vol. 3. Cambridge University Press, 1997. Migration Information Source. “Indian Immigrants in the US.” July 2008. Accessed November 2013. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/indian-immigrants-united- states-0/

Gittinger 189

Mukta, Parita. “‘New Hinduism’—teaching intolerance, practicing aggression.” In REsource: Professional Reflection on Theory and Practice in Religious Education vol. 20 (1997): 9-13. ———. “The public face of Hindu nationalism.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 23.3 (2000): 442- 466. Nakamura, Lisa. Cybertypes: Race, Ethnicity, and Identity on the Internet. New York and London: Routledge, 2002. Nandy, Ashis, Shikha Trivedy, Shail Mayaram, and Achyut Yagnik. Creating a nationality: the Ramjanmabhumi Movement and Fear of the Self. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995. ———. Time warps: Silent and evasive pasts in Indian politics and religion. Rutgers University Press, 2002. Naregal, Veena. Language, Politics, Elites and the Public Sphere: Western India Under Colonialism. Anthem Press, 2002. Negroponte, Nicholas. Being Digital. Random House Digital, Inc., 1996. Nehru, Jawaharlal. The discovery of India. Penguin Books India, 1946. Neyazi, Taberez Ahmed. "Cultural imperialism or vernacular modernity? Hindi newspapers in a globalizing India." Media, Culture & Society 32, no. 6 (2010): 907-924. Norris, Sigrid. "Multimodal discourse analysis: a conceptual framework."Discourse and technology: Multimodal discourse analysis (2004): 101-115. Olston, Christopher, and Marc Najork. “Web crawling.” Foundations and Trends in Information Retrieval 4, no. 3 (2010): 175-246.

Ong, Walter J. Orality and literacy: The technologizing of the word. Routledge, 2012 Orsini, Francesca. “The Hindu Public Sphere.” In The Indian public sphere: Readings in media history. Edited by Arvind Rajagopal, 121-134. Oxford University Press, 2009. Overdorf, Jason. “India: Meet the ‘Internet Hindus’,” Global Post, June 18, 2012. Accessed November 2013: http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia- pacific/india/120615/internet-hindus-hindu-nationalists-right-wing-politics Pandey, Gyanendra. “Mobilization in a Mass Movement: Congress ‘Propaganda’ in the United Provinces (India).” Modern Asian Studies 9.2 (1975): 205-226. ———. “Modes of history writing: New Hindu history of Ayodhya.” Economic and Political Weekly (1994): 1523-1528. Papacharissi, Zizi. "Democracy online: Civility, politeness, and the democratic potential of online political discussion groups." New Media & Society 6, no. 2 (2004): 259-283. ———. “The virtual sphere: The internet as a public sphere.” New media & society 4.1 (2002): 9-27.

Gittinger 190

Pariser, Eli. The filter bubble: How the new personalized web is changing what we read and how we think. Penguin, 2011. Parsons, Timothy. The British Imperial Century, 1815-1914: A World History Perspective. Rowman & Littlefield, 1999. “Penguin agrees to axe Wendy Doniger’s controversial book The Hindus: An Alternative History,” report, India Today Online (11 February, 2014). Accessed February 2014: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/wendy-doniger-the-hindus-alternative-history- penguin-scrapped/1/342913.html Pennington, Brian Kemble. Was Hinduism Invented?: Britons, Indians, and the Colonial Construction of Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. “Percentage of Individuals Using the Internet 2000-2012.” International Telecommunication Union. Accessed July 2013. http://www.itu.int/en/ITU- D/Statistics/Documents/statistics/2013/Individuals_Internet_2000-2012.xls Pinkney, Andrea Marion. “Revealing the Vedas in ‘Hinduism’.” Routledge Handbook of Religions in Asia (2014): 30-46. Pradhan, Kunal and Jayant Sriram, “Rise of the Cyber Hindu.” India Today, November 1, 2013. Accessed October 2013. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/social-media-internet- cyber-hindu-twitter-narendra-modi/1/321267.html Putnam, Robert. “The Strange Disappearance of Civic America.” The American Prospect 24.1 (1996): 34-48. Radde-Antweiler, Kerstin. “Virtual Religion. An Approach to a Religious and Ritual Topography of Second Life.” Online-Heidelberg Journal of Religions on the Internet 3.1 (2008). Accessed August 2013. http://www.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/archiv/8294 Rai, Amit. “India On-line: Electronic Bulletin Boards and the Construction of a Diasporic Hindu Identity.” Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, 4.1 (1995): 31-57. Rairikar, Shachi. “The Internet Hindus.” Blog, Organiser. April 4, 2010. Accessed December 2013. http://organiser.org/archives/historic/dynamic/modules3ef5.html?name=Content&pa= showpage&pid=338&page=29 Rajagopal, Arvind. “Hindu nationalism in the US: changing configurations of political practice,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 23.3 (2000): 467-496. ———. Politics After Television: Hindu Nationalism and the Reshaping of the Public in India. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001. ———. “, consumer identity and image-based politics.” Economic and Political Weekly (1994): 1659-1668. Rambachan, Anatanand. The Limits of Scripture: Vivekananda's Reinterpretation of the Vedas. University of Hawaii Press, 1994. Rao, Anupama. The caste question: Dalits and the politics of modern India. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009.

