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Home , Diosdado Macapagal, Leni Robredo, Philippine Sea

The and the U.S.: change with continuity? toy julloo S0 Anador III and Leryk Baladjay

Philippines President (C) and Chinese President Xi Jinping review the guard of honors as they attend a welcoming ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on October 20,2016. (THOMAS PETER/AFP/GE(TY IMAGES)

rom colonial rule, to commonwealth, and finally ally, authoritarianism in the Philippines during the late 1970s—a the relationship of the Philippines and the United period marked by an increase in U.S. economic and military FStates is enduring but oftentimes quixotic. For the aid transfers. Moreover, transfer of military support from Philippines, there seems to be no other country that can hold it in thrall like the United States. The relationship between JULIO S. AMADOR III is Executive Director of the Phil- the United States and the Philippines goes back more than ippine-American Educational Foundation, Fellow at the -Pacific Pathways to Progress Foundation, and Senior a century. The two countries have shared a long history of Research Fellow at the Ateneo Policy Center of the Ateneo military, political, and economic ties, despite the geographi- School of Government. His research and policy interests cal distance between them. Both countries addressed the are in Philippine foreign policy and national security, U.S.- communist threat during the Cold War in the 1960s, and their Philippines relations, and ASEAN. relationship with one another became even closer during the DERYK BALADJAY is an MA candidate al the De La Salle Reagan era, when the Kirkpatrick doctrine (named for UN University-. He specializes in security, conflict and peace Ambassador Jean Kirkpatrick) complemented the rise of studies in and around East and Southeast Asia 77

GREAT DECISIONS • 2020

the United States to the Philippines During the long history between the pines officially calls parts of the South during the late 1990s also increased countries, the U.S.-Philippine bilateral China up to its 200-nautical-mile when both countries brokered an ad- relationship has been subject to various the West Phil- dendum of a visiting forces agreement domestic and foreign pressures. Dur- ippine Sea) when China's nine-dash line to the pre-existing mutual defense ing his campaign, Duterte's populist claim provided it impetus for military treaty. This relationship carried over to rhetoric was directed against then U.S. build-up in the . Since 2012 China the 21st century when both countries President Barack Obama. Critics of has tried to claim maritime domain in expressed support for one another in the U.S.-Philippine bilateral relations the large expanse of the West Philippine the war against terrorism beginning have labeled the mutual friendship as Sea and has also been encroaching on the in 2001 and, decades later, when both having imperialistic undertones and exclusive economic zones of neighbor- countries saw to the enhancement of have, on multiple occasions, actively ing Southeast Asian states. This develop- their respective armed forces' interop- protested it. One prominent challenge ment constantly challenges the principle erability within the Asia Pacific region. to this ebbing relationship is Duterte's of freedom of navigation as Chinese Since the early 20th century, the Philip- foreign policy calibration when, four maritime and naval forces have, on mul- pines'foreign policy tradition has been months into office, he announced a tiple occasions, threatened the use of emblematic of a close association with pivot to China and a relative distanc- force in enforcing its illegal claims over the United States. Then the introduc- ing from the United States. This was the disputed . tion of Rodrigo Duterte changed the a great departure from the Philippine These pressing geopolitical develop- U.S.-Philippine bilateral relationship foreign policy tradition of his predeces- ments have tested U.S. military com- and challenged the status quo. Or did sors who largely believed in the critical mitment to its historical ally. All these it, really? role that the United States played in the contributed to Duterte's pragmatic re- The election of Rodrigo Roa Duterte country and in the region. balancing. But to understand the logic as the new commander in chief of the This pivot to China further exacer- of Duterte's foreign policy initiatives, Philippines in 2016 was a game-chang- bated the already tumultuous situation a look at the history of U.S.-Philippine er. Rodrigo Duterte represented many in the (the Philip- relations is essential. firsts, including being the first president to have come from the southern island of and being the first presi- A complicated history dent to have come from a mayoral posi- tion (he served as the Mayor of Davao y T.S.-Philippine relations can be Felipe Agoncillo, the Filipino city for over 22 years). His election L.) traced as far back as the 1898 who was supposed to represent the as president effectively placed south- Spanish-American War. The United First Philippine Republic in the Paris ern voices into the fore of the national States, which had engaged militarily Treaty signing, was denied participa- agenda. This was important because the with the Spanish forces based in Cuba, tion in the negotiation. Having learned central bureaucracy is heavily criticized declared war against on Febru- of the America's betrayal of trust, for the overconcentration of its delivery ary 15, 1898, and deployed its armed President formally of public services in the capital and its forces to Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the declared war against the United States provincial peripheries. Rodrigo Duterte Philippines which, coincidentally, was on February 5, 1899. is also a metaphorical game-changer also undergoing its social revolution The U.S.-Philippine War would go because he was the manifestation of against the Spanish colonizers. When on for three years, only to falter on the rise and legitimation of populism in the Malolos Republic of the Philip- March 1901 with Emilio Aguinaldo's Philippine democratic politics. During pines announced its independence capture. US President William McKin- his campaign for the presidency, Duterte from Spanish rule on June 12, nei- ley (1897-1901) pursued a policy of made 30 promises, including to address ther the United States nor Spain, the benevolent assimilation actively super- social issues like corruption and drug two belligerents of the 1898 Spanish- seding and undermining Spanish colo- addiction within a timetable of some American War, recognized it. A peace nial elements at the time. In spite of its 3 months up to 6 years. These prom- protocol was reached between the two imperfections, the United States'colo- ises were received by applause but also war belligerents on August 12, 1898, nization of the Philippines presented doubts from civil society. followed by the Treaty of Paris, agreed itself as an opportunity for national re- to within the same year. The Treaty of imagination. Thanks to the three pillars Paris formalized Spain's ceding of ter- of American colonial statecraft, social Before you read, download the companion ritories to the United States, including policies took form and were jumpstart- Glossary that includes definitions, a guide to acronyms and abbreviations used in the Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippine ed in the archipelago: introduction of article, and other material. Go to www. archipelago. In the case of the Philip- the public education system, competent fpa.org/great_decisions and select a pine exchange, Spain was paid the sum civil service recruitment, and the re- topic in the Resources section. (Top Right) of $20 million. Problems erupted when placement of the Spanish guardia civil

