Tafolla, Trachtenberg, and Aho
Nonlethal grenade used during Non-Lethal Individual Weapons Instructors Course, U.S. Africa Command U.S. Marine Forces Africa (Lydia M. Davey) Africa (Lydia U.S. Marine Forces
From Niche to Necessity Integrating Nonlethal Weapons into Essential Enabling Capabilities
By Tracy J. Tafolla, David J. Trachtenberg, and John A. Aho
Colonel Tracy J. Tafolla, USMC, is Director of the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate. David J. Trachtenberg is President and CEO of Shortwaver Consulting, LLC, and was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy from 2001 to 2003. Colonel John A. Aho, USMC (Ret.), is a Senior Policy Analyst at American Systems Corporation. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 71 FEATURES | From Niche to Necessity
he Department of Defense (DOD) The recently released Strategic Defense Guid- Device, and Portable Vehicle Arresting Barri- conducts U.S. military operations ance notes that U.S. forces must be increas- ers and Running Gear Entanglers, designed to in accordance with internationally ingly flexible and adaptable to deal with a stop moving vessels. Trecognized and accepted laws and dynamic security environment that “presents More sophisticated nonlethal weapons principles governing the use of armed force. an increasingly complex set of challenges are being developed with greater operational Those laws demand that the employment of and opportunities.”4 In both asymmetric and range, scalable to a variety of needs, to force be judicious, proportionate to the threat, conventional environments, avoiding non- provide a layered defense against potential and tempered wherever possible by the deliber- combatant casualties has become increasingly threats. These include airburst nonlethal ate avoidance of noncombatant casualties. important to the success of military opera- munitions, pre-emplaced electric vehicle The principle of civilian casualty avoidance is tions. Nonlethal weapons can play a signifi- stoppers, and nonkinetic active-denial embedded in the Fourth Geneva Convention of cant and strategic role in accomplishing this technology. Active-denial technology, 1949 and reflects an agreement among civilized and helping to achieve mission success. which delivers precision nonlethal effects nations that, while highly destructive, warfare at extended ranges, offers promise in crowd should not be conducted indiscriminately. What Are Nonlethal Weapons? control, area denial, and other applications. Indeed, a new DOD Law of War Manual is A current working definition of Active denial uses millimeter wave technol- being drafted, reinforcing America’s adherence nonlethal weapons is “weapons, devices, and ogy to create an invisible beam of directed to these standards of conduct. munitions that are explicitly designed and energy that produces a strong heating sensa- U.S. restraint in the application of lethal primarily employed to incapacitate targeted tion on the surface of the skin, which is com- force is not unusual. For example, during personnel or materiel immediately, while pletely reversible once an individual moves North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to reflexively out of the beam’s path. operations against Serbia in 1999, thousands personnel, and undesired damage to property Although applicable to a broad range of Serbs acting as “human shields” stood on in the target area or environment. [Nonlethal of contingencies, nonlethal weapons are bridges in Belgrade and Novi Sad to protect weapons] are intended to have reversible neither a panacea nor a substitute for lethal the structures from allied bombing attacks effects on personnel or materiel.”5 DOD policy force, and this article is not meant to exag- that would have killed civilians and been a recognizes that the use of nonlethal weapons gerate the potential of nonlethal weapons to public relations disaster.1 The U.S. military may occasionally result in injurious or lethal accomplish mission objectives. Their purpose is to complement the lethal capabilities in the warfighter’s toolkit. Some current nonlethal contemporary military operations are unlike previous wars systems have technical and operational limita- where success was measured in purely military terms tions, including range, mobility, and weight considerations that necessitate tradeoffs and impact their usefulness and operational suit- has sought to exercise restraint in operations effects, though that is not the intended ability to the warfighter. Those limitations, in both Iraq and Afghanistan.2 More recently, outcome. Their use reflects an approach to however, can be reduced through targeted U.S. forces supporting NATO air operations warfare that seeks to reconcile the objective of investments in science and technology. against Libya took extensive precautions to defeating the enemy with the moral impera- avoid civilian casualties.3 tive of sparing innocent lives. Challenges and Roadblocks Contemporary military operations are The current generation of nonlethal DOD began to focus coherent atten- unlike previous wars where success was mea- weapons includes counterpersonnel and tion and resources on developing nonlethal sured in purely military terms. The impor- countermateriel capabilities used for control- capabilities as an outgrowth of U.S. humani- tance of winning “hearts and minds” is now ling crowds or stopping or diverting vehicles tarian assistance efforts in Somalia in 1995, growing. Today’s wars are mostly irregular on land and vessels at sea. They provide esca- which highlighted a need for capabilities conflicts fought not