Australia's security, 1939-1942: London or Washington?

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Authors Burns, Barbara Ruth, 1935-

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Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/317958 AUSTRALIA'S SECURITY, 1939-1942s LONDON OR WASHINGTON?

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Barbara Rath Barns

A Thesis Sabmitted to the Faealty of the

BEPARTMEiT OF HISTORY

In partial Falfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

In the Graduate College

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

19 6 6 STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

This thesis has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at the University of Arizona and is deposited in the University library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library,

Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable without special permission, provided, that accurate acknowledgement of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the Bean of the Graduate College when in his judgment the proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholarship. In all other instances, however, permission must be obtained from the author.

SIGNEDi .A-4/

APPROVAL BY THESIS DIRECTOR

This thesis has been approved on the date shown below?

/>Q2®4(gOj£j1

& e purpose of this study is to show the effect that the growth of

sJapamese power durimg the period 1939-1S*^ had oa the security of Austra­ lia 0 Australiaa governmental officials were faced with many agonizing and perplexing problems, which caused considerable tension between the

Dominion Government and the Waited Kingdom= Finally8 as a result of de­ velopments which will be considered in detail, Australia took the unpre-

cented step of frankly seeking to base her security on American rather than

British foundations„

Wnfertunately, certain official documents, pertaining to the sub­

ject of this thesis, of which the Grown Copyright is legally vested in the

Controller of lis Majesty8s Stationery Office, are unavailable to the pub­ lic at the present time, These restrictions deprive my study of any claim to be definitive0 However, it has been ay intention to present the picture

as accurately as possible through the use of all available material.

My trip to Australia, and subsequent visits to the Australian

National Wmiversity in Canberra and the University of Melbourne, proved invaluable as they afforded me the opportunity to use their extensive libraries. Consequently, much of the research for this thesis was carried out at these two universities, I also received immeasurable help in under­

standing the views of the Australians at the time of World War II from dis-■ tinguished professors serving at the two universities mentioned above,

Without this assistance, this work would have been an impossible task. „TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

EREFACE ...... iii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS...... v

ABSTRACT ...... vi

I. MENACE OF JAPAN ...... 1

II. AUSTRALIA9 BRITAIN, AND PACIFIC SECURITT...... 20

III. AMERICA, BRITAIN, AND PACIFIC SECURITY ...... 52

IV. PACIFIC SECURITY? WHOSE RESPONSIBILITY? ...... ?1

V. AUSTRALIA, AMERICA, AND PACIFIC SECURITY...... 106

VI. CONCLUSION...... 130

LIST OF REFERENCES...... 134

iv IjIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure Rage

la ..The Japanese Empire and Its Partition ...... 1.9

2. British Commitments in the Far East ...... 5.1

v ABSTRACT

In Septembers 1939o Australia as a ©©minion of the British Cem- monwealthg was prepared to follow the traditional role of accepting

guidance9 leadership and military assistance from the United Kingdomo •

However„ the divergence, of interests between Britain and Australia

caused tensions to increase. Typical of these were: Britain®s insis­

tence that the European theater take precedence over the Pacific a

Churchill®s unwillingness to grant Australia a major role in policy­

making for the Pacific9 the deaf ear given to Australia8s plea to fur­ ther strengthen Singapore, and the use of Australian troops in the

Middle East while the situation nearer home was rapidly deteriorating,

Added to these was the knowledge of the waning power of Great Britain

and her inability to defend her possessions in the Pacific„ Therefore8 when a Japanese invasion of her homeland seemed possibles Australia turned for aid to America, Though this plea may have been unorthodoxp .

it was realistic, Australia®s security was jeopardized; she could not

defend herself unaided. Nevertheless9 it took many agonizing days before America responded in what Australia considered a suitable manner. The

ultimate decision to call on Washingtons rather than Londons and the events that led up to this decision, comprise the major portion of this work. CHAPTER I

THE HENACE OF JAPAN

In September 1939 King George VI, on the advice of the United

Kihgdem government, declared war against Germany on behalf of the

United Kingdom, India, Burma, and the Colonial Empire, Also the king declared war against Germany on behalf of the self-governing dominions of Australia9 Canada, South Africa and lew Zealand on separate advise­ ments of these governments, The Prime Minister of Australia, Mr* Menzies, declared that Australia was at war with Germany by virtue of the king's statement» There was no hesitation, Australia would cooperate with the Imperial Government to the fullest extent „ However, there was a lack of preparation on the part of all Commonwealth governments. Few realized the problems ahead. Be one anticipated the sacrifices that would be required. At the outset of the war, Australia felt reasonably secure as a part of the British Empire. She looked to the Prime Minister of

Britain for guidance, assistance and leadership. This had been her traditional role and it was the path she was prepared to follow. How* ever, as the war progressed, the ability of the British to guarantee security in every part of the globe declined, while differences of in­ terest developed which required impartial and independent consideration.

The truth is that while the Pacific was am area in which the interests ' \ 1 of Britain as a whole were only secondarys though still deemed important, to Australians it was a sphere of vital interest, of direct, immediate peril, and. of special responsibility,.

While the world, watched with horror the aggressive actions of

Germany in Europe, Australians watched their neighbor to the north „ As an island continent of white people in the midst of a sea of Orientals,

Australians had reason to be apprehensive. They had been hearing about the Yellow Peril (denoting all Orientals) all their lives„ But this ex= pression, since the 192©8s, pertained only to Japan and carried with it the picture of a small, overpopulated island that lacked the necessary natural resources and thus was greedy for the land, and the resources within it, that Australians cherished0 Australia's fear of Japan did net date from Pearl Harbor, bat from the day Japan began her aggressive actions in the 192©8s . The face that Japan was expanding, seemingly un<= hindered by the great Western powers, indicated that Australia might be her victim in the near future „ Aware that the rest of the world was preoccupied by the European situation, Australian governmental officials implored those powers stronger than she to stop this threat before it grew toe large to handle„ She offered a variety of alternatives, none of which she could back up alone. For the most part, Australian sugges­ tions went unheeded„ Bae to her lack of military resources, Australia's hands were tied as she watched Japan's empire grow larger«

The story of Japan's growth must be told because it has a direct bearing on Australia's relations with her Mother Country« It is only natural that since Australia would be endangered by any southward drive 3 on the part of Japang she should be one of the first to send up warnings to the rest of the world concerning this menace. She also felt that it was only natural that Great Britain should see this danger and conse­ quently send aid to her Dominion government. Within this realm of reason- lag lies the bulk of the controversy that was later to develop between

Prime Minister Churchill and Prime Minister Curtin. As the situation grew more distressing for each prime minister, their apparent inability to reassure the other successfully caused friction that was unlike any between Great Britain and Australia before, The menace of Japan was the decisive factor causing strained rela­ tions between Australia and her Mother Country, True, there had been dif­ ferences of opinion in the past. But these were of minor importance in comparison to the close bond that Australia felt for Great Britain.

Therefore there is a direct correlation between the increasing threat of

Japan and the tone of the messages exchanged between the two prime min­ isters. Each country was under tremendous pressure and limited in its responses to conditions throughout the world. Neither interpreted the same picture with the same degree of importance. There was obviously a divergence of interests and as this became more apparent, relations grew more tense.

Japan0s entry into the conflict had changed the whole emphasis of the Second World War for Australians. Previously they had fought their wars on the territories of other people; new a war threatened their own soil. Previously it had been London or Coventry that was bombed; now it was Darwin and Broome, The bulk of the nation0s fighting men, whether 4 seas land ©r air forces, was serving in war theaters thousands of miles from the Pacific area. The possibility of Japanese invasion loomed larger each day, Without help from a stronger power, Japan, by virtue of her control of the islands, would have Australia at her mercy. It was obvious to the Australians that if attacked they would never be able to defend Australia unaided. As each hour brought reports of impending disaster6 Australia called for help. Bat who would respond to this call? Only two powers had adequate strength to stop the Japanese 5 Great Britain and the United States, Each felt that the European struggle should be settled first. This was clearly impossible if

Australia were to remain unscathed. Lomdonffs reaction to the situation in the Pacific was quite unsatisfactory, in the eyes of Australians. Washington, from the Australian viewpoint, seemed unhurried and inde­ cisive . Would help come from these powers in timet If so, from which one, or both? Was there any way that Australians could influence either of these great powers? Australians became dedicated to the cause of enlisting aid for their country so that they might remain one of the two "Western" powers in the East, Before the anxieties of the Australians can be fully appreciated and viewed in the proper perspective, it is necessary to examine the growth of Japan6s power. For herein lies the source of Australian anxieties. It is necessary to show that Australia .watched this rapid growth with great apprehension. She could visualize what the conse­ quences might be and she forewarned others of the danger, as she saw it.

However, as will be indicated in successive pages, few recognized the 5 extent ©f the challenge that Japan was flaunting in the Pacific and/or were able to meet this challenge„

Japanese policy in the 19208 s was still tinder the control of the civilian elements» The government sought to relieve the problem of overpopulation fcy encouraging emigration, improving farming, and by mak­ ing advancements in industry. Despite these efforts the problem remained unsolved, Japan had always had a tradition of military leadership, and eventually the Japanese decided on a program of conquest. Every avail­ able means was used to mobilize the people in the service of the national goal of expansion. The population was thoroughly saturated with a steady barrage of propaganda. One publication stated that the Japanese were like

» , ,a;great crowd of people packed into a small and narrow room, and there are only three doors through which we might es­ cape, namely emigration, advance into world markets and expan­ sion of territory. The first door, emigration, has been barred to us by the anti-Japanese immigration policies in other coun­ tries, The second doer, advance into world markets, is being pushed shut by tariff barriers and the abrogation of commercial treaties » , , , It is quite natural that Japan should rush upon the last remaining door,'

By 1931 the Japanese were psychologically ready for war. The de­ cisions that would set the movement into action were made by the imagina­ tive leaders of the military^ and these decisions were readily accepted

■j Hashimoto Kingori, "The Meed for Emigration and Expansion," Japan 1931-19*5» ed. Ivan Morris (Boston? 1, G„ Heath and Go,, 1963),

Hugh Borton, Japan^s Modern Century (lew York: The Ronald Press Co,, 1955)i) p® 321, ^len" the^apanise pe©ple realized that the military alone had a plan to solve the economic and international crisis which faced the nation, they followed this leadership," 6 by the populace« KDominated by a sense ©f mission, fortified by the

sense of eeonomie grievance, and assured of popular support, the mili­ tary set out to protect what was considered t© be the legitimate in= terests of the homeland Japan initiated its scheme by seising Manchuria from China,

This major act of aggression paved the way to the Pacific war. An ex­ plosion occurred on the tracks of the South Manchurian Hailway near

Mukden on September 18, 1931• Chang Hsueh-liang, Manchurian war lord, was blamed for this incident by the Japanese. This episode started a chain reaction which enabled the army, under General Honjo, to seize con­ trol of Mukden, Changchun, and Antung. With the fall of Chinehou, on

January 3, 1932, Manchuria came under the complete control of Japan.

The advances of the Kwantumg Army in Manchuria started a reac­ tion in Japan that could only make the people feel that the civilian

element in government was unworthy of their support. The militarist faction did its utmost to take advantage of this situation and to

consolidate its control of the government. On every question of do­ mestic or foreign policy, the militarists attempted to have the final word. In order to discredit the policies of the old party government, the militarists condemned the signing of the Washington Agreement, the

Kellogg Pact, and the London Maval Armaments Pact. Instead, their ulti­ mate goal was a firm stand in China and an increase in Japanese influence

in new regions and territories. The long-range aims of the militarist

^Wilfrid J. 0 sConnell, ^British-Japanese Relations 1931=1939® (unpublished Master's thesis. University of Arizona, 1963), p. 6?. 1 faction were described, by Araki Sadao with Japan as the self-styled leader of the East Asiatic Union, This plan presupposed the inevitable emancipation of the entire Far Eastern territory, TShen using such terms, Araki Sadao meant that those areas including Eastern Siberia,

China, Indo=.China, the South Seas and India would be free only after they had thrown off the shackles of white oppression by allowing the

Japanese to liberate them. For, according to Sadao, Japan could net overlook a single instance of disorder springing up anywhere in Eastern

Asia, Japan, self-appointed mistress of the Asian peoples, considered herself the only power representative of her race that was strong enough and wise enough to rid the area of the evils brought about by the white race. The climax of Japan®s dream would be the ^Greater ©o-Frosperity

Sphere,"

Abroad, the world watched Japan®s aggressive actions with a grow­ ing sense of apprehension, One country that felt the increasing pressure was Great Britain, Always concerned with the status quo, because of her large economic investments in China and her colonial possessions in the surrounding area. Great Britain had good reason to fear this tighter grip on Manchuria by the Japanese, China was even more concerned because she feared that Japan was using Manchuria simply as a stepping stone to her front door. Coincident with this disturbance in the existing conditions in China were other problems that taxed British ingenuity,^ Either by

k Ibid,, p, 71o "To be able to afford singleminded attention to any one solution was impossible. The European economic crisis accom­ panied by the pressure of disarmament and reparations, the failure of the Credit-Anstalt in Austria spreading financial paralysis throughout 8 chance or by calculating the risks8 the Japanese Army chose this moment to strike at Manchuria and thus test the league of Nations. On Sep«= tezaber 19» 1931» the Chinese and Japanese representatives sent messages informing the Council of the League that a critical situation existed in Manchuria, The messages sent during the next few weeks set the tone for future negotiations, Although Japan continued to use the channels of diplomatic correspondence„ it appeared that she had no intention of obeying the League, This was substantiated when Japan refused to remove her troops from Manchuria as requested by the League, in the form of a message dated September 22, 1 9 3 1 or later when this request was put in the form of a resolution passed by the Council on October 24, 1931« The troops remained even as the Japanese Government issued another polite note stating its willingness to negotiate with the Chinese government„

At this point, Britain chose to believe in Japan8s just cause and to doubt the ability of the Chinese to solve the matter, It was dif­ ficult to deny the validity of Japan's claims„ Her trading rights had suffered greatly, Manchuria had been in a state of lawless confusion for years and in order to stabilize the country Japan declared it was neces­ sary for her to seize it from China, Great Britain, at this moment, was in mo position to make a stand on moral rectitude. She was being forced off the gold standard and was facing a controversial general election,

Germany, the growth of sentiment favoring an Austre-German customs union, the strength of the Indian claim to a greater measure of self-government were a few of the vexations that required the attention of diplomacy,11 5 League of Nations, Official Journal, Minutes of the Sixty-Fifth Session of the Council, 12th year, No. 12, p. 2290. 9 In any ease even Great Britain, though a Far Eastern Power, had no means of action. The Washington naval treaty gave Japan local supremacy in the Far East; and successive British govern­ ments confirmed this supremacy mhen they deliberately postponed the building up of their base in Singapore, What would be gained if the League of Nations condemned Japan? Merely a dis­ play of moral rectitude which, in so far as it had .any effect, would set Japan against British trading interests.

The League did net abandon the matter, but instead the entire ease was turned over to the Lytton Commission. ? A decision was reached at about the same time as the heir to the throne of the old Manehu dynasty, Pu Ti, ascended to the throne of Manehukuo, which had been granted by the

Japanese Government the status of an independent state. The Lytton Com­ mission condemned Japan, not as an aggressor, but because she had re­ sorted to force before all peaceful means of redress were exhausted. On

March 27, 1933s when the Assembly unanimously adopted the resolution to deny recognition of Manehukuo, Tokoyo gave notice of her withdrawal from the League, The Chinese reconciled themselves to their less; and in

1933 peace was restored between Japan and China, The British Government, regarding the League as an instrument of conciliation rather than a machine of security, considered its policy successful when the Manchurian affair

A. J, P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (London:

Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War. Vol. Is The Gather- L_ (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948), p. 88. “The eonelu. siens dr awn. were plains Manehukuo was the artificial creation, of the Japanese General Staff, and the wishes of the population had played no part in the formation of the puppet state. Lord Lytton and his colleagues in their Report not only analysed the situation, but put forward concrete proposals for an international solution. These were for the declaration of an autonomous Manchuria, It would still remain part of China, under the aegis of the League, and there would be a comprehensive treaty between China and Japan regulating their interests in Manchuria, The fact that the League could not follow up these proposals in no way detracts from the value of the Lytton Report." had been brought to an end, The Important thing, to the British, was to

restore peace, even at the cost of Manchuria„ As years went by this

Manchurian incident was to become a source of debate„® According to some

authorities, Japan had, by her actions in Manchuria, showed the real

weakness of the structure of international relations o'*

Despite the moral chastisement implied by the League8s actions,

Japan did not cease in her expansion. Beginning in lf33 Japan steadily

nibbled at China8s borders north of the Yellow Biver, “In 1935s the

Japanese Army was heavily entrenched in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and

North China „ lone of the Western powers was willing to risk a war by

challenging Japan®s actionsThe military leaders of Japan felt that these aggressive actions were necessary in the light of Japan's need for natural resources and undeveloped land areas. They saw the creation of puppet states on the continent as a necessity in order to exploit the re­

sources in such a manner as to contribute toward a self-sufficient

%aylor, op, cit,, p. 64, “In later years the Manchurian affair assumed a.mythical importance, It was treated as a milestone on the road to war, the first decisive 'betrayal8 of the League, especially by the British government. In reality, the League, under British leadership, had done what the British thought it was designed to do: it had limited a conflict and brought it, however unsatisfactorily, to an end,"

^Lord Hankey, Diplomacy By Conference (London? Ernest Benn Lim­ ited, 1946), p, 127o ", * , another difficulty is to impose sanctions on one's friends, [Britain and Japan were allies during World War I] , , „ That was the real difficulty when the Japanese transgressed the Covenant in Manchuria and afterwards China, , „ , more so in the ease of Japan be­ cause no country or combination of countries was ready to undertake pres­ sure that might lead to so great a war , , , Another trouble is, namely, that every time a nation breaks the rules, and is subjected to pressure of some kind, it usually ceases to be a member of the general interna­ tional organization, , , »" 11 armament industry for Japan. In this light„ the main events during the last half of 1935 between Japan and China take on added significance.

The army alone had a plan. It advocated the formation of a bloc. composed of Japanp Hanchukuo9 and North China to strengthen the country economically and to protect it from attack from the Soviet Union. In the absence of anything better and lacking a liberals non^mdlitary traditions the people followed. . . . ^

In order that Japan be unencumbered in her aggressive actions it was necessary for her to feel secure from any possible attack from the Soviet Union. ”Japan was fearful of Russia. Her military leaders believed a war with Russia to be all but inevitable. This feeling was festered by the repeated clashes along the Amur and the border be­ tween the Russian-protected Outer Mongolia and Manehuka© 9 in addition to the friction over the fishing rights in the waters off the coast of

Eastern Siberia. Therefore9 on November 25$> the Sirota government sponsored the signing of the Anti-Comintern Paeti^ "Although this single pact was slim protection against a Soviet attack on Manchuria and Korea8 it gave Japan moral support in'her drive to gain undisputed 1 u control of China." In mid-1937 hostilities broke out once again in - ■ ]_5 the Far East as the Second Sino-Japanese War began.

•^Ibid.c p. 341.

^Kenneth Scott Latourette6 The History of Japan (rev. ed.s New Yorks The Macmillan Companya 195?)» P° 1§9« l^Bertoa, on. eit.. p. 348. "The published clauses of the Pact provided for the collaboration in preventing the spread of Communism within the borders of the two states and among third powers. The secret clauses were directed against the Soviet Union."

^ I b i d c. p. 341. •^Gwendolen Garters The British Commonwelath and International Security (Torontos The Ryerson Press, 194?)s p. 286. "Shortly after the 12

From August 13» to November 9» 1937» the se©pe of Japanese opera­ tions expanded rapidly9 With lightning speed, the Japanese array estab­

lished a blockade from Chingwangta© to Swaton, damaged Shanghai, and bombed the cities of Canton and NankingThis entire matter came to the attention of the League and the Brussels Conference; it was dis­

cussed in regard to Japan!s commitment to the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922„ Chiang Kai-shek had resisted the Japanese and also appealed to the League„

However, no practical solution was forthcoming for, even though the con­

flict concerned the League, they could see no way to bring it to a peace­ ful conclusiono Therefore, the Brussels Conference did nothing to help Chinao The British did allow some supplies to reach China over the Burma

Road; but beyond this Great Britain did not feel that she could run the

risk of jeopardising her position with Japan when conditions were growing

so grave in Europe and her position there was being challenged. She wished to avoid a crisis in both areas, but, whereas she assumed the role

of a major power in both Europe and the Far East, her actions seemed to

be a feeble reply to the expansion of Germany and Japan, rather than a

projection of an independent policy. Instead of attempting to solve the

problems existing in Asia and Europe jointly and with equal consideration,

arrival of a squadron of Japanese warships off Shanghai, large-scale hos­ tilities began on August 13, 1937» Despite resistance, the Japanese pushed ahead rapidly and by the end of the year had acquired control of the Yangtze River and of Nanking, In comparison with the first Sino- Japamese conflict which aimed at cutting off certain provinces from Chinese control, the war which began,in 1937 appeared directed toward domination of the whole of China,"

1 < S - I, S, Friedman, British Relations with China; 1931-1939 (lew, Yorks Institute of Pacific^Relatiohs,'' pp - ■ - 1 13 Great Britain regarded them, separately9 with the greater amount ©f atten­ tion focused ©n the European situation. Thus, her maim concern was he strengthen herself against further difficulties in the Far East. . Great

Britain, who had commitments in both hemispheres* was, attempting to be both a European and a World Power. The attempt was too much for her.

The difficulties in one sphere held her back whenever she tried to act in the other. Therefore, in the absence of any other power with the will and means to resist, Japan8s aggressions continued to go unchecked.

Gm November 3, If38, Premier Konoye issued his fa.m©us statement of ®A New ©rder in East Asia® calling for a closer bond between the newly acquired territories of Manehukuo, Inner Mongolia, North, Central„ and South China with Japan.

Although relations had been strained between Japan and Russia throughout the tii^e of the war in China, they ipere to worsen during the summer of lf3f® For Japan was on the move again. Feeling her northern flank was temporarily secure from Soviet attack, Japan occupied the

Hainan Islands in February lf3f and then the nearby Spratly Islands.

By this action on the,south coast of China, Japan defied France, one of the colonial powers. Then she began to encroach on the British settle­ ment of Tientsin. Neither France nor Great Britain was in a position t© defend their claims in the Far East since the situation in Europe was so grave. The Japanese squeezed concessions out of the British, who steadily gave way. The. European situation then was used by Japan to her advantage. The Russians viewed the growing strength ©£ Japan with alarm.

