DOCSLIB.ORG

AUSTRALIA's SECURITY, 1939-1942S LONDON OR WASHINGTON?

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
AUSTRALIA's SECURITY, 1939-1942S LONDON OR WASHINGTON? Australia's security, 1939-1942: London or Washington? Item Type text; Thesis-Reproduction (electronic) Authors Burns, Barbara Ruth, 1935- Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 04/10/2021 22:32:59 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/317958 AUSTRALIA'S SECURITY, 1939-1942s LONDON OR WASHINGTON? fey Barbara Rath Barns A Thesis Sabmitted to the Faealty of the BEPARTMEiT OF HISTORY In partial Falfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS In the Graduate College THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 19 6 6 STATEMENT BY AUTHOR This thesis has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at the University of Arizona and is deposited in the University library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library, Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable without special permission, provided, that accurate acknowledgement of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the Bean of the Graduate College when in his judgment the proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholarship. In all other instances, however, permission must be obtained from the author. SIGNEDi .A-4/ APPROVAL BY THESIS DIRECTOR This thesis has been approved on the date shown below? />Q2®4(gOj£j1<o ^ F, LAMMERS \yrnA Bate Professor of History FSEFACE & e purpose of this study is to show the effect that the growth of sJapamese power durimg the period 1939-1S*^ had oa the security of Austra­ lia 0 Australiaa governmental officials were faced with many agonizing and perplexing problems, which caused considerable tension between the Dominion Government and the Waited Kingdom= Finally8 as a result of de­ velopments which will be considered in detail, Australia took the unpre- cented step of frankly seeking to base her security on American rather than British foundations„ Wnfertunately, certain official documents, pertaining to the sub­ ject of this thesis, of which the Grown Copyright is legally vested in the Controller of lis Majesty8s Stationery Office, are unavailable to the pub­ lic at the present time, These restrictions deprive my study of any claim to be definitive0 However, it has been ay intention to present the picture as accurately as possible through the use of all available material. My trip to Australia, and subsequent visits to the Australian National Wmiversity in Canberra and the University of Melbourne, proved invaluable as they afforded me the opportunity to use their extensive libraries. Consequently, much of the research for this thesis was carried out at these two universities, I also received immeasurable help in under­ standing the views of the Australians at the time of World War II from dis-■ tinguished professors serving at the two universities mentioned above, Without this assistance, this work would have been an impossible task. „TABLE OF CONTENTS Page EREFACE . iii LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.............. v ABSTRACT .................. .............. vi I. MENACE OF JAPAN ....... ....... ........ 1 II. AUSTRALIA9 BRITAIN, AND PACIFIC SECURITT.......... .. 20 III. AMERICA, BRITAIN, AND PACIFIC SECURITY ......... 52 IV. PACIFIC SECURITY? WHOSE RESPONSIBILITY? ........ ?1 V. AUSTRALIA, AMERICA, AND PACIFIC SECURITY........ 106 VI. CONCLUSION. ............. 130 LIST OF REFERENCES. .............. 134 iv IjIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Figure Rage la ..The Japanese Empire and Its Partition ........... 1.9 2. British Commitments in the Far East ............ 5.1 v ABSTRACT In Septembers 1939o Australia as a ©©minion of the British Cem- monwealthg was prepared to follow the traditional role of accepting guidance9 leadership and military assistance from the United Kingdomo • However„ the divergence, of interests between Britain and Australia caused tensions to increase. Typical of these were: Britain®s insis­ tence that the European theater take precedence over the Pacific a Churchill®s unwillingness to grant Australia a major role in policy­ making for the Pacific9 the deaf ear given to Australia8s plea to fur­ ther strengthen Singapore, and the use of Australian troops in the Middle East while the situation nearer home was rapidly deteriorating, Added to these was the knowledge