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THE PHIL.PPINES AND THE U.S. 7

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LUCIDITINNFORMATION DESIGN, LLC with the Philippine Constabulary in ciety, it was not without failures. Land Moreover, governance in the southern 1901. Newly inaugurated US President redistribution policies that were en- island of Mindanao had become more Theodore Roosevelt (1901-09) offi- acted lacked support mechanisms and militaristic than that in Luzon, the larg- cially ended the Philippine insurrection only perpetuated ownership within the est and most populous island in the on July 1902, despite lingering sporadic American and Filipino business class Philippines. guerilla resistance in the archipelago. who had vested interests in land and A significant contribution of the While the touted pillars of American natural resources. Instituted tax poli- American colonization period was the colonial statecraft provided the initial cies that replaced the Spanish taxation contour of an early Philippine govern- framework for the early Philippine so- system remained burdensome as well. ment. Much like the American system,

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GREAT DECISIONS • 2020 the early form of a Philippine govern- ate democratization of the Philippines. countries had improved during the ment employed the distribution of pow- Alongside Wilson's Philippine coun- Japanese invasion of the Philippines. ers that greatly favored the smaller pro- terpart, Manuel , the move for It was under Philippine President Ser- vincial constituents. This was in con- the filipinization and democratization gio Osmefia (1944-46) that the earli- junction with the transactional merits of the colonial government gained est attempt to broker a military base of American patrons that post-colonial momentum. On March 1934, the Tyd- agreement between the two govern- took after. The first munici- ings-McDuffie Act was passed, which ments took place. The agreed mandate pal elections of December 1901 and, would provide the Philippines with a between presidents Osmefia and Harry later on, the first provincial governor decades' worth of preparation for a S. Truman (1945-53) called for the elections of February 1902, segmented scheduled 1946 independence decla- territorial integrity of the Philippines, a Philippine Assembly that embodied ration. A constitutional plebiscite was the mutual protection of both the Unit- this transactional dynamic. More im- also held on May 1934 for the approval ed States and the Philippines and the portantly, the formation of the early of the 1935 Constitution. With the elec- maintenance of peace in the Pacific re- national elite and ruling class was pat- tion of Manuel Luis Quezon (1935-44) gion. After all hostilities against terned after this transaction dynamic. as the second Philippine president, the ceased, President Truman signed the Nevertheless, the institutional reforms Commonwealth of the Philippines was Philippine Military Assistance Act, ensured that the Philippine Assembly inaugurated in 1935. which saw to the training of Philippine would take on representative features. The period of relative peace enjoyed military and naval personnel and the Republican presidents McKinley, under the Commonwealth government transfer and maintenance of military Roosevelt and William Howard Taft came to an abrupt halt when Imperial equipment. President Roxas shifted (1909-13) argued that the benevo- Japan launched air raids from the island his foreign policy toward a stronger lent assimilation of the Philippines of Formosa () on Pearl Harbor alliance with the United States. This would take long periods of time and and on some of Philippines' military move was strengthened when the Mil- therefore require a piecemeal, guided facilities on December 7, 1941. This re- itary Bases Agreement of 1947 was approach to the administration of the sulted in the United States entering the reached. archipelago. But this was not shared by Second World War. The Japanese inva- The aftermath of the Second World democrat President Woodrow Wilson sion of the Philippines and of South- War saw the persistence of Communist (1913-21), who sought the immedi- challenged Western colonial elements in the Philippines and in the rule and further sparked nationalist rest of East and Southeast Asia. The anticolonial movements for indepen- HUKs that were once determined to dence. Imperial Japan declared Phil- overthrow Imperial Japan's colonial ippine independence on October 1943 efforts now took on Communist, anti- and installed the Second Republic with imperialist and anti-colonial elements. Jose Paciano Laurel (1943-45) as the President Truman and Philippine Presi- new president. Widespread fighting by dent (1948-53) bro- the U.S. Armed Forces in the kered the Mutual Defense Treaty on against the Imperial Japanese Army August 30, 1951—the quintessential was sustained throughout 1943 and military treaty that guided the U.S.- toward late 1944. Only one organized Philippine bilateral relations up to the resistance group—the Hukbong Bayan 21st century. The United States main- Laban sa Hapon (colloquially known tained close rapport with the Philippine as HUKBALAHAP or HUKs, literally government by offering military sup- translated as, "People's Army against port against the Communist insurgency the Japanese")—was able to sustain an of the HUKs. The first official signs of insurgent revolution against the Japa- dissatisfaction with U.S.-Philippine nese. On October 20, 1944, General bilateral relations were hinted at un- MacArthur landed on and began der President Diosdado 's the military operations that eventually (1961-65) administration when the liberated the Philippines from Japanese Philippines War Damage Claims Bill occupation. The Republic of the Philip- was rejected by the on May 1962. The "Take Your Choice", William McKinley raising U.S. flag in the Philippines, and pines was inaugurated as scheduled on Macapagal administration retaliated William Jennings Bryan chopping it down, July 4, 1946, fulfilling the decade-old by cancelling an official visit in 1963. with U.S. flags flying over Puerto Rico Tydings-McDuffie Act. The inaugura- Moreover, the administration's Procla- and Cuba, as Uncle Sam and another man start of the Third mation No. 28 saw the transfer of In- watch from U.S. soil, (ARTWORK BY F.VICTOR tion also marked the GILLAMJUDGE MAGAZINE, MAY 12.1900: CREDIT: JT Republic of the Philippines. dependence celebration from the 4th of VINTAGE/GLASSHOUSE/ ZUMA VVIRE/NEWSCOM) Military relations between the two July (as per the Tydings-McDuffie Act)