Hostilities on a rather large seale had broken out along.the Soviet bor­ der in July 1939• This grew to larger proportionss until the Japanese were defeated at loaunhan in August» suffering approximately 18,@0® eas- ualties, A full-scale war with the Soviet Union at this time was the last thing Japan wanted. Such action would only jeopardize her position in China, Japan had, for some time, hoped that Germany would give her support against the Soviet Union, Quite the contrary happened. From the moment that Poland became a target of German aggression, the Soviet

Union was transformed into a possible neutral, or even an ally, .Then came the disquieting news of the Honagression pact signed between Germany and Russia, This pact could be interpreted as Russia8s means of gaining security against any further Japanese outbreaks, Japan8s feeling of confidence, fostered by her successful dealings at the expense of France and England, was shattered by the realization that she was in danger of isolation from the Axis,

, „ , With Hitler*s invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939c and the outbreak of World War II in Europe, Japan declared that it would not become involved in the war, but would concentrate on the settlement of the war in China, At the same time, negotia­ tions were begun in Moscow which settled the Homunhan affair. For the second time within a year, therefore, a war with Russia was averted, '

Japan blamed the Western powers for the stubborn resistance of

Chiang Kai-shek and looked for a way of preventing these powers from giving aid to Chiang, When France fell in mid-June of 1940, Japan seized . 15 upon this opportunity to intimidate Great Britain, With no fear of re­ prisals, Japan demanded that Great Britain send no more military supplies: to the Chinese Nationalists over the Burma Road, Britain eould only hope 18 to avoid war with Japan by agreeing to close the Road for three months.

Inasmuch as France had already fallen and none of the British Dominions or India or the Colonies was able to give substantial help. Great Britain was indeed alone. Therefore, she had no wish to be drawn into conflict with Japan,

Throughout this period Hitler had attempted to persuade Japan to join the Axis, However, Japan had insisted upon playing an independent role. By autumn' of 19^-0 it appeared that an Axis victory was within the bounds of possibility. Was Japan to gain nothing from the collapse of the

Netherlands, of France, and perhaps even of Britain, with all their vast possessions in East Asia? With Germany pushing toward an alliance with her, it appeared as if Japan9s glittering schemes sprang from dreamland to reality. Therefore, Japan signed the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance with Germany and Italy, on September 27, 1940, ,t!The three agreed to as­ sist one another, Japan1'recognizing and respecting the leadership of

Germany and Italy in establishing a new order in Europe, and Germany and

Italy acknowledging the leadership of Japan in bringing into being a 8new 19 order in Greater East Asia,80 They also agreed to assist one another with all military, economic, and political means if one of them were

18Ibid,, p. 359. 19 Latourette, on, cit,, p, 247, attacked fey a nation at present not involved in the European War or in the

Chinese-Japanese conflict„ With the security of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliancea Japan be­ gan her expansion to the South. Just outside the perimeter of the areas directly controlled by the Japanese were ample supplies of bauxite, tin, and rubber. Japan steadily increased her pressure and by September 1940 the demands she had made on Indochina for the use of three airfields and the right to station troops at each had been conceded. Feeling more secure on the northern flank after signing the lonagression Pact with

Russia in April of 1941, the Japanese once more approached the Nether­ lands* East Indies, making demands for oil, rubber, and tin. When the

Netherlands refused to comply, the Japanese Nationalists reasoned that these supplies would have to be taken by force. When Hitler invaded the

Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, without advising Japan of his plans, the

Third Konoye Cabinet acted with great haste. The members of the Cabinet set down the basic principles it would follow to acquire its strategic materials $

a. Progress southward on Indochina and Siam despite the pos­ sibility of war with Great Britain and the United States. b. Observance of the Neutrality Pact with Russia. c. If and when Russia was at the point of being defeated by Hitler, Japan would enter into the European war. In this way, Japan would have the opportunity to strengthen her position in Eastern Asia at the expense of R u s s i a .

Borton, op. eit.. p. 364• "The one great weakness in Japan*s economic self-sufficiency was a lack of oil, the basic fuel for the Im­ perial Navy and the Air Force. . . . Thus the expansionists argued that, if the Butch, for example, would not agree to let the Netherlands* Indies become a member of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, their rich oil fields might have to be seized." 21 . . With this program firmly in mind, it was only a matter of time before the Japanese cabinet "approved of a war plan which included a simultaneous attack on the naval bases at Pearl Harborg Manilap and

22 " Singapore „11 ■ Feeling that her attention must not be diverted from her conquest of the South Pacific9 and not wanting to fight on two fronts simultaneously$ Japan decided that she would refuse to go to war with the Soviet Union8 despite any overtures that might be forthcoming,

. The stage was now being set for the event that would bring the

United States into the war. While. Cordell Hull, Secretary of State for the United States, issued an ultimatum,Premier T@j§ had begun the plan that started the war in the Pacific, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, The declaration of war sent from Japan to the

United States was still in the process of being decoded by the Japanese

Embassy in Washington when the attack took place.

The devastation was immense, Ninety percent of the American naval and air strength in the Hawaiian Islands was immobilized at one stroke. At the same time that Pearl Harbor was being attacked, so too were the Philippines, Malaya, Guam, Wake and Midway Islands, and the

British strategic outposts at Hong Kong and Singapore, Viewed from the

Japanese standpoint, these attacks were tremendously successful,

22Ibid,„ p. 368, 23 Ibid, “Secretary Hull insisted that no settlement was pos= sible, until Japan withdrew its troops from China, adopted a liberal commercial policy, and gave up its alliance with the Axis,“ 18

Baring the next six months the Japanese forces swept southwards1

nearly free from the interference of Great Britain or the United States8 who were virtually defenseless to stop the onslaught« By mid-summer^

Japanese power had expanded to include a gigantic quadrangle encompassing the entire western Pacific (see map)0 The fear that, at one time, only

Australia felt keenly, was now shared by the entire world» — I— \ too' IF IT /JO* At C H A T KA THE JAPANESE EMPIRE AND ITS PARTITION ]. )\ Dutch Hbr.ci’1 (J- ATTU * |S KISKA

Sli' MAN „ Fd r k h c.s t « * L en b o F (u n o e o control, China -U.S.S.H . Jcaponese. control, World Wor II

T i e n t s i n i e u Ft X • //(/ 3H/C

-JO- m i d w a y is *> 5CW//V

; Z ' z ^ CNtweroK ' J # | Japan.. I n d o b e. K W A J A L ttN Hl j A P A V f jf fM R/Re. 19*1 | | | j (ISLANDS UHDtOLINfO) / p a l a u IX IHI JAPAN> 1951

TARAWA JAPANESE MANDATED IS. M A lM A n fH A TO U.S TRUSTEESHIP

KARAPUTO, KURIL E IS. AND PORT ARTHUR TO U.S.S R.

AAA N C H U R IA , F O R M O S A A N D ELLICF * PESCADORES IS. TO CHINA lands indi*5 . f GUIN IS ; FUNAFUTI KOREA TO BE INDEPENDENT ID ’- -/o* RYUKYU, BONIN, HU, ^ ^ - VOLCAZVO AND MARCUS IS. TO U.S TRUSTEESHIP z/o* _L

Figure 1 The Japanese Empire and Its Partition CHAPTER II

BRITAIN AUSTRALIA All PACIFIC SECURITY

The British Empire had been built aromad, and held together by, its sea power» World War I had brought an acute awareness to all mem­ bers of the British Commonwealth of the dangers implicit in a far-flung oceanic empire. Great Britain had possessions in Africa, the Indian

Ocean, Asia, Australia, the Pacific Ocean, North America, South America, and in the Atlantic Ocean. In the nineteenth century British naval power was supreme. However, this supremacy rested upon the control of the narrow seas of Europe, such as: the Channel, the Mediterranean Sea, and the North Sea. Other strategic points under British command were: the Cape of Good Hope, the Falkland Islands, Malaya, and Australia (see map). World War I indicated that the naval power of Great Britain was such that she could not easily base a fleet in both the Atlantic and the

Pacific. wIn the light of this experience, the future defense of the

British Empire appeared to depend on a continuation of close relations with the United States and Japan and/or an expansion of British naval power to make it possible to protect not only the British Isles and the

North Atlantic but also the Far Eastern parts of the Commonwealth and X Empire.11 Since the emphasis after World War I was on disarmament, and

X Carter, oo.cit.. p. 36.

20 21

considering the enormous losses sustained in the war8 Great Britain had

no choice but to accept the former alternative» namely„ close relations

with the United States and Japan,

As a member of the British Commonwealthg Australian was closely

tied to Great Britain in trade9 finance«, culture8 and politics. Aus­

tralia’s intimate relation with a great power of world-wide interests and

commitments exposed her to the currents of world history. Her position in the Pacific had made her susceptible to the full impact of events in

Asi#. Australia and Hew Zealand tended to feel their isolation as small

white communities close to the great masses of Oriental peoples as a danger

rather than as a blessing. Therefore» it is not difficult to understand

why Lord Jellieoe said, in 19199 "naval defense was of particular impor­

tance for Australia’s security.

On June 2®, 1921» at the Imperial Conference of Prime Ministers

of the Empire, several important issues in regard to defense were dis­

cussed. Of these, the most significant was the renewal of the Angle-

Japanese Alliance. This Alliance, which had been signed in 1902, was the

first formal admission that Britain’s sea power was on the w a n e . ^ Britain

no longer had the ability to patrol the Seven Seas. In British circles,

this alliance was viewed as a way to insure her from an attack on her

Asiatic possessions by sea. It was hoped that the renewal of this alli­

ance would be advantageous then, not only to Great Britain, but to Japan,

2Ibid.. p. 38. /A Nicholas Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth 1952 (Sew:York; Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 5^. Australia, and. even to the United States» It was generally agreed by

the Australian House of Representatives that this treaty would promote

peaceo However, Australian political leaders felt it necessary that a

proviso be inserted concerning the “White Australia" policy. This prin­

ciple, which had long been the source of antagonism between Japan and

Australia, was designed as the answer to Australian immigration regula­ tions. In excluding all colored people, even those who were British sub­

jects, from permanent residence in Australia, they hoped to maintain their high standard of living. Regardless of the fact that it aimed at

all non-Caucasian people, the Japanese felt particularly slighted. This

policy hurt Japan*s national pride rather than her national interests and thus cannot be regarded as a deterrent to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

For the "White Australia® policy is believed, by most Australians, to be a means of preserving Australia's racial uniformity rather than a

policy of negative prejudice against Orientals. "By the end of the day, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has been shelved as the basis for diseu-

sion."^ This was not because of antagonism between Australia and Japan but because America has voiced opposition to it through the Canadian

representative who referred to the Alliance as a barrier to the growth

of -American friendship. In fact, Australian Prime Minister Hughes made a rather stirring speech in which he said, "I am strongly in favor

of its Cthe Treaty} being renewed. . . . Should we not be in a better

position to exercise greater influence over Eastern policy as an ally

of that great Eastern Power, than as her potential enemy?. . . We 23 m i l do well for the world6 s peace==we will do well for China-~we will 5 do well for the Gonmonwealth of British nations to renew this Treatyo"

Regardless of the Australian views of the Alliance8 it was dropped and thus the security of the Commonwealth in the Pacific was diminishede

Now it became the main concern of Australia, along with New Zealand, to see that some alternate policy be drawn up to safeguard their position in the South Pacific, The Washington Conference was to relieve this concern®

The three great issues that the Washington Conference was con­ cerned with when it met in December of 1921 were: disarmament, the future of China, and political arrangements in the Pacific. The first formal achievement of the Washington Conference was the signing of the Pour™Power

Treaty on December 13* 1921, by the United States, Great Britain, France and Japan. It pledged each to respect the rights of the others in rela­ tion to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the Pacific, to accept mediation in ease of controversy over these possessions, and to ©pen frank discussions if their rights were threatened by any other power. A reservation accompanied the treaty embodying provisions to the effect that it should not be deemed an assent on the part of the United

States to mandates granted in the Pacific under the Peace Treaty of Ver­ sailles, and that it should not preclude agreements relative to mandated islands. This treaty answered the needs of the powers involved by pro­ viding for American participation in Pacific arrangements, and by the

5 - Berriedale Keith, Speeches and Documents on the British Domin­ ions. 1918-31 (Londons Oxford University Press, 1935)» P. ^9« 2k pledge of security covering Australia and Sew Zealand, This treaty was purposely left vague in order to allow latitude in interpretation and ne­ gotiation among all powers ,f To Australia and Sew Zealand, with their isolated position in the South Pacific, the Four-Power Breaty and the agreement not to fortify further the islands in the western Pacific 7 brought release from the nightmare of Japanese expansion southwards,"

Feeling pleased with the success of the Washington Conference and secure in the knowledge that the problems that were most likely to cause tension between Great Britain, the Waited States and Japan had been solved, the Australasian states gave the growing power of Japan very little atten- O tioa,’ There were several reasons for this: First, and foremost, the

Washington Agreement had stated the'three powers (United States, Great

Britain, Japan) agreed that the status quo at the time of the signing of the treaty, with regard to fortifications and naval bases, should be main­ tained in their respective territories and possessions. Under the terms set down in the Washington Treaty, it was implied that there would be no new fortifications or naval bases established in the territories of the

Pacific» There also would be no measures taken to increase the existing naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces and/or

Z Thomas A, Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (lew Torks Appleton-Century^Crofts, Inc., 195®)*' !>«' 695« "Most important of all, the Four-Power Treaty specifically abrogated the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, It was the vehicle by which the British were able gracefully, yet rather obviously, to withdraw from their embarrassing commitments, Naturally, the Japanese were not altogether happy over the somewhat abrupt severance of their relationship with Great Britain, , , , The four great Powers bound themselves mutually to respect one another's insular posses­ sions and dominions in the Pacific.* Barter-,:, op, pit,, p. 6k 8Ibid,, p. 135. to increase the coast defense of these areas „ Secondlyj, in the If208 s the focal point of danger appeared to be Barope".^ The problems „ both economic and political, of Western Emrope absorbed everyone8s attention«

As international difficulties increased during the 19208s Japan fell out= side of the perimeter of light that focused on the trouble spots of the world. Therefore, “few seemed to have- realized at any time during the first Sino-Japanese dispute 0.931} that what was taking place was not only a shattering blow to the peace structure which had been set up after the war8 but also a dangerous undermining of the basis of peace in the Pacific which rested on all three aspects of the Washington arrangements„“1®

The Sino=Japanese War in 1931 served to renew the underlying fear of the Japanese which had not quite disappeared from Australian minds after the incredible termination of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905= Until

1905 fears of Russian as well as Japanese expansion were widely enter­ tained, But when Russia8s Far Eastern naval strength was destroyed at

Tsushima, Australia focused her eyes exclusively on Japan, The Australians realized even more the blataney of the “White Australia“ slogan which must have seemed to the Japanese to be directed against themselves, This pol­ icy excludes immigrants of non-European descent even from the Tropical north, “Her f Australia8s) population, the most homogenous in the Common­ wealth, was almost 99 per cent of British Isles extraction,In addi­ tion to all this there was cognisance of the precarious position of the

British in the Far East, Even at heme.* Australians had economic problems. Still in the

grip of the 1929 depressions the Australians were looking for markets for their wool and wheat„ "At few points in the inter=w@r period were 12 economic motives so greatly to the fore as in 1931 and during 1932. Collectively, these factors caused a great deal of caution in Australian

policy toward Japan, This viewpoint was echoed in British official cir­

cles, During the Sino-Japanese dispute, fear and reluctance to antag­

onize a valuable customer^ were to be a conditioning factor of Australian

policy (see chart below).

To avoid war became the keynote of Australian policy. As her anx­

ieties increased, Australia should have been able to appeal for aid to

either the British Commonwealth or the League of Nations, Australia, as

one of the Dominions, was fortunate in her membership in two world-wide

groups. The League gave Australia the opportunity of public expression.

This organization with its idealistic aims was supported wholeheartedly by Australia.

12.Carter, eg. cit.» p. 137.

S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce Yearbook 1935 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1935), p. 318.... Percentage of [Australia8 s] Total Trade with Principal Countries General Imports General Exports Country 1930- 1931” 1932- 1933"" 1930= 1931- 1932- 1933- 1931 1932 1933 1934 1931 1932 1933 1934 Wnited States 18.8 i c r ^ 13.2 3=3 2 ©1 X e4 2.2 France 2.5 2.6 2.1 1.6 7=5 4.8 6.2 5=8 Germany 3=3 3.2 3=2 3=2 5=9 4.1 5=2 8.4 United Kingdom 38 A 39; 5.. 41 A 43.5 43=9 49=5 47.6 47=3 Japan 3=9 5 A 6.2 6.2 1,6 12.2 11.8 12.3 2?

Bat when it eame t© a question of seearity for themselves9 none of the Dominions could, feel that the league was an adequate sub­ stitute for the Commonwealth connection, „ „ , In generalc offi­ cial opinion in Australia tended to feel that it was unrealistic to attempt to apply the League system to the Pacific area and that the sooner this was realized and changes made in the League structure to accord with reality, the better for the League itself as well as for its members in that area. For behind . ^Australian and British anxiety lurked the fear that the League might take active measures against Japan which would leave Great . Britain and Australia with the responsibility of carrying them ©ut,-L

International tensions increased in magnitude as the inadequacies of the League became more obvious. According to Lord Hankey, n„ , , of all attempts to stop war or nip it in the bud perhaps the most tragic failure was that, of the League of Nations , , . which achieved no more than a few minor successes, and never once succeeded in mustering an In­ ternational Force against any of the aggressor states in the troubles that broke out in every continent between the two great wars.

Many world leaders regarded the League6 s endeavors to solve inter­ national problems with, a mixture of hopefulness and optimism. For them, the memory of the last war was etched painfully on their minds. Others did not see the successes of the League and were quick to predict its failure, These people pointed to the situation in East Asia to substan­ tiate their claims, Rather than averting a major war, they felt the

League had laid the foundation for future problems by not being able to force Japan to remove her troops and relinquish her claims on Manchuria,

Other examples of the League8s defeat occurred when the League failed to stop Italy8s conquest of Ethiopia, Italy8s defiance of her obligations

■^Carter, on, eit.„ p. 100,

-L%ankey, op, eit,, p,124 to the League coupled with Geraanyfs reoeeupation of the Rhineland and

Britainrs reluctance to act, crippled any action that the League might have wished to take. From these two defeats sprang others until8 as these pessimistic observers were only too happy to point out, a tradi= tion of failure and defeat clung to the Geneva institution. "By 1937» the very frequency with which international crises filled the headlines had jaded many an appetite for sensation and bred a curious insensibility 1 A to war scares which amounted to boredom."

By reason of the grave situation throughout the world brought on by the failure of the League* the Imperial Conference of 1937 took on greater significance. Uppermost in the minds of all Australians was the security of the Pacific. With this in view* the Australian Prime Min­ ister* Lyons* introduced the idea of the Pacific Pact. This pact was to provide for nonaggression by the countries of the Pacific Ocean area.

Disputes* if they should occur* were to be settled around the peace table* rather than by armed force. Lyons8 purpose was probably to make certain that Japan did not gain control of the Philippines. The Pacific Pact failed, to materialize because of Japan’s aggressions against China and because the pact was labeled vague and unrealistic by Great Britain and lew Zealand.Although the Imperial Conference started out to be of little consequence* it grew beyond expectations. "The Imperial Conference in 1937 became in fact one of the decisive meetings in the history of the

l^Jaek Shepherd* Australia’s Interests and Policies in the Far-East (lew Yorks Institute of Pacifie'Relations* 1940)* p. 76.

17carter* op. eit., p. 272. Commonwealths, not because of any formulation of theoretical principles

; . » but because it united its participants in an awareness of common danger."^® The vital question of whether the Dominions could depend on

Great Britain in ease of an unprovoked attack was answered in the affirm­ ative, Howeverg other questions, equally important, were left unanswered.

The most important of these was how to diminish or eradicate the danger of an outbreak of general war.

From the fall of .1937 to the spring of 1939» the British govern­ ment, with the tacit and sometimes explicit support of Australian, Canadian, and South African governments, followed the road of ap­ peasement, The premise on which it was based was that many aims of the aggressive powers were legitimate. The hope behind it was that if they were satisfied, the urge to conquest would disappear. To yield a little to avoid war became the m a x i m , 9

There were many reasons for following this line of thinking. The position of Great Britain was relatively much weaker in the years 1936-1939 than from 19U-1914. With the advent of air power the age-old barrier of the English Channel could no longer be counted upon.^® Britain8s European enemies were much stronger at this period than in the early 19@0ss, In addition to this, her allies were few in number and weaker than in the earlier period. In the Far East the situation was equally grim, if not more so, for the reason that Japan, in 1936» had denounced the agreements concerning naval limitations and restrictions on fortifying bases. With the United States retiring into isolation. Great Britain was greatly han­ dicapped, Although the Imperial Conference of 1937 served to unite the

Dominions around Great Britain, this was not much solace as conditions worsened throughout the world. . An iaerease in armaments prodaetion was evident thromghoat the overseas Bomimioms and Great Britain. Behind this build-u.p was the un-= easiness broaght on by reeent events smeh ass the See.ond Sin©»»Japanese War» the XiaXe-Ethiopian eonfliet9 the Leagues intervention into @a@h and subsequent failure.,.and Germany"s potentially ^aggressive" poliey in rearmament and remilitarisation* It was not until lareh of If39 s> with annexation of Czechoslovakia, that the British Government realised that her appeasement policy had failed*^

At this time almost all eountries intensified their,programs of rearmament for their own defense* Among the overseas Dominions, the two which might expect to have their safety jeopardized were Australia and lew

Zealand/ Australian defense, according to the Government, was to be„ founded on an efficient and powerful Empire lavy, despite British warnings to the contrary* There were some Australians who felt that the primary needs was to prepare to defend Australia it self rather than its trade ,, routes* While the Great Powers watched Europe, Australia8s eyes were on

Japan* She reasoned that Japan, feeling secure with the Anti-Cominfern

Pact and' her successes against China8 would precipitate a war in the Pa« eifio at the same moment a war started in Europe. Australia8 $ anxieties increased until the event she had hoped t© avoid happened*

2 X :■ - 1 _ a’ ' Ibid.* p. 285, % e British Government "then undertook a sudden and startling reversal of traditional policy. Limited liability confined to Western Europe was replaced by large-scale commitments in Eastern Europe extended under the view that European peace was indivisible. That these heroic measures failed ultimately to keep the peace does not indicate that they were basically unsound but rather that they were undertaken to© late. The tragedy of the years immediately preceding the outbreak ©f war was that most public opinion within democratic countries did not become convinced of fhl© necessity of a firm stand Against the fascist powers until the moment had passed when a stand could be effective." ©a September 1, 19399 with, the German invasion of Poland, World War II was begun. One hour after the British declaration, on September 3» the Australian Federal Executive Council approved a proclamation that Aus­ tralia. was in a state of war with Germany. "The prompt declaration that

Australia was at war was accepted without demur from any significant quarter in Australia„"22 The statement of war made by the Prime Minister of Australia, Menaies, was broadcast over the air and then appeared in the

Commonwealth Gazette the night of September 3° To declare war was a very real decision rather than just an act of "rubber stamping" the declaration made by the British Government, In World War I, as a member of the Brit­ ish Empire, Australia had been included automatically when King George V declared war. But some constitutional charges had taken place and Aus­ tralia now had an independent voice „ However, the gravity of the deci­ sion can be judged by virtue of Ireland8s decision to remain neutral.

