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ETHICS and MORALITY Basic Ethical Concepts  Category: ETHICS AND MORALITY Basic Ethical Concepts specially in everyday language, the dis- questions of ‘good life’ are tied to an evaluati- Etinction between the terms ‘ethics’ and on of what is good and are answered in the ‘morality’ is not always clear. Even in some form of recommendations how to achieve philosophical texts both are used synony- that goal, norms or principles of moral right- mously, while others seem to draw a clear ness generate imperatives. distinction between them. Historically, the term ‘ethics’ comes from Greek ethos which Today it is common to separate ethics into means the customs, habits and mores of peo- three sub-branches: 1. descriptive ethics, 2. ple. ‘Morality’ is derived from Latin mos, mo- metaethics and 3. normative ethics: ris which denotes basically the same; it was 1. Descriptive ethics aims at empirically introduced by Cicero as an equivalent to the and precisely mapping existing morality or Greek ethos. moralities within communities and is there- For the sake of clarity we assume as a stan- fore linked to the social sciences. Another dard definition that morality means the cu- aim is to explain the development of existing stoms, the special do-s and don't-s that are moralities from a historical perspective. No shared and widely accepted as standard in a normative prescriptions are intended. society or community of people — accepted 2. Metaethics is a relatively new discipline as a basis of life that doesn't have to be ratio- in the ethical arena and its definition is the nally questioned. Ethics on the other hand is most blurred of all. The Greek meta means the philosophical reflection upon these rules after or beyond and indicates that the object and ways of living together, the customs and of metaethical studies is morality and ethics habits of individuals, groups or mankind as itself. The aim is to better understand the lo- such. This comes close to the conception of gical, semantic and pragmatic structures of Aristotle. moral and ethical argumentation as such, In ancient Greek philosophy the question their origin and meaning. Other fields of in- was to find how to act well and rightly and quiry are e.g. whether morality exists inde- what personal/individual qualities are ne- pendently of humans, and the underlying cessary to be able to do this. Ethics therefore mental basis of human judgements and con- encompasses the whole range of human acti- duct. on including personal preconditions. This is 3. Normative ethics means the methodolo- still true today, but for e.g. Aristotle ethics fo- gical reflection upon morality tackling its cri- cused mainly on the pursuit of the ‘good (li- tique and its rationale. Norms and standards fe)’, the eudaimonia. The aim was to identify for acting and conduct are being set up or to- and to practically realise ‘the (highest) good’ re down, and argued for or against. When in life — which means that you have to eva- “ethics” is talked about in a common sense luate what is ‘good’ as regards content: what then we are talking about this eneral norma- life is a good life and what is not? tive ethics. When enquiry is directed towards As opinions concerning the question what the principles of moral judgement or the cri- makes a good life differed more and more in teria for the ethical analysis of morality, then modern times, ethics had and has to face the we talk about fundamental ethics. question how the resulting conflicts of inte- Finally in the realm of normative ethics, rests and values could be solved peacefully there is applied ethics. Here normative theo- and justly without taking the part of one side ries are applied to specific, controversial mo- or the other. And this leads to the question of ral issues like animal rights, abortion, what is morally right; moral rightness and euthanasia etc. − generating the classic so- ‘good life’ become separate issues. Whereas called hyphen-ethics, e.g. bio-ethics, medical The Ethics Portfolio - Technical University Darmstadt for NanoCap Category: ETHICS AND MORALITY Basic Ethical Concepts ethics, business-ethics, nano-ethics etc. 2. Consequentialist theories on the other Inversely, these special issues constantly hand determine the value of an action on the challenge theory and demand improve- grounds of a cost-benefit analysis of its con- ments, changes and specifications. sequences. If the positive consequences out- Alongside hyphen-ethics it is also possible weigh the negative ones then the action is to distinguish between ethics that focuses on morally proper. societal and institutional dimensions (social 3. Virtue theories focus on a given set of ethics) or on the individuum (individual rules like “do not steal” etc. But instead of ethics). defining them merely as obligatory duties, While we consider applied ethics to be a the emphasis lies on the individual to deve- sub-branch of normative ethics, other moral lop good habits of character based on these philosophers treat it as a discipline on the sa- rules (and avoid vices). Thus virtue theory me level as normative ethics, arguing that it emphasises moral education. Q: What are “codes of ethics/conduct” or what is “ethical research”? Shouldn‘t that be called moral? A: By calling research or a code “ethical”, the authors want to point out that the moral rules they set up are based on Fig 1: Basic sketch of ethical disciplines rational deliberation and can be subject to critique. Q: Looking at the definitions of ethics and morality − what is moral philosophy? A: It is uses normative elements but is independent mostly used as a synonym for ethics. Some, otherwise. like the French philosopher Jean-Pierre Du- puy use it differently. For him ‘ethics’ stands In normative ethics there are different for the effort to force everything into univer- theories as to how criteria of moral conduct sal harmonized principles while ‘moral philo- should be defined. The three main theories sophy’ endures colliding or incompatible can be sketched as follows: values or concepts in the discourse. 1. Deontological, i.e. duty theories locate the basis of morality on specific, foundatio- STEFAN GAMMEL nal principles of duty and obligation. These principles are binding regardless of the con- sequences that acting on their basis might bring. Links to other Portfolio sheets: Nano-Ethics Code of Conduct Soft Regulation Literature: Print & WWW Frankena, W.: Ethics. Prentice Hall, 2/1973; http://www.ditext.com/frankena/ethics.html Dupuy, J.-P.: Complexity and Uncertainty. A Prudential Approach to Nanotechnology. UNESCO, 2005; http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/files/20003/11272944951Dupuy2.pdf/Dupuy2.pdf MacIntyre, A.: A Short History of Ethics - A History of Moral Philosophy from the Homeric Age to the Twentieth Century. Routledge, 2006. The Ethics Portfolio - Technical University Darmstadt for NanoCap.
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