of the waning power of Great Britain and her inability to defend her possessions in the Pacific„ Therefore8 when a Japanese invasion of her homeland seemed possibles Australia turned for aid to America, Though this plea may have been unorthodoxp . it was realistic, Australia®s security was jeopardized; she could not defend herself unaided. Nevertheless9 it took many agonizing days before America responded in what Australia considered a suitable manner. The ultimate decision to call on Washingtons rather than Londons and the events that led up to this decision, comprise the major portion of this work. CHAPTER I THE HENACE OF JAPAN In September 1939 King George VI, on the advice of the United Kihgdem government, declared war against Germany on behalf of the United Kingdom, India, Burma, and the Colonial Empire, Also the king declared war against Germany on behalf of the self-governing dominions of Australia9 Canada, South Africa and lew Zealand on separate advise­ ments of these governments, The Prime Minister of Australia, Mr* Menzies, declared that Australia was at war with Germany by virtue of the king's statement» There was no hesitation, Australia would cooperate with the Imperial Government to the fullest extent „ However, there was a lack of preparation on the part of all Commonwealth governments. Few realized the problems ahead. Be one anticipated the sacrifices that would be required. At the outset of the war, Australia felt reasonably secure as a part of the British Empire. She looked to the Prime Minister of Britain for guidance, assistance and leadership. This had been her traditional role and it was the path she was prepared to follow. How* ever, as the war progressed, the ability of the British to guarantee security in every part of the globe declined, while differences of in­ terest developed which required impartial and independent consideration. The truth is that while the Pacific was am area in which the interests ' \ 1 of Britain as a whole were only secondarys though still deemed important, to Australians it was a sphere of vital interest, of direct, immediate peril, and. of special responsibility,. While the world, watched with horror the aggressive actions of Germany in Europe, Australians watched their neighbor to the north „ As an island continent of white people in the midst of a sea of Orientals, Australians had reason to be apprehensive. They had been hearing about the Yellow Peril (denoting all Orientals) all their lives„ But this ex= pression, since the 192©8s, pertained only to Japan and carried with it the picture of a small, overpopulated island that lacked the necessary natural resources and thus was greedy for the land, and the resources within it, that Australians cherished0 Australia's fear of Japan did net date from Pearl Harbor, bat from the day Japan began her aggressive actions in the 192©8s . The face that Japan was expanding, seemingly un<= hindered by the great Western powers, indicated that Australia might be her victim in the near future „ Aware that the rest of the world was preoccupied by the European situation, Australian governmental officials implored those powers stronger than she to stop this threat before it grew toe large to handle„ She offered a variety of alternatives, none of which she could back up alone. For the most part, Australian sugges­ tions went unheeded„ Bae to her lack of military resources, Australia's hands were tied as she watched Japan's empire grow larger« The story of Japan's growth must be told because it has a direct bearing on Australia's relations with her Mother Country« It is only natural that since Australia would be endangered by any southward drive 3 on the part of Japang she should be one of the first to send up warnings to the rest of the world concerning this menace. She also felt that it was only natural that Great Britain should see this danger and conse­ quently send aid to her Dominion government. Within this realm of reason- lag lies the bulk of the controversy that was later to develop between Prime Minister Churchill and Prime Minister Curtin. As the situation grew more distressing for each prime minister, their apparent inability to reassure the other successfully caused friction that was unlike any between Great Britain and Australia before, The menace of Japan was the decisive factor causing strained rela­ tions between Australia and her Mother Country, True, there had been dif­ ferences of