Consequently, Menaies wanted it known that Australia was in complete agree­ ment with the declaration made by Chamberlain, He sent a message to

Chamberlain stating that if the Crown was at war, than Australia, as a

©©minion of the British Commonwealth, was also at war. It was

believed that a decisive show of united strength was likely to prove important in rallying resistance to the latest German en­ croachment , while to allow delay over constitutional niceties and to invite arguments as to whether Australia should or should not go to war would only weaken the number of adherents to a cause which the great majority of Australians supported, A prompt and decisive entrance into the war was necessary in order to leave no doubts at home and to hearten the other allies of the British Commonwealth,23 32 Australia’s industries were so well-developed at the beginning of the war in 1939 that it was possible for her to begin the production of munitionss not only for the Australian Air Force, Wavy, and Array, but also for the other members of the British Commonwealth of Nations and allieso

The part that Australia was to play in World War II must never be minimized.

Not only did she feed, clothe, and equip her own troops, she "played a very big part in meeting the requirements of the British and Allied forces in gk the Near East, Middle East and Far East," At the outbreak of the war in

September, the Australian government agreed to raise a special service force of 20,@00 men hmd to build an air force of 10,400 pilots, 13,000 air crews and 20,000 to 30*000 ground staff. She was destined to supply much more than this,

Australia had long considered Singapore to be her umbilical cord to the protection of the Commonwealth, and at the same time her Achilles8 heel. She felt that as long as Singapore stood, so could she.

By the time of the First World War British expansion to south-east Asia had reached its maximum extent, Burma, Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Brunei, and Sarawak were under British control whether as colonies or protected states, and this situation remained un­ changed between the wars until the Japanese onslaught destroyed in a few months a position which had taken many centuries to build. The inter-war period therefore represents the climax of Britain’s eastward expansion , -5

©f these British possessions in southeast Asia, none was more important to the British than Singapore, the gateway to the Pacific, As early as 1921

2^1, J, Timperley, Australia And the Australians (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942), p, 8,

25saul Rose, Britain and Southeast Asia (Londons Ghatto and Windus, 1962), p. Si, 33 the idea of a fleet stationed at Singapore had been considered. That year the British Cabinet approved a proposal made by the Committee of

Imperial Defense to establish a base at Singapore capable of maintaining a battle fleet. This same idea had been suggested earlier by Admiral

Jellieoe in 1 9 1 9 However, his plans had called for a .powerful naval force which neither the British Government nor the Dominions were pre­ pared to undertake. In 1921 there had been some talk of Sydney as a pos­ sible naval base. Neverthelessa the Board of Admiralty preferred Singapore because it would serve as a refuelling station between Ceylon and Aus­ tralia. Singapore was al4.o closer to Burma, India, and the Persian Gulf.

In addition to this, Singapore had a strong natural strategic position and had long been the focal point for trade. To stave off any complaint from other powers, Britain issued the statement that the base was directed against no one in particular that rather it was simply a matter of in­ creasing the efficiency and economy of the navy.

"The construction of the naval base at Singapore exemplifies many of the hollow assumptions and narrow outlooks of the makers, of policy in 27 Great Britain between the Wars." Their policy was extremely inconsistent and proved to be unreliable. An example of this is provided by the de­ cision made by the Labor Government in 1924. In the face of opposition from Australia tad New lealand, the British government decided to suspend work on the Singapore project on the grounds of economy and as a contribu­ tion to disarmament. Again in 1928-29, when the matter came up for

^Robin Hghmam, Armed Forces in Peacetime (Londons G, T„ Foulis and Company, Limited, 1962), p. ,2?1.

27lbid. consideration it was resolved by the Conservatives, this time, to suspend work. This was justified, in the minds of those making policy, by the as== sumptien that it was highly unlikely that Britain would be involved in any armed conflict in the next ten years, Australian thinking on this matter was also at fault for ^instead of Canada, New Zealand, and Australia help™ ing to maintain a Far Eastern Fleet of at least 1@ battleships, thus match™ ing Japan*s force, the Royal Navy and its potential partners were busy mothballing their ships, Four months after the Japanese invasion of Manehuria (September 18,

I93I 9) riots broke out in Shanghai, In order to quell these riots, a Japanese naval force was landed there, "These actions caught Britain off guard and she did nothing for fear of provoking a major Far Eastern war,"^

The next blow to the Singapore strategy was administered in 1935 by the conclusion of the Anglo-Serman Naval Agreement, “This agreement permitted

German naval building up to 35 per cent of British strength, which meant that henceforth the greater part of the British fleet would have to be kept 30 in home waters to meet this danger,'* In the light of the emergence of a potentially hostile Germany, matters regarding Singapore were being subordi­ nated and Britain6s strategic eyes were now focused on Europe,

As the issue of Singapore became one of controversy and mixed empha­ sis, Australia began to form a foreign policy. In the 192©8s and 193©ffs

Australia8s policy was not much more than an extension of that of Great

Britain, True, she sometimes deviated from the set course, but this was 35 not often a determined, act of opposition. Australian poliey hung on one realizations while the Pacific was an area of importance to Great Britain, it wags only secondarys whereas, to Australians it was an area of vital in­ terest, of direct immediate peril, and of special responsibility. “By

1936 it was still convenient, but no longer accurate, to write of am im­ perial or Commonwealth foreign or defense policy. There was no longer a common policy? the Commonwealth was an association of autonomous states each of whom was separately responsible for making its own policies. It is true that the United Kingdom remained the predominant partner both in influence and in actual power? . . 31 ©f course, the geographical posi­ tion of Australia made the decisions of foreign policy rather precarious.

She felt that it was necessary, and indeed it was, for her to have a strong, dependable naval power behind her. In this case, the power she relied upon was Great Britain. This, in turn, involved the United Kingdom in the issues of the Pacific as well as Europe. With the conclusion of the Anglo-German

Maval Agreement and in the face of Italian aggressions, Australians real­ ized their extreme vulnerability in the event that Japanese aggression should coincide with European aggression. “Widely expressed doubts about the ability of the Royal Wavy to retain control of the Mediterranean in a war with Italy served at least to dispel some illusions about the margin of

British resources that would be available in the Pacific should the United

Kingdom become engaged in war against Germany and Italy.Therefore, a foreign policy was, more or less, thrust upon Australia, through circum­ stances rather than intention, as she realised that the primary interests

^Mansergh, op. eit., p. 56. ^I b i d ., p. 15?. of Great Britain and herself were net identical„ .therefore,, in 1936,' dne to the aforementioned events and the denuneiation of the Washington naval treaty by Japan (1935) and Japan*s subsequent fortification of her mandated islands, Amstralian foreign policy became a distinct reality. Now this policy was to revolve aromnd the continued Japanese naval superiority in the western Pacific which made invasion of the Australian mainland a def­ inite threat, “Its effect was to deepen Australian concern with the safe­ guarding of imperial communications8 to encourage the government to explore the possibility of some new agreement to maintain peace in the Pacific s and above all to focus. attention on the need to strengthen imperial defense „l,5^

In 1936, a definite Australian foreign policy, was being formulated. She insisted, for instance, on being represented separately at the Montreux

Conference which was called to discuss the stability of the Near East,

From the Australian point of view, the most important accomplishment was the signing of the Anglo-Egyptiam treaty, Australia played a positive role because she was vitally interested in the security of the Empire com­ munications through Suez, As long as the line of communications remained open, Australia felt that she would be safe.

It was announced by the Chiefs of Staff in 1937 that if Britain were faced with a war against. Japan, Germany, and Italy, with her only ally be­ ing France, the security of the Wnited Kingdom and of Singapore would be the keystones upon which the British Commonwealth of Nations would base its survival. Thus, making this decision, they began to determine the strength.of.Singapore. No longer could Singapore be regarded as a primary

33ibid, :' : ./ . \ 37 base for the British fleet a The Admiralty told, the Cabinet that it eould not defend Singapore unless the Royal Navy were raised to the three-power standard with eight battleships in the Far Bast. The policy now became that of stationing at Singapore, as soon as possible after the beginning of war with Japan, a fleet strong enough at least to maintain a defensive position and to serve as a deterrent against any threats to British in­ terests in the Far East. In Londons, Japan was presumed to be the enemy, but there was also the supposition that Britain would not be called upon to fight simultaneously there and in Europe. Therefore, the main fleet eould always move to Singapore in time. However, the possibility of Italy intervening in the war was acknowledged. If such a thing occurred, this would cause conflicting claims on the fleet. “In that situation, policy would have to be governed by the principle that no concern for British interests in the Mediterranean should be allowed to interfere with the dispatch of a fleet to the Far East. This order of priorities remained unaltered and unquestioned until 1939= The Australians received great encouragement and relief when the announcement came from Prime Minister Chamberlain that if Great Britain

should be engaged in a war with Germany, Italy, and Japan, the British in­ tended to send a fleet to Singapore. “The size of the fleet would neces­

sarily depend on the moment when Japan entered the war and what losses, if

any, had been previously sustained. It would, however, be Britain's in­ tention to achieve three main objectives:

1. The prevention of any major operations against Australia, New

Zealand or India.

3^Rose, op. eit.. p. 85. 2<> To keep open Britain*s sea eemmunieations„

3= To prevent the fall of Singapore,,®^

In October of the same year,, i&en World War II had already begmn9 the

First Lord of the Admiralty a Winston Churchill 8 gave the same priority to the defense of Singapore» These grandiose words of assurance helped to

bolster the confidence of the Australians in their plight in the Pacific,

However9 it would be well to sum up, at this point, the huge defense eom= mitments of the United Kingdom, To begin with, the United Kingdom under­ took the overall defense of the Empire, In regard to the army commitments this meant the maintenance of line forces in the principal coloniesg pro­ tectorates, and mandates, the garrisoning of focal strategic points throughout the Empire9 and a huge responsibility for the defense of India,

Britain8s principal commitments in the colonial field involved stationing forces in Gibraltar, Cyprus, Malta, Jamaica, Bermuda, Mauritius, Ceylon,

Aden, Malaya, and Hong Kong, Local volunteers were expected to supple­ ment her forces. Also certain non-British territories were protected by the United Kingdom (due to treaty or concession rights): the Sudan,

Palestine, Egypt, and Irag in the Middle East, and Shanghai and Tientsin in the Far East, In regard to naval commitments. Great Britain was even more strained. The loyal Navy was to provide general sea security to the scattered dominions, to India, and to the Gdlonies, The dominions con­ tributed toward the defense of many of the most important of the British naval bases such ass Halifax, Exquimalt, Singapore, Gibraltar, Malta, Hong Kong and the ports of Ireland,3^

35lbid, 3%ansergh, op, eit,, pp, 75=77 39 When,Germany attacked Poland in If39 there Has a feeling of unity among, all Australians in their declaration of war against this r

Hitlerite aggression. The first concern ©f the Australians was to make certain that home defense measures Here capable of meeting any possible threat» ®But after the first fortnight of war it was difficult for either the Government or its critics to find clear evidence that any im­ mediate threat existed« For the moment Japan showed no hostile intention and the British Mavy and Singapore were still accounted a considerable force 0 o o «> Where could Australia act with the most effectiveness?

Could she risk sending troops overseas when the situation in the Far

East was unsettled? Clearlys during the “twilight war,* Australia could not see where to fight„^ There was much to confuse Australians but very little to challenge or inspire them, "For over 20 years one half of organized political opinion in Australia had been declaring that there . must be no participation in a war in Europe,"^ How they were in such a war and had not decided upon the method or the extent to which Australia should take part.

The political situation in Australia, at this time, was anything but stable, The three main political parties represented in the Aus­ tralian Parliament were the United Australian Party (U,A,P,), the

Australian Labour Party (A,L,P0), and the Country Party, Menzies, a mem­ ber of the U,A,Po, became Prime Minister in April, 1939, on the death of

J, A, Lyons, This party was founded in If31 by a fusion of a labor group

3?Hasluek, op, eit,„ p, 157,

38lbid,. p, 158, 39ibid,. p. If?, 40 under J„ A» Lyons m t h the Nationalist Party, Generally speaking9 this party favored tariff paroteetioa, national development and wage determi­ nation by governmental action. The W„A,P, won its first election in 1931 but lacked the necessary support to govern alone in the next two elec­ tions, The 1934- and 1937 election figures made coalition with the Country

Party a necessity. Page, as leader of the Country Party, thus shared the reins of government. With Menzies as Prime Minister, and under the pres­ sure of World War.‘11, a coalition was eventually devised with the Country Party. However, this coalition did not work as smoothly as others since

Menzies did not enjoy the same confidence as Lyons. Consequently, rela­ tions between Menzies and some of his supporters were strained.

The Country Party was founded in 1919 to defend agrarian interests.

The Party has worked for protection for the farmer by means of special aid, in addition to protection to industry and labor. Although the Country

Party was critical of certain aspects of the tariff, this had not hampered the party from cooperating with the W.A.P.

The Opposition Party at this time was the Labour Party, led by

John Curtin. The largest and most cohesive group that was contending for power, this party was dedicated to the creation of a society where all could live the "good life.* Protection and labor legislation were re­ garded as the means of making this possible. Marxian ideas played but little part in its thought and activity. As the oldest of these three political groups. Labour was very early articulate and powerful. The party, under the direction of John Curtin, who had rebuilt it after its landslide loss in 1931, was again in the public8s eye. "Even when the Labour party is mot in offiee it possesses tremendous influence and is able to prevent any startling deviations from its policies, "The fact that a running narrative of Australian political his­ tory contains little reference to clash between rival parties over essen­ tial principle is significant« As has been indicated, in theory$, a fundamental difference in basic philosophy between the Labour, the W.A.Pe, and the Country Party does exists Whereas Labour has: a socialist objec­ tive, to which its parliamentary representatives were pledged, the other two parties stood "for reasonably free enterprise in a not excessively . ■ h Z controlled society3h practice,, the approach of any Australian gov­ ernment to any major issue, foreign or domestic, has been more on the advice of officials and experts who are retained in offiee irrespective of change of governments than by its party polities. It is usually.the,: "swing voters" who decide whether a government will survive or fall,

"More than 40 per cent of voters unshakably vote Labour$ more than 40 per cent, equally unshakably, vote for the other parties. It is to the com­ paratively small residue of voters who make up their minds from election to election that the elaborate apparatus of Australian campaigns is directed,

Although the existence of a state of war was accepted as a fact.

Parliament now had to deal with the question of how to raise, train, and

Hartley Grattan, "The Australian Political Seesaw," Current History (January 1933)$, p» 434,. . ~ ,

Gollam, "Australian Party Polities," Australia, ed, C Hartley Grattan (Los Angeless University of California Press, 1947), p, 115, organise the Australian armed forces. There occurred between Measles and Gurtin8 as leaders of their respective parties8 heated debates on these subjects. Measles felt that it was the role of Australia to help the British Commonwealth in every way possible* including sending troops abroad to any theatre suggested by the Prime Minister of Great Britain.

His view had to be tempered* however* by Labour8s opposition to eoaserip- tion and to expeditionary forces. Curtin would clearly prefer to see the Aal.F. (Australian Imperial Force) near home with the main body stationed in the north of Australia.

. . a Curtin8s conception of the great danger to Australia was that it might find itself involved in a Pacific war unprepared and unsupported, Knowing full well that the Australian people would not support defenseless isolation* he declared that over­ seas developments forces Australia to rely more and more upon its own resources and that therefore air power* founded on Aus­ tralia 8s own industrial resources* offered the only feasible programme for defense. Ho one in Australia foresaw develop­ ments accurately* but.Curtin was proved by events to have had the clearest vision. Another member of the Opposition* Mr. Ward* more outspoken than Curtin* stated that those who advocated sending troops out of Australia were "either consciously or unconsciously guilty of a traitorous act. Against this type of discord* Measles stated on October 20* 1939s that "it must be made clear that there is no obligation for service abroad* except in the ease of a volunteer for such service."^ This announcement seemed to appease

Curtin and to satisfy the ©pposition. A clear distinction was drawn

^Lloyd Ross* "The Sole of Labour*" Australia, ed. C. Hartley Grattom (Berkeley: University of California Press* I#?)* p. 2*9. 43 teetmem the A=I0F» and the militia6 The AoIoF0 consisted of volunteers tdi© id,sheda and -were qualified9 to fight overseas; whereas the militia was strictly for home defense and consisted of men fulfilling their obli­ gation to their country at that time. The Government now made its first decision on the controversial issue by calling up the entire militia9 which could only serve within Australia. It was hoped that the militia, supplemented by volunteers, would meet the goal of Slowly, the

Mensies8 government, which favored immediate aid to England, won out, despite criticism of such a policy. A large body of public opinion was beginning to realize that the issue of sending forces overseas was rapidly moving beyond controversy. These people saw Australian participation in terms of raising troops to fight at Britain8s side. This, then, would necessitate sending troops overseas. The Labour Party soon realized that the citizens viewed the A.I.F. with such national pride and patriotism that it would be impossible to keep it at home when the war raged in

Europe.

A big decision had been made. The A.I.F. would go overseas, low the question was, "Where?" The debate continued in Parliament as Australia watched Hitler and tried to guess where he would strike next. In the back of Australian minds, the question lingered, "What would happen to the

Netherlands8 Indies if Holland were invaded?” Bather than make any decision on their own, the Australians seemed to be waiting for Germany's actions on which to base their conduct. The news that in Great Britain Chamberlain had given way to Churchill on May 1©, 1940, was taken less as an indication of serious state of affairs than as a ground for confidence in more de­ termined allied action. Australian eyes remained focused in Europe, "The rapid German advance through Holland and Belgium into France cheeked ep- tiaism'bat, day after day, there was still someone or other in Europe to he reported in the newspapers as saying something or other that sounded 47 • ''' ' yery knowing and very hopeful „ft , . . .. "

Within a short time, howevers the situation was anything but hope- fule The decision to plaee the cruisers Perth and Hobart and five de» , stroyers at the disposal of the'.Waited Kingdom Government had been made in Movember, lf3f0 However, the Australian government reserved the .con­ trol of all other ships in the loyal Australian Havy, But the deeision of where to send the was mueh more diffiemlt to arrive at. It took several more months of debates in addition to Ghurehill's persuasive words, to convince Parliament to send the A.I»$V t© the Middle .East, .

The fall of France on June I? marked a turning point in Australian thinking. In addition to the emotional effect, the fall of France and the attacks on Great Britain had other extensive effects on the Australians„

A western front manned by Britain and France had hitherto been the center of the war8 s pattern, „ , «, How the land front in the West had disappeared; the Allied naval forces had been greatly reducedi the Mediterranean had become a hazardous sea; Germany had gained Atlantic ports and with them a better chance of evading the block­ ade and of carrying aggression against Allied convoys; the British Isles, core of resistance to a conquering Germany,,had lost arms and equipment in France, was under attack, in daily prospect of invasion, and discomfited by under-water and over-water raids on her shippings Uncertainties in the Middle East had been further complicated by Vichy rule in Syria, while the eountrie s of south­ eastern Europe, where anti-Axis diplomacy had hinged on Anglo- French guarantees, were either seeking friendship with Germany or were disturbed by great fear of German attack. Italian entry into the war had brought an enemy into Horth Africa on the borders of Egypt, and into East Africa; Britain, new depending on her own fleet . alone, was left with Gibraltar and Malta, marking the way to Alexan­ dria And the Suez Canal as lonely rocks in a hostile sea. Palestine

WHasluck, op, eit., p. 211. and Egypt were no longer a convenient stage halfway to or from Europe but outposts„ not a barrier against the AxiggS© much as an exposed and precarious position to be defended»

For Australians the tone of the war had changed. In the light of the events in Europe and the Middle East* Australia„ Butch and French

colonies were cut off from the military aid they had relied upon, There

was no doubt now that Australia must act* and act in the best interest of

Great Britain, In answer to the public clamor for action* Menzies de­

clared that the war would be run in an entirely different way. On June

16* Menzies* in a broadcastg called for ^all-around sacrifice* unremitting toil and unflinching devotion** He went on t© say that Australia could

not depend on receiving help from Great Britain* but rather Australia might have to be ready to lend aid to Britain, He called for the Aus­ tralian Chiefs of Staff to meet to decide important issues. On August 23* 19W* they issued the report that in light of the assurances given by

Churchill stating that the defense of Singapore remained of primary im­ portance* and considering the recent events* the A,I,F, would be sent to the Middle East,

It should be noted that this decision was only made after very

careful assessment of the problem, Australian officials reasoned that

Japan would certainly try to take advantage of the recent successes of the German and Italian forces, While the Chiefs of Staff did not con­

sider war with Japan as necessarily impending* they did recognize that it must be very tempting to Japan to strike a sudden blow, "The security of imperial interests in the Far East depended upon Britain8s ability to 46 eontrol sea eemmuBleations-in the southwest Pacific 9 and that was eondi<= tional upon the presence of an adequate fleet based on Singapore. But with the French collapse this became impossible„ Therefore$ the pos­ sibility of a Japanese invasion could not be overlooked, Britain, nego­ tiating from a position of extreme weakness, had already agreed to close the Burma Road for a period of three months, from July 1? to October 18,

1940, The closing of the Burma Road stemmed from the fear on the part of

Great Britain that refusal might cause a Japanese onslaught on southeast Asia, It should be recorded that Churchill had frno greater faith in a policy of appeasement in the East than he had had earlier in the West,"5®

However, it was a way to buy time until the situation in the West had im­ proved to such an extent that he could deal with Japan, It was announced by the Australian Minister for External Affairs, McEwen, that the Aus­ tralian government had been in full consultation with the United Kingdom government on the subject.

As if to answer the nervousness of the Australian people, Churchill wrote another of his encouraging messages on August 11, 1940, In this one he told the Prime Ministers of Australia and lew Zealand that, ttIf , „ , contrary to prudence and self-interest Japan set about invading Australia and New Zealand on a large scale, I have the explicit authority of the

Cabinet to assure you that we should then cut our losses in the Mediter­ ranean and sacrifice every interest, except only the defense and feeding of this Island,Although this no doubt gave the Australians great

49^Mansergh, on. cit., p. 85, Ibid.. p. 87. 51Ibid.. p. 86. 4? confidence g GMrehill^s Chiefs of Staff did not see the picture in the same lighto They felt that, above all* it was necessary to keep sufficient naval forces in European waters to match both the Italian and German fleets. It was impossible to do this and send a fleet to the Far East also,

Churchill now summed up the position as he saw it.