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7HE PHILOPPONIES AND 7C-llE U.S. 7 to June 12 (as per the Malolos Repub- lic's 1898 independence declaration). Beginning in the 1960s, Philippines' domestic concerns were complicated by international financial institutions. The Philippine economy was unsus- tainable, especially because its export revenue could not finance debt repay- ment. Philippine exports were driven by raw materials. From 1967 to 1971, sugar, , and forestry products made up 70% of Philippine exports. Also, American development assis- tance had drastically declined in the late 1960s. The entrance of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund into the fray offered hope for salvation but did not, in any manner, guarantee it. In particular, the presence President Reagan and Philippine President , along with First Ladies of the World Bank had become massive and Nancy Reagan, walk into the White House after the arrival ceremonies in the Philippines from 1970 to 1982— on the South Lawn September 16, /982.(3ErrmANN/GErry IMAGES) spanning the leaderships of presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan. To ippine Military Bases Agreement was government was assured that all mili- implement and satisfy the radical sta- renewed on 1979 with the promise of tary and security commitments and bilization measures needed to enforce $500 million in U.S. foreign aid to the financial obligations would be hon- the structural adjustments set forth by Marcos administration. The line drawn ored. The Philippine government was the international financial institutions, between economic and military aid was keen not to over-borrow in the late President Ferdinand Marcos (1965-86) erased under the Reagan administra- 1980s due to domestic developments: declared on September tion. Under Ronald Reagan (1981-89), domestic debt of some $12.3 billion 21, 1972. Within a year of declaring the U.S. government bundled foreign that comprised some 40-50% of the martial law, President Marcos won aid, inluding both economic and mili- national budget; natural disasters, an increased American military support, tary. The Communist threat, which earthquake in 1990 and the eruption which jumped from $18.5 million to had been the rallying cry of the gov- of Mt. Pinatubo in 1991; and the Gulf $45.3 million in 1973, and was accom- ernments of the United States and the panied by an increase in the supply of Philippines during the onset of the Cold war materiel along with capacity and War, played a large role in the U.S.- personnel training by the United States Philippine bilateral relations. This was to combat Communist and Muslim in- especially highlighted when U.S. Sec- surgencies. Speculations suggest that retary of Defense Caspar Weinberger the Marcos administration exploited visited Manila in April 1982 and af- these security concerns to ensure the firmed the role of U.S. military bases in continuation of American military and quelling the Communist threat. During economic aid to the Philippines. Add- this period President Reagan's foreign ing fuel to the fire, during the Marcos policy had increased support for repres- years' public spending was fueled by sive right-wing regimes throughout the public debt. The military and economic developing and underdeveloped coun- aid from the Nixon, Ford and Carter tries, dubbed chiefly as the Kirkpatrick administrations to the Philippines were Doctrine. minimal, but continued the trend of and the EDSA doling out foreign assistance in spite "People Power" Revolution (named of human rights violations. after the Epifanio de los Santos Av- During the Carter administration enue, a major Philippine thorough- (1977-81), a thin line was drawn be- fare) overthrew the Marcos dictator- tween economic and military assistance ship—characterized as aberrant in the after the signing of the Arms Export latter years of its lifespan. Under the Corazon Aquino in Manila, Philippines, on January 31 , 1987. (ERIC BOUVET/GAMMA Control Act of 1976. The U.S.-Phil- first Aquino administration the U.S. RAPHO/ GETTY IMAGES)

