THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA

The Possibility of Moral Science in the Philosophy of William Ockham

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Faculty of the

School of Philosophy

Of The Catholic University of America

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

@

Copyright

All Right’s Reserved

By

Bart Jason Himel

Washington, D.C.

2020

The Possibility of Moral Science in the Philosophy of William Ockham

Bart Jason Himel, Ph.D.

Director: Timothy B. Noone, Ph.D.

The essential character of William of Ockham’s moral theory has long been an issue in the secondary literature due to the perceived difficulty of reconciling his claim that morals is a science based upon necessary principles with his equally strong claim that God can issue virtually any command which it would be our moral duty to obey. Most commentators have attempted to resolve this difficulty by focusing on a select group of texts in which Ockham makes these claims, but other texts in which he deals with these issues, sometimes more directly, often have been ignored. The author of the present dissertation attempts to resolve this issue by means of a close reading of all of the relevant texts in Ockham’s works. In the first chapter, the author presents the primary texts of Ockham which have been the focus of discussion; he then surveys the secondary literature, and offers criticisms of the dominant positions that have been taken. In the second chapter the author examines Ockham’s views concerning the nature and requirements for scientific knowledge, especially that it must be in the form of a demonstration; and in the third chapter, he more fully examines one of these requirements, that all of the propositions in a scientific demonstration must be necessary propositions.

Having established the requirements for scientific knowledge in general, in the fourth chapter the author attempts to establish that Ockham’s moral theory can yield scientific knowledge of ethical matters even if such knowledge is limited to general propositions as opposed to propositions regarding particular actions. In the fifth chapter, he extends this analysis

to Ockham’s natural law theory as presented in his political writings. He shows that, despite a significant terminological difference between Ockham’s earlier academic writings and his political writings, the same tensions are equally present in the latter as in the former, and so the resolution offered in the previous chapter can easily be extended to Ockham’s natural law theory in his political writings. The final chapter sums up the results of the previous chapters.

This dissertation by Bart Jason Himel fulfills the dissertation requirement for the doctoral degree in Philosophy approved by Timothy B. Noone, Ph.D., as Director, and by Michael Gorman, Ph.D., and Angela McKay Knobel, Ph.D. as Readers.

______Timothy B. Noone, Ph.D., Director

______Michael Gorman, Ph.D., Reader

______Angela McKay Knobel, Ph.D., Reader

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Table of Contents

Introduction…………………………………………………………………….Page 1.

Chapter 1: Introduction to the Problem of Moral Science……………………..Page 4.

Chapter 2: The Nature of Demonstrative Science…………………………….Page 45.

Chapter 3: The Nature of Necessary Propositions…………………………….Page 77.

Chapter 4. Can There Be a Demonstrative Science of Morals?...... Page 104.

Chapter 5: The Political Writings: Moral Science and Natural Law…………Page 137.

Chapter 6: Conclusion………………………………………………………...Page 175.

Bibliography……………………………………………………………..……Page 181.

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Introduction

In his writings on moral questions, William of Ockham claims that we can have a scientific knowledge of morals based upon necessary principles that are per se nota, and that are accessible to human right reason; however, there are other passages in which

Ockham seems to claim that all moral principles depend upon the will of God for their truth, and that He can change them at will. Thus, there appears to be a conflict between two view of morality in Ockham’s writings: a rationalist view based upon right reason, and a divine command theory view based upon God’s will.

In this dissertation I will examine the question whether these two sets of texts can be reconciled, and, if so, in what ways. Over the past century of scholarship on Ockham’s moral theory, different scholars have staked out positions on both sides of this conflict: some have maintained that Ockham’s moral theory is essentially a rationalistic one so that true moral science is possible within it; while others have maintained that Ockham’s moral theory is essentially a divine command theory, and consequently no true moral science is possible within it despite Ockham’s claims to the contrary. I will try to sort out these claims, and, by using a close reading of Ockham’s texts, I will try to resolve whether Ockham is entitled to his claim that we can have a moral science.

This dissertation will have six chapters in it. The first chapter is an introduction to the issue to be dealt with. First, it cites the relevant texts in Ockham’s writings. Then it describes the views which different commentators have taken on those texts through the centuries. It attempts to assess the relative merits of each of the views put forward; and it criticizes the shortcomings of each of the views.

1

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The second chapter begins the close reading of Ockham’s texts by looking at his various discussions of what constitutes scientific knowledge in general. It shows that, for

Ockham, the requirements for a truly scientific knowledge of any subject matter are very strict. Specifically, it shows that scientific knowledge in the strictest sense is always of necessary propositions which are deduced from necessary premises. It also discusses the various lesser types of scientific knowledge which Ockham is willing to accept.

The third chapter elaborated on the nature of necessary propositions. It having been shown in the second chapter that scientific knowledge is always of necessary propositions, this chapter more fully discusses what Ockham believes is required for a proposition to be truly necessary. It is shown that for Ockham a necessary proposition is one which can never be false, but only true. Together, the second and third chapters establish the criteria necessary for claiming any subject matter is susceptible to scientific knowledge; the following chapters will evaluate whether Ockham’s views on moral principles can be assimilated within such criteria such that a moral science is possible.

The fourth chapter directly deals with this challenge. It looks at Ockham’s texts in which he discusses moral science and moral principles, and it attempts to apply the criteria discussed in the previous two chapters to them to see if a true science of morals can be defended within Ockham’s works. This chapter will look at several possible solutions, and it will in the end conclude that at least a limited science of morals is possible.

The fifth chapter extends this discussion into Ockham’s political writings. First, it explains why it was desirable to segregate Ockham’s political writings from his academic writings: they were written at distinctly different periods in Ockham’s life, they are

3 motivated by different circumstances, and there is a distinct terminological difference between the two sets of texts which must be explained. This chapter argues, first, that it makes sense to read Ockham’s political writings in the light of his academic writings, that they are not so distinct in content as they may at first appear and that the same sets of issues appear in both sets of texts; and, second, it argues that the same reconciliation of these issues is possible in both.

The sixth chapter is a conclusion. It sums up what has gone before, and briefly recites the position argued for in the other chapters.

Chapter 1: Introduction to the Problem of Moral Science

William of Ockham never wrote a systematic work on moral theory, nor did he ever comment on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. However, he did discuss issues dealing with moral philosophy throughout his works. Despite the fact that these discussions are thus scattered, there is a remarkable consistency between his discussions of individual topics, such as virtue, right reason, moral science and divine commands, when he discusses these in separate works. However, the overall nature of his moral theory suffers from an apparently significant inconsistency. When he discusses moral science, Ockham is adamant that there are certain moral truths which are accessible to reason alone, and these are the subject matter of moral science. However, when he deals with the role that God’s commands play in moral theory, he is equally adamant that acts are immoral only because God has commanded the opposite of these, and that God could have in fact commanded something completely different, which would then be virtuous or meritorious. So, Ockham seems equally committed to a moral theory that is based upon reason and so is accessible to any person, and a theory based upon divine commands, the content of which would seem to be available only through revelation.

How do we reconcile these different points of view? That has long been a contentious issue among scholars of Ockham’s moral theory. Some have maintained that

Ockham’s theory is predominantly a divine command theory1; others have claimed that

Ockham’s theory is based on right reason, which orders us to obey divine commands2;

1 For the most recent statement of this position, see Thomas M. Osborne, “Ockham as a divine-command theorist,” Religious Studies 41 (2005): 1-22. 2 Marilyn McCord Adams, “The Structure of Ockham’s Moral Theory,” Franciscan Studies 46 (1986): 1- 35; John Kilcullen, “Natural Law and will in Ockham,” in A Translation of William of Ockham’s Work of Ninety Days, Vol. 2, trans. John Kilcullen and John Scott (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2001), 851- 882. 4

5 still others have claimed that Ockham’s moral theory is confused3, or is a conscious attempt to balance these two principles.4 The best way to answer these questions would seem to be to present and discuss those texts in which Ockham discusses moral science, discuss those in which he discusses God’s commands and His freedom, and then see what would be necessary to make these two sets of texts cohere. That is what I plan to do.

In his academic writings Ockham discusses the nature of moral science several times. His most detailed discussions are in his question de connexione virtutum5, his question circa virtutes et vitia6, and in the fourteenth question of his second Quodlibet.7

Of these discussions only the last is concerned exclusively with the nature of moral science; the first two take it up in the context of more general discussions of moral theory and prudence. I will take them up in this order, however, because this is most likely the order in which they were written.

In the first distinction of the second article of his de connexione virtutum, Ockham distinguishes the various meanings of prudence. He distinguishes four types of prudence, only one of which is also called moral science. The first type of prudence is of any knowledge which is directive of any action, whether mediately or immediately. This meaning of prudence is then further divided into two sub-types. The first refers to any

”evident cognition of some universal proposition which is known evidently through

3 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. 3, Ockham to Suarez (Westminster, MD: The Newman Press, 1953; reprint, New York: Doubleday, 1993), 103-110 (page citations are to the reprint edition). 4 Armand Mauer, The Philosophy of William of Ockham in the Light of Its Principles (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1999), 516-539. 5 William of Ockham, OTh VIII, Connex., 323-407. 6 Ibid., CVV, pp. 272-286. 7 William of Ockham, OTh IX, Quodl., 176-178.

6 teaching, because it proceeds from self-evident propositions,”8 and he tells us that this

”scientific knowledge is moral science properly speaking.”9 This clearly refers to knowledge of propositions that are known as a result of syllogistic reasoning, which is what I take he means when he says such knowledge “proceeds” from self-evident propositions. The second subtype also includes evident knowledge of universal propositions which “are known only through experience,”10 which, he tells us, is also moral science. So, in this text, Ockham is maintaining that moral science just refers to evident knowledge of universal propositions, whether those propositions be known through teaching or through experience, so long as that knowledge is directive of action.

In fact, we can speak of moral science of propositions that can be known only through experience. However, we should note that he refers only to the first type of moral science as “proprie”, indicating that knowledge of universal propositions known through teaching and reasoning has a certain priority over knowledge of universal propositions known only through experience, even though he does not deny that both types of knowledge are moral science.

In his further discussions of prudence, which Ockham does not call moral science, he restricts the second and third types of prudence to particular propositions only. The second meaning of prudence is described as “evident knowledge that is immediately directive in regard to some particular possible action.”11 To be so directive, this type of prudence has to be the “knowledge of some particular proposition that evidently follows

8 “…notitia evidens alcuius universalis propositionis quae evidenter cognoscitur per doctrinam, quia procedit ex propositiones per se notis…” William of Ockham, OTH VIII, Connex., 330. 9 “…notitia scientifica proprie est scientia moralis …” William of Ockham, OTH VIII, Connex., 330. 10 “…solum evidenter cognoscitur per experientiam …” William of Ockham, OTH VIII, Connex., 330. 11 “…notitia evidenti immediate directive circua aliquod agibile particulare…: William of Ockham, OTH VIII, Connex., 330-331.

7 from teaching and from a self-evident universal proposition, as from a major premise.”12

It would seem that this type of prudence is dependent upon the first, insofar as the universal propositions from which such prudence would follow would seem to be the very type of propositions knowledge of which constitutes prudence in the first sense, which is moral science.

The third meaning of prudence is even more concerned only with some specific action. It is defined as “knowledge, gained only in virtue of experience, immediately directive in regard to some possible action.”13 After giving an example, Ockham emphasizes that this type of prudence is “only of some particular proposition known through experience…”14; he then points out that this type of prudence is what Aristotle mean by prudence, insofar as it is distinguished from moral science.15

Ockham then gives a fourth meaning of the term prudence, which is of “an aggregate of all immediately directive knowledge, whether gained from teaching or experience….”16In this sense of the word, prudence encapsulates all three of the meanings already discussed.

So, based upon this discussion, it seems that moral science is a species of prudence. Prudence is in general any knowledge which is capable of directing human actions; it is knowledge that directs our actions so that we “live well”17. However, within

12 “…notitia alicuius propositionis particularis quae evidenter sequitur ex universali propositione per se nota tamquam maiori et per doctrinam.” William of Ockham, OTH VIII, Connex., 331. 13 “…notitia immediate directive accepta per experientiam solum respect alicuius agibilis.: William of Ockham, OTH VIII, Connex., 331. 14 “…solum respect alicuius propositionis particularis cognitae per experientiam…” William of Ockham, OTH VIII, Connex., 331. 15 William of Ockham, OTH VIII, Connex., 331. 16 “…aliquo aggregation ex omni notitia immediate directive, sive habeatur per doctrinam sive per experientiam…” William of Ockham, OTH VIII, Connex., 331. 17 “…bene vivere…” William of Ockham, OTH VIII, Connex., 331.

8 this general knowledge, there is knowledge of universal propositions and knowledge of particular propisitions. Knowledge of merely particular propositions is what is prudence in a narrow sense; it is what is usually meant by prudence. Knowledge of universal propositions is prudence in a broader sense; but it is better called moral science. So we can see that the distinguishing mark of moral science is that it is concerned only with universal propositions, all other moral knowledge being mere prudence.18 So in this early text19, moral science is knowledge of any universal proposition that is directive of any human action, either mediately or immediately.

In his question circa virtutes et vitia, Ockham also seeks to distinguish moral science from prudence. There he also says that moral science is understood in two ways.

The first is “for any scientific knowledge which can be had evidently through teaching,”20 which, he tells us “proceeds from self-evident principles.”21 So this type of moral science is merely of propositions that we know evidently through teaching, and that we know through principles that are known per se. It is likely that Ockham means by the last phrase that this knowledge is produced syllogistically, but it is important that he does not state this. Also, there is no claim that this moral science is of universal principles, but it is likely that Ockham intends this, because the example he gives of this type of knowledge is: “every benefactor ought to be benefited in turn; but anyone saving

18 There is a fourth type of prudence, which is of all immediately directive knowledge, so moral science would be a subset of that type of prudence. But Ockham’s discussion of that adds nothing to what has come before. 19 The editors of the critical edition date the lecture to the autumn of 1319. William of Ockham, OTh VIII, 22*. 20 “pro omni notitia scientifica quae evidenter haberi potest per doctrinam .” William of Ockham, OTh VIII, CVV, 281. 21 “…procedit ex principiis per se notis …” William of Ockham, OTh VIII, CVV, 281.

9 someone from death is a benefactor; therefore, every such person ought to be benefited in turn.”22 Notice that every proposition in this syllogism is a universal.

In the second way moral science is understood “for evident scientific knowledge which is gained and can only be gained by experience, and in no way evidently through teaching.”23 So there is moral science of propositions that can in no way be known through teaching, but only through experience. But are these propositions universals?

Apparently not, for after giving the example “an angry person on such an occasion ought to be made less angry through fine words”24, he points out that this example shows that

“through experience man has evident knowledge of many singular propositions.”25 So, while it is clear that this type of moral science is of universal propositions, it is of universal propositions that can be known only through many singular propositions. It is knowledge that can be had only by induction, we might say. That this is the proper understanding of Ockham’s intention is clear from how he distinguishes this type of moral science from prudence. First he distinguishes two types of prudence, one of which is “for evident cognition of some singular proposition which is only obtained through experience;”26 the other “is commonly for the evident cognition of some practical universal proposition which is evidently known only by experience.”27 The first deals

22 “…omni benefactori est benefaciendum; sed quilibet liberans aliquem a morte est benefactor; igitur omni tali est benefaciendum .” William of Ockham, OTh VIII, CVV, 281.

23 “…pro notitia scientifica evidenti quae solum habetur et haberi potest per experimentiam, et nullo modo evidenter per doctrinam .” William of Ockham, OTh VIII, CVV , 281-282. 24 “…quilibet iracundus ex tali occasione est per pulchra verba leniendus et mitigandus….” William of Ockham, OTh VIII, CVV, 281. , 282. 25 “…homo habet per experimentiam notitiam evidentem de multis propositionibus singularibus ….” Ibid. 26 “…pro notitia evidenti alcuius propositionis singularis quae solum habetur mediante experientia …” Ibid. 27 “…communiter pro notitia evidenti alicuius universalis practicae quae solum evidenter cognoscitur per experimentiam …” Ibid.

10 with singular propositions, while the second deals only with universal propositions.

Taking moral science in the first sense, it is obviously different from either type of prudence, since it alone is learned through teaching. However, taking moral science in the second sense, and prudence in the second sense, they are the same. But if we take prudence in the first sense, it is different from moral science in the second sense, because moral science in this sense is “concerning universals.”28 So, in either case, moral science is only of universal propositions, even if those universal propositions can be known only through experience.

Comparing these two discussions of prudence and moral science, we can see that they are quire similar. Each presents two different types of moral science, and two types of prudence. However, the discussion in de connectione virtutum subsumes moral science under prudence as a species under a genus; whereas the discussion in circa virtutes et vitiae makes no such claim. But it is clear from both discussions that prudence and moral science are each types of practical knowledge which are capable of directing human acts.

Both are also propositional. The difference between them is that moral science is always of universal propositions and prudence properly speaking is always of particular propositions; in neither case is the method by which the propositions known relevant:, they may be known by teaching or by experience, or they may be self-evident or follow from self-evident propositions. Moral science and prudence “are distinguished as a moral universal habit and a less universal habit.”29

28 “…circa universalia ..” Ibid., 283. 29 “…distinguuntur sicut habitus magis universalis et minus universalis.” William of Ockham, Sent. OTh I, 321.

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Seemingly Ockham’s final discussion of moral science is in the fourteenth question of his second Quodlibet. There, the question put to him is: whether there can be a demonstrative science of morals. This question is so pointed that it must have been asked by someone who was convinced that Ockham may not be able to justify such a science, perhaps by having read his Reportatio.30 More on that later. After noting that the term morale is used in two senses, first, “broadly for human acts which are absolutely under the will’s control,”31 second “strictly for morals or acts subject to the power of he will according to the natural dictate of reason and according to other circumstances,”32 he proceeds to answer the question. He divides moral science into two types, “one is positive, the other non-positive.”33 Positive moral science is “that which deals with human and divine laws which obligate someone to follow or avoid things which are neither good nor evil unless they are prohibited or commanded by a superior to whom it belongs to make laws.”34 These are things that are neither good nor bad in themselves, but only because they are commanded or prohibited. Ockham says that jurisprudence is an example of this type of moral science. He also says that this positive moral science “is not a demonstrative science,”35 because it is based on “human positive laws, which are not evidently known propositions.”36 So its character as a demonstrative science is compromised because positive human laws are not evident propositions; but what about

30 William of Ockham, Sent., OTh V, 338-358. 31 “…large pro actibus humanis qui subiacent voluntati absolute …” William of Ockham, OTh IX, Quodl., 176. 32 “…stricte pro moribus sive actibus subiectis potestati voluntatis secundum naturale dictamen rationis et secundum alias circumstantias .” Ibid., 177. 33 “…una est positive, alia non positive.”33 Ibid. 34 “…illa quae continent leges humanas et divinas, quae obligant ad prosequendum vel fugiendum illa quae non sunt buna nec mala nisi quia sunt prohibita vel imperata a superiore, cuius est leges statuere .” Ibid. 35 “…non est scientia demonstrative …” Ibid. 36 “…leges humanas positivas, quae non accipiunt propositiones evidenter notas .” Ibid.

12 divine laws? Ockham’s original definition includes the possibility that God can command or prohibit things that are good or bad only because He has commanded or prohibited them, but this is not cited as a reason for the non-demonstrative character of this science. Does Ockham think that we can have demonstrative science of things that

God has commanded or prohibited in this way? Or does he consider the example of human positive laws sufficient to deny it the character of a demonstrative science?

Ockham does not tell us this, but if the first answer is the correct one, it would follow that, even if God commanded or prohibited things that were morally neutral, we would have to have evident knowledge of this. Later we shall return to the question of whether this is possible37.

Ockham then turns his attention to non-positive moral science. It is “that which directs human acts apart from any command of a superior, just as self-evident principles or principles known by experience so direct; for example, every good thing is to be done, every bad thing is to be avoided, and things of this type of which Aristotle speaks in moral philosophy.”38 This science is of propositions that direct our acts without any command of a superior. Also, note that it is of things that Aristotle discusses in his moral philosophy, which is strong evidence that one need not be aware of divine revelation to have "knowledge of conclusions deduced syllogistically from self-evident principles or known by experience is demonstrative; moral knowledge is of this type; therefore, etc.”39

So, unlike in the two previous discussions of moral science, we have the claim that it is of

37 See below, pp. 104-107. 38 “…illa quae sine omne praecepto superioris dirigit actos humanos; sicut principia per se nota vel nota per experientiam sic dirigit, sicut quod omne honestem est faciendum, et omne inhonestum est fugiendum, et huiusmodi, de quibus loquitur Aristoteles in morali phosophia.” Ibid. 39 “…notitia deducens conclusions syllogistice ex principiis per se notis vel per experimentiam scitis est demonstrative; huiusmodi est disciplina moralis; igitur etc.”39 Ibid.

13 propositions which are deduced syllogistically from other propositions, which are themselves known per se or known by experience. Does this contradict his previous claims that moral science is of propositions that are themselves known either per se or through experience? Not necessarily, since propositions of those types are not excluded here; rather, all Ockham has done is give us this class of propositions that fit the model of a demonstrative science. As examples of such moral principles he gives “the will ought to conform itself to right reason, every vituperative evil ought to be avoided….”40 He then claims that this science is more certain than many others because “anyone can have more experience of his own acts than of other things.”41 So its greater certainty is assured because we have greater experience of our own acts than any other acts. But it’s interesting to note that this science’s greater certainty is in no way due to a claim that its principles are more evident.

