INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON KENYA’S
NATIONAL SECURITY: A CASE OF NAIROBI CITY COUNTY: 1975-2013
SIMON ODERO MUGA
A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF PEACE DIPLOMACY AND SECURITY STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS (INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY) OF KENYATTA UNIVERSITY
SEPTEMBER 2019
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DECLARATION
iii
DEDICATION
I dedicate this work to my beloved grandmother, Salina Nyondang’a for being a source of inspiration in my life.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I would like to express my appreciation to Kenyatta University for granting me a chance to pursue my Masters degree in International Relations and Diplomacy and further approving my request to conduct this study.
I thank most sincerely my two supervisors Dr. Susan Mwangi Owino and Dr.
Washington Ndiiri, for encouragement and constructive advice during the research period. I also extend my appreciation to Dr. Edwin Gimode, Dr. Joseph Wasonga, and
Dr. Francis Mulu, for being there right from the beginning of the study to this far.
My deep appreciation to Erick Okuto and Maina Danson for their assistance during the data processing period. Special thanks to Kenyatta University team working at the Post
Modern Library for being there to accord me all the necessary help I needed. Jomo
Kenyatta Memorial Library at the University of Nairobi also played a critical role in provision of key sources of information during the study, I therefore say thank you to the officers based there. I am indebted to my informants for this study would not be complete without their input. I am also grateful to my fellow students and close associates for their brilliant ideas which provided vital points during the study process.
On a personal note, I am thankful to my parents Risper Abuto and John Odero for their endless support and tolerance. Finally, I extend my special gratitude to my wife and our two sons (Joel and Zack) for being patient with me while in the field collecting data and throughout the research period.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
DECLARATION...... ii
DEDICATION...... iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ...... iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... v
LIST OF TABLE ...... viii
OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS ...... ix
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ...... x
ABSTRACT ...... xi
CHAPTER ONE ...... 1
INTRODUCTION...... 1
1.1 Background to the Study ...... 1
1.2. Statement of the Research Problem ...... 11
1.3 Objectives of the Study ...... 13
1.4 Research questions ...... 14
1.5 Research Premises ...... 14
1.6 Justification and Significance of the study ...... 14
1.7 Scope and Limitations of the study ...... 16
1.8 Literature Review ...... 16
1.8.1 National Security in Perspective ...... 26
1.9 Theoretical framework ...... 28
1.9.1 Securitization theory ...... 28
1.10 Research Methodology ...... 30
1.10.1 Research design ...... 30
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1.10.2 Research location ...... 30
1.10.3 Target population ...... 30
1.10.4 Sample size ...... 31
1.10.5 Sampling Procedure ...... 31
1.10.6 Research Instruments ...... 31
1.10.7 Data Collection procedures ...... 31
1.10.8 Data collection methods ...... 32
1.10.9 Data Analysis and presentation ...... 32
1.10.10 Ethical Considerations ...... 33
CHAPTER TWO ...... 34
TRENDS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN KENYA; 1975-2013 ...... 34
2.0 Introduction ...... 34
2.1 The context and emergence of terrorism, 1975-1998 ...... 34
2.2 Radicalization ...... 43
2.3 Terror acts after 9/11-2013 and its proliferation in Kenya ...... 45
CHAPTER THREE ...... 54
IMPLICATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM ON KENYA’S NATIONAL SECURITY; 1975-2013 ...... 54
3.0 Introduction ...... 54
3.1 Socioeconomics and Political Impacts ...... 54
CHAPTER FOUR ...... 63
COUNTER TERRORISM METHODS USED BY THE KENYAN GOVERNMENT 1998-2013 ...... 63
4.0 Introduction ...... 63
4.1 Counter terrorism measures ...... 63
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4.2 Challenges faced in the fight against terrorism ...... 80
4.2.1 Dialogue ...... 80
4.2.2 Media ...... 81
4.2.3 Internet ...... 82
CHAPTER FIVE ...... 83
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 83
5.1 Summary ...... 83
5.2 Conclusion ...... 86
5.3 Recommendations ...... 87
REFERENCES ...... 90
APPENDICES ...... 102
Appendix I: Cover Letter ...... 102
Appendix II: Research Instruments ...... 103
Appendix III: List of Key Informants ...... 114
Appendix IV: Map of Nairobi City County ...... 115
Appendix V: Research Permit ...... 116
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LIST OF TABLE
Table 1: Data on terrorist attacks in Kenya from 1975 to 2013...... 15
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OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS
Anti-terrorism: methods of reducing the susceptibility to terrorist attacks and to reduce
the effects any possible attacks.
Counterterrorism: measures employed to curb acts of terrorism.
Horn of Africa: defined in this context as the region consisting of Tanzania, Ethiopia,
Uganda, Djibouti, Kenya, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia,
International terrorism: the unlawful use of violence committed by a person or
groups with some connection to a foreign power in furtherance of a
specific objective.
National security: to guard against internal and external threats to peaceful
coexistence.
Radicalization: the process of adopting extreme ideals and ideas which are either
political, social or religious contrary to the accepted norms.
Security: is the absence of either threats or fear of attack.
Terrorism: the systematic use of violence by a person or groups against unarmed
innocent people in order to gain either socially, politically or even
economically.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ATPU Anti-Terrorism Police Unit
CBRNE Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
FBI Federal Investigation Bureau
HOA Horn of Africa
ICG International Crisis Group
IMRO Internal Macedonia Revolutionary Organization
JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force
NACOSTI National Commission of Science, Technology and Innovation.
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCBD Nairobi Central Business District
NCTC National Counter Terrorism Centre
NSIS National Security and Intelligence Services
NSS National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OTC Overseas Trading Company
PKK Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan
SPU Special Prosecution Unit
SSR Security Sector Reforms
TIP Terrorism Interdiction Program
TPU Tourism Police Unit
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNEP United Nations Environmental Program
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ABSTRACT
Terrorism has become and remains a major international concern and a high priority security matter of the global community. It contravenes the basic principles of law, order, human rights and physical security. Other than Nigeria in the sub Saharan Africa, Kenya has felt the devastating effects of international terrorism in the region. Kenya especially suffers crime levels at the upper end of the African scale, which adds to the intrinsic internal insecurity. This study focused on international terrorism and its implications on Kenya’s national security, a case of Nairobi City County; 1975-2013. The objectives of this study were to investigate trends of International terrorism in Kenya; 1975 - 2013. Secondly, to interrogate the implications of international terrorism on Kenya’s national security and finally, to assess the strategies employed by the Kenyan government to counter international terrorism; 1998-2013. The study applied both primary and secondary data in order to realize the objectives. The theoretical framework was based on the Securitization Theory. It states that political issues are usually construed to be highly security concerns that must be dealt with immediately they are characterized to be dangerous or alarming by the actors who have the mandate to move the issue beyond politics. For instance, terrorism is securitized in Kenya hence the attention given to it is usually of high significance. The study revealed that there have been consistent upward trend in international terror attacks in Kenya between 1975 and 2013. The study also discovered that the Kenyan problem is escalated by the unstable states neighboring it, this is coupled by a number of incompetent and corrupt officials at the security agencies in the country. According to the study, Kenya experienced numerous attacks after the 2011 military incursion in Somalia. The study further revealed that the ability by terrorists to always change tact has led to their prolonged ‘survival’ despite the government of Kenya deploying all the available machineries at its disposal to fight it. To this end the study argued that these factors have had far reaching implications on Kenya’s’ national security.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
This chapter focused on the following areas; background of the study, Statement of the research problem, Objectives of the study, Research questions, Research premises,
Justification and Significance of the study, Scope and limitation of the study, Literature review, Theoretical framework, and Research methodology.
1.1 Background to the Study
International terrorism remains among the greatest threats to both human and state security in the 21st century. According to Suder (2006) terrorism activities have many implications which are beyond borders. For instance the 9/11 kind of terrorism was planned and executed by international partners. He further states that global terrorism is still a major challenge to most establishments as they always target innocent and helpless individuals. The key objective is to get maximum casualty and media publicity which tend to influence human psychology. This translates into a terrible human cost.
Bonner (2007) on the other hand indicates that Governments consider the terrorist threat to be unprecedented in its nature and magnitude.
However, there is a dilemma in the definition of terrorism. As demonstrated by scholars like Sudha, International Organizations (United Nations), security experts and governments. They all grapple to get a detailed, satisfactory and globally recognized meaning of terrorism. Owing to this, there is no clear-cut definition on what it entails and what it does not (Sudha, 2001). Cronin (2003) notes that the challenges experienced in getting the meaning of terrorism are as a result of its dynamic nature and personal observation. Terrorism has many definitions since some scholars emphasise on
2 criminals. While others pay attention on their techniques, purposes, mode of operation while others lay emphasis on the motivations and characteristics of terrorism (Stern
2000; Otiso 2009; Nzau, 2010).
Hoffman defines terrorism as the use of violence to cause fear and intimidation in order to achieve a political objective (Hoffman, 2004), his definition, though sounds good but lacks a number of factors as it is only geared towards political settlement. Stern terms terrorism as an act or threat of war meted on unarmed with the aim of retaliation and coercing people to give to a particular demands (Stern, 2000). According to Snow
(2007) terrorism is “the commission of atrocious acts against a target population normally to gain compliance with some demands the terrorists insist upon”. Terrorism is a strategy adopted by various organizations to impose their views and express their grievances.
Terrorists often are dedicated to some religious, ideological or political cause; with varied motivations, which include: religion (Al Qaeda; Al Shabaab; Boko Haram), class ideology (Shining Path in Peru), ethnic conflict and nationalism (Basque fatherland and liberty) (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2008). Extremists resort to terrorist acts in order to coerce, threaten and target the liberty of people, economies and organizations with an aim of achieving political, religious or ideological goals (Conrad, 2011). It is clear there exists no common definition of terrorism, as most experts and organizations tend to be biased on the side that favor them while conceptualizing the term terrorism.
The term terrorism was conceptualized as “The systematic use of terror or unpredictable violence against governments, publics or individuals to attain a political objective. It has been used by political organization with both rightist and leftist objectives, by
3 nationalistic and ethnic groups, by revolutionaries, and by the armies and secret police of governments themselves” (Weinberger, 2003). The modern conceptualization of terrorism was first used by English savant Edmund Burke when portraying the system de la terreur, otherwise called the Reign of Terror, happening during the French
Revolution, from June 1793 to July 1794 (Gus, 2003).
Led by Maximilien Robespierre, the radical Jacobin government tried to smother any restriction to the tyranny and cement the grip of the French Republic. The Jacobins, an amazing ideological group for an incorporated government, built up the Revolutionary
Tribunal, which approved the capture and supervised the indictment of suspected nonconformists. Inside a year's time, the temporary court denounced about 40,000 individuals, requesting their execution by a novel weapon, the guillotine (Burgess,
2003). In this context, terrorism is often adopted as a way of cracking down on those who are opposed to the revolutionaries and whom the government regarded as the
‘enemy of the people’.
According to Otsiala (2014) the revolutionary governments often adopt state terrorism in order to protect the system and maintain power. This is often manifested in two forms, namely, overt and convert sanctioned national terrorism. Overt sanctioned national terrorism is the open display of state political violence driven by state recognized institutions such as the police, as was the case of Nazi Germany (Adolf
Hitler), Joseph Stalin (Russia), and Pol Pot (Cambodia). Covert official state terrorism unlike overt is secretive application of state sponsored political violence, it is done in a manner that nobody can accuse the Government of doing it since the perpetrator is not
‘known’.
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However, Rapport (2004) on his part classifies terrorism into different waves, he talks of anarchist wave of which according to him is the international terrorism. Secondly, he talks of anti-colonial wave which swept through 1920s and lasted for almost forty years, this was followed by the new left wave which ended in the twentieth century.
Religious wave which emerged in 1979 is the final one, this was driven by Islamic fundamentalism. This remains the biggest threat to national security, never the less, this study focused on a broader spectrum of terrorism.
Notably, Botha (2013) states that the contemporary upsurge of transnational terrorism is always aimed at the United States of America and other Western countries and their friends. He argues that this could have some connection to the existence of United
States military soldiers in Saudi Arabia; economics and military aid in Israel and their strategies on Western Asian states. No wonder the many attacks targeting Western
Interests across the globe.
Terrorist activities have existed in Africa since 1970s when al-Qaeda and Osama bin
Laden operated in Sudan (Kagwanja, 2006; Rabasa, 2009). Terrorism and religious extremism remain key challenges bedeviling Africa. In reference to Nigeria, Sabo maintains that religious extremism manifests itself through politics. The political elites politicize the religious identities for political gains; a case in point is of the Christians in the South and Muslims in the North (Sabo, 2015). In fact, Nwaoha vividly exposes that Zamfara, a Sharia state in Northern Nigeria experienced high levels of insecurity as a result of “extreme” religious extremism and anti-west sentiments (Nwaoha, 2013).
In August 2011, Boko Haram bombed the United Nations office in Abuja, Nigeria. In another instance, the organizations members burnt down twelve public schools in
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Maduguri and forced 10,000 students out of school in March 2012 (Bergen, Hoffman,
Hurley, Southers, 2013). Yet again in 2014, the extremist movement kidnapped over
200 young women from Chibok in Borno State in Nigeria, these are just but a few incidences occasioned by the group.
April 1993, extremist Muslims in Tanzania demonstrated over the sale of pork and alcoholic drinks in the country. As a result of their agitation, they destroyed bars and several Christian-owned butcheries. Further, Shaikh Yahya Hussein the leader of the
Council for the Promotion of the Quran, a radical Muslim group in Balcuta-Tanzania, was accused of distributing cassettes campaigning for the overthrow of the regime and called for the establishment of a Muslim state based on the Sharia law (Obed, 2000).
Religious extremism has also manifested itself in Ethiopia, for instance in the mid-
1990s the Al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya, now dormant Somali Islamist group, carried out a series of bomb operations aimed at transporting infrastructure and government buildings (Menkhaus, 2007). Religious extremism has also been experienced in Libya and Mali through the acts of terrorism. The phenomenon in Mali dates back to the colonial era but the country has experienced a surge in Islamist militia activity since
2011 when the Ansar Dine established affiliations with the Al Qaeda (Morgan, 2013).
In June 2012, three hundred men from the Ansar al-sharia group which is an Islamist militant group in Libya marched to the Benghazi’s Tahrir square. Their aim was to request for the enactment of Sheria law in Libya. Together with other salafi organizations in Libya, the Benghazi-based extremist group destroyed mausoleums,
Sufi mosques and shrines (Bergen et. al, 2013).
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Religious terrorism is arguably the most feared and very common in the modern society. Terrorists who practice religiously motivated violence base their mission on the belief that their faith is just and god expects them to revenge on all infidels.
According to Noftsinger et al (2007) this grouping presents the best danger to the worldwide network, vulnerable exploited people don't dwell in a solitary area or offer regular national bonds, as people of fluctuating religions live on almost all landmasses on the planet. Also, the conviction that "God" gives the defense of homicide, robbery, or torment makes this type of terrorism especially perilous. The Kenyan constitution does not have any preferred religion in the country, however, some faiths take advantage and attack others in their places of worship. The government has responded to this by beefing up security in places of worship but not much has been achieved as the country still witnesses cases of terrorism attacks in churches. Notable examples of these terrorist organizations include; al-Qaeda, Hizbollah, Alshabaab, Boko haram, among others.
Religious extremism provides a strong ideological foundation for terrorism and related crimes. Referring to the 9/11 attacks executed by Al-Qaeda, Stepanova adds that the extremist interpretation of the concept of Jihad was used to justify mass casualties as long as the “ultimate” target is the “enemy” (Stepanova, 2010, p. 28). The situation is no different in Africa where Islamist extremists pursue the radical ideology of jihadism.
In this case, jihad has been used as the central component to proselytize and radicalize
Muslims into joining extreme movements such as al-Shabaab, Boko Haram among other Muslim-affiliated extreme movements. The guiding ideology is that Islam is under eminent attack by Kufirs and calls for a jihadist response (Gus, 2010). These religious extreme movements use jihad as their fundamental religious justification for
7 violent actions. In fact, they justify their acts as divinely sanctioned. The groups distort the beliefs of Islam to doctrinal and ideological instructions that justify violent acts.
