Harvard University (Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs, Davis Center for Russian & Eurasian Studies) and Indiana University-Bloomington

RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH Editor: Henry E. Hale Associate Editor: Danielle Lussier Vol.3, No.1, October 2003

TOP NEWS • Parliamentary (Duma) elections Dec. 7, 2003 THE POLLS: If the Vote Were Today… Vote VTsIOM-A ROMIR • Presidential election Mar. 14, 2004 DUMA Dec. 1999 Sept. 2003 Sept. 2003 • “Managed Democracy” stifles campaigns United 23%* 28% 31% • Media face biggest constraints since 1989 Communists 24 23 11 • Putin endorses but doesn’t join it LDPR 6 5 5 • United Russia, Communists far ahead in polls 6 5 4 • 2 pro-Western, free-market parties likely to win seats SPS 9 5 5 Against All 3 4 8 • Zhirinovsky’s nationalists surge into third place “Hard to Say” -- 20 13 • Putin unchallenged in presidential race • District races, not party-list contests, will be decisive PRESIDENCY Mar. 2000 Putin 53 55 61 • Putin may not get majority in parliament Zyuganov 29 11 6 Glaziev -- 3 1 Zhirinovsky 3 3 4 SEE INSIDE Yavlinsky 6 2 2 P.2: The Duma’s 2 Halves: Rules of the Game Nemtsov -- 2 1 P.2: Profiles of major parties, leaders, strategies Against All 2 5 3 P.2: That’s Illegal?! Russia’s severe campaign laws “Hard to Say” -- 9 5 P.5: Insider Information: Top Russian analysts from ______ROMIR polled 1500 people in 40 regions nationwide on September 18-24 different party camps explain the campaign and reports the straight percentage of adult citizens who say they would vote for a particular party or candidate, given a list of names, if the elec- tion were held now. VTsIOM-A, surveying 1600 people in 40 regions na- WHAT’S AT STAKE tionwide on September 19-22, makes an additional adjustment in its Duma ratings, counting only the responses of the 63% who, in answer to a sepa- The December Duma elections will be the first held under the rate question, said they are likely to vote (note: VTsIOM-A does not do this watch of Russian President (pictured). At for the presidential vote, where 8% are found not planning to vote). ROMIR stake is the working majority that has helped him enact a found that 16% and 9% will not vote for Duma and president, respectively. radical reform agenda including a 13% flat tax, ratification of We report only parties/candidates with at least 3%, except for Yavlinsky and Nemtsov. START II and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a * Unity’s total. United Russia grew out of Unity and its absorption of Fa- reduction in the power of maverick regional leaders, and therland-All Russia, which had won 13% in the 1999 election. restrictions on media freedoms. Yeltsin was long stymied by opposition-dominated parliaments and sometimes resorted to presidential decrees or brute violence to impose reforms. MAKING SENSE OF RUSSIAN POLLS Putin, whose calling card is political stability, is pulling out Pollsters can obtain very different results just by changing all stops to keep from falling into the same position. the wording of a question, the set of choices from which respondents choose, or the baseline of comparison. Honest The key “stop” is what Russians like to call “managed and highly respected specialists thus often disagree on how democracy,” ways by which the state manipulates election best to assess public opinion, as reflected in the different outcomes. All three major television networks are state- techniques used by VTsIOM-A and ROMIR (see above). controlled, give sparse coverage Such differences can become politicized: Under fire from to opposition candidates, and some pro-Putin politicians for allegedly inaccurately report- report extensively on the good ing their “true” ratings, Yury Levada’s VTsIOM became the deeds of Putin and his closest center of a political scandal over the summer. Formerly a associates (for a Communist take, see state organization that operated independently, VTsIOM Peshkov on p.10). Competitors are found itself the target of a privatization plan that Levada forbidden to campaign on tele- said would impinge on his agency’s integrity. He then de- vision until the final month be- fected with his entire team of specialists and founded fore election day, further boost- VTsIOM-A, a fully private polling firm. ing incumbents whose “non-campaign” activities are deemed newsworthy (see Nikonov on p.8). Election law is complex and DATES TO REMEMBER severe, enabling selective disqualification of candidates. November 7, 2003: Television campaigning begins Others are given an “offer they can’t refuse,” such as a December 7, 2003: Duma elections government post, in return for pulling out of a race. Democ- March 14, 2004: Presidential election racy itself is thus at stake. The election’s outcome is far from certain. Powerful regional bosses and financial-industrial “oligarchs” are THAT’S ILLEGAL?! True or False: sometimes dubious Kremlin allies, wary of the short 1. The President cannot campaign for candidates he likes. leash on which Putin intends to keep them. Election 2. Parties cannot bring voters to the polls on election day. commissions have also been reluctant to falsify results 3. Campaigning is outlawed on voting day and eve. outright on a large scale, leading to Kremlin losses in 4. Providing almost any information about a candidate is some key regional elections in recent years, including legally considered “campaigning” by the provider. industrial powerhouse Nizhny Novgorod. This leaves 5. Media outlets can be shut down after two findings of voters with real power to influence outcomes. If citizens “campaigning.” become too disgusted with the process, they also can 6. Parties and candidates cannot campaign for the Duma on annul any race if a plurality exercises the right to vote television between Sept. 2 and Nov. 7, 2003. “against all” or if fewer than 25% come to the polls, 7. The President cannot be a member of a political party. events that have happened in isolated, but significant, instances. The answers? All are true. Purportedly to eliminate the dirty campaign tactics and abuses of state power in favor of par- ticular candidates that have characterized previous elec- THE 2 HALVES OF THE DUMA tions, a newly revised law on “voter rights” prevents media The 450-seat Duma (pictured) has two halves. One half from expressing views about a candidate’s position or cam- is filled when Russians vote for one of the 25 party lists paign, demands that all candidates receive equal coverage of candidates that have been nominated. The 225 seats by a media outlet, bars many top state officials from cam- are divided among these parties paigning unless they take an official leave of absence, and in proportion to the share of the restricts “preelection campaigning” to a prescribed period. vote won by each party that nets Subjectivity in identifying “reporting” and “campaigning” at least 5%. The other 225 seats constrains journalists’ ability to provide basic political cov- are elected much like the United erage. Some parliamentarians, led by SPS (see p.3), have States House of Representatives, where a voter chooses a challenged this law on the grounds that it violates free candidate to represent his or her territorial district. The speech. The Constitutional Court is set to rule this month. candidate with the most votes wins. Districts are de- signed to be roughly equal in population. City has the greatest representation with 15 districts (see Kol- “manageable,” particularly in regions where governors have makov on Moscow politics, p.5), whereas 39 regions have just built strong political machines. Unfair election tactics and one district apiece. Each voter thus makes two separate voter confusion are also facilitated by the mass media’s ne- choices, one for a party and one for a district candidate glect of the districts. Even apart from governors’ complete who may or may not belong to that party. control of local media in some regions, not one Russian or foreign media outlet has had the will and the means to cover all of these district races systematically. Russian voters have WHERE THE KEY BATTLE LIES no CNN website where they can go to see how other races While most analysts tend to focus on the party list com- are shaping up nationwide in order to learn how their vote petition, the district elections represent the key “swing will impact the overall balance of legislative power. Closer factor” influencing whether Putin can control the new to the vote, Russian Election Watch will draw on a new Duma. According to polling results reported on p.1, source of information on the districts designed to help rem- Putin’s favorite edy this problem. party, United