Gittinger 191

Rao, Nandini, and C. Rammanohar Reddy. “Ayodhya, the print media and communalism.” In Destruction and conservation of cultural property. Edited by R. Layton, et.al., 139- 156. London: Routledge, 2001, “Recommendations on National Broadband Plan, 8th December 2010,” Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI). Acccessed July 2013. http://www.slideshare.net/SubrataMondal1/broadbandrecommendation08-12-10final “Religious Affiliation of Asian Americans,” Pew Research Religion and Public Life Project 2012. Accessed Aug 2013. http://www.pewforum.org/2012/07/19/asian-americans-a- mosaic-of-faiths-overview/ Rheingold, Howard. The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier. London and Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000 [1993]. Richwine, Jason. “Indian Americans: The New Model Minority.” Forbes. February 24, 2009. Access November 2013. http://www.forbes.com/2009/02/24/bobby-jindal-indian- americans-opinions-contributors_immigrants_minority.html Robertson, Roland. Globalization: Social theory and global culture. Vol. 16. Sage, 1992. Rosenberg, J. “Globalization Theory: A Post Mortem,” International Politics 42 (2005): 2-74. Rusciano, Frank Louis. “The Three Faces of Imperialism.” In Cyberimperialism? Global Relations in the New Electronic Frontier, edited by Bosah Ebo, 9-25. London: Praeger, 2001. Said, Edward. Orientalism. New York: Random House, 1979. Santana, Arthur D. "Virtuous or vitriolic: The effect of anonymity on civility in online newspaper reader comment boards." Journalism Practice 8, no. 1 (2014): 18-33. Savarkar, V.D. Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu? New Delhi: Hindi Sahita Sadan, 1969 [1923]. Scheifinger, Heinz. “Hindu Embodiment and the Internet,” Online—Heidelberg Journal of Religion on the Internet 4.1 (2010): 196-218. Access September 2013. http://www.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/archiv/11305 ———. “Hindu worship online and offline.” In Digital Religion, Understanding Religious Practice in New Media Worlds, edited by Heidi A. Campbell, 121-127. New York: Routledge, 2013. ———. “Hinduism and Cyberspace,” Religion 38 (2008): 233-249. Searle-Chatterjee, Mary. “‘World religions’ and ‘ethnic groups’: do these paradigms lend themselves to the cause of Hindu nationalism?” Ethnic and Racial Studies 23.3 (2000): 497-515. Sen, Amartya. The Argumentative Indian—Writings on Indian Culture, History and Identity. London: Penguin Books, 2005. Sharma, Jyotirmaya. A Restatement of Religion: Swami Vivekananda and the Making of Hindu Nationalism. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2013.