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7 GREAT DECISIONS • 2020 personnel visiting the United States. President Benigno Aquino III's (2010-16) foreign relations with China were conflict-ridden due to boundary spats in the West Philippine Sea. Al- though China had long been known to engage in maritime disputes, territo- rial disputes worsened under the sec- ond Aquino administration when in 2012, Philippine and Chinese vessels engaged in a stand-off in the Reed and Scarborough shoals—maritime areas located within the Philippines' exclu- sive economic zone. On January 22, 2013, the Aquino administration filed a landmark case in The Hague and an Arbitral Tribunal under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Filipino soldiers participate in the Amphibious Landing training as part of the 2018 Balika- (UNCLOS) was con- tan exercises between the Philippines and the United States in Zambales Province, the stituted. In 2016, the tribunal ruled that Philippines, on May 9, 20/8.(XINHUA/ROUELLE UMALI/GETTY IMAGES) China's expansive claim to sovereignty over the waters of the war that impeded and reduced Filipino foreign investments in the process, had no legal basis. However, there is remittances. But by this time, support the Philippines was largely resilient no mechanism for enforcing the deci- for the renewal of the U.S.-Philippine throughout the crisis. sion. Coupled with this separation from Military Bases Agreement had de- It was only under President Joseph China, President Aquino III intensified clined. The military bases agreement Estrada (1998-2001) that the Visit- relations with the United States. In was not renewed by the Philippine ing Forces Agreement was revisited, 2014, the governments of the United Senate on September 1991 by a slim resulting in two agreements that came States and the Philippines brokered the margin and the bilateral relations of into force in May 1999, outlining pa- Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agree- the United States and the Philippines rameters for U.S. Armed Forces vis- ment (EDCA) on April 28, after eight hit an all-time low. iting the Philippines and for Filipino months of negotiations. During the administration of Presi- dent Fidel Ramos (1992-98) the Phil- ippines and other East Asian coun- Current issues besetting tries, especially its treaty allies Japan, U.S.-Philippine relations Taiwan, South Korea, and, ontemporary U.S.-Philippine rela- the 31st ASEAN Summit on November quasi-ally Singapore, still saw the Ctions is beset with challenges. A 2017, held in Manila, there was no dis- United States as the prime guarantor key domestic issue that strikes at the cussion of human rights as President of security against an emerging Chi- heart of bilateral relations is the pre- Donald Trump expressed his full sup- na. All are strategically situated along vailing human rights crisis brought port of the Philippine government's the peripheries of China. The Status about by President Duterte's war on war on drugs. of Forces Agreement, a precursor to drugs. As of August 2017, the Philip- What may come as a shock is the pre- the 1999 Visiting Forces Agreement, pine National Police were responsible vailing paradox of Duterte's sustained was reached by the U.S. and the Phil- for some 9,000 drug-related killings, high approval ratings in spite of the ippine governments but was not put although human rights watchdogs say drug killings. There are two plausible into effect due to growing anti-U.S. the figure is closer to 14,000. Based on explanations. First, Duterte positioned sentiments in the Philippines. The officially reported statistics, the poor himself as the repudiating demagogue, 1993 East Asian Miracle confirmed were noted to have been the number casting himself as an anti-establishment the market-governed economy ap- one victims of the drug war. While the populist. His promotion of radical so- proach of Japan, South Korea, Hong United States could have responded cial response to the drug problem stra- Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Indone- through its 1997 Leahy Law, which tegically positions himself as a man of sia and Thailand. But then the 1997 limits or prevents the U.S. government action—something that appeals to Fili- Asian financial crisis hit most of the from transferring foreign assistance to pinos. His administration has also effec- Asian countries, sowing the seeds for countries with gross human rights vio- tively managed the mass discontent with populist governance. Despite losing lations, this has not happened. During the previous administration's supposed