Russia, would get about 30% of WHO’S RUNNING the party-list vote UNITED RUSSIA, the “party of power,” makes loyalty to if the election Putin its chief campaign asset, emphasizing free-market were held now. economic reforms and a patriotic pragmatism in foreign But this is only policy. While Putin has refused to become a member him- 30% of half of self, he endorsed the party loudly in Sep- the Duma, the tember. United Russia brings together a 225 seats allo- host of odd political bedfellows, marrying cated by party-list voting. Even if we adopt United Rus- the pro-Putin Unity bloc to its chief rival sia’s own optimistic expectation that it will garner 40% in the 1999 Duma campaign, the Father- of the party-list vote, far more than any single party has land-All Russia coalition. Russia’s soft- won since Soviet times, Putin would need to net roughly spoken Interior Minister, 60% of the seats in the district contests in order to gain a (right), leads the party, pumped up by loyal majority. Barring absolutely massive election fraud massive media coverage of seemingly his every move. Oc- in counting party-list votes, which few expect, a Putin cupying the party list’s number-two spot is Emergencies majority requires a landslide in the districts. (United Minister Sergei Shoigu, who has become one of Russia’s Russia activists are pictured above.) most popular politicians for his ministry’s heroics in the face of floods, fires, and other widely televised disasters. Sym- The districts, then, are where the most important battles bolizing the party’s heavy reliance on the power of regional will be fought. It is also where democracy is most strongmen, Moscow Mayor and ’s

