MIDDLE EAST DIALOGUE 2014 Strategies for Change in the Middle East

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MIDDLE EAST DIALOGUE 2014 Strategies for Change in the Middle East MIDDLE EAST DIALOGUE 2014 Strategies for Change in the Middle East Debates on Politics, Economics, and Culture as Jordan Joins the GCC Sarah A, Tobin, PhD Northeastern University Carnegie Visiting Scholar On May 10, 2011, Jordan and Morocco submitted bids to become members of the GCC, or Gulf Cooperation Council, joining Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates in an economic and political cooperative relationship. The alliance brings with it a series of objectives such as regulatory consistency in economic, finance, customs, and trade relations. Citizens of GCC countries are allowed open movement to other GCC countries, as well as cross country investment and trade. The Peninsula Shield Force is the unified military of the alliance, which, for example sent Saudi Arabian forces to help quell Bahraini revolutionary uprisings in March 2011. A common currency has been proposed, the Khaleeji. In an alliance that mirrors many European Union and Schengen States’ objectives, the GCC holds out both short- and long-term promises for their citizens. As Barany (2013) has pointed out, the citizens of GCC countries constitute some of the wealthiest in the world. In 2010, Qatar’s per capita gross domestic product in purchasing power parity was first in the world at $179,000. Saudi Arabia, the poorest of these member countries, ranked fifty-fourth at $24,200. The state-bestowed benefits in these countries often include no income tax, free housing, healthcare, and education. By contrast, Jordan would struggle to survive financially without aid from the U.S., E.U., and from Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, living standards in Jordan and Morocco “are modest, with per capita incomes in 2010 of only $5,400 in Jordan (142nd) and $4,800 in Morocco (149th). In relatively poor societies like these — the rural poverty of Jordan and Morocco is particularly conspicuous—regime legitimacy does not derive from people’s sense of economic well-being (Barany 2013). GCC wealth, particularly in the wealthiest countries of Qatar and the UAE, ultimately limited the interest of the populace in participating in Arab Spring protests. “Rich people,” it seems, “seldom take to the streets” (Barany 2013). When Jordan submitted their bid in March 2011, it was the first time that new members had been considered, and the timing coincided with many Arab Spring protests in the region, which raised eyebrows, concerns, and regional support for political stability (Ramady 2012). Jordan, despite its status as a poorer country, attempted to mirror the political strategies of the GCC countries to gain national support. By aligning themselves with the GCC, the Hashemites tacitly acknowledged a national importance to developing, solidifying and securing a Muslim middle class. Jordan’s economic and political stability, it seems, was best bolstered by way of patronage systems that secure personal wealth rather than through the voting booths. Reactions to the news of the bid by a middle class Jordanian populace were mixed. Twitter, Facebook, and local blogs such as 7iber.com lit up with comments that ranged from frustration and disgust that the Jordanian government unilaterally and undemocratically sought to 2 MIDDLE EAST DIALOGUE 2014 Strategies for Change in the Middle East forge a political and economic alliance without polling the citizens, to joking and sarcasm about the deep national differences that exist between Jordan and the Gulf countries, despite a frequent washing in the media as all “Islamic.” As a result, much of the ensuing jokes displayed uncertainty or even cynicism about the GCC membership, revolving around differences in levels and types of consumption between wealthier GCC member constituents and poorer Jordanians. References to Gulf “culture” of austere dress, censorship, and extreme wealth dominated the twitter responses. Multiple references were made to the ghotra, the red and white head covering associated with men in Saudi Arabia including how to wear it “correctly” and the amount of starch one must use when ironing it. One Tweeter made reference to the lack of customs or duty fees on otherwise expensive and cost prohibitive cars in Jordan, which are in abundance in Saudi Arabia by stating that he “just ordered my new white Chevrolet caprice with the burgundy leather upholstery inside.” Many other expressed anticipation that gas prices in Jordan would drop to Saudi levels. As one tweeted, “Fuel prices to drop to pre-2003 prices and car prices to go down 50% #wishing.” At the same time Jordanians on Twitter drew upon differences between the perceived and stereotyped austere, largely-Salafi Islamic observance found in GCC countries (particularly Saudi Arabia) and contrasted this with a kind of “real” or “authentic” Islam of Jordanians. Jordanians asked questions such as, “Does this mean I can go up to any non-khaliji people and threaten them with tafseer?” These questions attempted to turn the association of aggressive Saudi sheyukh back on them and “retaliate” with an interrogation of them and their religious practices. Another summed it up with, “I guess you will wear a dishdash, have 4 wives dressed in black and a few extra bucks.” For the Middle East Dialogue 2014: Strategies for Change, I aim to further unpack the debates within Jordan about joining the GCC. The tweets and the responses in social media by Jordanians all speak to a public dialogue about classed nationalism and do so in relatively defensive terms. Together, these responses amplify the notion that there is a kind of Jordanian nationalism found in the Muslim middle class, and it is one that prides itself on contrasting values of diversity in dress and public representations, democratic processes of openness and some freedoms in expression, and in localized Shari`a-derived understandings of the role and purposes of wealth. At the same time the defensive position Jordanians express is tied to a fear that the cultures of GCC countries and Saudi Arabia in particular are going to dominate the cultural landscape of Jordan. These social media expressions, therefore, hint at a precariousness and an uncertainty about Jordan’s Islamic middle class in the face of political and economic prompts for more singularized, “non-native” and public culture. References: Barany, Zoltan. 2013. "Unrest and State Response in Arab Monarchies." Mediterranean Quarterly 24 (2):5-38. Ramady, Mohamed A. 2012. The GCC Economies: Stepping Up to Future Challenges: Springer. .
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