opinion in the past. But these were of minor importance in comparison to the close bond that Australia felt for Great Britain. Therefore there is a direct correlation between the increasing threat of Japan and the tone of the messages exchanged between the two prime min­ isters. Each country was under tremendous pressure and limited in its responses to conditions throughout the world. Neither interpreted the same picture with the same degree of importance. There was obviously a divergence of interests and as this became more apparent, relations grew more tense. Japan0s entry into the conflict had changed the whole emphasis of the Second World War for Australians. Previously they had fought their wars on the territories of other people; new a war threatened their own soil. Previously it had been London or Coventry that was bombed; now it was Darwin and Broome, The bulk of the nation0s fighting men, whether 4 seas land ©r air forces, was serving in war theaters thousands of miles from the Pacific area.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • 04 Chapters 8-Bibliography Burns
    159 CHAPTER 8 THE BRISBANE LINE CONTROVERSY Near the end of March 1943 nineteen members of the UAP demanded Billy Hughes call a party meeting. Hughes had maintained his hold over the party membership by the expedient of refusing to call members 1a together. For months he had then been able to avoid any leadership challenge. Hughes at last conceded to party pressure, and on 25 March, faced a leadership spill, which he believed was inspired by Menzies. 16 He retained the leadership by twenty-four votes to fifteen. The failure to elect a younger and more aggressive leader - Menzies - resulted in early April in the formation by the dissenters of the National Service Group, which was a splinter organisation, not a separate party. Menzies, and Senators Leckie and Spicer from Victoria, Cameron, Duncan, Price, Shcey and Senators McLeary, McBride, the McLachlans, Uphill and Wilson from South Australia, Beck and Senator Sampson from Tasmania, Harrison from New South Wales and Senator Collett from Western Australia comprised the group. Spender stood aloof. 1 This disturbed Ward. As a potential leader of the UAP Menzies was likely to be more of an electoral threat to the ALP, than Hughes, well past his prime, and in the eyes of the public a spent political force. Still, he was content to wait for the appropriate moment to discredit his old foe, confident he had the ammunition in his Brisbane Line claims. The Brisbane Line Controversy Ward managed to verify that a plan existed which had intended to abandon all of Australia north of a line north of Brisbane and following a diagonal course to a point north of Adelaide to be abandoned to the enemy, - the Maryborough Plan.
    [Show full text]
  • World War II and Australia
    Essay from “Australia’s Foreign Wars: Origins, Costs, Future?!” http://www.anu.edu.au/emeritus/members/pages/ian_buckley/ This Essay (illustrated) also available on The British Empire at: http://www.britishempire.co.uk/article/australiaswars9.htm 9. World War II and Australia A. September 3, 1939, War 1 (a) Poland Invaded, Britain Declares War, Australia Follows (b) Britain continues ‘Standing By’ – the Phoney War (c) German U-boat and Air Superiority B. Early Defeats 5 (a) Norway, then France, Fall (b) A British Settlement with Hitler? (c) Challenge to Churchill’s leadership fails C. Germany invades Russia 11 (a) Germany Invades Russia, June 22, 1941 (b) Churchill and Roosevelt Meet – the Atlantic Charter D. Japan Enters WWII 16 (a) Early lightning gains – with historical roots (b) Singapore Falls; facing invasion, Australia fights back (c) Midway Battle turns the Naval Tide (d) Young Australians repel forces aimed at Port Moresby (e) Its Security Assured, how then should Australia have fought the Pacific War? E. Back to ‘Germany First’& further delaying the Second Front 30 (a) The Strategy and Rationale (b) Post-Stalingrad Eastern Front: January 1943 – May 1945 (c) Britain’s Contribution to ‘Winning the War against Germany’ F. The Dominions and the RAF’s Air War on Germany (a) The Origins of the ‘Empire Air Training Scheme’ (EATS) 35 (b) EATS and the Defence of Australia - any Connection? (c) Air Operations – Europe (d) Ill-used Australian Aircrew (e) RAF Bomber Command and its Operations – (see Official UK, US Reports!) (f) A contrast: US Air Force’s Specific Target Bombing from mid-1944 G.