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THE. Pll-Ig0..f1PPONES AND THE U.S. inaction on social issues. The Duterte part of the Philippine government. The junction with the drug war that Duterte administration has also strategically de- Philippine government's inaction on initiated in the latter half of 2016, the ployed the politics of fear. This return the Arbitral ruling on the West Philip- international community took notice of to national "bossism" on the local level pine Sea is attributed to one particular the drastic handling of drug prevalence and the use of executive policing powers circumstance. According to the Philip- and the subsequent decline of human have spurred possible state-sanctioned pine national government, the inaction rights conditions in the Philippines. violence. President Duterte's popular- on the ruling can be attributed to the President Duterte's vocal protests, ity was not because of a revolt of the country's attempts to gain soft Chinese some spanning sovereignty concerns poor masses but rather a protest of the material inducements, especially in the and political independence of public new middle class that had failed to reap advent of China's Belt and Road Initia- administration, have been met with the benefits of good governance of the tive coupled with its foreign loans en harsh criticism from the international previous administration. In an attempt masse. The visit of U.S. State Secretary community as the death toll of the drug r.o quell the criticisms of the drug war, John Kerry on July 26, 2016, in fact, war kept rising. On March 17, 2018, :he Duterte administration has named played a critical role in the Duterte ad- the Philippines submitted a written Philippine Vice President , ministration's foreign policy strategy. notification to the United Nations of ;munch critic of the government's drug Secretary Kerry advised lessening the an intent to withdraw from the Rome Nar program, to be anti-drug czar after emphasis on the Arbitral ruling when Statute (the treaty that established the ;he accepted Duterte's offer to lead and dealing with maritime disputes, fur- ICC) to which it had been a party since .7.o-chair the Philippines' Inter-Agen- ther suggesting that a more strategic 2011. The ICC was notified a day later. y Committee on Anti-Illegal Drugs approach toward China is afoot. While The Duterte administration's with- :ICAD). the Philippines' relationship with the drawal from the Rome Statute followed Another issue that strikes at the United States is strained, it does not a preliminary examination launched by lean of the U.S.-Philippine bilateral mean that the latter will abandon the the ICC—a course of action to warrant elation is the Duterte administration's former. While U.S. Asian alliances whether an investigation is needed—on Nivot to China and Russia, paralleled maintain concerns of security risks, the the Duterte administration's drug war. vith a proactive distancing from the United States remains the prime guar- As of March 17,2019, the Philippines Jnited States. President Duterte ma- antor of security to its peripheral allies. is officially no longer a party to said iipulated the fragile public perception This is especially true for a long-time statute. The United States is not a party )f the Filipinos on the historical atroci- treaty ally like the Philippines. to the statute, either. ies committed by the United States in A third challenge to the U.S.-Phil- A fourth challenge to the bilateral he Philippines and, through his angry ippine bilateral relations is the Philip- relationship is the diminishing pres- emarks, galvanized support for his pines' withdrawal from the Interna- ence of the United States in the West breign policy preference. President tional Criminal Court (ICC). In con- Philippine Sea primarily due to man- )uterte's attempts at loosening the ties vith the United States is a postcolonial epudiation of America; to liberate the 'hilippines from its status as some sort if neocolonial ward. Duterte's pivot away from the U.S. !eed not be construed as complete sev- ranee of ties, but rather as a recalibra- ion of interests. Despite the hints of istorical revenge, the Philippines'de- nse posture in the region is optimally laintained. The Duterte administra- on's acceptance of the 2014 EDCA, ihich affirms mutual cooperation to romote peace and security in the re- ion, is indicative of the government's olicy response to the uncertainties osed by China's regional preponder- nce. Nevertheless, the recent Philip- ine policy approach to China (which Protesters burn an image of President Rodrigo Duterte near the Philippine Congress on mrie label as appeasement) is straining July 22, 2019, in Manila, Philippines. ()ES AZNAWGETTY IMAGES) l.S.-Philippine relations. But this pol- :3, is not ill-informed, at least on the