2 President round out the third and THE (SPS), torn between fourth list slots. The party has nominated some of the its unease with Putin’s managed democracy and support of country’s most authoritative and famous public figures his economic reforms, has decided to emphasize the latter in in 144 Duma districts and will support close political its 2003 campaign. The most prominent party voice is now allies in most of the 81 others. that of (right), the architect of Russian pri- vatization in the 1990s and the THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE RUSSIAN current head of Russia’s rich FEDERATION (KPRF) claims both democratic ideals electricity monopoly, Unified and the Soviet legacy, advocating a strong role for the Energy Systems. While Chu- state in managing a gradual transition to a socialist-mar- bais remains one of the most ket economy. Party leader widely hated figures in Russia, (right) has he is intensely adored by a also long sought a broad coali- sizeable minority and is valued tion of leftists and nationalists, by Putin, facts that SPS hopes a goal largely realized for the will be sufficient to guarantee it at least 5% of the party-list 2003 campaign. Radical leftist vote. While formal party leader and more opposition- splinter parties that had run on minded appears only rarely on state- their own and received more controlled television, Chubais has recently been given broad than 2% of the vote in both coverage in both television and print media, where he boldly 1995 and 1999, notably the defends his 1990s reforms as visionary and even says they Russian Communist Workers’ Party, are now in the laid the basis for a future Russian “liberal empire” in the KPRF fold. Also in, occupying the highly visible num- former USSR. Chubais is also known for his sharp attacks ber-two slot on the party’s list, is former Krasnodar gov- on the other pro-Western, liberal-market party, Yabloko, ernor Nikolai Kondratenko, known as one of Russia’s having savaged it with great success for SPS in 1999. Early most charismatic and outspoken anti-Semites. Interest- indications are that distinguishing SPS from Yabloko is an ingly, the party also includes some representatives of big important element of the SPS campaign again in 2003. business on its ticket, declaring that it is not only a party Pragmatically recognizing its weakness in the districts, it has of the poor. Several moderate defectors from the KPRF nominated only 118 district candidates and intends to con- camp have launched their own blocs, notably economist centrate on a still smaller subset. Sergei Glaziev’s Motherland and current Duma speaker Gennady Seleznev’s “Speakers’ Bloc,” an alliance with YABLOKO appears to have over- Putin ally Sergei Mironov, speaker of the Federation come the internal discord that Council (Russia’s unelected upper house of parliament). nearly proved disastrous for it in None of these Communist spinoffs, however, is polling 1999, parting ways with many of close to the critical 5% level. As usual, the KPRF is run- the figures involved in these dis- ning candidates in a majority of the 225 districts (this putes such as 1999’s campaign time 178) and will back allies in most others. chief, Vyacheslav Igrunov. While broadening its ranks at the local THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF level, the party has reserved the RUSSIA (LDPR) has surged into a solid third place in top three places on its party list for most polls, with wildly nationalist and charismatic longtime party loyalists: leader (below) now claiming to be an (above), ex-Ambassador to the U.S. even tougher version of Putin. Known for antics such as Vladimir Lukin, and former deputy governor of St. Peters- throwing orange juice in the burg Igor Artemiev. Perhaps most critically, however, the face of liberal legislator Bo- party has managed to stay tightly on message. Leaving no ris Nemtsov and physically doubt about its support for a peaceful resolution of the scuffling with a female crisis, Yabloko includes human rights activist and Communist lawmaker, he is former SPS legislator Sergei Kovalev on its party list, to the in rare form this year. In a reported consternation of many Kremlin officials. Yavlinsky late September speech be- has also injected new life into his longstanding call for de- fore the Duma, for example, monopolization, singling out Chubais in the process by he audaciously play-acted pointing to Unified Energy Systems as a chief culprit. Seek- the part of a “Western” spy ing to shed its image as a party of “constant critics,” Yav- out to subvert Russian linsky now claims that Putin’s government has in fact “swine,” gaining plenty of television coverage in the adopted about 2/3 of Yabloko proposals over the last three process. While he reliably captures a sizeable protest years, including the flat tax. The party remains largely con- vote, his party is also known for backing the Kremlin in fined to urban aspirations, however, nominating candidates in just 115 of the 225 districts. major Duma votes, helping explain his media access and raising suspicions that he is himself a KGB product and THE PEOPLE’S PARTY consists primarily of a set of receives regular support from the Kremlin, though Zhiri- Duma deputies who were elected in 1999 as independents novsky denies this. The LDPR has nominated 186 devo- but who then coalesced into a pro-Putin deputy group. The tees as candidates in the 225 Duma districts. party has remained at only about 1% in the party-list polls

3 despite attempts by leader Gennady Raikov (below) to Many observers treat United Russia as primarily a Voloshin- build national reputation by advocating capital pun- Surkov creature but regard other pro-Putin parties like the ishment and opposing . People’s Party and the Speakers’ Bloc as attempts by the But the party is highly likely to reappear Chekists to gain their own Duma footing. If this is the case, in the next Duma since it consists of Putin’s loud endorsement of United Russia and his relative some four dozen incumbents who have indifference to the others signal a victory for the Family, proven themselves in Duma district elec- probably brought about by the failure of the People’s Party tions before. Since most of these candi- and the Speaker’s Bloc to creep close to the 5% barrier in dacies are likely to be coordinated with United Russia the polls. and other Kremlin allies, their chances are good. It seeks to expand its territorial stronghold by nominating 59 Both Kremlin clans (sometimes district candidates. called multiple “Kremlin towers”) are also suspected of actually promoting MANY OTHER PARTIES AND BLOCS have also a proliferation of parties with the advanced candidates, but all remain far below the 5% express purpose of sapping votes mark as the public fears “wasting votes” on parties that from key Kremlin antagonists, such will not clear the 5% barrier. Moreover, none contains a as the KPRF. Frequently mentioned significant number of incumbent Duma deputies. in this vein are Glaziev’s Motherland alliance and the Speakers’ Bloc. A SHADOWY KREMLIN CLANS are also regarded by recent United Russia attack on the some astute observers as being among the most impor- latter, however, perhaps indicates that tant actors in this race (see Michaleva on p.6). The chief ri- the Family clan is worried that these blocs could actually valry is said to involve two factions. “The Family” work against United Russia as much as against the KPRF. grouping consists mainly of holdovers in Putin’s Ad- While some see Putin as beholden to these groups, others ministration from the Yeltsin regime and includes presi- see him as following Yeltsin’s grand tradition of playing dential chief-of-staff Aleksandr Voloshin and his deputy different groups off one another so as to maximize his own Vyacheslav Surkov. Another set, variously called “St. decisionmaking autonomy. Petersburgers,” “Chekists,” or “Siloviki,” mainly in- cludes those whom Putin has brought in, often with for- --Henry Hale, Indiana University, Carnegie Moscow Center mer-KGB links or ties to the city of St. Petersburg, such as deputy chiefs-of-staff Igor Sechin and Viktor Ivanov.

Russian Election Watch is produced with support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and is a joint publication of

The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University Graham T. Allison, Director The Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University Timothy J. Colton, Director and Lisbeth Tarlow, Associate Director Indiana University - Bloomington

The views expressed in Russian Election Watch are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of any sponsoring organization. The editors welcome feedback of all kinds. Please direct comments to

Henry E. Hale (Editor) Danielle Lussier (Associate Editor) Assistant Professor Research Associate Department of Political Science Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs And Russian & East European Institute John F. Kennedy School of Government Indiana University Harvard University [email protected] [email protected]

Special thanks to Isabelle Kaplan for translation and layout and to Mara Zepeda for logistical support. The editor is also grateful to the Carnegie Moscow Center for Visiting Scholar status during the campaign season and to various Carnegie colleagues for feedback and translation suggestions.