Based upon these three discussions, we can draw some conclusions. Ockham believes that we can have a true moral science. This science consists of knowledge of universal propositions, whether they are known per se or can be known only through experience, and of universal propositions that can be deduced syllogistically from these first two classes of propositions. Also, these propositions must be directive of human acts, either mediately or immediately. Finally, these propositions must direct our actions apart from the command or prohibition of any superior.

Our problem will be reconciling these views with views expressed especially in the second book of his Commentary on the Sentences, which has come down to us only in

40 “…voluntas debet se conformare rectae rationi, omne malum vituperabile est fugiendum …” Ibid., 178. 41 “…quilibet potest habere maiorem experientiam de actib eus suis quam aliis .” Ibid.

14 a Reportatio. The question there42 is whether a fallen angel is always involved in an evil act; in other words, are the damned angels free or not to continue their rebellion against

God. This is an interesting question because, if they maintain their freedom, it would seem possible that they could repent, and there would then be the problem of the damned loving God and so meriting salvation. This question extends, of course, to the state of damned humans as well, but the question is couched in terms of the angels. Ockham’s solution to this question is that God himself maintains the hatred of Himself in the wills of the damned, which, since His will is immutable, ensures that they will never repent.

Ockham thinks this solution is required because freedom of the will is such an essential property of angels and humans that they cannot be without such freedom even in hell or heaven.

But this solution creates its own problems, which Ockham addresses as dubia.

One of them is based on Aristotle’s claim in book 2 of the Ethics that the names of some actions are inherently bad, and so these things cannot be done virtuously. Aristotle’s examples are murder, theft and adultery, as well as spite, shamefulness and envy.43

Ockham’s objector claims that odium, of God presumably, is of this type; and so, since

God cannot do anything evil, hatred cannot be caused by God alone, which Ockham’s position requires.

Ockham’s solution to this doubt is dramatic. He admits that hatred, theft, adultery and similar things do have evil connected to them “under the present dispensation,”44 but this is only “insofar as they are done by someone who is obligated by divine precept to do

42 William of Ockham, OTh V, Sent., 338-358. 43 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II, 1107a10-13. 44 “…de communi lege …” William of Ockham, Oth V, Sent., 352.

15 the opposite, nevertheless anything absolute in these acts can be done by God without any evil circumstances connected.”45 So these things are wrong only because someone does them when he is obligated by divine precept to do the opposite. God, however, can do any of them without fault. Why? Because “God is obligated to cause no act.”46 God is under no obligation to anyone, so whatever He does, He does rightly. More importantly for us, however, is Ockham’s claim that someone could do these acts meritoriously if God commanded them; but in that case “they would not be called or named theft, adultery, hatred, etc., since these names signify such acts not absolutely but connoting or giving to understand that someone performing such acts is obligated by divine precept to do the opposite. And therefore, only the whole signification of a nominal essence of such names signifies evil circumstance.”47 So, these names signify that something is wrong because God has commanded that they not be done.

Furthermore, Ockham claims that this is the only way that they can be said to signify bad circumstances. In other words, he here seems to be forcefully claiming that the only thing that can make actions wrong is that God has commanded that they not be done; if

He had commanded the opposite, these same actions would be meritorious.

So, the only difference between “taking someone else’s property” and “theft” is that the latter signifies the fact that God has commanded that we not take someone else’s property. This would mean that no action has its own intrinsic goodness or evil, but is only such because God has commanded or forbidden it. Now we are also told that God is

45 “…quatenus fiunt ab aliquo qui ex praecepto divino obligatur ad contrarium, tamen quantum ad omne absolutum in illis actibus possunt fieri a Deo sine omni circumstantia mala annexa .” Ibid. 46 “…Deus ad nullum actum causandum obligatur .” Ibid., 353. 47 “…non dicerentur nec nominarentur furtum, adulterium, odium, etc., quia ista nomina significant tales actus non absolute sed connotando vel dando intelligere quod faciens tales actus per praeceptum divinum obligatur ad oppositum. Et ideo quantum ad totum significatum quid nominis talium nominum significant circumstantias malas.” Ibid., 352.

16 not obligated to perform any act. Presumably, this would mean that He is under no obligation to command or forbid any action; and so, the only way to know what is good or evil would be to know what God has in fact commanded or forbidden. From here it is not too far to claim that the only way we can know what is right or wrong is by revelation; that only those who have the word of God can know what is morally right or wrong. This would imply that there cannot be any virtuous pagans, which seems plainly false, as Ockham himself would no doubt agree. Ockham does believe that the virtues of pagans are specifically distinct from those of Christians, since “God is the object of any perfectly virtuous act elicited by a good Christian, and he is not the object of any virtuous act a philosopher or a pagan might elicit.”48 But he never suggests that the virtuous acts elicited by pagans aren’t truly virtuous; rather, pagans are stuck at the third degree of moral virtue whereas Christians can proceed to the fourth, which has God as a partial object.49 More importantly, it would seem to contradict explicitly what Ockham himself says about moral science, especially in the Quodlibet. Remember, there Ockham had claimed that there is a demonstrative moral science that directs human acts “without any command of a superior.”50 But given what we have read in the Reportatio, can Ockham seriously maintain that there are any such moral standards? If God could command or prohibit anything, what moral standards or propositions would direct our acts apart from the command of any superior?

All of this is compounded and complicated when we turn to texts that deal explicitly with divine acts and our knowledge of them. First, it is necessary to know that

48 William of Ockham, OTh VIII, CVV, 403 49 William of Ockham, OTH VIII, CVV, 325-326. 50 “…sine omni praecepto superioris …” William of Ockham, OTh IX, Quodl., 177.

17 the claim that God is obligated to cause no act is absolutely true for Ockham, excepting, of course, His love for Himself. Whatever God does extra se is inherently free. Clearly, any moral commands of the type under discussion would fit into the category of things

God does extra se. One problem this raises is that Ockham seems committed to the view that such acts cannot be known by us in this life. “The reason for this is that when something depends solely upon the divine will causing contingently and freely, whatever

He causes apart from Himself, that cannot be known with certainty by a wayfarer either by reason or by experience.”51 This would seem to cut off the possibility of certain knowledge of moral precepts commanded by God, which seem to be willed contingently and freely. Yet such would seem to be the case with the moral acts discussed above, viz. theft, adultery, etc., and so the moral badness of such acts would seem to be inaccessible to us.

So, how are we to reconcile these claims? There have been several attempts over the years, but none of them are, to my mind, entirely satisfactory. One way would be to claim that Ockham is fundamentally a divine command theorist, that divine commands play the ultimate role in his ethics, and so there is very little for right reason to do other than tell us to obey God’s commands. In general, a divine command theory of ethics, which is sometimes called theological positivism, claims that the foundation of morality is the will of God: it is right to do what God wills us to do, and it is wrong to do what

God forbids us to do.52 God’s will performs the same function in such a theory that the

51 “Cuius ratio est quia quanda aliquid dependent ex sola voluntate divina contingenter et libere causante, quidquid causat extra se, illud non potest certitudinaliter a viatore cognosci per rationem nec per experientiam.” William of Okham, OTh V, Sent., 319. 52 For a general discussion of divine command theories, see Divine Commands and Morality, ed. Paul Helm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). One recent attempt to defend such a theory can be found in Robert M. Adams, “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness”, in Robert Adams,The

18

Categorical Imperative functions in Kant’s theory or the Principle of Utility functions in

Utilitarianism. In such a view, our basic moral obligation is to obey God’s will; all other moral obligations would follow from that basic one.

Such an interpretation of his ethical view would obviously render pointless

Ockham’s claims about a moral science which directs us without any command of a superior. In its most extreme form53, this view claims that reason cannot inform us of any moral precept, which obviously makes nonsense of non-positive moral science. This may be overcome by claiming that whatever God commands is precisely what right reason will dictate; that if God had commanded differently, right reason would dictate differently. Such an interprations is defended by Taina Holopainen54: she describes

Ockham’s ethics as “a matter of divine law always discerned through reason or conscience.”55 Another approach would be to claim that there are some things, perhaps only one, that are so right that not even God could command the opposite. This would be the denial that all moral precepts are willed contingently and freely by God. This approach can take one of two forms. One56 is the claim that right reason has the final word because it commands us to obey God, or at least to love Him. The other57 is more subtle; it claims that some basic principles like “right reason is to be obeyed in all things,” “evil is to be avoided,” etc., are per se notae, and so do not depend solely upon the divine will; but the more specific commands and prohibitions, e.g. “do not steal,” do

Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 97–122. 53 Thomas M. Osborne, “Ockham as a divine-command theorist,” Religious Studies 41 (2005): 1-22. 54 Taina Holopainen, William Ockham’s Theory of the Foundations of Ethics (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola Society, 1991), 133-149. 55 Ibid., 148. 56 Lucan Freppert, The Basis of Morality According to William Ockham (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1988.) 57 David W. Clark, “William of Ockham on Right Reason,” Speculum 48 (1973), 13-36.

19 depend upon free and contingent divine commands. A third major approach would seem to be that of Copleston58, who claims that we have two moral theories in Ockham, and that he was unaware of the tension caused by these texts. Finally, there is the view of

Armand Mauer59, which is that Ockham’s moral theory is, like so much else in his philosophy, a result of the attempt to balance diverse principles, in this case, the absolute freedom of God, and the Aristotelian view that right reason is the standard in moral science.

Before presenting these views, it must be said that the question of whether

Ockham’s claims for a non-positive moral science is possible given his claims about divine freedom has rarely been directly addressed in the secondary literature. Often, scholars are content merely to argue from his claims regarding God’s freedom to command anything as this is stated in the Sentences commentary to the conclusion that there is nothing for reason to do; such a view would make non-positive moral science impossible, but this last inference is usually not explicitly drawn. On the other hand, scholars who do recognize Ockham’s claims that a non-positive moral science is possible often support this by merely citing the text from the Quodlibet, showing no inclination to reconcile this claim with the ones regarding divine freedom in his Sentences commentary.

What this means is that, in both cases, the view of the relationship between divine freedom and moral science has to be inferred from what authors say about divine commands and right reason. Finally, for whatever reason, the scholars who have dealt

58 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. 3, Ockham to Suarez (Westminster, MD: The Newman Press, 1953; reprint, New York: Doubleday, 1993), 103-110. 59 Armand Mauer, The Philosophy of William of Ockham in the Light of Its Principles (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1999), 516-539.

20 most extensively and most explicitly with these issues have been contemporary American scholars.

The view that Ockham was an extreme voluntarist, basing morality wholly upon the free decrees of God, and so incapable of defending a true moral science, seems to be the oldest one; indeed, it goes at least as far back as Suarez. He cites Ockham as one of the thinkers who claim that “law is an act of will of the legislator.”60 Later in the same work he says that Ockham “says that no act is bad except insofar as it is prohibited by

God, and there is no act which could not become good if it were commanded by God, and vice versa. Hence he supposes that the whole natural law consists in divine precepts given by God, which precepts he could abolish or change.”61 Finally, Suarez says of this school of thought that its basis “seems to be that actions are not good or bad except that they are commanded or prohibited by God, since God does not will to command or prohibit this to a creature because it is bad or good, but rather that this is just or unjust because God has willed that it be done or not done....”62 Suarez clearly thinks that there is in Ockham’s thought no basis for natural or moral law in anything other than the will of God, even going so far as to say that something is good or bad merely because God wills that it be done or not done. Unfortunately, Suarez’s characterization of Ockham’s views in this way seems to be based wholly upon the question in his Reportatio which we have discussed above, in which he does say that things like theft, adultery, etc. can be

60 “…legem esse actum voluntatis legislatoris.” Francisco Suarez, De Legibus, I: De Natura Legis (Madrid: Instituto Francisco de Vitoria: 1971), 85. 61 “…dicit nullum esse actum malum, nisi quatenus a Deo prohibitus est, et qui non possit fieri bonum si a Deo praecipiatur, et e converso… Unde supponit totam legem naturalem consistere in praeceptis divinis a Deo positis, quae ipse posset auferre et mutare.” Francisco Suarez, De Legibus, II: De Lege Naturali (Madrid: Instituto Francisco de Vitoria: 1974), 81-82. 62 “…videtur esse vel quia actiones non sunt bonae aut malae nisi quia a Deo praeceptae aut prohibitae, quia ipsemet Deus non ideo vult hoc praecipere aut prohibere creaturae quia malum est aut bonum, sed potius ideo hoc est iustum vel iniustum quia Deus voluit illud fieri aut non fieri…” Ibid., 83.

21 done rightly or meritoriously if commanded by God. However, Suarez makes no attempt to reconcile this text with the ones in which Ockham claims that a demonstrative moral science is possible, because there are moral principles which are per se nota. So, although Suarez’s account may do justice to writers who followed Ockham, it remains unsatisfactory as an account of Ockham’s own thought.

Review of Modern Secondary Literature

In modern Ockham scholarship, the classical statement seems to be that of

Maurice de Wulf. He says straightforwardly: “Morality is based upon divine voluntarism. Nothing is good or evil in itself, the difference between the one and the other resting on a divine decree which might have ordained otherwise…. Accordingly, we can learn nothing about morality by examining our nature, and the intellect is powerless to inform us of the prescriptions of the divine law.”63 This position is explicit: morality depends upon free divine commands; consequently, we cannot know by our intellect (or, presumably, our reason) what the content of morality is. This effectively blocks the possibility of any non-positive moral science. The problem with de Wulf’s position is its baldness: it is stated without supporting texts, and does not even attempt to assimilate Ockham’s claims about right reason as a norm of morality. Indeed, de Wulf

63 “La morale est basée sur le voluntarisme divin. Il n’y a ni bien ni mal en soi, la différence entre l’un et l’autre reposant sur un décret de Dieu qui eût pu renverser l’ordre existant. … .S’il en est ainsi, l’inspection de notre nature ne peut rien apprendre sur la moralité, et l’intelligence devient impuissante á reseigner sur les prescriptions de la loi divine.” Maurice de Wulf, Histoire de la Philosophie Médiévale, vol. 3: Aprés le treizième siècle, 16th ed., (Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie: 1947), 42

22 makes no mention of right reason or non-positive moral science when discussing

Ockham’s moral theory.

Gordon Leff seems to have held a similar position. He claims that, in the thought of Ockham, “[m]orality for the first time lay simply with God’s arbitrary decree…”64

This is due to Ockham’s concern to safeguard God’s freedom, which he does with his doctrine of God’s potentia absoluta, i.e., what God could have willed, as opposed to what he has actually willed, which would be his potentia ordinata. Because of this absolute power, and the freedom it brings, when it comes to morality God could have willed anything, and so “…there could be no means of knowing what He might will.”65 Once again, we are cut off from any possibility of knowing God’s commands, and because they constitute morality, there is no way we can know what is right or wrong. Again, the biggest problem with Leff’s statement, as with de Wulf’s, is the lack of supporting texts, and worse, the lack of any acknowledgement of the texts that uphold our ability to know certain moral truths by reason alone, without divine aid. Later, in his study of Ockham,

Leff maintains more or less the same position. He says that “moral acts owe their virtue to conforming to God’s decrees.”66 And: “Absolutely then the criterion of good or bad is what God wills or rejects, which is ipso facto for a good end.”67 However, in this later work he is more aware of the fact that Ockham is committed to pagans being able to know what is morally right or wrong, although, how they can do this without divine revelation is mysterious. Indeed, Leff claims that there are “signs of strain in reconciling

64 Gordon Leff, Medieval Thought: St. Augustine to Ockham (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1958), 289. 65 Ibid. 66 Gordon, Leff, William of Ockham: The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1975; reprint, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1977), 480. 67 Ibid., 496.

23 a fixed moral order with God’s decrees or what he could will.”68 This strain applies not only to the fact that God can reward any act He chooses, even if it violates His precepts in the present order, “but also to the natural omnipresence of right reason as the guide to moral virtue accessible to all having the use of reason, pagan and Christian alike.”69 Leff admits that it is not at all clear how these two points, both of which are clearly important to Ockham, can be reconciled. However, it is clear that Leff thinks that divine commands are in some way more fundamental than right reason.

Yet another author who treats the subject this way is Paul Helm. He characterizes

Ockham’s view this way:

What can be labelled an Ockhamist Divine Command Theory holds that morality is founded upon a free divine choice. If God commands fornication then fornication is obligatory, and it is within God’s power to do so. He could establish another moral order than the one he has in fact established and he could at any time order what he has actually forbidden. From this position Ockham could consistently only regard ethics as a matter of special divine Revelation in Scripture or elsewhere, and not a matter of natural law discerned through reason or conscience.70

Here we have the same striking move from morality being due to a free divine choice, to the stark claim that, given this, morality cannot be discerned through reason or conscience. Helm is somewhat better than de Wulf or Leff, in that he claims that from his view of morality as founded on divine commands he could not “consistently” maintain that ethics be discerned through reason or conscience; but he follows their lead in not only making no attempt to reconcile this claim with Ockham’s claims that some

68 Ibid., 525. 69 Ibid. 70 Paul Helm, “Introduction,” in Divine Commands and Morality, ed. Paul Helm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 3.

24 moral principles can be known through natural reason, but not even acknowledging that such texts exist. It seems to be that the view that Ockham was a divine command theorist was so strong that no need was felt to ask if sense could be made of these claims when one also took into consideration the other aspects of his views on morals. Specifically, his explicit views on right reason or moral science are not discussed at all, so there is a question of how each of these authors would have confronted these texts. A particularly striking example of this view is that of Anita Garvens. She views Ockham’s ethics as so voluntaristic in origin that she is surprised to find mention of right reason at all.

“Hinsichtlich der völligen Kontingenz des Sittengesetzes , wie Ockham es in bezug auf

Inhalt und Allgemeingültigkeit fasst, staunt man deshalb nicht wenig, dass bei ihm trotzdem eine subjektive, das sittliche Handeln des Menschen bindende Norm sich findet: die recta ratio, die dem scholastischen Begriff des Gewissens entspricht.”71 Clearly, if we are to be surprised to find right reason in a moral theory, it is very difficult to understand how there could be non-positive demonstrative science of morals. One can be surprised to encounter right reason in a moral theory only because one is convinced the theory leaves nothing for reason to do.

The case is clearer in the case of Frederick Copleston, although his view is somewhat more complex than those mentioned above. Copleston claims that:

It would seem then, at least at first sight, that we are faced with what amounts to two moral theories in Ockham’s philosophy. On the one hand there is his authoritarian conception of the moral law. It would appear to follow from this conception that there can be only a revealed moral code. For how otherwise than through revelation could man know a moral code which depends entirely on God’s free choice? Rational deduction could not give us knowledge of it. On the

71 Anita Garvens, ”Die Grundlagen der Ethik von Wilhelms von Ockham,” Franziskanische Studien XXI (1934), 374.

25

other hand there is Ockham’s insistence on right reason, which would seem to imply that reason can discern what is right and what is wrong.72

At least in this case we have an author who is aware of the existence of both sets of texts, both those that stress what Copleston terms the authoritarian conception of moral law, and those that stress right reason. But Copleston is clear that “[a]uthoritarianism has the last word.”73 So he sees Ockham as essentially a divine command theorist, and so committed to the view that the content of morality is not discernible by reason. “If the moral law is dependent simply on the divine choice, how can its content be known apart from revelation?”74 Clearly Copleston is convinced that, if morality is founded wholly and simply upon a free divine choice, there is no way for reason, right or otherwise, to tells what is right or wrong, good or bad. So what about those things that Ockham tells us right reason can tell us? Copleston confesses his bewilderment on this point. He can only surmise that “[i]t would seem that the only way of escaping this difficulty is to say that what can be known apart from revelation is simply a provisional code of morality, based on non-theological considerations.” So, what reason can tell us is what the moral law would be if God does not command otherwise. Although this interpretation would make some sense of Ockham’s claim that even an act done from erring reason is right, it would make nonsense of his claim that there is a non-positive moral science. For, to be a science, it would have to be certain, and reason in this case could tell us nothing certain.

Copleston is quick to say that he does not wish to claim that Ockham had such a view of morality in mind, and “[v]ery probably he did not clearly realize the difficulties created

72 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. III, Late Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy (New York: Doubleday, 1993), 107. 73 Ibid., 109. 74 Ibid., 110.

26 by his authoritarian conception.”75 This last sentence is why I claim that in Copleston’s view Ockham is simply confused: he has presented two mutually incompatible moral theories, and has not realized that they are incompatible. However, it is clear that, for

Copleston, it is the non-theological view that must be assimilated to the authoritarian, theological view, or that non-positive moral science must be assimilated with the view that God commands all things, not vice versa. The problem with this view is that it does not make a serious enough attempt to reconcile these texts. Of course, Copleston’s book is a general history of philosophy, not a work devoted exclusively to Ockham’s philosophy, so a more detailed, nuanced presentation is perhaps not to be expected.

It needs to be pointed out that the positions reviewed so far were articulated by scholars before the critical edition of Ockham’s philosophical and theological works was completed in 1987. Some were writing even before the critical edition was even begun.

So, it might not be too surprising that these scholars endorsed views that were perhaps one-sided as they were often working with inadequate texts. Since the publication of the critical edition with its critical apparatus, we now have access to a much fuller range of texts that have also been more adequately edited. Now, however, we turn to scholars who have been able to work with a full critical edition to guide them.