    [Show full text]
  • Necessary Chicanery : Operation Kingfisher's
    NECESSARY CHICANERY: OPERATION KINGFISHER’S CANCELLATION AND INTER-ALLIED RIVALRY Gary Followill Z3364691 A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Masters by Research University of New South Wales UNSW Canberra 17 January 2020 1 Thesis/Dissertation Sheet Australia's Global University Surname/Family Name Followill Given Name/s GaryDwain Abbreviation for degree as give in the University calendar MA Faculty AOFA School HASS Thesis Title Necessary Chicanery: Operation Kingfisher'scancellation and inter-allied rivalry Abstract 350 words maximum: (PLEASE TYPE) This thesis examines the cancellation of 'Operation Kingfisher' (the planned rescue of Allied prisoners of war from Sandakan, Borneo, in 1945) in the context of the relationship of the wartime leaders of the United States, Britain and Australia and their actions towards each other. It looks at the co-operation between Special Operations Australia, Special Operations Executive of Britain and the US Officeof Strategic Services and their actions with and against each other during the Pacific War. Based on hithertounused archival sources, it argues that the cancellation of 'Kingfisher' - and the failure to rescue the Sandakan prisoners - can be explained by the motivations, decisions and actions of particular British officers in the interplay of the wartime alliance. The politics of wartime alliances played out at both the level of grand strategy but also in interaction between officers within the planning headquarters in the Southwest Pacific Area, with severe implications for those most directly affected. Declaration relating to disposition of project thesis/dissertation I hereby grant to the University of New South Wales or its agents the right to archive and to make available my thesis or dissertation in whole or in part in the University libraries in all forms of media, now or here afterknow n, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968.
    [Show full text]
  • Sir Earle Christmas Grafton PAGE, PC, GCMG, CH Prime Minister 7 April to 26 April 1939
    11 Sir Earle Christmas Grafton PAGE, PC, GCMG, CH Prime Minister 7 April to 26 April 1939 Earle Page became the 11th prime minister following the death of Joseph Lyons. Page was deputy prime minister in the Lyons Government and Australia’s first ‘caretaker’ prime minister. Member of the Farmers and Settlers Association and New State League 1915-25. Member of the Country Party of Australia 1920-61. Member of House of Representatives representing Cowper (NSW) 1920-61; Treasurer 1923-29; Minister for Commerce 1934-39, 1940-41; Health 1937-38, 1949-56. Page ceased to be prime minister when the new United Australia Party leader, Robert Menzies, was elected to replace him. The UAP was the majority party in the coalition. Main achievements (1921-1956) Founder of the Country Party in 1920 and parliamentary leader of the party 1921-39. Entered agreement with ruling Nationalist Party to form Australia’s first coalition government 1923-29, and served as deputy prime minister in that government 1923-29. As Treasurer, Page initiated subsidies for rural exports, abolished Federal land tax and set up a rural credits department within the Commonwealth Bank. With Bruce, he created the Loan Council in 1924, which became statutory in 1929. Also served as deputy prime minister in coalition government with United Australia Party headed by Joseph Lyons in 1934. He founded the Australian Agricultural Council and led two trade delegations to London, 1936 and 1938. Served on Australian War Cabinet 1941 and Advisory War Council 1942-43, 1944-45, and the Pacific War Council in London 1942.
    [Show full text]
  • John Curtin a Tribute: Strengthening the Rule of Law and Australian Democracy
    Curtin University John Curtin a tribute: strengthening the rule of law and Australian democracy JCPML Anniversary Lecture presented by the Rt Hon Malcolm Fraser on 12 June 2008. It is now over 60 years since John Curtin died. The circumstances of his own upbringing in Victoria, the family’s move to Western Australia, his work within the union movement, his repeated attempts to enter Parliament, his opposition to conscription in the First War, his unification of the Labor Party in 1935, his wartime leadership, are all well documented. There is little that can be added that is fresh or new. He was persistent. He had a high sense of public duty. The office of Prime Minister cost his life. His health was never good. He worried about important decisions in a manner that was much to his credit. When, with a great sense of Australian purpose, he defied both Churchill and Roosevelt to bring Australian troops home for the defence of Australia, he agonised over the decision. He knew he was putting those troops at risk until they were safely in Australian ports. The long journey across the Indian Ocean was unprotected and subject to Japanese attack. He often walked in the evening or at night to allay his concerns, or at least to make it possible to live with them. Worry or concern about the consequences of major decisions did not deter him from taking those decisions. It all stands greatly to his credit, to his determination and his moral strength. It needs to be understood that, up to the time of the Second World War, Australia had no independent foreign policy.