Al Shabaab’s ideology is centered on Wahhabism, a philosophy that cracks down on un-Islamic practices. The ideology strongly condemns advancements and innovations in Islam and its rituals, and literally interprets Islam. Wahhabism is a puritanical divide of Sunni Islam that seeks to purify the Islamic religion by enforcing the teachings and practices of Prophet Muhammad and his forty companions. As such, Al-shabaab intends to create an Islamic state within Somalia thereby enforcing Islamic law in the country and the entire region (Odhiambo, Maito, Kassilly, Chelumo, Onkware &
Oboka, 2013). Wahhabism has been used interchangeably with salafism, an ideology that is grounded on the Quran and the Prophet’s teachings as being ultimate. Further, the salafi’s believe that they are the only group that will acquire salvation during judgment day. Based on the appeal of the ideology, movements such as the Al Qaeda which is a jihadist salafi group and its members are influential in North America,
Africa, Asia and Middle East (Blanchard, 2006). Menkhaus observes that “aggressive” salafist missionaries from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan have managed to penetrate, lure and re-socialize the Muslim populations in the Horn of Africa (Menkhaus, 2007).
Forest (2007) in his report notes that the social roots of Islamist violence might fortify because of hatred of outsiders by host populaces. The troubles of adapting to modernization versus customary culture, joblessness, and unfulfilled desires for the second and third era of foreigners, which has been worsened by monetary help in
Muslim nations that empowered workers to fabricate and advance their very own networks just as spread neo fundamentalist belief system. This kind of belief system
8 targets genuine people in uncertainty of their confidence and personality, and claims to removed, offended youth looking for a character past the lost societies of their folks and obstructed desires for a superior life in the West. For example, as Roane observes, in “central Montreal more than 15,000 of its 1 million people are of Algerian descent”.
The claim that they have been deprived of employment because of their origin and they also allege mistreatment by those in authority.
The 1998 bombing of the United States of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania confirmed the presence of terrorism in the region. However, the origin of terrorism in
East Africa can be traced from 1975 when terrorists struck a lavatory of the iconic
Starlight Nightclub that once stood where Integrity Center stands today. The following year, 1976, there was an attempted attack by the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP) and the Baader-Meinhof group (Aronson, 2013). The 1980 terrorist attack of Norfolk hotel in Nairobi by the Palestinian Liberation Organization was a revenge for Kenya’s association with Israeli in the 1976 Entebbe Airport attack
(Otenyo, 2004). The incident brought East Africa into the Israeli-Palestinian battle.
Nearly two decades later in 1998, al-Qaeda operatives in East Africa carried out double assault in the United States of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (Botha,
2013). Almost at the same time in 1994, the al-Qaeda operatives helped train the obscure Salafi Foundation of Uganda. This in turn developed into a hostile group called
Allied Democratic Forces whose agenda was based on hostility against the government
(Shinn, 2007). The group is currently operating in the eastern parts of Democratic
Republic of Congo.
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The 1998 US embassy bombing in Kenya and the 2013 West gate attack have raised fundamental issues regarding Kenya’s policy on security, its state of preparedness, state responsiveness and the regional security dimensions. Moreover, although various strategies in handling international terrorism have been adopted, it appears that most of the strategies employed are state-centric and the communities are still relegated thus placing demand on the future of the country’s terrorism challenges since a concerted effort is required in order to win war on terror. The existing gaps in organizational capacity in emerging police reforms, operational preparedness and logistical capacity have always been blamed for the reactive tendency of the police in responding to terror attacks and threats. These gaps in research become more compelling against the evidence of growing implications of international terrorism on the country’s national security; coupled with the ever-changing nature and terror trends in the world and thus a critical area for research.
The current threat to the regional security emanates from al-Shabaab, which is an al-
Qaeda associate based in Somalia. Al-Shabaab developed by way of an offshoot of
Islamic court union (ICU), which was a remainder of al Ittihad al Islamiya (AIAI).
AIAI was a terrorist’s organization whose activities were conducted in Somalia as early as 1980s (Rabasa, 2009). Al-Shabaab has surpassed other extremist groups in the region and it has remained resilient to various counterterrorism measures in the region. To achieve this, the group has co-opted some extremist groups in the region as their affiliates. The key associates of the groups are al-Hijra of Kenya and Ansar Muslim
Youth Center (AMYC) of Tanzania (Nzes, 2014; Anzalone, 2012). These affiliate
10 groups are used to mobilize recruits, raise funds and launch assaults on behalf of Al-
Shabaab (ibid).
Al-Shabaab has been involved in many assaults outside Somalia. However, Kenya has been the most targeted country of all the East African countries. The first successful attack by the group outside Somalia was the 2010 twin attack in Kampala-Uganda
(Nzau, 2010). Since then the group has carried out many terrorist onslaught in the region with greatest attacks being the 2013 Westgate attack. (Global Terrorism Index,
2016). According to Alshabaab, killing and stealing from infidels is legal and allowed by god. One Imam was quoted saying;
The English and French speaking people are supposed to be handled the same way since their blood and cash are legalized anywhere in the world. Therefore is it is not expected that any Muslim will collaborate with infidels. Terrorist organizations like
Alshabaab have a strong conviction that Kenyans, Ethiopians, Burundians and
Ugandans are equitable to French and English people for they have entered Somalia and attacked Muslims (Jones 2013).
Botha (2007) opines that in order to ‘succeed’ terrorists employ a number of tactics during their operations to demonstrate power by inflicting harm on their enemies, deterring any future resistance and to strengthen the will and capacity of their organizations. Among the commonly used tactics are armed robbery, abductions, killings, arbitrary targeting, use of mass destructive weapons, CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive weapons) cyber, suicide, and innovative methods.
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In reaction to the increasing danger of terrorism, Kenyan spy agency has progressively focused on the national security and the threats posed by terrorists. This is happening as some authors like Botha (2007) argue that there is no instant solution and cure that exist to prevent terrorism since there has been a sequence of terrorists assault in Kenya mostly targeting churches, Christian gatherings, government institutions, military bases, police posts, immigrant campsites, learning centres, bus parks, discothèques, and recently supermarkets. All these in one way or another have had serious implications on national security in Kenya. International terrorism indeed has become a central threat to security, hence making this area a concern for study.
1.2. Statement of the Research Problem
In spite of various state strategies to combat International terrorism, terrorism still exists as a potent danger to Kenya’s national security. This casts a lot of doubts on the state control approaches to combat terrorism. For example, the past two decades have seen a surge of extremism and terrorism in the country, this has partly been attributed to the protracted instability in the neighboring countries like Somalia. The country has been used as safe haven for various terror related activities within the region. As a result
Kenya has been on the receiving end, as the refugees flee from the war torn areas in to the country. Some of these refugees come into the country with ulterior motives which include criminal activities, like terrorism. Some of these people belong to Alshabaab which is a Somalia based organized criminal group.
Al-Shabaab which also goes by other names like Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen, an al-Qaeda associate has used the country as launching pad for terror activities in the region and has remained the most eminent security threat to the region. The group has
12 co-opted different extremist groups within the region to advance its radical ideologies.
The al-Hijra of Kenya and Ansar Muslim Youth Centre (AMYC) of Tanzania have been carrying out recruitment and raising funds on behalf of al-Shabaab. In advancing extremism, religion and specifically Islam has been the rallying point. Islamic fundamentalism has been a major pull factor on which terrorism has thrived in East
Africa. Alshabaab claims responsibility in nearly all attacks in Kenya while claiming that their reason is Kenyan troops continued stay in Somalia (Rapport, 2004).
The 1998 Al-Qaeda attack on the United States of American embassy in Kenya epitomized the danger posed by international terrorism. The reaction from the attack had far reaching consequences. Key among them was an attempt to unite Africans to address their security concerns in the continent, but more specifically the East African region. Combating international terrorism various dimensions including many stakeholders. According to Adam the dimensions are militaristic and diplomatic strategies. Militaristic resolutions to international terrorism have been used in Iraq,
Somalia and Afghanistan, thereby raising a lot of concerns with some groups backing it while others disagreed, all geared towards its achievements and challenges (Adam,
2007).
Otiso (2009) argues that Kenya could be targeted because of its geographic, regional, historical, political, economic and socio-cultural factors. In his analysis he concludes that the assaults have affected the country’s’ GDP negatively besides causing conflict among the two major religions in the country, Christianity and Islam. Kenya has continuously been attacked by terrorists whose mode of operation range from kidnappings of Government officials to suicide bombers. After continuous and spirited
13 attacks in the country. The Kenyan government deployed the militaristic approach christened Operation Linda Nchi (Kiswahili for protect the nation), and has deployed its army and air forces at the boundaries of Kenya and Somalia including Kismayo.
Combating transnational terrorism in Eastern part of Africa offers two contradictory points. On one side, it is considered to promote development in the region while on other there is mistrust leading to the collapse of the regional blocks (Anangwe, 2006).
Despite several measures to counter terrorism, the strategies have apparently not matched the terrorists resolve in executing attacks in the country. As a result more and more lives are lost, economy deteriorated and mass destruction of property is still being witnessed in the country.
In light of the above, international terrorism still poses danger to Kenya’ national security owing to continuous attacks witnessed in the country. With this reality in mind, the study was conducted with a view to investigate the implications of international terrorism on Kenya’s national security from 1975-2013.
1.3 Objectives of the Study
The following objectives guided the study;
1. To investigate trends of International terrorism in Kenya; 1975 - 2013.
2. To interrogate the implications of international terrorism on Kenya’s national
security.
3. To assess strategies employed by the government of Kenya to curb international
terrorism; 1998-2013.
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1.4 Research questions
The following questions guided the research;
1. How has international terrorism changed since 1975?
2. To what extent has international terrorism impacted on Kenya’s national
security?
3. What methods has the Kenyan government employed in dealing with
international terrorism; 1998-2013?
1.5 Research Premises
The study was based on the following research premises:
1. The ‘victory’ of international terrorists in Kenya since 1975 has been informed
by the ability to morph.
2. International terrorism has negatively affected the Kenya’s national security.
3. Establishment of an anti-terrorism police unit has helped reduce cases of terror
attacks.
1.6 Justification and Significance of the study
A number of existing literature on terrorism have put more emphasis on counter terrorism strategies in the country. They provide deep analysis of preventive measures with little on the implications of international terrorism on Kenya’s national security. It is the constitutional responsibility of the government to protect the people and their livelihoods. This is important to socioeconomic and political stability of a nation.
Therefore, this study will be important in informing and influencing security policies in regard to fighting international terrorism to ensure that the country is stable.
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The researchers’ time frame was based on the fact that Kenya experienced the first international terrorism in 1975. According to Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, the year 2013 was significant because Kenya had the highest number of terrorist attacks in history
(see table 1), this was placed at 46 with a total of 174 killed (ATPU, 2014).
Table 1: Data on terrorist attacks in Kenya from 1975 to 2013.
Time frame Statistics of Death cases Injuries Offender
attacks
1975 1 0 0 PFLP
1980 1 16 87 PFLP
1998 1 213 3846 Al Qaeda
2002 2 13 78 Al Shabaab
2010 5 6 35 Al Shabaab
2011 25 14 54 Al Shabaab
2012 39 67 362 Al Shabaab
2013 46 174 314 Al Shabaab
Source: ATPU
While the study was confined to Nairobi City County because of its international significance, it also considered other regions such as Mombasa, Mandera and Garissa, which have had similar experiences relating to international terrorism. Nairobi was also considered because it has some of the most devastating attacks besides having the highest number of casualties compared to other regions in the country.
The outcome of this study are useful to other researchers doing or intending to carry out research on international terrorism in Africa and beyond. Also, considering that this
16 study is relatively new in Kenya, some scholarships may be awarded to students with interests to study it abroad.
1.7 Scope and Limitations of the study
The study was limited to only one aspect, the implications of international terrorism on
Kenya’s National Security a case of Nairobi City County; 1975-2013. While the study was confined to Nairobi City County because of its international image, the study also considered other regions such as Mombasa, Mandera and Garissa, which have had similar experiences relating to international terrorism. Where necessary the regions were only studied in so far as they relate to the topic under research.
In view of the sequence of global terrorism, studying all aspects of national and international terrorism was not tenable. Another big challenge experienced was sensitivity of the topic, which made some informants apprehensive in discussing the topic since they felt they would be victimized at the end. As a result they failed to submit their questionnaires. To overcome this challenge, the researcher assured them that their personal information will not be revealed, and that the study was purely meant for academics. The study also guaranteed total confidentiality of the data obtained from the informants.
1.8 Literature Review
This section dealt with interrogation and analysis of materials linked to the research topic, and to help identify the knowledge gaps that were addressed by the study.
According to Sudha (2001) the efforts to get a common definition of terrorism is shrouded by issues of law, history, philosophy, morality, and religion. Experts agree
17 that the definition is more of an individual appreciation of the situation, since there can never be a common understanding. Sudha goes ahead to state that definition of terrorism is key if any international organizations or individual states wants to decisively deal with the menace. It is important as it helps the society map out the parameters of what kind of punishments will be meted against who as outlined in the definition.
Brown, Cote, Lynn-Jones and Miller (2010) state that terrorism has existed since the first century when the Jewish terrorists (Zealots and Sicarii) called for revolution in
Judea against the Roman rule. Other notable early terrorists include the Hindu Thugs and the Muslim Assassins. Nonetheless, French revolution is considered to be the beginning of modern terrorism.
Cronin (2002) opines that though Kenya has suffered the four main categories of terrorism including leftist, rightist, ethno nationalist, and religious. The most traumatizing attacks have come from ethno nationalistic and religious terrorism which is demonstrated by the historical sequence that has morphed into an international problem. This requires a concerted action by all nations of good will to help in fighting this menace.
Kenya is always considered the objective of terrorist activities in the larger East African region as demonstrated by a sequence of sporadic attacks in the country since 1975.
Consequently resulting to major impacts including; massive loss of lives, conflict among Christians and Muslims, undermining the country’s economy, radicalization of the youths, issuance of travel advisories to diplomats and many others. Recent terrorist threats and experiences still remain an immense challenge for the law enforcement
18 agencies, coupled with the level of police unpreparedness indeed this study is critical
(Cronin, 2002:39).
According to Goyal and Bell (2009) the effects of international terrorism have been felt in almost all the spheres in Kenya, be it in the economy, political affairs and even socially. It interrupts the livelihoods of people in countries that largely depend on tourism. In Kenya for instance tourism contributes up to about 25 percent of the GDP, this is constantly affected by continuous travel advisories mainly by the western countries. Due to these sanctions most people have been rendered jobless and the ripple effect still felt in the economy. Yet the country has inadequate capacity to prevent, mitigate or even manage crime and build sustainable counterterrorism measures hence it was this gap that the study sought to fill.
A study by Baen (2008) support the fact that terrorism affects the economy of a state.
He further noted that these terrorism activities in Kenya and other countries disrupted exports of various items including tea. This has in turn adversely impacted on the country’s economy. Pakistan and Afghanistan were the world's major importers of tea produced in Kenya. As a result of the social and financial effects of the terrorist assaults of 11 September 2001 on the United States, coupled with the ensuing military exercises in Afghanistan, fares to these business sectors have been disturbed hence huge losses witnessed across the region.
Schmid (2008) found out that in 2001, the Kenyan government closed its borders with
Somalia and further suspended all the air travels the country. The action was necessitated by the view that terrorists operating Somalia would hijack aircrafts and subsequently commit suicide activities in Kenya. Consequently, this resulted to massive
19 losses since there was no revenue collected during the period. Although these studies provide good models and framework of international terrorism, they lack analysis on the particular aspects on the implications of international terrorism on national security.
Wardlaw (1986) notes that debates on how to deal with terrorism is clouded by political positioning, moral confusion and wishful thinking. He considers that all acts of terrorism are often portrayed as being equally dangerous to the national security and the international system. However, this has exaggerated the threat that is posed by terrorism. This disconnect between the reality and perceptions have elevated terrorism to prominence. Therefore, the complexity of terrorism requires a structured study.
Rosenau (2005) looks at the recruitment of Kenyan population into terror organizations like the al-Qaeda. He notes that Kenya has been the avenue of international terrorism since 1970s when Palestine Liberation Organization sympathizers bombed the Norfolk
Hotel in Nairobi. The infiltration of terrorism into the country according to Rossenau is attributed to many issues, including the substantial Muslim population, widespread poverty, poor policing, and inadequate border control. He further adds that systematic political and economic marginalization of some groups may also cause discontent in the society. However, he is quick to point out that even though some locals participated in the 1998 and 2002 terror attacks, it appears that they did it unwillingly. Nevertheless, this does not capture the current situation in which many locals have been voluntarily providing support to extremists.
Gatsiounis (2012) delves on al-Shabaab’s activities in the East African countries like
Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya. He notes that al-Shabaab had begun to forge coalitions among likeminded Islamic organizations in East African region in which the groups
20 survival and relevancy is anchored. However, the group’s evolution is attributed to the
US and Ethiopia’s operations in Somalia that aided the generation of support for fundamental Islam in Somalia. The group has carried a number of attacks off Somalia but much of the attacks have been concentrated in Kenya.
