The Polish Case

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The Polish Case leszek koczanowicz THE POLISH CASE Community and Democracy under the PiS unday, 25 october 2015, proved a political turning point in Poland. In May 2015, the presidential election had already brought an unexpected upset when the incumbent, supported by the governing Civic Platform, was routed by the right-wing Scandidate, Andrzej Duda. It was obvious that a major turnover was on the cards. However few, if any, envisaged the magnitude of the bombshell. In the October 2015 parliamentary elections, the conservative-nationalist Prawo i Sprawiedliwos´c´ (Law and Justice) party won an absolute major- ity in the Sejm—an unprecedented result in Poland’s post-communist history. The pis also claimed 61 of the hundred seats in the Senate.1 Meanwhile Civic Platform, the liberal-conservative formation that had dominated the political landscape since 2007, saw its vote plummet by 15 points to 24 per cent and lost a quarter of its seats. For the first time since 1990, no left or centre-left party managed to pass the 5 per cent threshold for entry to parliament. However, new political forces robustly asserted their presence. In third place came Kukiz’15, a novel forma- tion centred round Paweł Kukiz, a 53-year-old punk rocker, which ran in alliance with the far-right National Movement, advocating a switch to first-past-the-post, single-member constituencies as a panacea for all the ills of Polish democracy.2 The first months of thep is government have shown rather clearly the political direction in which the country is likely to be heading in the next few years. Wielding full political control—Sejm, Presidency, Senate— the party has proclaimed that, having obtained a mandate from the nation, it is determined to follow through on its electoral promises and implement a radical programme of ‘good change’. Its leaders’ statements new left review 102 nov dec 2016 77 78 nlr 102 imply that this will transform Poland’s model of democracy to make it an instrument of the national community. The key question, then, is how ‘community’ is actually comprehended here. Indeed, the relation between community and democracy is one of the most intractable, if also most intensely debated, points of contemporary political theory. The difficulty lies in the fact that the two concepts—liberal democracy and community—have developed along separate lines, often not sim- ply oblivious of but even overtly inimical to each other. Liberalism takes as its starting point an isolated, autonomous individual whose relations with others are harmonized in the public sphere by procedures of a largely legal nature. By contrast, ‘community’ highlights the role of ‘the people’—of the national community—as a vehicle of values that mat- erialize in social life. A problem inherent in this approach is the relation between the community and political power. While the community is ‘live’, ‘warm’ and ‘all-embracing’, political power is ‘frigid’ and ‘distant’, with the state as ‘the coldest of all cold monsters’, as Nietzsche famously put it. If the notion of liberal democracy is embedded in Enlightenment thinking, the notion of community draws rather on Romanticism, with its distrust of the overarching power of reason and, in particular, of its universalizing claims. The history of nineteenth- and twentieth-century political thought may be interpreted as an ongoing contest of the two 1 The Polish Sejm, or lower chamber, is elected on a d’Hondt, multi-member, open- list system of proportional representation; Prawo i Sprawiedliwos´c´ [pis] won 235 of its 460 seats, with 38 per cent of the vote. The 100-seat Senate is elected on a first-past-the-post basis.p is was founded in 2001 by Lech and Jaroslaw Kaczynski, well-known figures of the Christian right. A former Justice Minister and Mayor of Warsaw, Lech Kaczynski served as President from 2005 until his death in the Smolensk air crash in 2010. The pis formed a minority government in 2005 and a governing majority, in coalition with far-right groups, in 2006 before being defeated by Donald Tusk’s Civic Platform in 2007. Tusk himself left Polish politics in 2014, his party’s ratings already in free fall, to become president of the European Council. 2 In fourth place, with 8 per cent of the vote, was another newcomer: Nowoczesna [Modern], led by former World Bank economist Ryszard Petru, promoting a liberal social and economic agenda. Nowoczesna’s vote came largely from former Civic Platform supporters, disappointed with its failure to shake off its social conserva- tism. Those that failed to pass the threshold (5 per cent for parties, 8 per cent for coalitions) included the coalition led by the post-Communist centre-left Democratic Left Alliance (sld), punished by voters ever since its scandal-ridden 2001–05 government; Razem [Together], a new left-liberal formation founded by young intellectuals and social activists despairing of the sld; and the ultra-libertarian KorWin [Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic: Liberty and Hope]. koczanowicz: Poland 