    [Show full text]
  • John Curtin's War
    backroom briefings John Curtin's war CLEM LLOYD & RICHARD HALL backroom briefings John Curtin's WAR edited by CLEM LLOYD & RICHARD HALL from original notes compiled by Frederick T. Smith National Library of Australia Canberra 1997 Front cover: Montage of photographs of John Curtin, Prime Minister of Australia, 1941-45, and of Old Parliament House, Canberra Photographs from the National Library's Pictorial Collection Back cover: Caricature of John Curtin by Dubois Bulletin, 8 October 1941 Published by the National Library of Australia Canberra ACT 2600 © National Library of Australia 1997 Introduction and annotations © Clem Lloyd and Richard Hall Every reasonable endeavour has been made to contact relevant copyright holders of illustrative material. Where this has not proved possible, the copyright holders are invited to contact the publisher. National Library Cataloguing-in-Publication data Backroom briefings: John Curtin's war. Includes index. ISBN 0 642 10688 6. 1. Curtin, John, 1885-1945. 2. World War, 1939-1945— Press coverage—Australia. 3. Journalism—Australia. I. Smith, FT. (Frederick T.). II. Lloyd, C.J. (Clement John), 1939- . III. Hall, Richard, 1937- . 940.5394 Editor: Julie Stokes Designer: Beverly Swifte Picture researcher/proofreader: Tony Twining Printed by Goanna Print, Canberra Published with the assistance of the Lloyd Ross Forum CONTENTS Fred Smith and the secret briefings 1 John Curtin's war 12 Acknowledgements 38 Highly confidential: press briefings, June 1942-January 1945 39 Introduction by F.T. Smith 40 Chronology of events; Briefings 42 Index 242 rederick Thomas Smith was born in Balmain, Sydney, Fon 18 December 1904, one of a family of two brothers and two sisters.
    [Show full text]
  • 2008 State General Election Report
    2008 Western Australian State General Election WESTERN AUSTRALIAN Electoral Commission Election Report FOREWORD Western Australian electors went to the polls on 6th September 2008 to elect the 38th State Parliament. The distribution of State electoral boundaries determined on 29 October 2007, reflecting one vote one value principles, came into effect for this State general election. This report provides details about the processes involved in the conduct of the 2008 State general election by the Western Australian Electoral Commission. The State general election is a significant event in terms of logistics and human and administrative resources, held over a very short timeframe. This was starkly evident at this election which was called some 6 months earlier than the expected time of February 2009. It is noteworthy that for the 20 general elections held since the Second World War only one has been held this early. Compounding this challenge in delivering election services was the minimum time of 31 days from writs to polling day, the impact of significant electoral district boundary changes and a tight labour market affecting staff availability and experience. The State general election is one of the bigger events in Western Australia. In 2008 over 1.3 million electors were involved, an increase of approximately 6% since 2005. A total of 10 registered political parties and 472 candidates for the Legislative Assembly and Legislative Council contested the election. There were 796 ordinary polling places across the State, 58 intrastate, interstate and overseas and a further 59 polling places in remote areas serviced predominantly by air. While the majority of electors chose to cast their vote in person on polling day, there was an increasing trend to vote early or use postal voting for convenience.
