Public Law Litigation in the U.S. and in Argentina: Lessons from a Comparative Study
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The Erosion of Checks and Balances in Argentina
Electoral Fraud, the Rise of Peron and Demise of Checks and Balances in Argentina Lee J. Alston Andrés A. Gallo Professor of Economics Department of Economics Director, Program on Environment and Society University of North Florida University of Colorado Coggin College of Business, Room 3404 Research Associate, NBER e-mail: [email protected] e-mail: [email protected] April 2007 For comments and support on earlier drafts we thank A. Leticia Arroyo-Abad, Blanca Sánchez-Alonso, Vanessa Baird, Dan Bogart, Michael Bordo, John Drobak, Bertrand Du Marais, Alan Dye, Samuel Fitch, Wolfgang Keller, John Londregan, Gary Libecap, Joseph Love, Geraldo Munck, Larry Neal, Douglass North, Leandro de la Escosura Prados, Sebastian Saeigh, Mary Shirley, Carol Shiue, Pablo Spiller, Sven Steinmo, Thomas Ulen, Werner Baer and seminar participants at the University of California, University of Colorado, University of Illinois, University of Paris X, and the NBER. We also received valuable feedback from participants at the 2004 meetings of the New Institutional Economics. 2 Electoral Fraud, the Rise of Peron and Demise of Checks and Balances in Argentina Abstract The future looked bright for Argentina in the early twentieth century. It achieved high levels of income per capita and was moving away from authoritarian government, towards a true democracy, with a system of checks and balances. Unfortunately, Argentina never finished the transition. The turning point away from the road towards checks and balances occurred in the 1930s. To stay in power in the 1930s, the Conservatives in the Pampas resorted to electoral fraud, which neither the legislative, executive, or judicial branches checked. -
Comparison of the Constitutional Basis of the United States and Argentine Political Systems
COMPARISON OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ARGENTINE POLITICAL SYSTEMS By SEGUNDO V. LINARES QUINTANA t While the following article was in the process of publication, a Constitutional Convention of 169 members adopted a new Constitu- tion for the Argentine Republic; however, the significant changes effected by this new Constitution indicate that the problems raised herein are still germane. This new Constitution is made up of 103 Articles and one Tem- porary Article, as compared with the 110 Articles of the old Consti- tution. It shows a decided tendency to recognize the advancement of the social and economic rights of all the people, as indicated by the Articles concerning the rights of workmen and the family, of educa- tion and culture for all, and the determination of the social functions of property. Among the most significant changes are the provisions permitting the re-election of the President and Vice-President for more than one term of six years, and for the election of Senators and Depu- ties for terms of six years. Another major innovation of particular interest is the provision extending Argentine citizenship automatically to all foreigners who have resided in Argentina five years unless the foreigner signifies in writing his intention not to become a citizen. The whole spirit of this new Constitution is presumably expressed in the amendment to the Preamble, which adds, after setting forth the purposes of "confirming justice, consolidating domestic peace, pro- viding for the common defense, promoting the general welfare . .," the language: ". ratifying the inexorable decision to constitute a nation, socially just, economically free and politically sover- eign. -
The Political Economy of Sub-National Democracy
Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris ÉCOLE DOCTORALE DE SCIENCES PO Programme doctoral Amérique latine Centre d’études et de recherches internationales [CERI] Doctorat en science politique The Political Economy of Sub-National Democracy Fiscal rentierism and geography in Argentina Matías Federico Bianchi Thèse dirigée par M. Olivier Dabène Soutenue le 21 mai 2013 Jury : M. Olivier Dabène, Professeur des universités, Sciences Po Paris M. Carlos Gervasoni, Profesor, Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (rapporteur) M. Gérôme Sgard, Professeur FNSP, Sciences Po Paris M. Laurence Whitehead, Senior Research Fellow in Politics, Nuffield College, University of Oxford (rapporteur) Matías F. Bianchi – « The Political Economy of Sub-National Democracy» - Thèse IEP de Paris – 2013 2 PREFACE "Un intelectual debe ocuparse de cosas que lo conmueven moralmente." - O´Donnell (Página 12, 14 Sept 2003). This dissertation is about a deep moral preoccupation that has almost