Gittinger 192

Singh, D. K. “Shashi Tharoor to lead Congress 'fightback' on social media with Shah Rukh Khan,” , March 11, 2013. Accessed May 2014: http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/shashi-tharoor-to-lead-congress-fightback-on- social-media-with-shah-rukh-khan/1086087 Slevin, James. The Internet and Society. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2000. Smart, Ninian. Dimensions of the sacred: an anatomy of the world's beliefs. University of California Press, 1996. Smart, Ninian. “The importance of diasporas.” In Migration, Diasporas and Transnationalism, edited by Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen, 420-429. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1999. Smith, Brian K. “Who Does, Can, and Should Speak for Hinduism?” Journal of the American Academy of Religion. December, 68.4, (2000): 741-749. Smith, Marc A. and Peter Kollock, eds. Communities in Cyberspace. London: Routledge, 1999. Stark, Ulrike. An Empire of Books. Ranikhet, India: Permanent Black, 2007. Stolow, Jeremy. “Religion and/as Media.” Theory Culture Society 22.4 (2005): 119-145. Taylor, Alan. “Diwali: The Festival of Lights.” The Atlantic. November 13, 2012. Web. “Technology worship: sign of the times.” Patriactionary (blog). November 15, 2012. Accessed November 2013. http://patriactionary.wordpress.com/2012/11/15/technology-worship-sign-of-the- times/ Thapar, Romila. A History of India. Penguin UK, 1989. Therwath, Ingrid. "Cyber-hindutva: Hindu nationalism, the diaspora and the Web." Social Science Information 51, no. 4 (2012): 551-577. Tomlinson, John. Cultural Imperialism. London: Printer Publishers, 1991. Tönnies, Ferdinand. Community and Civil Society. Translated by Jose Harris and Margaret Hollis. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. ———. Community and Association (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft). Translated by Charles US Department of Commerce US Census Bureau. “Profile of General Population and Housing Characteristics: 2010.” Accessed August 2013. http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bk mk “USA’s Best: Indian Americans top community.” Report, IBN Live. February 20, 2009. Accessed November 2013. http://ibnlive.in.com/news/usas-best-indian-americans-top- community/85882-2.html van der Veer, Peter. “Hindus: a superior race.” Nations and Nationalism 5.3 (1999): 419-430. ———. Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India. University of California Press, 1994.

Gittinger 193

Van Dijk, Teun A. "Aims of critical discourse analysis." Japanese discourse 1, no. 1 (1995): 17-28. ———. “Structures of discourse and structures of power.” Communication yearbook 12 (1989): 18-59. Venkatachalapathy, A.R. The Province of the Book: Scholars, Scribes, and Scribblers in Colonial Tamil Nadu. Ranikhet, India: Permanent Black, 2012. Vertovec, Steven. “Community and congregation in London Hindu temples: divergent trends,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 18.2 (2010): 251-264. ———. The Hindu Diaspora. London: Routledge, 2000. Viswanathan, Gauri. “Colonialism and the Construction of Hinduism.” In The Blackwell Companion to Hinduism. Edited by Gavin Flood, 23-44. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. ———. Masks of conquest: Literary study and British rule in India. Columbia University Press, 1989. Weber, Max (1958) The Religion of India. Glencoe (IL): The Free Press Wellman, Barry and Caroline Haythornthwaite, eds. The Internet in Everyday Life. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002. ———. Networks in the Global Village. Boulder, CO and London, UK: Westview Press, 1999. ——— and Milena Gulia, “Virtual Communities as Communities.” Communities in Cyberspace. Eds. Marc A. Smith and Peter Kollock. 167-194. London: Routledge, 1999b. Williams, Raymond. Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. New York: Routledge, [1985] 2011. Wodak, Ruth. The discursive construction of national identity. Edinburgh University Press, 2009. Young, Katherine. “World Religions: A category in the making?” In Religion Dans L’histoire. Edited by Michel Despland, et.al. 111-130. Toronto: Canadian Corporation for Studies in Religion/Corporation Canadienne des Sciences Religieuses, 1992. Zastoupil, Lynn. Rammohun Roy and the Making of Victorian Britain. Palgrave Macmillian, 2010.

Gittinger 194

Websites:

Bharatiya Janata Party bjp.org

The official website of the BJP, a Hindu nationalist party in India and dominating party of the Lok Sabha.

Encyclopedia of Authentic Hinduism encyclopediaofauthentichinduism.org

Website featuring Swami Prakashanand Saraswati and his book The True History and the Religion of India. “An amazing literature that gives the true understanding of authentic Hinduism.”

Hindu Janajagruti Samiti hindujagruti.org

The official website of the HJS, a global Hindu organization promoting efforts towards an “all Hindu nation.” Thought to be an offshoot of the RSS.

Hindu Unity hinduunity.org

Host website of the Bajrang Dal and other militant, radical Hindu nationalist groups. This site was deactivated late 2013, but is still viewable through archives.

Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh rss.org

The official website of the RSS, a right-wing and sometimes militant Hindu nationalist party in India.

Vishva Hindu Parishad vhp.org

The official website of the VHP, a transnational Hindu nationalist party emphasizing Hinduism worldwide. It is also the parent organization of the Bajrang Dal.

Wayback Machine web.archive.org

Archive of webpages since the inception of the Internet, with screenshots and links from any site that was webcrawled at the time.

Gittinger 195

Appendix

The starting point for my research on Hinduism online began with a collection of surveys. One of the initial questions with which I was concerned was how Hindu non-resident Indians (NRIs) living in the United States are using the Internet and encountering Hinduism online. This was inspired, in no small part, by an article titled “Google has replaced your grandparents’ wisdom” which ran in 2013 on the website of feminist e-magazine Jezebel. The article posited that, in our cyber age and with ease of information access, we no longer ask our parents or grandparents about things that we can easily find online.1 To explore this idea, I surveyed Hindu students at

American universities about how they used the Internet, how they encountered Hinduism, and if it was relevant to their identity as a Hindu.

My proposed method of ethnography was quite simple: I would construct an online survey of how Hindus used the Internet and negotiated religious and/or cultural identity online, and then send the link and a brief explanation of my project to the officers and administrators of various Hindu student groups at universities in the United States—Hindu Student Councils,

Indian Graduate Student Associations, and so forth. The organizations would then be able to distribute the invitation across their internal list-servs, thereby protecting the anonymity of their members. I assembled a list of almost forty universities in the state of New York alone who had such organizations, as well as schools in Texas, California, and the Midwest.

1 According to a UK study, less than one in four grandparents claim to have been asked advice on domestic chores such as learning to cook family recipes, sewing on a buttons or tying ties. Only one third of grandparents said that they had been asked by their grandchildren about what life was like when they were young, mostly because young people are increasingly turning to internet resources like Google, Wikipedia and YouTube to answer their questions about anything from how to make borscht to what it was like to grow up during WWII (Davies 2013).

Gittinger 196

I made some very careful considerations in constructing the survey. It was anonymous

(although there was an option to provide an email for further questioning), brief (less than twenty questions), and I cautiously avoided questions that were related to Hindu nationalism. In fact, in the early stages of my research, I had planned to avoid the subject entirely and concentrate on cultural identity rather than political elements. I was surprised that only four universities responded from New York, one from the Midwest, and a handful of students from a California and Texas university—a total of 80 respondents from American universities, all falling between the ages of 18-35.

It was only after my surveys had been running for several months that I came across an article by a South Indian Christian woman who had done field work on Hinduism in America.

She noted that despite the fact she was Indian, there was great mistrust from Hindus that she would not represent them well, or that she was an outsider who had no business discussing

Hinduism (see Kurien 2007). Despite her attempts to engage in conversations on message boards online (where she did not conceal her non-Hindu status), she failed to allay the fears of mischaracterization of her potential subjects. In reading this account, I came to realize that I may have experienced a similar bias, especially if the curious person has found my publications

(which are critical of Hindu nationalism and discuss Hindu terrorism). This was certainly the case of the editor of Hinduism Today, electronically introduced to me by one of my professors, in hopes that the magazine might be able to help me with my survey distribution. The editor politely told me he had searched my name on Google and saw some of my other publications— which were critical of BJP politics—after which he decided he didn’t want to be involved.

Gittinger 197

For this reason, I again turned my attention to the role of nationalism online, no longer able to ignore the political aspect of Hinduism in the global sphere. Much in the way I have been thinking about this process, Kurien notes that in her research in the United States she found that

Hindutva supporters were becoming the central authority and hegemonic voice that Hinduism had so far lacked, defining Hinduism, Indian identity, Indian history and culture, and the obligations of good Hindus. Thus many elements of the Hindutva discourse were manifesting themselves in the self-definition and explanations of lay Hindu Indian Americans, even those who were uninterested in or opposed to Hindu nationalism (Kurien 2007, x).