A classic strategy to deal with the view that God’s commands are free and contingent, and yet right reason could direct us, is represented by Jürgen Miethke.76

Miethke deals with this question in his chapters on Ockham’s ethics, especially in connection with his discussion of a command to hate or not love God, a discussion which will be important to us later, as well as his discussion of moral science. Miethke points

75 Ibid. 76 Jürgen Miethke, Ockhams Weg Zur Sozialphilosophie (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1969).

27 out that Ockham’s discussion of the command to hate or not love God is a border case, which serves mainly to bring out certain ontological commitments. Miethke’s main view is that, although the structure of the present order depends upon God’s free commands, that in no way impugns its inherent rationality; rather, it serves to bring out the fact that this order is not the only possible order. “[E]r bestreitet nur, daß diese innere Struktur die einzig möglich und schlechthin notwendige sei, eben weil sie über den Satz vom ausgeschlossen Widerspruch hinaus, der zur hinreichenden Bestimmtheit des Seienden allein nicht genügt, noch andere Bestimmungen in sich enthält, die zwar aus der kontingenten, und das heißt freien Entscheidung Gottes fließen, aber eben darin auch

‘rationabiles’ sind.”77 So, to use an analogy with physics, which Miethke makes later78, we recognize that God could have created different creatures than the ones he has, but this does not in any way mean that we cannot know the ontological structures of the creatures He has created except by means of revelation. For example, fire need not rise, but this does not in any way mean that we cannot know that fire rises except by some special revelation. Similarly, we may assume, Miethke wants to claim that what is morally right or wrong in the present order is none the less rational because it depends upon God’s commands. These commands are rational, even if their rationality is not immediately clear to us. “Auch im ethischen Bereich ist die durchgängige Rationalität des sittlich Gebotenen nicht voll für den Menschen erkennbar, wenn Gottes einfaches

Wesen als gut auch erkennt, was immer er will und tut. Damit aber ist die Rationalität des Gebotes nicht prinzipiell aufgehoben, wenn auch faktisch nicht in jedem Einzelfall

77 Ibid., 316. 78 Ibid., 330.

28 nachzuweisen.”79 So, as long as we remember that God is good, we can safely believe that His commands are rational, even if we cannot know precisely why a given command is rational.

But if the commands that constitute the present moral order are free decisions of

God, even if they are rational, how do we know them? Miethke resorts to a classic strategy: he quotes Ockham from the Sentences: “by the very fact that the divine will wills this, right reason dictates that it should be willed.”80 This line comes from a discussion about what makes something right. Ockham claims that a correct will is in conformity with right reason, but this is not always in conformity with “previous right reason, which shows the reason why the will should will this.”81 So some things can be willed only after God has willed them. This, however, would seem to be merely a statement of a divine command theory. Something should be done only because God has commanded it. Of course, on this reading, right reason does tell us to do what God has commanded, but is this enough? It is certainly not contrary to Ockham’s views that reason will dictate that we obey God’s commands, but this is only if we know that God has commanded something. The question arises: what would reason tell us if we have no knowledge of God’s commands? In other words, can this view explain the possibility of a non-positive moral science that is available even to pagan philosophers like Aristotle?

On this view, when such a philosopher attempts to work out the content of morality, if there are many different possible moral orders, he should believe that there are several possible reasonable moral orders, but not that one has definitely been established. After

79 Ibid. 80 “…eo ipso quod voluntas divina hoc vult, ratio recta dictat quod est volendum .” William of Ockham, OTh IV, Sent., 610. 81 “…rationi rectae praeviae, quae ostendat causam quare voluntas debet hoc velle .” Ibid.,

29 all, each of them is equally rational, so how is reason to choose? It would seem that

God’s commands would have to cut off certain possibilities, so that our reason would not be tempted to accept them as morally true or binding; but if this were the case, our reason would be deceived, as these possibilities are just as rational as any others.

It would be instructive to consider the analogy with physical science to which we alluded earlier. Certainly, if God had created a slightly different world, one in which, for example, the law of gravity were slightly different, we could still determine the law of gravity by investigating things that fall or otherwise obey the slightly modified law of gravity. Similarly, had God created a world in which men did not laugh, in that world it would not belong to the essence of man to laugh, and we would not say that man is necessarily risible. But in either of these cases, we would have the behavior of things to guide us. In the moral sphere, we have no such thing to guide us. Morality, after all, is of how we should behave, not how we do behave; it is not psychology. This position leaves open the possibility that natural reason would either not be able to know which is the moral order in which we live, or it would believe that the one we live in is the only possible moral order, when in fact it is not. In either case, it would seem that the possibility of a true moral science is destroyed.

Probably the most detailed attempt to present Ockham as a divine command theorist in recent times is that of Thomas M. Osborne.82 His presentation is also one of the few to present Ockham as a divine command theorist while also taking into account his repeated claims regarding right reason as a norm for ethics, as well as his claims for the existence of a non-positive moral science. As far as Ockham’s general moral theory

82 Thomas M. Osborne, “Ockham as a divine-command theorist,” Religious Studies 41 (2005), 1-22.

30 is concerned, Osborne reconciles the claims about divine commands and right reason by making the distinction between “how an action’s moral value is known and what makes it good or bad.”83 On Osborne’s account, it is solely by a divine command that any action is good or bad. Right reason only informs us of the goodness or badness of an action, but reason does not account for this value in the way that divine commands do. On this reading, right reason is necessary for acting virtuously, but does not provide the reason the action is virtuous. What right reason informs me of is the content of a divine command. What would happen if God had created an entirely different moral order?

“Morality would still be rational, but, nevertheless, right reason would dictate the performance of entirely different acts. Even the dictates of right reason depend on God’s free decisions to make certain acts worth or blameworthy.”84 So, on this reading, God has arbitrarily made certain acts, e.g. adultery, theft, etc., morally wrong, and right reason dictates that they not be done; but He could have willed just the opposite, in which case the acts now called adultery, theft, etc. would be obligatory, and in that case, right reason would dictate that they be done.

When Osborne deals with the question in the Quodlibet about the possibility of a demonstrative moral science, appealing to his distinction between the moral value of an act and how that value is known, he claims that this question is “only about the way in which different obligations are known.”85 On this reading, it would seem that there are some obligations which we know merely by divine or human commands, and others which we know without such commands; to the first would correspond Ockham’s

83 Ibid., 6. 84 Ibid., 11. 85 Ibid., 2-3.

31 positive moral science, to the second, his non-positive moral science. But in either case, what grounds these obligations is a divine command. Modern examples of the first type which Osborne presents are driving on the wrong side of a street, or not paying the appropriate tax. These are examples from human laws, and in each case, it is clear that the right thing to do is due almost entirely to a command of a lawmaker. I say ‘almost,’ because this fact must be combined with the principle that laws made by a legitimate lawmaker are just and so must be obeyed. However, there are certain other obligations we have which are known through non-positive moral science. Its principles are either self-evident or known through experience. Osborne notes that Ockham does not discuss how principles known through experience are known, but he does give some of

Ockham’s examples of self-evident principles: “good is to be sought” and “a needy person is to be assisted.” Are even principles such as these true only because they are commanded by God? Apparently not. While Osborne says that “[t]hose precepts of non- positive moral science which are non self-evident could change if God’s commands were to change,”86 this makes no reference to those that are self-evident. Apparently, God cannot change them by a new command. So, not even God can make it so that good is not to be sought, but He could change what is good. But does the goodness of an action depend upon God’s commands? Osborne presents two cases. “If God were to issue different commands, then would that natural goodness which is under consideration differ? If the natural goodness would differ, then ultimately even the natural goodness which explains the goodness of an act depends on God’s commands. If the natural goodness would not differ, then divine commands override concerns of natural goodness

86 Ibid., 11.

32 when it comes to making moral judgments.”87 In either case, the good of obeying God’s command is the final determining factor in moral judgments. So, in Osborne’s view, we have two types of moral science because we have two types of divine commands: those that cannot be known except through revelation; and those that can be known without such revelation. What Osborne is suggesting here is that right reason cannot dictate that any act be done, unless what that act commands be done has previously been made good or right by God’s command.

Osborne’s view is an interesting one; however, it suffers from one serious defect: it does not do justice to Ockham’s texts. Although Ockham does make the distinction between positive and non-positive moral science in the context of a question whether moral science is demonstrative, he never claims that this has to do only with the way morality is known. In fact, his text is quite explicit that non-positive moral science is of things “which direct human acts apart from any command of a superior.”88 It is of knowledge of moral precepts which do not depend upon the command of a superior for their moral force. The implication here is strong: there is a type of morality which is binding on us even if we were commanded by no one to do anything. That one of these

‘superiors’ includes God should be evident from the text itself. In discussing positive moral science, Ockham has described it as the science of “human or divine laws which obligate someone to follow or avoid things which are neither good nor evil unless they are prohibited or commanded by a superior to whom it belongs to make laws.”89

Osborne’s reading would require amending the text to say that non-positive moral science

87 Ibid., 10. 88 “…quae sine omni praecepto superioris dirigit actus humanos .” William of Ockham, OTh IX, Quodl., 177. 89 Ibid., italics added.

33 directs our acts in the absence of any command of a superior except God. But this reading is in no way implied by anything Ockham says there. Yet God’s commands that obligate us to do something that would be neither right nor wrong apart from His commands have already been classed as part of the subject matter of non-positive moral science. Thus, Osborne’s reading would require us to distinguish between divine commands or laws that obligate us just because God has commanded them that fall under positive moral science from other divine commands that obligate us just because God has commanded that but that fall under non-positive moral science. I cannot see how such a distinction can be made.

Also, a question arises because of Ockham’s claim that pagans, especially

Aristotle, knew that certain things are right or wrong. Osborne himself is clear on this point: “A pagan… does know that she should avoid adultery and murder.”90 But how can this be, if these things are to be avoided only because they are prohibited by God?

Clearly, on Osborne’s reading, these acts are morally bad only because God has prohibited them. Or are we to take this for a self-evident truth? This seems unlikely, considering Osborne’s own claim that the precepts of non-positive moral science are some of the things that would remain unchanged even if God’s commands were to change. In any case, it would seem that, on Osborne’s reading, non-positive moral science must tell us that adultery and murder are wrong; and so, bringing this in line with

Ockham’s claims about the nature of non-positive moral science, these must be known to be wrong apart from the knowledge of any precept of any superior, even God.

90 Osborne, 7.

34

I turn now to those authors who do not view Ockham as presenting a moral philosophy based primarily on divine commands. The two best representatives of this position are Marilyn McCord Adams and John Kilcullen. I begin with Adams.

Marilyn McCord Adams’ position on Ockham’s moral theory is perhaps the most extraordinary, taking extraordinary in a fairly literal sense. In her view, Ockham’s distinction between positive and non-positive moral science stakes out two independent fields of value theory: one based upon divine commands, the other on right reason. Each of these has its own standard. “The precepts of non-positive morality have the authority of the agent’s own reason underlying them; those of the latter bind by virtue of some external authority.”91 Indeed, sometimes Adams seems committed to the view that non- positive morality is the sphere of morality proper, while that of positive morality is the sphere of merit and grace. Clearly whatever God accepts as meritorious is based upon

His free choice: He is not obliged to reward anyone for anything. Indeed, Ockham goes so far as to say that God could grant damnation to someone for virtue.92 However, as things stand, God has willed that merit is to be based upon virtue, and so we are commanded by God to obey right reason.93 Because of this, in the order of merit, the need to obey right reason is based upon a free divine command, and so here we are faced with a divine command theory.

Things are otherwise when we turn to the category of non-positive morality.

There, as we have seen, Adams claims that for Ockham right reason is our ultimate guide.

In fact, in this case, right reason dictates that the commands of God be obeyed. Adams

91 Marilyn McCord Adams, “The Structure of Ockham’s Moral Theory,” Franciscan Studies 29 (1986), 16. 92 William of Ockham, OTh VII, Sent., 55. 93 Ibid., OTh VIII, 411.

35 argues for this claim as follows. According to Ockham, natural reason can demonstrate the existence of a nature than which none is nobler or better.94 Reason cannot tell us that there is only one such nature, but it can tell us that such a nature is to be loved in the highest degree. If such a nature were personal, so that He could issue commands, it would follow that His commands ought to be followed; that “whatever is pleasing to God ought to be done.”95 Through this line of reasoning, right reason tells us to follow any commands of God that we know about. Thus, right reason recognizes divine commands as “a derivative norm in non-positive morality,”96 so that in this sphere “the latter [divine commands] derive its authority from the former [right reason].” So, the final picture here is that in the sphere of non-positive morality, right reason is the ultimate norm; and this explains why a pagan like Aristotle could have such a moral science. But right reason would also dictate that, if there were a God who could issue commands, those commands should be followed as a secondary criterion of moral action. This dictate to obey divine commands is based upon the knowledge that God is the highest good, and so should be loved above all else; and that this love of God above all things requires that we obey any commands He might issue, that we will what He wants us to will.

But this raises the question: could God will something contrary to the dictates of right reason? It would seem from the text in the Reportatio that He could, if He could make adultery, theft, and murder meritorious. One possible answer to this on Adams’ reading would be to point out that Ockham says they could be done “meritoriously”, not virtuously. This would be to claim that right reason would dictate that they not be done,

94 William of Ockham, OTh IX, Quodl., 3. 95 Adams, “The Structure of Ockham’s Moral Theory,” 24. 96 Ibid., 33.

36 and God dictate that they be done. There are, however, at least two problems with this interpretation. One is the claim, already advanced by Adams, that God has issued the precept that we act according to right reason; and if this interpretation were correct, God would be ordering us both to obey right reason and to disobey right reason. Ockham may have a very elevated concept of what God could command, but he is quite clear that not even God could command a contradiction, and this would certainly be a contradiction.

The second problem is that, while Ockham does speak in terms of these actions being done meritoriously, he also claims that their being considered bad in themselves because we are commanded by God to do the opposite is how it was understood by “sancti et philosophi.”97 How could the philosophers have known this? It must be that in some way the contents of divine commands are naturally knowable, or at least that divine commands are constitutive of the natural goodness or badness of certain acts. Adams would not want to accept the first interpretation, I think, because even she does not claim that reason can tell us that God has issued commands, only that, if He has issued commands, they should be obeyed. So it must be the case that God’s precepts to one thing or its opposite are what constitute that thing being good or bad. But this is not the way out that Adams takes.

Adams claims that we have in Ockham’s theory two moral systems, one based upon right reason, the other upon divine commands. “A theory may do no harm in positing two logically necessary and sufficient conditions of the same thing, provided they yield extensionally equivalent results.”98 So long as the two moralities do not come into conflict with one another, we are safe. In a later writing, Adams expresses this same

97 William of Ockham, OTh III, Sent., 352. 98 Adams, “The Structure of Ockham’s Moral Theory,” 27.

37 claim more strongly still. She claims that Ockham’s acceptance of God’s freedom to command virtually anything could mean that He could “command the opposite of what right reason dictates.”99 Because of this, Ockham’s highest degrees of virtue, at which one does an action both because right reason dictates it and for the love of God, would be impossible. The whole system would break down. But this will not happen.

In accepting this logical possibility, Ockham insists on the controversial assumption that it is enough for the coherence of moral theory if the two criteria for morally virtuous action, right reason and divine precepts, in fact yield extensionally equivalent results. God actually commands rational creatures to follow the dictates of right reason and in fact rewards adherence to right reason and sacramental participation with eternal life. The two norms could break apart but they do not and will not!100

So we are safe so long as right reason and divine precept dictate that we do the same things.

Even if such a claim could save the coherence of Ockham’s overall moral theory

(and that is probably all that Adams is concerned about), it seems wholly unsatisfactory in terms of the possibility of moral science open to the pagans. It would leave open the possibility that non-positive moral science would dictate something that should not in fact be done. But, as we shall see later, a science is precisely such because its conclusions cannot be false. Its premises are propositions that are per se notae or known through experience, and its conclusions follow syllogistically from these premises. Given this, how could reason give us a secondary criterion that might contradict its other dictates?

This would seem to be logically impossible. Of course, one could suppose that the only dictate of right reason might be to follow all divine precepts, but then non-positive

99 Marilyn McCord Adams, “Ockham on Will, Nature, and Morality,” in The Cambridge Companion to Ockham, ed. Paul Vincent Spade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 266. 100 Adams, “Ockham on Will, Nature, and Morality,” 266.

38 morality would be virtually empty, and would not be able to give rise to a moral science that can direct our acts apart from the commands of any superior, which is precisely what

Ockham claims it does. On this reading, a non-positive moral science would seem to have to tell us that adultery is wrong, or maybe it isn’t, if God has commanded that; and it would have to dictate such a thing for virtually any action. Thus, it is questionable whether such a moral science is directive of our acts in any meaningful way. However, this is not what Adams suggests. She suggests that adultery could be wrong by right reason, and yet commanded by divine precept. In such a case, unless one were to have absolute priority over the other, neither non-positive moral science nor positive moral science would seem to be possible; but if he had to choose which is more fundamental, it would seem that Ockham would claim it is divine precept. He would almost certainly not be willing to constrain the divine liberty in any strong sense.

The strongest case that Ockham’s moral theory is not a divine command theory comes from John Kilcullen.101 What makes Kilcullen’s interpretation so impressive is that he is willing to take on the Reportatio text head on. On Kilcullen’s reading,

Ockham’s moral theory is a natural law theory102 because it is based on several principles that are per se nota, or known as soon as their terms are understood.103 Among these principles is “obey God.” None of these principles is derived from another; indeed, if they were, they wouldn’t be per se nota. However, there may be cases in which two or

101 John Kilcullen, “Natural Law and Will in Ockham,” in A Translation of William of Ockham’s Work of Ninety Days, vol. 2, trans. John Kilcullen and John Scott (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2001), 851- 882. 102 As is well known, Ockham never uses the term ‘natural law’ in his academic writings, so he never characterizes his moral theory as a natural law theory. He does, however, use the term in his political writings; but whether what he says about natural law in his political writings is the same as or even similar to his moral theory is a contested issue. It will be the subject of chapter 5 of this dissertation. 103 Ibid.,

39 more of the principles conflict, and we must decide which to obey. One obvious example of this is, the precept not to use someone else’s property without his permission, but this can be done well in a case of extreme necessity.104 This example, which is quite common for Ockham, shows that there is a precept of natural law which generally holds, but that in certain circumstances it can be set aside. Now, Kilcullen argues that the precept,

“Obey God,” is such that, whenever it comes into conflict with another precept, it is always the precept that holds, overriding the other precept, no matter what it might be.

Kilcullen claims, however, that the fact that this principle always overrides any other has been taken by most interpreters to mean that other principles only hold because they have been commanded by God, which clearly does not follow. “That the rule ‘Obey God’ takes precedence over the rule ‘Thou shalt not kill’ does not imply that ‘Thou shalt not kill’ binds (when it does bind) only by virtue of a divine command.” In other words, the fact that God can command the opposite of a dictate of reason does not mean that that dictate of reason only holds because God has commanded it. This is obviously true. In fact, God could not command the opposite of a dictate of reason if reason did not so dictate.

But how does Kilcullen handle the text from Ockham’s Sentences commentary?

He claims that almost all previous interpreters, beginning with Suarez, have over- interpreted that passage, especially one word. Here we quote the passage in full, as

Kilcullen does.

Ad aliud dico quod licet odium, furari, adulterari et similia habeant malam circumstantiam annexam de communi lege, quatenus fiunt ab aliquo qui ex praecepto divino obligatur ad contrarium, tamen quantum ad omne absolutum in illis actibus possunt fieri a Deo sine omni circumstantia mala annexa. Et etiam

104 William of Ockham, OP IV, Brev., 160.

40

meritorie possunt fieri a viatore si caderent sub praecepto divino, sicut nunc de facto eorum oppositae cadunt sub praecepto.105

According to Kilcullen, the problem arises with the interpretation of the word ‘quatenus.’

If it is taken to mean ‘because,’ or ‘on account of,’ then of course the passage would be claiming that hatred, theft, adultery and similar things are wrong only because they are forbidden by divine precept. However, if we take ‘quatenus’ to mean merely ‘seeing that’ or ‘since,’ then it would imply only that they are wrong just so long as there is no divine command to perform these acts. Kilcullen claims that “Suarez is putting a lot of weight on an ambiguous expression (quatenus) and ignoring other passages (such as

Quodlibet II, q. 14….”106 Kilcullen’s point is well taken. We should take care not to allow one passage to override all others; and, to the extent possible, we should strive to arrive at an interpretation that makes sense of as many passages as possible. The question here, however, is: How tenable is his reading of this passage? Can we take quatenus in the weaker sense which Kilcullen proposes? Or is the stronger interpretation more likely? That will depend upon what the nature of a science is for Ockham, and whether Kilcullen’s interpretation can be made to harmonize with that. My sense is that it will not, since for Ockham it will turn out that the conclusion of a scientific demonstration must be a necessary proposition, which means that its opposite would be a contradiction. Given this, to except anyone from a moral precept, God would have to ordain (will) a contradiction, which not even Ockham thinks He can do. But we shall have to wait until we review the nature of science for Ockham, and the nature of

105 William of Ockham, OTh VI, Sent., 352. 106 Kilcullen,

41 necessary propositions, to ask whether Kilcullen’s interpretation is supportable by the texts.