There was no sign at this moment of any hostile action or in­ tent upon the part of Japan, The main preoccupation of Japan was naturally America, It did-not seem possible to me that the United States could sit passive and watch a- general assault by Japan upon all European establishments in the Far Easts even if they them­ selves were not for the moment involved. In this case we should gain far more from the entry of the United States8 perhaps only against Japan, if that were possible, than we should, suffer from the hostility of Japan, vexatious though it would be. On no ac­ count must anything which threatened in the Far East divert us from our prime objectives in Europe, We could not protect our interests and possessions in the Yellow Sea from Japanese attack. The fartherest point we could defend if Japan came in would be the fortress of Singapore, Singapore must hold out until the Mediter­ ranean was safe and the Italian Fleet liquidated,52

Churchill went on to state his optimism that Singapore, provided that it

was adequately garrisoned and supplied with food and ammunition, would be

able to hold out for six months. In which ease this would be enough time

to enable the British Fleet to reach Singapore and reinforce it. Therefore,

on this basis, Churchill assumed that as long as the British Havy remained undefeated, and Singapore remained in British hands, no invasion of Aus­

tralia And Hew Zealand by Japan would be possible,

Churchill and Menzies did not see the threat of Japan in the same

perspective, Churchill assured Menzies that any attack from Japan would

be in the nature of raids and seaborne air attacks against ports. However,

-^Churchill, op. eit,, pp. 416-417. 48 the Australians reasoned that one© the Japanese had gained possession of

the Netherlands1 East Indies, seized control of the air bases in Indo-

China and Thailand, and captured Singapore they would be free to wage a heavy attack on Australia» Again, the defense problem hinged on the ab­

sence or presence of the British fleet at Singapore = Although Churchill® s messages relieved some of the anxiety of a possible Japanese attack, the

defense of Singapore still remained of primary importance» Regardless,

there was no great desire to send troops to Singapore to await a prospec­

tive foe, rather the Australians wished to be of assistance to the entire

cause. Thus, a message was sent to which the United Kingdom replied,

that the major immediate threat to the Empire, outside the United Kingdom, was the Middle East and, after balancing the risks between the Middle East and Far East, the United Kingdom considered that the needs of the situation would be best met if the Seventh Division, equipped from local Australian resources on a modified scale, were sent direct to the Middle East, where it could complete its training more quickly than in Malaya, The War Cabinet readily approved this new proposal, , „ ,53

With the Burma Road closed, the balance tilting progressively

against Singapore, and with Australian troops being sent to the Middle

East Benzie's decided the situation was critical enough to warrant separate

action on the part of the Australian government„ On the 18th of August,

Sir John Latham was appointed as first Australian Minister to Japan. This

did not indicate a difference in attitudes of the two. governments toward

Japan but rather a desire on the part of Australia to have first-hand

knowledge of Japanese actions, News from the Far East had always gone

through the diplomatic channels of Great Britain before being sent to

-^lasluek, op. eit., p. 225. Australia„ This process was very slow and. often led to misunderstandings when British and Australian views did not entirely coincide. In an effort to coordinate Australian and American policies a minister was also named to the United States» The Australian government sent messages to all con­ cerned that these two appointments were not to be misconstrued in any way

(as) to imply a disassoeiation of Australian from United Kingdom policy.

According to lasluek, the appointment of Sir John Latham was the action of a government that still fervently hoped for peace with Japan and be­ lieved in the possibility.-^

With the reeleetion of Menzies to the Prime Ministership in Sep­ tember 19^0 came a continuation of the Government's policy. Menzies ap­ pointed a delegation to assess the position of Singapore and on November

25* 194-0» he informed the Advisory War Council of "the alarming position in regard to the defense of Singapore. The Burma Bead had already been reopened by the British (October 18) and now, mere than a month later,

Australians stepped up their requests for British reinforcements in Singa­

pore. There was general agreement among the top officials that Menzies

should go to London to talk about this and other matters with Mr. Churchill.

On December 1st the Australian government cabled the Dominions Office urging that immediate steps be taken to remedy the deficiencies in the army and air forces at Singapore in view of the inadequacy of the naval forces available. . . . On December 2nd the Australian War Cabinet agreed that Mr. Menzies should communicate with London about the possibility of basing three or four capital ships at Singapore as a deterrent to Japanese action in this region.56

But the ships and weapons that were requested simply were not available.

The lack of urgency and lack of adequate defense measures on the part of

^ I b i d ., p. 228. 3%&psergh, op. pit., p. 89. 56%bid. Britain served to heighten anxieties in Australia„ These anxieties can be seen in the increased number of visits by Menzies to London as.he at­

tempted to gain a larger role in making policy decisions involving the

Far East, With impending danger so near the Australian government hoped for the closest collaboration m t h Great Britain, But as John Curtin

stated, “collaboration meant something very much more than being informed

about developments,"^ Complaints to London increased as Australia felt

handicapped when not consulted on decisions that involved her security.

As conditions worsened in Europe, the strategic importance of Singapore touched bottom in Churchill’s thinking, Australia, aware of the fading

power of the British Commonwealth in the East, was even more conscious of the great superiority of the sea power of the Japanese, Her policy was

one of trying to tiptoe past danger and thus avoid the ugly events that might be waiting around the corner.

57lbid, u . s. s

OUTER . M 0 N C 0 L I A MANCHURIA '

Nonkinq

FOUMOSA

PH ILIPPIN E IS

^ . EQliATOP » / ZpV NETHERLANDS EAST"'! N D I E S

THE EAR EAST Darwin

O 200 600 1200 MIIES

©CASSELL A CO LTD l» 6 1 ' British Possessions

Figure 2 British Commitments in the Far East CHAPTER .111

AMERICA, BRITAIN, AND PACIFIC SECURITY

The war raged, on in Europe, yet the Ameriean people refused to consider any proposals for action in the defense of the European democ- raci.eso This policy of isolationism had been in existence for a consid­ erable'length of time. The Americans simply did not want to get involved in European affairs. They were aware that Fascism and Nazism were growing, Regardless, Americans, beguiled by the arguments of many re­

spected public figures, believed that the best way to deal with the aggressors was to stay away from them and concentrate on the problems within their own country, "The idealism which had once made Americans eager to save the world now made them turn their backs on it. The Dem­ ocratic majority in Congress carried a series of measures which made it impossible for the United States to play any part in world affairs? and

President Roosevelt accepted these measures without any sign of dis- agreement," To understand this feeling that had developed in the

American mind, it is necessary to go'back to 1935=

"By 1937, public opinion polls indicated that a large majority

of Americans believed our participation in the First World War had been

■^Taylor, op, elt., p. 66.

52 a mistake» The prevalent aversion to foreign involvement and the deter- mined opposition to any form of politieal or military eommitment fomnd their most eloquent expression in the effort to insure the United States against being d r a m into another eonfliet,, that is, in the extraordinary neutrality legislation of the years of 1935=1937 %hich represented a startling break from the traditional adherence to established interna­ tional l a w . There is no finer example of this than the response of the

American people to President Roosevelt$s Quarantine Speech given October

5» 1937s la Chicagoo The President, realizing the American sympathy for the Chinese and aware of Japan^s violation of international agreements, called for collective security» But the response to his speech was not as he anticipated. For a #strong and country-wide protest, among

Democrats as among Republicans,^ was heard. This speech was such a complete departure from isolationism that it could be said that the

Americans were not ready for it. Said Roosevelt, *Wbrld lawlessness is spreading. When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community. . , . joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community.^ In the face of such disapproval, Presi­ dent Roosevelt shelved his plans for the moment, although he was convinced that America could not stand completely aloof from the world problems, A

2w, hanger and S, Gleason, The Challenge of Isolation, (lew York Harper Brothers, 1952) p. 14. . 54 few months after the Quarantine Speech9 Americans were awakened to the realization of the explosive nature of international affairs„ In De­ cember, 1937» the UoSoSo Panay was attacked by the Japanese» This event

served as an ominous warning that even the American people a despite their isolationist policy., might be drawn into world affairs e

In the wake of the uneasiness that continued to increase* the

President* on October 11* 1938* announced an increase in the budget of

$300*000*00# for the purpose of national defense„ It became his objec­ tive* from this date forward* to build a huge air force and develop* more fully* plane-production facilities« Still* the Japanese persisted and the Americans did nothing„ Under our existing neutrality laws* there was nothing to prevent foreign powers from buying munitions from the

United States as long as they paid cash* However* once the President recognized a power as a belligerent* the sale of such materials was for­ bidden* Therefore* at the time of Hitler8s march on Czechoslovakia * in mid-March* 1939» our neutrality laws were unchanged. However* the dramatic feature was the attitude on the part of Americans of the ^continuous and almost unanimous opposition to any involvement in another war,w^

Regardless whbther the United States wanted to become involved in a war or not*.she was being drawn closer to it each day. So far* however* the State Department issued verbal disapproval and held back from taking more drastic steps. The verbal protests were lodged against the Japanese in their occupation of the Spratly Islands (March 31» 1939)

5lbid,. p, 51o and their bombings of American properties in China„ Then, as Hitler8s ag­

gression increased, in defiance of Roosevelt8s message, the President,

on April 15s 1939$ ordered the Fleet, which had been centralised in the

Atlantic for maneuvers, to return, t© San Diego, its regular base. This

move was in direct response to the increasingly critical world situation.

The Americans hoped that a major conflict could be avoided, still refus-

. ing to admit to themselves that such a conflict might include them. But,

whereas they were not willing to fight overseas, they were willing to

accept any measures thought essential for national or hemisphere defense.

This was indicated "when President Roosevelt called for a half a billion

dollar military bill on April 26, 1939 «■ One month later, he called for

a naval supply bill of three-quarters of a billion dollars. Beth bills

were voted through promptly and by big margins. The public was in com­

plete agreement with the President that "the Western Hemisphere should 6 remain a strong citadel wherein civilization might flourish unimpaired.®

The American Fleet was becoming a subject of considerable inter­

est throughout the world. As it lay off the coast of San Diego, much

conjecture from many quarters was heard. Lord Halifax, British Foreign

Secretary, had suggested on March 21, 1939$ that if the Fleet were called

back to home base, Australia^ anxieties would be somewhat diminished for

the time being. But with the Italian occupation of Albania, the French

Government became extremely anxious. For at this moment, the British let

their alleged intention be known; that is, to send part of their Fleet to 56 the Far Easts therefore cutting down the number of ships in the Mediter­

ranean,, Then Roosevelt decided that the United States Fleet would be sent to the Pacific for the purpose of lightening the pressure upon the British.

Since the President and his military advisers shared in the view that it was more important to hold the Mediterranean than to strengthen the defenses of the Far East, this agreement was very satisfactory to both parties® The appearance of the United States Fleet in the Pacific, in all probability, made a deeper impression on the Tokyo Government than all the dispatches, notes, and protests of the preceding months.?

The United States War Department had regarded the Philippines as a military liability since Japan had acquired Germany *s Pacific islands in

1919«> Until the mandated islands were reduced, the United States was in no position to fight a war in the Far East, Therefore, the War Department was in complete agreement with the patient and cautious policy of the

State Department toward Japan, Even a cautious buildup in a place like

Guam might be misinterpreted by the Japanese. Just as the United States was careful to avoid upsetting Japan, the latter seemed desirous of improv­ ing relations with the United States in mid-May of 1939° The United States was not the only power that hoped for friendly relations with Japan,

Both Great Britain and France felt that with war likely to erupt in

Europe, it was beyond consideration for them to accept Japan*s challenge in the Far East.

Public clamor went up from all sides as the Japanese assaults

7lbid., p. 10*. continued, and we were still trading with Japan. fi!It is impossible to emphasize to© foreefmlly that Japan was dependent on the. United States for the great hulk of its vital imports notably of scrap iron and petro= leuflu There .was no way in which Japan,, if deprived of this trade, could Q long continue military operations, even in China.*® Considering this fact, it was not unreasonable to ask why the United States was continu­ ing to aid the Japanese onslaught against the Chinese and Europeans.

Some Americans regarded the policy of their own government as immoral, while others supposed it was pressured by heartless business interests„9

In reaction to the events in the Far East, Mr, Hull, United States

Secretary of State, issued warnings to the Tokyo Government concerning the situation in Tientsin and the Japanese bombings of Chung-king,

However, the warnings had very little effect on the Japanese. Finally, the step was taken that satisfied, to a large degree, the American people 0 On July 26, 1939, President Roosevelt announced that he was giving six monthsr notice that the Japanese treaty would be revoked and economic sanctions would be imposed if the Japanese actions continued.

This statement was cheered in many quarters. Public opinion was satis­ fied, The British and Chinese were bound to be encouraged. And, most important, it served notice to the Tokyo Government that America had no intention of weakening. As ever, the American people were much more willing to take a strong position against Japan than against Germany. Then the M g news eame« On August 23$ 1939$ the Hazi-Soviet Paet was announced„ This pact necessarily started a new phase in Japanese policy$ her present one having been completely upset by the

Paet0 It should be remembered that Russia was Japan8s traditional

enemy and by September, 1939, they were engaged in what could be called undeclared war on the Manchurian borderHowever9 for the moment9 -

all eyes were focused on Europe „ When war broke out the President made

it clear that he was in favor of the sale to the Allies of anything and

everything they needed in their war effort „ within the bounds of the

neutrality legislations According to the Gallup polls of October 23,

1939, about 62# of the population favored all possible assistance to the

Allies short of war."^" The President$ his advisors, and the majority of

Americans were in agreements

At this juncture, the Japanese announced that they would eon- eentrate on settling the "China Incidents" The new Abe Cabinet seemed to put forth a concerted effort to clear up the entire matter of China,

As long as the Japanese armies were occupied in China, the chances of

their expanding to the north or south were extremely unlikely. In fact,

the question in the minds of those in charge of the Japanese Government

was not possible conquests beyond China, but how to ward off the threat

of economic sanctions by America which could come due January, 19#,

Attempts to settle the problem were suggested by the British, who felt

IGlbid,, p, 293e 11Ibid., p, 288, that concessions should be made by both China and Japan, However» the

United States Government stated that any agreement that gave Japan a

special, military or oeonomie position would be completely "eat of the question, Welles insisted ffon equality of opportunity for all nations in Chinao" T? Herein a precarious situation developed. The United

States remained firm and in doing so created a definite problem. For the Japanese Cabinet never considered giving up their dream of a Greater

East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and even if they had considered such an idea, they probably could not have stopped the army. Whereas the prin­ ciples set up by the United States were unacceptable„ the Japanese did feel the threat of economic sanctions, *It was a formidable threat indeed; and it may safely be assumed that if, in the autumn of 1939» the 8phony war8 in Europe was not followed by real war in the Far East, the firm position of the American Government more than anything else served as an effective deterrent,0^

The situation in the Far East was momentarily forgotten as

Hitler8s armies swept through the Low Countries (in the spring of 194-®).

The shock experienced by the Americans was tremendous. Previous military plans were fast becoming obsolete as the German victories mounted up. So far. Hitler was doing all the scoring and the Allies could only be given half a chance of victory. This «, o obei%% the ease 9 it is obviems that the United States was not in a position to act effectively even if forced to defend itself against unprovoked attack« Though he ^Roosevelt} had long talked of the need for building thousands of planes and.of greatly expands ing airplane production facilities9 it appeared likely that what he had had in mind was for the United States to supply Britain and France with the planes needed to cheek Nasi aggression without actually involving the United States in the struggle. In general one must conclude that he overrated the capabilities of Britain and France . . .

In l^##, two themes were of extraordinary importance^, thus over­ shadowing all others. Number one was to put the national defenses in order as quickly as was possible. Number two was to do everything with­ in our limits to save France and Britain from destruction. In connection with the first theme 9 it was felt the navy was equal to the immediate task and in much better condition than the army. With the feeling of reliance on the navy, eyes turned toward the question of the air program.

The program was found lacking and consequently it was doubled and *3@0@ additional fighter planes were ordered at once, to encourage the construc­ tion of new plants.”3-5 The role of the army was even more complex due to so many demands on it However 9 it was decided that the army8 s program was to be confined to the defense of the nation for one year. In addi­ tion to this would be the defense of the Western Hemisphere with the possibility of protective occupation of European possessions in the

l^Ibid.. Po 471.

15lbid., p.

l^Ibid., p; 4?5. "’Great concern was expressed about a possible Nazi-inspired revolution in Brazil, disorders in Mexico, Japanese aggres­ sion against the United States, and the likelihood of a German victory over Britain and France, followed by a Nazi attack on the Western Hemi­ sphere. It would be patently impossible to send American forces to the Far East, South America and Europe simultaneously, or even to two of the three areas, without seriously dividing the forces.% 61

Western Hemisphere if the situation demanded it. When it came to draw­

ing the line behind which the United States would stand, it was decided that America could not afford to get involved with Japan or extend her­

self beyond the 1 8 0 ^ meridian, but that she should expend her efforts

on the situation in South America. The second theme caused great anxiety in the American public when it became apparent that Britain and France were in grave danger.

There was no doubt in anyonefs mind that Britain and France were in > truth the first line of defense between Hitler and America. It seemed logical that the line of effective defense was to support the Allies

so that they could hold out. This theme began to merge with the first theme, that of national defense. The clamor for preparedness reached

a fever pitch as the Allies met defeat after defeat, Eyen the unpree-

edentedly large appropriations by Congress did not quiet the public.

The President8 s program of a step-up in national defense was warmly

received. If he was criticized at all, it came from those who felt he was not moving swiftly enough.

On May 15, 19#, Ambassador Kennedy, after a long meeting with Churchill, reported to President Roosevelt that the Prime Minister was convinced that England would be attacked within a month. Therefore, the need for American aid was immense. Kennedy, however, advised the

President that if aid was given to England that "the United States would be left holding the bag in a war in which the Allies expected a beating."

Kennedy asked Churchill to state what kind of aid he expected since the

United States Fleet was in the Pacific, the Army was quite unprepared, 62 and the United States didn8t have enough planes for„her own requirements.

Ohmrehill8s response was for thirty or forty destroyers and aigr planes that could be spared. He then offered the best assurance he could give„ that iss England would never give up (as long as he remained in power) and if necessary would move to Canada and take the British Fleet and fight on. He ended his message by stating that he looked to the United

States to keep the Japanese quiet„ So the President knew the grave situation from the very beginning, Churchill had asked a great deal of him and the United States. Not only were they to give as well as sell planes9 destroyersg and other supplies but the United States was asked to take the full responsibility of containing the Japanese. At this moments being so short of military supplies, there was very little the Americans could do. However, the public sensed that if the United

States were not moving toward a war, most surely the war was moving toward the United States,

It became increasingly difficult for Americans to remain neutral as the news reached them of more Nazi victories. The French were now thinking of ways to ease out of the scrape ,as best they could.

The British, throughout May, were putting the pressure on the United

States for aid. The President was very disturbed by these events, but his hands were tied. All he could do was to issue statements, most of them directed toward Mussolini in the vain hope of dissuading him from taking action. But Mussolini was not listening. After many meetings a change of policy was enacted. c o o Prior to Maya 1940a the Wnited States Governmeat had made n© eeimaitmenti had provided Be official assistamee. The decision to do so was taken only in the latter part of May, 1940, and then only in a small way and almost casually. The . question at that time was whether the War and lavy Departments should make available to the Allies a limited number ©f planes, and a- certain amount of artillery and ammunition. A list of surplus items had been drawn up and approved by the President. Thereby a principle had been established, which in the sequel was not further debated ©r. seriously challenged. But the commitment was a yet a narrow, specific one, altogether too insignificant to serve as the basis for a general policy. Actually, nothing of these transactions was revealed to the public. It still remained for the President to secure popular approval and support before the individual instance could be generalized as accepted policy.1?

In the light of European events in late May and early June ' . ' . . ; (Evacuation of Dunkirk-May 26^June 3, Italian declaration of war June

10, and the Fall of France): the American people were willing to back

the President in any move to support the Allies, short of war. As

early as June 1, 194©, President Roosevelt had sent orders to the War

and Navy Departments to draw up a list of those supplies that could be

spared for Britain. “By the end of the week more than six hundred

heavily loaded freight ears were rolling toward the Army docks at Raritan,

New Jersey, up the river from Srayesend Bay. Ry June 11 a dozen British merchant ships moved into the bay and anchored, and loading from light­

ers began. “3-8 Churchill had nothing but praise for Roosevelt for his

actions in this hour of need. Says Churchill ”. . . at that time it was a supreme act of faith and leadership for the Waited States to

17lbid., n. #3.

ISWinston S . Churchill„ Memoirs of the Second World War (Bostons Houghton Mifflin, 64 deprive themselves ©f this very considerable mass ©f arms for the sake

of a country which many deemed already beaten. "^9 For the United States

had left for herself the minimum requirement of equipment as stipulated by the American Army8s mobilization plan, that is, equipment for only

1,800,©00 men.

From April through July of 1940, European happenings commanded the attention of the Americans. In contrast, the Japanese activities almost paled into a forgotten war. luckily the situation was relative­ ly quiescent in Asia during the first half of 1940. Most Americans favored the termination of the commercial treaty with Japan and aid to

Nationalist China. By the spring of 194© the policy of supporting

Chiang Kai-shek8s Nationalist Government had been established in prin­ ciple . However, the difficulties in carrying out this program were extraordinarily great8 But, on March 7® 194©o a loan was made to China by the Export-Import Bank to the tune.of $20,000,000 which was to be repaid by the export of tin to the United States. On March 30, 1940, the Tokyo Government made the announcement establishing the Nanking

Government„ Certainly the Japanese must have feared reprisals on the part of the United States. But none came. The Japanese had taken a calculated risk and been correct. By exploiting the European situation to push their own aims in Asia, the conflict between Japan and the

United States remained a battle of words. As the 'Dutch and French went down in defeat, the possibility of the Japanese taking over

19Ibid. the Batch Indies and French Indo-Ghina began te prey ©n the minds ©f the American leaders 0 By the end of May, "it wi.s believed in Washing­ ton that the Germans and Italians had given the Japanese a free hand in the Batch Indies and that the Japanese might be tempted to act „ The entire situation was Sraught with danger. If the Japanese succeeded in occupying the Indies and thus gained control of her products, Japan would almost be independent of American supplies needed for the comple­ tion of the conquest of China. Therefore, the threat of the termination of the commercial treaty would be nonexistent. In addition to this, and probably just as important, if net more so, was the real reliance of the United States on the products of the Indies. Since the United States depended on the Indies for rubber and agricultural products, Japanese occupation would be a severe blow to their potential as a military power.

At the same time, Tokyo had reason to be afraid of the Allies occupying pi the Indies, With the developments in Europe close to disaster. Washing ton felt it necessary to avoid any conflict with the Japanese. There­ fore, a plea for talks on the situation in the Far East seemed advanta­ geous. It does not seem likely that Roosevelt or Hull had any illusions that these would lead to concrete results. Contrary to this, the view was that any time gained by talk would be very valuable.

As was supposed, the gap between the Japanese and the American

20Langer and Gleason, op. eit., p. j88.

23-Ibid., p. 590. "Tokyo had reasons to fear, especially after the allied action in Curacao and Aruba, that the Allies might occupy the Dutch possessions and thus jeopardize the flow of vital materials to Japan." Governments proved impossible t©'bridge. The United States was not even willing t© consider the terms of Japan« Such terms included$

1® Some definite trade arrangement9 even if temporary,

2, Gessation of American aid t© China so that they could settle

the China Incident.