SOURCES FOR IMAGES USED IN RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH, Vol.3, No.1: All accessed on October 13, 2003: kremlin.ru (Putin); duma.gov.ru (Duma building, Raikov), vvp.ru (Gryzlov, United Russia activists); kprf.ru (Zyuganov); ldpr.ru (Zhirinovsky); chubais.ru (Chubais); yavlinsky.ru (Yavlinsky); geo.ya.com/travelimages (Kremlin).

4

INSIDER INFORMATION: CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS BY LEADING RUSSIAN PRACTITIONERS

THE MOSCOW DIMENSION OF THE DECEMBER 2003 ELECTIONS Sergei Kolmakov Vice-President of the Foundation for the Development of Parliamentarism in Russia ______

SOME KEY POINTS: Luzhkov’s Fatherland-All Russia peared in July 2003, averring that *Moscow voters will choose both bloc received 40% and its chief ri- Duma leader and Luzhkov ally mayor and Duma delegation on val, Unity, only about 7%). The Vyacheslav Volodin was planning a December 7 most important clause of the cease- December 2003 run for Moscow *Luzhkov is heavy favorite after fire, however, is Luzhkov’s pledge mayor at the behest of a Kremlin gray deal with Kremlin, but the upcom- not to monopolize the naming of a cardinal hoping to sow discord be- ing term will be his last successor. tween Volodin and Luzhkov. It turned *Major battle looms on post- All the difficult questions — out that this information was fabri- Luzhkov horizon namely whether a third term would be cated by Volodin’s political enemies *Protest vote potential high in legal for Yury Luzhkov and the legis- within United Russia, but it didn’t get Moscow lative collision over whether the vice- much play. mayor would be an elected official — It would seem that the weak list In the last elections (March 2000) were already settled several months of candidates challenging Luzhkov there were 6,939,686 registered voters before the election. confirms that the mayoral election is in Moscow, accounting for 6.4% of predetermined and plebiscitarian in the Russian electorate. For December nature. However, the specter of a pos- 2003 Moscow’s share of the national The cease-fire’s most sible Candidate X, someone to clear electorate remains the same even important clause is the political streets of all the muck, though the number of voters in Mos- looms as the potential for a protest cow has declined. Voter turnout is Luzhkov’s pledge not vote grows in Moscow. By some es- typically high (64-70%) in Moscow, timates this potential has risen steadily where the electorate is primarily right- to monopolize the over the last three years and may now center and heavily influenced by the naming of a successor. account for up to 25% of the voting city’s mayor. public. Doubtless, the main issue is what The protest vote in Moscow falls Yury Luzhkov’s virtually certain Following the Constitutional into two basic camps. A large part is reelection to a final term as mayor Court’s July 2002 decision to allow the “adaptees,” representing Mos- will mean for Moscow. Here are some Luzhkov to run for a third term, his cow’s middle class, who are dissatis- features of the 2003 mayoral cam- prospects for reelection became clear. fied with the Luzhkov “system” of paign: Equally clear was the fact that the governance, the total domination of • An utter lack of public intrigue and, 2003-2007 term would be his last. As business, and the ineffective utiliza- as anticipated, the non-participation to the post of vice-mayor, on March tion of the city’s real estate and finan- of any federal-level candidates 28, 2003 Russia’s Supreme Court cial potential. (such as Borodin and Kirienko in upheld the Moscow City Duma’s de- The second group is connected the 1999 elections); cision to make it an elected office, with the problems of growing social • A temporary truce between even though this defies federal law. polarization in the city: Luzhkov and key federal political Thus in Moscow’s upcoming mayoral • Stratification along social and clans on the following terms: an end elections in December, candidate geographic lines, which creates to the destabilization of Moscow’s Yury Luzhkov will run alone, in con- elite, well-heeled neighborhoods ruling circle, a peaceful reelection, trast to the 1999 election, when he and on the one hand and ethnic, envi- and a “head start” of at least 2-3 vice-mayoral candidate Valery Shant- ronmentally neglected areas on years in exchange for the mobiliza- sev shared a ticket. the other; tion of Moscow’s electorally useful After the courts’ decisions, ru- • The hardening of the housing and politically significant resources mors of rifts in Luzhkov’s team over market and erosion of social jus- for the benefit of United Russia’s such things as succession ceased to tice, which is fueled by the flight party list. (For example, in 1999, circulate. The last such report ap- of so-called “native Muscovites”

5 to the outer suburbs; ity that such a candidacy could be vival of the “Moscow group” as a • Overpopulation of the city, which useful to political forces — such as monolithic force once its leader de- makes it difficult to improve liv- the Union of Right Forces, Glaziev’s parts and the problem of succession is ing conditions for a significant Motherland bloc, and Seleznev’s party at hand. segment of the population since — that need to make an electoral Then there are the problems of… the migration of foreigners and breakthrough and to overcome cam- • The concentration of decision- people from other cities is insuf- paign inertia. making power in the hands of the ficient regulated and since large- Of those who are likely to throw premier of the Moscow Govern- scale housing development is be- their hats into the mayoral ring, the ment; yond the reach of the average greatest danger is posed by Nikolai • The possible social and political Muscovite, designed mainly for Maslov, the deputy chair of Gosstroi consequences for the megapolis’ those with the greatest means; (the state construction company of the development prospects if a power and Russian Federation) and a former of- vacuum is created; • Unfulfilled plans and promises ficial in Luzhkov’s administration. He • The possibility of long-term social for the improvement of city infra- is very familiar with the Moscow sys- upheaval if the Moscow model of structure. tem and knows its weak points. privatization is reexamined, if a re- Further, the high level of corruption In contrast, the candidacy of the distribution of property takes place, and ethnic tension in various regions banker Aleksandr Lebedev poses less and if the models of regulating mar- of the city is a widespread source of of a threat to the mayor. In fact, Lebe- kets (be they open, gray, or black) discontent among this group. dev’s presence can even be seen as a are reexamined; All the factors enumerated above means of halting entry into the race of • The destruction of longstanding city can be used to Candidate X’s advan- a more marketable candidate who ties with developers; tage. Two goals can bolster the candi- would tap into Moscow’s right-center • St. Petersburgers’ expansion into dacy of such a person. One is the po- middle-class electorate (as former Moscow’s financial and construc- tential to become known as the second Prime Minister Sergei Kirienko did in tion complex… most popular person in the city after 1999). █ Luzhkov, provided X makes a suc- The main question in the mayoral cessful showing in the polls to the election surrounds the substance and tune of 15%. A second is the possibil- direction of the next Moscow gov- ernment’s agenda as well as the sur-

