Decision at Casablanca

The daytime vs. nighttime bombing debate carried the highest stakes—the outcome of the war against Germany. Decision at Casablanca

IXTY years ago, in January By Herman S. Wolk 1943, the US Army Air Forces leadership squared off against Britain’s air ministry and Prime Min- Sister Winston Churchill on the key issue of strategic bombing. The decision that was reached at a 10-day Despite damage, a B-17 stays in formation and drops its bombs. British conference in Casablanca, French leaders were skeptical of AAF plans to conduct daytime strategic bombing of Morocco, marked a critical turning Germany. point in World War II. Allied heads of state and the Com- bined Chiefs of Staff at the Casa- blanca Conference, the second of the AngloÐAmerican wartime meetings, faced this question: Should the AAF continue its daylight strategic bombing campaign or join the Royal Air Force in night bombing operations against Nazi Germany? The Allies had to decide where to attack after completing the North November 1942 under the code name African campaign. By late 1942, there Operation Torch and soon showed already were signs that the Allies good progress. In late November, were beginning to take the offensive after the Allies defeated the Nazis in against the Axis powers. Tunisia, President Franklin D. Roose- In the Southwest Pacific, Maj. Gen. velt recommended to Churchill that George C. Kenney’s Fifth Air Force Britain, Russia, and the US convene had gained air superiority over Ja- a military conference. pan, and by 1943, Buna, Papua (a Roosevelt seemed certain that So- critical point in the battle for New viet Premier Joseph Stalin would Guinea), fell to the Allies. Previ- want to attend. Churchill willingly ously, in May and June 1942, Japan accepted since, as he said, “At present had suffered heavy losses in the battle we have no plan for 1943 which is on of the Coral Sea and Midway island. the scale or up to the level of events.” On Guadalcanal, the tide had turned As it turned out, Stalin declined in favor of the US Marines. the invitation, saying he was too busy On the other Axis front, the Allies repelling the Germans at Stalingrad. had invaded North Africa in early However, the meeting stood, because

78 AIR FORCE Magazine / January 2003 AIR FORCE Magazine / January 2003 78 The daytime vs. nighttime bombing debate carried the highest stakes—the outcome of the war against Germany. Decision at Casablanca