The attacks usually take different dimensions as noted by Rapoport (2004). He analyses different waves of terrorism which include the ‘anarchist wave’, ‘anti-colonial wave’,
‘new left wave’, and finally the ‘religious wave’.
Rapoport allude that the religious wave of terrorism begun to be felt in 1979, as it drew its doctrines from the Islamic fundamentalism. He discusses each wave in details but notes that every stage is unique. Nonetheless, in some instances, the features extend into other stages, hence sharing some similarities. The development of the four waves of terrorism is key in appreciating how terrorism has continuously changed from its original face to the modern day kind of menace experienced. His study looks at the overall origin and growth of terrorism, by looking at the nebulous aspect of terrorism.
Nonetheless, this study will concentrate and delve on the implications of terrorism in
Kenya.
On the other hand, Makinda (2007) notes that the origin of terrorism is traced back to four cases; for those that struggled for independence, civilian conflicts after independence, the ripple effects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to Africa and finally the beginning of Al Qaeda group. The first two are related and the latter two are similarly intertwined in that Al-Qaida took advantage of the Israeli Palestinian war to spread their network across the globe. However, Makinda is quick to assert that around
1976, the effects of Arab Israeli war began to be felt in East Africa. First was the
21 capturing of French aircraft destined for Greece from Tel Aviv and diverting it to
Kampala, Uganda.
Both Rapport and Makinda agree that terrorism has indeed undergone through different stages over the period. There is also a similarity in their fourth views in that whereas
Rapport talks of Religious wave that is driven by Islamic fundamentalism, Makinda focusses on al-Qaeda organization which draws its inspiration from the Muslim culture.
The modern day terrorism, especially the one affecting Kenya revolves around the two.
Shinn (2004) traces the expanding significance of Africa while fighting terrorism, especially after the 9/11 assault in the United States. Shinn alleges that there is likelihood that most organizations funded by countries in the Middle East like Saudi
Arabia, have the potential of supporting terrorism activities in the region, Kenya being the most hit. The philanthropies have their objective based on advancing Sunni fundamentalism in Muslims statement of faith prominently known as Wahhabism. He additionally talks about the participation of Kenya and United States of American governments with an end goal to battle against fear based oppression in the area.
Mogire and Mkutu (2011) looks at the approaches engaged by the Kenyan authorities to fight terrorism threats and activities within. The two state that whereas the methods were geared towards getting the origin of terrorism in the country. They lack the input of the locals as a result they are always viewed as western domination in the local affairs. Consequently, they violate the fundamental human rights.
Jackson and Sorensen (2010) defined terrorism as the use of threats, intimidations and conflicts on citizens with a view of achieving certain objectives. The duo go ahead to argue that International terrorism involve the territory or citizens of more than one
22 country. In the first definition, the author fails to acknowledge the fact that these attackers also target security officers as well. Despite the efforts made to combat the vice, several elements of international terrorism still influence national security and thus critical for research.
Whittaker (2004) on the other hand notes that in most cases, the people who champion for the freedom of their subjects are labeled terrorists, while in other contexts they are referred to either as activists, soldiers, revolutionaries, or defence forces. The “freedom fighters” of the 1950s and 1960s, straining to loosen imperial shackles were watched globally by a vast audience, which either supported or disapproved them. Nelson
Mandela of South Africa was referred to as a terrorist by the west while at home he was revered and regarded as a freedom fighter. He further gives example of what others refer to as terrorism, that following the protest movements, as one might term them, of antiquity, of imperial Russia, of nineteenth century Marxists contest in Europe, there was a gathering together of resolute activists fighting for a course but readily labeled
“terrorists” by authority. Right and leftists fought it in Europe after 1918; the resistance of the Second World War won both persecution and acclaim. The 1940s and 1950s brought total war and total terror in genocide. Contemporary terrorism touches every country and is multivariate in origin and style. It is distinctive historically in a widened dispersion and on hugely escalated scale.
Even though given policy measures to counterterrorism are highly relevant, few studies have attempted to provide the notion of the implications of international terrorism on national security and the future of terrorism at a local level.
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Endeavors to exempt extremism and killing of government officials from cases relating to politics be relegated from repatriation had been adopted as early as 19th century in some jurisdictions like Belgium. However, the possibility of efficiently characterizing terrorism as a global criminal offense just assembled force in the 1920s and 30s. In
1926, Romania asked for the League of Nations to come up with a draft on ‘convention to render terrorism universally punishable’ unfortunately this was never considered.
Terrorism was more analytically measured in many International Conferences for the
Unification of Criminal Law between 1930 and 1935. The word ‘terrorism’ was first discussed at the Third Conference in Brussels in 1930 (Whittaker, 2004). This study defined terrorism as the systematic use of violence by a person or groups against unarmed innocent people in order to gain either socially, politically or even economically.
Asmus and Pollack (2002) state that in September 11, in excess of 3000 individuals were killed in under two hours; individuals from in excess of 60 nations, killed without differentiation and without benevolence. From that point forward, various littler, yet at the same time lethal assaults have been submitted by al-Qaida, people or gatherings identified with or upheld by al-Qaida, or purported non-aligned mujahedeen. They include the attack on a synagogue in Djerba, Tunisia, killing mainly German and French tourists, the attack on a French oil tanker off the Yemen shore, the bombing of a bus carrying French submarine engineers in Karachi, Pakistan, the blowing up of a discotheque in Bali, the hostage-taking in a theatre in Moscow and the double attack on
Israeli tourists in a Mombasa hotel in Kenya and targeting on board passengers of an
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Arkia flight leaving Mombasa airport (The latter using surface-to-air missiles and missing the plane with over 260 passengers by only a few meters).
There is a plethora of literature (Latif and Munir, 2014; Burgess, 2003) on terrorism, but most have focused on either terrorist groups, counter-terrorism measures, the evolution of terrorism, or the impact of terrorism economically, but little exists on the implication of terrorism on national security. The study will therefore partly rely on the existing literature in relation to the study on international terrorism and its implications on national security.
Forest (2005) notes that there have been a couple of endeavors to efficiently distinguish and investigate the land causes of those occupied with transnational Islamist terrorist or
Jihadi developments, activities and their sympathizers. He includes that not all contenders in Jihads have moved toward becoming terrorists, it is anyway recorded that
Jihadi veterans have framed the center of transnational Islamist terrorism bunches over the world.
Besides the involvement of locals in the preparation and implementation of terrorist activities, the groups similarly had foreigners who were actively involved in various attacks across the country. Botha (2013) highlights the most notable ones, which include;
Wahid el-Hage (from Lebanon) - was Osama Bin Laden’s secretary and was
posted to Kenya in the mid-1990s to help operate the country’s terrorists group.
Anas Al-Liby (from Libya) – he participated in mapping for possible terrorist
targets in Nairobi. They included nationals from Britain, United States of
America, France, and Israel.
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Mustafa Mohamed Fadhil (from Egypt) – was involved in the aiding the 1998
Tanzanian terrorist attack.
He further states that the 1998 suicide attackers in Nairobi were of Saudi Arabian nationalities, the missiles were thrown at the US Embassy security officials in Nairobi by Mohammed Daud and Azzam.
Alshabaab which is the major organized terrorist group in East Africa claims responsibility in almost all the attacks in the region. It largely draws its membership from Mujahedeen expedition in Afghanistan and unsuspecting youths from other regions particularly the eastern part of Africa.
Forest (2007) notes that Islamist violence is on the rise because of social factors like, problems of managing modernity against old-style beliefs, unemployment, and unsatisfied hopes of the second and third generation of migrants. This has been worsened by financial aid in Muslim states that empowered immigrants to build and support their own communities as well as spread neo fundamentalist philosophy. The main targets of this kind of ideology are people who doubt their faith and identity. It is mostly appealing to the displaced, disillusioned young who are searching for identities outside the missing cultures of their parents. Finally, people with unfulfilled hopes of a healthier life in Europe. Most terrorist attacks in Kenya involve foreigners who have either entered the country through lawful channel or some through non-conventional methods.
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1.8.1 National Security in Perspective
According to Lang and Amanda (2009) national security is one of the primary concerns of an independent state, especially in the realist described world of anarchy and scarcity.
Security or the absence of threats is the primary responsibility of state. It has the mandate to ensure safety of its citizens both internally and externally. National security practices in Kenya since postcolonial era have been work in progress. It keeps improving every day in order to outsmart criminals who often invent new tactics of criminality.
The practice merged the British Colonial laws touching on security with the standards believed to be significant to native Kenyans. In the late 1950s post Mau Mau war to counter the colonialists, Kenyans were determined to make a crime policy that coexisted with their tribal lifestyle. It was not realistic to expect formal police and the justice system officers throughout the country due to high population. However, there were provincial regions, which were sectioned into districts led by District officers. At the level were local administrative chiefs who acted as the government agents with the mandate of handling unlawful matters devoid of some proper participation from the bigger government units.
However, with the enactment of the new constitution in 2010, things took a new turn as the principles of national security were fully recognized by law. They include; national security being under control and guidance of the constitution and parliament.
In the pursuit of national security, the agencies will be expected to comply with the law and observe human rights as enshrined in the constitution of Kenya. Respect for various
27 cultures and regional representation during recruitment exercises will also be adhered to in the process. (Const., 2010).
In the recent past a lot of changes have happened in the security sector, different regimes participated differently in either fighting or promoting terrorist activities in the country.
For instance, during Jomo Kenyatta’s reign, Kenya and Tanzania were permissive environments for terrorists operations. The nations continued to be somewhat unhopeful environments for enlistment and maintenance of terrorists (Forest, 2011).
While during Moi regime, experts indicate that the national security was not given much attention since corruption and inefficiency seriously undermined the government’s ability to provide security to citizens.
According to Soke (2003) civil servants working in key security departments turned their offices into corruption zones. Foreigners getting the required documents to gain entry into the country was very easy so long as one had money to bribe the officials. He states that the 1998 bomb attack in the country was as a result of laxity among security officers and weak immigration regulations with no proper vetting. Hence allowing foreigners access thereby mixing with the locals easily as they clandestinely plan and execute their attacks.
The study revealed that the government of Kenya had various mechanisms to deal with crime in the country. Among them include frequent police patrols, use of specialized forces, community policing, International cooperation among other special forces
(Interpol). These were aimed at fighting terrorism in the country, but none seemed to be working effectively. Indeed, Forest (2007) supports this fact saying that among the commonly used entities are various kinds of Special Forces (SF). They are most useful
28 and appropriate to further advance for use in existing and impending operations to counter international terrorism.
1.9 Theoretical framework
1.9.1 Securitization theory
Buzan and Ole (2003) state that national security policy is not naturally developed but a creation and interpretation of the political class, decision makers, and opinion leaders in the society. This theory states that political issues are sometimes construed to be highly security issues that must be dealt with immediately they are characterized to be dangerous or alarming by the actors. They have the mandate to move the issue beyond politics. These issues are always given more priority in terms of countering them.
According to Ochieng’ (2016) Terrorism is a threat to Kenya’s national security and its fight is often given preference over other crimes which equally exist in the country. The response that is given by security agencies whenever there are incidences of terror activities has vast implications on the national security, since the theory validates oppressive or exclusionary securitization process.
Security matters are not ordinarily existing but has to be expressed by securitizing actors as issues of concern. Clara (2013) supports this assertion by stating that pronouncing immigration a ‘threat to national security,’ for example changes immigration from a low priority political issue to a high priority concern that needs action such as border security. However, according to William (2008) the United States of America way of dealing with terrorism has renewed the policy on political and militaristic strategies. According to him, securitization of global terrorism tends to promote human rights, ecological conservation and human governance to the view of
29 transnational security program. Securitizing terrorism create gaps that can be used to rationalize violation of human rights and freedom as it tolerates usage of unorthodox ways to bring back security.
On its part Game theory illustrates the deliberate connections between terrorists and a targeted government in situations where activities depend on each other hence none can be analyzed as passive. According to Sandler (2003) in the last twenty years political and economy experts have used Game theory to analyze terrorism. The theory has also been widely used to study international relations, conflict resolution among others.
Terrorism is considered as the systematic use of violence aimed at achieving certain goals. For instance, Sandler et al (1983) present some rational actor model that depict the mediation process between terrorists and government policy makers. This largely happens in occasions where detainees or property are held under conditions set out.
They further explain that terrorists’ assessment of the chances that their concerns will be granted by an adversary depends on the likelihood based on the previous engagements. This implies the terrorists ' requests will be to a great extent affected by those of the administration or the other way around.
Game theory is very important in analyzing the interplay between adversaries. This is explained in situations where for example, in its efforts to counter terrorism, the government of Kenya increases the security of ‘persons of interest’ and vulnerable places, this raises the price of such assaults as a consequence terrorists devise other forms like kidnapping and hostage taking which is rampant today. Securitization process may have its own challenges, but it is so far the only theory that can adequately explain how international terrorism affects the national security.
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1.10 Research Methodology
This section focused on; Research design, research location, targeted population, sampling procedure, research instrument, data collection procedures, data analysis and presentation, data management and ethical consideration.
1.10.1 Research design
The study used descriptive research design in that it enabled the researcher to take a broad view of the outcomes to a bigger population. It was also significant as it assisted the researcher to comprehensively examine the implications of international terrorism on Kenya’s national security.
1.10.2 Research location
The study was done in Nairobi City County because of its international significance.
The Kenya’s capital town was established in the early 1900 by the colonial powers at the time, the area has had some of the most devastating terror attacks in the region. The city is found at the south central part of Kenya and covers around 700 square kilometres.
It had a population of 3,138,295 people as at year 2009, according to Kenya National
Bureau of Statistics (Census, 2009). That population is expected to have risen to about
4milion. The city has a lot of international significance since it hosts one of the United
Nations offices, Gigiri and nearly all the foreign embassies.
1.10.3 Target population
The target population was the people of Kenya who have endured the effects of terrorist attacks.
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1.10.4 Sample size
The expected sample size of this study was one hundred and thirty; ninety for members of the public and thirty for officers working for various security agencies and ten members of various civil society organizations were also consulted. However, due to low response rate occasioned by the sensitivity of the study, only 85% of the informants
(members of the public) and 77% for security agencies responded.
The sample population comprised officials from the ministries of defense, interior and coordination of national government, and victims of terrorism attacks.
1.10.5 Sampling Procedure
The study used convenient and purposive sampling techniques because of their relevance when selecting subjects for interview and filling questionnaires. Only those informants with vital information on the study problem were required. In some instances snowballing was used when the researcher through referrals interviewed people that he had earlier not identified.
1.10.6 Research Instruments
The researcher used interview schedule and open-ended questionnaires to collect comprehensive and detailed primary data. The interview guide was used to collect data from informants in the Ministry of Defense and Interior and coordination of government affairs while the open-ended questionnaires were used on the victims.
1.10.7 Data Collection procedures
Before commencing field work the researcher obtained authorization letter from
Kenyatta University. The letter was used to acquire research permit from National
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Commission of Science, Technology and Innovation (Appendix 5). Appointments were then secured with respective informants in the study.
1.10.8 Data collection methods
The study used both primary and secondary data. The collection of primary data was done through key informants, one on one and focus group discussions. Open-ended questionnaires were also used due to the fact that they prevent biasness. Primary data involved visitations and oral interviews conducted in various places including Nairobi
Central Business District, various police stations, ministries of Defense and Interior and coordination of national government for oral interviews. The aim was to get informants firsthand information on the implications of terrorism on their operations. These were done with the support of three trained research assistants.
Secondary data was collected from various libraries including Kenyatta and Nairobi
Universities, National Defense college etc. Materials analyzed included reports, published and unpublished articles, scholarly books, related theses, journals, reference papers, local daily newspapers, and the internet.
1.10.9 Data Analysis and presentation
Data analysis involved transcribing, collecting/collating, editing, coding and reporting the data in a manner that made it sensible to the reader and researcher for purpose of interpretation and discussion. Data analysis started in the field to avoid loss of important data.
The analysis of the qualitative data begun by creation of order of the collected data. The tape-recorded data was transcribed and typed, coded and then analyzed thematically in
33 accordance with the objectives of the study for easier analysis. The secondary data was exposed to serious recorded examination and understanding to check the significance and accurateness of the paper for the purpose of the research. The examined data was stated in form of narrative with direct excerpt from the primary data.
1.10.10 Ethical Considerations
Ethical considerations were observed in the study, as it guaranteed total confidentiality of the data obtained from the informants. All the reference materials used were adequately acknowledged. An assessment of the objectives and the findings of the study was done, and based on this categorization, subsequent chapters were obtained and later submitted for examination. Conclusions were drawn and recommendations done for further research.