A final line of interpretation of Ockham’s moral theory is one which refuses to characterize it as either wholly voluntarist or rationalist. This interpretation has been put forward by David W. Clark107 and more recently by Armand Mauer.108 Of these two,

Clark’s presentation seems to be the more sophisticated. He makes an attempt to sort out what is the work of right reason, and what is the work of divine precept. He claims that the distinction between positive and non-positive moral science in Ockham is related to two aspects of his moral theory, the dogmatic and the formal.109 By the formal element he seems to means those principles which Ockham claims are per se nota and constitute the principles of non-positive moral science. These all seem to have an “a priori or formal character; principles such as ‘The will ought to be conformed to Right Reason,’

‘All evil is blameworthy and to be avoided,’ ‘All good should be loved,’ and ‘Everything honest should be done’ give little information abut concrete actions.”110 In other words, what reason by itself can tell us are basic principles, but not which actions answer those principles. For example, it can tell us that “All evil is blameworthy and to be avoided,” but it cannot tell us what exactly is evil. This is left up to God’s commands. They give us the concrete dimensions of morality. The final result of all of this is a moral theory which is true at the expense of being uninformative. “It is characteristic of Ockham’s ethic that the framework or structure of the moral life is rationally certain and constant,

107 David W. Clark, “Voluntarism and Rationalism in the Ethics of Ockham,” Franciscan Studies 31 (1971): 72-87 and “William of Ockham on Right Reason,” Speculum 48 (1973): 13-36. 108 Armand Mauer, The Philosophy of William of Ockham in the Light of Its Principles, (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1999). 109 Clark, “Voluntarism and Rationalism in Ockham,” 85. 110 Ibid.

42 but the content is mutable. Normative propositions attain the level of logical necessity at the expense of appearing non-informative or ‘content-less.’ The Creator might command men to love or to hate each other without altering the meaning of justice or the truth that

‘justice ought to be done.’”111 We know, in any possible moral order, that good ought to be done; but without revelation, presumably, we do not know what counts as ‘good.’

This interpretation certainly maintains both rationalistic elements as well as voluntaristic ones. Clearly the ‘contentless’ normative propositions are rationalistic, while the concrete norms are voluntaristic. So, on this reading, Ockham’s claims for a non-positive moral science would be justified, it just wouldn’t be able to tell us what to do in any particular situation. The crux of this interpretation is the claim that all of the principles which Ockham claims are per se nota have an a priori or formal character. It is true that when Ockham gives us examples of such principles, these are usually the type he gives. However, does that mean that they are the only kinds possible? Certainly these are the only types of examples he gives in the Quodlibet, but what of principles known by experience? In de connexione virtutum he gives as an example of such a principle: “an angry person should be mollified with fine words.”112 Is this principle content-less? It would seem not. But it is instructive that, in the Quodlibet, Ockham does drop any mention of principles known through experience as a basis for moral science, so perhaps he decided that such principles were merely matters of prudence rather than moral science properly speaking. After all, the Quodlibet is the only text in which Ockham is concerned merely with moral science for its own sake; in de connexione virtutum he is

111 Clark, “William of Ockham on Right Reason,” 26. 112 “…quilibet iracundus per pulchra verba est leniendus .” William of Ockham, OTh VIII, Connex., 330.

43 concerned more with the nature of prudence. So perhaps Clark’s interpretation could survive this criticism.

There is also the obvious criticism that Ockham nowhere invokes anything like the formal/dogmatic distinction which Clark attributes to him. Of course, there is no reason why we shouldn’t use an interpretive scheme if it contributes to our understanding, so even this criticism is not conclusive. But does the interpretation match

Ockham’s practice? Certainly, insofar as most of the principles Ockham cites as per se nota have the general characteristic which Clark notes. But Ockham also says that non- positive moral science directs our acts apart from the command of any superior. How can it do this, if it cannot issue any commands? Any actual dictate that directed any actual action would have to derive its content from a divine precept. I might know that “good is to be sought,” but unless I know what is good, I am fairly stuck; I cannot act in any moral way. So, as brave an attempt as this seems to be, it also seems to come up somewhat short.

Maurer’s view does not share this weakness, but mainly because he does not attempt to sort out separate spheres for the rationalistic and voluntaristic elements.

Rather, he falls back on the claim that something is willed by right reason precisely because God wills it.113 Because of this, Maurer can claim “that there is a strong element of rationality in Ockhacm’s ethics, but there is even a stronger element of volition.”114

Indeed, Maurer sees Ockham’s ethics as an attempt to balance his concern for divine omnipotence and freedom on the one hand, and evident experience and reason on the

113 Maurer, 537. 114 Ibid., 538.

44 other.115 Both, he maintains, have a part to play in Ockham’s ethics, and neither should be stressed to the exclusion of the other. Certainly, Ockham is very concerned with safeguarding God’s absolute freedom and power. No one, I think, has ever accused

Ockham of understating the divine power, particularly His potentia absoluta. Equally certain is Ockham’s commitment to the view that Aristotle and other pagans had true knowledge of virtue, and so a moral science. But the real question before us is: is he entitled to such a view? Can what he says about divine freedom to command virtually anything be reconciled with a non-positive moral science that is available to all, Christian and pagan alike? Maurer does not address this question directly.

The problem with all of these interpretations of Ockham’s ethics is not that they fail in certain particular ways. It is that, in no case that I am aware of, does any interpreter attempt to reconcile these texts with what Ockham says about science in his other writings. So almost all who have written on this issue have discussed this moral science without even knowing if they are using ‘science’ in a consistent way; or, indeed, if Ockham was when he made his claims about a non-positive moral science. Clearly, if we are to determine if Ockham can have a non-positive moral science, it would be a benefit to know what he means by science, if only to know what we mean when we ask if the texts which claim such a science is possible can be reconciled with what he says about God’s freedom. It is to this question of the nature and requirements of a science that we now turn.

115 Ibid.

Chapter 2: The Nature of Demonstrative Science

Because the question before us is how we can reconcile Ockham’s claims that there is a demonstrative science of morals with his claims that something is morally right only so long as the divine command stands, we must examine what Ockham thinks are the hallmarks of demonstrative science. Only when we see what his requirements are for this will we be in a position to decide if what he says about a demonstrative science of morals can be justified.

Ockham discusses the nature of science in several places in his works. His most sustained discussions occur in three places: the Prologue to his Commentary on the

Sentences116, the preface to his commentary on the Physics117 of Aristotle, and his Summa

Logicae118. What he says in these various places is virtually identical, indicating that

Ockham held the same view of what constitutes a science for his entire career. His view is basically that of Aristotle’s in the Posterior Analytics. For the sake of simplicity, we shall begin with the prologue to his commentary on the Physics.

First, Ockham explains what scientia in general is. He says that it is “a certain quality existing subjectively in the soul.”119 In other words, knowledge is not a substance, something existing in its own right, but is only a modification of the soul of some knower. It is, in fact, a habitus.

116 Originally delivered as lectures in the 1317-1318 academic year, but the final redaction must have been completed only after 14 July 1318 because Ockham refers to Petrus Aureoli as “doctor” but Aureoli received his license only on that date. See the “Introduction” in William of Ockham, OTH I, Sent., 36*. 117 Delivered at the London convent sometime in the years 1322-1324. See the “Introduction” in William of Ockham, OPh IV, Expos. Phys., 9*. 118 Completed circa 1323. See the “Introduction” in William of Ockham, OTH 1, SL, 56*. 119 “…quaedam qualitas existens subiective in anima.,,,” William of Ockham, OPh IV, 4. 45

46

Next, Ockham distinguishes four different senses of scientia. First, he says it is a

“a certain cognition of something that is true.”120 In this sense it refers to anything that we believe that is also true, regardless of how we have come about the knowledge.

Indeed, he says it includes things that we know “per fidem”, and other things that are not known “evidenter,” because they are true and we know them without any doubt. He gives the example of knowing that Rome is a large city. Clearly, if I have never been to

Rome, I cannot have any evident knowledge of this fact; nevertheless, it can be called scientia because I know it and it is true.121

The second sense of scientia is that of an “evident cognition.”122 This is the case of knowing something based upon a “non-complex cognition of certain terms.”123 By this, Ockham does not mean the words of a proposition, but what those words signify.

This is clear from the example he gives. He says that I know that the wall is white just by seeing whiteness on the wall.

The third sense of scientia is “an evident cognition of some necessary truth.”124

So in this sense no contingent truths can be the object of scientia. However, first principles and the conclusions that follow from them can be known in this way.

The fourth sense of scientia is the most restrictive. In this sense it is “the evident cognition of a necessary truth caused by the evident cognition of necessary premises and derived from them by syllogistic reasoning.”125 Ockham notes that this is what Aristotle

120 “…certa notitia alicuius veri .” Ibid., 5. 121 The same example is also discussed by Scotus in his Lectura. See John Duns Scotus, Lectura III, d. 23 q. unica n. 15 (ed. Vaticana XXI), 102. 122 William of Ockham, OPh IV, 6. 123 “…notitia aliqua incomplexa terminorum aliquorum…” Ibid. 124 “…notitia evidens alicuius necessarii .” Ibid. 125 “…notitia evidens veri necessarii nata causari ex notitia evidenti praemissarum necessariarum applicatarum per discursum syllogisticum” Ibid.

47 calls science in the sixth book of the Ethics, where it is distinguished from understanding, the knowledge of principles, and wisdom. Thus, this is clearly the strictest definition of scientia. Although Ockham does not say this here, I think that we can take it that this is what he means by scientia. This is confirmed by the fact that this is how he defines scientia in the prologue to the Ordinatio and in the Summa Logicae.

Clearly, these four senses of scientia move from a very loose sense of the word to a very strong sense of the word. The first includes all knowledge, even if it is not evident; the second includes all evident knowledge, whether contingent or necessary; the third includes all evident knowledge of necessary truths, whether principles or conclusions; and the fourth includes only the evident knowledge of necessary truths derived from other necessary truths. Again, Ockham never tells us that the earlier senses are improper or loose, and the last is the most proper or strict; but then, this is merely a prologue to a commentary and so may not be the place for such discussions. However, if we remember that the question before us is whether there really can be a demonstrative science of morals, it is clear that only the last sense of scientia is relevant for us, for only the fourth sense has anything to do with a syllogism, and so it is the only one that describes demonstrative knowledge. Of course, not every syllogism is a demonstration, so we must be aware that the meaning of scientia that will be relevant to us will have to be even more restrictive than the one we have before us now.

Ockham does, however, go on in this prologue to give us some more information about what scientia is. First, he points out that scientia is sometimes taken for one habitus, sometimes for a collection of habitūs. For Ockham, the proper sense is the former; and so, any science, such as metaphysics or the philosophy of nature, is really a

48 collection of knowledges, and not one piece of knowledge. He proves this in this way: it is possible for someone to know one conclusion of such a science but be ignorant of another; but error and scientific knowledge about one and the same thing are formally incompatible; therefore, any two conclusions in metaphysics or philosophy of nature are distinct things, since one can be in error about one of them and yet have scientific knowledge of the other.126 Therefore, the knowledge of these things are two distinct habitūs. And so, any field, such as metaphysics or philosophy of nature, has only the unity of an aggregate, like that of a city or an army.127 We must assume that Ockham takes the same position with regard to ethics: it is not one science, but a collection of many bits of knowledge. This would also mean that so long as even one moral proposition is demonstrable, Ockham would be justified in his claim that a demonstrative science of morals is possible, even if it would be restricted in scope.

The final point Ockham makes here about scientia is a distinction between a real science and other sciences, such as logic. Against the view that a real science is of things, whereas logic is about words that refer to things, Ockham takes the view that a real science itself is about words or intentions or mental contents that stand for things128; while logic is a science about mental contents that stand for other mental contents. This is because all knowledge is of propositions. This should be obvious if we keep in mind that scientia in the fourth and most strict sense is of a conclusion of a syllogism. Now, clearly, the only thing that can be the conclusion of a syllogism is a proposition, not the things referred to by that proposition or its subject or its predicate. Perhaps we are in a

126 Ibid., 7. 127 Ibid. 128 “…de intentionibus supponentibus pro rebus …” Ibid., 12.

49 better position to appreciate what Ockham says here than his contemporaries because our notion of logic is of modern symbolic logic, which clearly uses symbols to refer to terms and entire propositions, whereas Ockham and his contemporaries did not have this perspective. As it affects the notion of a science of morals, this means that this science is knowledge of propositions which are themselves conclusions of syllogisms.

Another discussion of scientia occurs in the second question of the prologue to

Ockham’s commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. Fortunately, this prologue is an ordinatio, indicating that Ockham checked it, and perhaps revised it. The second question of the prologue is, “Whether the evident cognition of theological truths is science properly speaking?”129 Ockham splits his answer into three articles: the first asks what kind of proposition is knowable by scientia properly speaking; the second asks what is scientia; and the third answers the question. Let us take the second issue first.

In answer to the question, “what is science?”, Ockham says it is, according to

Aristotle, “the evident cognition of a necessary truth, by nature caused by premises applied to it by a syllogistic argument.”130 This is substantially the same definition that he gives in his prologue to his Expositio on the Physics.

Ockham immediately gives explanations for each part of this definition. The first, that is, evident cognition, excludes such things as “opinion, suspicion, faith (or belief), and things of this type”131; clearly, these things are not cases of evident cognition. The second criterion, that it be of a necessary truth, excludes “evident cognition of contingent

129 “Utrum notitia evidens veritatum theologiae sit scientia proprie dicta?” William of Ockham, OTh I, Sent., 75. 130 “…notitia evidens veri necessarii, nata causari per praemissas applicatas ad ipsum per discursum syllogisticum .” Ibid., 87-88. 131 “…et opinio et suspicio et fides et huiusmodi …” Ibid., 88.

50 things, which is not science properly speaking.”132 The third condition, that it be caused by premises applied to it through syllogistic reasoning, excludes “evident cognition of first principles,”133 since these cannot be made known through a syllogistic argument, certainly not through a demonstration.

Finally, Ockham says that he says by nature caused because it is not necessary that the knowledge be had in fact by syllogistic reason, because such knowledge can in fact be caused by experience. As an example, he gives the proposition “the moon can be eclipsed.” Clearly such a proposition can be known by experience alone. All that is required is for one to see a lunar eclipse, and from that one can infer the proposition in question, and know it without any doubt; and such knowledge can be had by anyone, not merely someone learned in astronomy, physics or mathematics. Ockham says that such knowledge of such a proposition is scientia, “provided that this be a demonstrable conclusion.”134 So, so long as what is known can be the conclusion of a syllogism and is a necessary truth, it does not matter how one comes by the knowledge, it will be an instance of scientia. Here Ockham’s position is somewhat looser than that of some of his contemporaries, who maintained that unless the proposition was in fact known through a demonstrative syllogism, it was not known scientifically. Indeed, Ockham even mentions an objection on these lines. The objector claims that knowledge caused by experience and knowledge caused by demonstration produce specifically distinct types of knowledge. There are two arguments given for this claim. The first claims that “there is a greater difference between knowledge acquired by experience and knowledge acquired

132 “…evidens notitia contingentium quae non est scientia proprie dicta …” Ibid. 133 “…evidens notitia primorum principiorum …” Ibid. 134 “…ponendo quod ista sit conclusio demonstrabilis.” Ibid., 88.

51 by demonstration than there is between knowledge that it is so and knowledge why it is so; but knowledge that it is so and knowledge why it is so are of different species; therefore, etc.”135 Apparently Ockham does not consider this claim to be especially weighty, as he does not offer a response to it. The second argument is somewhat different. It is based upon the principle that “distinct causes cause distinct effects.”136

But knowledge caused by experience and knowledge caused by demonstration are the effects of different causes, and so they are different in species. Ockham answers this argument by merely denying the principle. He says that “it is not absurd that distinct causes should produce specifically the same effect.”137 As an example, he points out that both the sun and fire cause the same heat, whereas they are clearly specifically distinct causes of heat. And so, it is not necessary that knowledge caused by experience and knowledge caused by demonstration produce specifically distinct types of knowledge.

This seems clear, since if the objector were correct, it would follow that an astronomer would know that the moon can be eclipsed twice: once by means of experience, if he happened to witness a lunar eclipse; second, by astronomical demonstration. These two bits of knowledge would have to coexist in his mind together as specifically distinct subjects of knowledge, which seems absurd.

Now that we have seen what scientific knowledge is, we can return to Ockham’s discussion of what types of propositions can be known scientifically. He gives us three conditions. The first is that it be “a necessary proposition,”138 and Ockham claims this is

135 “plus differunt scientia adquisita per demonstationem et scientia adquisita per experientiam quam scientia quia et scientia propter quid. Sed scienti quia et propter quid differunt specie,…, igitur, etc…,” Ibid. 89. 136 “…distinctae causae causant distinctos effectus …” Ibid. 137 “…non est inconveniens distinctas causas specie habere eosdem effectus specie.” Ibid., 90. 138 Ibid., 76.

52 obvious. This excludes a contingent proposition, which, though it can be evidently known, nevertheless “it is not necessary but can be false,” and so it cannot be known by scientific knowledge strictly so called.

The second condition is that it be “a proposition which can be doubted.”139 By this condition is excluded any proposition which is “per se nota,” which, even though it is necessary and can be evidently known, still it cannot be known through scientific knowledge strictly speaking, because it is not dubitable. But, it is not necessary that such a proposition actually be doubted or appear false to someone, rather, it is sufficient if “it is possible for it to be dubitable to the one learning it, or be doubted or appear false to someone, and afterwards it can be made known by syllogistic reasoning.”140 In other words, so long as anyone in the world could doubt the proposition, it is fit to be known scientifically.

The third condition is that “by nature it may be made evident through evident propositions applied to it through a syllogistic argument.”141 Again, Ockham claims this condition is obvious. This condition is needed to distinguish these propositions from

“certain first principles which are not known per se, and consequently are dubitable, since these cannot be made known through a syllogistic argument, and so cannot be known scientifically.”142 What kinds of principles can Ockham have in mind here?

What kinds of first principles, which would of course be necessary, are not per se nota,

139 “propositio dubitabilis “ Ibid. 140 “…possibile est quod sit dubitabilis ab addiscente vel quod possit ab aliquo dubitari, vel apparere falsa, et quod postea per discursum syllogisticum possit fieri nota .” Ibid., 77. 141 “…sit nata fieri evidens per propositiones evidentes applicatas ad ispam per discursum syllogisticum…” Ibid. 142 “…aliquibus principiis primis quae non sunt per se nota, et per consequens sunt dubitabilia, quia tamen non possunt fieri nota per discursum syllogisticum ideo non sunt scibilia scientia proprie dicta.” Ibid., 77- 78.

53 and so can be doubted? He has in mind first principles that can be known only by experience. As an example, he gives the proposition “calor est calefactivus,” heat is able to heat, which he claims is necessary and dubitable. This is because, “if any intellect were to grasp heat intuitively through the intellect alone and never were to see nor to sense heat heating, for example, if nothing able to be heated were cognized intuitively to be near something hot, then someone could doubt whether heat can produce heat just as one can doubt whether a white thing produces whiteness, consequently this proposition is dubitable.”143 So, “heat is able to heat” is not per se nota, but, without experience of a hot thing heating something else, is just as doubtful as the proposition “a white thing can produce whiteness.” This last proposition is clearly false, or at least it is not necessary, since the whiteness on my walls will not turn a book white if I simply bring them into contact. But it would heat a book if the wall were hot and I brought them into contact.

But how can I know this? “[I]t can be made evident only through experience gained through intuitive cognition.”144 So, there are some first principles that can be known only through experience. However, this class of propositions is not to be confused with the class we discussed before, that of propositions that are “nata causari” to be known by syllogistic argument, but are in fact known by experience, for example, the moon can be eclipsed. That class of propositions could be known by experience alone, though they could also be made known by a demonstrative syllogism. This class of propositions is a class of first principles. They can be known only by experience, and cannot be made

143 “…si aliquis intellectus apprehenderet calorem intuitive solum per intellectum et nunquam videret net sentiret calorem calefacere, puta, si nullum calefactibile esset alicui calori intuitive cognito approximatum, ita posset dubitare an calor posset producere calorem sicut dubitat an albedo possit producere albedinem, et per consequens ista propositio est dubitabilis.” Ibid., 78. 144 “…tantum fit evidens per experientiam sumptam ex notitia intuitive…” Ibid.

54 known by a demonstrative argument. There is an important difference between a proposition that can be known by experience, and one that can be known only by experience.

So, from what has been said so far, we can sum up what kinds of things can be known through a demonstrative syllogism: they are propositions that are (1) evidently known, (2) necessary truths, (3) dubitable, though not necessarily doubted (what is necessary is that they can be doubted) and (4) by nature suited to be made known through a demonstrative syllogism, though they may be known without such a syllogism so long as they could be known by such a syllogism. It is important to realize how flexible this is. He has allowed for scientific knowledge of things that are not in fact known by scientific reasoning.

We turn now to the account of scientific knowledge which Ockham gives in his

Summa Logicae. First of all, we must note that Ockham’s discussion here is somewhat more complex and nuanced. He is here concerned to spell out all of the requirements for demonstrative knowledge, rather than merely meeting certain objections against the view that theology is a science, which was his concern in the Sentences commentary.

Nevertheless, his account is basically the same, with some more details filled in.

First, he claims that, according to Aristotle, “a demonstration is a syllogism that produces knowledge.”145 This is, he says, the nominal essence of “demonstration,” and so all who use the term mean precisely this. Then he claims that “to know” is used in diverse ways, so we must understand how it is used in this definition. Although it can be understood in many ways, Ockham discusses three meanings of the term here. First, to

145 “…demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire.” William of Ockham, SL, OPh I, 505.