AT THE STARTING LINE: SEPTEMBER AND THE DUMA VOTE Galina Michaleva Head of the Yabloko Party’s Analytical Center ______

SOME KEY POINTS: preferences of political elites became rights, parties are now legally recog- *The business elite is pushing into clear, which determined the adminis- nized as basic actors in the electoral the Duma with unprecedented fervor trative, financial, and human resources process. No less important is that an *Russia’s party system has stabilized of the candidates. Now one can al- electoral system analogous to that of *Warring Kremlin clans use parties ready discern with some certainty who the Duma, where half the members as instruments of battle will be the favorites, the longshots, are elected from party lists, has been *Party proliferation, inspired by the and those with some chance at win- brought to regional legislatures. Kremlin, will favor veteran parties: ning. 2) The party system has stabi- Yabloko, KPRF, LDPR While these elections, the fourth lized. Three veteran parties — the to the , are on the whole KPRF, the LDPR, and Yabloko — based on the same electoral formula as have made it to the Duma three times With the presidential decree of previous ones since 1993, they are and approach their fourth election September 2 declaring the official nevertheless distinguished by certain with the same leaders and the same start of the campaign season, a motley features that have implications for the basic platforms — socialist, national- crew of political actors of varying party system and parliamentarianism ist, and liberal-democratic, respec- strength began to form a clearer pic- as well as for the country’s political tively. Each party has a solid elector- ture. Administrative “newcomers” development in general. ate, a more or less developed network joined veterans of the Russian politi- 1) A change in the institutional of party organizations, established cal scene for the formalities of con- and legal framework. The 1993 elec- decision-making structures, a financial ventions and candidate nomination. tions established a mixed electoral base, and a system of protection from After plenty of separations, mergers, system (party-list and district) that has internal as well as external threats. and formations of new political blocs, endured until now. However, as a re- 3) The federal and regional elite the election’s participants finally had sult of a new law on parties and have recognized parties as an impor- been determined by month’s end. The amendments to the law on voter

6 tant instrument for winning and wield- ent favorite, United Russia, whose Neither the platform nor the elec- ing power. success became less certain over the torate of the KPRF has changed de- 4) Rather than serving as “prima- course of this past summer. Political spite the internal conflicts and loud ries” for the presidential race, these analysts and journalists started to talk expulsions of key leaders in recent Duma elections have their own mean- about a “multi-towered” Kremlin and years. Since its chief rival in these ing. about party-clones. elections is United Russia, we can Taken together, these factors have A second by-product of the strat- expect the most pointed polemics created an objective increase in the egy was the creation of potential from these two parties. value of a Duma seat. In past election “party-rats” who could steal votes cycles we saw ex-premiers set their from the KPRF, whose ratings remain sights on the Duma en masse and unaffected by the party’s absence By September it became governors participate in various elec- from television screens. clear that if Putin…did toral blocs, whereas , Surprisingly, all these party initia- not openly support with two exceptions, engaged in this tives have proven unsuccessful despite process more indirectly. the expenditure of vast financial re- United Russia, a majority Now the situation has changed in sources over the summer. By Septem- of votes would go to the a fundamental way. The new election ber it became clear that if Putin, who cycle is characterized by the business up until then had merely observed as Communists. elite’s push into the legislative branch events unfolded, did not openly sup- via several different “columns” at the port United Russia, a majority of The LDPR’s image has not same time: by district elections and by votes would go to the Communists. changed (it doesn’t make any sense to inclusion in the party lists of virtually The “Yukos affair,” seen as yet talk about its platform planks since all the parties. another attempt to “curb the oli- these don’t have any significance), Another important feature of garchs,” elicited a sharply negative having virtually one figure, Zhiri- these elections is the open conflict reaction in the US and Great Britain, novsky, a whirling dervish on the between the two groups in the Krem- Contrary to expectations, however, it verge of a collapse. As it turns out, lin, each of which uses the new parties has failed to break the inertia of the this is an effective strategy for win- as instruments. In a departure from the electoral process. Yukos shareholders ning the protest vote, as is evidenced administrative parties of previous continue to underwrite different po- by the substantial growth in the election cycles, these new groups pre- litical players while Yukos chief Mik- LDPR’s rating over the summer. sent themselves not as administrative- hail Khodorkovsky persists in making The Russian Democratic Party bureaucratic machines with sem- his vociferous political statements. Yabloko, sticking by its democratic blances of an ideological platform but In September it became clear that and liberal principles, is paying more as PR-projects that are advertised as one of this campaign’s idiosyncrasies attention to social problems — hous- products of demand without even the is that party platforms and goals are ing services reform, the environment, pretense of a political platform. Their nearly identical. It is only the images and education. The new issues are positions, indistinguishable from each and leaders, along with the scale of geared not only to its small but stable other, amount to basically the same the activities they unleash and their nucleus of voters but also to a broader slogan: a declaration of love for and use of dirty campaigning, that distin- set of voters within its reach. Yabloko loyalty to the president. guish the parties here. The same has one of the lowest “negative” rat- planks — economic growth, redistri- ings — the quantity of voters who bution of natural-resource rents, the absolutely disapprove of the party and Both sides in the Kremlin war on poverty, raising salaries and of Yavlinsky is small. hedge their bets against pensions, military reform — appear in An anomaly in this group is the the apparent favorite, all the political platforms from the Union of Right Forces, which was Communists to Union of Right Forces created relatively recently and has not United Russia. (SPS). With the exception of the yet entirely formulated its platform KPRF, all support the President either except to defend business, be it large, But the elite’s decision to use partially or entirely. medium, or small. The “face” of SPS these parties as weapons in their inter- But it is precisely such similari- has also changed — Anatoly Chubais, nal struggle has created a paradox in ties and the abundance of new politi- the largely unpopular architect of the that it has spawned a plethora of little cal players that will give clear elec- economic reform that was so costly known and practically identical parties toral advantages to the “old” parlia- for so many, has moved from the rear led by little known politicians. All mentary parties. Now, at the start of guard to third place in the party, be- these parties have converged to com- the campaign, there are 44 parties and coming de facto spokesman and sym- pete on a single playing field. 20 associations. The most significant bol of SPS. The party began its fight Both sides in the Kremlin — the participants in the campaign can be back in the summer with numerous so-called “Siloviki” (Sechin, Ivanov) divided into the following groups: television ads and posters as well as and “The Family” (Surkov, Voloshin) 1) The “old” parliamentary par- an aggressive campaign aimed at dis- alike — have the same goal vis-à-vis ties, the KPRF, LDPR, and Yabloko. crediting Yabloko and winning over the emergence of these new players: All these are now both experienced its voters. to hedge their bets against the appar- and stable.