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CHAPTER TWO
TRENDS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN KENYA; 1975-2013
2.0 Introduction
This chapter presents analysis part of the results obtained under the first objective on the trends of International Terrorism in Kenya. It gives an account of how terrorism has continually changed in terms of modus operandi. Data collected was analyzed and the discussions are as presented here in.
2.1 The context and emergence of terrorism, 1975-1998
Cronin (2002) opines that although Kenya has experienced all the four main categories of terrorism including leftist, rightist, ethno nationalist, and religious. The greatest and disturbing attacks have come from ethno nationalistic and religious terrorism which is demonstrated by the historical sequence that has morphed into an international problem.
Kenya has been the main target of terror activities in the larger East African region as demonstrated by chains of periodic attacks witnessed in the nation since 1975.
Consequently resulting to major impacts including; massive loss of lives, rising tension among religious societies like Christians and Muslims, undermining the country’s economy, radicalization of the youths, issuance of travel advisories to diplomats and many others. Recent terrorist threats and experiences still remain an immense challenge for the law enforcement agencies, coupled with the level of police unpreparedness indeed this study is critical (Cronin, 2002:39).
Rotberg (2005) argues that the present upsurge of global terrorism can be traced to
1960s and 1970s. In the 1970s, terrorism was characterized by hijacking of planes
35 hostage taking among others. During this period East African region experienced the first international terrorism, Palestinian Liberation Organization with the help of the then Ugandan president Iddi Amin hijacked a France airline destined for Israel. The aircraft was later landed in Uganda. He adds that this led to the famous raid “operation thunderbolt” by the Israelis. During the operation Kenya provided logistical support which got Kenya to the center stage in the Israel Palestine conflict. The Kenyan government was not amused by the incident, in return it organized for a landing zone at JKIA for the Israeli planes of war in order to rescue the hostages in Entebbe. That decision by Kenya to facilitate the raid did not please Iddi Amin who retaliated by ordering for the massacre of many Kenyans and Abayudaya Jews living in Uganda
(Rotberg, 2005).
According to Rubin (2008) in December 1980, a bomb blast at the Norfolk Hotel in
Nairobi killed 16 people and injured 87. The Hotel was owned by a renowned person of Jewish origin who had close ties to Israel. Kenya may have been targeted because it supported the Israeli commando team that freed the hostages hijacked by Palestinians in the Neighboring Uganda in July 1976. The same view was shared by Aronson (2013) who said that terrorism attacks were aimed at the Israeli nationals as opposed to the
West.
Mogire and Agade (2011) state that the logistical support that Kenya provided for the
Israelis during the raid was an apparent indication that it supports Israeli invasion of the
Palestinians land. Due to the perceived support, there was a plan to bombard an El Ali traveler’s aircraft by the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestines (PFLP) and the Baader-Meinhof groups. It was intended to occur in the course of a brief stop for
36 fuel replenishing in Nairobi subsequently following Entebbe attack. This strategy was frustrated owing to information sharing among security agencies from Kenya and Israel
(Aronson, 2013).
The terrorist undertakings in parts of Africa did not cease after the 1980 Norfolk Hotel attack. Following the end of cold war and Afghan-Soviet conflict, there was upsurge of terrorist activities in the great part of the HOA (Horn of Africa). This was marked by the presence of al-Qaeda divine leader Osama bin Laden in Sudan from 1991-1996 when he was ejected by the Sudanese government due to international pressure. It was during this period that the 1998 attacks on US embassies in Kenya, Tanzania and the foiled Uganda attack were planned (Adan, 2005).
In 1998, al-Qaeda terror group owned the responsibility for the bombing of the United
States of American embassy in Kenya. During this attack 224 Kenyan nationalities and
12 US citizens lost their lives and over five thousand individuals’ sustained injuries
(Adan, 2005). The targets shifted from targeting the Israelis to both US and her allies, and focusing on the soft targets such as Kenya. Due to historical close ties of Kenya, the US and her lies, it was perceived that Kenya was supporting the US interest in the
Middle East. Specifically US support towards Israel in their occupation of the
Palestinian land. The absurdity in the attacks is that in as much as they were aiming at the Americans and other western citizens most of the causalities were the natives.
One year after the 9/11 attack in US, Kenya witnessed another terrorist attack along the coastal parts. This further marked the existence of terrorist undertakings in Kenya. On
November 28, 2002: fifteen people, among them three Israeli tourists died during the bombing of Israeli owned paradise hotel in Mombasa (Makabila, 2014). At the same
37 time, there was an attempt to use ground to air missile to bombard an aircraft destined for Israel from Mombasa airport. The proceeding periods from 2002 there were no terrorists’ attacks but this should not be perceived to mean absence of terrorist activities within the country’s borders.
According to Makabila (2014) the emergence of an al-Qaeda affiliate al-Shabaab in
Somalia created a new threat to the country. It did carry out its first attack off Somalia in 2010 in Uganda and with subsequent attacks majorly targeting Kenya. In June 2010, grenade exploded in Uhuru Park during a political rally killing 6 people and injuring
30. This was followed closely by the December attacks killing three police officers in different areas in Nairobi. Later in the same month, one person was killed by grenade attack at the Kampala coach. There was also spate of abduction of foreigners and locals by the al-Shabaab group along the coastal and the Northern regions of the country
(Blanchard, 2013).
The Daily Nation reported on January 18, 2012 that two government officials had been abducted by Al shabaab in Wajir. The two were the local registrar of persons and the
District officer. The report was confirmed by the then North Eastern deputy Provincial
Commissioner Wenslas Ongayo, “They raided the Centre at about 6.45 pm as locals thronged mosque and other centers for evening prayer while the officials were distributing Identity Cards,” (DN, 2012).
As an intervention measure against the al-Shabaab menace, the Kenya government intervened in Somalia under the patronage “Operation Linda Nchi”. In response, al-
Shabaab attacks in the country became more frequent. Wafula (2014) indicates that
Kenya has been hit 113 times from the time of incursion to Somalia. The attacks almost
38 begun immediately, according to Makabila (2014) two days after the Kenya’s military involvement in Somalia there was an explosive attack in Maura’s pub in Nairobi killing one person and wounding 15 other people. Indeed, when asked during the research interview about his view on Kenya’ intervention in Somalia, one high ranking military officer said that:
“This exercise was not well planned, and there was no proper consultation of all concerned agencies as a result our country must prepare for the worst outcome”
(Captain, O.I., 29/4/2016).
According to Ochieng’ (2016) terrorists keep changing their targets, varying from worshipping areas, shopping malls, public gatherings, areas frequented by foreigners, public transport systems to security agencies.
In September 21, 2013, the Westgate shopping mall was attacked by four hooded gunmen. This was the largest al-Shabaab attack in the country because of the mass casualty and the amount days it took for it to be brought to a close. The attack resulted in 67 deaths and injuring 150 people (Blanchard, 2013). The partial ownership of the mall by Israelis’ and the frequency by persons of international significance was the reason for its attack (K.I. ATPU, 2016).
According to Otsiala and Hajir, after the mall attack, al-Shabaab has continued to carry on with their attacks in the country despite the government effort to curb it. The latest attack being on a bus travelling to Nairobi from Mandera which caused 28 deaths
(Otsiala & Hajir, 2014). This came at a time when the Institute of Economics and Peace released a report on Global Terrorism Index ranking Kenya 12 globally and 4th in terms of terror attacks and activities. These clearly show that Kenya will remain a terrorist’s
39 safe haven and a target for attacks despite the government constant efforts to fight it
(Institute of economics and peace, 2014).
From the above studies it is clear that terrorism has been and continues to grow both in numbers and methods of attack. This research also supported that view, with most informants showing that there is consistency in the manner of international terrorism attacks in Kenya. Scholars like Suder agree that Terrorism has grown to an unprecedented extent and quality, she adds that international terrorism is up surging, and the rate of suicide terrorist attacks has significantly gone up: from 41 in the 1980s, to 100 in the 1990s, to 174 in 2000-03 alone. She is however concerned that these acts are particularly dangerous because with time terrorists could procure and use armaments which have great consequences. This is considered to be the gravest threat to developed countries and to world order (Suder, 2005).
In general, majority of these assaults occurred in the towns of Garissa, Mandera,
Nairobi, Kwale, Lamu and Kilifi. Nairobi recorded the highest percentage of the attacks with mass casualties at 39%. Garissa followed closely with 23% and Kilifi, Lamu and
Kwale counties closing the list with 1% each attacks. Many attacks are attributed to
Garissa because of its proximity to the border between Somalia and Kenya (ATPU,
2013).
Further revelations from this study indicated that kidnappings and killings of government officials and innocent civilians were rampant. Members of focus group discussion unanimously affirming that it was the usual occurrence. These assertions were also confirmed by reports from the Daily Nation dated January 8, 2012.
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The informants also concurred that there was steady increase in indiscriminate grenade attacks in busy supermarkets and church gatherings, while others also stated that there was effort to expand to other regions with the help of sleeper terrorist cells who prey on the school going youths for recruitment.
Bauman and Galecki (2005) also argue that the present terrorism being a marvel in the time of globalization, is by definition 'additional regional'. This infers; it has no central command, no army installation, and no garrison huts to be besieged. This military power shows up from no place and after that vanishes immediately and inexplicably.
There is no leader; there are no requests and pecking orders, yet for certain reasons such a large number of discrete people pursue a similar way, much more similarly.
According to Rabasa (2009) in early 1990s Kenya had a favorable environment for carrying out terror related activities. Since al-Qaeda cells operated freely without being checked or detained by the concerned agencies. He adds that, Alqaeda terrorist group took responsibility of the August 1998 twin attack of the US embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania. He further indicated that this was a precursor to the 9/11 terrorist attack of the twin towers. In March 2000, fourteen Kenyans were killed when their truck ran over a land mine while crossing the Kenyan-Ethiopian border near Moyale. This was the first attack by Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) who were fighting for secession from
Ethiopia (Rubin, 2008). In November 2002, Alqaeda directed two concurrent assaults in Kenya: the vehicle shelling of the Paradise Hotel and the bombed surface to air rocket assault on an Israeli sanction flying machine taking off from Mombasa air terminal, al-
Qaeda guaranteed obligation in both the assaults.
41
Rising cases of terrorism in Dadaaab area, alongside successive kidnappings at the
Kenya-Somali outskirt, led to 2011 suspension of everything except crisis aid ventures at Dadaab. While an expanded police nearness has since enabled a few exercises to continue, security dangers, including lobbed hazardous gadgets (IEDs), keep on hampering service delivery. Kenyan police, military personnel, and locals have been progressively under attack in various projectile and IED assaults since late 2011 (Ploch,
2013). This is attributed to Kenya’s intrusion in Somalia.
The level of agreement differed on a number of issues relating to the trends of international terrorist attacks in Kenya. For example, many informants agreed that there has been an increase in the use of sophisticated weapons in the attacks. This was supported by Forest, that before the assaults in the United States on September 11, 2001.
Terrorism authorities and counterterrorism specialists perceived exasperating pointers that terrorist gatherings were turning all the more often to suicide besieging as a strategy for assault comprehensively (Forest, 2005). In fact, the Telegraph reported that the West gate mall was attacked by special suicide commandos also known as members of a
‘martyrdom brigade.’ It further reported that according to the al-Shabaab extremists’ website magazine written in both English and Swahili language, Shebab spokesman Ali
Mohamed Rage was quoted saying that:
“Westgate was not a fight, it was a message, and the real fight is on the way”
(Telegraph 12 Nov 2013).
Alshabaab have lately changed their targets from the West to locals, which is meant to send a message to the government to withdraw the Kenyan troops in Somali. This
42 indicates that the government still needs to do more in order to combat terrorism which still promises to be a challenge going in to the future.
Botha and Solomon (2007) on their part claim that terrorism portends real danger right from the local level to the global security. Internationally, the biggest threat posed by terrorism is its ability to create networks with people from various nationalities. This is extremely dangerous as proved by the 1998 bomb attacks in Kenya and Tanzania, and also the 9/11 incident in the US.
While on the other hand many agreed that the changing dynamics of international terrorism are known to them, most of them acknowledged that terror problems have been identified but more appropriate measures need to be undertaken, many recognized the need to improve technological gaps. However, Forest (2005) in his piece ‘Deterring
International Terrorism’ asserts the trend has not been toward ever more destructive terror methods producing ever more deadly effects. The techniques in recent high profile attacks were fairly simple in terms of bombs used in executing the attacks.
According to him, weapons of mass destruction have no place in the future. His position contradicts that of the majority of scholars who foresee a dangerous future if terrorism is not controlled now.
In conclusion, there is a worrying trend that is currently adopted by the international terrorists, that of changing their targets from the Western interests to locals, possibly to get mass casualty which is their key objective. The situation worsened immediately
Kenya sent its soldiers to Kismayu in Somalia to pacify the region, in return Alshabaab has been attacking Kenya in order to withdraw their soldiers. The big question is, how
43 does terror organizations get their members? The answer is explained in the next section on Radicalization.
2.2 Radicalization
According to Rotberg (2005) the emergence of Al Qaeda in Kenya is an outgrowth of alienation and radicalization of a small number of Kenyan Muslims. He further notes that wealthy organizations in Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf have been supporting terrorist activities hence the sharp increase of Islamism in the region. This is mostly promoted by Wahhabi-controlled charities through mosques and madrasas. As an ideological factor Wahhabi, influence has been linked to radicalization. Nonetheless, the financial contributions to the Muslim charitable organizations have also been implicated in radicalization. Out of the Wahhabi influence there developed the Salafi doctrine, which advocates for Muslim unity. This was utilized fundamentally to rally youthful Muslims around the globe to the conviction that the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq are an attack against Islam. By utilizing religious beneficent associations the Salafi precept effectively spread, misusing financial factors. For example, poor living conditions and joblessness, the developing distance between the haves and have not, political fraud, and perceived western dictatorship. It is outstanding that magnanimous associations offer a scope of administrations including wellbeing and instruction, and are available to all independent of religious affiliations. This provides the entry point for the conversion and recruitment of Muslims and non-Muslims who incidentally will have nothing to lose.
According to Beattie and Lang (2009) at the end of May 2008, the Al-Ikhlas forum posted a 39-minute video entitled Nuclear Jihad, the Ultimate Terror. In the video it
44 inferred a fast approaching atomic strike on the West. The video, sound and content carried an absolute arrangement of joined enthusiastic intrigue to protect against the
West's hostility against Muslims. Abu-Musab al-Suri's interests for Muslims to ascend and leave the United Kingdom, just as multi-gathering exchange about the need to wage
Jihad utilizing CBRN specialists and weapons. Rabasa (2009) likewise recognizes that there are such a significant number of preacher gatherings supported by Saudi and other
Gulf foundations. These effectively engendering radical Salafi translation of Islam that, while not really brutal, work as a door to terrorism.
However, according to Botha (2013) alleged political and economic relegation of the coastline area and the Northern frontier region majorly dominated by Muslims has frequently produced grounds of enlistment and radicalisation of young people by terrorist organizations. The region remains largely underdeveloped and as a result disenfranchisement among the communities push them to call for cessation from
Kenya.
Arbitrary arrest of young innocent Muslims whenever there are incidences of terrorism has led to many youths joining Al-Shabaab in order to revenge the torture suffered in the hands of police. A middle aged Muslim youth living in Huruma, Nairobi noted in
Swahili that:
“mimi nilishikwa na polisi na kuchapwa viboko wakisema sisi waislamu ndio ni magaidi na tunauwa wakenya na vilipuzi, nilisema siku moja nikishika bunduki wataona hawa, hivyo ndivyo nilivuka na kwenda kutrain” (Yasin, O.I., 2016)
Translated in English to mean that, ‘I was arrested and assaulted by police for being a
Muslim and on allegation that Muslims are terrorists and are the ones killing Kenyans
45 while using grenades, I said to myself that one day I will hold a gun and they will know me, that is how I joined the Alshabab’.
John (2002) on his part confirms the claim by stating that in Pakistani madrasas trained
Taliban and tens of thousands of Pakistanis, many who went to fight the jihad in
Afghanistan. Others became religious leaders and teachers. Some estimate that as many as 80,000 to 100,000 Pakistanis trained in Pakistan’s madrasas and fought in
Afghanistan between 1994 and 1999. A senior police officer Mr. Bundi based at ATPU headquarters in Nairobi while responding to the issue of madrasas said that:
“Through radicalization in madrasas, hundreds of jobless Kenyan youths have been quietly joining Alshabaab with the promise that they would be highly paid and live a better life” (Bundi, O.I., 2016).