against countries but in lation-of-force options that allow U.S. forces short of lethal means. In 1996, Congress complex environments against terrorists and to determine intent of potentially hostile indi- directed the establishment of an executive extremists who wear no uniforms and operate viduals and groups and modify behavior. agent for the DOD Non-Lethal Weapons within the civilian populace—often in a delib- Examples of counterpersonnel systems Program in order to provide oversight on erate attempt to shield themselves from attack currently used include dazzling lasers—optical joint nonlethal matters, maintain insight and maximize propaganda opportunities distracters useful for temporarily overwhelm- into the various independent Service efforts, from civilian casualties. ing an adversary’s visual sense by emitting eliminate duplication and program redun- Tomorrow’s wars will likely see U.S. a bright flash and glare effect—and acoustic dancies, and facilitate the fielding of nonle- forces involved in a range of contingen- hailing devices that emit loud warning tones thal weapons capabilities. The commandant cies from traditional to irregular warfare or clear verbal commands over long distances. of the Marine Corps was given this task, and operations. Former Secretary of Defense Also in use is an array of nonlethal munitions, the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate Robert Gates set DOD on course for a “rebal- grenades (and their delivery systems), and was established to conduct day-to-day man- anced” military that is better postured to Tasers. Countermateriel systems include spike agement of joint programs and coordination succeed in nontraditional operations while strips, caltrops (heavy-gauge steel-puncturing of Service-unique programs on behalf of the preparing for other types of contingencies. spikes), the Vehicle Lightweight Arresting executive agent.
72 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Tafolla, Trachtenberg, and Aho
Dazzler directed-energy weapon used for signaling or as nonlethal deterrent to hostile forces approaching ship U.S. Navy (Luciano Marano)
Since then, significant progress has in terms of civilian lives saved, mission Game-changers and Champions been made in developing nonlethal tech- objectives achieved, strategic goals accom- Translating new, cutting-edge tech- nologies and fielding existing off-the-shelf plished, and international support attained nologies into fielded systems has historically capabilities. Despite their relevance to among allies and partners who appreciate been difficult. Though the Global Position- today’s contingency operations, however, efforts to protect civilians. Unfortunately, ing System (GPS) is ubiquitous today, its nonlethal weapons remain an underutilized nonlethal weapons have not yet been fully future was far from assured during its initial asset. Institutional resistance, bureaucratic embraced by military leadership and the development. GPS was criticized as costly inertia, competition with legacy programs policy community. and unnecessary, a General Accounting for funding, inadequate training, doctrinal Importantly, in some quarters of the Office6 (GAO) report was highly critical, and shortcomings, unclear requirements from the military, there is a cultural aversion to non- its budget was cut. The individual Services Services, and practical impediments to field- lethals. This is understandable in light of the pursued their own incompatible navigation ing—such as technological hurdles and insuf- military’s training as a fighting force whose and timing options. It was only through the ficient quantities of nonlethal systems with mission includes locating, closing with, and vision of GPS advocates that funding was greater standoff range—have impeded a more destroying the enemy. It requires a shift in restored and the program was successful. thorough integration of nonlethal capabilities mindset to convince the Nation’s warriors Similarly, as the importance of into the total force. In addition, fostering a that employing tools that allow for mission unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to intel- greater understanding of the role and utility accomplishment without loss of life or highly ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of nonlethal weapons as an irregular warfare destructive lethal fires where possible will not missions has increased, so has resistance enabler, vice a niche capability commonly weaken the force. to shifting budgetary resources away from associated with force protection missions, Without a broader-based understand- manned to unmanned platforms. Yet despite remains a significant challenge. ing of their value and a stronger commit- an initial reluctance to fund aircraft without The total cost of the DOD Non-Lethal ment to their fielding, nonlethal weapons are pilots, the Air Force today “is training more Weapons Program, including all joint and unlikely to recognize their full potential for pilots for advanced UAVs than for any other Service-specific investment, is roughly meeting the requirements of U.S. military single weapons system.”7 $140 million annually. Yet the return on strategy or the operational dictates of contin- History is replete with similar examples this investment can be disproportionate gency operations. where visionary approaches encountered ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 73 FEATURES | From Niche to Necessity practical roadblocks. Billy Mitchell’s vision of prevented the hijacking of two vessels in the even more people against our broader decisive airpower independent of