7 2) United Russia. Two adminis- ing chances of “reserve administrative ously unknown parties that are never- trative parties from the last election party initiatives.” theless conducting active advertising cycle (Unity and Fatherland-All Rus- 3) Reserve administrative parties. campaigns. sia), have now reorganized as United Created as a safeguard in the event of The Central Election Commission Russia, a party of functionaries and United Russia’s collapse, they com- (CEC) will without doubt create pref- the bureaucracy, created by adminis- mand relatively little recognition but erences for potential victors “ap- trative means. It has virtually one major financial resources. They attract pointed” by the Kremlin and stum- point in its program — unconditional voters with exotic campaign ads and bling blocks for all others. This is support for President Vladimir Putin. program points. For example, the made possible by new election legisla- Party of Life intends to revive an en- tion that officially limits the abuse of dangered muskrat-like animal, while official state posts for electoral pur- The abundance of new the People’s Party plans to amend the poses, but that, owing to its self- players will give clear Constitution with a clause about civic contradictory nature and the outright electoral advantages to responsibility, to reinstate the death absurdity of individual articles, sig- penalty, and to criminally prosecute nificantly broadens the authority of the “old” parliamentary homosexuals. elections commissions and, first and parties. 4) Party projects directed at win- foremost, the CEC. ning a portion of the Communists’ In closing, the upcoming month vote. Polls show the KPRF still in the will provide answers to these most The is some ambiguity at the lead. The biggest of the parties di- important questions: helm of United Russia: Minister of rected at whittling away this standing • What will the players talk about Internal Affairs Boris Gryzlov is not a is Motherland, led by the until re- with their voters and how? member of the party yet is called its cently promising representative of the • Whom will the elite groups support leader and spokesman. The Presi- Communist leadership Sergei Glaziev and to what extent? dent’s speech at United Russia’s con- along with , well- • From the President’s perspective, gress was an obvious move to go for known for his conservative and anti- which of the players is desirable to broke in response to two develop- Western views. The bloc also com- have in the ranks of the next Duma? ments: the falling ratings of this ad- prises a mixed bag of obscure politi- █ ministrative giant and the deteriorat- cians and small parties. Alongside these has emerged a gamut of previ-

A STRANGE START Vyacheslav Nikonov President, POLITY Foundation

SOME KEY POINTS: • One month of political advertising The Public Opinion Foundation’s *New law suffocates campaign through the mass media is allowed (FOM) most recent poll of eligible *The Kremlin’s goals: United Russia before election day (December 7); voters indicates that there are two ma- outpacing KPRF plus a pro-Putin • Every party is to receive an equal jor parties in the lead: the pro-Putin Duma majority amount of coverage; party United Russia and the Commu- *Putin surprises observers by backing • Mass media sources are not to take nist Party of the Russian Federation United Russia over other pro-Putin sides in their editorials; (KPRF) with 20% each. A survey of parties, gives former a big advantage • Commentators cannot express any voters who intend to participate in the *Kremlin split is one of few threats to opinions that could encourage sup- election conducted by VTsIOM esti- the United Russia juggernaut port for one of the parties. mates the Communist electorate at Multiple violations of these rules can 23% and United Russia’s at 28%. The official start of the State lead to the suspension of a program The threshold for gaining seats in Duma election campaign on Septem- broadcast or newspaper publication. the Duma by party-list voting is 5%. ber 7 was followed by some peculiar As a result, just to play it safe, FOM gives the LDPR, under the lead- events. Advertisements for the politi- many newspapers have significantly ership of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, 6% of cal parties, together with leading poli- reduced the amount of their election the total votes. The Yabloko party of ticians, completely disappeared from coverage, while the television chan- Grigory Yavlinsky and the Union of the television screen while the news- nels present only pre-recorded politi- Right Forces of Boris Nemtsov are papers became all but empty of any cal talk shows. Yet commentators estimated to receive the minimum 5%. campaign analysis. daily criticize this new law together VTsIOM’s poll does not differ much The cause for such an unprece- with its initiator, the Central Election from FOM’s findings, giving the dented situation derives from a new Commission. Leaders of various par- LDPR, Yabloko, and the Union of law on voter rights, which, besides ties initiate media events challenging Right Forces 5% each. Other parties some very useful norms, contains the constitutionality of this piece of do not have competitive ratings: none these rules: legislation in the courts. of them gets more than 2%.