monopolized my intellectual energy since a teenager. With different questions, levels of complexity and approaches, the goals have remained unchained: the paradoxical political dynamics of Argentina´s provinces. I come from San Luis, the province whose politics is the main driver of this work. In high school I already could not understand how people from San Luis would vote, in increasingly higher percentages in every subsequent election, for politicians who were openly corrupt, that changed judiciary authorities when they did not like them, and spent public funds on building the best basketball team on the country while having one of the worst education and health systems. Those questions led me to study political science, to approach the theories of development and democracy of Guillermo O´Donnell, Amartya Sen and others, who gave me hints about the centrality of citizenship and the factors that could hinder their capabilities. -
Moving Floors: the Obstacles to Guaranteeing Environmental Protection of Native Forests in the Context of Argentina’S Federalism
MOVING FLOORS: THE OBSTACLES TO GUARANTEEING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION OF NATIVE FORESTS IN THE CONTEXT OF ARGENTINA’S FEDERALISM A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Development Management and Policy By John Luft, B.A. Buenos Aires June 7th, 2013 Copyright 2013 by John Luft All Rights Reserved ii MOVING FLOORS: THE OBSTACLES TO GUARANTEEING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION OF NATIVE FORESTS IN THE CONTEXT OF ARGENTINA’S FEDERALISM John Luft, B.A. Thesis Adviser: Dr. Ricardo Gutiérrez ABSTRACT At the end of 2007, Argentina’s Congress passed a forest law intended to provide a national floor of environmental protection for the country’s remaining native forests. The law was a response to the environmental problems and social conflicts that have accompanied the high rate of deforestation over the past several decades, which was the result of the conversion of native forests into agricultural and pasture land. This thesis will show how the northern provinces have accomplished the lowering of the law’s protection floor, using the province of Salta as an in-depth case study. It will argue that the Argentina’s Secretary of the Environment and Sustainable Development (SAyDS) has allowed this to happen because President Cristina Kirchner (2007-the present) has appointed environmental secretaries who favor the province’s control of their natural resources over the national government’s constitutional obligation to provide its citizens with a safe environment. The President has appointed such secretaries because environmental protection has never been a policy priority for her or her husband, the late President Nestor Kirchner (2003-2007), and enforcing the law’s protection floor would require that the SAyDS challenge economic priorities of both governors and the national government. -
Electoral Fraud, the Rise of Peron and Demise of Checks and Balances in Argentina
Electoral Fraud, the Rise of Peron and Demise of Checks and Balances in Argentina Lee J. Alston Andrés A. Gallo Professor of Economics Department of Economics Director, Program on Environment and Society University of North Florida University of Colorado Coggin College of Business, Room 3404 Research Associate, NBER e-mail: [email protected] e-mail: [email protected] November 2007 For comments and support on earlier drafts we thank A. Leticia Arroyo-Abad, Blanca Sánchez-Alonso, Werner Baer,Vanessa Baird, Dan Bogart, Michael Bordo, John Drobak, Bertrand Du Marais, Alan Dye, Joseph FerrieSamuel Fitch, Wolfgang Keller, John Londregan, Gary Libecap, Joseph Love, Geraldo Munck, Larry Neal, Douglass North, Leandro de la Escosura Prados, Gary Richardson, Sebastian Saeigh, Mary Shirley, Carol Shiue, Pablo Spiller, Sven Steinmo, Thomas Ulen, John Wallis and seminar participants at Northwestern University, University of California- Berkeley, University of California- Irvine, University of Colorado, University of Illinois, University of Paris X, the Washington D.C. Area Economic History Group and the NBER. We also received valuable feedback from participants at the 2004 annual meeting of the International Society for the New Institutional Economics. 2 Electoral Fraud, the Rise of Peron and Demise of Checks and Balances in Argentina Abstract The future looked bright for Argentina in the early twentieth century. It achieved high levels of income per capita and was moving away from authoritarian government, towards a true democracy, with a system of checks and balances. Unfortunately, Argentina never finished the transition. The turning point away from the road towards checks and balances occurred in the 1930s.