land and sea Gulf of Aden within 24 hours of each other, mission. Thus, the disciplined application forces was roundly criticized. And while today’s but also enabled the capture of 16 pirates of force is consistent with our values and operations continue to demonstrate naval without injury to them or to crew mem- international law, increases our chances of and land force indispensability, many credit bers12—a telling demonstration of their value strategic and operational success, and more Mitchell’s vision as a key contributor in the in combating piracy and saving lives. effectively advances national policy.”13 Non- development of the modern-day aircraft carrier As the U.S. military is called upon to lethal weapons are responsive to the National and widespread acceptance and employment assist in humanitarian assistance/disaster Military Strategy’s direction. of carrier-based air combat—an outcome that relief operations overseas, nonlethal weapons In Afghanistan, civilian casualty would have been unlikely in the absence of a can also be useful for crowd control and to avoidance has become a central warfighting high-level commitment to the concept. deescalate tensions before violence erupts, requirement. The tactical directive governing The future of military technologies is helping U.S. forces maintain order during the the use of force acknowledges that civilian often driven by cost, yet too often cost is con- distribution of food, water, and medical sup- casualties have “strategic consequences” and fused with value. GPS, UAVs, and the aircraft plies to survivors after a natural disaster. calls the protection of Afghan civilians “a carrier have proven their value despite the Future concepts of warfare may dictate moral imperative.”14 It states, “Every Afghan relative expense of developing them. Similarly, the need for more innovative approaches civilian death diminishes our cause [empha- the value of nonlethal weapons for meeting to meeting mission requirements, placing sis in original]. If we use excessive force or mission requirements in today’s challenging greater stresses on commanders’ freedom of operate contrary to our counterinsurgency and complex military operational environ- maneuver and freedom of fires as well as flex- principles, tactical victories may prove to be ments may outweigh the costs of developing ibility and versatility in the force’s response strategic setbacks.”15 these novel technologies. capabilities. And any future vision for nonle- The negative consequences of civilian thal weapons must include a fully integrated casualties are magnified by the instantaneous Lessons for Tomorrow inventory of scalable effects capabilities in transmission of information, enabled by The utility of nonlethal weapons which an individual weapons system can be technology, and driven by the demands of in irregular conflicts, peacekeeping, and “dialed up” commensurate with the scenario an instant news cycle. Video and images of humanitarian operations is more than theo- faced. The ability to isolate and segregate grieving families and destroyed homes can retical. As retired Lieutenant General Emil R. appropriate targets through nonlethal means exacerbate negative perceptions of American Bedard, USMC, has noted, “Every warfighter may take on added importance, along with military might. Greater reliance on nonlethal eventually realizes that non-lethal weapons the ability to deny an adversary from seeing, weapons can help mitigate this effect. The tactical employment of nonlethal weapons can have other strategic benefits. the ability to temporarily deny an adversary’s use of infrastructure For example, the ability to temporarily deny through nonlethal means allows it to be reactivated later an adversary’s use of infrastructure through nonlethal means not only allows it to be reac- tivated at a later date but also saves money in are vital in creating the effects needed to hearing, communicating with, or reinforcing the long run by avoiding the need to rebuild. defeat an adversary.”8 Their use in Somalia troops on the battlefield. Likewise, employment of nonlethal devices in the mid-1990s was credited with dissuad- Because nonlethal weapons are appli- or nondestructive fires to prevent enemy ing mob violence that previously had led to cable to a broad range of missions the U.S. vehicles from crossing a bridge means that violent clashes between U.S. forces and Somali military is likely to encounter, their potential the bridge need not be destroyed by costly demonstrators.9 During peacekeeping opera- utility across the range of military operations munitions. It also allows it to be used by tions in Kosovo in 2000, U.S. forces effectively is increasing. To meet this growing utility, friendly forces, thus avoiding future U.S.- diffused an explosive situation by using their transformation from force protection borne reconstruction costs. nonlethal weapons during a confrontation tool to force application capability to comple- Estimates of the U.S. costs of recon- with a crowd of hostile Serbs in the town of ment lethal effects is required, along with struction in Iraq highlight the strategic Sevce.10 And in Afghanistan and Iraq, nonle- their institutionalization across the doctrine, benefit that could be provided by the wider thal weapons have played an important role. organization, training, materiel, leadership use of nonlethal weapons. By March 2011, the As one Army officer noted, their use “sends and education, personnel, and facilities United States had spent approximately $61 a strong message without the need to employ domains. Eventually, they may become