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7 GREAT DECISIONS • 2 0 2 0 time disputes with China, the regional and equity in the military agreements administration had maintained a stra- giant. 74,000 U.S. troops are currently between the United States and the tegic posture with the Philippines due deployed in the Asia Pacific across five Philippines. When Philippine National to vested key interests in the bilateral treaty allies of the United States: Aus- Defense Secretary relationship, particularly in the main- tralia, Japan, South Korea, Thailand called for the review of the 1951 Mu- tenance of external (disputed territories and the Philippines. Aside from the tual Defense Treaty in December 2018, as flashpoints for conflict escalation) number of troops deployed, the United the United States took great measure and internal security (peaceable resolu- States has maintained minimal associa- in ensuring continued commitments tion to the separatist insurgency) with- tions with any maritime disputes. To and support for the transfer of military in the Philippines and throughout the this effect, China has reinforced its ter- personnel in the Philippines. But this Southeast Asian region. The entrance ritorial claims in the region alongside assurance was thinly veiled with the of Rodrigo Duterte definitely shook the its bolstering of economic and financial same undertone of maintaining legal U.S.-Philippine bilateral relations to assertions in the Asia Pacific. For ex- ambiguity in the Mutual Defense Trea- the core. Despite the Obama adminis- ample, China's Belt and Road Initia- ty, which drew the concern of Secretary tration's enormous strides in maintain- tive seeks to boost economic connec- Lorenzana. Secretary Lorenzana went ing strategic relations with the Philip- tivity and infrastructure along the old so far as to suggest that legal ambigu- pine government, it remained critical Silk Road and throughout the Eurasian ity in military agreements can lead to of the latter's gross human rights viola- region. The China- Economic confusion and doubt especially when tion in the conduct of its drug war. The Corridor alone could amass some $62 mutual defense obligations are trig- Trump administration's appeasement billion worth of revenue in invest- gered. This active concern is only logi- of Duterte's policy agenda, on the other ments. This is further reified by the cal as China aggressively projects its hand, may be a strategic response to Regional Comprehensive Economic dominance even within the Philippines' the Philippines' rebalancing toward Partnership between China and the rest exclusive economic zone. Moreover, China and Russia. The United States' of Asia, to which the United States is a comparison of the two agreements Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of not a party. In 2015, the creation of the from 2014—U.S. defense cooperation 2018 alone is indicative of "the United Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank with Japan and with that of the Phil- States' continued commitment to the (or AllB) effectively challenged the ippines —suggests that there exists a region" despite the encroaching threats West-affiliated regional international disparity in legal specifications and to democratic institutions in Asia. This, financial institutions like the Asian De- clarifications in the defense obliga- in part, also complements the Trump velopment Bank and the Japan Inter- tions between the United States and administration's "Free and Open Indo- national Cooperation Agency. Despite the Philippines. Secretary Lorenzana's Pacific" strategy/framework in Asia. the Philippine government's clamor for concern remains on point through and Rodrigo Duterte currently serves as intervention in the West Philippine Sea through: Ambiguity in military agree- the single most important factor for the debacle, the United States has limited ments is perilous considering Chinese U.S.-Philippine bilateral relations. Un- its stance and its position on the mat- regional preponderance and territorial der his executive watch, the bilateral re- ter—one loosely based on verbal agree- aggression. The Philippine govern- lations of the United States and the Phil- ments reached by the former Obama ment's concerns were quelled when, ippines may either come out stronger in administration and Xi Jinping's admin- on March 1, 2019, U.S. Secretary of the end or wither, stagnate even, in the istration. These mutually agreed upon State Mike Pompeo assured the Duterte process. But this does not in any way limits serve as constraints to the United administration that any armed attack in preclude the influence of domestic and States'intervention in the West Philip- the West Philippine Sea will trigger de- international forces. As a matter of fact, pine Sea, effectively restricting its ac- fense obligations outlined in the Article the strengthening of U.S.-Philippine re- tions to freedom of navigation initia- 4 of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. lations is anchored on how the United tives and freedom from maritime coer- While Secretary Pompeo's opportune States will respond to the Philippines' cion, intimidation and threats. A shared and timely comment may abate the recalibration and rebalancing. coexistence between the United States Philippines' lingering doubts on U.S. Building good-will. One unortho- and China was initially envisioned by commitment in maritime disputes for dox process, at least in this case, would both presidents Barack Obama and Xi now, manifestations of the U.S.'s obli- be building good-will. Whenever Jinping on the matter of China's rise. gations to the treaty remains to be seen. President Duterte invokes instances The United States will allow such for of American colonial excess, the gov- as long as it is peaceful, prosperous, Policy options ernments' ties with one another tend stable, and responsible. But this was ef- In spite of China's meteoric rise in the to take a beating. One possible way of fectively reversed under U.S. President region over the past decades, the Unit- building good-will is providing for his- Donald Trump. ed States remains as the Philippines' torical reparations. A recent example Lastly, and perhaps the more exigent single most credible and trustworthy is the return of the Balangiga bells last one, is the challenge of legal ambiguity security partner. The second Obama December 11, 2018. (the Balangiga