55 know is “the evident comprehension of a truth.”146 Obviously this includes not only necessary truths, but also contingent ones, such as “I know you are sitting,” and “I know that I understand and live.”147 The second meaning of to know is “an evident comprehension of a truth which cannot be false.”148 This means only necessary things can be known scientifically in this sense, not contingent ones. The third meaning of to know is “the evident comprehension of one necessary truth through the evident comprehension of two necessary truths, disposed in figure and mood, so that the two truths cause the third truth to be known which otherwise would be unknown.”149 And this is how the word is meant in the definition of demonstration, and how everyone who speaks correctly of demonstration uses the term. Indeed, he says that everyone means such a syllogism which makes known a conclusion which otherwise would remain unknown, “unless perhaps at the same time as these premises there were other premises to cause knowledge of the same conclusion.”150 So once again we have the possibility that this demonstration does not in fact cause knowledge of the conclusion, but so long as it could, it is still a scientific demonstration.

After this discussion of what demonstration in general is, Ockham now turns to the components of a demonstration. He had noted earlier that every demonstration is composed of propositions, and every proposition is composed of terms; but not just any term or proposition is fit to be a part of a demonstration, but rather each such must meet

146 “…evidens comprehensio veritatis.” Ibid., 506. 147 Ibid. 148 “…evidens comprehensio veritatis quae non potest esse falsa.” Ibid. 149 “…evidens comprehensio unius necessariae per evidentem comprehensionem duarum veritatum necessariarum, in modo et figura dispositarum, ut illae duae veritates faciant tertiam veritatem evidenter sciri, quae aliter esset ignota.” Ibid. 150 “…nisi forte in eodem tempore simul concurrant cum illis praemissis aliae praemissae sufficientes ad causandum notitiam euisdem conclusionis.” Ibid.

56 certain criteria.151 First of all, Ockham notes that certain types of terms cannot be part of an “affirmative demonstration composed of propositions merely concerning inherence and merely about the present.”152 These include such terms as “chimera”, “infinite body”, and “infinite creature”, because these terms obviously signify nothing at all.

Ockham does note, however, that they could be used in a negative demonstration because they can certainly be predicated necessarily of something negatively.153

Ockham does tell us that us that, while not every term can be used in the highest sort of demonstration (demonstratio potissima), every term can be used in some demonstration. However, as far as the highest type of demonstration is concerned, the only terms that can be included are “precisely subject, attribute, and definition.”154 To make his point clearer, Ockham notes that the attribute (passio) “is not some thing inhering in the subject, in the way that heat is in fire, but an attribute is a certain predicable, distinct from the subject, and really conveying the same thing that the subject conveys and something more, or at least that same thing in another way.”155 And he says the same is true of definition. This discussion seems to be directed against those who would claim that a science must be about real things, not terms. Ockham, of course, is convinced that science is knowledge of propositions, which are made up of terms. So the attribute, or predicate, is not something that really is in the subject, as some philosophers have maintained, but it is a term distinct from the subject, which supposits

151 Ibid., 505. 152 “…demonstrationem affirmativam ex propositionibus mere de inesse et mere de praesenti.” Ibid., 507. 153 Ibid. 154 “…praecise subiectum, passio et definitio.” Ibid. 155 “…non est aliqua res inhaerens subiecto, illo modo quo calor inest igni, sed passio est quodam praedicabile, distinctum a subiecto, et realiter importans illud idem quod important subiectum et aliquid plus, vel saltem illud idem alio modo.” Ibid.

57 for the same thing as the subject while giving us different information than the subject term does.

Now, before one can build a demonstration from these terms, they must be cognized beforehand in a certain way. First of all, of every term in the demonstration, it must be cognized “what it is.”156 That is, one must understand what the term means, what its nominal definition is; one cannot demonstrate anything of a subject term if one does not know what the subject term means. Besides this, however, it must also be known of the subject term “that it is.”157 That is, one must know if what the subject term signifies really exists. Ockham expresses this somewhat imprecisely by saying that “one must know beforehand that being is not impossibly predicated of the subject signifying something.”158 I say this is imprecise because Ockham does not mean to say that the premises must not contain internal contradictions, but that the premise in which something is predicated of the subject, or vice versa, must be cognized, and so it must be true. So one must know beforehand that the subject exists.

Is this also true of the other terms of the demonstration? Ockham claims that it is true of the definition, and this “for the same reason that is necessary to cognize of the subject that it is.”159 Although Ockham offers no explanation, what he says is clear enough. If the premise in which the definition is predicated of the subject must be true, it must be the case that what the definition signifies really exists, and that it is the same thing as what the subject signifies.

156 “…quid est…” Ibid., 508. 157 “…quia est.” Ibid. 158 “…oportet praecognoscere quod esse non impossibiliter praedicatur de subiecto significative sumpto.” Ibid. 159 “…propter eandem rationem quam oportet de subiecto praecognoscrere quia est.” Ibid., 509.

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About the attribute, Ockham claims that this is not always the case. Even if it enters into an affirmative demonstration it is not necessary to cognize anything beforehand other than what the term means. This is true if the major premise is a conditional or equivalent to such.160 However, when “the major is affirmative, not equivalent to a conditional, it is just as necessary to cognize beforehand that it is as it is of the subject.”161 Of course, it cannot be the case that one must know that the subject term and attribute supposit for the same thing, for that would mean that one would already know that the conclusion is true, and so the demonstration would not produce knowledge, which it must do to be a legitimate demonstration. Rather, what Ockham seems to intend here is simply that the attribute is possibly a predicate of the subject term.

Ockham now turns to a discussion of the types of propositions required for a demonstration. First, he divides such propositions into two classes: those that are parts of the demonstration, such as premises and conclusions; and those that are not. These latter are called axioms (dignitates), maxims (maximae) or suppositions (suppositiones). He says that these do not appear in a demonstration under their own form,162 nevertheless “in some way it is in virtue of these propositions that the premises of the demonstration are known.”163 To explain this, Ockham gives us this example of a “primary proposition, known precisely through experience, ‘every heat can heat’, which cannot be part of a demonstration, at least of a demonstration of the highest and universal sort.”164 So this seems to be a first principle, at least insofar as it cannot be deduced from anything else,

160 Ibid. 508. 161 “…maior est affirmative, non aequivalens condicionali, ita oportet praecognoscere de passione quia est sicut de subiecto.” Ibid., 509. 162 “…sub propria forma non ingrediuntur demonstrationem…” Ibid., 509-510. 163 “…virtute tamen illarum propositionum aliquo modo sciuntur praemissae demonstrationis.” Ibid., 510. 164 “…una proposition prima, per experientiam praecise nota, ‘omnis calor est calefactivus;, quae non potest esse pars demonstrationis, saltem potissimae et universalis,…” Ibid.

59 nor is it based on any prior truth. However, it is in virtue of this that such a proposition as “every hot thing can heat” is true, and this can be part of a demonstration. Ockham gives the example: “Every hot thing can heat, every fire is a hot thing; therefore, every fire can heat.” So, for Ockham, “every heat can heat” and “every hot thing can heat” are distinct propositions, and “the first is prior and the second is posterior.”165 But the second cannot strictly speaking be deduced or demonstrated from the first, but the second can be a part of demonstration, and the first cannot. Why? What is the difference between these two propositions? Take the demonstration that Ockham gives as an example. If we replace “hot thing” with “heat” we get “Every heat can heat, every fire is a heat; therefore, every fire can heat.” Ockham would claim that this is a bad demonstration because the second premise, “Every fire is a heat”, is false. Fire is not heat, or a heat; rather, it is something that has heat. Heat is a quality that substances can have as attributes, but it itself is not a substance. And this is the real reason that “every heat can heat” cannot enter into a demonstration of the highest and universal sort: the subject term must supposit for a substance, not some quality that merely inheres in a substance. Ockham never says this, but I believe it is pretty obviously what he is thinking here.

Ockham next divides such propositions as do not enter into a demonstration into those that everyone who is to learn must know, such as “everything either is or is not”,

“of each thing an affirmation or a negation”, and others of this type; and those that not everyone must have but only for specialists, for example, “something is mobile”, and “if equals are subtracted from equals”, etc.166 Clearly the first class are general principles of

165 “…prima prior est et secunda posterior.” Ibid. 166 Ibid.

60 logic, such as the law of non-contradiction, and the second are classes necessary for studying a special science. This division does not seem particularly important for our purposes.

Next, Ockham claims that all propositions required for a demonstration can be divided into premises and conclusions. Some propositions are premises only, “namely indemonstrable propositions”167; some are conclusions only, “namely demonstrable propositions”168; but some are both premises and conclusions, since they can be demonstrated through other premises and be used to demonstrate other conclusions. This indicates that the premises of a demonstration need not be first principles, so long as they are ultimately traceable from a first principle.

Finally, Ockham divides all propositions entering a demonstration into principles and conclusions. All propositions are called principles “that are not conclusions and yet are required for a demonstration, whether they be parts of the demonstration or not.”169

These are also called “first principles”, and can be further subdivided into those that are known per se, or those “to which the intellect assents immediately upon grasping their terms,”170 and those that are known only through experience, such as the previous example, “every heat can heat”.

All of these ways of dividing the propositions that make up demonstrations are interesting, but seem to have been included more for the sake of completeness than for any important reason. However, the next several chapters give us important information

167 “…scilicet est indemonstrabilis…” Ibid. 168 “…scilicet est demonstrabilis…” Ibid. 169 “…quae non sunt conclusiones et tamen requiruntur ad demonstrationem, sive sint partes demonstrationis sive non sint partes eius.” Ibid., 511. 170 “…quibus scilicet intellectus statim assentit ipsis terminis apprehensis…” Ibid.

61 about properties that propositions must have to be legitimately included in a demonstration, especially of the highest sort.

The first property of a proposition in a demonstration, and one that applies to all of the propositions, whether premises or conclusions, is that they are necessary. This is obvious, says Ockham, from the very definition of demonstration, since it produces knowledge of a necessary conclusion. Thus, the premises must also be necessary because, although a necessary proposition may be inferred from some that are contingent or impossible, it “cannot be known from contingent or impossible premises,”171 and so the premises must also be necessary. Also, those propositions that do not enter into a demonstration, but upon which the demonstration depends, must also be necessary because they are “prior to and better known than the premises.”172 The clear implication here is that they could not be prior to or better known than the premises unless they were necessary; apparently, no contingent proposition is prior to or better known than any necessary one. Next Ockham tells us that, because these propositions are necessary, they are also “perpetual and incorruptible.”173 Ockham is quick to point out, however, that such propositions are not to be taken for certain necessary, perpetual, and incorruptible things; for only God is such a thing, since anything other than God can become nothing through some power,174 presumably at least through God’s. Ockham says that the terms necessary, perpetual and incorruptible can be taken in two ways. In one way something is called “necessary, perpetual and incorruptible because through no power can it begin to

171 “…non tamen potest sciri per contingentia nec impossibilia…” Ibid., 512. 172 “…sunt priores et notiores praemisae…” Ibid. 173 “…perpetuae et incorruptibilis.” Ibid. 174 “…aliquid aliud a Deo potest esse simpliciter perpetuum et incorruptibile quin per aliquam potentiam posset fieri non-ens.” Ibid.

62 be or cease to be; and in this way only God is perpetual, necessary and incorruptible.”175

But in another way, a “proposition is said to be necessary, perpetual and incorruptible which cannot be false; that is, is true such that, if it be formed, it is not false but only true.”176 This distinction allows Ockham to maintain that certain propositions are always true without acknowledging that they always exist. This is important to Ockham’s metaphysics, in which God is the only eternal being. Also, while that is the reason that is cited here, we must keep in mind that for Ockham any proposition is only a quality in the mind. If he were to acknowledge that a proposition could be a perpetual and incorruptible being, he would have to admit that it is also a substance of some kind, which, of course, he would never do.

Ockham’s discussion of the necessity necessary for propositions in a demonstration goes on, and he makes several qualifications, but I would like to postpone any discussion of this until Chapter 3, which will deal with Ockham’s notion of necessity in greater detail.

Ockham goes on to discuss other properties of propositions. First of all, they must be true “in every case.”177 A proposition holds in every case “when the predicate coincides with everything contained under the subject and with the subject at every time.”178 This is the case when the predicate signifies everything the subject signifies, and at no time fails to signify something signified by the subject. Of course, the predicate can signify things not signified by the subject. For example, in the sentence “Man is an

175 “…necessarium, perpetuum et incorruptibile quia per nullam potentiam potest incipere vel desinere esse; et sic solus Deus est perpetuus, necessarius et incorruptibilis.” Ibid. 176 “…dicitur necessarium, perpetuum et incorruptibile propositio quae non potest esse falsa; quae scilicet est ita vera quod, si formetur, non est falsa sed vera tantum.” Ibid. 177 “…esse de omni…” Ibid., 514. 178 “…quando preadicatum omni contento sub subiecto et omni tempore competit subiecto.” Ibid.

63 animal”, ‘animal’ signifies everything signified by ‘man’, but of course signifies things like puppies, which are not signified by ‘man’.

Ockham’s next requirement for propositions in a demonstration is that they be true per se. What does this mean? First of all, Ockham distinguishes the various ways something can be per se. First, there is being per se, which occurs when something exists without any causes, and only God exists in this way; or when something exists without a material cause, such as intelligences; or when something exists without a subject, and this is the way substances exist.179 The next case is the case of causing per se, and this occurs in the example of killing being the per se cause of someone’s death.180 None of these senses of per se concern us here, however, since clearly none of them applies to propositions, which are our concern. This leads to the final sense of per se, which is saying something per se, which occurs, Ockham says, “when something is predicated per se of another.”181 Ockham then says that this occurs in two ways: one “when the predicate is placed in the definition of the subject”182; the other, “when the subject is placed in the definition of the predicate.”183 Ockham then says that, concerning propositions, per se has two senses, a wider and a stricter sense. The wider sense occurs when “the subject falls in the definition of the predicate or conversely, and what is per se higher than the other defines it or is defined through it.”184 This implies that the proposition must relate not only a predicate truly to the subject, but also a predicate that belongs essentially to the subject, or vice versa. Ockham gives as examples “Every

179 Ibid., 515. 180 Ibid. 181 “…quando aliquid praedicatur per se de altero.” Ibid.. 182 “…quando praedicatum ponitur in definitione subiecti…” Ibid. 183 “…quando subiectum ponitur in definitione praedicati.” Ibid. 184 “…subiectum cadit in definitione praedicati vel e converse et per se superius ad unum definit reliquum vel definitur per reliquum.” Ibid., 516.

64 human being is an animal,” “Every human being is rational,” and “Every human being is able to laugh.” In each case it is obvious that the predicate is true essentially of the subject; that is, the predicate expresses the essence, or at least part of the essence, of the subject. However, for a predication to be true in the stricter sense, it must not only meet the requirements of the wider sense, but also be such that “it be necessary without qualification, so that it neither can be nor could have been nor will be able to be false.”185

This requirement is obviously intended to exclude propositions that are, to use the scholastic term, necessary per accidens. Most importantly, this covers propositions about the past. For example, the proposition “Julius Caesar was murdered on the Ides of

March” is now necessarily true, in the sense that nothing can bring it about that it could be false. However, it would not meet the above requirement for being true per se in the stricter sense, because it could have been false had the Senators not gone ahead with the plot. Given that the distinction between predicating something per se in the wider sense and in the stricter sense is precisely that the stricter sense is necessary, it is clear that any proposition making up a demonstration must be per se in the stricter sense.

Ockham next strengthens the requirements on this type of proposition by claiming that, for a proposition to be per se in the strictest sense, it must be a “proper and direct predication.”186 This serves to exclude certain types of necessary propositions, specifically, those in which “inferiors are predicated of superiors taken particularly, subjects are predicated of their attributes, and one attribute is predicated of another attribute.”187 Examples of the first are “Some animal is a man” and “Some animal can be

185 “…ipsa sit simplicitur necessaria, ita quod nec potest net potuit nec poterit esse falsa.” Ibid. 186 “…praedicatio propria et directa.” Ibid. 187 “…praedicantur inferiora de superioribus particulariter sumptis et subiecta de suis passionibus et una passio de alia passione.” Ibid.

65 a man”, neither if which seems to be true necessarily. As an example of the second case,

Ockham gives “Everything that is able to laugh either is a man or can be a man”. For the third case Ockham gives us “Everything that is able to laugh is able to be taught”; this last is interesting because the reason it fails the test is obvious: it is not precisely because something can laugh that it can be taught, but something that can laugh can be taught because only something with an intellective soul can do either of these, though of course one would also need a corporeal body to be able to laugh.

To be a necessary per se proposition, it must be one in which “the predicate defines the subject, or something per se superior to the subject, or the subject defines the predicate or something per se superior to the predicate.”188 Ockham understands this to be the opinion of both Aristotle189 and Robert Grosseteste. Grosseteste had claimed that

“one thing is said per se of another when the quiddity of one essentially, and not accidentally, proceeds from the quiddity of the other.”190; Ockham denies that

Grosseteste here is claiming that one thing really proceeds from another “in the way an effect is really brought about by its cause”191, but is instead merely claiming that one thing is “conveyed or signified” by the other.192 Ockham gives examples of both cases.

Of the first case he gives examples such as “Every human being is a rational animal,”

“Every human being is an animal,” “Every human being is composed of body and soul.”

188 “…praedicatum definit subiectum vel aliquid per se superius ad subiectum, vel subiectum definit praedicatum vel aliquid per se superius ad praedicatum.” Ibid., 517. 189 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I 4, 73a34-b24. 190 “…dicitur per se alterum de altero cum quidditas unius a quidditate alterius essentialiter et non per accidens egreditur.” Robert Grosseteste, Cmmentariaum in Posteriorum Analyticorum libros, ed. by Pietro Rossi (Florence: Olschki, 1982), I, 4, lines 51-53. 191 “…illo modo quo effectus efficitur realiter a sua causa… “ William of Ockham, SL, OPh I, pg. 517. 192 “…importare sive signifcare…” Ibid.

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He does say that each of these, “if they were necessary, would be per se.”193 But again, we shall say more on why these aren’t necessary for Ockham in the next chapter.

Of the second type, when the subject or something per se higher than the subject defines the predicate or something per se lower than the predicate, Ockham gives examples such as “Every human being can laugh,” “Every human being is susceptible of contraries.” In the first case “’human being’ is placed in the definition expressing the nominal essence of ‘something able to laugh.’”194 And in the second, he says that

“‘substance’ or ‘body,’ which is per se higher than human being, is placed in the definition of the predicate.”195 But again, all of these are such that they would be per se

“if they were necessary.” Ockham doesn’t give us examples of propositions that he thinks really are per se until the next paragraph. Those examples include “Every human being can become pale,” “All matter can be susceptible of form,” Every creature can be created by God,” and others of this sort. We should note that all of these involve possibility; but more on the importance of this in the next chapter. Ockham points out that this qualification applies only to affirmative propositions. There are some negative propositions which are per se but in which the predicate does not define the subject, nor vice versa. In fact, he says that “every necessary negative proposition in which the subject term and predicate term are merely absolute and not relative nor connotative is per se.”196 But such propositions are not appropriate in a demonstration of the highest type.

193 “…si essent necessariae, essent per se…” Ibid. 194 “…in definitione exprimente quid nominis ipsius ‘risibilis’ ponitur ‘homo’.” Ibid., 518. 195 “…in definitione praedicati ponitur ‘substantia’ vel ‘corpus’, quod est per se superius ad hominem….” Ibid. 196 “…omnis negative necessaria, in qua terminus subiectus et praedicatus sunt mere absoluti et non relativi nec connotativi, est per se.” Ibid.

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The next quality which all propositions must have in a demonstration is that they must be true primarily (primo vera). A proposition is true primarily “when the predicate coincides neither with any subject more general than this subject nor with any subject prior to this subject that is not predicable of that subject.”197 This requirement is mainly intended to exclude cases in which the predicate belongs to the subject necessarily, but not precisely because of what the subject is. Ockham gives no explicit examples of this case, but Webering does. His example is “Every man is mortal.”198 It is certain that every man is mortal, but it is not true just because every man is a man, but because every man is a corporeal substance. It is, in fact, true of every ensouled corporeal substance.

Compare this with an example that Ockham does give of a proposition true primarily:

“Every human being is an animal.” Why is this true primarily while the previous example isn’t? Because there is nothing in virtue of which every man is an animal other than being a man. ‘Man’ is directly in the genus ‘animal.’ To take another case, Ockham gives as another example of a proposition that is true primarily: “Every simple intellectual substance is susceptible of learning.” Presumably, “Every man is susceptible of learning” would not be true primarily because, while it is necessarily true, it is true only because every man has an intellectual substance as a part of his ontological constitution. In other words, “Every man is susceptible of learning” is true but only because “Every simple intellectual substance is susceptible of learning” is also true. And there is nothing to which being susceptible of learning belongs more than to a simple intellectual substance.

197 “…quando praedicatum nulli subiecto communiori illo subiecto nec alicui subiecto non praedicabili de illo subiecto prius competit quam illi subiecto.” Ibid., 519. 198 Damascene Webering, Theory of Demonstration According to William Ockham (St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1953), 54.

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This concludes Ockham’s discussion of the requirements of every proposition in a demonstration. Each proposition must be true, necessary, true in every case, true per se, and true primarily. Each of these requirements is more stringent than the one before it: not every true proposition is necessary, not every necessary proposition is true in every case, not every proposition true in every case is true per se, and not every proposition that is true per se is true primarily.