8 The Kremlin aims at the follow- • Motherland – a vague alliance be- their combined electorate amounts to ing goals in the upcoming election: tween Sergei Glaziev, a former 12%. This also happens to be a por- • United Russia prevailing over the member of the Communist Party tion of the electorate that tends to be Communists; faction, and Kremlin loyalist reluctant to vote. • Pro-Putin forces making up more Dmitry Rogozin, who chairs the From a purely statistical point of than half of the next Duma. Duma Foreign Relations Committee view it will be very hard for both of As of now that expectation seems — aims at making inroads into the these parties to receive more than the to be well-grounded. Putin is popular, Communist electorate. necessary 5%. The chances are high with an approval rating of over 70%, If the Kremlin supports just its that one of these parties will not se- and finds ways to translate at least primary party, United Russia, it is cure enough votes for their representa- part of this popularity into more votes clearly going to prevail. However, if it tion and forever disappear from the for United Russia. chooses to support more than one, it political scene. It is difficult to say may improve the KPRF’s chances. which party will become the victim. Nevertheless, there are a few vari- It would seem that a merger be- Television channels pre- ables that are still unclear. tween the two parties would be a good sent only pre-recorded As far as the Communists are idea, but this is impossible for two concerned, the party is entering its reasons: 1) the personal ambitions of talk shows… first election in which it is the main their leaders and 2) the two parties’ opponent of the Kremlin. In the last different objectives and affiliations. Actually, the main intrigue of the elections, the Kremlin’s chief rival Yabloko is a social-democratic party party convention season was how was the Luzhkov-Primakov coalition, of intelligent losers, while the Union Putin would behave. Many observers which was eliminated through heavy of Right Forces is a liberal party of anticipated that he would stay outside campaign attacks by the Kremlin. cynical winners. of the party debates and were sur- It is difficult to say what will prised when he made a visit to the happen to the ratings of the Commu- There are very few things United Russia convention. While re- nist party should it become the target ceiving a standing ovation, Putin of the Kremlin; oftentimes the Rus- that could keep United stated that he did not regret casting his sian people sympathize with the un- Russia from winning, but vote for this particular party in 1999, derdog. And although the Commu- splits within the Kremlin extended his thanks for its support of nists have more campaign funds than his agenda in the Duma, and wished it ever before, generously provided by are cause for concern. victory in the upcoming elections. some of the oligarchs for the purpose With this type of support, United Rus- of lobbying their interests, it remains The probability of other parties sia clearly received an advantage. unclear whether they can effectively making it into the Duma is rather The most powerful media re- manage this financial support. small. Only one of the minor pro- sources, nation-wide television chan- It is possible that they will receive Kremlin parties has a chance of get- nels 1 and 2, are providing favorable somewhat less than 20% of the votes, ting the necessary votes if Putin pro- coverage of the party. The coffers are or they could surprise everyone by vides his personal support to it (which quite full — more than enough, it winning the race. But even then Putin doesn’t seem to be happening). But seems, to win an American or Japa- can maintain a majority by attracting even if he does, the votes this party nese election. single member district candidates who receives will be drawn from United Theoretically, there are very few are non-partisan. From a pragmatic Russia, which begs the question, things that could prevent United Rus- position the district candidates will “Why should the Kremlin lend too sia from winning. Splits within the tend to lean on the Kremlin in order to much of its support?” Kremlin (the “multi-towered” political deliver something for their constituen- The party conventions, where the situation) are cause for concern, with cies or for the governors and financial candidates were chosen for party lists each tower pressing its own agenda on groups that they represent. and districts, have come to a close. the President. Zhirinovsky and his quasi- This part of the organizational proce- It is still unclear whether Putin is nationalist Liberal Democratic Party dure tended to create hidden tension going to promote more than one party. will be unquestionably represented in inside the parties while leaving many There have been recently formed at the next Duma. Nationalist feelings disgruntled participants behind. But, least four other parties associated with are on the rise since the beginning of as always, the drama of the pre- the President: the war in Iraq. Zhirinovsky’s rela- election season was well concealed by • The People’s Party, a moderate, tions with the Kremlin are in high routine, exulted speeches. Out of the left-wing nationalist group, headed standing; his party always gives its 44 parties that are eligible to partici- by Gennady Raikov; full support to Putin. Plus, he is a pate in these elections, less then one half will actually be present on the • The Party of Life, chaired by the magnificent campaigner. voting ticket. speaker of the Federation Council, The same cannot be said about As of now the outcome seems Sergei Mironov, which has formed the Union of Right Forces or about the clear. But it is known that anything is an alliance with the Party of Rus- Yabloko party. Both tend to lose sup- possible in Russia. sia’s Resurrection, led by Duma port during election campaigns. The █ Speaker Gennady Seleznev; major problem for these parties is that