During interview of the informants, most of them cited madrasas as schools of jihad and hate. In its effort to fight terrorism, there was high approval of community policing and close monitoring of what goes on in madrasas by authorities. These measures according to informants could contain terrorism if properly implemented. According to
Forest (2005) network Policing strategies offer an approach to connect the formative and security parts of managing financial and statistical roots and terrorism at the neighborhood level. However, what are the underlying factors that make Kenya vulnerable for terrorist activities?
2.3 Terror acts after 9/11-2013 and its proliferation in Kenya
Kenya for quite some time has been the major target for terrorist attacks in the region; the terrorists’ threat is more palpable here than in other parts of the greater Horn of
Africa region (Rotberg, 2005). Many theories have been advanced concerning the
46 attacks. Among them is the country’s proximity to the War-torn Somalia, Kenya being the economic powerhouse of East Africa, the many tourist attraction sites, and the western interests in the country. For those reasons and many others, Kenya has always provided a tempting target to those wanting to attack Western interests and friends of the West. However, no single approach can explain the phenomenon.
According to Rotberg (2005) Kenya has close military relationships with a host of western countries. They include; United States of America, Britain, Germany, Italy,
France, and Israel, many of these de facto military in Kenya. This comparatively large presence in Nairobi is considered to be the main attraction and target of anti-western organization of terrorists like Al Qaeda. It is the capital city of Kenya where the
Government legislations including security policies are formulated and enacted. The capital also serves as home to the largest number of international companies and banks in the region and hosts one of the United Nations’ four regional headquarters—the only one outside the United States or Western Europe. No other country in East Africa or the Horn rises to Kenya’s regional economic stature, besides being the only city in the world that boasts a game park. This makes Nairobi vulnerable to terrorist attacks as has been witnessed in the recent past.
Blanchard (2013) opines that other factors that make the country vulnerable are the attractive beaches and conducive climatic conditions that attracts western investors, tourists. He further adds that Nairobi is the home of some of the United Nations offices
(UN), and also serves as a base for the regional humanitarian relief. According to him the Westgate mall attack of September 21 2013 in Nairobi was partially because of it reportedly being owned partially by an Israeli. Similarly the presence of the Western
47 interests such as embassies and tourists in the country and her continued cooperation with the Western countries such as the US. He concludes that it is anticipated that Kenya will continue to be target of the terrorists’ attacks.
Similar views are shared by Parker (2003) who acknowledges that Kenya is still targeted because of the numerous foreign diplomatic institutions, tourist attraction centers, and hospitality facilities within. He continues to add that the presence of United
Nations offices in Gigiri, Nairobi coupled with foreign owned investments expose the country to transnational terrorist activities.
However, Brenda (2007) on her part differs with the two authors in that according to her Kenya has done nothing significant to qualify as a special target, but she supports the fact that terrorists attack in Kenya sometimes are aimed at the American citizens.
The informants gave various reactions to questions posed to them with regard to factors that promote terrorist attacks in Kenya. According to Petr (O.I. 2016) no single factor can be attributed to the vulnerability of Kenya to terrorists’ attacks. He does not limit them to the presence of many western owned businesses in the city. Otiso (2009) supports the fact that Kenya has had close working relations with the west since independence.
The terrorist threat is more palpable in Kenya than in any other parts of the greater Horn of Africa region and Yemen. Informants gave diverse reasons for this. For instance, a security officer noted that they receive frequent information of threats to launch attacks in the country. While Adam (2007) blames it on finding supporters which he says is comparatively easy because of wide spread poverty, alienation and resentment by coastal Muslims of their upcountry rulers. Otiso (2009) further argues that the political
48 and economic relegation of the coastal area of Kenya have played a key role in facilitating terrorism, as the populace are always disenfranchised. As for the political and socioeconomic deprivation of the Coast relative to the rest of the country,
Informants concurred that indeed it encouraged the Coastal youths to join terror cells in order to fight for their rights.
However, poverty alone cannot be the only causal factor for terrorism, Botha (2007) argues that poverty on its own can’t lead people to engage in terror related undertakings, it has to be amidst other issues like joblessness and conflicts. On the other hand Shinn also supports the fact that poverty may not be the direct cause of terrorism but it plays a role. He argues that because of poverty, immigration officials and security agencies that are always paid low wages try supplement their needs by looking for extra income from different sources including accepting bribes from terrorists (Shinn, 2006). In turn, the border custom and security officials assist the terrorists to obtain Kenyan citizenships facilitating their free movement within the country (Khadiagala, 2004).
In the twin 1998 U.S Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, only 5 percent of the wounded persons in both attacks were nationalities of the target state-the United States of America. Over 200 Kenyans and Tanzanians were killed, and more than 5,000 were injured as a result of two suicide bombing by terrorist groups (Forest, 2007). Rotberg
(2005) contends that for a very long time Kenya has always had a good relationship with the United States (US) from the time of independence and this has made it a prime target for the terrorists. He staunchly argues that Kenya is the economic powerhouse and democratic beacon for both the EA and HOA and has been involved in peace brokering agreements for the war torn neighbors such as Somalia and Sudan, which can
49 easily make it a target of the terrorists. Most informants in the study also supported the fact that foreign diplomatic missions contribute to attacks realized in the country.
The unstable states of Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Djibouti provide the influx of lethal weapons to Kenya; these are used to attack innocent citizens. During the study, members of a focus group discussion were of the opinion that unstable neighboring countries were contributing to terrorism in Kenya, as a result causing the threat to national security.
The informants attributed the numerous attacks to the porosity of the borders, one particular respondent from ‘Section 3’ in Eastleigh area said that he came to Kenya in the year 2009 through the porous border without any document:
“mimi nilitipitia Mandera kwa boda nakuingia Kenya bila barua yoyote.” (Fatuma,
O.I., 2016). Translated in English to mean, ‘I came to Kenya through Mandera border without any documents’.
This has also been enhanced by the poorly protected borders between Kenya and its unstable neighbors. Consequently allowing proliferation of small arms and easy movement of members of terrorist organizations into and out of country to carry out attacks.
Otiso (2009) argues that the borders between Kenya and other neighboring states like
Tanzania, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia are porous. Because of the long stretches of the borders, there has been a challenge to the governments to effectively patrol all the areas and enforce orders, even though there exists border customs. This inability of the governments has been exploited by the terrorists who freely move from one country to the other. This particularly true in the case of the Kenya-Somalia border,
50 which is always used by refugees and as well as terrorist. Nonetheless, these countries have acted as safe haven for different terrorist groups, for example, Somalia has been a host of many terrorist groups that have operated and continue to operate in the region, and the country has played a host to al-Qaeda, al Itihad al Islamia and now is a host to al-Shabaab.
Christians are historically a dominant population in Kenya thus has always provided a challenge to the Muslim community as they often cannot get the power like the bigger numbers of the Christian faithfuls (Terdman, 2007). The Muslim community has continued to be at the periphery in terms of politics and economically because of their numbers. This has always made the Muslims and Somalis living in Kenya to be frustrated, thus creating a fertile ground for recruitment into terrorists’ activities. This is so for other EA countries where the Muslim community also forms a small percentage of the population.
High rate of discrimination in the provision of vital documents like national identity cards and passports. The Kenyan government has specialized committees in the counties bordering Somalia and another one based in Nairobi city. The committee is mandated to vetting all the applicants of Somali origin in need of identification documents in Kenya (ICG, 2004).
According to Rotberg (2005) Kenya’s stagnating economy, its continued high level of corruption make it a safe haven for terrorists and their sympathizers. He further quotes
Kenya is among the states in which terrorist networks have permeated due to weak systems. A senior officer based at the immigration department in Nairobi asserted that one only needed a small amount of money to buy Kenyan citizenship;
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“Due to poor remunerations our officers accept anything in the name of money to issue very sensitive documents like passports to non-citizens” (Moraa, O.I., 2016).
She was supported by other informants sampled in Nairobi region who agreed that security agents being corrupt were a major factor enhancing international terrorism.
Where Kenyan governmental organizations has failed, Muslim charitable organizations, mostly from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, have stepped up their activities. Through increased funding for clinics, hospitals, Arabic religious schools in both rural and urban communities in the coastline together with other regions in Kenya.
The Saudi Arabian embassy in Nairobi has also been actively helping improve social and economic conditions by supporting the construction of schools and mosques. Their help is concentrated around Kenya’s majorly Islamic leaders and their organizations.
However, within this broad mix of activities, a small number of Kenyan Muslims have come under the influence of radical Islamic thinking, with radical imams preaching a stricter adherence to Islam. While expressing contempt to Western culture, and a strong abhorrence of the United States as an anti-Islamic state (Rotberg, 2005).
There is a strong indication that the Saudi government is reluctant to act on radicalism but instead provide them with support. It allows radical Islamic groups to recruit and raise money on Saudi territory. The government adopted somewhat a benign attitude toward Osama bin Laden’s international deeds, for as long as Islamic terrorist activities were directed at foreign targets. According to Forest (2007) the government has also refused to act on certain organizations, businesses and charities accused of terrorism related activities. In addition, focus group discussion members did not know about
Saudi Arabian charity to Kenya. Nevertheless, those who knew about its existence in
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Kenya indicated that they supported terror related activities hence doubted the genuineness of their activities in the country.
According to Brenda (2007) Kenya is a soft target because the local security and counter intelligence services are relatively weak. On the other hand, some of the weaknesses of the national security organs in preventing terrorism in Nairobi and Kenya at large were largely on laxity. Slow response to terror warnings was also cited. Informants agreed there was laxity among the security officers which large number of terrorists take advantage of. As a result they enter the country easily as immigrants. For example
Mohammed Saddig, who is a terrorist was travelling on fake papers to Pakistan from
Nairobi through Jomo Kenyatta International Airport on 6th August 1998 was arrested at Karachi Airport, Pakistan (Hared, 2005). During an oral interview, one senior police officer based at Vigilance House blamed the rising cases of terrorism on carelessness and negligence in the service.
Dadaab refugee camp is located in Garissa County (formerly North Eastern Province).
The camp is dominated by people of Somali descent who have fled from the War torn
Somalia. During the movement across the border, terrorists infiltrate the camp masquerading as refugees. Later they make their ways to Somali dominated neighbors in Mombasa and Nairobi where they map out their targets and mount terror attacks
(Otiso, 2009). The rate of unemployment at the camps is very high, coupled with lower levels of education make the youths very vulnerable to any ‘job’ offers given by the terrorists. A suicide commander based at the camp was quoted advising youths:
“You have a worthless life to look forward to. By carrying out his act of martyrdom, you will be doing something significant with your life. You will be enrolled in the hall
53 of martyrs. Your parents will be proud of you. This will give them prestige. And they will get a large financial benefit” (Forest, 2005).
In conclusion, it is clear the Muslims living on Kenya’s coast and other regions are essentially marginalized socially, politically and economically. This is witnessed in the economy which is growing too slowly to absorb the legions of frustrated job seeking school leavers. Socio economic issues always get publicized by average category of influential people by providing a ground for mobilizing the poor to support the course.
Hence, providing a group of enlistment into terrorist organizations. High levels of corruption, crime, radical Islamism and jihadists in general have found the Kenyan coast a fertile recruiting ground. Emergence of Al Qaeda in Kenya is an outgrowth of the alienation and radicalization of a small number of Kenyan Muslims. Kenya’s national security is threatened by these factors that exposes the country to attacks, and the next chapter focusses on the implications of international terrorism on Kenya’s national security.
54
CHAPTER THREE
IMPLICATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM ON KENYA’S
NATIONAL SECURITY; 1975-2013
3.0 Introduction
This chapter focused on the implications of international terrorism on Kenya’s national security.
3.1 Socioeconomics and Political Impacts
According to Goyal and Bell (2009) terrorism has had serious economic and sociopolitical implications in Kenya. Livelihoods, tourism, businesses, farming, and transport industry have all suffered in different ways. The vacation industry, considered to be among the top contributors economically represents 25% of the Gross Domestic
Product and has been incapacitated in light of on/off movement sanctions. These are usually issued mostly by the US, Europeans, and different nations from 9/11. Europeans have totally suspended the bans, however the United States keeps on issuing warnings occasionally. In view of the movement bans, numerous Kenyans have lost their positions, which legitimately influence the economy. The administration has likewise lost a noteworthy wellspring of income from its formal part of the economy.
Forest (2005) states that increasingly, “the travel industry and the voyage line industry are giving terrorists an extraordinary sea weakness that gives them an altogether different sort of chance to attack at a given nation's economy". As Joshua Sinai depicts,
"For instance, when terrorists having a place with the Egyptian Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya
(otherwise called Islamic Organization) assaulted journey dispatches along the Nile
55
River on four events from 1992 to 1994, voyagers avoided Egypt. In the Philippines, when the Abu Sayyaf Group assaults load vessels or kidnap outsiders from a vacationer resort (as it did in 2001), it impacts on the whole nation's exchange and economy. In
Somalia, when minute men seize outside boats cruising off the nation's coastline, vessels steer away from the district." notwithstanding having the option to hit a nation's
"wallet," journey boats offer a rewarding and stunning objective as far as setbacks. This as well impacts negatively on tourism and the spiral effect is felt in the economy, as supported by the focus group members who were interviewed in the study.
As a consequence of international terrorism, the government of Kenya continues to deploy different mechanism to deal with the menace. These sometimes may have far reaching effects on human rights; which include torture, arbitrary arrests, detention incommunicado and extrajudicial killings. For example, formation of Anti- Terrorism
Police unit which is a special unit within the police service which was formed to handle terrorism related cases. On the other hand, a number of legislations have also been put in place, e.g. Prevention of terrorism Act, 2012; Crime and money laundering Act of
2010; prevention of organized crime law of 2010.
Other strategies applied by the government in fighting terrorism in most cases have led to intercommunity discontent. Whenever terrorists attack parts of Nairobi, the security agencies tend to suspect people of Somali origin hence arbitrarily arresting them and to some extent even torture them. This normally leads to hatred as they feel unfairly targeted. Focus group discussion members supported the fact that measures taken by the government appeared to have raised intercommunity tension in the country.
One respondent in Kasarani area remarked that:
56
“Why does the government target Muslims whenever there is a terrorist attack in the country? We will also one day retaliate against their protected Christians” (Abdi, O.I.,
2016).
According to Adam (2007) the June 2003 thwarted terrorist attack in Kenya exposed the extent to which Somalia is involved in Al-Qaida operations. The assault on United
States embassy in Nairobi by light aircraft and truck had not only been deliberated on inside Somalia but directly involved Somali nationals associated with Al Qaeda. In addition, most of the informants expressed their affirmation that terrorism created sour relationship between the two countries, as a result the two countries treat each other with suspicion.
There is increasing dominance of religiously motivated terrorism, a fact that Suder says has to be taken into account. Religion is more often the motivation for terrorist acts than it has been in the last few decades (Suder, 2004). Other scholars like Forest and
Brenda (2007) concur that “indeed terrorism has serious implications on religion; the abuse of Mormons during the 1830s and 1840s gives a somewhat extraordinary case of crusades of terrorism against another minority religious gathering. The Mormons were driven from state to state until they at long last settled in what was to progress toward becoming Utah. The religious inclinations showed in the past propose that issues could show up later on” (Forest & Brenda, 2007).
Terrorist’s main objective is to cause fear and stress in people round the globe.
According to the Telegraph which is a UK based newspaper dated October 17, 2011, some members of Al-Shabaab were quoted saying “Are you ready to live under
Christians?” one Al-Shabaab official shouted on a militant radio station. “Get out of
57 your homes and defend your dignity and religion. Today is the day to defend against the enemy” (Telegraph, 2011). The comments were made in Qoqani town during the incursion of Kenyan troops in Somali as Al-Shabaab officials were forcibly enlisting new fighters from homes.
With regard to religion, the impacts of international terrorism on national security, during the interview both residents and security officers stated that international terrorism caused religious and ethnic tension. One particular police officer based in
Kayole said that: ‘chuki baina ya wakristo na waislamu imefika kiwango mbaya sana’
(Rop, O.I., 2016). Translated in English to mean, the hatred between Christians and
Muslims has reached a very dangerous level.
According to Rotberg (2005), Kenya has consistently given an enticing objective to those needing to assault Western interests and companions of the West. "Since the nation contains a few vacationer goals, American warships visit Mombasa, there is another U.S international safe haven in Nairobi, and Americans, Europeans, and
Israelis give engaging targets, Kenya and U.S are consolidated in the proceeding with fight against both remotely based and homegrown terrorism. The two terrorist attacks in Nairobi and Mombasa have resulted in closer collaboration between the U.S. and
Kenya, especially in the military and intelligence areas. This was supported by many informants who concurred that the relationship was indeed good and focused on the fight against international terrorism”.