Next we move on to properties that are not shared by all of the propositions. The first cases involve properties of the conclusion of demonstration. The first is that the conclusion must be dubitable. This is obvious, since if it were indubitable, its truth could not be made known through the premises. However, as he said in his commentary on the

Sentences, it is not necessary that the conclusion in fact be doubted, since the conclusion can be known before the demonstration in two ways: “for it is pre-known sometimes through experience, sometimes through other premises.”199 Once again Ockham affirms his belief that, so long as the specific conclusion known is the same but merely known in two ways, “such knowledge is of the same lowest species.”200

Although this property, of being dubitable, belongs necessarily to the conclusion of a demonstration, and never belongs to a premise, nevertheless Ockham does affirm that some principles of demonstrations can be dubitable. How can this be? It can be in the case of principles that cannot be known except through experience. In fact, Ockham says that “all [principles] that cannot be known except through experience are dubitable,

199 “…quandoque enim est praecognita per experientiam, quandoque per alias praemissas.” Ibid., 524. 200 “…talis notitia sit eiusdem speciei specialissimae.” Ibid.

69 even if they are primary, so that they cannot be demonstrated from others.”201 So principles known only through experience and all conclusions are dubitable.

Next Ockham spells out just what type of proposition can be the conclusion of a demonstration. First, not just any proposition in which the attribute is predicated of its primary subject can be a conclusion; for example, “Every heat is able to heat” cannot be the conclusion of a demonstration, because it can be known only through experience.

One might think that it can be demonstrated thus: “Everything productive of heat is able to heat; every heat is productive of heat; therefore, every heat is able to heat.”202

However, Ockham points out that this is a begging of the question, because the middle term is nothing other than the nominal essence of the attribute, and the nominal essence of both the subject and the attribute must be known before the demonstration is even formed. Therefore, one cannot know the minor premise and doubt the conclusion at the same time, which is clearly necessary in a true demonstration.203

Ockham points out that there are four types of propositions in which the attribute is predicated of its primary subject. The first occurs when “some attribute conveys precisely and directly the same thing that the subject conveys and obliquely some form really inhering in it.” 204 The second occurs when “some attribute conveys precisely and directly that which is conveyed by the subject and obliquely something neither inhering in it nor essential to it.”205 The third occurs when “some attribute conveys directly that

201 “…omnia quae nonnisi per experientiam cognosci possunt dubitabilia sunt, quantumcumque sint prima, ita quod ex aliis demonstrari non possunt.” Ibid., 522. 202 “…omne productivum caloris est calefactivum; omnis calor est productivus caloris; igitur omnis calor est calefactivus.” Ibid., 525. 203 Ibid. 204 “…aliqua passio importat in recto praecise illud idem quod importat subiectum et aliquam formam realiter inhaerentem sibi in obliquo…” Ibid., 526. 205 “…aliqua autem passio praecise importat in recto illud quod importatur per subiectum et in obliquo aliquam rem non inhaerentem nec essentialem sibi…” ibid.

70 which is conveyed by the subject and obliquely conveys parts of that thing and something not inhering in it.”206 And the fourth occurs when “some attribute conveys directly what the subject conveys and negatively or obliquely conveys parts of the subject.”207 Now

Ockham says that there cannot be demonstration in the first two cases, because, if one is ignorant of the primary subject of such an attribute, it can be known through experience alone.208 He further claims that this is clear by induction, though he gives no examples of this. But he does say that one can demonstrate a proposition when the attribute is predicated of its primary subject in the third and fourth ways. This seems to be because these ways involve parts of the subject. It seems that Ockham believes that one can be aware of the nature of the subject, or at least its nominal essence, and yet be ignorant of what its parts are, or perhaps even if it has parts. So one can know that an attribute belongs to a subject after one knows about its parts. And Ockham claims that this is always the case in mathematical demonstrations, because in mathematics “demonstration occurs always or frequently through the definition of the subject as through a middle term.”209 However, he does note that this is rarely the case in other sciences, although he does not tell us that it is never the case.

After conclusions, Ockham turns his attention to other propositions involved in demonstrations. First, he deals with principles, both premises of demonstrations and maxims and other propositions which themselves do not enter into demonstrations but upon which the premises do depend. The first property of all principles is that they are

206 “…aliqua autem passio importat in recto illud quod importat subiectum et in obliquo importat partes illius rei et aliquam rem sibi non inhaerentem….” Ibid. 207 “…aliqua autem passio importat in recto illud quod importat subiectum et negative vel in obliquo importat partes subiecti.” Ibid. 208 Ibid. 209 “…demonstrator in eis semper vel frequenter per definitionem subiecti tamquam per medium.” Ibid., 527.

71 first, by which Ockham means they “cannot be demonstrated through anything prior.”210

But, he says, this does not mean that there are no propositions prior to them at all, but merely that they cannot be demonstrated through any of them. For example, the law of non-contradiction is obviously prior to all other propositions, but they cannot all be demonstrated through them. Also, Ockham gives us his previous examples of “Every hot thing can produce heat” and “Every heat can produce heat.” The latter is prior to the former, though the former cannot be demonstrated through the latter. Ockham also notes that there is an order of priority among contingent propositions. For example, “Socrates is” is prior to “Socrates is a human being.” However, since contingent propositions can never enter into demonstrations, this really need not concern us.

In the next chapter Ockham tells us that principles also need to be immediate, by which he means a proposition “which cannot be demonstrated through another proposition that is prior to it.”211 He tells us that, though every proposition that is first is also immediate, and conversely, still these terms are not synonymous; however, he does not really explain the difference in the meanings of these terms. Yet, he does explain further what it means for a proposition to be prior. First, he separates out this meaning of priority from that associated with beings and that associated with terms. Among propositions “one is said to be prior either because one is more explanative of the same reality or explains more realities than the other, or because by a natural consequence one implies the other but not conversely.”212 In other words, one proposition is prior to

210 “…per priori demonstrari non possunt.” Ibid., 528. 211 “…qua non est altera prior per quam possit demonstrari.” Ibid., 529. 212 “…una dicitur prior alia: vel una est magis explicative eiusdem rei vel plurium rerum quam alia, vel quia una consequentia naturali infert aliam et non e converse.” Ibid., 529-530.

72 another either because it is more general in its scope than the other or because the truth of the other in some way either depends on the truth of the prior or is implied by the prior.

The principles of demonstration are also causes of the conclusion. This can be understood in four ways, according to Ockham. In the first way “knowledge of the principles causes knowledge of the conclusion.”213 This is clearly a subjective criterion, as Ockham has already acknowledged that one can have knowledge of the conclusion through experience or through some other premises. He also points out that sometimes the conclusion can be the cause of the knowledge of the principles. A good example of this is the lunar eclipse. By seeing a lunar eclipse, I can gain knowledge of the principle

“the moon can be eclipsed by the interposition of some body between the sun and the moon”, though this is clearly the principle and “the moon is eclipsed” is a conclusion.

In another way the principles are said to be causes of the conclusions because they

“express the cause why it is in reality just as the conclusion says it is.”214 Clearly this is a more objective criterion. In fact, it is a metaphysical or physical interpretation of the fact that principles cause conclusions.

In a third way, “a principle is called the cause of a conclusion because it implies the conclusion by a natural consequence but not conversely.”215

In a fourth way, “because the conclusion is composed precisely of terms given in the principles, however the principles are not composed precisely of terms from the conclusion.”216 In other words, both the subject and predicate terms of the conclusion

213 “…notitia principiorum efficiat notitiam conclusionis….” Ibid., 530. 214 “…exprimunt causam propter quam sic est a parte rei sicut denotatur per conclusionem.” Ibid. 215 “…dici principium causa conclusionis, quia conseqentia naturali infert conclusionem et non e converse.” Ibid., 531. 216 “…quia conclusio componitur praecise ex terminis positis in principiis, non sic autem principia praecise componuntur ex terminis positis in conclusione.” Ibid.

73 appear in the premises, but at least one term, the middle term, appears in the premises but does not appear in the conclusion. Ockham says that it is because of this case that the premises are said to be the material cause of the conclusion, since they provide the matter

(terms) out of which the conclusion is formed.

There are two final properties shared by all of the principles of a demonstration.

The first is that they are better known than the conclusion. This is obvious, says

Ockham, since a demonstration produces knowledge and “nothing less known can make one know something better known, nor can something unknown make one know something equally unknown, it is necessary that the principles be better known than the conclusion.”217 It is not clear here whether by “better known” Ockham means that they are in fact better known to someone forming a demonstration, or that they are capable of being better known. Perhaps the latter, because he does allow that sometimes the conclusion is the cause of the knowledge of the principles, as when someone knows the conclusion first by experience.

The second property is that each of the premises “can be known prior in time to the conclusion.”218 This seems obvious, if the premises are to be able to cause knowledge of the conclusion in someone. Clearly, he must know the premises before he makes the demonstration, but equally clearly he must not know the conclusion before making the demonstration if the demonstration is to produce knowledge of the conclusion in him. Ockham does spell this out in some detail. He claims that it is possible to know the major premise and be ignorant of the minor premise, or conversely. However, he

217 “…nihil ignotius potest facere scire notius, neq aeque ignotum facit scire aeque ignotum, necesse quod praemissae sint notiores conclusione.” Ibid., 531-532. 218 “…potest tempore cognosci ante conclusionem.” Ibid.

74 does seem to imply that, once both the major and minor premises are known, knowledge of the conclusion should follow almost immediately. Although he never says this, his discussion of how the premises can be known before the conclusion seems to imply this.

It remains to say something of the different types of demonstration. They are demonstration from what is prior and demonstration from what is posterior. Ockham describes the first type as “a certain demonstration the premises of which are without qualification prior to the conclusion, and this is called demonstration from what is prior or demonstration why it is so.”219 This is a demonstration in which the premises are prior to the conclusion in the senses discussed above, i.e., that they explain more realities than the conclusion or are more explanatory of the same reality, or because they imply the conclusion by a natural consequence but not vice versa. The other type of demonstration is one “the premises of which are not without qualification prior to the conclusion, but they are better known to the syllogizer, and through them the syllogizer arrives at knowledge of the conclusion, and such a demonstration is called demonstration that it is so or from what is posterior.”220 The examples Ockham gives here of these two types of demonstration are the familiar ones of the lunar eclipse. The example of demonstration from what is prior is the astronomer who reasons: when the moon is in such a position, the moon is eclipsed; the moon is now in such a position; therefore, the moon is eclipsed.

The example of demonstration from what is posterior is that of someone ignorant of astronomy in general, or of the positions of the earth and moon, should see the moon is

219 “…quaedam est demonstratio cuius praemissae sunt simpliciter priores conclusione, et illa vocatur demonstratio a priori sive propter quid.” Ibid., 533. 220 “…cuius praemissae non sunt simpliciter priores conclusione, sunt tamen notiores sic syllogizanti, per quas devenit sic syllogizans in notitiam conclusionis, et talis demonstratio vocatur demonstratio quia sive a posteriori.” Ibid.

75 eclipsed, and reasons: when the moon is eclipsed, the earth is interposed between the sun and the moon; the moon is now eclipsed; therefore, the earth is now interposed between the sun and the moon. Clearly the situation described by the conclusion of this argument is the cause of the situation described by the second premise, although for someone making the argument knowledge of the second premise is the cause of his knowledge of the conclusion. In the first example, however, not only are the premises the causes of the knowledge of the conclusion in someone making the argument, but the situations they describe or the principles they enunciate are the causes of the situation the conclusion describes. In other words, there is a more natural flow in the first argument: the sequence of propositions follows the priority of nature.

There are other differences between demonstration from what is prior and demonstration from what is posterior based upon this initial difference. The first might be termed the completeness of the knowledge given by each type of demonstration.

Demonstration from what is prior “is from necessary and prior propositions, through which, having it, every doubt and every question about the conclusion ceases.”221 In other words, if I have such a demonstration of a given conclusion, I then know not only that the conclusion is true, but also why it is true, and so there is really nothing left to investigate concerning it. Demonstration from what is posterior, however, is not like this.

First, it may be through premises which are not prior to the conclusion. An example of this is that of the demonstration formed by the person who witnesses the eclipse, and, from that, reasons that the earth is interposed between the sun and the moon. However, in this case there is no doubt that the conclusion is true, it is just that the premises are not

221 “…est ex propositionibus necessariis prioribis, qua habita cessat omnis dubitatio et omnis quaestio circa conclusionem.” Ibid., 536.

76 prior to the conclusion. The second case occurs when there is not an end to every doubt or question about the conclusion. To illustrate, Ockham gives us this example: no non- animal breathes; a plant is a non-animal; therefore, a plant does not breathe. Although this demonstration is through prior premises, it still leaves open the reason plants do not breathe, perhaps because the reason why only animals breathe is unexplained.

There is another way in which demonstration from what is prior and demonstration from what is posterior can differ, and that is if one is in one science and the other is in another. Ockham has a good deal to say about this, especially in the case that one of the sciences is subalternating and the other subalternate, but this needn’t really concern us here, as it is not really relevant to our discussion. What are relevant are all of the properties of the propositions that go into making up a demonstration: that all of the propositions must be necessary; that the premises must be prior to the conclusion, at least in a demonstration of the highest sort; that the premises must make the conclusion known which otherwise could have remained unknown. It will be necessary to see if, on

Ockham’s own account, any syllogisms in moral science can meet these standards.

However, before we turn to that question, we must further investigate one of the properties of demonstrative syllogisms that has come up already: what is required if a proposition is to be truly necessary? Ockham has already given us some hints about this, but what we have discussed so far has not fully explained his thinking on this matter.

And it is with this that the next chapter deals.

Chapter 3: The Nature of Necessary Propositions

In the preceding chapter we saw that Ockham claims that scientific knowledge is always of a necessary proposition, and that this necessary proposition must be deduced from other necessary propositions. Thus, it is clear that, if we are to accurately assess

Ockham’s claim that there can be a demonstrative science of morals, we must understand what he means by ‘necessary proposition’, as well as understanding just what types of propositions can count as necessary. This does not seem to be a topic that has attracted a great deal of interest among Ockham scholars, which seems odd considering how much attention has been lavished on his logic, and it is clearly the case that the nature of necessary propositions is a topic that falls within the study of logic.

Before discussing Ockham’s position on this issue, we should point out that the main problem Ockham is dealing with here is one that is posed by Aristotle’s account of scientific demonstration in the Posterior Analytics. Of course, Ockham’s entire presentation of demonstrative science is indebted to Aristotle’s work, but here there is a particular problem with reconciling Aristotle’s views with the Christian faith. In chapter

8 of book 1 of the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle says that, if the premises from which a conclusion follows are universal, “then it is necessary for the conclusion of such a demonstration… to be eternal. There is therefore no demonstration of perishable things…”222 For Aristotle, of course, this did not preclude the possibility of a demonstrative science of things in this world. We could have demonstrative science of species, even if there is no scientific knowledge of individuals. While we cannot have scientific knowledge of a man, we can have knowledge of human beings in general. And

222 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, trans. Jonathan Barnes, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 13. 77

78 this is possible because Aristotle considers the species to be eternal, because the world itself is eternal. So, for Aristotle, the proposition “Man is a rational animal” is eternal because, while no particular man is eternal, the species is, and so it is always true that there exists a man of whom it is right to say that he is a rational animal.

However, we should note that Aristotle’s view is ambiguous, especially if, like

Ockham and all Christian thinkers, one believes that the world was created ex nihilo by

God. Aristotle does believe that demonstration is of eternal “things”, but just what are these things of which there is demonstration? As Ernest Moody has pointed out, there are two possible interpretations.223 One is that the subject term of a demonstrative proposition must signify something eternal. In that case, it would seem that only God could be the subject of scientific demonstration, because in a Christian universe (and presumably in a Jewish or Muslim universe as well) only God fits this description. This was the position of some medieval Augustinians, who were quite willing to admit that we can have true scientific knowledge of God alone, and of creatures only insofar as they refer to God in some way, usually by being referred to the divine ideas. The second alternative is that demonstrative propositions themselves are eternal things. In that case, it would seem that only an eternal mind could have demonstration of anything. It would be impossible for humans, or at least individual humans, to possess this kind of knowledge. Because our minds are not eternal, no propositions formed by them could be eternal. This seems to have been the position taken by Averroes, who denied to individual humans the ability to possess demonstrative scientific knowledge. This would

223 Ernest A. Moody, The Logic of William of Ockham (New York: Russell & Russell, 1965), 228-229.

79 also seem to be to the position of both Maimonides and Spinoza224, who seem to deny immortality to humans except insofar as they comprehend eternal truths. Ockham, on the other hand, will try to steer a middle course between these two positions, because he is in fact committed to both: that humans do have demonstrative scientific knowledge, as

Aristotle claims; and that God alone is necessary and eternal, which is a truth of the faith.

Ockham discusses the nature of necessary propositions in several places, including two such discussions in the Summa Logicae. His first discussion of this subject is in Part II, chapter 9, which is called “What is required for the truth of modal propositions.” The chapter deals with what makes necessary propositions true.

Specifically, he is most concerned with distinguishing between modal propositions cum dicto and modal propositions sine dicto. A proposition cum dicto is one which appears in another proposition which describes the first. For example, “that every man is an animal is necessary”, or “that a man is running is contingent”. When evaluating such a proposition we must be careful to distinguish its meanings according to composition and division. Taking the first example, in the sense of composition, it is equivalent to saying that “every man is an animal” is necessary. Taken in the sense of division, however, it is equivalent to saying “every man is necessarily an animal.” Ockham then offers a few observations on such propositions taken in the sense of composition. The most interesting is that, while a universal proposition can be necessary, each of its singulars is contingent. For example, “that every true contingent proposition is true is necessary” is true and necessary, and yet each of its singulars, e.g. “that this true contingent proposition is true is necessary” and “that that true contingent proposition is true is necessary”, is

224 See, for example, Stephen Nadler, Spinoza’s Heresy: Immortality and the Jewish Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 80.

80 obviously false. Similarly, “that every false contingent proposition is false is true” is, he says, true and necessary; but each of its singulars is true but contingent.225

However interesting this may be in itself, it is not our main concern here. The most interesting part of the section is the penultimate paragraph, which reads:

However, with respect to necessary propositions it must be known that a proposition is called necessary not because it is always true, but because it is true if it exists and cannot be false. For example, this mental proposition “God exists” is necessary, not because it is always true – since if it does not exist, it is not true – but if it exists, it is true and cannot be false. Similarly, this spoken proposition “God exists” is necessary, and yet it is not always true, since when it does not exist, then it is neither true nor false; but if it is spoken, it is true and cannot be false unless the signification of the terms is altered.226

He goes on in the next paragraph to say that the same thing should also hold for impossible and contingent propositions. The important thing here is, of course, that the truth or falsity of any proposition is critically dependent upon its existence, and that this existence is as a mental proposition in the mind of someone who thinks it, or as a spoken proposition, or, though Ockham does not deal with this case here, as a written proposition.

His second discussion of necessary propositions occurs in chapter 5 of tract II of

Part III, which deals with demonstrative syllogism, which we’ve discussed in chapter 2.

His discussion in this place is, however, quite brief. Here he notes, first, that necessity is a property shared by all of the propositions in a demonstration. That the conclusion is necessary is stated in the definition. And this requires that the premises must also be

225 William of Ockham, OPh I, SL, 273-274. 226 “Tamen de propositione necessaria est sciendum quod propositio non propter hoc dicitur necessaria quia semper sit vera, sed quia est vera si sit non potest esse falsa. Sicut haec proposition in mense ‘Deus est’ necessaria est, non quia simper sit vera, - quia si non est, non est vera -, sit si sit, est vera et non potest falsa. Similiter haec proposition in voce ‘Deus est’ est necessaria, et tamen non semper est vera, quia quando non est, tunc non est vera nec falsa; sed si sit prolata, est vera et non potest ese falsa nisi termini aliter instituerenter ad significandum.” Ibid., 275.

81 necessary because “what is necessary, even if it can be inferred from the contingent or the impossible, nevertheless it cannot be known through the contingent or impossible….”227

Thus, in order to demonstrate a necessary conclusion, one must use necessary premises.

But this qualification leads into a discussion of just what a necessary proposition is.

Ockham points out, without argument, that, “as they are necessary, so are they perpetual and incorruptible.”228 However, he immediately goes on to warn us that “it must not be understood that these propositions are certain perpetual and incorruptible entities.”229

This is because, in Ockham’s metaphysics, “only God is perpetual and incorruptible, nor can anything other than God be simply perpetual or incorruptible without being able to be reduced to non-being through some power,”230 presumably through the divine power. So clearly, for Ockham there cannot be any eternal, necessary, perpetual or incorruptible beings other than God, for these would necessarily conflict with the doctrine of divine omnipotence. If there were such beings, by definition God would not be able to destroy them, and so God would not be omnipotent. On the other hand, if God were able to destroy them, they would not be perpetual or incorruptible. This is important because it clearly shows that Ockham does not accept the possibility that there can be beings which are necessary in an accidental way, so to speak. I have in mind here Thomas’s view, in his Third Way, that some things are necessary through another.231 For Ockham,

227 “…necessarium, quamvis possit inferri ex contingentibus vel impossibilibus, non tamen potest sciri per contingentia vel impossibilia…” William of Ockham, OTh I, 512. 228 “…sicut sunt necessariae ita sunt perpetua et incorruptibiles.” Ibid. 229 “Quod non est sic intelligendum quod propositiones illae sunt quaedam entia perpetua et incorruptibilia.” Ibid. 230 “Solum enim Deus est perpetuus et incorruptibilis, nec aliquid aliud a Deo potest esse simpliciter perpetuum et incorruptibile quin per aliquam potentiam posset fieri non-ens.” Ibid. 231 Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a 3.