as billion on Iraq reconstruction, which included deadly force.”11 essential an enabler of mission success as GPS. repair to economic infrastructure damaged in Though important for irregular warfare the conflict (for example, restoring electricity, missions such as counterinsurgency, nonle- Tactical Uses, Strategic Impacts communications, transportation, water, oil, thal weapons have much broader applicability The 2011 National Military Strategy and gas).16 While not all of these costs could across the full range of military operations. emphasizes the importance of civilian have been prevented through more extensive For example, as a counterpiracy capability, casualty avoidance: “The risk we assume by use of nonlethal capabilities, significant the use of nonlethal counterpersonnel tools minimizing collateral damage to innocents expenses might have been avoided if damage such as the acoustic hailing device not only is balanced by a reduction of risk to turning to Iraq’s infrastructure had been minimized
74 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Tafolla, Trachtenberg, and Aho U.S. Marine Corps (Daniel Balmer)
Marine demonstrates capabilities of X26E Tazer
by the application of appropriate and effective capacity to affect outcomes from the tactical forces.21 Many occur at entry control points, nonlethal technologies and capabilities. level to the strategic. convoys, and other controlled access areas. Likewise, in Afghanistan, the costs of As former International Security Assistance reconstruction to the U.S. taxpayer have been The Afghanistan Experience Force (ISAF) Commander General David significant, with the Special Inspector General Nearly a decade after the start of Petraeus noted, “Counterinsurgents cannot for Afghanistan Reconstruction reporting Operation Enduring Freedom, noncombatant succeed if they harm the people they are that these costs have exceeded $85.5 billion.17 casualties continue to strain the U.S.-Afghan striving to protect.”22 Wider use of nonlethal While some of these costs are directed toward relationship, undermining efforts to develop capabilities in such scenarios could mitigate establishing civil governance institutions the trust and confidence of the Afghan this risk, allowing U.S. forces who must make and other elements essential to the building people. This strain was recognized by Interna- split-second decisions to “pull the bullet back” of a democratic society, some portion of this tional Security Assistance Force Commander should they engage suspicious individuals spending has been allocated to repair and General John R. Allen, who noted in his 2011 later deemed to be noncombatants. rebuild property and infrastructure damaged Tactical Directive that “Every civilian casualty Although some U.S. forces in Afghani- or destroyed in the counterinsurgency. is a detriment to our interests and those of the stan are equipped with nonlethal capabilities, In addition, monetary restitution to Afghan government, even if insurgents are their overall availability remains limited. grieving family members when innocents are responsible. We must redouble our efforts to As General Joseph Dunford, assistant com- accidently killed and the costs of sheltering eliminate the loss of innocent civilian life. . . . mandant of the Marine Corps, has stated, the those whose property is destroyed in kinetic We must never forget that the center of gravity “demand for effective nonlethal weapons right engagements could be minimized through the in this campaign is the Afghan people; the now exceeds the inventory. . . . Squads and wider application of nonlethal means. citizens of Afghanistan will ultimately deter- platoons that are interacting with people [in In short, the use of nonlethal weapons mine the future of their country.”18 Former Afghanistan] want to take decisive action but can have a strategic “multiplier effect” by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral limit the possibility of injuring civilians.”23 avoiding collateral damage to property and Mike Mullen warned, “Lose the people’s trust, U.S. combatant commands have sought infrastructure, minimizing unintended and we lose the war.” to expand the availability of nonlethal civilian casualties, overcoming negative per- Civilian casualties in Afghanistan rose weapons, though progress has been slow. ceptions of the United States, denying oppor- 15 percent from 2009 to 2010 and another 8 Recent surveys of deployed units indicate tunities for enemy propaganda victories, percent from 2010 to 2011,19 yet three out of significant shortfalls in nonlethal weapons and minimizing long-term reconstruction four civilian casualties are caused by Taliban education, knowledge, training, and avail- costs. Perhaps no other capability allows for a and insurgent forces.20 Nevertheless, so-called ability. Accordingly, U.S. Central Command broader range of employment options across escalation-of-force incidents are the primary recently reemphasized predeployment train- a wider spectrum of contingencies with the cause of civilian casualties by coalition ing requirements for nonlethal weapons. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 75 FEATURES | From Niche to Necessity