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THE ELECTORAL MARATHON’S STARTING PISTOL FIRES: THE CONTESTANTS ARE RUNNING IN PLACE Viktor Peshkov Russian State Duma Deputy, Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee

SOME KEY POINTS: tronic library, United Russia is men- probable votes). Results compiled by *Despite massive media bias in favor tioned in the Russian media twice as the polling agency VTsIOM-A indi- of United Russia, it has failed to pull often as the Communist Party of the cate that United Russia leads by a ahead of the Communists Russian Federation (KPRF), with margin of 5% (28% to 23%). Accord- *The KPRF has also failed to expand 1.8% of all references as compared ing to data from the Russian Center beyond its traditional electorate with the KPRF’s 0.9%. An even larger for Political Culture Research *Most Russians think Putin does not distortion characterizes the media’s (TsIPKR), the Communist Party con- need United Russia coverage of the activities of Russia’s tinues to lead in the polls by a mini- *Creativity is needed for either one to political leaders: Vladimir Putin ap- mum margin of 1%. break the deadlock pears in the media approximately 20 Taking all this as a whole, the times more than KPRF leader Gen- present situation is generally thus: The beginning of September in nady Zyuganov, who is Putin’s main Given all the fluctuations of electoral Russia saw the start of a campaign and only realistic competition in the possibilities, the two parties are now season that will include elections for upcoming presidential elections. neck-and-neck. This indicates that the the State Duma as well as for presi- All this media bias — the gaps in attempts of these forces to break this dent. But if you look at the whole of media attention paid to the KPRF and stability through loud political actions the current year, it is clear that, practi- United Russia as well as to Putin and are to no avail. cally speaking, the electoral struggle Zyuganov — is taking place in a has long been under way. In fact, the situation where the Communists out- For all United Russia’s electoral race has not only traveled a paced the “United Russians” in the long road to the official opening of the 1999 parliamentary elections and superiority over the Com- campaign but reached an apex, a de- Putin’s vote was less than double munist Party in the velopment only underscored by the Zyuganov’s in the 2000 presidential presidential decree kicking off the contest. In other words, the situation media world, the two par- electoral campaign. in the media does not correspond to ties are neck-and-neck. Since the winter, television air- that at the polls. waves have been crowded with cam- But we have yet another electoral So, the propaganda campaign paign ads, images of loud and even paradox: For all United Russia’s tri- United Russia launched during its lavish events like conventions and umphant superiority over the Com- congress last spring, casting itself not presentations, and the sounds of popu- munist Party in the media world, the just as President Putin’s only and lar figures endorsing one party or current ratings of the two main par- main support but also as “the linchpin other even as they formally claim ticipants in the electoral process re- of the entire system of power,” has not electoral neutrality. But now, after the main overall equal. An analysis of yielded the party any significant official start of the race, its main par- polling results published by a variety breakthroughs in the electoral- ticipants seem to be in a decidedly of research services shows that the political arena. odd position. divergence in ratings between the par- In fact, only 26% of Russians Take, for example, the media, ties most often falls within the 3-4% agree with the statement that “without whose penchant for the pro-Putin average statistical margin of error. United Russia Putin will have a hard United Russia party, as in the past, The Public Opinion Foundation’s Sep- time,” while a majority either disagree cannot be ignored. According to data tember findings show equal chances with the role of United Russia as the from the HEB Integrum-Techno elec- for United Russia and KPRF (20% of

TABLE 1: Electoral Rating of Russia’s Leading Parties (change from previous month)

Public Opinion Foundation VTsIOM-A TsIPKR Sept. 20-21, 2003 September 2003 July 28 - Aug. 5, 2003 KPRF 20 (+1) 23 (-5) 25 (+1) United Russia 20 (0) 28 (+5) 24 (+3) LDPR 6 (-2) 5 (-4) 7 (+1) Yabloko 4 (0) 5 (+1) 5 (0) SPS 5 (+1) 5 (0) 4 (-1)

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FIGURE 1: The leaders of United Russia emphasize the Party’s role as President Putin’s main and single support. What is your opinion.

35% 30% 25% 20% 32% 15% 26% 10% 18% 13% 10% 5% Р1

0% 1. Yes, Putin 2. United Russia simply 3. The support of 4. Other 5. No opinion will have a hard wants to be a presi- United Russia only or no answer time without dential party, but Putin hurts Putin. United Russia . is doing fine without it.

“party of Putin” or feel that his con- of large-scale pre-election action has actual campaign activity conducted by nection with the party is a detriment to had minimal effects. Nearly 70% of a majority of election participants. him. voters did not even know about the The candidates are entering the At the same time, popular support push, which had a positive impact on home stretch of the electoral race in a for United Russia matches that for a only 1-2% of people, meaning that an virtual dead heat. To extricate the new Communist Party of the Soviet overwhelming majority of even electoral competition from its current Union — just 13%. In other words, staunch KPRF supporters remained deadlock will require in the remaining for all its strength, United Russia re- outside the sphere of action of the two months no small amount of inven- mains for now within the bounds of its campaign activities. tiveness, energy, and intellect from all traditional electorate. As a result, there is a persistent the parties, especially United Russia Of course, the KPRF finds itself “freezing” of the electoral scene at the and the Communist Party of the Rus- in a similar situation. A campaign official start of the campaign despite sian Federation. among voters by the Party’s deputies the passing of more that a half year of █ intended as an organizational “carrier”

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