82 something is not a necessary being just because God chooses to allow it to exist forever; rather, if it is a necessary being, God cannot destroy it.

So, if necessary propositions are not perpetual and incorruptible beings, what are they? They must be something, or we would not be able to form any demonstrative syllogisms. Ockham notes that the terms “necessary”, “perpetual” and “incorruptible” are taken in two ways. The first way is the way that has already been rejected, that of something that “through no power can it begin or cease to be.”232 This, he tells us, describes God alone. However, there is another way to be “necessary”, “perpetual”, and

“incorruptible”, and this is a way that seems to apply to propositions alone. In this way

“a proposition is called necessary, perpetual and incorruptible that cannot be false; that is, it is so true that, if it be formed, it is not false but only true.”233 Thus, a proposition is necessary, not if it is always true, for, if no one were to form it, it wouldn’t exist; but, if it is formed, it is only true and never false. Again, we see that Ockham seems to be anxious to avoid any implication that propositions exist independently of any mind forming them.

Thus, if God had chosen to create a world without any minds capable of forming any propositions, or if He had not chosen to create a world at all, there would be no necessary propositions, nor any propositions of any kind.

For our purposes, however, it is also important to notice what limits Ockham himself thinks this imposes on what kinds of propositions can and what kinds cannot be necessary, and so premises in a demonstrative syllogism. He points out that, though it conflicts with Aristotle’s views, “no proposition composed of terms that convey precisely

232 “…per nullam potentiam potest incipere vel desinere esse…” Ibid. 233 “…dicitur necessarium, perpetuum et incorruptibile propositio quae non potest esse falsa; quae scilicet est ita vera quod, si formetur, non est falsa sed vera tantum.” Ibid.

83 corruptible things, is merely affirmative and merely categorical and merely about the present, can be either a principle or a conclusion of a demonstration, since every such proposition is contingent.”234 So no proposition that describes things that are not eternal and incorruptible can be eternal, incorruptible or necessary itself. As an example of such a proposition, Ockham gives us “Man is a rational animal.” He claims this is not necessary, because it implies “Man is an animal”, and also “therefore, a man is composed of body and a sensitive soul.” Now, Ockham claims that this last proposition cannot be necessary because “if no man were to exist, this would be false because of false implication, since it would imply that something is composed of body and soul, which would then be false.”235 In other words, the proposition “man is a rational animal” implies that at least one man exists and is a rational animal. Clearly God could have created a world in which no man existed, in which case this proposition would have always been false; and He could also destroy every man now living in this world, in which case the proposition would become false. Because of this, even if this proposition is now true, as it clearly is, it is not necessary. Nor is Ockham willing to admit that this proposition is equivalent to “If a man is, a man is a rational animal”, for categorical and conditional statements are not equivalent. Clearly the difference for Ockham is that the categorical proposition carries what we today would call existential import, and the conditional proposition does not. And because of all this, we must agree that no merely

234 “…nulla propositio de illis quae important praecise res corruptibiles, mere affirmativa et mere categorica et mere de presenti, potest esse principium vel conclusio demonstrationis, quia quaelibet talis est contingens.” Ibid., 512-513. 235235 “…si nullus homo esset, ipsa esset falsa propter falsam implicationem, quia implicaretur aliquid componi ex corpore et anima, quod tunc foret falsum.” Ibid., 513.

84 categorical proposition about the present can be either a premise or a conclusion of a demonstration.

However, Ockham is quick to point out here that all hope is not lost, although it would seem that he has effectively cut off all hope of any demonstrative science of anything other than God. He does point out that, although propositions composed of terms describing corruptible things cannot be principles and conclusions of demonstrations, nevertheless demonstrations can be formed using propositions that are conditional or possible “because conditional propositions and those concerning the possible and ones equivalent to them can be necessary.”236 As examples he gives “If a man exists, an animal exists” and “If a man laughs, an animal laughs”, and he also grants

“Every man can laugh” if the subject term merely stands for things that can be, and so, presumably, is not taken to carry any existential import. And he claims that from this “it is clear” how there can be scientific knowledge about contingent things. He does not give us any examples of such a scientific demonstration, only pointing out that it must be formed from propositions that “are not merely about the present and inherence, categorical and affirmative, but are either negative or hypothetical or about the possible or in some other mode, or equivalent to these.”237 As we shall see, it is far from clear how this would work, but we shall save this discussion until we have looked at other places in which Ockham discusses necessary propositions, so that we may get a fuller understanding of his view.

236 “…quia propositiones condicionales et de possibili et aequivalentes eis possunt esse necessariae.” Ibid. 237 “…non sunt mere de praesenti et de inesse, categoricae et affirmativae, sed vel sunt negativae vel hypotheticae vel de possibili vel alio modo, vel aequivalentes eis.” Ibid., 513-514.

85

Perhaps Ockham’s most extensive discussion of what makes a proposition necessary occurs in his question “Whether the World Could Have Been Made from

Eternity through the Divine Power.”238 Although the whole of this question is interesting, for our purposes the most relevant is Ockham’s discussion of necessity. This discussion is occasioned by Ockham’s response to an objection based upon Aristotle’s dictum: “everything that is, when it is, necessarily is” (omne quod est quando est necesse est esse). This expresses the view that, since necessarily something cannot both be and not be at the same time, then if something is a certain way at a certain time, it is simultaneously impossible that it not be that way, and so it is necessary that it be that way. This type of necessity is often called “accidental necessity” or “necessity of the past” because it would render necessary every statement about the past. In the current context, it has the force of arguing that, if the world had been made from eternity, it would have always been necessary, and not contingent. This is because, if the world had been made from eternity, there was no time before it was made at which it could have not been made, nor can it not be made now, since it is; and therefore, the existence of the world is rendered necessary. It would follow from this, although Ockham does not say so explicitly, that God could not have chosen to not create the world. Indeed, he sums up the objection by saying that “…if the world had been from eternity, it would have been absolutely necessary from eternity and in no way contingent.”239

Ockham’s answer to this is, first, to challenge the interpretation of the quote from

Aristotle. He claims that Aristotle does not say that everything that is is necessarily when

238 William of Ockham, OTh VIII, 59-97. 239 “…si fuisset ab aeterno, absolute necessario fuisset ab aeterno et nullo modo contingenter.” Ibid., pg. 66.

86 it is, but rather that “this proposition is necessary: ‘everything that is, is when it is’ since this cannot be false.”240 Ockham has cleverly moved the necessity out of the proposition and made the proposition itself necessary, rather than interpreting it as imposing any necessity on things. He goes on to say that, if one interprets this as is commonly done, in the first way, “it is false since it is false of any singular, except God.”241 Here again we have Ockham’s view that only God is absolutely necessary, although it is merely implied without being explicitly spelled out.

Although it may seem that Ockham has sufficiently answered the question, he does not stop there. He immediately goes on to discuss the difference between conditional, causal, and temporal propositions. He begins by explaining what is needed for a conditional statement to be true, which is remarkably similar to modern accounts of material implication: “for the truth of a conditional it is required that the antecedent can neither be nor be true without the consequent.”242 But he is quick to point out that it is not required for either the antecedent or the consequent to be true. And so, the proposition “If Socrates is, Socrates is” is true, whether he exists or not, “because it does not denote anything except the relation between the antecedent and the consequent, that is, the relation that it cannot be true without the consequent.”243

Turning next to causal propositions, he says that the requirements for a necessary conditional proposition also apply here, but also “that each part be true in fact and that

240 “…ista propositio est necessario ‘omne quod est, est quando est’ quia haec non potest esse falsa.” Ibid., pg. 87. 241 “…est falsa quia quaelibet singularis est falsa, excepto Deo.” Ibid. 242 “…ad veritatem condicionalis requiritur quod antecedens non possit esse nec sit verum sine consequente.” Ibid., pg. 88. 243 “…quia non denotatur nisi habitudo inter antecedens et consequens, hoc est, quod habitudo non possit esse verum sine consequente.” Ibid.

87 the antecedent be the cause of the consequent.”244 What does it mean to say that one proposition causes another? It might mean that the truth of the antecedent is the reason that the consequent is true; or, in other words, the state of affairs described by the antecedent is the cause of the state of affairs described by the consequent. So, to use the example he gives, “If you run, you will move” is a true causal proposition, because the antecedent cannot be true unless the consequent is, and your running is the cause of your moving, and if you are in fact running and are in fact moving.

Finally, a temporal proposition is true if both parts of it are true at the same time.

And, he says, if either part is false the whole proposition is false “because of false implication.”245

Using this, he points out that this proposition, “When Socrates is, or while he is, he is necessarily”246 is false because one part of it is false, namely “Socrates is necessarily”. It is false because Socrates is not a necessary being. In fact, such a statement can be true of only one singular, God. All such statements about God are true, because in fact God is a necessary being.

Next, however, Ockham considers the further objection that the proposition

“everything that is, when it is, is necessarily” is true “by a conditioned necessity not an absolute necessity….”247 Ockham’s response to this is to say that this is not logical. This is because “a proposition is no more necessary by a conditioned necessity than a categorical necessity, because every proposition which is necessary is absolutely

244 “…sed quod utraque pars sit vera de facto et quod antecedens sit causa consequentis.” Ibid. 245 “…propter falsam implicationem.” Ibid. 246 “Sortem quando est, vel dum est, necesse est esse.” Ibid., pp. 88-89. 247 “…necessitate condicionata non absoluta necessitate…” Ibid., pg. 89.

88 necessary.”248 Ockham is unwilling to allow for any type of necessity other than absolute necessity. Nothing is necessary in a weaker sense. Ockham is willing to admit that conditional and temporal propositions can be necessary, but he is totally unwilling to allow that any unique sort of necessity attaches to them. He is willing to allow that in a case such as “If Socrates runs, Socrates will be moved” the whole proposition can be said to be necessary by a conditioned necessity. But, he says, “…it should be more properly called conditional necessity than conditioned necessity, because this conditional is absolutely necessary since it never can be false, just as the necessity of a categorical proposition is categorial necessity and not categorical.”249 Finally, Ockham says, for any conditional that is necessary, there is no time, neither simultaneously, nor before, nor after, at which there is any possibility for the contrary to be true. Taking the example “If

Socrates is, Socrates is”, it is true whether Socrates exists or not, because “this conditional is always true if it is formed by the intellect.”250 So, once again, we are faced with Ockham’s view that a necessary proposition is one that is always true and can never be false, if it is formed by some intellect. And we have the stronger claim, which was lacking in the Summa Logicae, that there is only one type of necessity that attaches to propositions, absolute necessity.

However, later in Ockham’s career, in the first and second questions of his sixth

Quodlibetal Questions, he may have modified his views on this. The first question of the sixth Quodlibet asks if a person can be saved without created charity. This is an important

248 “…non plus est propositio necessaria necessitate condicionata quam necessitate categorica, quia omnis propositio quae est necessaria est absolute necessaria.” Ibid. 249 “…magis proprie deberet dici necessitas condicionalis quam condicionata, quia haec condicionalis est absolute necessaria quia numquam potest esse falsa, sicut necessitas propositionis categoricae est necessitas categorialis et non categorica.” Ibid. 250 “…haec condicionalis est semper vera si formetur per intellectum.” Ibid., pg. 90.

89 question in Catholic theology, as one of the affirmative answers, that someone can earn eternal salvation through his own works, is the Pelagian doctrine, which is a heresy.

Ockham begins his answer to this question by making a distinction between God’s absolute and His ordained power. First, he notes that we are not to understand that there are really two separate powers in God. There is only one power in God, as no two things in God are really separate. Nor should we understand this distinction to mean that “God can do some things ordinately, and he can do some things absolutely and inordinately, for

God does not do anything inordinately.”251 Rather, Ockham says that we should understand that there are two meanings of the phrase “power to do something.”

Sometimes it means the power to do something “according to the laws which have been ordained and instituted by God,”252 and this is what we mean by God’s ordained power.

Other times, however, it means the power “to do anything which it does not involve a contradiction for it to be done,”253 and this is what we mean by God’s absolute power.

To illustrate this distinction, Ockham uses the biblical verse from John 3:5: “Unless one is born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of God.” This verse says that it is impossible for someone to be saved without baptism, but is this true? After all, neither Adam nor Abraham were baptized, so is it impossible that they were saved?

Ockham points out two issues: one, that God is just as powerful now as He was before He laid down this law; two, that before this law, people did enter the Kingdom of God without being baptized, because they fulfilled the requirement that they be circumcised.

And so, because actuality proves possibility, and because God’s power does not diminish

251 “…aliqua potest Deus ordinate facere, et aliqua potest absolute et non ordinate, quia Deus nihil potest facere inordinate.” William of Ockham, Quodl., OTh IX, 585. 252 “…secundum leges ordinatas et institutas a Deo…” Ibid. 253 “…facere omne illud quod non includit contradictionem fieri…” Ibid.

90 over time, we must say that even now it is possible for someone to enter the kingdom of

God without being baptized. But how can this be, if God himself has said that it cannot happen? The answer is that it can happen through His absolute power, but not through

His ordained power. That is, that God could have instituted a different requirement to enter the His kingdom, or indeed He could have instituted no requirements at all. We could have a world in which people achieved salvation solely through their own works, or a world in which everyone was saved by God, or a world in which no one was. Each of these is a possible world, and since none of them involves a contradiction, God could have made any one. However, given that God has ordained that no one will enter the kingdom of God without baptism, is no longer possible that this will happen. So, according to God’s ordained power, what He has actually willed to happen, baptism is necessary for salvation. So this case, of someone entering the kingdom of God without being baptized, is possible according to God’s absolute power, but not according to His ordained power.

But what of those cases in which God does in fact act contrary to laws he has already ordained? For Christians do believe that God works miracles, events that violate natural law, which is a law that God himself has ordained and instituted. Should we say that God performs miracles by His absolute power? Not at all, says Ockham. Any miracles that God actually works have been foreknown and preordained by God, and so he does them through His ordained power. Maurer construes this to mean that God’s absolute power is His power considered just as it is in itself, without consideration for His knowledge and will; whereas His ordained power is what he does “as regulated by his

91 knowledge and will.”254 However, I see no warrant in Ockham’s writings for this interpretation. Rather, the distinction seems to be simply between those things that God has ordained He will do (His ordained power), and those things He could have done but has not ordained (His absolute power). God never in fact acts by means of His absolute power. “Potentia absolute is not a sphere of action but of possibility.”255 It is by means of this distinction that Ockham preserves the freedom of God to act in ways contrary to those in which He has acted, to always keep in mind that “God can do that which He does not want to do.”256 Taken in this way it is really no different from the freedom of the human will, which though it has willed in a certain way, nevertheless could have willed differently than it has. A better analogy, however, is with the legitimate legislative body of a nation (although Ockham uses the example of the pope), which could have legislated differently than it has, but now that it has legislated this way rather than that, it must act according to its decrees. For example, the fact that lawmakers could have made the law such that driving on the left side of the street was legal rather than driving on the right side, does not imply that now they can drive on the left side of the street. We recognize that originally the decision was arbitrary, but now that a law has been passed even the lawmakers themselves must obey it.

Why is all of this important to us? It is important because it seems that what is necessarily true can be interpreted as what is beyond even God’s absolute power to change. Ockham, like all Catholic theologians, believed that, as far as salvation is concerned, God had instituted one law (the Mosaic) which prescribed one way to

254 Armand Maurer, 265. 255 William J. Courtenay, Capacity and Voilition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power (Bergamo: Pierluigi Lubrina, 1990), pg. 120. 256 “…multa potest Deus facere quae non vult facere…” William of Ockham, Quodl., OTh IX, pg. 586.

92 salvation, then had changed that law into a new one (the Gospel or Christian law) which had prescribed a different way to salvation. This was brought out nicely in his discussion of whether someone can be saved without baptism (according to the Gospel law). The answer is yes, because people were in fact saved in accordance with the Old Law, before the New Law was established. The question we will have to ask ourselves is this: is a similar change in the law possible also for the purely moral law? Is it within the power of

God to have made, for example, adultery immoral until a certain time, and after that to make adultery not immoral, or even right? If God can do this, it would seem to make the moral law against adultery contingent, not necessary, and so unfit to serve as a premise or a conclusion of a demonstrative syllogism. However, if such a moral law were necessary and so fit to be such a premise or a conclusion, it would seem to that not even God can change it.

A second and deeper question is this: can the necessity of the moral laws be safeguarded if, though God decreed and instituted them, they will not change? Can

God’s ordaining a law give it some type of necessity? Maurer interprets Ockham this way. He denies the view that for Ockham God is a capricious monarch. Rather, he says that the world which God has created “is ruled by physical and moral laws which give it order and rationality, but they are contingent on his freely establishing them. The laws are necessary, though their necessity is not absolute but contingent on the divine will.”257

What sense can we make of a necessity that is dependent upon a free divine will?

Perhaps we can say that while “Adultery is wrong” is not necessary, nevertheless, “If

God has ordained that adultery is wrong, it is wrong” is necessary. This would seem to

257 Maurer, 263-264.

93 be the distinction Ockham draws between absolute and conditional necessity, which we have discussed above. Ockham also discusses it in the second question of his sixth quodlibet. There he is asked whether God necessarily accepts an act elicited by someone who has created grace. His answer depends upon this distinction between absolute and conditional necessity. First, he says that absolute necessity is when something is necessary “without qualification so that it involves a contradiction for its opposite to be true.”258 This includes things like “man is risible” and “God exists.” These are things that, seemingly, not even God could render untrue. Taken in this sense, it is not necessary for God to accept an act performed by someone who has created grace, for He need not accept anyone in this sense. Conditional necessity, however, occurs when “a conditional proposition is necessary even though both the antecedent and the consequent are contingent.”259 Ockham’s example of this type of necessity is “If Peter is predestined,

Peter will be saved.” This is necessary although each part is contingent. Also, Ockham says that the consequence is necessary, not merely the conditional. Taken in this sense, then, it is necessary for God to accept an act performed by someone who has created grace. Why? Because this is necessary: “God has ordained and established through laws already handed down that such an act elicited in this way is to be accepted; therefore,

God accepts such an act once it has been elicited.”260 Obviously, God need not have established and ordained this, so in that sense, His acceptance of such an act is free and not necessary. However, given that He has established such laws, it is necessary that He

258 “…simpliciter necessarium, ita quod eius oppositum esse verum includit contradictionem.” William of Ockham, Quodl., OTh IX, 259 “…aliqua condicionalis est necessaria, quamvis tam antecedens quam consequens sit contingens.” Ibid. 260 “Deus ordinavit et instituit per leges iam datas quod talis actus sic elicitus sit acceptandus, igitur Deus illum actum iam elicitum acceptat…” Ibid.,

94 accept such an act. Now, if conditional necessity can impose some type of necessity on

God Himself, as it seems Ockham is here claiming it does, may it not be the case that a similar conditional necessity will hold for moral laws, and so make them necessary enough to be the premises and conclusions of demonstrative syllogisms? This may be a way to save the necessity of moral principles, and therefore the possibility of a true demonstrative science of morals, even if such principles are freely established by God.

There is one other issue which we should, perhaps, address. This is the connection which Ockham is willing to admit exists between necessity and immutability.

Although in the text from the Summa Logicae Ockham points out that necessary truths are not perpetual and incorruptible things, he never bothers to address the fact that they should be immutable. Probably he thought this goes without saying, and it does. But the question should arise whether any proposition that is immutable is also necessary. After all, it would seem that a proposition that is immutably true would satisfy the criteria which Ockham has laid down for a necessary proposition: it is true and can never be false; if it be formed, it is not false but only true; and it is always true if it is formed by the intellect. If immutable propositions were to count as necessary, it would seem to offer a way of explaining Ockham’s claim that there can be a demonstrative science of morals, even if moral precepts were true only because God has willed them: if God willed them immutably, they would still be necessary in such a way that they could function as premises in demonstrative syllogisms.

Ockham does deal with this issue of immutability and necessity in one place, his

Treatise on Predestination, God’s Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents.261 There it

261 William of Ockham, Praedest., OPh II, 501-539.

95 arises in question II, article IV, where Ockham is considering the objection that God does have necessary knowledge of future contingents. In part one, the specific argument is made: “God knows A immutably; therefore necessarily. Proof of the inference: Necessity is not posited in God except for the necessity that belongs to immutability; therefore whatever is in Him immutably is in Him necessarily.”262 The force of this argument is that, if God does know future contingents necessarily, then this knowledge cannot be changed; and it seems that the things He knows must happen, and so would not really be contingent. It is a threat to human freedom. If God knows immutably “John will do X tomorrow”, and immutability implies necessity, it would seem that tomorrow John will do x necessarily, i.e., not freely. Ockham will clearly want to avoid this consequence.