78 AIR FORCE Magazine / January 2003 AIR FORCE Magazine / January 2003 78 Churchill wanted to gain American daytime, the B-17 bomber would be expensive, they will abandon it and approval for a Mediterranean strat- vulnerable to Luftwaffe fighters. turn to night action. ... But they will egy that called for an attack on Italy Because the RAF’s Bomber Com- not do this until they are convinced in 1943. Churchill believed that hit- mand had suffered heavy losses dur- of the necessity. And they will only ting the underbelly of Hitler’s For- ing daylight raids, Portal thought learn from their own experience. In tress Europa would force Germany nighttime bombing was the right spite of some admitted defects— to scatter its forces, making a final approach. Air Chief Marshal Arthur including lack of experience—their Allied blow against the European T. “Bomber” Harris, commander of leadership is of a high order, and continent less costly. RAF Bomber Command, concurred the quality of their aircrew person- Churchill also believed that Roose- and said that area bombing or city- nel is magnificent. If, in the event, velt, having been “in for a penny” busting could wreck the German they have to abandon day bombing with Operation Torch, would send economy and war machine, making policy, that will prove that it is in- US forces “in for a pound” to con- an Allied invasion unnecessary. deed impossible. I do not believe it tinue operations in the Mediterra- However, one RAF official who will prove to be so.” nean. had met with AAF leaders during Churchill was not convinced. The Roosevelt, in fact, was inclined to 1941 discussions in Washington, Americans, he stated, would suffer accept the Mediterranean strategy, D.C., knew they wanted to conduct heavy losses during the day, and it but US military leaders were not. daytime bombing over Germany. Air was necessary to convince them to They had been opposed to the North Vice Marshal John C. Slessor, as- join the RAF force at night. Sinclair, African thrust, considering it more a sistant chief, Air Staff (Plans), sent however, warned Churchill that the political move than a sound military a note to the British secretary of Americans were committed to day- step. Instead of pushing on into Italy, state for air, Archibald S.M. Sinclair, light bombing. Should the British said Gen. George C. Marshall, US explaining that the US was deeply continue to question this campaign, Army Chief of Staff, the Allies should committed to daylight precision it would jeopardize the entire bomb- invade across the English Channel bombing. ing offensive against Germany and as soon as possible. Slessor pointed out that Lt. Gen. potentially encourage an American “The Mediterranean is a blind al- Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, AAF Com- swing to the Pacific. ley to which American forces had manding General, Maj. Gen. Carl only been committed because of the A. “Tooey” Spaatz, Twelfth Air The Eaker Ploy President’s insistence that they Force commander, and Maj. Gen. The debate continued into late should fight the Germans some- Ira C. Eaker, Eighth Air Force com- December 1942, when Portal finally where,” Marshall argued. mander, were convinced that, once joined Sinclair and Slessor in the they had bombers in sufficient num- view that pushing the AAF on this Day vs. Night Bombing bers, they could do the job in the issue could cause deep resentment Meanwhile another Allied argu- daytime. He wrote: “Americans are and have a lasting negative effect on ment intensified in the run-up to the much like other people—they pre- the air war. However, Arnold wanted Casablanca Conference. RAF Air fer to learn from their own experi- to take no chances with the funda- Chief Marshal Charles A. “Peter” ence. If their policy of day bombing mental concept of US strategic Portal wanted the AAF to join the proves to their own satisfaction to airpower. He asked Lt. Gen. Dwight RAF in night bombing, since during be unsuccessful or prohibitively D. Eisenhower, commander in chief, Allied Air Forces North Africa, to send Eaker to Casablanca for fear that Churchill still might convince Roosevelt to shift Eighth Air Force to nighttime bombing. On Jan. 15, 1943, Eaker arrived in Casablanca. The British had come to the conference armed with position papers and a comprehensive agenda. Churchill brought his top military leaders—Field Marshal Alan F. Brooke, Portal, Maj. Gen. Hastings Ismay, Admiral of the Fleet Dudley Pound, Admiral Louis Mountbatten, and Slessor—backed by a large staff. “We Americans were unprepared,” recalled Col. Jacob E. Smart, who accompanied Arnold. “The President had failed to inform the Chiefs of the armed services of the nature of the meetings. The Chiefs came without Maj. Gen. Carl “Tooey” Spaatz (left), Twelfth Air Force commander, confers agreed position papers. The unpre- with Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder. Spaatz, like Arnold, Andrews, and Eaker, pared Americans could only react to met with Churchill privately, pressing the case for daytime bombing. well-prepared positions—all pre-