Without Service institutionalization of our culture and accept the importance, of these capabilities must also be communi- nonlethal weapons training and equipping, and sometimes preeminence, of non-lethal cated from the top down. deployed forces will continue to be called effects.”25 This is not the equivalent of upon to exercise what some have called “dumbing down” U.S. military capabilities. Signs of Progress “courageous restraint” to minimize unin- Nor is it a reflection of what some have called Notwithstanding the limitations of tended casualties and damage. While such a “softer military.”26 As former USCENT- current systems and the challenges noted restraint has contributed to a 26 percent COM Commander General Anthony Zinni, above, there appears to be a broad-based foun- drop in the number of coalition-caused USMC, noted, “Non-lethal weapons when dation of support for greater investment in civilian casualties, it has also been contro- properly applied . . . make the United States and employment of nonlethal weapons—from versial, raising concerns that it limits the more formidable, not less so.”27 senior leadership to deployed units to policy- ability of troops to protect themselves and Unfortunately, misunderstandings and makers and opinion leaders. Several combat- thus increases their risks. Some have noted mischaracterizations of the effects of nonle- ant commanders have now included nonlethal that restraint in the application of lethal thal weapons are common. New technologies weapons on their annual Integrated Priorities force on ethical grounds “transfers risk” often raise ethical, cultural, and political List. General Chiarelli has also noted that “In from enemy combatants and noncombatants concerns. The challenge of deploying a new a counterinsurgency, non-lethal effects are as to U.S. forces and that this creates “a false technology is that it is not well understood important as—and, at times, more important dilemma where one must choose between and is easily subject to mischaracterization, than—kinetic effects.”28 Then–Major General non-combatant lives, which have value, and especially in underdeveloped societies where Richard Mills, commander of ISAF’s Regional soldiers’ lives, which do not.”24 Here, also, cultural, ethnic, and religious differences Command–Southwest, stated, “I am a sup- the greater availability of nonlethal weapons may be exploited for political purposes by porter of non-lethal weapons. I would like to may help alleviate these concerns. America’s adversaries. see some suite of those weapons provided to The effects of unintended civilian In response to a request from an opera- us over here.”29 At the unit level, one Army casualties reach beyond the local population. tional commander, an Active Denial System officer who served in Iraq and Afghanistan The accidental killing of innocents can have was shipped outside of the continental United commented, “To back away from applying a traumatic effect as well on young troops States—and was later ordered to return non-lethal weapons in irregular warfare risks who must forever live with the consequences stateside, having never been used. Although sending the message that the United States of their actions. The United States must do the system has been demonstrated as safe in is incapable of either developing [a nonlethal all it can to provide its uniformed men and more than 11,000 tests on 700 human vol- weapons] arsenal or determining how to women in harm’s way with the tools they need unteers and does not cause any long-term or employ [nonlethal weapons], or is reluctant to complete the mission and avoid inadvertent permanent health issues, the newness of the to attempt a form of warfare that involves death or injury to noncombatants. technology, coupled with concerns over its dealing with dissatisfied people as human mischaracterization as a “microwave” weapon beings and not simply as targets.”30 Setting the Record Straight that “fries,” “cooks,” or sterilizes its targets, Congress has also expressed bipartisan Communicating effectively about resulted in a lack of willingness to employ support for nonlethal weapons. The Ike nonlethal weapons and how they can assist it. This experience highlights the power of Skelton National Defense Authorization Act the warfighter in achieving the objectives of perceptions to shape policy and reinforces the for Fiscal Year 2011 called for the procure- U.S. military strategy is a critical prerequisite importance of ensuring they are based on fact ment and fielding of nonlethal capabilities to to gaining acceptability and support for rather than myth. “improve military mission accomplishment these capabilities. This effort, however, will Shaping the information environment and operational effectiveness” in counterin- be handicapped without the more active is just as important as shaping the military surgency operations.31 engagement of senior-level military and environment. Strategic communication The House Armed Services Committee civilian leaders. is essential for generating understanding (HASC) in particular has highlighted “the Accepting nonlethal weapons as an and advocacy of technological solutions to value of non-lethal weapons in reducing risks integral element of the warfighter’s toolkit contemporary military/operational issues. to the warfighter and to non-combatants in requires a cultural shift that is counterintui- A bottom-up approach, including at the current and prospective contingency opera- tive to the military, which understandably unit level, is a necessary but not sufficient tions.”32 The committee urged DOD “to accel- erate its effort to field such systems, including active denial technologies; to ensure adequate restraint in the application of lethal force on ethical grounds funding for the non-lethal weapons science “transfers risk” from enemy combatants and noncombatants to and technology base; and to develop policy, U.S. forces doctrine, and tactics for their employment.”33 The HASC also expressed concern that DOD “does not fully appreciate the important role emphasizes the use of lethal force. As former condition for success in achieving greater non-lethal capabilities can play in helping to Army Vice Chief of Staff General Peter acceptance and integration of nonlethal ensure mission success,” arguing that “bud- Chiarelli noted, “if we’re really serious about weapons capabilities into current and future getary trends do not reflect an urgent need for fighting an insurgency, we have to change military planning and operations. The value non-lethal capabilities.”34