Even as the talks continued% Roosevelt and Hull realised that the Yenai

Government had gotten themselves in an uncomfortable position. Either they would have to act 9 and act with great speed, or they would be swept away by another government. They chose to act. On June 1®, 19^®> the Japanese settled the dispute between themselves and the Soviets. On

June 11* I9W 9 Japan advised the British, French, and Italian Governments to withdraw their troops from China. At the same time, air attacks were

started on Chungking, On June 1? or 18, the crisis was further height­ ened uhen . . . the Japanese Eireetor of Military Intelligence summoned the British Military Attache in Tokyo and made, the following brutally frank statements the Japanese people would be cow­ ardly if they failed to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the disasters suffered by the French and British. Nothing could stop Japan from Seizing French Indo-China, the Netherlands8 Indies or Hong Kong— any one or all of them. The United States was in mo position to prevent Japan from taking whatever action it liked in the Western Pacific. . The only way in which Britain could avoid war would be by immedi­ ately closing the Burma Road and Hong Kong frontier, and by prompt withdrawal of British troops from Shanghai. This, he added in conclusion, was the view of the Japanese fighting forces and of the Japanese people. The British would simply deceive themselves if they put trust in the soothing words of the Tokyo Foreign Office® As if to reinforce these threats the American Intelligence Services were receiving reports which suggested the possibility of a Japanese raid on Hawaii, , General Marshall for a moment feared that Japan and Russia might act was. a team* in the Far East to hold our ships in the Pacific „ So acute. seemed the threat that the forces at Hawaii and Panama were promptly a l e r t e d <,22 With the swift turn of events in both Asia and Europeg the

■British Government conferred with the American Government in order to establish a policy that would be advantageous to both. In these crowded daysg it was difficult for America to decide what to do beyond issuing warnings to Japan about upsetting the status quo and assuring Britain that we would keep our Fleet at Hawaii, The United States was being extremely careful to avoid hasty involvement„ ’"Quite apart from the fact that the War and Navy Departments did not have supplies that could be sent to Inde-GMna, the Administration was determined to Avoid com­ plications in the Pacific if humanly possible. This meant that for the time being nothing could be done to check Japanese encroachment in Indo=

China or elsewhere in the Far E a s t , *23 i t was hoped that the decision to leave the Fleet in the Pacific would deter the Japanese from aggres­

sion against Indo-China or the Butch Indies, It was recognized that

some minor Japanese successes were inevitable and had to be accepted„

If the position of the United States was precarious9 the posi­ tion of Britain was even more so, Britain advocated a strong stand against

Japanese aggression, but in her present position she could not fight a war in the Far East singlehanded. She, therefore, offered two alternatives 68 to the United States, Very simply„ the first was for the United States to bring pressure on Japan by imposing a full embargo on exports to

Japan or by sending naval forees to Singapore, This was made in the full realization that if Japan did not maintain the status quo, it very well might lead to war. This line was what the British preferred and would baek up in every way. However, Hull was not at all in favor of this. The second alternative„ of trying to effect a peace settlement between Japan and China, did not meet with favor from Hull either. He reiterated previous attempts at the peace settlements and said America could do no more, although he had no objection to Britain making an effort. Since the British and French could mot possibly offer effective resistance and the United States would not, the Japanese had their way for the present.

By mid-July 1940, there was a complete change in the Japanese

Government, Former Premier Yonai was replaced by Konoye who then appointed General Tojo as Minister' of War, The closing of the Burma Road was effected on July 12, since the British could find no way to avoid it. The events in Asia had a direct bearing on the decisions made by Congress in July, By the National Defense Act passed by Congress on July 2, 1940, all strategic materials, machine tools and a great many other products were now subjected to a rigid licensing system. It seemed very likely, as July wore on, that the long-debated embargo on the export of oil and scrap iron might be imposed. The public was in favor of it, as were many in Congress, The debate was ended and action was taken when the War Department announced that agents of the Japanese were building up a eerner in aviation gasoline. The meaning was clear, the market wotid be exhausted and thus the United States Army and Havy would not be able to acquire large quantities, of oil if an emergency should arise, ,©n July 25, l?^©, President Roosevelt' signed an order putting petroleum products, iron, tetraethyl lead, and steel serap under the licensing system. It looked as if the die had been cast. But such was not the ease, Welles, being convinced that such action would pro­ voke Japan into attacking the Indies and perhaps British possessions, persuaded the President to backtrack. Thus the situation remained unchanged. The Administration seemed unwilling to do any more than send warning statements to the Japanese, The desire to.support the British in the Far East was sincere but the President and lull felt that the real menace was Hitler and it would be foolish for America to become deeply committed in the Far East,

On the eve of the national elections, Roosevelt sent a message to Congress and then said' at a press conference that the final arrange­ ments had been made for the sending of 5® destroyers to Halifax where they would be taken over by British crews , . ,*He , , , declared the agreement 8met inconsistent in any sense with our status of peace, It is am epochal and far-reaching act of. preparation for continental de™ fense in the face of grave danger,8 It was, he asserted, ^probably the most important thing that has come for American defense since the

Louisiana Purchase,This announcement was enthusiastically received

^Ibid,, p, 770, 70 by the American public» By these actions„ the United States had departed from their policy of neutrality and entered upon a status of limited war.

In September, 1940, the Americans still held on to the hope that by sending aid to Britain, they could avoid participating in the war.

But gone was the old isolationism. Some Americans did subscribe to non-

interventions however, most realized that their survival depended on

victory by the British. The Americans were now committed to the defeat

of Hitler and his allies as they east their lot in support of Great

Britain. CHAPTER IV

PACIFIC SECURITYi WHOSE RESPONSIBILITY?

Throughout the period 1935-19^6» the policy adopted by the United States Government was of vital interest to Australians. Needless to say, the months of May-September9 19409 were filled with apprehension for the

Australians9 as they watched Japan grow more bold while America grew more cautiouso The Australian Government had taken a chance in respect to the growing hostility of Japan, inasmuch as the Australians neither strength­ ened their home defenses nor reinforced Singapore„ Knowing that they could not defend themselves unaided against the Japanese, it was only natural that they look for a champion to save them. In early July, the

Australian Department of External Affairs issued a statement that every indication seemed t© point to the conclusion that if Japan attacked

Australia, the United States would hot come into the war,**" In early

August of 1940, the United Kingdom Government and the Australian Govern­ ment conferred and agreed that should Japan attack the Netherlands Indies and the Dutch resist, then most assuredly Britain and Australia would find themselves at war with Japan, During the closing months of 1940, while the war raged on in Europe, the Australian Government was plagued with a number of decisions to make. The Menzies Government had. won in

^Hasluck, op, pit,, p, 226,

71 72 the gest-ra). election in September $ but the victory was mot a substantial one. The fear that Germany might invade the British Isles had subsided by Octobers but there were still air raids and submarine and surface attacks which took a heavy toll of British convoys,, Hearer to Australia there were reports that ships had been sunk on or near the Australian

coaste The Japanese situation in the Pacific had not changed since they

signed the Axis Pact in September, but the Australians were under no illusionso They knew that the moment the British Commonwealth weakened,

Japan would strike» However, for the moment the real peril centered on the Battle of Britain and the Battle of the Atlantic. The active foes were Germany and Italy. The prospective foe was Japan.

Appreciating the fact that Japan was only waiting for the right moment to attack, a conference was called for October 22, 19%0, to dis­

cuss the Far East Defenses. Questions concerning the defense require­ ments of India and Burma were raised.

The United Kingdom view was that Singapore was the key to the British Commonwealth8s defensive position, and that Australia and Hew Zealand and the British possessions in the Far East would best be defended by an adequate concentration of forces in Malaya. The possibility of a major expedition against Aus­ tralia and Hew Zealand initially was ruled out, but heme defenses against raids and forces for convoy and other duties had necessarily to be maintained.^

This conference having ended on October 31, 1940, Menzies appointed a group to investigate the Singapore position. By the end of Hovember, their findings were ready, and he went to London to take up these matters with

^Mamsergh, op. eit., p. 88, 73 Churchill„ Although the conference had. revealed the weaknesses of

Singapore„ no substantial aetion was taken to repair the weaknesses.

However» as has been pointed out previously8 the weapons9 equipment e and supplies needed in the defense of Singapore simply did not exist. Henee it was not lack of will but lack of material that determined the

British response. The attempts to insure seourity against Japan also brought Aus­ tralia into a new role in international polities, @For the greater part of her history sinee Federation Australia had had no foreign poliey of her own. As part of the British Empire 8 Australia was the object of decisions made elsewhere,Baring this time she was not always a willing object. Sir Alan Watt has pointed out that Australia had no for­ eign poliey ^ ffshe could only reflect a policy and this was British Professor Bruce Hiller has stated thats

Between 1939=42 there were practically no diplomatic people- only those in Great Britain, Japan and the Waited States, The Committee of External Affairs had been started in 1935= Foreign poliey was more of a personal view of practical poli­ ticians , Almost everything that came in was British in natureo The Prime Minister was the front communication, sinee he was the first to receive the British line. The Minister of External Affairs was a relatively insignificant post. The

% u g o Wolfsohn, ffForeign, Policy,m Australian Civilization, (Melbourne$ F, W, Cheshire^-102')'»» p, 225, ^Interview with Sir Alan Watt, Head of the Department of International Relations at Australian National University, Canberra, Australia, July 10, 1964, 74 number ©£ senior civil servants m s small„ Service officers (army9 navy, etc.) were able to put forth mere pressure than the civil servants

But as the Japanese threat grew mere grave $ Australians could net deny to themselves that while the British were fighting for their life in

Europe9 British interests in the Far East was only marginalWhile

Henzies was Prime Minister9 he was the voice of foreign policy9 and as such was simply a reflection of British policy, Curtin, head of the

Opposition, leader of the labour Party, urged a more independent policy.

He emphasized the need for the development of more air power in the event that Singapore could not be reinforced,^ However, while Menzies was: in office, very little along these lines was done, Unwillingly at first, but with increasing zest, the Australian Government began to mold a foreign policy of its own.

Whereas the birth of Australian foreign policy occurred because of the growth of the Japanese menace, it was also conditioned by Euro­ pean affairs, 1 9 4 1 brought with it a continuation of old problems and a deluge of new ones. To the Australians the main concern was still

^Interview with Professor Bruce Miller, Member of the Interna­ tional Relations faculty of the Pacific Studies Department at the Aus­ tralian National University, Canberra, Australia, July 11, 1964,

^Interview with Professor Partridge, member of the Political Science Department at the Australian National University, Canberra, Australia, July 1§, 1964,

7Sir Frederick Eggleston, ^Foreign policy,^ Australia, ed. G„ Hartley Grattan, (Los Angeles 1 University of California Presq,) 1947)!, p, 142, the Far last. They had. little appreciation for what was taking.,place in the Balkans „ It certainly appeared that the hard-won victories of the

Greeks against the Italians wemld earns® Hitler to give assistance to

Italy, If this were so. Great Britain would certainly need extra troops to help establish a Balkan Front „ Could Britain abandon the opportunity of creating a Balkan front by sending troops to the Far East?

Churchill thought the danger of Japan going to war with the British Empire had lessened and that the growing naval and military advantages in the Mediterranean would also have their effect on Japanese conduct, It would be quite impos­ sible for the British fleet to leave the Mediterranean at the present juncture without throwing away irretrivably all that had been gained there and all prospects for the future.

However, as discouraging as this news might be to the Australians 8

Churchill went on to say, in the latter part of his message, that if Aus­ tralia were ever seriously threatened by an invasion, the British would not hesitate to sacrifice the Mediterranean position in order to help Australia, In the wave of the news concerning the weak­ nesses of Singapore and the growing nervousness of the Australian people, it was decided that the best course would be to send Menzies to London to see that Australian interests were being considered in their proper magnitude, Leaving Australia on January 21, 1941, after many conferences with leading personalities there, he visited Australian forces in the

Middle East on his way to London, When he left Australia, as has already been noticed, his main concern and that of his War Cabinet, was the

situation in the Far East. In fact, there was absolutely no question

concerning policy in the Balkans brought up in the Australian Cabinet.

When Menzies arrived in London, Churchill was. talking about using Austra­

lian and New Zealand troops that were fighting in Africa to establish a

^ Balkan front. This was a difficult decision to make, for the Australian

Government found it hard to believe Britain would give up a successful

campaign in Africa to try to establish a second front. It cannot be

stressed enough that here was a real weakness of the United Kingdom Gov­

ernment. For she should have consulted with the Dominion Governments

when an enterprise of this nature was being considered. At no time did

Churchill or his representatives pose the problem to the Australian Gov­

ernment, until it was too late. Therefore, Menzies found himself in a

rather peculiar situation. He had left Australia fully confident that he

knew the sentiments and wishes of the Australian Cabinet, only to be

faced with a problem that they had not discussed. It was not until late

February, 1941, that the Australian War Cabinet received a telegram from

Menzies asking his colleagues to agree with the decision to send two of

the Australian divisions to Greece from North Africa. They did so, but

with reservations. Mr. Fadden, acting Prime Minister in Menzies1 absence, cabled that the concurrence was "conditional on plans having been com­

pleted before hand to ensure that evacuation, if necessitated, will be

successfully undertaken and that shipping and other essential services

will be available for this purpose if required.nl' The point of all this was.that the Wnited Kingdeitt was tardy in informing its Dominion Governments, ilthoagh Dominion troops might well be committed to a dangerous role„ the approval of the Government involved was not always semght in advance. .Frequently, the result was that major de- cisions in both military and political departments i&dLeh should have been made after, were being made before, any consultation with the Commonwealth

Governments involved. More than once, Churchill was called on to explain why Australia and other Dominions were not informed. Churchill explained that in times of war it is not always possible to keep everyone informed.

He went on to explain that, at times, the situation called for a decision only he eould make, since he was the only one that possessed full dat# con­ cerning the situation. Secrecy, speed, and action had to be the keynotes in war. Although there was a great deal of wisdom and truth in this line of reasoning, Australia still felt that better communications could and should be set up between Great Britain and her Dominion Governments. However, the

Australian Government was learning quickly from its experiences. The contro­ versy . surrounding the Greek campaign and its subsequent failure had some im­ portance. From this point on, the Australian Government was absolutely insis tent on being informed. Haen the Syrian campaign, occurred, following after the Greek and Crete campaign# the Australians were informed. However, the critics were still not satisfied. They stated that information was late and inadequate. The fact that the Syrian campaign was a success did not assuage the Australian critics who charged that the decision had been taken

^without effective Australian participation.^

l®Ibid.» p . ■102, 78

The Australians were t© be disappointed time and again ©n this

matter. While in London, there was at least one occasion on which

Menzies was very disappointed in his share of making policy. From

January to March, secret Anglo-American staff talks were going on.

Henzies knew this, as did the Australian Government at home. But when

the agreements were made public» they were wholly unexpected and eer*

tainly net to the liking of the Australians. For Roosevelt agreed with Churchill that the vital theater was Europe. Thus both favored a hold­

ing war in the Far East. What was even more startling was the decision

that, if the United States should become involved in the war, Britain

would send six capital ships to Singapore and the United States Navy

would aid the Royal Navy in the Atlantic. To the Australians, the im­

portance of the United States Navy in the Pacific cannot be overempha­

sized. For she saw it as the main deterrent to Japanese aggression.

The Australian Government could not help but feel apprehension that, at

a time when her armed forces were being used overseas, security arrange­

ments in the Pacific were being changed with only tardy reference to

Australia. After the Roosevelt-Halifax talks (Feb. 8, 1941)a Australian

hopes dwindled in regard to substantial support from the United States

in the Pacific.

The visit to London and subsequent participation in making

policy in the War Cabinet there left a lasting impression on Menzies.

He became convinced that it was necessary for a representative of the

Australian War Cabinet to be present at all meetings of the Imperial

War Council. He felt that such representation simplified and accelerated the process of eeasaltation,' espeeiallj in regard to the ia.se of deaihioB forces. A representative in London also lessened Australian anxieties in relation to the defense of the Paeifie. Menzies also found that he was able to enter into the discussions and make Australian wishes felt, although not to the extent he would have wished. Although Churchill expressed the opinion that Menzies8 visit was %ost valuable,®^ he did not seem to appreciate the strain he was putting on Australia by insist­ ing that the Prime Minister, and only the Prime Minister, of a Dominion be allowed a voice in the United Kingdom War Cabinet. As Prime Minister of Australia, Menzies felt his place was at home inspiring and leading his people who felt that they were in direct danger. Yet it was this danger that prompted the Australian Cabinet to permit Menzies to visit .

London when his political position was so shaky. In the 19^0 election,

Labour had come within ®a hairs8 breadth from complete success . . Despite the fact that Menzies had left his office in the good hands of

Fadden, and his mission to London could be used to his political advan­ tage, he knew he should be back home gaining supporters. This problem of representation in the United Kingdom War Cabinet was to grow to greater proportions and plague Australians through the war.

No sooner had Menzies left his country for London (Jan. 21,

194-1) than Australian newspapers carried headlines of the impending danger in the Far East. Word had come that Japan was attempting to sign peace treaties with Batavia and the Batch and exbend her influence into

Thailand and Ind©=>Ghinae This news stimulated discussion in the Austra­ lian War Cabinet„ Baring these discussions;, Curtin» as leader of the

Opposition* had a great deal to say. He favored issuing statements con­ cerning the danger to Australia in order to awaken the public to the need of a great war effort and to calm the industrial unrest. When he had sized up the military situation* he was inclined to advocate rein­ forcement of the Australian Naval Squadron* although he admitted that this was not practicable due to the situation in the main theaters of war* that is.* the Mediterranean* North Africa and the. Atlantic. When dSSbiderimg the possibility of a war in the Far East, Curtin advocated that Australia reinforce Singapore instead of dispatching more troops to the Middle East. Curtin also felt that the transfer of the United States

Navy from the Pacific would be disastrous to Australia. Therefore* if

Australia were drawn into a Pacific war, she would have to stand alone, for awhile at least. Even if America did intervene, said Curtin, iimned- ate assistance would not be available. Therefore, he stressed again the importance of reinforcing Singapore and the use of the Australian air force to counter any air attack from Japan.^

Throughout the early part of April, Australian newspapers carried articles that were intended to renew the confidence of the people. For examples "The confident belief is expressed that Japan will not at present launch any excursions in the South Pacific., since events have distinctly minimized the possibilities of an Axis 'victory. Assurances were reiterated again on April 10. fi'If a balloon goes up in the Pacific 9 we will get powerful naval reinforcements and get them quickly9 regard­ less of whether the United (states comes in with us9" said Vice Admiral X Sir Geoffrey Layton. . . In the event of an emergencyg however, units would come quickly enough and in sufficient strength to permit effective defensive action 9 while a full fleet could reach Singapore in two months.

Just as the Australians were beginning to feel comfortable due to these

British assurances„ an event occurred that aroused anxieties again.

These are best expressed by an exerpt from an article.in the Sydney

Whatever interpretations may be given to the Russo-Japanese Pact signed last Sunday9 there is not the slightest doubt that it places the problems of the Pacific basin in a new and dangerous perspective if only because it greatly in- creases the possibility of a Japanese expansionist movement southwards by force of arms The threat is at the very gates of Singapore 9 and at the back door of Australia itself .^-5 Articles of this nature filled the papers on April 16 and for the next week, alerting the public to the fresh danger. To the Australians9 the Russo-Japanese Pact had special significance. The Australians viewed this pact with alarm since they recognized that now Japan could focus her entire attention on the south because there was no fear of a Soviet attack. As the newspapers pointed out, ,fM©t one comfortable illusion

^Sydney Morning Herald. April 4, 1941, p. 9

15lbid0. April 10, 1941, p. 10.

16"Japan8s Southward Drive. =Sydney Morning Herald. April 16, 1941, p. 10o about the remoteness of this eenfliet is now left to us.”17 It was at this time, while Menzies was in London (April, 1941) that he decided to press the issue of an Australian representation to the

Imperial War Council. He was slowly coming to the realization that a change was needed in the higher-level conferences on the war effort. He felt that this could be best accomplished by the formation of an Imperial

War Cabinet containing representatives of each of the four self-governing dominions (i.e., Australia, Canada, South Africa, and Hew Zealand). How­ ever, when Henzies consulted the other three involved (i.e., Mr. Mackenzie

King, General Smuts, and Mr. Fraser, respectively) none of them favored the change. When Churchill was approached on the matter, he expressed the view that such a proposal would destroy the basis of the coalition govern­ ment, since he was not willing t© increase the membership of the War

Cabinet fearing that it would become too large to conduct business efficiently. In reality, the question put before Churchill by Menzies was much simpler than it appears. The other three Dominions expressed disapproval of Menzies8 idea and stated that they were completely satis­ fied with the Imperial War Cabinet as it stood. None of these three had the fears that Australia did. In matters of geography, they felt secure, whereas Australia felt herself isolated and threatened by an attack from the Japanese. Menzies reasoned that if the other three had rejected his proposal, then Churchill8s decision was not one of overweighting his cabinet, but rather of simply including one representative from Australia. 83 Tims» Australia would be assured that her unique position was being put

before the Cabinet and Menzies would be free to go back to Australia,

Howevera Churehill did not see it that way and stood firm on his decision

not to enlarge the Cabinet„ not even by one, Menzies8 failure in this matter was a terrible disappointment to him, Churehill8 s suggestion that Menzies revisit London soon shewed his indifference to the uncer­ tainties that were mounting in Australian domestic politics,

Despite this disappointment, Menzies returned home at the end of

May ready to give leadership and inspiration to his country. He and his

staff brought back with them very complete reports on the many aspects of the war effort, FfEjy the middle of July, instead of leading the nation to greater efforts, he was grappling with dissention in his own party and

©pen hostility from some of its members. Instead of proceeding with the

great administration tasks he had set for himself and the nation, he was

struggling ©nee again for sufficient political stability „ . „ In­

stead of uniting and inspiring the public„ he found himself being attacked by the Opposition, The newspapers had, for the past month or so, been

carrying articles criticizing the Empire8 s policy in the Balkans„ Curtin had let it be known that he was very critical about Australian troops being sent there, He felt that Australian troops should be used closer to home. Encouraged by.the results of the September (1940) election and the increase of Labour members in the House of Representatives, he sought

l%ansergh, op,cit,, p, 116-115,

l^Hasluok, op,clt,, p, 491, to make his wishes known. The real control of the House did not lay with the U.A.P. or Labours but "with a couple of independents whose views were unaseertainable."2® Curtin continued to talk long and hard in criticism

of the D.A.Po and the way it was handling the war situation. By the first week of July (1941), the newspapers were widely reporting the dis­

sensions within the U.A.P. Henzies* party was wrecking itself, and al­ ready the public had begun to predict when the Opposition or Labour Party would take over the reins of the Government. All that the Government

could do was to stay in office and hope for the best. Competing with the domestic political situation for attention were the swiftly moving events on the international scene. During the month of May, the people were informed on the buildup of defenses in

Malaya. . . further strong Navy, Army, and Air Force reinforcements

had arrived yesterday evening. The forces which arrived from Britain

. 0 0 were part of the policy of steadily increasing forces in Malaya

which had been going on for some time.® 21 Almost two weeks later the same paper reported President Roosevelt8 s proclamation "that a state of

unlimited national emergency existed in the United States. He thus assumes

virtually war-time power, and the nation is placed on war footing „ ...