    [Show full text]
  • Earle Page and the Imagining of Australia
    ‘NOW IS THE PSYCHOLOGICAL MOMENT’ EARLE PAGE AND THE IMAGINING OF AUSTRALIA ‘NOW IS THE PSYCHOLOGICAL MOMENT’ EARLE PAGE AND THE IMAGINING OF AUSTRALIA STEPHEN WILKS Ah, but a man’s reach should exceed his grasp, Or what’s a heaven for? Robert Browning, ‘Andrea del Sarto’ The man who makes no mistakes does not usually make anything. Edward John Phelps Earle Page as seen by L.F. Reynolds in Table Talk, 21 October 1926. Published by ANU Press The Australian National University Acton ACT 2601, Australia Email: [email protected] Available to download for free at press.anu.edu.au ISBN (print): 9781760463670 ISBN (online): 9781760463687 WorldCat (print): 1198529303 WorldCat (online): 1198529152 DOI: 10.22459/NPM.2020 This title is published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial- NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). The full licence terms are available at creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode This publication was awarded a College of Arts and Social Sciences PhD Publication Prize in 2018. The prize contributes to the cost of professional copyediting. Cover design and layout by ANU Press. Cover photograph: Earle Page strikes a pose in early Canberra. Mildenhall Collection, NAA, A3560, 6053, undated. This edition © 2020 ANU Press CONTENTS Illustrations . ix Acknowledgements . xi Abbreviations . xiii Prologue: ‘How Many Germans Did You Kill, Doc?’ . xv Introduction: ‘A Dreamer of Dreams’ . 1 1 . Family, Community and Methodism: The Forging of Page’s World View . .. 17 2 . ‘We Were Determined to Use Our Opportunities to the Full’: Page’s Rise to National Prominence .
    [Show full text]
  • An Historical Perspective on the Political Representation of Australian Farmers
    Australian Journal of Politics and History: Volume 50, Number 4, 2004, pp. 469-490. Transitions between Formations and Organisations: An Historical Perspective on the Political Representation of Australian Farmers DARREN HALPIN1 Economics and Public Policy, The Robert Gordon University, Scotland The political representation of Australian farmers merits more attention from an historical perspective. Drawing upon the existing wealth of organisational histories it is argued that one can identify a number of shifts in the dominant organisational form or strategy pursued by primary producers in seeking political representation over time. Each phase has its own logic and rationale rooted in a range of historical conditions. The article identifies the importance of the pattern of social interaction, economic conditions and the prevailing political process in catalysing transitions between “phases” of representation. It concludes that the current debate over representation amongst primary producers and rural communities should be interpreted as the precursor to yet another phase of representation. Introduction A flurry of amalgamations of farm interest groups in the late 1970s produced a peak interest-group structure in the National Farmers’ Federation (NFF). The formation of the NFF in 1979 signalled a new phase in the political representation of primary producers. It evidenced a clear departure from a reliance on the party political system to effectively transmit the interests of farmers to the political sphere. Further, it signalled a determination by farmers to present a united position to government in order to maximise influence. The NFF is a federation of state farm organisations (SFOs) and commodity councils (CCs). At present, the NFF family2 of interest groups is the recognised voice of Australian primary producers.
    [Show full text]
  • Fraser and Churchill: a Working Partnership Between Two Prime Ministers
    Fraser and Churchill: A Working Partnership Between Two Prime Ministers GERALD HENSLEY Mr. Hensley was a New Zealand diplomat (1958-80), who subsequently served two premiers as head of the Prime Minister's Department and was Secretary of Defence. Retiring in 1999, he was honoured by being appointed a Companion of the New Zealand Order of Merit. A prolific writer on Pacific and Asian affairs, he is the author of a memoir, Final Approaches (2006); Beyond the Battlefield (2009), a history of New Zealand's relations with its World War II allies; and Friendly Fire (2013), on nuclear politics and the collapse of ANZUS, 1984-87. hey couldn’t have been more different in outlook and in background—yet TWinston Churchill and Peter Fraser had greatness, a quality more easily Churchill with Fraser and General Eisenhower on a visit to Allied troops recognised than pinned down, but on the eve of D-Day, May 1944. which might be summed up as the ALEXANDER TURNBULL LIBRARY ability to rise to any large occasion. FINEST HOUR 161 / 18 -oth Britain and New Zealand acquired their true dreamy and leisurely rumination on the obvious,” with B-war leaders after war had broken out—and both decisions bundled hastily together at the close. almost by accident. Neither Winston Churchill nor Peter Fraser had been heads of government, and both were dis- trusted by large elements of their own parties. But for both countries, half the globe away from each other, World War II was the direst emergency of their existence. Michael Joseph Savage, Both sensed the need for someone who could rise to the New Zealand Prime challenge, and both were lucky that the lottery of politics Minister 1935-1940.