84 THE PD.- IL PPONES AND TC-slE U.S. massacre took place in 1901 during the Philippine-American war. Ameri- can forces took three church bells as trophies of war.) The bells were partic- ularly important for President Duterte as a symbol of colonial oppression by the United States; that unless the church bells of Balangiga were not on Philippine soil, the unjustified mas- sacre of Balangiga remains an affront to U.S.-Philippine relations. This was remedied when U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Sung Kim and other American political leaders endeavored to arrange the return of the church bells to the Philippines. Defense cooperation. Like fos- tering socio-political good-will, the maintenance of a comprehensive de- fense cooperation in the region, and Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte (R) and U.S. President Donald Trump (L) hold a bi- with the country, is necessary. This lateral meeting on the sidelines of the 3 I st Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) may pertain to drafting succinct, time- Summit at the Philippine International Convention Center in Manila on November 13, 2017. (ROLEX DELA PENNAFPVIA GETTY IMAGES) ly and relevant defense cooperation guidelines between the United States Implementing the 2016 Arbitral bloc approach is also the best means of and the Philippines. But the instance Tribunal ruling. When the arbitral tri- maintaining security and order within Df the 2014 EDCA indicate that this bunal ruling against Chinese expansion and around the West Philippine Sea. is not the case. In contrast to the 2014 in the South China Sea was released Experiences with the ASEAN bloc in- U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, the on July 12, 2016, it was a remarkable dicate that it is a good counterbalance 2014 EDCA serves more as logistical foreign policy victory for the outgoing to Chinese territorial aggression. All transfer and jurisdictional parameter Aquino administration. It was, how- ASEAN countries are within China's agreements on military equipment ever, Rodrigo Duterte's administration peripheral sphere of influence. Each and its use. The former, on the other that inherited the success. Pursuing the vary in their experiences and relation- land, outlines comprehensive defense arbitral tribunal ruling is now incum- ship with China. But structuralizing guidelines under invasion scenarios bent on the new government; however, an ASEAN bloc as counterbalancing oupled with bilateral cooperation President Duterte's rhetoric indicates entity against China is not an easy mechanisms allowing for the similar that the government will not be pur- feat especially because the regional ogistical concerns that makes up the suing the implementation of the rul- bloc is more a convening body than an ?hilippines' 2014 EDCA. To contex- ing for two reasons: a risk-assessment enforcing one. In 2017, ASEAN was :ualize the Philippines' 2014 EDCA, of conflict escalation with China and most outspoken in pointing out the :Mina's aggressive military build-up Duterte's choice of amicable dispute controversial missile testing of North n the West Philippine Sea is now settlement with China through verbal Korea, invoking administrative ac- illegedly capable of launching mis- agreements. President Duterte still tion from countries like Japan and the ;Hes in the region alarming both the maintains his firm position on matters United States to ensure that Kim Jong- ?hilippines' Department of National of the Philippines'sovereignty and ter- un's government was held accountable. 3efense and the United States' Pen- ritorial integrity, as he elaborated in his While the preponderant China posits a agon. Moreover, an updated VIIRS recent State of the Nation Address last different case, a viable option remains: Visual Infrared Imaging Radiometer July 22, 2019. This has been a source for the Philippines (and the United >uite) satellite imagery released by the of concern for many of the critics of States) to turn to ASEAN countries for Karagatan Patrol (Sea Pa- Duterte administration. Figures like a pooling of security capacity. The U.S. rol) shows that foreign vessels from retired Senior Associate Justice Anto- and the Philippine governments need Jietnam, Taiwan and China are within nio Carpio of the Supreme Court of the not look far from the ASEAN region. It he exclusive economic zones along Philippines have been forthright about is also important for the Philippines to he western Philippine coastline, with the necessity of protecting the West actively ensure its fellow Asian neigh- peculation that Chinese vessels, corn- Philippine Sea as a global common bors that this strategic turn to ASEAN nercial and non-commercial alike, from China's grand thievery. does not go in contravention to their .omprise a majority of these. Pivoting to ASEAN. The ASEAN claims in the disputed regions.