Plans for co-operation with Australia and Britain in the Pacific will now

proceed to the point of commitments, if they have not already done so.

2®G©llan, op. cit., p. 144. American Naval forces can now be expected to be based at Singapore..

Within a month, the Australians found out their expectations were jus­ tified as the newspapers carried stories of the arrival of Catalina flying boats at Singapore. Attention shifted from the Far Eastern theater of war as the next bit of news was reported. Germany had finally performed the act that Churchill had been trying to alert the Russians to for quite some time. At k A.M. on June 229 1941, Germany attacked Russia. That night,

Churchill broadcast over the B.B.C. network that: . . o E-have to declare the decision of His Majesty® s Govern­ ment-— and I feel sure it is a decision in which the great Dominions will in due course concur— for we must speak out now at once, without a day8s delay. I have to make the dec­ laration, but can you doubt what our policy will be? We have but one aim and one single, irrevocable purpose. We are resolved to destroy Hitler and every vestige of the Nazi regime. From this, nothing will turn us— nothing . . . Any man or state who fights on against Nazidom will have our aid. Any man or state who marches with Hitler is our foe® . . . That is our policy and that is our declaration. . ..23

The Dominion Governments once again had not been consulted or informed, before Churchill made his statement public. However, this time, Menzies

said the statement was completely accepted by the Australian Government.

In less than a month, Churchill announced that an Anglo-Russian Agree­ ment had been signed, with the full consent of all the Dominions, for the united action of the British Commonwealth and Russia against Nazi

Germany. The newspapers, once again, project the Australian feelings

22Ibdd., May 29, 1941, p. 7.

23Winston Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 3, The Grand Alliance. (Bostons Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950),p. 371-373° in regard t© the events just mentioned. For example? "Diplomats here

know that German "s' attack on Russia same as a oomplete surprise to the

Japanese, , , Japan is -expected new to wait mere patiently than eyer ok before moving against the Indies."

Japan was not only surprised by the aetions of Germany, but

also by the restrictions.put on her by America* The Japanese demand for bases in Freneh Inde«=Ghina became known on July 23, 1941, ©n the follow­

ing day, Japanese warships were sighted off Camraak Bay, On July 25th

and 26th, all Japanese assets were frozen in the United States and the

United Kingdom and Dominions, All treaties between Japan and Great Bri­ tain were denounced by the latter. This aetion was followed by a

reciprocal one bn the part of Japan. Japanese troops landed in Indo­ china on July 28th and by the 29th, the Viehy Government had signed a

paet giving Japan the use of eight airdromes there. The press followed

each of these aetions with ©onsiderable interest and extensive coverage.

An article appeared quoting U. S. Umder-Seeretary of State, Mr. Sumner

Welles, as sayings '"The occupation of Indo-China or the establishment

of further military bases there will endanger the peaceful use by

peaceful nations of the Pacific. . , .It will also jeopardize Ameri­

can sources of vital defense materials such as tin and rubber, and also 25 endanger other areas, including the Phillpimes." The same paper

reported that "Eeohoraie strictures applied by the United States, the

24 Morning Herald, July 31, 1941, p. 7 25 British Empire, and the Netherlands' East Indies against Japan are be­ lieved only preliminary . . . Stronger measures, which will increase the economic pressure, will be taken if Japan retaliates vigorously, or if it is seen that territorial occupations obviously presage further 26 expansion„K Needless to say, the Australians were very impressed and relieved by the strong economic restrictions put on. Japan by America.

But their newspapers carried no illusions that America might declare war on Japan„ In fact, they stated the contrary, that is, a complete break with Japan was not expected in Washington.

On August 6 , Prime Minister Henzies went before the Council and stated the objectives that he felt the Government should attempt to carry out 1

1 .. The maintenance of Anglo-American cooperation in economic measures against Japan. 2. Obtain U. S. cooperation in issuing a warning against Japan. 3 . Answer a request made by Thailand to know the attitude of Great Britain and the United States in the event of a Japanese attack.^7

In citing the objectives, Menzies made it clear that he was aware of the inability of Great Britain and the disinclination of the United States to aid Thailand materially. He stressed that this could throw Thailand into the lap of Japan. At the same time, Menzies stressed the need of keeping in line with the United States. At no time did Menzies regard, the war with Japan as ^inevitable.'1 Quite to the contrary, he was 88 always working against that supposition in the Australian mind,

Menzies1 political position at home was growing more shaky each day,, Curtin offered more opposition at each meeting of Parliament„ yet he did not seem to want to overthrow the government„ although he was en­ couraged to do so by his party. During the past year, Curtin had been very critical of the Government8s defense policy and the sending of forces to the Middle East, nThe fact that the Labour Party was in no way associated with the decision to send the Australian division to

Greece gave to the subsequent controversy a touch of party acrimony which it might not otherwise have acquired.% 28 At this same meeting,

Curtin said that if a war with Japan was considered inevitable, Australia should “bring pressure to bear on the United States of America to knock

Japan out n o w , “^9 However, he did not specify what type of pressure would bring the United States in. Menzies8 objectives (as cited above) were given much considera­ tion in the newspapers. It was rather obvious that number one would not be difficult to carry out. The second objective, that of a warning, was a rather long time in coming, and when it was issued by Roosevelt, it was not as strong as the Australian Government had hoped. The third and fourth objectives seemed to be covered by an article in the Sydney Mornin;

Herald, statings

2%ansergh, op. eit., p. 100.

^Hasluek, op. eit,, p. 529« . It would- fee too optimistie to expeet the United States t© take military aetlott if Japam moves against $hailand„ , . ♦ Any Japanese move frem Thailand further south, however, would be a different matter$.because it would be taken to mean that Japan had designs on the Dutch East Indies; and AmOriean pub­ lic opinion would then back up military resistance e e » . Many Australians in London believe that unless a stronger policy is formed in London, Australia will begin to look to Peafl. Harbor rather than to Singapore for aid, , . , Aus- • tralia has not had reason to expeet that either "Whitehall or the White House intends to draw a deadline for Japan at any point north of the southern boundary of Thailand.3©

A few days later, the following piece appeared in the newspaper: . . . . Any threat to a British possession is a threat to the whole Empire and should such a threat be implemented by mili­ tary action, the whole Empire will resist it. Whether a Japanese movement into Thailand will be construed as an act of war depends upon the attitude of the United States, and : that has by no means been clearly stated. Indeed the U.S.A. has thus far been satisfied with half-measures. . . . It can do so only if the threat in Thailand is of such a nature that an attack on Singapore will develop out of it as a matter of course. In that ease— considering the measures that Washington has taken against Japan and influenced the Empire into taking and considering that the Anglo-Japanese alliance was abandoned because the Americans objected— it will have a plear right to call for a full measure of American support, » . . Throughout the war there has been too little consultation of Parliament in matters that vitally concern Parliament and the nation.31

The press offered the people no pretty illusions during July and August,

If41. It had become obvious that if Japan attacked Thailand, the British

Empire, and therefore Australia, would declare war against Japan, and consequently Australia might very well find herself isolated in the

Pacific, Being aware of this, lemzies told Evatt (Minister of External

3®S y d n e y Morning Herald, August ,% IfAl,-p. 11.

33-Bulletin (Sydney), August 13, If41, p. S, Affairs) that there was still the hmge task of eonvineing the United. Kingdom. Government9 and Churchill as much as anyone9 of the necessity

©f holding Singapore«,

Throughout these past few weeks9 Menzies had been campaigning throughout the capital of each state. At the same time, as the situa­ tion in the Far East grew more tense, there were repeated pleas to. Churchill from Menzies for membership in the Imperial War Cabinet.

Stating that he was needed in Australia, Menzies requested that Churchill

. accepta net the representative of Australia that you would choose but the representative of Australia which the Australian Government may choose. ^ 2 The idea was still not acceptable to Churchill. The situa­ tion was growing so critical in the Far East that Menzies cancelled his tour and returned to Canberra on August 11, 1941. The same question was asked repeatedly by Australians9 flWhat about America?” This ques­ tion was discussed in the following articles

As usual9 Hr. Churchill8s broadcast account of his foregather­ ing with Mr. Roosevelt$ heard in Australia on August 25, sounded magnificent over the air. Cablegrams mentioned that British newspapers had summed up its message as (l) '^Britain and America will fight together if there is war” with Japan5 (2) ffFull aid without barriers” will be given Russia 1 (3) ”To the conquered nations $ Have faith and hope. Deliverance is sure.” . . . It made the stopping of Japan Uncle Sam$s special pigeon, with Britain pledged to come in and help. Hitherto it has been accepted that Britain must always be first to take the plunge, with Uncle Sam helping, though without coming in. On the evidence of a wide range of American press utter­ ances, the U.S.A. would seem to be cool— down to freezing

32nansergh, op. cit,, p. 112. 91 point-- on the question of any participation on the European side; but there is nothing like that feeling noticeable in regard to the idea of war with J a p a n . 33

Seldom has a newspaper reported so accurately the situation existing

at that moment. Churchill was making sure that he was not going to be left fighting a war in the Far East alone, if he could avoid itin

any way. He let Roosevelt know that he would give him all his support but America must initiate the action. The Australians and the British

were aware that it was a difficult position for Roosevelt to be in

since the Democratic platform on which he was elected had stated that

the United States would not participate in any foreign wars nor send

her troops to any foreign lands unless attacked. But, although they appreciated his position, they felt that words had lifted hopes so

often that now only actions could have any weight. One thing, gave

them confidence, that is, that American public opinion was much more

receptive to a strong stand in the Far East than in Europe. The Aus­ tralians knew this, yet it was only a slender hope to cling to.

Throughout August, the political situation was anything but

stable. Finally, on August 29th, Menzies lost his office. In the faint hope of remedying the critical political situation, Menzies had

selected as his successor Fadden, the new Country Party leader. Fadden

was almost apologetic upon receiving the news. In a public statement, he said he had not sought this arrangement but had been asked to accept

33|«Britain, U.S.A. and Japan,® Bulletin (Sydney), August 2 6 , 1941, p. 7. 92 it by the UoAoP, Fadden$s position was just as insecure as Menzies8 had been. Each had only a majority of one in the House of Represen­ tatives’. Curtin, although he had not sought the position of Prime

Minister, was very critical of the choice that had been made. He said

that the appointment of Fadden was only a face-lifting device. The

newspapers were also skeptical about the change. They called it the

"Fadden makeshift1* and stated that what Australia needed was a Govern­ ment that would govern and they did not think the Fadden Government was

that sort of government. Even Churchill expressed his regrets that the

Australian people saw fit to change Prime Ministers. In early September, 1941, the situation in the Far East had

eased considerably. On September 1, Churchill informed Fadden that the situation in the Far East was "not only more favorable but less tense."34

The public still clamored for action from the Government, especially on

the issue of representation on the Imperial War Council. Under pressure,

Fadden persuaded Churchill to allow him to appoint a special envoy to

London who would sit on the War Cabinet. It was obvious, even to

Churchill, that Fadden would not be able to come to London, due to his

unstable political position. The exact powers that this envoy was to

have were not discussed at length at this time. Due to the tenuous

majority in the House, Fadden had great difficulty selecting an envoy.

Before Fadden8s choice could reach London, his Government had fallen.

Thus, the solution designed to appease the Australian public had not

34Hasluek, op. eit.„ p. 534. 93 solved the problem. The Australians became even more interested in the American position in these early days of September. Constant speculation as to the course the Americans would take was being voiced by the newspapers.

The negotiations between the U.S.A. and Japan have not proceeded as well as had been expected. . . . President Roosevelt is willing to meet Prince Konoye, but he proposed certain basic conditions for the conference. These have not been acceptable to Japan, and a gloomy view of the prospect of negotiations is, therefore, taken in Washington. ^5

On September 15th, the same paper ran another article concerning Roosevelt

Washington is finally convinced that President Roosevelt is in earnest and that the attempt to win the war without fighting has been abandoned, according to the political ob­ server of the

Two days later, the Bulletin reported that America, by President Roose­ velt *s broadcast on September 16 stating his firm stand, was now one step closer to war, Hews of this nature could not help but give encour­ agement to the Australians, who lay isolated as the Japanese menace poised to strike. It appeared to tisaa despite Churchill's periodic assurances, that they might be doomed before anyone could rescue them.

35Sydney Morning Herald, September 4, 1941, p. 9«

36ibid., September 15, 1941, p. 1?. 94 Governzaeat officials of Australia were all too aware that Churchill was

Taeginnimg to think the situation in the Middle East and Egypt was more

important than the security of S i n g a p o r e ,57 As the importance of Singa­

pore went down in the Prime Minister6s eyes, the Australians had no

recourse but to look for encouragement elsewhere. Their greatest hope

lay in a decision by America to go to war before it was too late— to©

late in this ease being after Australia was attacked.

At the time that these articles were appearing, a very much

different drama was unfolding between Fadden and Churchill, The Aus­

tralian Cabinet had become convinced that with the threat of Japan only

momentarily stalled, their troops overseas in campaigns they considered

doomed (their ©pinion based on the outcome of the Greek campaign), the

only course was to recall their divisions, Fadden sent telegrams ex­

pressing these wishes, Ghurehill sums up the case very wells

, , , The new Government, under hard pressure from its oppo­ nents, was much concerned about the position of the Australian division in Tobruk, They desired to collect their troops in the Middle East into one force in order to give them an oppor­ tunity for refreshment, restoration of discipline and re-equip-

3%ansergh, op, cit,, p, 117, ^Marshall Sir John Dill, posi­ tively reasserted in May, 1941, as an accepted principle of imperial strategy that 9in the last resort the security of Singapore comes be­ fore that of Egypt,9 This was a view which the United States military advisors also entertained. But Mr, Churchill strongly dissented, , . . Said Churchill, 5I would not tolerate the idea of abandoning the struggle for Egypt, and was resigned to pay whatever forfeits were exacted in Malaya, , „ ,8 And in such matters Mr, Churchill8s view was apt to prevail. Of this the Australian Government was only too well aware, and the knowledge brought it no reassurances, , 95 meat, and to satisfy pmblie ©pinion in Australia„ . „ . They therefore demanded their immediate relief by other forces„ Auehinleek protested strongly against this change. . =3“ Churchill felt that if he sent a message to Fadden furnishing all the details on the importance of holding Tobruk, Fadden would certainly . change his request. This did net prove to be the ease, however. In a further attempt to make Fadden understand his situation, Churchill

(on Sept. 11$ 19%) sent him another dispatch along with General

Aueinieek's telegram stressing the physical impossibility of removing the Australian troops so soon— (meaning in September and October since relief was hoped for by November). Churchill went on to says

. . . If however you insist that the Australian troops must be withdrawn, orders will be issued accordingly irrespective of the cost entailed and the injury to future prospects. I trust that you will weigh very carefully the immense responsibility which you would assume before history by depriving Australia of the glory of holding Tobruk till victory was won, which otherwise, by &©d8s help, will be theirs f o r e v e r .39

But Fadden was not persuaded to change his request. Thus Churchill sent him a telegram on Sept. 15th reading s ^Orders will at ©nee be given in accordance with your decision. The maintenance of secrecy for the hQ present is of the highest consequence to all.*8 A much longer tele­ gram to Auehinleek from Churchill shows Churehill9 s depth of under­ standing of Australian polities and his wish to keep unity with all

Commonwealth Governments ?

3^Churchill, op.eit.. p. 411. 39lbid., p. 413.

^ I b i d . 96

I am grieved at Australian attitude, but I have long fear­ ed the dangerous reactions on Australian and world opinion of our seeming to fight all our battles in the Middle East only with Dominions troops. . . . 1 trust the Australian withdrawal will not further delay your offensive. The situation has already worsened. . General Auehinleck was so deeply offended by the Australian decision that he wanted to tender his resignation on grounds that he did not have the confidence of the Government of Australia. His resignation was turned down by Churchill who then tried to ease the situation by having Oliver

Lyttelton, Minister of State, write to Auehinleck. Lyttelton assured

Auehinleck of Australian confidence in his work and went on to say that,

I was astounded at Australian Government8s decision, being . sure it would be repudiated by Australia if the facts could be made known. Allowances must be made for a Government with a majority only of one faced by a bitter Opposition, parts of which at least are isolationist in outlook. ^

Thus, the second big conflict had been waged between the Aus­

tralian Government and Churchill. The first had been Measles.* request

for permanent Australian membership on the Imperial War Council, other

than the Prime Minister. This had been denied by Churchill. However,

after Menzies8 resignation, Churchill did suggest an envoy be sent to

London. This was not the answer the Australian Government wanted. For

this envoy would not be a principal. As Churchill stated, . . . Khe

would not be, could not be, a responsible partner in the daily work of

^Ibid. . ^ I b i d ., p. 414. 97 our Government„ Thereforea the problem had mot been solved.to the satisfaction of the Australian Government. It remained a constant source of irritation to the Australian Government that their troops should be used and the Government not be informed until after the deci­ sion was made. Australian officials wantfd to be on the talks at the planning level. This inadequate system was to plague the Government for the duration of the war and cause a great deal of hard feelings.

The second conflict, much more intenses was eventually solved to the satisfaction of the Government, in that the Australian troops were removed from Tobruk, Underlying both of these conflicts was one feature, the security of. Singapore. No one was more aware than the Australians, that the importance of Singapore had touched bottom with Churchill.

They had no illusions that it was impregnable. Now that Japan had been deprived of her overseas oil supplies, she might decide to attack the defenseless Malaya at any moment. Since America8s policy was puzzling, to say the least, and her actions could not be predicted with any assur­ ance, and since Churchill did not seem disposed to see the seriousness of the situation in the Far East, the Australian Government, going through many domestic crises, felt that their security was in having their troops where they could offer the best defense. The attitude of

Churchill and Roosevelt to knock out Germany first and then turn to

Japan did not help much.

The domestic political crises never ceased to command the atten-

^.3ibid,, p. 845. 98 tion ef the Australian public throughout August, September and October.

What so many had hoped for finally ©eeured. Fadden was forced to resign on October 4ths not on the question of foreign affairs but on its budget request. On this occasion, both independents (Coles and

Wilson) overthrew the existing government by voting with Labour. Curtin was selected as the new Prime Minister and took office on October 15th.

Curtin8s new government was to be anything faut rfa face-lifting device."

He was ready to step in and lead the country down a new path. The change to a Labour Government came at a time of rising hope in the pos­ sibility of averting war with Japan. There had been perhaps some inat­ tention to foreign affairs, by the public, during the political skirmishes, but the Australian optimism was not simply a failure by Australia to read the portents. It also reflected news from elseiahere, inasmuch as a hope­ ful picture was being presented to the Australian Government by the United

States and the United Kingdom. All that was needed to complete the pic­ ture and bring more confidence were assurances that Australian troops were being removed from Tobruk.

Upon assuming his office, Curtin assured the people that there would be no change in the war effort— it would continue at the maximum.

He still considered it a prime objective that the Australian voice be heard effectively in the making of political and strategic decisions in

London. He felt that the main point was not membership in the War

Cabinet.but the presence of a Minister in London to press constantly the Australian viewpoint. In this ease, it meant a Minister in London stressing the need for capital ships at Singapore. Curtih went so far 99 \ as to say that the Australian war effort was contingent on this fact„

If capital ships were sent to Singapore, then he would feel inclined to

have Australian troops fight overseas. At the same time, Curtin em­

phasized that war expenditures would have to be stepped up. He had been in office less than half a month when he made a broadcast appeal on be­

half of the amount of $100,000,000 war lean he had brought before

Parliament. According to Professor Partridge„ this was ftan enormous

step in a budget which had otherwise been peanuts.In this meas­

ure, Curtin had the backing of Fadden, the leader of the Opposition

Party. The new Prime Minister also was in me way ready to acquiesce in

the prevailing Anglo-American view of the war situation, that is, the

Atlantic first, the Pacific second. This view, however, would not be

emphasized until later. With Curtin came the birth of an obvious Aus­

tralian foreign policy.

Churchill seized upon the opportunity of a new prime minister

to contact Curtin concerning the withdrawal of troops. On October 14th,

he sent this telegram to Curbing

I feel it right to ask you to reconsider once again the issue raised in my telegram to your predecessor. I have heard again from General Auehimleck that he would be very greatly helped and eonvenieneed if the remaining Australian troops could stay in Tobruk until the result of the approaching battle is decided. I will not repeat the arguments which I have already used, but I will only add that if you felt able to consent, it would not expose your troops to any undue or invidious risks, and would at the same time be taken very kindly as an act of comradeship in the present struggle. 5

^Partridge s

^Churchill, p. hl6 . 100

Inasmuch as Curtin8s Government did not desire to reverse his predecessor8s decision, Churchill was forced to inform the General that the Australian troops were to be relieved„ Disquieting news reached the Australian people that in the midst of Japanese=Ameriean talks the Japanese Government suffered a shake-up and General iBjo had become Premier on October l?th. The newspapers con­ veyed this event to the people. "Fears in the Democracies that Japan intends to make some warlike move grew during the weekend following the announcement of the personnel and policy of the new Army-controlled

Cabinet in Tokyo, , , Die Australian newspapers throughout the end of October reported that it appeared certain that although Americans did not want war, war was surely moving toward them.

Curtin received a bit of encouraging news from Sir Earle Page,

Australia8 s Envoy Extraordinary, who had dropped off for a visit to the

United States, on his way to London, Page had learned in Washington of the reinforcement of the Phillipines and the planned military buildup which was to reach completion by early 194-2, He reported to Curtin that

General Marshall had said that such a buildup would be such a serious menace to Japan that she would be forced to withdraw from the Axis, A few days later, Curtin received another telegram from an entirely dif­ ferent source that was even more encouraging, On Oct, 26th, Churchill telegraphed that he was sending the Prince ttf Wales to join the Repulse in the Indian Ocean to further deter Japan, He also mentioned that four

Herald, October 20, 194-1, p» 1, 101 more battleships would be sent as soon as they were ready, Churchill went ©n to say that it was his ©pinion, and that of his advisors, that

Japan realized that she had overextended herself and after the five years ©f war with China would not risk further war unless or until

Russia had been decisively broken. In another telegram ©n quite another matter, Churchill wrotes Our new fast minelayer, Latona, was sunk and the destroy­ er Hero damaged by air attack last night in going to fetch the last twelve hundred Australians remaining in Tobruk, Providentially, your men were not on board. I do not know our casualties. Admiral Cunningham reports that it will not be possible to move these twelve hundred men till the next, dark period, in November. Everything in human power has been done to comply with your wishes .^7 Taking everything into consideration, the situation had brightened

considerably for Australia. By the middle of November, Page had reached London and the War

Cabinet was considering his strongly prepared ease for the further

strengthening of Singapore, Churchill used this occasion to express

his view that “the correct strategy was to move armed strength from theatre to theatre as the situation changed, and that consequently it would be an error to move forces to the Far East . . . where they might

remain inactive for a year He further went on to say that if

Japanese aggression should take place, it would be British policy, even

if it meant sacrifices, to wait until President Roosevelt took action.