It is for this reason that the current incarnation of the project shifted more towards competing discourses of Hinduism, rather than looking at diasporic conceptions of Hindu identity as presented or encountered in digital spaces. Frustratingly, the most interesting conversations about Hindu identity and authenticity of tradition are going on behind closed doors—closed communities and message boards to which I have no access as a non-Hindu. Even a generic

Facebook account which had an abbreviated version of my name, no pictures, and my gender set to “male” did not help me access groups such as the Internet Hindus or the Hindu Students

Council (full subterfuge, such as taking an Indian name and making a false identity entirely was not an ethical proposition for this project). The few contacts I made with cyber-activists, I should note, were with full disclosure of my name, gender, and school affiliation.

Although my surveys were directed towards another hypothesis, they nonetheless were fruitful in that they gave me a better picture of how younger Hindus (abroad or in India) might be encountering their traditions online. More importantly, the questions I formed as my primary hypotheses—about authenticity, authority, and definitions of “Hindu” online—arose from the communication between many of these respondents after the completion of the surveys. For this reason, I am able to share some interesting data that may help think about the role of the Internet in this process.

Gittinger 198

Surveys:

I found the best way to analyze the responses from the American Hindu students was to sort them by their status as ‘visiting’, ‘first generation’, ‘second generation’, or beyond. 52.6% of those surveyed were in the US on visa or exchange. 31.58% were first generation, that is, born in

India but moved here with their family at some point, and 15.79% were second generation, born in the US to parents who migrated from India. None of those surveyed were third generation, but that is consonant with US census data which shows that prior to 1980, Indian immigrants were quite low, and almost doubling per decade since.2

Frequency of being online was highest among foreign students at 83% saying they were online “pretty much constantly” compared to 69% of first generation and 45% of second generation. Almost all students across the board accessed the Internet via personal laptop or home computer, in addition to using a smart phone second and lastly through a public or school computer.

As for the sites they frequented on a daily basis, Facebook was fairly universal, with second generation being 100% and the other two categories being only slightly less. As might be predicted, reading US electronic newspapers was highest among second generation (63.6%, with lowest first generation 26.1%), and reading Indian electronic newspapers was highest among the visiting students (61.1%, with lowest second generation 27.3%). A significant indicator was the

2 According to US Census reports the figures are as follows, revealing a dramatic increase in the last generation: 1940: 2,045 1980: 362,531 1990: 815,447 2000: 1,678,765 2010: 2,843,391 Gittinger 199 frequency with which they visited Hindu cultural websites or Hindu religious websites;3 the more ‘naturalized’ the person was, the less likely they frequented those sites on a daily basis.

(table 1) Visiting First generation Second generation Hindu cultural sites 16.7% 4.3% 9% Hindu religious sites 13.9% 4.3% 0

I also distinguished three categories by which a person may identify as ‘Hindu’—cultural, religious, and political. Presenting these three options (with ability to choose multiple identifiers), the results were as follows:

(table 2) Visiting First generation Second generation Culturally 86.1% 87% 90.9% Religiously 72.2% 52.2% 45.5% Politically 16.7% 17.4% 0

It would seem that the delineation between ‘culture’ and ‘religion’—as is often made in Western scholarship—was more evident with students who were second generation, thus choosing the cultural distinction over other categories. Again, identifying as ‘religiously Hindu’ dropped off generationally, as did identifying politically over time.

One interesting set of data was borne out of the article I cited earlier, “Google has replaced your grandparents’ wisdom.” I gave the students categories in which they could either say they would go to their parents or go online first to inquire about: a traditional recipe, a guru or religious figure, opinions on Indian politics, how to celebrate a traditional holiday, personal

3 A Hindu ‘religious’ site would include websites with sacred texts, information about or religious practice, and other portals which are clearly designed towards the Hindu religious practitioner. Hindu ‘cultural’ sites would include tourism websites, shopping, and more general ways to interact with Hindu culture as one would encounter in an ethnic neighborhood. It should be noted, however, categories such as ‘culture’ and ‘religion’ in India are conflated, as they are inextricably intertwined. For example, tourism sites which I have relegated to the category of ‘culture’ are often sacred locales, and thereby ‘religious’ as well. The distinction was made to differentiate searches and web surfing that was explicitly religious in purpose (as in the case of accessing a commentary about the Bhagavad Gita) but I acknowledge that ultimately this distinction is a superficial one beyond the context of this survey.