85 7- 14-gE PHIJLOPPENES AND THE U.S.

discussion questions

1.Under present United States'foreign policy, do the Philippines 4.Corruption has been wide spread under the Duterte administration, have a good reason to be suspicious of U.S. assurances given the as has increased use of violence. How much should these conditions ambiguities of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the verbal reassur- impact our relationship with the Philippines? What policies would ances of the Secretary of State? What factors do you think might you suggest given the fact that these are domestic Philippine issues? cause the United States to hesitate to respond in contravention of the treaty mandates? 5.Human rights, the rule of law and constitutionalism are bedrock principles for democratic nations. Duterte's withdrawal 2.China's expansion into the South China Sea has not been from the Rome Statute opens the door to increased contravention significantly challenged by the United States. What suggestions of those principles in his country. What possible strategies could would you propose to counter China's expansionist activities in the US develop to persuade the Duterte government to change implementing the Belt and Road program which would reassure course? the Philippines of our commitment to them? 6.America's past colonial history in the Philippines has not been 3.Duterte's authoritarian policies share a lot in common with forgotten by them, especially the middle class and is reflected other authoritarian leaders around the world. The United States in part by Duterte's "pivot" to China and Russia. What policies policy has been to not condemn these policies. In the case of the would you propose to promote better U.S. relations with the Philippines, should the United States use more assertive diplo- Philippine people? macy to try to deter increasing assertion of authoritarian rule? If so, what suggestions would you make to the State department?

suggested readings Abinales, Patricio N. and Amoroso, Donna J. State and Society Bartholomew, Rafe. Pacific Rims: Beermen Bailin'in Flip-Flops in the Philippines. 464 pp. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, and the Philippines'Unlikely Love Affair with Basketball. 416 2017. This clear and nuanced introduction explores the Philippines' pp. New York, NY: Berkley Books, 2011.In Pacific Rims, Rafe ongoing and deeply charged dilemma of state-society relations Bartholemew, journalist, New Yorker, and veteran bailer, ventures through a historical treatment of state formation and the corre- through the Philippines to investigate the country's love of bas- sponding conflicts and collaboration between government leaders ketball. and social forces. Wolff, Leon. Little Brown Brother: How the United States Karnow, Stanley. In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philip- Purchased and Pacified the Philippines. 418 pp. Oxford, Eng- pines. 536 pp. New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 1990. Stanley Kar- land: Oxford University Press, 1992. First published in 1960,Little now won the Pulitzer Prize for this account of America's imperial Brown Brother won the Francis Parkman Prize from the Society experience in the Philippines. In a swiftly paced, brilliantly vivid of American Historians in 1962 as the book which "best combined narrative, Karnow focuses on the relationship that has existed be- serious historical scholarship and literary distinction." Available tween the two nations since the United States acquired the country again, this book looks at a long history of Filipino struggle for from Spain in 1898, examining how we have sought to remake the independence. Philippines "in our image." an experiment marked from the outset by blundering, ignorance, and mutual misunderstanding. Miller, Jonathan. Rodrigo Duterte: fire and fury in the Philip- pines. 352 pp. New York, NY: Scribe, 2018.Through interviews Hamilton-Paterson, James. America's Boy: The Marcoses and with Duterte himself, his sister, daughter and son, two former presi- the Philippines. 502 pp. London, England: Faber and Faber, 1998. dents, old friends, death squad hitmen, and relatives of his victims, James Hamilton-Paterson, who knew the Philippines well having Channel 4 News' Asia Correspondent Jonathan Miller shows that lived there for some years, resolved in America's Boy to examine far from the media cartoon of The Godfather, John Wayne, Hugo the Marcoses more closely - not to exonerate them but, rather, to Chavez, and Donald Trump rolled into one, Duterte is a sinister, explain the political and social roots of their regime, sustained for dangerous man, who should not be taken lightly. so long by support from Washington.

Don't forget: Ballots start on page 98!!!!

To access web links to these readings, as well as links to additional, shorter readings and suggested web sites, GO To wwwipa.org/great_decisions and click on the topic under Resources, on the right-hand side of the page.