^7Churehill, op. eit,, p. 4-1?. ^®Hansergh, op. eit., p. 122. 102 Then Churchill would, act "not within the hoar, but within the minute.”

One thing was certain, Churchill was not going to be caught fighting

a war in the Far East without American assistance. On this subject, the Australian Government took exception to Churchill8 s view. For they believed that the British nations should act as one, with or with- .

out American assistance. Although this was a patriotic stand for the

Australian Government, Churchill did not regard it as sane, To begin fighting the Japanese alone in the Pacific was clearly out of the realm of physical possibility. But to the Australians, who wanted to hear that Britain would defend them, Churchill8 s words rang with insincerity and suggested reluctance to protect part of the British Commonwealth.

As Churchill6s feelings became known to the Australian people, they could not help but turn elsewhere for encouragement and reassurance.

He was no longer their shining hero offering promises of an impregnable

Singapore that would be able to hold the Japanese menace until the

British Fleet arrived. Instead, he was the war leader of Great Britain

#io had a huge task on his shoulders and seemingly did not appreciate the fear of attack felt by the defenseless Australians. His assurance that it was not within Japan's power to invade Australia did not help a frightened people. His attitude that the Allies might have to suffer losses until Britain found the opportunity to send troops only reawakened the Australians to the fact that Britain was extremely weak in the Pacific.

This was expeeially true when one considers that the losses could very well be Australian lives. % late November and early December,

Australians were beginning to see the situation more starkly, A sense 103 of iapendiag danger settled over the country, "Where to turn?”

"What would happen when war came?” were questions echoed throughout the country. It appeared that Churchill could not or would not give satis­ faction to the Australians, It still was difficult to rely on the

United States when their actions were so unpredictable and a champion was needed immediately. But what to do? In the wake of this distress

Curtin made a broadcast, "The dangers in the Pacific are very.great,

Nobody in Australia knows the hour at which we may be called upon to defend ourselves , , On November 29th» "Curtin » , , said he passed from that hope to a consideration of the impending war and revealed the core of Aus­ tralian anxiety, , „ „ There seemed to him to be a grave danger of further armed aggression by Japan without any arms intervention by the United States,"5© That evening his worst suspicions were realized when the news reached him that Japan was about to attack Thailand,

Curtin9 s immediate reaction was to ask what Britain intended to. do about it, It is at this point that there, was a complete divergence 51 of view between the Australian Government and Churchill, Churchill8s answer to Curtin's question was completely unsatisfactory as far as

Curtin was concerned. According to Churchill* the British attitude was I

^Bulletin (Sydney)* November 26* 1941* p, 6 .

5%asluek* op, oit,, p. 548,

53-Ibld,, p, 554, 104 to "march In line with the United States of America.In the event of a Japanese attack, Britain would immediately declare war on Japan, but otherwise she would wait for America. The Australian view was still that the British Commonwealth should act with or without American assis­ tance. Aware of Churchill"s views, Curtin's objective was to align Australia with the United States in every way he could and encourage the United States to enter the war in the event of an attack on Thailand.

In this regard, the Ministerial Statement issued by Dr. Evatt, Minister of External Affairs on November 2?th takes on added significances

. . . At the outset I take the opportunity of stating that the recent change of government in this country does not imply any vital change in Australia's foreign policy. Indeed, through the instrumentality of the Advisory Mar Council, continuity in external policy is assured to a substantial degree. .’. . Australia has a supreme and special interest in preventing forcible aggression in the Pacific. . . . At this difficult time in our history, Australia is fortunate in having the friendship and cooperation of the President and the people of the United States of America. The policy of that country has been governed in the main by her determination to safeguard against all forms of aggression the Western Hemisphere and her important Pacific territories. . . Thus the objectives of the United States and of Britain are similar.53

As the "Yellow Peril" moved southward, Australia could only helplessly count her defenses. "At home Australia had one armoured division with very little armour and seven semi-equipped and semi­ trained militia divisions. She had a numerically large air force but

52Ibid.

5 % . V. Evatt, Foreign Policy of Australia. (Sydneys Angus and Robertson LTD, 1945), p. 1. 105 it was .chiefly a training organization* » . It was obvious to

Curtin that New Zealand and Australia would not be able to defend the

Southwest Pacific alone, "Whatever the reasons„ it was plain that Churchill did not intend to defend the area any more than he had already done until the United States took action. The only course of action left ©pen to

Curtin was to appeal to Roosevelt,

i^Sir Frederick Eggleston, p. 395° CHAPTER V

Au s t r a l i a n , Am e r i c a n / A © p a c i f i c s e c u r i t y

Australian governmental officials were keenly aware that Great

Britain8 s power in the Pacific had declined tremendously since 1939° Aware also that Australia8s power was not sufficient to stop any Japan­

ese onslaught— indeed 8 she did not even assume she could hold her own

country— Australians looked feverishly for someone to fill the vacuum

created by Britain8s decline„ Australia had been trying to wake America from her complacency so that America might assume the leadership in the

Pacifico She had not had much success„ But at no time, thus far, had

she put America first and Great Britain second in her thoughts of Pacific

security. The practice had always been to look to. Great Britain for

leadership, attempting always to make the Australian viewpoint known to

the Prime Minister, In the ease of impending invasion of Thailand, for

example, Curtin asked Churchill what he was going to do if the invasion

took place, When Churchill replied that he was going to declare war on

Japan and then wait for America to take action, Curtin8s reaction was -

that the British Commonwealth should act together and not wait for America

The reason for this was rather obvious, Australia wanted Great Britain

to commit herself in the Pacific and consequently come to the defense of

Australia, Despite the fact that she had been terribly disappointed in

Great Britain in the past, Australia still had faith in the mother country Australians had a hard time understanding the policy of America„ They felt that war was drawing closer to the United States with each day, hut were unsure whether America would be in the war before Australia's position was jeopardized. This question plagued the Australians who now became committed wholeheartedly to the task of trying to awaken America to her responsibility in the Pacific. Instrumental in presenting the Australian viewpoint was E. G.

Casey, Australian Ambassador to America. Casey was the first diplomatic representative appointed by Australia to a foreign country. The reason for this appointment, which occurred in If39$ was stated very adequately by Caseys . . . We recognized that it had become unreasonable and inap­ propriate to continue to ask the United Kingdom to watch all •ease, interests throughout the world, and that we should new shoulder some of this burden ourselves. Moreover, we had reached a state where Australia had problems of its own which could not be properly handled except by Australians.^

Casey considered it part of his job in the United States to make Australia as widely known as possible with as much speed as possible. Upon his arrival in the United States, early in If^O, he got right to the business at hand. When asked what the attitude of the United States was, Presi­ dent Roosevelt replied, in very diplomatic terms, that the element of distance denoted a declining interest on the part of the United States.

Throughout If40, Casey made himself known to those people who made and/or

3-Casey, R. G., Friends and Neighbors. (East Lansing: The Michigan State College Press, 1955)‘$ pV lo... IQS molded American public opinion. It had been stressed earlier by Cordell

Hull that with the presidential election coming soon,, the President had to be careful not to get. too far ahead of public opinion. As Casey saw it

There was no doubt that President Roosevelt and Cordell Hull were convinced that Britain was fighting America8s war, and the United States would have to take her proper place beside us in due course, but to achieve this, they were dependent on American public opinion being convinced that American interests were really and demonstrably at stake, and in 1940 this was not the case.2

As the months flew by while Casey was representing Australia in

Washington, the American view toward the war changed. Casey reported

each of these changes, however slight they might have been, to the Aus­

tralian Prime Minister. At the same time, he recorded in his diary$

"Eighteen months in Washington impressed bn me the usefulness of an

Australian diplomatic post in the United States. . . . Umitbd Kingdom

representatives are naturally so engrossed in their own problems that

'Dominion problems tend to be overlooked or insufficiently appreciated.

By November of 1941, Casey was able to record the noticeable effect of

his presence in Washington. "Since Lend-Lease has been in operation, we

have been getting American requisitions approved and orders placed two

or three times more quickly, relatively, than other countries, including

the United Kingdom.Casey8 s importance to Australia in Washington

2Ibid.„ p. 40

% b i d ., p. 68 should never fee minimized. Through his endeavors, a country that was a

great distance away was brought closer so that when, the time for action

cames the bonds of friendship were already tightly tied. In addition to Casey8 s appointment, Sir John Latham had been appointed First Australian Minister to Japan on August 18, 1940. For

some time previously9 Australia had been complaining of the lack of

communication between Britain and the other members of the British

Commonwealth. lews about Japan was slow in coming and many times was

slanted to the viewpoint of the home government. Australia felt a

strong need to know what was currently happening in Japan. Beside this

desire to be well informed about the movements of the Japanese govern­ ment was the wish to avoid a war with Japans if at all possible. There­ fore 9 the appointment of Latham had a dual purpose and was designed to promote peace between the two countries.

Despite the fact that Casey kept Australia informed on America’s

reactions* Australians did not understand that American leaders were not

seeing the same series of events in the same light. Curtin never did

quite understand that Roosevelt agreed with Churchill that the danger in the Atlantic was the chief danger. Recognizing that Great Britain was

occupied elsewhere and that the Pacific was not of vital importance to her, Curtin began looking to the United States for diplomatic leadership

in the Pacific. Even so, Australia hastened to inform the American

Government that

» , . defensive measures to deter Japan from aggression Should not close the door to an understanding with Japan so long as no vital interests were sacrificed during the course of any discussions and therefore that any warning to Japan 110

sfeomld reiterate the willingness and desire of the British Commonwealth fand America] to seek a general settlement in the Pacific: whieh proteeted the rights of all parties „5

Australia clearly was net willing to face a showdown alone against a

strong powero And Americans policy did not encourage the expectation

of American troops rushing to Australia8s defense„

But 8' as each day passed in early December and the news of the impending attack on Thailand filled the paperst Australians grew more

apprehensive, Churchill tried to relieve these apprehensions by issu­

ing encouraging reports that the prospect of a Japanese attack seemed very unlikely» More than words were needed to satisfy the Australians„

Churchill.knew this and had already sent the Prince of Wales and the

Repulse to Singapore, where they arrived on December 29 1941. On December 4 a The Sydney Morning: Herald was filled with a number of

articles concerning the arrival of these ships. One article said;

•Australia can be comforted from the knowledge that such powerful units

are so near her in the event of trouble Another stated; ••The arrival

of a British Fleet at Singapore is hailed . „ „ as Britain8s answer to

Japanese threats of a thrust from Indo-China against ThailandThe

Australians were greatly encouraged by this show of strength from the

mother country.

Churchill had sent these ships to Singapore ‘•to exercise that

SHasluekg Paul, op. eit., p. 546.

^Sydney Morning Herald. December 4, 1941» p. 9.

?Ibid.s p. 2 . Ill kind of vague menace which capital ships of the highest quality whose whereabouts is unknown can impose upon all hostile naval calculations.”8

A tremendous importance was placed on these two ships by both Churchill and Curtin, Still another effort to restore confidence to the Australians was being accomplished. This effort, the evacuation of Australian troops, was still very much against Churchill’s advice. However, it was being carried out and at a considerable loss. Although done in secret, it gave Australian officials a safe feeling to know that soon they would be defended by their own troops. ' As encouraging as the previously cited articles may have been, another article in the same paper on the same date offered consolation to them from another quarters "The ’Hew York Herald Tribune8 sayss

’The United States of America must now be prepared to accept war in the

Far East at the moment Japan chooses to take the colossal risk. This does not mean that the U.S.A. is ready to fight for Singapore, Burma, or the Indiesj but for its own security in a civilized future.8 As grim and foreboding as this may have sounded, the Australians could only read it with hope. Hope that America would soon, be in the war.

Each day brought fresh reports of the movements of the Japanese.

Some were hearsay, others were fact. On December 7, 1941, the worst fears of Australia were realized. In one night, with one deadly blow,

Japan secured virtual command of the Pacific. Australia’s trained

^Churchill, on. cit., p. 615.

^Sydney Horning Herald, op. pit. 112

divisions.were still overseas, her aircraft were almost nonexistent, and.

her long coastlines were indefensible. Curtin announced over the radio

and in the newspapers s ,sWe are at war with Japan. That has happened

because in the first instance, Japanese naval and air forces launched an

unprovoked attack on British and United States territory. . . . This is

our darkest heur,*^® Curtin was mistaken, their darkest hour was yet to

come. The “Yellow Peril® was going to move much closer than Pearl Harbor.

The world was shocked by this event. Churchille upon hearing the

report over the wireless, called President Roosevelt immediately. When

he was able to reach him, the Presidents comment was, "It's quite true.

They have attacked us at Pearl Harbor. We are all in the same boat

now. Mot only were the Allies shocked by this momentous Japanese

attack, but so was Hitler. The attack on Pearl Harbor was a striking

example of the disunity of the Axis Powers. The major effort of Germany and Italy in the West was spent before the Japanese ally irrupted in the East. . . . Far from strengthening the non-interventionists in the United States, as Ribbentrop hoped, the Japanese by their attack on the American Fleet had done the one thing necessary to unite popular sentiment behind an interventionist President.

When the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor, Australia began to face the reality that, for the first time in her century and a half of existence, her own country might become a battlefield. Unlike the

lOlbid., December 9» 1#1, p. 7. Uchurchill, ©p. elt.. p. S@5 *

•^Mansergh, op. eit., pp. 126=27. 113 Americans9 who panieked on the West Coast of America, the Australians faced the situation with stiff resolve„ After Pearl Harbor enlistment figures jumped sharply. Curtin had promised he would not put a selec­ tive service act in, and he did not at this time. The danger became so obvious, as did the need for home forces, that it is estimated that five out of six Australian adult males were under arms, or engaged in war 13 industry of some kind after December 7, 19^1. The situation was to get much worse and, as it did, Australia braced herself for the supreme crisis— the invasion of her homeland.

The welcoming news that America had entered the war was almost stifled by the news of her losses at Pearl Harbor. As Roosevelt related this tragic news to his people, Churchill was calling a meeting to review the naval position in the Pacific. On December 9th, this is how he saw its . „ . We tried to measure the consequences of this fundamental change in our war position against Japan. We had lost the command of every ocean except the Atlantic. Australia and New Zealand and all the vital islands in their sphere were open to attack. We had only one key weapon in our hands. % e Prince of Wales and the Repulse had arrived at Singapore. 1$ '

Churchill further stated that he toyed with the idea of sending the two

British ships to join those American ships left in the Pacific. It would have been a grand, heroic, and symbolic gesture. However, on the next day, Churchill heard that the decision of how best to use The Prince

T3Timperley, H.J., Australia and the Australians. New .Yorks Oxford University Press, 19%, p. 29. >

l^Churchill, op. clt.„ p. 615. 114 of Wales and the Bepulse had been taken out of his hands»

To the horror and dismay of the British and Australians alike 8 the Japanese had sunk the two British battleships in the Gulf of Siam on December 109 1941. These two ships that had brought so much hope to the British Dominions in the Pacific were completely destroyed by Japanese bombers<, Churchill records his reaction to the news thus:

o » , So I put the telephone down. I was thankful to be alone. In all the war I never received a more direct shock. The reader of these pages will realize how many efforts, hopes, and plans foundered with these two ships. . « » There were no British or American capital ships in the Indian Ocean or the Pacific except the American survivors of Pearl Harbor, who were hastening back to California. Over all this vast expanse of waters Japan was supreme, and we everywhere weak and n a k e d . 5

The combination of naval losses suffered by the Americans and British gave the Japanese full command of the Pacific. They how could attack at any point in the Far East with any force. Fortunately, the area was so vast that to expand too far southward would cause them to overextend themselves. But, how many countries would go down before this point was reached?

Newspapers and radios blared the reports of the Japanese successes in the Pacific. However, it was not until December 16, 1941, that the full news was made official in a statement by Dr. Evatt to the Australian

House of Representatives. Evatt chose this moment to sum up Australia $s reaction to the Japanese victories in the Pacific and in Southeast Asia.

l^lbid., p. 620. 115

» . % the extension of the war to: the Pacific j, the Com­ monwealth has been placed in a situation of special danger» Before war came into the Pacific„ we had entered into com­ mitments to the best of our abilitya Our airmen are fight­ ing in England, They are training in Canada, Our sailors have fought their ships in many of the seven seas„ Our soldiers have fought with indomitable courage on distant shores in Europej, in Africa, in Asia* . But what of the defense of these shores? The Govern­ ment has been stocktaking» It has inherited a situation in - which* for one reason or another* the defense of our country has been treated as a subordinate and subsidiary part of the distant war. From now onwards we shall be thrown back more and more upon our own resources» . „ » So far as we are con­ cerned, we shall continue our efforts to assist in the pro­ curement of a full alliance between Russia and all the enemies of Japan to the end that these engaged against the three Axis Powers shall form a solid and impregnable , barrier against those whose will it is to dominate the world. ° The fact"that America had the Allies could not erase the fact that the Japanese were having their way in the Pacific „ Host

Australians agreed with the views stated in the Bulletin on December

17$ fFTn the long run, it will be shown that the Japanese lost more than they gained when they attacked Hawaii „ , . . Divided, the British

Empire and the United States— behind which stand most of the Latin-

American Republics— are conquerable. United, they can and will conquer

. .*17. But, meanwhile, the chain of victories of Pearl Harbor, Guam,

Sarawak, and Tarakan revealed unsuspected Japanese strength and gave initial weaknesses on the part of the Allies, A dominant diplomatic aim of Australia always had been to prevent a situation in which Japan would be at war with Australia without the United States being

l%vatt» op» cit o, p, 75»

^-^Bulletin (Sydney), December 17, 1941, p. 8 . at war -with. Japan at the same time. This had been achieved» but certainly net in a manner that Australia had foreseen. America had declared war on

Japan, but she was so crippled by her losses that, no one could estimate how long it would take her to recover.- In the meantime9 Australians were clamoring for aid. Each day seemed to bring bad news t© the Aus­ tralians. : On December 24th, Wake fell. On December 25th, the British

Crown colony on Hong Kong fell. During these last few weeks, the air and naval forces of the Netherlands East Indies and the United States had done appreciable damage to Japanese warships and transports, but, in comparison with the Japanese conquests, these damages were meager.

As the days went by, the Japanese war machine rolled on. Telegrams between Churchill and Curtin increased in frequency.

They exemplify the inability of each to appreciate the situation as seen by the other. Churchill had to make decisions that involved the entire war effort and, although he sympathized with the Australians, he felt he could net jeopardize Britain8s position in the other theaters by send­ ing the aid that Curtin requested to the Pacific. Curtin, on the other hand, saw, the situation grow more alarming with each day and continually felt that Churchill was not giving enough urgency to the matter,

. . . The Australian Government lacked full confidence, not only in Britain8s appreciation of Pacific perils, but also in her readiness to help within her range of active comprehension, be­ cause of the strategic preconceptions her government entertained. So it was that in the face of military and naval disasters which seemed daily to bring,nearer.the prospect of Japanese invasion, many Australians concluded that Britain had deliberately neglected the Pacific in an understandable if mistaken concentration on the European and Middle Eastern theatres of war, and mere ser­ iously, that her strategy was determined by an incorrect and complacent underestimate of Japanese power 11? Within the telegrams sent t© Ghortiaill from Gurtin tms invariably the message stressing the need for reinforcements for Singapore. .Cmrtin was fully aware that the reinforcements that he requested would have to some from the Middle East and he said"so. He also let it be known that if Malaya was to be saved,' the deeisions and action had to be taken immediately. He reiterated the promises made by the United Kingdom

Government of an impregnable Singapore. Upon these promises had been . based all of Australia8® defense plans. Australia had dispatched troops overseas in the light of assurances regarding Singapore. As the Yellow . . ' , 4 ■ ■■ .. Peril swept southward j, Gmrtirn did not feel that Churchill was doing all in his power to help in the Pacific. The Australian Government became even more outspoken in their criticisms of the Imperial Government.

One consequence of the American entry into World War IX was that attention shifted from exclusively Gommomwealth organisations to Anglo- .

American cooperation. In the. Pacific, it certainly appeared that the

United States was going to have to take the lead in stopping the

Japanese. At least this is the way Ourtin saw the picture. As Prime '

Minister of Australia during Australia's most trying period of existence,

Curtin had never gotten along to© well with Churchill. No one was more aware of this than Churchill when he saidt "At this moment however, when pressures from all sides were so fierce, I was too conscious of the depth and number of the differences in outlook that divided us, . . It . became Curtin's objective to stir the great power ©f America into action

Churchill, Winston, The Second World War. Vol. A, Hinge of Fate. (Bostons ,. Houghton Mifflin Company11^ ifli")' p. 5® 118 in the Paeifie8 especially since he was not having tmieh .success with Churchill „

Oa December 2?» 19^1» Curtin delivered the most controversial speech of his career» Published first in the Melbourne Herald and later carried by the other major papers, Curtin said, in parts

We refuse to accept the dictum that the Pacific struggle must be treated as a subordinate segment of the general con­ flict „ %- that it is not meant that any one of the other theatres of war is of less importance than the Pacific, but that Australia asks for a concerted plan evoking the great­ est strength at the Democracies8 disposal, determined upon hurling Japan back. The Australian Government therefore regards the Pacific struggle as primarily one in which the United States and Australia must have the fullest say in the direction of the Democracies8 fighting plan. Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links with the United Kingdom, We know the problems that the United Kingdom faces„ We know the constant thredt of invasion. We know the dangers of dispersal of strength. But we know too that Australia can go, and Britain can still hold on. We are therefore determined that Australia shall notgo, and we shall exert all our energies toward the shaping of a plan, with the United States as its keystone, which will give to our country some confidence of being able to hold out until the tide of battle swings against the enemy. Summed up, Australian external policy will be shaped toward" obtaining. Russian aid, and working out , with the United States, as the major factor, a plan of Pacific strategy, along with British, Chinese, and Dutch fo r c e s . ^0

Behind this speech lay many grievances. Regardless of the encouraging words of Churchill, Curtin felt that they were no more than that, words, Although Churchill,assured Curtin he was doing everything possible, he did not feel that it would be wise to remove forces from the Middle East, where victory was so near. To Curtin,

2QI b i d .. p. 8. 119 ■she eduld not or would not see the whole picture, Churchill8s promises were not enough. The faet that Australia still did not have what she

considered her rightful role in the Imperial War Council added more fuel to the fire. The Australian Government was keenly aware that she lay naked in the wake of Japanese aggression as a result of her troops

serving in the Middle East, The naval power, on which she had so long

relied for her protection, had been swept away, if only temporarily. Her coastline, where all her cities were located, would be impossible

to. defend, A reaction due to the aforementioned conditions, was ex­

pected, But few in Australia or abroad, were ready for Curtin’s dec­ laration,

Curtin’s speech was received with varying degrees of feeling

from the people he represented. Some frankly wondered exactly what he meant. Others said that even though theirjPrime Minister had been undiplomatic, he had hit the nail on the head, "For it appeared obvious

that British power had collapsed. The only question was, could America 21 fill the vacuum?11 In some circles, the opinion was voiced that "the 22 Pacific was now an American responsibility," Whether Curtin intended his speech to be so or not, it was "in essence a challenge to the Anglo-

American strategic policy which gave priority to the European theatre.