On foreign policy, issues to be addressed included whether the battle against terror can be won by power alone, or by connecting with the hearts and psyches of Arabs and
Muslims, and how to address the underlying drivers of terrorism. After the September
58
11 assaults, President Bush reported that the United States would embrace a national- security procedure that concentrated on averting future demonstrations of terrorism.
This foreign policy is geared towards preventing another attack and by increasing the government’s control to find suspected terrorists and bring them to justice (Paul 2005).
Kenya on the other hand continues to face numerous terrorist attacks which calls for security personnel to deeply think of how to deal with it, as Pnyangaga puts it that
Kenyan foreign policy has been largely influenced and shaped by the recurring terrorist attacks thereby making it dynamic (Pnyangaga, 2013).
While according to Brenda (2007) terrorist bunches in different nations started to pick
Americans or images of United States in their nations as focuses of assaults to power changes in American international strategy. The assaults happened abroad, yet the intended interest group was the American open and American lawmakers. According to Bonner (2007) commentators from diverse professional backgrounds have stressed the ‘foreign policy’ dimension as important in reducing the radicalization that produces recruits for terrorism or groups for whom terrorists can rely on for at least passive support (those who may give ‘sympathy and silence’).
Response from the study indicated that a good number of informants agreed that international terrorism results in the change of foreign policy in a state. Kenya has in the past reviewed her foreign policy in response to the growing number of terrorist operations in the country, for example, incursion to Somali to wipe out Alshabaab in the year 2011.
Rotberg (2005) in his study observed that prior to 1998 bomb attack in Kenya, the then
U.S ambassador appeared on a local television and wrote several articles explaining
59 the threat that international terrorism posed to the safety and well-being of Kenya’s citizens as well as to the country’s economy her international image. The embassy urged some essential U.S. personnel to leave the country and later the United States released travel advisories warning Americans to postpone unnecessary visits to Kenya.
A study by Baen (2008) noted that terrorist activities in Kenya and other countries disrupted exports. Tea export which is considered among the country’s top earners suffered a major blow after the main importers; Pakistan and Afghanistan were implicated in the 9/11 attack on the United States of America. The situation worsened by the military activities in Afghanistan as markets shut down thereby occasioning serious job losses which in turn affects the economy negatively.
Schmid (2008) found out that from July to November 2001, the Kenyan government shut the Kenya-Somalia outskirt due to security and consequently restricted flights to
Somalia. While this was seen as vital due to the recognition that Somalia gave refuge to terrorists and the dread that terrorists may commandeer air ship for suicide missions in Kenya, this further brought about the loss of income from exchange and travel, which particularly influenced the transportation division and caused huge loss of occupations.
Terrorism may likewise effect firm qualities adversely as demonstrated by the US financial exchange which debilitated fundamentally in the days and weeks following the 11 September assaults on the New York World Trade towers. Essentially, the
Spanish securities exchange additionally dropped following the Madrid terrorist bombings. In Kenya after 1998 assault, while most money related markets recoup from the negative impacts of terrorism, US markets appear to be especially strong (Chen and
Sierns, 2004).
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According to Suder (2006), terrorism has affected business straightforwardly in various ways. "Terrorism can diminish expected returns because of greater expenses and further decrease the estimation of a business by raising the rebate rate to reflect expanded hazard. Terrorism related hazard may likewise go about as a damper to diminish the craving for hazard among private. He keeps on attesting that today; by difference terrorism is among the top worries in the meeting rooms of global organizations”. Indeed, in the 2004, Price Waterhouse Coopers Global CEO survey, chief executives ranked terrorism among the top five potential threats to business growth. Most informants in the study also identified terrorism as a “significant threat or ‘one of the biggest threats’ to their organization. Essentially, an ongoing overview by RAND Europe and Janusian Security Risk Management (2004) of security and hazard chiefs at driving UK companies found that numerous individuals accept that terrorism is a 'huge danger' to their associations and more than 33% anticipate that terrorists should purposely focus on their association and staff”. The author concluded that global terrorism in the post 09/11 era could be considered as a continuous disruption to the world economy. Nearly all the informants interviewed noted that indeed economy was seriously affected by terrorist attacks.
According to Forest (2007), there is “extensive proof that focused killings can weaken terror associations. Execution strategies will undoubtedly hamper the profitable uses and streams of merchandise, individuals, thoughts, and properties inside a hierarchic terror association, which makes it less proficient. The coordination issues among working pieces of a beheaded association can keep it from benefiting from favorable circumstances of scale or reach. There is likewise motivation to accept that authority
61 focusing can hurt terror associations. For example, al-Qaeda, the slaughtering of Osama for instance left a major hole among the terror gathering”.
In 2000, the government of Israel came up with a security policy of killing all those who were suspected to be future terrorist threats. The justification was that it was meant to prevent would be terrorists from conducting such attacks in the country. The preventive mechanism is described as being good by Lang as it stops potential terrorists from entering Israel (Lang, 2009).
According to Avi Dichter, Head of Shin Bet, Israel’s Internal Security Agency, 2003, it’s not an eye for an eye. It’s having him for lunch before he has you for dinner. They deserved a bomb that would send the dream team to hell. I said, “If we miss this opportunity, more Israelis will die.” There is no fair fight against terrorists. Never has been. Never will be. However, Lt. General Moshe Yaalon, Military Chief of Staff IDF,
2002–2005 completely disagrees with this assertion, ‘we won’t get to the bottom of the barrel by killing terrorists. We’ll get there through education. Dichter [Shin Bet] thinks we’ll kill, kill, kill, and kill. That’s it we’ve won. I don’t accept that. You need power to secure Israel likewise there is also need to be humane (Forest, 2007).
Informants interviewed chose extra judicial killings as another way of dealing with terrorism. This is because of frustration from the judicial process which sometimes-free known and dangerous criminals to the society for lack of sufficient evidence. A senior police officer based at the Directorate of Criminal Investigation told the researcher in confidence that:
“we cannot continue arresting dangerous criminals everyday only to be discharged by our courts for insufficient evidence, and that is why i support killing them when seen
62 and sometimes these crooks have more lethal weapons than us and are ready to kill our officers on sight”, (Kyeng, O.I., 2016).
In conclusion, efforts by the government to counter international terrorism have far reaching implications on Kenya’s national security, hence calling for the need of a more robust approach as will be recommended in the study.
63
CHAPTER FOUR
COUNTER TERRORISM METHODS USED BY THE KENYAN
GOVERNMENT 1998-2013
4.0 Introduction
This chapter focused on the evaluation of mechanisms adopted by the government of
Kenya in its effort to counter terrorism between 1998 and 2013. Securitization process sometimes calls for the government to come up with measures whose implementation always to a large extent violates the law and affect human rights. For example, according to Krause and Otenyo (2005) the 1998 Al-Qaida attack on the US embassy in Kenya was an eye opener as it made the two countries alert of the risks presented by terrorists. The attack left more than 200 individuals dead, among them 12 US nationals and thousands sustained injuries, this provoked Kenya to start though at a slow pace a comprehensive antiterrorism approach. The problem aggravated by the deep roots terrorists have across the globe, which include sympathizers and various sponsors. In its endeavor to fight international terrorism for example through military force, extrajudicial killings, snap police operations, et alia, the public has suffered in many ways as discussed below.
4.1 Counter terrorism measures
Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU)
The government of Kenya in the year 2003 through the commissioner of police formed a specialized police unit called Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU). This was an arm of the police force that was meant to proactively deal with terror related crimes in the country.
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ATPU has its head office in Nairobi, and other regional offices in Mombasa, Busia,
Eldoret, Lokichogio, and Garissa, these towns are known to be used as hide outs by terrorists in the country (GoK, 2004). The unit’s key mandate was to assist in monitoring terrorists’ activities thus providing early detection and disruption of planned attacks.
According to Whittaker (2008) in order to improve work of ATPU in dealing with terrorism which was becoming a threat not only to national security but also regional and international peace and security. The Government of Kenya created a Joint
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) which was to deal with communication, command and control among organizations charged with provision of security. Regrettably, the Joint
Terrorism Task Force was immediately abolished against the advice of the United
States of America which was the sponsor. The incident was occasioned by refusal of the then commissioner of police to surrender the control of ATPU, which was necessary to the task force’s existence (U.S. Department of States, 2006).
Mogire et al., argue that ATPU in execution of its mandate has carried out many counterterrorism programs that have resulted to arrests of terrorism suspects and disruption of terror plots. It has further led discovery of their operative cell in Kenya
(Adan, 2005; Mogire et al., 2011).
As a consequence of insufficient specialized training and corruption allegations, the unit has continuously failed to live up to the task. Moreover, there have been cases of excessive use of force in effecting arrests, disappearance, extradition of suspects, mistreatment and torture of suspects.
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Anti-terrorism legislations
A study by Hoffman and Morrison (2008) found out that having good laws is one of the best ways to effectively deal with terrorism in the country. They cited the benefits of laws in the development of an effective terrorism Reduction strategy. Their views were shared by Netanyahu who offered advice on countering terrorism by reviewing the law to enhance observation and action against groups promoting violence
(Netanyahu, 2005). However, such laws should not infringe on human rights. Capacity building to judicial officers actively involved in the justice system is key in the war against terrorism. Terrorists’ activities have adverse implications on the populace and this invites exclusive drill and exercise to the officials dealing with criminal matters.
However, the Kenyan government has faced numerous challenges in its attempt to enact the few anti-terrorism laws it has. In 2003, the government drafted the Suppression of
Terrorism bill. The bill was vehemently opposed by the members of public, civil rights activists and the national leaders, because it infringed on human rights (Kagwanja,
2006). Opposition to the bill made the government to withdraw it. However, in 2006 the government made another attempt, but again it received a lot of resistance. Reason being cited was that it was backed by the US and that it was the US interest and not
Kenya’s (Kagwanja, 2006; Whitaker, 2007; Whitaker, 2008).
The key argument given by Whitaker (2008) for the unwillingness of the Kenyan government to enact the legislation is because the consideration of Kenya as being a democratic government in transition. Since the long authoritative regime of Daniel Moi was coming to an end, and any attempt to restrict personal liberties will not be warranted. The accusation of the bill being backed by US shows some high-handedness
66 of the US in counterterrorism policy in the Horn of Africa. Some scholars such as
Kagwanja (2006) argue that it puts the so called fragile democracies such as Kenya in the region at jeopardy.
Whitaker (2008) further argues that due to lack of legal provisions to specifically prosecute terrorists. The public has often seen them being released from the police custodies for lack of relevant sections of law to charge them. Moreover, there has been fierce debate concerning whether the available legal penal codes can be effectively applied to prosecute terrorists (Adan, 2005; Mwazighe, 2012).
Adan (2005) notes that even though the government did not have enough laws to help in countering terrorism. It still managed using laws on criminal acts to apprehend and commit to trial terror related suspects. Nevertheless, he acknowledges that countries that are faced with international terrorism such as Kenya should enact such legislation to effectively enable them to deal with international terrorism.
Mwazighe (2012) acknowledges that even though Kenya has a legal framework that can be used to deal with terrorism, this he considers to be by chance and not by design.
Because of the changing nature of terrorism there is need to have a legal framework that effectively deals with terrorism. Simply because the available criminal procedure is not efficient to handle terrorists in court as witnessed in certain cases where the punishment is too lenient for the crime committed. Nevertheless, Prevention of
Terrorism Act 2012 was passed in parliament and the president Mwai Kibaki accented to it. In 2004, Kenya also enacted the Witness Protection Bill to protect witnesses who are threatened and intimidated, some of whom testified against terrorists (Kagwanja,
2006). This with the enactment of Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2012 provided a good
67 starting point for mitigation of terrorism undertakings in Kenya. According to the study most informants indicated the need of the legislations in as far as dealing with terrorism is concerned, stating that Kenya is need of very punitive measures enshrined in law in order to deal with international terrorism.
Military Intervention
According to Juergensmeyer (2009) militaristic operation is a very effective tool in the fight against terrorism. It involves physical elimination of terrorists. For example, as was witnessed during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan where Al Qaeda organization was brought down resulting to many arrests of terrorists and murdering of some. Be that as it may, those military activities were now and again not yielding positive results. Instead of being preventive, such assaults only served a portion of the political and hierarchical goals of militant bosses thereby drawing public attention. This in turn bolsters their endeavors and strengthen the perception that US is a bully who uses the advantage of its forcefulness to achieve its objectives. The government of
Kenya for the very first time in the year 2011 conveyed a large number of its troops to
Somalia to help flush out Alshabaab terrorists. The invasion ('Operation Linda Nchi') has been partially instrumental, considering the takeover of Kismayu which is seen to be Alshabaab business center point. However, during the study an informant said that the invasion was poorly planned and so far many Kenya soldiers have lost their lives in the hands of Alshabaab.
An examination by Cope (2008) established that Israel Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu accepted the utilization of military activity to crush terrorists. This according to him discourages tyrants from targeting the US and European nationals.
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For instance, the US attacked Sudan using rocket bomb, this was meant to send a message to Sudanese government that it would face more attacks if it sustained facilitating activities of terrorists. Nonetheless, Netanyahu neglects to respond on the spiral impacts of such attacks. For example, the attacks might end up making the terrorists harder and stronger besides affecting innocent population.
On the other hand, Juergensmeyer (2009) underpins the hard-on-terrorism philosophy, proposing that using force to eliminate terrorists and their leaders will act as a deterrence on would be assailants. Then again, the clear utilization of military power could lift the probability of further terrorists’ reprisal. Late practice demonstrates that the best military activity to counter fear based oppression is the utilization of preventive strategies instead of revengeful strikes, as occurred in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi
Freedom. Such fear mongering decrease estimates will demoralize more states from supporting terrorists gatherings (Whittaker, 2008). Military activity was also blasted in execution by most informants.
During the interview, one respondent said that:
‘wanajeshi sasa wamevuka na kazi yao ni kuua waislamu wasio na hatia’ (Hassan, O.I.,
2016). Translated to mean, Kenyan soldiers now have crossed the borders and their main work is to kill innocent Muslims.
National Counter Terrorism Centre
After the terrorists’ attack of 2002, the government established the National Counter
Terrorism Center (NCTC) in order to collect intelligence and coordinate regional efforts in curbing terrorism. It is compost of officers drawn from the National Police Service, ministry of Defense, Immigration Department, National Intelligence Services and
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Customs (Mogire et al., 2011). Adan (2005) argues that NCTC is also delegated the mandate of investigating concealment of money, drug peddling, and to deal with the propagation of illegal weapons. Furthermore, he acknowledges that this has helped in relaying information on time thus helping in fighting terrorism activities. To complement the administration effort in the fight against international terrorism, the
National Security Advisory Committee was established to provide policy guidance to the institutions that were dealing with counter-terrorism (Wycloff, 2004).
Security Sector Reforms
According to Ochieng’ (2016) the government of Kenya was reluctant to carry out security reforms to deal with terrorism threats after the 1998 attack. However, the 9/11 attack in US and the coming to power by President Mwai Kibaki provided an impetus for changes in the security sector to handle terror related activities. He further notes that the government should also focus on improving the efficiency in the criminal justice system as this will enhance professionalism when dealing with suspects of terrorism.
Mogire et al., give a clear outline of the security institutions that were formed to handle international terrorism in Kenya, ranging from National Security Intelligence Service
(NSIS), the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), the Anti- Terrorism Police
Unit (ATPU), the Tourist Police Unit (TPU), Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and the special prosecution unit (SPU) in the office of the attorney general to prosecute terror related offenses (Mogire et al, 2011). These according to Whitaker (2008) were geared towards improving Kenya's capacity to investigate terrorists’ incidents, identify cells, coordinate law enforcement, and prevent future attacks.
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However, Rotberg (2007) asserts that the progress was stifled by wide spread corruption, inefficiency and sometimes sheer incompetence throughout various levels of Kenya’s bureaucracy, especially in the police force and in the customs and immigration services. According to Carson (2003) Kenya became the theatre of terrorist activities because the government of president Kibaki was reluctant in addressing the political concerns raised by citizens.
Policing (including forensic interrogation, collection of intelligence, reconnaissance and investigation) plays an important part in domestic and international counter terrorism. At the domestic level, police and intelligence agencies need to be facilitated with specialized equipment to monitor activities of terrorists. Intelligence agents must be recruited from within the sectarian communities from which terrorists emanate.
Adequate resources must also be provided for intelligence gathering. There is urgent need by the security agencies to develop mechanisms for detection, surveillance and arresting terrorists and their sympathizers. Immigration officials should also have strategies of monitoring travels along the border points to curb unnecessary activities.