    [Show full text]
  • The Living Daylights 2(9) Richard Neville Editor
    University of Wollongong Research Online The Living Daylights Historical & Cultural Collections 3-1974 The Living Daylights 2(9) Richard Neville Editor Follow this and additional works at: http://ro.uow.edu.au/livingdaylights Recommended Citation Neville, Richard, (1974), The Living Daylights 2(9), Incorporated Newsagencies Company, Melbourne, vol.2 no.9, March 5- 11, 28p. http://ro.uow.edu.au/livingdaylights/19 Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library: [email protected] The Living Daylights 2(9) Publisher Incorporated Newsagencies Company, Melbourne, vol.2 no.9, March 5- 11, 28p This serial is available at Research Online: http://ro.uow.edu.au/livingdaylights/19 30c Vol.2No.9 March 5-11 1974 INTERNATIONAL WOMENS DAY march 8&9 Stomping the violent male Brazil’s decade of murder Grovelling in Canberra What’s on in your town Liife & Death HIS week The living daylights looks i cakT AD/); Tat dying. When Allison Gillmore visit­ w f cArir h w i f ' ed the offices with plans for exploring the b E U \E Fk, Australian way o f death, we said sure, FOP-TMM a n d mason smilingly, and expected never again to see Richard Beckett CANT C0N\peT£ Wl7b her. Ideas are cheap around newspaper OVfK P R IC E S ' offices, with the talkers outnumbering the beats up &JT 7 7 /f5 executors, and while much is cast upon the - s /f o p waters, less is washed up by the tide. But the w eek’s news Allison returned, with a thick folio on HAT’LL TEACH US TO ACT AS death styles — including a guide on how to TAN INDEPENDENT NATION: bury your own — which begins eccentrical­ : Still totally unable to get used to the ly on page 9.
    [Show full text]
  • An Unlimited War Effort", June-July 194 1
    CHAPTER 9 "AN UNLIMITED WAR EFFORT", JUNE-JULY 194 1 1—THE PRIME MINISTER'S PROSPECTU S call for an unlimited war effort was made by Menzies in June after A he had returned from his visit to Britain and America . He had arrive d in Sydney on 24th May . He had been away for four months during which time he had passed over battlefields, met soldiers in the Western Desert , heard the bombs on London, seen devastation, courage, sacrifice, an d endurance . He had talked with Churchill and with Roosevelt, with Cabine t Ministers, Chiefs of Staff, generals, admirals and organisers of the wa r effort. From the palace to the tenement, from Cabinet room to factory he had seen a nation at war . He had been at the heart of things and ha d seen both the dire need and also something of the organising of the tota l effort by which alone it could be met. The Australian Prime Minister was moved and deeply impressed . He had been impressed by the leadership of Churchill. "He is not only in himself the embodiment of the traditiona l spirit of Great Britain, but he has in him, in his spirit itself, a burning flame which will never admit defeat, and which can transfer itself to othe r men and women so that they are able to breathe freely once more, an d again turn themselves vigorously into battle." He had been impressed by Roosevelt who "has not merely been an interpreter of what his peopl e think, but has himself been a very great creator of public opinion an d international spirit" .
    [Show full text]