MARTHA BRILL OLCOTT (Hamilton, New York) WILLIAM FEERMAN (Knoxville, Tennessee)

THE CHALLENGE OF INTEGRATION: SOVIET NATIONALITY POLICY AND THE MUSLIM CONSCRIPT

Publication of 1970 piqued Western interest in the potential political, economic, and social implications of the demographic shift that was occurring in the USSR. The census revealed that during the intercensal period from 1959 to 1970 the Slavic population of the USSR had increased at an annual rate of 1.34 percent, while the Muslim population had grown at a rate of 3.25 percent annually. The 1979 census demonstrated that the shift in de- , mographic balance had continued, despite an overall decline in birthrates.2 Using the 1970 and 1979 censuses, U.S. demographers have estimated that by the year 2000 there will be 63,880,000 Muslims in the USSR, of whom 49,449,000 will live in Central Asia and Azerbaijan.3 One of the areas in which these demographic changes are likely to have a dramatic effect is in the ethnic composition of the armed forces; this is in- evitable if, as appears to be the case, the size of the standing army is main- tained. Although the Soviet reluctance to release data makes it impossible to determine precise ethnic composition of the draft pool, Murray Feshbach has estimated that in 1980 19.5 percent of the 18-year-old population came from Central Asia, and that by 2000 the proportion of Central Asian nationals in the draft pool will rise to 26.3 percent.4 The successful integration of Muslims into the Soviet army ultimately

1. Throughout this article the word "Muslim" is used to denote people of Muslim extraction, individuals who belong to national groups which historically were Muslim; people who may or may not be religious believers. For demographic data on the Muslim population, see Murray Feshbach, "Trends in Soviet Muslim Population: Demographic Aspects," in The Soviet Economy ill the 1980s: Problems and Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983). pp. 279-83. 2. In the intercensal period of 1970 to 1979 the Muslim population increased by an annual rate of 2.47 percent and the Slavic population by 0.90 percent. (Feshbach, Trend:." p. 279 and Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie SSSR, Chislennost' i sostav naseleniia SSSR [Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1984], see tables 13-36). 3. For present purposes we will use the term "Central Asia" to refer to Kazakhstan as well as Kirghizia, Tajikistan, Turkmenia, and Uzbekistan. These population estimates, which am based on average absolute increases, were drawn from Stephen Rapawy and Godfrey Baldwin, "Demographic Trends in the 1950-2000'," in The Soviet Economy in the 1980s, p. 319. 4. In the year 2000 an additional 6.9 percent should come from Transcaucasia(Murray Feshbach, "The Structure and Composition of the Soviet Industrial Force," NATO Directorateof Economic Affairs [Brussels:NATO, 1980],p. 58). 66

depends upon their experience during military service. The quality of the con- script's military experience, however, in part depends upon the preparation that he receives prior to conscription. Among other things-regardless of his nationality-today's Soviet soldier must speak Russian, have good technical skills, and be in good physical health. Since the 1967 Law of Universal Ser- vice, which cut the military obligation to two years for most Soviet con- scripts, the Komsomol and educational system have borne a greater burden for preparing youth with these qualities.5 Although the last three Soviet censuses give evidence of slow but steady progress toward the achievement of a bilingual society, as of 1979 no Mus- lim nationalities except the and reported the majority of their population as fluent in Russian.6 The levels of pror all Muslim nationalities were uniformly lower in rural areas.7 While the percentage of Russian speakers is undoubtedly higher among the pre-draft-age population than among the Muslim population at large, the deficiencies in Russian language and technical skills of this population remain a continuing cause of concern to the Party and military leadership. The regime is also challenged by what it regards as poor political socialization of the Central Asian and Caucasian conscripts. One of the major channels of political socialization relevant to the military is primary military preparation-NVP (nachal'naia voennaia odgotovka}-which is covered in the ninth and tenth grades. A central component both of NVP and other forms of political socialization is internatsional'noe vospitanie (international upbring- ing). Internatsional'noe vospitanie, as the Soviet military itself, has traditionally reflected a strong Slavic bias; it has stressed Russian language, Russian military heroes, and the sacrifices and contributions of the Russian people. In recent years, however, the Party has mandated that internatsion- al'noe vosoitanie (including the officially promoted image of the military) be adapted in such a way as to encourage nonew the "Soviet homeland" and the Soviet Army as "their own" rather than as alien Slavic institutions. Since 1982, as part of this policy, the Party has also attempted to attract more non- into voennye uchilishcha, institutions that train military officers. Successful integration of Muslims into the Soviet army, of course, depends

5. Much has been written by Western analysts about the impact of the ethnic problem on the military. For some conflicting interpretations, see Ellen Jones, Red Army and Society (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985); S. Enders Wimbush, "Nationalities in the ," in S. Enders Wimbush. ed., Soviet Nationalities in Strategic Perspective (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985). pp. 227-48; S. Enders Wimbush and Alex Alexiev, The Ethnic Factor in Soviet Armed Forces (The RAND Corporation, R- 2787/1, March 1982). and Sergei Zamascikov, "The Role of the Military in the Social Integration of Ethnic Muslims in the USSR," Radio Liberty' Research Bulletin, RL 477/83, 23 Dec. 1983. 6. V. I. Kolov, Nalsional'nosii SSSR (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1982), p. 232. Among the Tatars 62.5 percent reported fluency in Russian, as did 52.3 percent of the Kazakhs, 49.3 percent of the , 29.6 percent of the Tadzhiks, 29.5 percent of the , 29.4 percent of the Kirghiz, and 25.4 percent of the Turkmens. 7. M. N. Guboglo, Sovremennye einoiazykovoi protsessy v SSSR (Moscow 1986), p. 114.