International Cooperation
In its 2004 peace prize presentation, the Nobel Committee emphasized the need for cooperation among parties. The committee noted that in order to meet the global challenges, it was indeed necessary to participate in international cooperation
(Norwegian Nobel Committee, 2004).
Cooperation is important in dealing with international terrorism, it focusses on sharing of intelligence, extradition of suspected criminals, and mutual assistance between states. Cooperation is an aspect of international human rights law which plays a key
71 role in the dispensation of justice. For instance, arresting suspects, freezing assets, and securing evidence. Bonner stated that the reciprocal cooperation between states in combating international terrorism can promote its national security (Bonner, 2007).
According to Wamahiga (2014) terrorist attacks alongside other factors prompted the government of Kenya to be left with no other option other than to fight terror. It was the only option if she was to be in a position to secure herself from further aggressive activities emanating from terrorist groups and their operatives. The first step was at the international arena where she rooted for cooperation with the West who arguably had counter terrorism weaponry. Besides being able and well trained counter terrorism man power as well as superior intelligence collection machineries that easily dwarfed the ones in use in Nairobi.
In improving the airport security, the Kenyan government in conjunction with other entities cooperated in providing safety in the air. Whitaker (2008) notes that Kenya has worked with Uganda and Tanzania to harmonize regional aviation security regulation.
There has been improved screening at the entry points in the different airports in the country in order to help deal with security issues.
Kenyan government has always resorted to cooperation with other countries, in the fight against terrorism; however, this was after the 1998 bombing of the US embassy.
Initially, there was reluctance to take steps to curb international terrorism in the region because it was considered isolated case and Kenya was being considered as victim
(Whitaker, 2008).
According to Rotberg, President Daniel Arap Moi sensed the dangers that global terrorism posed to the Western community. During his last five years in office, he
72 endorsed and encouraged the close cooperation that developed between the U.S and
Kenyan security services, especially in the intelligence arena (Rotberg, 2007). During the study, members of a focus group discussion unanimously supported international cooperation as a way of dealing with terrorism threats.
However, after President Moi’s departure from office in 2002, his successor Mwai
Kibaki also recognized the need to fight terrorism in Kenya as it was evidently spreading in East Africa. His efforts were frustrated by some senior government officials who felt that the process would undermine the Islamic community. While others felt that by acknowledging the existence of terrorism in Kenya, the country’s image and reputation would devastate tourism industry.
Diplomacy
Diplomatic undertakings are always key when handling international terrorist activities.
It facilitates deliberation on concepts that give rise to terrorism are challenged. As indicated by CIA veteran Paul Pillar, 'The greater part of the issues basic terrorism are to be discovered abroad, as are most things the U.S can do to battle terrorism.' Further, he notes, 'most progress in the battle against terrorism eventually relies upon the points of view and conduct of outside governments, gatherings, publics and people.’ (Pillar,
2001).
According to Jenkins (2007) public diplomacy and information promotions are important features of terrorism reduction strategy. He analyzes the main approaches on which to combat terrorism while observing the origin and problems that give rise to terrorist organizations. He further looks at factors that influence people to join outlawed organizations and the possibility of mounting attacks by such people. While as indicated
73 by Juergensmeyer (2009) any stable strategy aimed at terrorists groups need comprehension and clear understanding of their objectives. The driving force among the pioneers and individuals, things that animates it to assault and those that facilitate the surrender of fear mongering. Authorities should focus on expanded accentuation on this zone in countering terrorists purposeful publicity, explain fear mongering, and the perception that legislatures are threatening to Islamic faith. It is because many psychological oppression decrease endeavors are aimed at the Muslim people group.
This campaign can be fruitful in the event that it tends to the worries of Islamic leaders.
Financial Controls and Socioeconomic Development
Finances is the main facilitator of terrorists’ work, in its absence the probability launching a successful transnational assaults is bound to fail. As opposed to selling of drugs and other transnational crimes, the unique feature of terrorism is its affordability in terms of execution. A case in point is the revelation that the 1993 attack on World
Trade Centre in the US costed about $400. According to Pillar, The meagre amounts involved makes it hard to track the cash (Goldstein et al., 2008).
An investigation by Lee revealed that if checks and balances are practiced accurately in financial matters positive results can be yielded. For instance, the September 11 coordinated attacks in New York by Al-Qaida is estimated to have costed around
$500,000 to execute. Nonetheless, insurance dealers are also said to have suffered about
$40 billion losses resulting from damages. Due to numerous avenues of funds that Al-
Qaida had, it was projected that the group had about $30 billion before it launched the
September 11 attacks (Goldstein, et al., 2008). If a viable budgetary regulatory framework was in place in the United States of America, the huge amounts executed in
74 financial institutions and other organizations to promote activities of Al Qaeda would probably be known early.
In a recent study by the RAND Corporation, Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk suggested measures which can be taken through the use of development policies in order to impede the activities of terrorists in the region. The policy suggestions include; “social and monetary advancement strategies can debilitate nearby help for terrorist exercises, genuine strategy accomplishments in these zones can demoralize terrorist initiates, insufficiently subsidized improvement arrangements are probably going to swell desires and recharge support for terrorism, the capacity of these approaches to hinder terrorism rely upon their execution, social and financial improvement strategies can be utilized as a 'stick' to dishearten terrorism, and these arrangements don't dispose of terrorism, yet can decrease its quality” (Forest, 2005).
Socioeconomic development is also a factor to consider in the fight against terrorism.
This can yield positive results if combined with diplomatic and informational tools of state power. (Whittaker, 2008). Sentiments supported by Barrett (2007) who also found out that significant improvement of social and economic status can alleviate the origin of terrorism. Diplomacy and information campaigns play a pivotal role in changing attitudes of Muslim community by promoting the Islamic culture and African teachings.
Both Whittaker and Barret agree that disenfranchisement and poor state of majority members of Muslim community is partly to blame for rising levels of extremism, ethnic conflict, and revolution against the west.
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Farah (pseudonym) who is a legal officer residing in Eastleigh remarked that:
“Most young Muslims feel disenfranchised due to lack of development and employment opportunities in the country, they perceive that it’s only them who are neglected by the
Government, no wonder they join the organized criminal groups in order to earn a living” (Farah, O.I., 2016).
According to Lee (2009) due to poverty in most African countries, they have welcomed organizations that provide aids to the people. These include learning institutions, medical care, relief food, and the like. Terrorist organizations with intentions of spreading animosity and extremism took advantage of these groups in camouflaging their activities. Consequently, emphasis should be put in the terrorism reduction sensitization hence dealing with socioeconomic differences terrorist organizations benefit from. Third world nations have little means that cannot effectively handle terrorism; consequently, cooperation with the developed countries should be encouraged to provide much needed aid. Since this will help decrease the number of
Muslim youths joining terrorist groups.
However, Krueger and Maleckovia do not support such argument as they state that eradication of poverty is unlikely to change the feeling of terrorists.
In conclusion, the study revealed that the idea that economic development is good and can help reduce the number of incidences related to terrorism.
National Security Intelligence Services (NSIS)
National Security Intelligence Services had its roots in the Special Branch section in the Kenya Police force, under the command of the British control (Chau, 2007; Agbala,
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2009). However, due to development of new threats to the state and reconceptualization of security to concentrate on human security. With the end of cold war, there grew need for reform of the institution to handle the new threats. The new threats such as terrorism demanded for reforms in the intelligence organisation.
Therefore, in 1998 as a consequence of Security Sector Reforms, the NSIS was formed and charged with the mandate of dealing with contemporary challenges (Chau, 2007).
However, it is in 2002 that the NSIS was well structured to handle terrorism threats in the country. This was through designation of new responsibilities such as provision of timely notice on matters of state interest, with much focus on security, terror related activities and economic crimes (Boinett, 2009, p. 32). To further, enhance the capability of the organization, the enactment of 2010 constitution renamed the organization to
National Intelligence Service. With additional powers of which was realized by the
National Intelligence Service Act, 2012. Its mandate includes; investigation, gathering, evaluation, collation, interpretation, dissemination, and storage of information. Further roles are detection and identification of any possible threats to internal security (Boinett,
2009). Therefore, the organization has been helpful in provision of materials used in prosecution and making decisions relating to security matters.
According to Wardlaw (1989) due to the increase in contemporary issues like cybercrimes, human and drug trafficking, terrorism and money laundering, there is urgent need for intelligence services since these operations are done covertly. The challenge only comes in establishing the priorities, collecting, analysing, and disseminating the information. Nevertheless, intelligence plays an effective role in mitigation operations while addressing security concerns.
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Intelligence sharing within key government security institution and even regionally plays a vital part in curbing international terrorism, since terrorists do not respect boundaries. However, the good work of the institution is eroded by a few officers who often fail to execute their mandate as expected by the public. The study confirmed that officers working under this department were incompetent and did not do their work properly. According to Captain (2016) the reason for numerous attacks in the country is due to laxity of some officials within the NIS;
“Sometimes I wonder whether, our intelligence department in this country still exists, because it is their role to detect any threat to our national security early enough and refer to police for action, in our ministry (Defense), we decided to have our own unit to handle the intelligence aspect when we realized that NIS was not as effective,”
(Captain, O.I., 2016).
Tourist and Diplomatic Police Units
Kenya is always a well-known destination for tourists’ attraction because of its wildlife and the beaches along the coast. It also hosts different embassies which has always made it vulnerable for terrorist activities. In dealing with this, the government established both Tourist and Diplomatic Police Units to safeguard visitors in the parks and at tourists’ hotels. The unit also provides security to diplomats of different countries that have bilateral ties with the Kenya (Adan, 2005: Mogire et al., 2011).
Participation in Regional and International Counterterrorism Agents
According to Adam (2007) collaboration between the Kenyan and U.S. intelligence services including Federal Bureau of Investigation, has been supportive in identifying
78 and capturing some of the perpetrators of the 1998 attack against the American embassy in Nairobi. Through this collaboration, some people were apprehended in connection to the 2002 bombing of the Paradise Hotel in Mombasa.
Kenya has been actively participating in Terrorism Interdiction Program (TIP) from
2003. The US Department of States always manage the project. It was established in order to help boost the security along the borders of countries at high-risk of terrorists shipment (Wycloff, 2004). TIP is a joint program that installs and maintains the
Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) at selected points of entry in a participating country. The TIP hardware and software provides states with computerized state of art computer system. These systems help migration officials and border control officials to easily observe people with intention to leave or enter the country illegally. This according to Wycloff (2004) has provided fast, secure and reliable means for the relevant officials to check the travelers’ identities to know whether they are on terrorists checklists. This has in turn improved intelligence sharing among states hence facilitating arrests of terrorists’ suspects and disruption of their activities (Adan, 2005).
To deal with international terrorism the government had also to involve the military and this required training the military officers on counterterrorism measures. Adan (2005) persuasively argues that in 1998, the military had no training in issues dealing with counterterrorism as matters of terrorism were considered to be of criminal acts thus were left to be handled by the police. However, after the 2002 attack of the Kikambala hotel the government through cooperation with the US sponsored program in the HOA.
Combined Joint Task-Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) offered military training on
79 matters dealing with counterterrorism as such to enable them detect, disrupt and even defeat international terrorism. Mogire et al., (2011) acknowledges that in 1998 the military was ill prepared in preventing and responding to terrorism. Military now plays a key role in counterterrorism through intelligence gathering and threat assessment and provision of border control and surveillance.
A joint Terrorism Task Force (Aronson, 2012) and National Counter Terrorism Centre, and National Security Advisory Committee were also formed in attempt to tackle threats and danger posed by terrorism. The U.S. government has been supportive to these initiatives, unfortunately, there are no tangible results. For instance, in 2003
President George Bush approved $100million to assist in countering terrorism activities in East African region. Kenya itself was given $90 million. The challenge was that even with the disbursement of this money to different governments, terrorists still continued to operate unabated since there was no capacity to recognize them, thwart their plans and arrest them with a view to prosecuting them in a court of law (Prestholdt, 2011).
Only cooperation among component states and security forces in the region, among available international security resources will diminish the likelihood of further Al
Qaeda attacks. While according to Suder (2005) faced with this formidable challenge, he considers that a solution lies in enforcing global cooperation with new alliance between states to restore security. The old foes (the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact) are now allies in the common fight against terrorism. The new NATO-Russia Council, established in May 2002 identifies terrorism as an important area for cooperation, a point that was confirmed by the focus group discussion members who participated in the study.
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4.2 Challenges faced in the fight against terrorism
In its efforts to fight international terrorism, the government of Kenya has faced the following challenges;
4.2.1 Dialogue
For some time now, there have been discussions on whether the government should have dialogue with terrorists or at least with the converts returning from Somalia. This has received mixed reactions from different personalities with some in support while others against. According to Forest (2007) dialogue will not work in most cases, for example the Israeli government’s “no negotiation” policy towards terrorists. The logic of the policy is that conceding to terrorist demands rewards terrorism and only encourages future attacks.
Dialogue involves negotiation between two warring parties with a view to resolve their differences. It becomes a challenge when one party is apprehensive about the process.
Forest (2005) also in another context adds that whatever the terrorist intent, it is the policy of most governments that they do not negotiate with terrorist and never concede to their demands. For instance, in the case of Turkey, it has been fearful of political dialogue with certain Kurdish elements and mostly refuses to negotiate with PKK on a political level. He however noted that closing media of passing information and negotiation has always been counterproductive.
While Suder (2005) emphasizes that focus should be on political dialogue with third world countries on the fight against terrorism, the assistance to capitalize on building counter terrorism capacities.
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Dialogue was supported by most informants who remarked that it was indeed a good approach in tackling of terrorism. However, caution should be exercised in order not to fall in the trap of terrorists. Informants feel that a more constructive approach should be considered to allow room for talks. Corporal, a military officer who took part in the
‘Operation Linda Nchi’ exercise admitted that Kenyan soldiers were being killed every day by Alshabaab in Somalia but the government cannot disclose that to the public since it would affect the national security; “Our soldiers die every day in the hands of
Alshabaab but the government will never tell you that because of obvious reasons, and
I support any move towards negotiation with them for the sake of peace” (Corporal,
O.I., 2016).
4.2.2 Media
Terrorists count on media coverage to spread fear and widen the impact. For example, a direct attack on a bus might harm only a few individuals, but once it is covered in the media, it reaches huge audience. Citizens who see news of a bus bombing on the television might decide to stop riding the buses, which could disrupt flow of labor. The media likewise has apparently expanded the result from psychological oppression with fast wide spread worldwide revealing bringing to the world the dread and ever present probability of a nearby assault.
The message of any terrorist incident gets to the public within minutes, rivalry among news sources additionally energizes the communication of data that encourages dispersion of terrorist messages. Some of the time actuating bolster that may not generally have eventuated. By putting terrorism on a worldwide stage, the media likewise may give the way to motivate and train different terrorist’s groups further
82 raising terrorism (Schlagheck, 1988; Weimann and Winn, 1994). According to Brenda
2007 terrorists will regularly look for media consideration for their activities. Media inclusion and exposure broaden the mental impacts of terrorist activities. She further says that popularity based social orders typically have a free press that gives more noteworthy media introduction to terrorist activities. The consequence of which the U.S has been possibly powerless for a lot of its reality as a country, essentially in light of the fact that it has been a sensibly just framework (Brenda, 2007).
In more dictatorial states, the governments has little regards to public participation and often dictates to media what to air. Informants in the study also supported the fact that media coverage should be regulated.
4.2.3 Internet
According to Suder (2007) with the growth of the internet, it is considerably more difficult to monitor the activities of terrorists. Moreover, the propaganda effort of terrorist groups and their supporters is much broader in scope because of the internet.
On his part, Forest (2005) supports the fact that the invention of internet has facilitated invention of other types of terrorism. “The web is making personality and a feeling of solidarity, assembling a reason driven still, small voice, and returning portions of the people to crowd driven medieval types of fighting. He further opines that the web has turned into a weapon of assembly that is intuitive, quick, and modest, with few (or, as in the radical case, zero) guidelines or laws to control it. It is used to advertise messages propagating war/ jihadi manuals of training, propaganda, and campaign materials online”.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Summary
The study was based on investigation of international terrorism and its implications on
Kenya’s national security, a case of Nairobi City County; 1975-2013. It attempted to do this under the following objectives; first, to investigate trends of international terrorism in the Kenyan context from 1975-2013. The study revealed that the ability by terrorists to always change tact has led to their prolonged ‘survival’ despite the government of Kenya deploying all the available machineries at its disposal to fight it.
Secondly, to interrogate the implications of international terrorism on Kenya’s national security and lastly, the study assessed the strategies employed by the Kenyan government to curb international terrorism after 1998.