Gittinger 200 issues with ethnic identity, and questions about historical events in modern India (see table 3).4

The second generation, which would be the most ‘americanized’, relied heavily on the Internet for information about religious or historical figures, personal issues regarding identity, and historical events in India.

(Table 3) “Are you more likely to ask a family member or to do an Internet search to find out about the following topics:”

A. A traditional recipe B. A Guru, priest, or other historical figure C. Opinions on Indian political issues D. How to celebrate a traditional holiday E. Personal issues with ethnic identity, relationships, or social struggles F. About Partition, Emergency, or another historical event post 1948

(results given as: family / Internet)

A B C D E F Visiting/non- US citizen 69% / 31% 44% / 56% 14% / 86% 97% / 3% 50% / 50% 22% / 78% First generation 67% / 33% 48% / 52% 38% / 62% 86% / 14% 62% / 38% 24% / 76% Second generation 82% / 18% 9% / 91% 36% / 64% 91% / 9% 27% / 73% 9% / 91%

Rather than focus on the ratio of parental-information versus Web-source information, it is worth looking at the latter on its own. It is clear that the Internet is playing an active role across the board—albeit at different levels—in cultural negotiations. Overall, 54% of those surveyed are turning to the Internet to help deal with personal issues of ethnic identity, relationships, or social struggles. While an overwhelming percent rely on their parents for the transmission of culture of traditions such as holiday celebration and food recipes, 71% preferred to forge their political

4 Note: not all survey-takers answered this section, which was the most time consuming (71 out of 80 surveyed). Percentiles rounded up/down to whole numbers.

Gittinger 201 identities outside the home, turning to the Internet for opinions on Indian political issues and information about historical events in India.

Another important question was: “when you enter cyberspace, how important is it that you retain your cultural identity?”

(table 4) Visiting First generation Second generation Very important, I am clearly 11.1% 15.0% 0 Hindu and/or Indian Somewhat important. I don’t 38.9% 25.0% 63.6% hide it but I don’t make a point to emphasize it. Not important, I construct a 47.2% 45.0% 36.4% fairly generic identity online that could be anything I deliberately choose 2.8% 15.0% 0 anonymity and hide my cultural background online.

These figures suggest that, among the students surveyed, the second generation overall felt their ethnic identity was important enough to reveal to some degree online, but not to the point of emphasis or anonymity. This suggests that the more removed they are from the memory of the homeland, the more important this identity becomes to them. If this is a correct assumption, then this is consistent with what is often called ‘symbolic ethnicity’, a theory put forth by sociologist

Mary Waters (1990) in which she questions the process of claiming an ethnic label among middle-class Americans. 5 In his book American Karma Sunil Bhatia employs the concept of symbolic ethnicity as a heuristic device in his study of American Hindus, positing that the claim

5 Referring specifically to white Americans, the ethnic identity is symbolic, personal choice, and does not influence daily life: It does not determine where you will live, who your friends will be, what job you will have, or whether you will be subject to discrimination. It only matters in voluntary ways—in celebrating holidays with a special twist, cooking a special ethnic meal…remembers a special phrase or two in a foreign language (Waters 1990, 147).

Gittinger 202 to Indianness enhances the belonging to a community while at the same time highlighting individualism (Bhatia 2007, 25).

Indian migrants counter their assignations of otherness by invoking the discourse of sameness, equality, and universal humanity to define their sense of identity. Their assertions of self, through the frame of universal humanity, do not mean that they are erasing their ethnicity or sense of “being Indian.” Rather, they want to invoke their Indian ethnicity without having to feel that displaying their Indianness will have negative costs (Bhatia, 25).

As Bhatia’s research explores, Indian migrants are more comfortable with highlighting their cultural identity than racial identity in order to avoid the stigmas that ‘people of color’ have in the US. As Indians have some of the highest education and highest household income in the US, they fit the ‘model minority’ and ‘invisible minority’ archetypes.

As one respondent noted, “Here, I am American, but to maintain my cultural identity I find the Internet is a good place to find community.” Another said, “I don’t personally use the

Internet to ‘maintain a cultural identity’ but I feel it is a valuable tool to connect immigrant communities to useful resources and to facilitate communication with other members of the community.” 44% of visiting students reported they felt more connected to India as a sort of

‘homeland’ through online communities, 34% of first generation agreed, while none of the second generation surveyed experienced that connection. Thus it is clear that computer-mediated communication has the potential to facilitate a sense of community which plays an important role among the diaspora; constitution of ethnic identity and choosing to identify as culturally Hindu, however, did not necessarily reflect imagining a connection to India as a motherland.