80 AIR FORCE Magazine / January 2003 pared from the British point of view. We felt that we had been duped.” Arnold had prepped Eaker. “The President is under pressure from the Prime Minister to abandon day bombing and put all our bomber force in England into night operations along with—and preferably under the con- trol of—the RAF,” Arnold told Eaker. Eaker was furious. “That is ab- surd,” he replied to Arnold. “It rep- resents complete disaster. It will permit the Luftwaffe to escape. The cross-channel operation will then fail. Our planes are not equipped for night bombing; our crews are not trained for it. ... If our leaders are that stu- pid, count me out. I don’t want any part of such nonsense.” Arnold emphasized that Churchill A B-17 crew is forced to bail out over enemy territory. Fortress crews trained needed to be persuaded and said he for daylight bombing of Germany, but such missions made them more vulner- would arrange for Eaker to meet with able to attack by enemy fighters. the Prime Minister, who in fact thought highly of the Eighth Air Force commander. was lower than the RAF’s at night. ‘bomb the devils around the clock.’ Arnold had also made other plans. Day bombing, Eaker noted, would When I see your President at lunch He arranged for Spaatz and Lt. Gen. complement the night effort. The today, I shall tell him that I with- Frank M. Andrews , commander, US RAF, flying at night, would be guided draw my suggestion that US bomb- Forces in the Middle East (who had by fires set by day—an around-the- ers join the RAF in night bombing flown in from Cairo, Egypt), to talk clock offensive. “The devils will get and that I now recommend that our with the Prime Minister prior to the no rest,” he said. Since AAF crews joint effort, day and night bombing, ChurchillÐEaker meeting. Arnold, had been trained to bomb in day- be continued for a time.” himself, already had pressed the case time, Eaker explained, if they oper- The EakerÐChurchill meeting for continued daylight bombing with ated at night, their losses would in- proved to be one of the critical turn- Churchill. crease. It would take months for the ing points of the war in Europe. On Jan. 18, for 30 minutes, Eaker AAF to prepare for effective night Arnold recalled, “We had won a met with Churchill—dressed in his operations. major victory, for we would bomb in air commodore’s uniform—at the Eaker wrote in the position paper: accordance with American principles, Prime Minister’s villa. Churchill “We have built up slowly and pain- using methods for which our planes stressed that, despite months of build- fully and learned our job in a new were designed.” ing up, the Americans had yet to theater against a tough enemy. Then Churchill said, later, “I decided to drop a single bomb on Germany. He we were torn down and shipped away back Eaker and his theme, and I was skeptical of the daylight bomb- to Africa. Now we have just built turned round completely and with- ing concept. “I had regretted,” he back up again. Be patient, give us drew all my opposition to the day- wrote in his memoirs, “that so much our chance, and your reward will be light bombing by the Fortresses.” effort had been put into the daylight ample—a successful day bombing The Prime Minister seemed will- bombing and still thought that a con- offensive to combine and conspire ing to let the matter drop, said Arnold. centration upon night bombing by with the admirable night bombing of “It was quite evident to me he had the Americans would have resulted the RAF to wreck German industry, been harassed by some of his own in far larger delivery of bombs on transportation, and morale—soften people about our daylight bombing Germany.” the Hun for land invasion and the program and had to put up a fight on Eaker predicted that by the end of kill.” the subject,” he added. “Whether they January his bombers would be hit- were fearful we would use our air- ting targets in the Third Reich. The Skill and Tenacity Win planes ineffectively in the daylight Eighth Air Force commander then According to Churchill, Eaker missions; whether they were afraid proceeded to make the case for day pleaded his case “with skill and te- we would waste airplanes; or whether bombing and gave the Prime Minis- nacity.” If not sold by it, Churchill they feared we would do something ter a one-page exposition of his ra- was certainly impressed. “Young they could not and had not been able tionale. Eaker emphasized that the man,” he said, “you have not con- to do, I do not know.” Eighth had been held back by lack of vinced me you are right, but you By the day of the EakerÐChurchill long-range fighter escort, the com- have persuaded me that you should meeting, the Combined Chiefs of mitment to Operation Torch, and by have further opportunity to prove Staff still had failed to agree on an poor weather. He also pointed out your contention. How fortuitous it overall strategic concept for press- that the Eighth’s loss rate in daytime would be if we could, as you say, ing the war. This failure to set pri-