79 concepts—although the dichotomy, of course, requires qualification. Democracy can neither arise nor develop without the people’s support; and without the backing of the masses, democracy is reduced to a game between elites. Nevertheless, a key question is still to determine the conditions under which popular protest can be transformed into stable democratic institutions, or augment society’s democratic potential. The dispute over ‘democracy’ versus ‘community’ has resulted in a rather feeble compromise between the two competing perspectives. This does not mean that a new theoretical framework has emerged, but rather that the two sides to the debate have agreed to make some conces- sions. Some liberals have acknowledged that, even in the public sphere, people are not merely autonomous individuals without any prior history. Rather, they are immersed in certain traditions that shape their lives and form their political beliefs, which implies that in politics not only auton- omous individuals but also groups and collective identities are at stake. And most communitarians no longer deny the validity of procedures, instead asserting that these must be filled with the live content of com- munal values. The question that still remains unresolved is how much community democracy actually needs, with the concomitant query as to at what critical point a strong community comes to be destructive of democratic society. For the problem of democracy lies in its volatile, elusive nature. This was perhaps best captured by Claude Lefort, who saw democracy as a system organized around ‘an empty place’—previously occupied by the monarch—and with its central notion of ‘the people’ necessarily constructed and reconstructed all over again, constantly ‘up for grabs’. Unsurprisingly, then, democracy is inherently susceptible to the tempta- tions of both authoritarianism and anarchism. The former is related to a recurring tendency to fill in the ‘empty place’ with definite symbols, such as the nation or the proletariat. At the same time, democracy is also always at risk of dwindling into anarchy, when its precarious balance begins to crumble. In this perspective, democracy is framed as a grand call to boundary-crossing, to transgression of what is actually there.3 As Cornelius Castoriadis insisted, the Athenians’ momentous discovery was the realization that institutions are a human product rather than a divine work. In his monumental study, Castoriadis convincingly argues 3 Bernard Flynn, The Philosophy of Claude Lefort, Evanston, il 2005. 80 nlr 102 that institutions, including the essential one, i.e., ‘the imaginary institu- tion of society’, create individuals, being created by them at the same time. This reciprocal relation between individuals and institutions pre- supposes individual autonomy as an essence of democracy.4 On this view, it is clear that democracy, as a system with the change- ability of institutions and individual autonomy at its core, may quite easily find itself on a collision course with community—founded upon unity and tradition, and on a view of the individual as the expression of communal values. It may, but it does not have to; and any answer to the question of how much community democracy needs will largely be an empirical one, related to and predicated upon particular politi- cal and cultural circumstances. Democratic societies, as we know, emerged within national states in tandem with acceptance of their plu- ralistic character. Yet as democracy was consolidated, these very societies would be transformed, ushering in a growing approval of political and ethical pluralism. Consequently, the national community would become increasingly self-reflexive. Everybody for themselves, only the nation for all? To say that communal attitudes are pervasive in Poland is to state a banality. Despite the significant and, in many senses, pioneering accom- plishments of the gentry-based democratic tradition, it was the loss of independent statehood that determined the trajectory of political and social thought in Poland. Nineteenth-century Polish intellectuals found themselves challenged to formulate a concept of the nation outside and beyond the national state—a concept that would help the national idea survive the times of partition and subjection. The titanic efforts of Polish intellectual elites sustained the continuity of national identity, but that success came at a price. The nation emerged as a projection of hopes and anxieties—or, to use a psychoanalytical term, as a phantasm that left a heavy imprint on the lives of multiple generations of Poles. At its heart lay a dream of absolute national unity and the appended belief that it was almost tangible, within reach. By definition, a phantasm not only resists reality but creates a symbolic sphere that holds sway over people’s beliefs and effectively motivates human action. As a phantasm is, clearly, saturated with emotion, going beyond it or opposing it is an unusually 4 Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, Oxford 1989.
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