The question I would raise at this point is whether or not Hindu NRIs are using the

Internet much differently than the average American student. Or perhaps a better question might ask not how migrants are negotiating religious or cultural identity online, but how religion and culture is negotiated online in general. This broader question is being well traversed in current

Gittinger 203 scholarship, although studying the symbols and cultures of the ‘other’ may be easier simply because it appears more visible. As Nakamura (2002) argues, “the Internet is a place where race happens.”6 Could we not argue that “the Internet is a place where cultural/religious identity happens” as well?

To explore the idea that one didn’t have to be an immigrant to seek cultural regrouping online, I replicated my survey, with some modifications and additions. Through faculty contacts,

I invited students at University of Delhi and Benares Hindu University to take the revised survey.7 Although I received only 20 responses, the results were interesting on many levels. One was of particular interest: the question of how one conceives of oneself as a ‘Hindu’—culturally, religiously, and/or politically?

Wanting to eliminate the overlap experienced in the US survey, I had them rank by level of importance the three nuances of being Hindu. The results for top ranking identifier were not surprising:

 Culturally, religiously, politically 75% (15 respondents)  Religiously, culturally, politically 13% (3 respondents)  Politically, religiously, culturally 12% (2 respondents)

As far as online communities are concerned, 15 out of the 20 reported they belonged to a virtual community (chat group, organization or other community that has little or no ‘real world’ interaction).

6 Nakamura’s study of the discursive and rhetorical production of racial categories in cyberspace (what she terms “cybertypes”) is a thoughtful investigation of how ‘race’ is created, delineated, and recognized through the language of the Internet. She notes that being ascribed a particular race or ethnicity is already a disorienting position, but being typed as such in cyberspace is “doubly disorienting” (2002, xv). 7 Again, these were university students, 87.5% which were between 21-30 years old and 12.5% between 31-40 years old. The immediate differences from the US students surveyed was that they were online less frequently (only 25% reported they were online “pretty much constantly” as opposed to an over 71% of the US group. Also, while over 82% accessed the Internet via smartphone in the US, only 25% of those surveyed in India reported doing so. Overall their use of the Internet was on a par with US students, although 100% of the Indian students surveyed frequented news sites such as CNN or BBC, compared to about 61% of those in the US.

Gittinger 204

As I noted briefly my discussion on globalization (chapter one), I posed a new question to the students as to what they would consider to be ‘authentic’ Hinduism, and they were invited to check as many categories as applied. Here were the choices:

 Traditions that draw from classic texts such as the Vedas or Dharmashastras  Traditions which have syncretic elements (Hinduism blended with Christian or tribal traditions, for example)  Non-textual or non-doctrinal traditions which are practiced locally  Purely devotional or bhakti practices  Western versions of Hinduism which have been popularized worldwide (such as neo-Vedanta, , etc.)

With the exception of one person who ruled out ‘non-textual/local traditions’ and ‘Western versions’, an overwhelming majority of the other respondents agreed that authentic Hinduism must draw exclusively from the classical texts (85%) or, conversely, saw Hinduism as encompassing all of the above (10%). Looking at individual responses, those who felt the only authentic Hinduism was the textual/classical tradition also felt that engaging religion online was problematic.

A little more than half of the respondents thought one could encounter an ‘authentic’

Hinduism online, either requiring a little extra work to sort through the Westernized sources

(28%) or taking the position that traditions found on the Internet as just as ‘authentic’ since there were all sorts of Hindu tradition in general (29%). The rest thought that religion and culture must be engaged in real space and could not be found online (28%) or that the Internet is just too

Westernized/Americanized to find authentic Hindu culture at all (15%).

It is from these two surveys (the American one with 80 students and Indian one with 20 students) that the hypotheses for this dissertation formed. Although a small sampling, and only a foundation for further research in the area of ‘cultural regrouping’ online, it is clear that the

Internet is playing a role in how young Hindus encounter Hinduism online. For this reason, these

Gittinger 205 discussions of presentation, production, and management of “Hindu” and “Hinduism” in the electronic public sphere are an important one.

Gittinger 206