AIR FORCE Magazine / January 2003 81 production as a major target and des- ignated a complex that, if badly dam- aged, would help make the planned Allied invasion a success. The Combined Chiefs deliberately had crafted the Casablanca Direc- tive to allow both the AAF and RAF sufficient flexibility to pursue their own bombing doctrines and, at the same time, set the stage for a cross- channel strike. However, the final overall 1943 strategy amounted to a victory for the British Mediterranean strategy. The Allies would invade Sicily next, followed by the effort to knock Italy out of the war. Preparations in En- gland would continue for the cross- channel strike, but the invasion was on hold—a blow to the American Eighth Air Force commander Ira Eaker (here as lieutenant general) was key to overcoming British opposition to the AAF strategic air campaign. Churchill strategy championed by Marshall. said Eaker convinced him “with skill and tenacity.” Although the conference “was more or less a rat race, out of it I think there is a definite understanding between orities for 1943 threatened to scuttle point where their armed resistance is the British and ourselves as to the the conference. As Slessor recalled, fatally weakened.” conduct of the war in future,” said “Tempers were getting a little frayed.” Arnold. For starters, Arnold empha- At this critical point, Slessor pre- Eighth’s Orders sized to Eaker the absolute impor- sented a compromise policy to Por- Of seven points the Combined tance of starting to attack targets in tal that amounted to a breakthrough. Chiefs emphasized in the directive, Germany. By the end of January, Eaker Actually, the Combined Chiefs they aimed one specifically at Eaker’s had sent the first Eighth Air Force were not that far apart, but Slessor Eighth Air Force: “You should take bombing mission over Germany. got to the heart of the problem. “The every opportunity to attack Germany After Casablanca, Arnold wrote real trouble was that Americans ob- by day, to destroy objectives that are to Spaatz: “You and Ira were both a viously felt that we were concentrat- unsuitable for night attack, to sus- great help to me at Casablanca. I ing all our interest and attention on tain continuous pressure on German don’t know what I would have done defeating Germany and didn’t care a morale, to impose heavy losses on without you.” damn about Japan, while our Chiefs the German fighter force, and to con- The question of whether the Army of Staff suspected that the Ameri- tain German fighter strength away Air Forces would continue daylight cans intended to build up a tremen- from the Russian and Mediterranean bombing was settled, allowing the dous campaign in the Pacific to the theaters of war.” The Chiefs also strategic air campaign to go ahead serious prejudice of our ability to directed the Eighth to provide the and intensify. defeat Germany,” he said. Allied armies, when they re-entered The Casablanca Directive was “one Slessor based his compromise pro- the continent, “all possible support of the finest air documents of the posal on Eaker’s concept of an inten- in the manner most effective.” entire war,” emphasized Maj. Gen. sive strategic bombing campaign. The The Casablanca Directive described Haywood S. Hansell Jr., one of the RAF would bomb at night, and the primary targets as submarine con- AAF’s outstanding war planners. In AAF would pound away during the struction yards and bases, the air- retrospect, Hansell concluded, if the day. He also suggested postponing a craft industry, transportation, oil, and AAF been forced into night bomb- decision on the invasion of Europe. other industries. The immediate top ing, the entire course of the war might With few alterations, the CCOS priority was the Nazi submarine fleet, have been different. It would cer- accepted this proposal. which was taking an enormous toll tainly have been almost impossible On Jan. 21, 1943, the Combined on Allied shipping and imperiled the to defeat the Luftwaffe, and the suc- Chiefs formally promulgated the entire Allied offensive in the west. cess of the Normandy invasion would Casablanca Directive, setting out a Subsequently, in June 1943, the have been jeopardized. combined bomber offensive. Ad- Combined Chiefs approved the so- The decision at Casablanca marked dressed to Eighth Air Force and RAF called “Point-blank Directive.” That the beginning of the end for Nazi Bomber Command, the directive directive pinpointed fighter aircraft Germany. ■ outlined the major objective of the bomber offensive as “the progres- Herman S. Wolk is senior historian in the Air Force History Support Office. He sive destruction of the German mili- is the author of the Struggle for Air Force Independence, 1943–1947 (1997), tary industrial and economic sys- and a coauthor of Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United tem, and the undermining of the States Air Force (1997). His most recent article for Air Force Magazine, morale of the German people to a “American Chieftains,” appeared in the September 2002 issue.

82 AIR FORCE Magazine / January 2003