76 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Tafolla, Trachtenberg, and Aho U.S. Army (Phillip Valentine) U.S. Army (Martin Greeson)
M5 Modular Crowd Control nonlethal munition used to incapacitate large groups with flash bang and Soldier loads 40mm nonlethal rounds into impact of rubber balls launching system during training in Iraq
In 2004, the Council on Foreign is increasingly likely to confront.40 Moreover, ■■ help determine intent and provide Relations called for “incorporating . . . non- the employment of nonlethal capabilities to important deescalatory options for warfighters lethal capabilities more broadly into the support antiaccess/area-denial operations between shouting and shooting equipment, training, and doctrine of the is recognized in the new Joint Operational ■■ avoid negative consequences that U.S. armed services,” concluding that doing Access Concept. could emerge as a result of the use of lethal so “could substantially improve the United force including to young troops where the States’ ability to achieve its goals across the Conclusion costs of a wrong decision on the use of force full spectrum of modern war.”35 In 2007, a Many future conflicts are likely to be can be psychologically devastating RAND study highlighted the “inadequacy” of unconventional and irregular and take place ■■ be applicable to anticipated contingen- nonlethal capabilities and the negative politi- in environments where it is difficult to distin- cies and changes in the strategic environment cal fallout from killing noncombatants.36 In guish between combatants and noncomba- ■■ conform to U.S. military strategy 2009, RAND called for a range of capabilities tants. Conventional operations may also occur ■■ be consistent with the moral principles that are scalable for maximum effectiveness, in urban environments within close proxim- that guide U.S. military actions concluding that “creating and mainstream- ity to civilians and critical infrastructure. In ■■ reflect an American approach to war ing this capability requires vision, initiative, these circumstances, nonlethal weapons can that is compliant with international law and its commitment, and persistence on the part of play an increasingly useful role in support of requirement to use force judiciously, propor- those soldiers’ civilian and military leaders.”37 U.S. military goals and objectives. Yet this tionately, and discriminately And Brookings Institution scholar Michael transformation is unlikely to happen without ■■ reduce unintended civilian casualties O’Hanlon has argued, “Rather than ask our a greater understanding of the tactical and and inadvertent damage to property troops to make a choice between being at risk strategic benefits of these weapons. ■■ avoid expensive reconstruction costs and taking actions that could kill innocent Nonlethal weapons are not a substitute associated with rebuilding infrastructure Afghans and set back the war effort, we for the application of lethal force. When damaged as a result of traditional kinetic mili- should give them the [nonlethal] tools they employed, nonlethal weapons are always tary operations need to do their job.”38 backed by lethal means. As an adjunct to ■■ help achieve mission success. More recently, a report by the Center for lethal force, however, they can be a power- Strategic and Budgetary Assessments noted ful addition to the warfighter’s toolkit. For To accomplish these objectives, the that nonlethal weapons—including directed- example, nonlethal weapons can: value of nonlethal weapons must be better energy technologies—can play a valuable appreciated by everyone from the civilian role in countering the antiaccess/area-denial ■■ close the gaps in existing counterper- and military leadership down to the operator strategies of adversaries.39 It is precisely sonnel and countermateriel capabilities on the battlefield. Because of their trans- these kinds of threats that the new Defense ■■ create a more capable and versatile formative strategic benefits across a range Strategy Guidance argues the United States force without loss of lethality of military operations, the role nonlethal ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 77 FEATURES | From Niche to Necessity weapons can play in likely future contin- the general public. Such advocacy is essential the law enforcement community, as “less lethal” or gencies should be explicitly referenced in to highlight the growing relevance of nonle- “less than lethal” weapons. In 1996, the term “non- policy and strategy documents such as the thal technologies and the ability of nonlethal lethal weapons” was established in DOD lexicon and formally codified in DOD Directive 3000.3, Quadrennial Defense Review.41 Persistent weapons to help achieve the objectives of “Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons,” available at myths must be dispelled with dispassionate U.S. military strategy. Although the top
78 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Tafolla, Trachtenberg and Aho
States Congress, April 30, 2012, available at