The origin of terrorism can be traced back to Judea in the first century where Zealots and Sicarii who were both Jewish terrorists organized for a rebellion against the Roman
Empire. Terrorism was also used by revolutionary governments to preserve state power and maintain authority over their subjects. However, defining terrorism remains the biggest challenge to security experts, since no single proposal has been universally adopted. Terrorism is viewed by people differently, for example, where as some people consider terrorists as freedom fighters others see them as criminals who should be punished by law.
Terrorism has undergone through different forms in its manifestation, including; anarchist wave, anti-colonial wave, left wave and religious wave.
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Religious wave of terrorism is the modern threat to national security, it is driven by
Islamic fundamentalists whose objective is to revenge on what they consider as infidels.
They perceive that Islam is under attack by Kufirs and calls for a Jihadist reaction in creating an Islamic state governed by Islamic laws. The organizations used by these terrorists include; Al-Qaida, Boko Haram, Ansar-alsharia, Hizbolla, Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestinians, Al shabaab, among others.
These organizations recruit their members from the vulnerable, marginalized, and jobless youths who are promised good life if they participate in terrorist activities.
Some also get radicalized by the violent extremists who take advantage of the young innocent individuals who cannot be suspected of any crimes by the authorities.
The 1998 twin bomb attack of Kenya and Tanzanian US embassies by Al Qaeda resulted into several deaths and injuries. It was this attack that made the Kenyan government to seriously start reviewing its security policy and state of preparedness with regard to threats posed by international terrorism. Consequently, a number of agencies were formed to deal with this menace; ATPU, NSIS, NCTC, SPU, among others. Some legislations were also enacted to give legal framework in handling terrorism related cases.
On 16th October 2011 the government of Kenya through its military invaded port
Kismayo in Somalia with a view to pacify it, this was occasioned by series of Al shabaab activities in the country. Statistics show that after Kenya’s incursion, the rate terrorist attacks in Kenya increased immensely. The upsurge was meant to persuade the country’s leadership to withdraw its troops in Somali.
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From this study it is evidently clear that the Kenya police force, customs and immigration services, border patrol unit and the general internal security apparatus are professionally weak, underfunded and poorly managed. There is also poor coordination of intelligence collected by the authorities. Social, economic, and political issues among different communities in the country are considered to be part of the major causes of terrorism in Kenya. Consequently, most officers remain vulnerable to corruption hence most international terrorist attacks witnessed in Nairobi and elsewhere in the republic of Kenya.
The study also revealed that Kenya’s problem is escalated by the unstable states neighboring it, this is coupled by the numerous porous borders around the country. It is easier to arrest arrest an assailant whose documents are questionable than to arrest an attacker involved in the purchase and dealings of missiles.
There is increasing tension among religions and communities in the country which affects the peaceful coexistence of the Kenyan citizens.
On the other hand, the informants Nairobi who were interviewed highlighted some key failures they witnessed with the measures employed by the government, among them included; patrolling which most informants disapproved as having failed and was no longer effective in the fight against terrorism. On the other hand, public prosecution office was also blamed for its failure to mount spirited fight in the war against terrorism, finally, the informants were unhappy with the kind of military actions and legislations guiding on how to deal with terrorists.
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5.2 Conclusion
There have been consistent upward trend in international terror attacks in Kenya between 1975 and 2013. According to security agents, this has taken different dimensions ranging from hijackings, bombings, kidnappings, suicide missions, killing of both members of public and state officials, destruction of property, indiscriminate grenade attacks, among others. Madrasas are used as the schools of jihad and violent extremism.
Despite having several preventive structures in place, such as ATPU, NCTC, military intervention, Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012 and other policies for instance community policing, there have been insignificant impact in combating international terrorism after 1998.
The study also revealed that the Kenyan problem is escalated by unstable neighboring states, this is coupled by the numerous porous borders around the country. The administration has to regulate the entry points and the most vulnerable areas targeted by terrorists. It can do so by screening traffic through immigration offices and airports, it can likewise build the general hazard to fear tasks that includes huge quantities of staff. It is simpler to capture an employable whose papers are not all together than to seize an assailant at activity organize when firearms or explosives are being obtained.
The Kenyan government must stop and oppose hostile chances, executing or catching fear based oppressor pioneers abroad and devastating their bases of activity can debilitate psychological militants for the time being. These measures can now and then boomerang and swell the assailant's positions and capacities and make a less perplexing, less noticeable, and exceptionally energetic dread foe.
87
5.3 Recommendations
This study recommends some strategies to be considered by the Kenyan government going forward. For a secure and peaceful coexistence in the country, states agencies must cooperate and work in unison in order to resolve cases of international terrorism.
i. The administration has to regulate the entry points and the most vulnerable areas
targeted by terrorists. It can do so by screening traffic through immigration
offices and airports, it can likewise build the general hazard to fear tasks that
includes huge quantities of staff.
ii. The government should consider increasing and putting more economic, public
health, and educational help to the marginalized communities along the coast
and northeastern regions of Kenya. In so doing, more funds should be allocated
to education and scholarship for girls, the expansion of the rural health care
clinics, and the extension of microfinance and micro-enterprise programs. iii. Kenyan government should have some curriculums geared towards
peacekeeping and terrorism lessons, this will be enhanced by public
sensitization on effective anti-jihad message. iv. The government should strengthen its justice and legal systems and to enact
effective legislation that will make it possible to arrest and prosecute suspects
of terror related offences.
v. As a matter of urgency, the government should enhance intelligence on
counterterrorism strategies through capacity building and cooperation with
other agencies.
88
vi. Media should be seriously regulated with regard to the stories they air in public,
for instance, it is known that terrorists thrive when given publicity by the media.
Fear appeals consisting of stories with fear inducing graphic images coupled to
terrorist demands must be avoided. Threatening images are bad enough on their
own in that they increase fear and anxiety levels in viewers and may cause
anxiety disorders.
vii. The government should consider having a national prayer day in all the regions
within the republic, it should be a special inter-religion based prayer occasion
involving Muslims, Christians, Hindus e.t.c. this will reduce the tension existing
between the major religions in the country. viii. The Kenyan government has to neutralize the threat of terrorists in two levels;
domestic and international. At the local tier Kenya must take necessary actions
to protect her citizens through counter terrorism legislations, while at the
international level, Kenya should participate in global efforts to prevent
international terrorism in accordance with the responsibilities of states under
resolutions of the Security Council.
The study further recommends research to assess the motivational underlying forces of
terrorists and the characteristics of their value systems. This will help to know their
psychological histories, religiosity, history of mental disturbance, ambivalence, as well
as their attitude towards authority.
Finally, this study focused the implications of international terrorism on Kenya’s
national security in Kenya between 1975 -2013. Given that there appear to exist a
collaboration between international terrorists and the local youths, further studies could
89 involve assessment of factors that facilitates radicalization of young men and women into joining terror groups. A research on the implication of national terrorism on national security could inform such studies.
90
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APPENDICES
Appendix I: Cover Letter
December 2015
Dear Madam/Sir,
REF: REQUEST FOR DATA COLLECTION
I am a postgraduate student pursuing Master’s degree in International Relations and
Diplomacy at Kenyatta University. I am required to submit as part of my research work assessment, a project on implications of international terrorism on national security.
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Appendix II: Research Instruments
A4a) Questionnaire for state/security officers
SECTION I
1.00 INTERVIEW
1.01 DATE OF INTERVIEW (DD/MM/YY)……………………………………..
1.02 START TIME………………………………………………………………..
1.03 END TIME………………………………………………………………….
1.04 INTERVIEWER'S NAME ______
1.05 LOCATION NAME ______
SECTION II:
2.00 To begin, we are going to ask you some background questions about yourself.
2.01 Gender
Male………………………………………………………..1
Female……………………………………………………..2
2.02 In which age bracket can you be categorized? 18 – 24…………………1
25 – 35…………………2
36 – 45…………………3
46 – 55…………………4
56 and above……………5
2.03 Highest level of education attained.
Primary……………………………………………………1
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Secondary…………………………………………………2
Certificate…………………………………………….……3
Diploma…………………………………………….….….4
Bachelors………………………………………………….5
Masters…………………………………………………….6
Other (Specify) ……………………………………………7
2.04 What is your position in your profession? ______
2.05 Duration of service in current department 5 years and below………….1
6 – 10 years………………..2
11 – 15 years………………3
Above 16years……..………4
SECTION III
3.00 Investigating the changing dynamics of International terrorism in Kenya from 1975-2013.
3.01 Is there a consistency in the manner of international terrorist attacks in Kenya?
YES…………………………………1
NO………………………………….2
3.02 How? ______
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3.03 Can the changing dynamics of international terrorism be won by community and police collaboration operations?
YES………………..……..…………1
NO………………………...... ……2
3.04 Indicate your level of agreement with the following statements regarding trends of international terrorism in Kenya. Use Agree (A); Neutral (N) and
Disagree (D).
Agree Neutral Disagree A There is increase in use of sophisticated weapons in attacks B The changing dynamics of international terrorism are known to security agencies. C Terror problems have been identified but appropriate measures undertaken by national security are still weak. D There is a worrying in the changing dynamics of international terrorism manner of attacks in the country E The national security cannot win international terrorism due to technology adoption gaps.
3.05 Based on the recent terror attacks in Nairobi, what would you consider as the implications of terrorism on the national security in the future?
SECTION IV
4.00 Examining Kenya’s national security practices prior to 1998.
4.01 Please indicate your level of agreement with the statements: Use Agree (A);
Neutral (N) and Disagree (D).
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Agree Neutral Disagree A Military action is an effective prevention strategy in international terrorism B Police reforms have been effective in countering international terrorism. C Counterterrorism measures (Act) have greatly Influenced national security capacity in dealing with international terrorism. D Kenya’s invasion to Somalia resulted to numerous attacks in Nairobi
4.02 Do you think intelligence sharing is effective in regards to countering international terrorism? YES……………….………………1 NO…………..……………………2
4.03 Give reason for your answer above: ______4.04 Has the national security agency (focus your department) created new prevention strategies in the wake of recent terror attacks in Nairobi?
YES…………………………………1 NO…………..………………………2
4.05 List some of the prevention strategies you are aware of:
4.06 In your own opinion, has the national security strategies been effective in countering terrorism in Kenya? YES……………..……………………1 NO……………………………………2 4.07 Give reason for your answer above:
4.08 List the challenges you experience in an effort to adopt/ develop strategies used in handling international terrorism.
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4.09 Suggest solutions and ways in which the national security organs can effectively implement strategies to counter international terrorism in Kenya?
SECTION V
5.00 Interrogating the extent to which counter terrorism measures taken by the
Kenyan government have impacted on the national security from 1975-2013.
5.01 Please indicate your level of agreement with the statements below on factors that make Kenya vulnerable to terrorist attacks: Use -Agree (A); Neutral (N);
Disagree (D).
Agree Neutral Disagree A There are many Western-owned businesses in the city B The location of a major United Nations complex C Unstable neighboring countries D The political and socioeconomic deprivation of the Coast relative to the rest of the country. E The presence of a large number of foreign diplomatic missions F Porous borders G Marginalization the largely coastal Islamic community h The coastal beach tourism industry 5.02 Security agents are corrupt, hence fueling international terrorism in the city. YES……………………………1 NO……..………………………2 5.03 Explain
5.04 Is Saudi Arabian charity to Kenya genuine? YES……………………………1 NO...…………………...………2
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5.05 Is the laxity of the security officers to blame? YES………………………….…1 NO………….…………….……2 5.06 In your own opinion, has the fight against international terrorism had any implications on national security? YES……………………………1 NO………………….…………2 5.07 Explain your answer above? ......
End
Thank you for your contribution
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A4b) Questionnaire for the residents/ victims
1.00 INTERVIEW 1.01 DATE OF INTERVIEW (DD/MM/YY)…………………………………… 1.02 START TIME……………………………………………………………… 1.03 END TIME………………………………………………………………… 1.04 INTERVIEWER'S NAME ______1.05 LOCATION NAME ______SECTION II: 2.00 To begin, we are going to ask you some background questions about yourself. 2.01 Gender Male………………………………………………….…..1 Female……………………………………………….…..2 2.02 In which age bracket can you be categorized? 18 – 24………………………1 25 – 35………………………2 36 – 45………………………3 46 – 55………………………4 56 and above…………………5 2.03 Highest level of education attained. Primary……………………………………1 Secondary…………………………………2 Certificate…………………………………3 Diploma…………………………….…….4 Bachelors………………………………….5 Masters…………………………………….6 Other (Specify) ……………………………7 2.04 What is your occupation? Employed (public service)……………….1 Business (self-employed)………………...2 Employed (private)……………………….3 Unemployed…………………………..….4
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SECTION III. 3.00 Investigating the changing dynamics of International terrorism in Kenya from 1975-2013.
3.01 Has there been a consistency in terrorism events in Kenya? YES………………...1
NO…………………2
3.02 Can the changing dynamics of international terrorism be won by community and police collaboration operations? YES…………………………………1
NO……….…………………………2
3.03 Do the changing dynamics of international terrorism worry our security apparatus?
YES…………………………………1
NO…………………………………2
3.04 Indicate your level of agreement with the following statements regarding the dynamics of international terrorism in Kenya. Use Agree (A); Neutral (N) and Disagree
(D).
Agree Neutral Disagree A There is increase in use of sophisticated weapons in attacks B The changing dynamics of international terrorism are known to security agencies. C Terror problems have been identified but appropriate measures undertaken by national security are still weak. D The national security cannot win international Terrorism due to technology adoption gaps. 3.05 Based on the recent terror attacks in Nairobi, what would you consider as the implications of terrorism on the national security in the future?
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SECTION IV
4.00 Examining Kenya’s national security practices prior to 1998. 4.01 Do you think intelligence sharing is effective in regards to countering international terrorism? YES…………………………………1 NO…………...………………………2 4.02 Give reason for your answer above: undertaken by the national security agencies to ensure that you are protected from international terrorism? Patrolling………………………………………….…1 DE radicalization………..………………....……...…2 Prosecution of criminals……………………………..3 Partnering with both local and international community to combat terrorism.4 Military action……………………………………….5 Enacting legislations………………………………...6 Freezing accounts of the financiers………..…….….7 Other ______8
4.03 Is international terrorism sponsored by religious leaders? YES…………………1 NO………………….2 4.04 Please explain
4.05 What according to you are the weaknesses of our national security organs in preventing terrorism in Nairobi and Kenya at large? ......
4.06 Are there enough legislation to fight international terrorism? YES……………1 NO………….…2
4.07 Is parliament doing its role in policy formulation? YES……………1 NO……………2
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SECTION V
5.00 Interrogating the extent to which counter terrorism measures taken by the
Kenyan government have impacted on the national security from 1975-2013.
5.01 Please indicate your level of agreement with the statements below on the reasons why Kenya is a prime target to terrorists: Use -Agree (A); Neutral (N);
Disagree (D).
Agree Neutral Disagree a There are many Western-owned businesses the city b The location of a major United Nations complex c Unstable neighboring countries d The presence of a large number of foreign diplomatic missions e Porous borders f Marginalization the largely coastal Islamic community
g The coastal beach tourism industry
5.02 Security agents are corrupt, hence fueling international terrorism in the city. YES…………………………………1 NO……...……………..……………2 5.03 Explain
5.04 Do you know about Saudi Arabian charity to Kenya? YES………….………1 NO…………….…….2 5.05 Is Saudi Arabian charity to Kenya genuine? YES………………………...1 NO……………………….…2 5.06 Is the laxity of the security officers to blame? YES…………………..……1 NO………………...……….2
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5.07 In your own opinion, has the fight against international terrorism had any implications on national security? YES………………………………1 NO…………...……………………2 5.08 Explain your answer above?
End
Thank you for your contribution
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Appendix III: List of Key Informants
NO. NAME VENUE OF INTERVIEW DATE
1. Captain Department of Defense 29/4/2016 2. Abdi Kasarani 3/3/2016 3. Rop Kayole 8/3/2016 4. Kyeng’ Directorate of Criminal 5/4/2016 Investigation 5. Hassan Eastleigh 16/3/2016 6. Moraa Immigration, Nyayo house 5/5/2016 7. Fatuma Eastleigh 19/4/2016 8. Immigration official Immigration, Nyayo House 3/5/2016 9. Bundi Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, 17/5/2016 Nairobi 10. Yasin Huruma 15/4/2016 11. Corporal Department of Defence 27/5/2016 12. Farah Eastleigh 21/3/2016 13. Petr NCBD 17/5/2016 NB: The listed names are pseudonyms used for confidentiality and security of the informants during the Oral Interviews.
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Appendix IV: Map of Nairobi City County
Source: maps of the world
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Appendix V: Research Permit