23-Professor Partrodge, on, eit. 9? Professor Miller, 120 Chmrehill was extremely critical ©f Curtin8 s speech» He felt sure that it did. net represent Australian feeling. He contacted several high officials who supported this view, and then went to the task of replying to Curtin®s declaration. The telegrams once again flew back and forth, Churchill explained again and again his motives concerning the war effort and offered Curtin more reassurances, Curtin, in answer, reminded Churchill of their agreement to relieve the 6th and 7th Aus­ tralian Divisions from the Middle East and continued to stress the importance of Singapore, and the need for further .reinforcements due to the absence of a main fleet. It is possible that it is only a coinci­ dence that, after Curtin®s public declaration, Churchill saw fit to ful­ fill those demands that Curtin had been making for some time. Within a few days. Prime Minister Churchill had agreed to the request that a representative of the Australian Government be appointed to the War

Cabinet who would have a part in the formulation and direction of policy.

It was regarded as a great advantage to the Australian Government to have someone in the Cabinet when arguments were shaped and tentative decisions made, Curtin was also able to secure the withdrawal of her troops from the Middle East to the Pacific theater, a movement that had been a long time in being carried out. Later, Curtin was to be successful in getting Australian representation on the Pacific War Council and the appointment of General MaeArthur®s headquarters to Melbourne,

Meanwhile, the utterances from abroad, in reaction to Curtin®s speech of December 27th, were such that he found it necessary to follow up with another speech. In this speechs dated December 30thg Curtin

assured the public that “Australia was steadfast in loyalty to the

British way of living and that Australians intended to preserve their

country as part of the British Commonwealth. . . 11 It was hoped that this would placate those who had misinterpreted Curtin8 s first article as a denouncement of the British Commonwealth, It had not been his

intention to break with the British Commonwealth. Bor did he say in his speech that the Pacific theater was the only theater of danger.

His appeal to America, though unorthodox, was realistic. He was striv­ ing to announce to the one power that could help Australia put of what appeared to be a hopeless situation that Australia looked to them for military assistance. In effect9 Curtin was saying the Australians were ready to receive orders from America rather than from Great Britain, who was powerless to help Australia. Unfortunately, Curtin8s speech was misread and misinterpreted by many, and caused rather difficult rela­ tions between Churchill and Curtin for the next few months.

Throughout January of 19^2, the battle for the Malayan Penin­

sula was being waged. It took only a few weeks to reveal the weakness

of British defenses. Japan, with her superior air force, precise pre­ war study of the conditions in Malaya, infiltration of agents, superior

strength in land forces which were adept in jungle warfare, had every

advantage. The British Commonwealth troops were forced to continuously retreat. The strategy "was to fight the battle for Singapore in Johore, but to delay the enemy8s approach thereto as much as possible."^5 ihe battles were exhausting to the British due to the Japanese successes and the availability of fresh Japanese troops. By the middle of Janaury9

General Wavell (who became Supreme Commander of the A.B.D.A. nations in the Southwestern Pacific within a. few days) made it know to Churchill that he had grave doubts of the ability of the British to maintain a prolonged defense of Singapore. Churchill, however, still believed that

Singapore would be able to hold out at least two months, thus giving the British precious time. Unfortunately, Churchill had not been com­ pletely informed on the status of the defenses of Singapore, as the telegram from General Wavell was to prove. Churchill wrotes

I must confess to being staggered by Wavell1s telegram of the l6th and other telegrams on the same subject. It never occurred to me for a moment . . that the gorge of the fort­ ress of Singapore, with its splendid moat half a mile to a mile wide, was not entirely fortified against an attack from the northward. . .2®

As the situation becameimre?idtear to Churchill, it began to take on a nightmare quality. He ordered the situation rectified, stating that defenses should be built while troops fought to defend the northern part of Johore. As Wavell sent messages daily on the deteriorating situation in Malaya, Churchill began to ponder the advisability of diverting the reinforcements on their way to Singapore to Rangoon.

25churehill, on. eit., p. 42. 123 It appeared to Churchill that Singapore was doomed„ and if this were trueg it was certainly not worth losing all those reinforcements and aircrafto However, the decision was not Churchill8s alone, since he turned the matter over to the Chiefs of Staff who, in turn, gave the responsibility to General Wavell, Allied Supreme. Commander„

The surprising outcome of the meeting of. the War Cabinet was not the difficulty in solving a complicated problem, but that Curtin was informed of the details of the meeting. Sir Earle Page, the Aus­ tralian representative, who had not been invited to the meeting, was shown a copy of the minutes and consequently telegraphed Curtin of their contents. Curtin8s reply to Churchill dated January 23, 194-2, was in the form of a severe reproach. . . . Page has reported that the Defense Committee has been considering the evacuation of Malaya and Singapore. After all the assurances we have been given, the evacuation of Singapore would be regarded here and elsewhere as an inex­ cusable betrayal. Singapore is a central fortress in the system of the Empire and local defense. . . . We under­ stood it was to be made impregnable, and in any event it was to be capable of holding out for a prolonged period until the arrival of the main fleet.... On the faith of the proposed flow of reinforcements, we have acted and carried out our part of the bargain. We expect you not to frustrate the whole purpose by evacua­ tion. The trend of the situation in Malaya and the attack on Rabaul are giving rise to a public feeling of grave uneasi­ ness at Allied impotence to do anything to stem the Japan­ ese advance, . . . ^7

Churchill was disturbed by Curtin8s telegram, especially the expression

l i b i d o, pp. 57-58 124 “’inexcusable betrayal,85 He felt that it was used unjustly. He explains that he was simply entertaining a variety of plans designed to avoid a disaster that was sure to come if the present course was followed.

After due consideration, it was decided that all efforts should be made to reinforce Singapore and maintain its defense„ Churchill makes it abundantly clear that this decision was not due to Curtin8 s message„ It was becoming apparent to him that the overwhelming opinion was against the abandonment of what was known to be the focal point of British defense in the Far East, Added to this feeling, was the realiza­ tion of. the effect it would have on the Americans as they fought on so stubbornly at Corregidor, So it was decided mot to evacuate Singapore, but rather to defend it as best they could.

In early Janaury, it had been assumed that Singapore would be able to withstand a siege for at least eight to ten weeks. By mid-

January, with all things being considered, this view was no longer valid.

But no one was prepared for “the worst disaster, and largest capitula­ tion of British history,fr^® In any event, Singapore fell on February

15, 1942, one week after the Japanese began their assault. The British losses were tremendous, including "the loss of two-thirds of the 8th

Australian Division,By Sunday, February 15th, there was only a few days of food reserves left for the military, there was practically no

28Ibid,, p. 92. 2%etherimgton, John, Blarney, (Melbourne 1 F, ¥, Cheshire, 1954) p, 129 o 125 gasoline left for vehicles, gun ammunition was very short, and the water

supply was not expected to last more than twenty-four hours. Under these

conditions9 General Percival saw fit to surrender unconditionally to the Japanese. It was indeed a dark moment, filled with reeriminationas, second thoughts, and anxiety.

Criticism from many circles was hurled at Churchill and the

Chiefs of Staff. It seemed impossible that this British bastion of defense could fall so quickly. Prom one source came the statement;

The ease of the impregnable fortress of, Singapore is a prime example of ill-thought-out and badly pursued strategy. . . . Its loss stemmed from a compound of. mis­ takes starting. . . in 1921.*. . . In the end it turned out to be not much better defended than by the paper upon which politicians had printed the label "impregnable." In 19^2 it was virtually given to the invaders who were most grateful to acquire its useful facilities.3" Others accused the Prime Minister of Britain of being so interested in affairs elsewhere that he had not given the necessary attention and aid to the Pacific. Accusations continued, but they dissipated in the wake of the continued Japanese aggression. To Curtin, the man who had consistently begged for a reassess­ ment of the Singapore situation, the task of informing his people of this latest catastrophe must have seemed dreadful. In his statement, over the radio, he referred to the fall of Singapore as Australia’s Dunkirk. He expressed the view that Australia was now in a battle to save Australia. Australians were told that their worst fears

3°Highman, Robin. Armed Forces in Peacetime. (London; G.T. Foulis And Company LTD, 1962) p. 277. *” 126

seemed possible, a Japanese attack on their homeland appeared imminent.

Curtin, and later Evatt, told their listeners that in the light of recent events it was necessary that they re-organize all their manpower and all their physical resources, with great speed, in order to resist invasion.

Certainly events were proving that Curtin's message of forebod­ ing might be accurate. In a scant five months all the bastions of Western power in the East had been toppled. The whole of the vast area and riches of these islands had fallen under Japanese control. On February 19th* just four days after Singapore had fallen„ the Japanese sent their bombers over Darwin, Broome and Wyndham and left these three towns devastated. „ . .The Japanese air raid on Port Darwin. . . was carried out by a strong force of bombers and dive bombers. There was much damage and many casualties and the raid was above all a remin­ der of the inability of Australia to defend her long coastline without the return of her own forces or their equivalent and additional assistance as well. The obstinacy of the Australian Government, therefore, in insisting on the return to Australia as soon as opportunity allowed of all the trained Australian divisions overseas, and the unforgettable welcome accorded to the first United States forces to land at Melbourne at the end of February, 1942, alike stemmed from this realization. Aus­ tralians needed reassurance that their island continent was not in fact destined to be left 'the orphan of the Pacific' at the mercy of a Japanese invader possessing so many of the dreadful attributes of legendary Yellow Peril.^

When Churchill asked the permission of Curtin to divert the Australian division returning home to Rangoon, he was met with a flat negative.

Churchill went on to stress that without such reinforcement, Burma

^Mansergh, op. eit., p. 140. 12? w o m M surely falls , -No one was more aware of the situation in Southeast Asia than Curtin„ However9 he felt that if one division were diverted, other Australian reinforeements would be required* The Australian division was returned to Australia by way of Colombo. Thus, tensions continued to increase between the two prime ministers.

On Bareh 8th, the Japanese invaded Hew Guinea. Australians saw the attempts to gain Hew Guinea and the nearby islands of Hew Britain,

Hew Ireland, and the Solomons as the first step in the strategy of the Japanese to launch an attack on their homeland. It appeared that Aus­ tralia would have to fight or perish. The fearful invasion never took place, but that does not alter the fact that the threat was real and grave. Three attacks on the outwork of Port Moresby failed. The threat was to continue, with varying degrees of gravity, until the end of

September.

Meanwhile, conditions worsened in other areas of the Pacific,

By May of 1942, Rangoon, Java, Burma, and Corregidor had fallen. Almost the entire area-of Southeast Asia lay in the hands of the Japanese.

The only bright spot, in an otherwise gloomy picture, was the arrival of General MaeArthur in Melbourne on March 17, 1942. Added to this was the Allied victory in the Battle of the Coral Sea waged May 4-8. By

July, the Japanese were at the height of their power, having defeated

Great Britain, United States and the Motherlands.

The series of British defeats in the Far Easts the loss of Hong

Kong, Malaya, Singapore, and Burma, served to lower the prestige of 128

Britain in the eyes ©f the Australians» This British Dominion passed into a partienlarly eritieal phase of sentiment0 Australians spoke of ineffective military leadership^ ©f weaknesses in the Colonial struc­

ture and of the lack of appreciation for the Australian position in

the Pacific„ The speeches of Curtin and Evatt during the months of

March and April rang with accusations of the complacency of the United

Kingdom to the developments in the Pacific. Aid was not coming fast

enough or in great enough numbers. Their old reliance on the United

Kingdom had gone. Australia now turned even more to the United States.

Therefores the speeches made in March and April took .on a dual purpose.

The second purpose9 and the more important8 of these speeches was to stress the need for more efficient coordinated machinery in the war effort in the Pacific. The broadcast of March lAth delivered by

Curtin was leveled directly at the United States„ as he said;

0 0 . W e never regarded the Pacific asa segment of the greater struggle. We did not insist that it was a primary theatre of war9 but we did say and events have so far* unhappily, proved us right,, that the loss of the Pacific can be disastrous. , . . Britain cannot, with all her commitments at the same time, go all out in the Pacific. The responsibility falls on we fsie] Australians. . . . I pledge you my word we will not fail. You, as I have said, must be our leader. We will pull knee to knee with you for every ounce of our weight. . . . It is a matter of some regret to us that, even now, after 95 days, of Japan’s staggering advance south,, ever south, we. have not obtained first-hand contact with America. Therefore, we propose sending to you our Minister of External Affairs Dr. H. V. Evatt , who is no stranger to your country, so that we may benefit from his discussions with your authorities. . . . It is now "work or fight" for everyone in Australia. . . . For the first time in the history of this country, a complete call up, or draft, as you refer to it in America, has been made. . . . But I give you this warning; Australia is the last bastion 129 between the West Coast ©f America and the Japanese a If Australia goesg the Americas are wide open e . With the appointment of Dr. Evattg Australia ©nee again had a representative in Washington. Casey had been requested by Churchill to serve as British Minister of State in the Middle East. Evatt*s messages to the U.S. House of Representatives stressed the need for

Australian=Ameriean cooperation, warned of the danger of underestimating the strength of Japan, and entreated America to act quickly and decisive­ ly in the Pacific. By September of 1942, Evatt8s speeches took on a new quality. By this time, the tide had turned. The Japanese advance was halted by Allied offensives launched in the Solomons and Hew Guinea.

Although Evatt continued to stress the necessity of coordinated action, it is clear that he was pleased with the quantity and quality of the aid received by Australia from America. The situation in the Pacific was indeed brighter as the Japanese suffered reverses in the Coral Sea,

Midway and the Solomons. Thereafter, the Allies regained many of the islands and also invaded such Japanese possessions as Gilbert, Marshall and Marianas Islands, as well as Two Jima and Okinawa. The war was not over, but clearly the danger to the homeland of Australia had receded.

As the danger receded and the cooperation between America and Australia increased, a sigh, of relief could be heard. Australia had finally found a power strong enough to protect her island continent. CHAPTER H

QOICLFSIOH

As the tide of battle turned and the immediate danger to their homeland subsided8 Australians began to re-evaluate the pieture. The invasion that they had expected never materialized» But the effect that the possibility of such an attack had on their countrymen would not be easily erased» Australia would never be the same. She emerged from World War II with a new resolve that had been shaped by her perilous isolation in 1941=2e lever would she forget her helplessness - at that time. The awareness that the United Kingdom was more interested in

Europe tha% in Asia* and hence had been so complacent about developments in the Pacific that she had definitely underestimated the power of Japan* caused great misgivings on the part, of Australians, This* coupled with

Australia8s minor role in the making of Pacific strategy when she was likely to be the victim of any miscalculation* served further to widen the gap between Mother Country and Dominion Government, Australians emerged from World War II with a determination to secure for themselves a position in the inner circle where Britain8s policies were made. No more would they quietly acquiesce in British dicta when those views, were contrary to those of Australia, She must be heard and her opinions must carry seme weight, Australia could not be satisfied as a mere.echo of United Kingdom foreign policy, The fact that she had turned to the United States in 131 her hear of need did not alter her desire to he an effective member of the British Commonwealth. Instrumental in molding Australian publie opinion along these lines was the Prime Minister of Australia9 Curtin« He was an Australian nationalist with a strong will to keep the identity of the country frora being submerged in a wider imperial unity0 His aim was to safeguard \

Australiae To do so, he felt it necessary that his country have a bigger role in the making of British policy. He was loud in his pro™ tests, and at times, rather undiplomatic„ But he had learned through the force of events that the easy security that Australia had once enjoyed ,, because she was a member of the British Empire was gone, Curtin told, his people that the place which Australia would occupy in the Pacific after the war could never be the same as it was up to 1939• He stressed that

Australia, along with New Zealand, should be able to initiate and for~a mulate Pacific policies, rather than just be heard. This became a. recurrent theme in the speeches of Australian leaders. It was further proposed that Australia receive the support of all the United Kingdom so that she could carry out this role effectively, Curtin emphasized _ that he saw Australia as the power that would stand for democracy in . the South Pacific, But to do so effectively meant that not only Great .,

Britain but also the dominions, each in respect of its own area, should have a greater share in making and carrying out policies. The fact that his views were supported by a majority of his countrymen was 132 indicated by the election results of 19^3 which returned him to office by a substantial margin. Curtin* then* was indeed expressing the views of his people. The events from 1939-1942 had forced Australia to mature rapidly.

Among other things„ she was compelled to formulate a foreign policy of

her own. True* she did not have the adequate strength to enforce it

alone. However* she had found a new champion who now assured her that the leadership of the Pacific would be placed back in the hands of a Western power. This champion was the United States. They alone had

proved that they had the adequate strength to handle the situation.

Moreoverg the United States of America had the interests and ties in the Pacific and this definitely was to the advantage of Australia. In the years to come, Australia began to shape her foreign policy regarding

the Pacific so that it would be compatible with that of the United States.

This is not imply a complete acceptance of all details of American

policy, but rather shows a recognition that, in the last resort, the

security of Australia is closely tied to that of the United States.

Experiences in 1941-42 had impressed upon all those in Australia

and New Zealand the need for solid guarantees for the future of their

countries, Aware that the United States had interests in the Pacific

but also fully realizing that they lay on the perimeter of the United

States8 defensive system, Australia and New Zealand sought further

reassurances. Fear that they might be expendable in the eyes of Wash­

ington, due to so many American commitments in other parts of the world. 133 eaused them t© seek guarantees. This goal was realized when the Pacific

Security Agreement was signed by Australia and New Zealand with the

United States.

The war in Europe had begun on September 3» 1939» and ended on

May 8, 19^5» The war in the Pacific had begun on December ?» 1941, and ended on August 15, 1945« At the outset, the countries of the British

Commonwealth were not prepared for a war of survival. Ejy 1945, their resources- were geared to the waging of a war on a scale hitherto uncon­ templated when Hitler8s armies began their march. Australians anxieties and consequent resolution to remain an independent democratic nation are but part of the story of those years. LIST GF REFERENCES

Bailey, Thgaaas A. A Bj-plomatie listory of the Ameriean People. lew Xerks Appleton-Century-Grofts„ Ine., 1950• lerton, Hugh. Japan8s Modern Century. lew Xerks The Ronald Press Company, 1955. Garter, Gwendolen. The British Commonwealth and International Seeurity. ■ Torontos The Ryerson Press, 19^7« ' • 1 ......

Casey, Lord. Personal Experience 1939«1946. Londons Constable and CompanFm^CTrBl27^~^~ . ' . Friends and Neighbors. East Lansing s The Michigan State College Press, 1955. Churehill, Winston. The Second World War. Vol. 2s The Gathering Storm. Bostons Houghton Mifflin Company, 19&8. . The Second World War. "Vol. 3$ The Grand Allianee. Bostons Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950.

. The Second World War. Vol. 4s The Hinge of Fate. Bostons Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950. • . Memoirs of the Sesond World War. Bostons Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959. . While England Slept. New Xorks S.P. Putnam8s Sons, 1938. Coleman, Peter (ed.). Australian Civilization. Melbournes F.W. Cheshire. 19

Eden, Anthony. Faoing the Bietators. Bostons Houghton &fflin Company. 1962 Evatt, H.V. Foreign Policy of Australia. Sydneys Angus and Robertson LTD, 1945.

Fitzpatriek, Brian. The Australian Commonwealths A Picture of the Community 19Q1%1955. Melbournes Cheshire, 1956. .

Friedman, I.S. British Relations with Chinas 1931-1939. New Xorks InstitutT^T~^eifie~leIaEa^s7^^W.

134 135 Gratton, C. Hartley (ed.). Australia. Los Angeless University of California Press „ 1 9 W 7 ™ " ”™ Hankey, Lord. Diplomaey By Conference„ Londons Ernest Benn Limited, 1946,

Hasluekg Paul. Tke Government and the People', 1939-1941. Canberras Australian War Memorial, 195^« Hetheringtong John. Blarney. Melbournes P.M. Cheshire, 195^. Highman, Robin. Armed Forees in Peacetime. Londons G.T. Foulis and Company Limited, 1942. Horsfall, J.C. Australia. New Yorks Fredrick A. Praeger, 1955°

Keith, Berriedale. Speeches and Documents on the British (Dominions. 1918=31° Londons Oxford University Press, 1935- Langer and Gleason. The Challenge of Isolation. New Yorks Harper Brothers, 1952. Mansergh, Nicolas. Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs. Vol. 1, New Yorks Oxford University Press, 1958.

Oxford University Press, 1958. Morris, Ivan (ed.). Japan 1931=1945. Bostons B.C. Heath and Company,

, 1963o , . Rose, Saul. Britain and Southeast Asia. Londons Chatto and Windus, I962. Roseeranee, S.N. Australian Diplomaey and Japan. 1945-1951. New Yorks Cambridge UniversityPress, 1962. Shepherd, Jack. Australia9s Interests and Policies in the Far East. New Yorks Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940. Silcock, T.H. The Commonwealth Economy in Southeast Asia. Durhams Duke University Press, 1959.

Taylor, A.J.P. The Origins of the Second World War. Londons Hamish Hamilton, I96I Timperley, H.J. Australia and the Australians. New Yorks Oxford University Press, 1952. 136

Articles and Periodicals

Bulletin (Sydney)» 1940=1941

Grattan9 C e Hartley. IFThe Australian Political Seesaw, ^ January, 1953?■PP- 434-437• Sydney Morning Herald. 1940-1941.

Public Documents

U. S. Department of Commerce. Foreign Commerce Wash' ingtons United States Government Printing Office, 1935» P® 318.

Unclassified Studies

The League of Nations, Official Journal, Minutes of the Session of the Council. 12th year. No. 12, p. 2290

Unpublished Material

0 8Donnell, Wilfrid J. *British-Japanese Relations 1931-1939." Unpublished Master8s thesis. University of Arizona, 1963.

Other Sourees

Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. Interview with Professor Bruce Miller, member of the Department of Interna­ tional Relations— Pacific Studies Branch. July 11, 1964.

. Interview with Professor Partridge, Head of Political Science Department. July 15, 1964.

. Interview with Sir Alan Watt, Head of the Department of International Relations. July 10, 1964.

University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia. Interviews with the Heads of the History Department and Political Science Depart­ ment. June, 1964.