So how does he argue against it? His response is threefold. He first claims that the proposition “God does have necessary knowledge of future contingents” has two possible meanings. The first is that “God’s knowledge whereby future contingents is known is necessary”263, and this, he says is true. This interpretation seems to be saying merely that, since God is omniscient, necessarily He knows all things, including future contingents. In other words, it seems to turn the proposition in question into what is today termed de dicto264 necessity: Necessarily, God knows future contingents. This is confirmed by the fact that he says that “the divine essence itself is one, single, necessary and immutable cognition of all things, complexes as well as non complexes, necessary and contingent.”265 The second meaning is that “by that knowledge future contingents

262 Ibid., 530. 263 Ibid. 264 For the distinction between de re and de dicto necessity, see Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), 9-43. 265 William of Ockham, Praedest., OPh IV, 530

96 are known necessarily.”266 His meaning here seems to be that, it is not necessary for God to know that John will do X tomorrow, for, if it were necessary, God would ‘know’ it even if John did not in fact do X. And this is clearly false. The force of this counter- argument seems to be to draw a distinction between God’s knowledge of all true future contingents, which is necessary; and His knowledge of a given particular future contingent, which is itself contingent. Necessarily, God knows whether John will do X or

John will not do X, but He does not know either one necessarily.

As interesting as this is, it does not bear directly on what is of interest to us here.

Ockham’s second counterargument, however, is very relevant. His main point is that there is a fallacy of the consequent in the original argument. This is because, although

God’s knowledge is immutable and the future contingent He knows is immutable so that it cannot be first true and afterwards false, this does not mean the future contingent is necessary. This is because, even though A cannot change from truth to falsity, it still can be false and so not known by God. Ockham’s wording seems infelicitous here, but he is saying that, although a proposition about a future contingent event is always true and never false (or always false and never true), still it could have been false (or true). The proposition “George W. Bush will win the 2000 presidential election” was always true, and could not have changed from being true to being false; but it did not have to be true, it was not necessarily true, but only contingently true. This is true “because everything necessary is immutable, but not vice versa, unless one is speaking of those immutable things that are God Himself. For many immutable propositions are known by God,

266 Ibid.

97 which however are not necessary but simply contingent.”267 Necessity implies mutability, but not the other way around. So the fact that a proposition is true and never will be false is insufficient to establish its necessity. In fact, Ockham would seem to be of the opinion that all true propositions about contingent events are immutably true in this way. If John will do X tomorrow, then the proposition “John will do X on a certain date” was always true; and if John will not do X tomorrow, the contrary proposition “John will not do X on a certain date” would have always been true. What is not true, and which

Ockham seems to think of as absurd, is the view that “John will do X on a certain date” was true from eternity until a year before that certain date, and then became false. And this does seem to be an absurd claim. But if such a proposition about the future is true, it would seem to be immutably true. But such a proposition also seems to be obviously and inherently contingent, which implies that immutability is not sufficient to render a proposition necessary.

Before going on to discuss what all of this means for Ockham’s theory of science, perhaps we ought to briefly discuss what Ockham requires for a proposition to be necessarily true. Clearly, necessary propositions are propositions whose truth is necessary, so we should understand what this requires. For this we must turn to the second chapter of the second part of the Summa Logicae, entitled “What is required for the truth of a proposition which is singular and de inesse.” As we’d expect, Ockham is especially concerned to deny any ‘realist’ interpretation of the truth of a proposition. He explicitly denies that a singular non-modal proposition is true because “the subject and

267 “…quia omne necessarium est immutabile, et non e converso, nisi loquendo de illis immutabilibus quae sunt ipse Deus. Multa enim complexa sciuntur a Deo immutabilia, quae tamen non sunt necessaria sed simpliciter contingentia.” Ibid., 530.

98 the predicate are really identical, or that the predicate be in the subject in reality or really inhere in the subject, or that it is united with the subject in reality outside the mind….”268

No, he tells us, it “is sufficient and required that the subject and the predicate supposit for the same thing.”269 He gives the example “this is an angel”. For this to be true, it is only required that ‘this’ and ‘angel’ stand for the same thing. Extrapolating from this, we can say that for a proposition to be necessarily true, it is required that, if the proposition be formed, the subject and the predicate cannot fail to supposit for the same thing.

But what does this mean exactly? And how can we know if this holds? One attractive option offered by Damascene Webering is that the contradictory opposite of a necessary proposition involves a contradiction. He claims that Ockham himself points to this in his second question of the Prologue to the Sentences, when he uses the principle

“that which is known necessarily to inhere in some subject, so that its opposite includes a contradiction”270 as the premise of an argument. Webering claims that this puts Ockham very close to modern logicians who claim that a necessary proposition is one the contradictory of which can be demonstrated to include a contradiction in a finite number of steps. And he claims that here Ockham is perfectly justified in claiming that all necessary propositions (other than those whose subject is God) are conditional; and that in this he is close to Aristotle’s views on propositions that hold de omni.271

268 “…subiectum et praedicatum sint idem realiter, nec quod praedicatum ex parte rei sit in subiecto vel insit realiter subiecto, nec quod uniatur a parte rei extra animam ipsi subiecto…” William of Ockham, OPh I, SL, 249. 269 “…sufficit et requiritur quod subiectum et praedicatum supponant pro eodem.” Ibid., 250. 270 “Illud quod scitur necessario inesse alicui subiecto, ita quod oppositum includit contradictionem…” Damascene Webering, Theory of Demonstration According to William Ockham (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1953), 39. 271 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 7.

99

But we must be careful before accepting this explanation. First of all, the text which Webering quotes appears not in the second but in the third question of Ockham’s

Prologue to the Sentences, although this discrepancy may be due merely to the fact that the critical edition had not yet appeared when Webering was writing. Far more important is the fact that the line is not used to express Ockham’s view, but is the first premise in an argument in support of a position put forward by John of Reading, an opinion which

Ockham argues against! The third question in the Prologue is “Whether an attribute knowable of anything by knowledge strictly so-called differs from the thing in reality?”

Ockham considers the opinion of John of Reading, which is that “every attribute is really the same as its subject.”272 In support of this, Ockham offers this argument from

Reading:

“that which is known to be necessarily in its subject, so that the opposite includes a contradiction, is really the same as its subject; but in demonstration without qualification the predicate, which is an attribute, is necessarily known to be in its subject necessarily; therefore, such an attribute is not really distinguished from its subject.”273

This seems clear enough. It would seem to make any demonstration a mere begging of the question. How can one demonstrate that an attribute belongs to the subject if it cannot in principle be distinguished from the subject? Or, how can the conclusion of such a demonstration be dubitable, if the attribute and its subject are identical? There are three ways of getting around this which Ockham ascribes to Reading and to those who agree with him. The first is the formal distinction of Scotus; the second, a distinction of

272 “…passio quaecumque est eadem realiter cum subiecto.” William of Ockham, Sent., OTh I, 130. 273 “…illud quod scitur necessario inesse alicui subiecto, ita quod oppositum includit contradictionem, est realiter idem cum illo subiecto; sed in demonstratione simpliciter necessaria scitur praedicatum, quod est passio, necessario inesse subiecto; igitur talis passio non distinguitur realiter a subiecto.” Ibid.

100 reason, or a distinction “only through the understanding”274; and the third, the divine essence “causes in the intellect a quidditative concept of it proportioned to the intellect.”275 This last case reminds us forcefully that we are here dealing specifically with questions of our scientific knowledge of God. As one would expect, Ockham denies all three of these, but the details of this denial are not our main concern here.

What is of interest to us is, however, how he deals with the argument put forth in the first place to justify this position. First, his response is to draw a distinction between an attribute that is really in a subject and one that is merely predicated of the subject. If the attribute is another reality distinct from the subject, it “can be separated from the subject and therefore is not necessarily in the subject.”276 However, taking attribute in another way, it is not the same as the subject, because it is not a reality at all. It is merely a concept. And “so it is not demonstrated to be in the subject really but it is only demonstrated that it is predicated of the subject, not standing for itself but for a reality.”277 And he says that this is possible whether or not the attribute conceived in the first way, as a reality distinct from the subject, really inheres in the subject. But, he says,

“this will not be through a proposition purely about the present, but a proposition about the possible or one equivalent to a proposition about the possible.”278 Finally, he concedes that whenever an “attribute conveys another reality suited to inhere in the subject, that no proposition purely about inherence or about the present is necessary

274 “…tantum per intellectum…” ibid. 275 “…causare in intellectu sibi proportionato conceptum suum quidditativum…” Ibid., 131. 276 “…potest separari a subiecto, et ideo non necessario inest subiecto.” Ibid., 136. 277 “…ita non demonstratur inesse subiecto realiter sed tantum demonstratur praedicari de subiecto, non pro se sed pro re.” Ibid. 278 :…hoc non erit per propositionem pure de praesenti sed per propositionem de possibili vel aequivalentem propositioni de possibili.” Ibid., 137.

101 without qualification.”279 Again, we have a rather strong claim that any truly necessary proposition must be about possible things, not categorically about the present.

Next Ockham turns his attention to the argument itself. He says that a distinction must be made regarding the term “to be in” (inesse) in the first premise. If it means that one thing really inheres in another, as an accident is in its subject or a form is in matter, it is false by false implication. He seems to mean that, if the subject and the attribute are really the same, then the one cannot really be in the other, for in that case something would really be in itself, which, he says, is a contradiction. On the other hand, if “to be in” means to be predicated, he says that the proposition is true, but in that case the minor is false, “because in that way an attribute is never necessarily in its subject.”280 What can this mean? Ockham considers the example, “Every human being is capable of laughter”.

If, he says, each term supposits for itself, it would be saying that one concept (“capable of laughter”) is another concept (“human being”), which is impossible. On the other hand, if each supposits for a reality, then he says the minor is true but the major false “because then it is not necessary that that which is predicated necessarily of something be the same either really or formally.”281 This ends his response to Reading’s position.

But then, what is required so that the conclusion of a demonstration be necessary?

Ockham considers the supporting argument offered by Reading, that “what is naturally prior to another can be without the other without contradiction.”282 Ockham says that, while this is true of things outside of the soul, it is of no importance here. That is because

279 “…quandocumque passio importat aliam rem natam inhaerere subiecto quod nulla propositio pure de inesse et de praesenti est simpliciter necessaria.” Ibid. 280 “…quia illo modo numquam passio inest necessario subiecto.” Ibid. 281 “…quia tunc non oportet quod illud quod praedicatur necessario de aliquo sit idem realiter nec formaliter.” Ibid., 138. 282 “…prius naturaliter alio potest esse sine eo absque contradictione…” Ibid.

102 we are dealing with predicating an attribute of a subject in a proposition. Propositions are made up of concepts, not physical things. Therefore, whether a substance can be without its accident is one thing; whether the sentence predicating this attribute of a subject can be false is another. And he says once again that “it suffices for the conclusion of a demonstration, with other conditions, that the conclusion be necessary, so that in no way can it be false, but if the proposition exists, it is necessarily true. Whether or not the subject can be without the predicate, or vice versa, is not to the point.”283 So it seems that the necessity of a proposition is based merely on the fact that it cannot be false. And it seems that whether reality is necessarily as the proposition claims it to be is beside the point. Necessary propositions for Ockham seem to depend upon concepts only, not realities outside of the soul.

Why would Ockham assert this? The reason has to do with what kinds of propositions he asserts can be necessary and thus a part of a scientific demonstration. Just before this discussion he had asserted his belief that no proposition that is merely about the present and about inherence can be necessary simpliciter. Rather, only a proposition about the possible can be necessary in the relevant sense. So, he gives the examples of

“Every human being can laugh,” and “the moon can be eclipsed,” which, he says, “are always true, whether the realities are in actuality or not.”284 In other words, it does not matter if the subject of a necessary proposition exists or not285, the proposition can be necessarily true nonetheless.

283 “…ad conclusionem demonstrationis sufficit, cum aliis condicionibus, quod illa conclusio sit necessaria, ita quod nullo modo possit esse falsa, sed si propositio sit, quod ipsa sit necessario vera. Sive autem subiectum possit esse sine praedicato vel e converso sive non, nihil est ad propositum” Ibid. 284 “…quae semper verae sunt, sive res sint in actu sive non.” Ibid, 137. 285 Actually, it would be more accurate to say that it doesn’t matter if the subject term supposits for something actually existing, but since Ockham himself is often not careful about spelling this out we needn’t concern ourselves with it either.

103

What is interesting here is the suggestion, never spelled out by Ockham, that necessary propositions would be true or false even if no world ever existed. Even if God had created nothing, He would still know that every man can laugh, and the moon can be eclipsed. This may seem an obvious point but it is important for the question of the possibility of moral science because it is quite clear that for Ockham, moral precepts would have to be necessary in some way in order to function as premises of demonstrative syllogisms; and based upon what he has said in other places it would seem that these necessary moral precepts would have to be true even if nothing other than God existed at all. In other words, it would seem to be the case that not even God can make them false, or cause them not to obtain. The difficult question we will have to face will be: how can this need to be necessary be reconciled with Ockham’s claims that good and bad seem to depend upon the command of God alone?

Chapter 4. Can There Be a Demonstrative Science of Morals?

Now that we have seen what Ockham considers necessary to have a demonstrative science of anything, we are in a position to evaluate his claims that there can be a demonstrative science of morals. The crux of this issue will depend upon whether we can construe any moral principles as necessary propositions, such that they can be the premises of a demonstrative syllogism. Clearly, based upon what has been said so far, there must be moral principles which are necessarily true. This means that they must be true whenever they are formed, and can never be false. So, we must ask if there are any moral principles that can satisfy this criterion.

Let us review Ockham’s explicit discussions of moral science. There are three main places in which Ockham discusses this topic, in his question de Connexione

Virtutum, in his question Circa Virtutes et Vitium, and in the 14th question of his second

Quodlibet. In the first two of these discussions, Ockham is concerned to contrast moral science with prudence. In de Connexione Virtutum he distinguishes 4 types of prudence, the first of which he calls moral science. This moral science is described in two ways. In the first way, it refers to “evident knowledge of some universal proposition which is evidently known through teaching because it proceeds from self-evident principles.”286

He says that this is moral science “properly speaking.”287 This describes a knowledge of propositions which is arrived at through a process of reasoning from self-evident (per se notae) propositions. The second type of moral science is evident knowledge of universal propositions which “are known only through experience.”288

286 William of Ockham, OTh VIII, Connex., 330. 287 Ibid. 288 “…solum evidenter cognoscitur per experientiam …” Ibid. 104

105

His discussion of moral science in circa virtutes et vitium is very similar. There

Ockham also distinguishes two types of moral science. The first is “every scientific knowledge which can be had evidently through teaching,”289 and that “this proceeds from self-evident principles.”290 The second type of moral science is of “evident scientific knowledge which is had and can be had only through experience and in no way can be known evidently through teaching.”291 So once again we have the distinction between propositions known through reasoning from self-evident principles, and propositions that are known and can be known only through experience. It is interesting that Ockham makes this distinction so consistently, and so vehemently. It would appear that there can be a true science of morals that depends upon merely empirical principles instead of only through self-evident principles. Perhaps the moral science gained through empirically known principles has a certain lesser dignity than that gained through reasoning from self-evident principles, but it is true moral science all the same.

In either case, moral science properly speaking is contrasted with prudence properly speaking. The main distinction between moral science and prudence lies in this, that prudence is concerned with singulars, whereas moral science is always about universals.292

Ockham’s third major discussion of moral science is in his second quodlibetal question, and there the topic is solely “Whether there can be a demonstrative science of morals.” Unlike in the other two discussions, here Ockham is not concerned to

289 “pro omni notitia scientifica quae evidenter haberi potest per doctrinam .” William of Ockham, OTh VIII, CVV, 281. 290 “…haec procedit ex principiis per se notis…” Ibid. 291 “…notitia scientifica evidenti quae solum habetur et haberi potest per experimentum et nullo modo evidenter per doctrinam.” Ibid., 281-282. 292 “…prudentia est circa singularia, alia circa universalis.” Ibid., 282-283.

106 distinguish moral science from prudence. Here he is concerned only with moral science itself. He distinguishes positive from non-positive moral science. Positive moral science

“contains human and divine laws which obligate that some things be done or avoided which are neither good nor bad except because they have been prohibited or commanded by a superior to whom it belongs to make laws.”293 Non-positive moral science is “that which directs human acts without any command of a superior.”294 After pointing out that positive moral science is not demonstrative because it depends upon positive human laws

“which are not evidently known propositions”295, he goes on to claim that non-positive moral science is demonstrative. His proof is this: “knowledge of conclusions deduced syllogistically from self-evident principles or known through experience is demonstrative; moral teaching is like this; therefore, etc.”296

We noticed in the first chapter297 that while non-positive moral science is said to include both human and divine positive laws, the reason given for its non-demonstrative character is that human laws are not evidently known principles; but no mention is made of positive divine laws. So, does Ockham think that knowledge of positive divine laws can be demonstrative? This seems unlikely. Certainly, it cannot be for the reason given, because divine laws are not based upon human laws at all. But Ockham’s distinction between the positive and non-positive moral sciences as between one that is concerned with obligations that derive only from the command of a superior and another that directs

293 “…continet leges humanas et divinas, quae obligant ad prosequendum vel fugiendum illa quae nec sunt bona nec mala nisi quia sunt prohibita vel imperata a superiore, cuius est leges statuere.” William of Ockham, OTh IX, QQ, 177. 294 “…illa quae sine omni praecepto superioris dirigit actus humanos…” Ibid. 295 “…leges humanas positivas, quae non accipiunt propositiones evidenter notas.” Ibid. 296 “…quia notitia deducens conclusiones syllogistice ex principiis per se notis vel per experimentum scitis est demonstrative; huiusmodi est disciplina morals; igitur etc.” Ibid. 297 Supra, pg. 6.

107 human acts “apart from any command of a superior” seems to eliminate the possibility that merely positive divine laws can be the subjects of demonstrative moral science. The command of a superior that obligates me to do or avoid something that is not good or bad in itself is certainly not the kind of thing that I can know as the conclusion of self-evident principles. Of course, I could know that such a command were issued by experience, i.e.,

I hear the command directly or read it; but the question can be asked whether a command known by such experience can have the requisite necessity to ground a demonstration.

This text is thus a serious obstacle to any view of Ockham’s moral theory that sees it as a thoroughgoing divine command theory. Ockham clearly thinks, at least at this point in his career, that there are principles and conclusions deduced from them that direct our acts apart from any command of any superior. Thus, Osborne’s view298, that

Ockham maintains that something is right or wrong only because of God’s commands, cannot be supported by the evidence of this text. It is interesting that in his entire article

Osborne never addresses the part of the text that claims non-positive moral science directs human acts “apart from any command of a superior”, presumably because it cannot be integrated into his overall argument that it is only God’s commands that make something right or wrong and nothing else, not even right reason, does. Of course, it might be argued that Ockham is not entitled to this position, but it is simply untrue that

Ockham believes that only a divine command can make an action right or wrong, or direct human acts.

Similarly, Philotheus Boehner suggested that Ockham knew only “one invariable norm of Ethics, viz., the obligation to obey the will of God or to love God. For the rest,

298 Thomas M. Osborne, “Ockham as a divine-command theorist,” Religious Studies 41 (2005), 1-22.

108 ethical norms are commanded by the will of God and have to be obeyed in virtue of the general and absolute ethical norm.”299 Boehner does not argue further for this view; and because it is in the context of a review of another work, perhaps there was no reason for him to argue for it. But there is no discussion of what is the basis of this one invariable ethical norm: is it self-evident or known through experience?

Lucan Freppert attempts to solve this riddle by drawing a distinction between a

“purely positive decree of God”300 and the “natural, non-positive, commands of God.”301

He seems to want to base this distinction upon the absolute power of God and the ordained power of God. On this reading, what right reason discovers would be the ordinary moral principles willed by the ordained power of God in the natural order, whereas any divine commands which are contrary to the normal moral order would be issued by the absolute power of God and would be known only by revelation. Now, it is certain that Ockham does believe that there are divine commands which are purely positive, for he mentions them in Quodlibet 2.14 as part of the content of positive moral science. It is also quite plausible to suppose that he also believes that principles of non- positive moral science are also commanded by God in some way. But there is no reason to suppose that such a distinction between positive and non-positive divine commands could be based upon the distinction between God’s absolute and His ordained power. For this would suppose that these are two separate powers in God, and that He does some things with one power and other things through the other; but Ockham vigorously denies this. He claims that to say that God does some things through His absolute power rather

299 Philotheus Boehner, “A Recent Presentation of Ockham’s Philosophy,” in Collected Articles on Ockham, 153. 300 Lucan Freppert, The Basis of Morality According to William Ockham, 178. 301 Lucan Freppert, 179.

109 than through His ordained power would be to say that He does some things inordinately, which is false. Rather, the distinction between God’s ordained power and His absolute power is the difference between those things He has done and those things He has not done but could have done.302 In the moral sphere, it would be the difference between those commands He has issued and those He has not but could have issued. However we distinguish those divine commands that are merely positive and those that might be non- positive, it cannot be based upon the distinction between God’s absolute and His ordained power.

Marilyn McCord Adams, on the other hand, attempts to cast the distinction as one between the category of morals and the category of merit. She maintains that “the authority of divine commands within the sphere of non-positive morality does rest on that of right reason, whereas in the category of merit/demerit divine commands are fundamental.”303 This would confine the authority of purely positive divine commands wholly within the realm of salvation. However, while it is true that Ockham consistently maintains that an act is meritorious simply because God accepts it, it is not clear that he consistently draws a distinction between morals and merit. He often uses terms derived from merit for moral claims. In a later work, Adams seems to abandon this line of argument, instead maintaining that, while divine precepts and right reason are independent criteria of good acts, “it is enough for the coherence of moral theory if the two criteria for morally virtuous action, right reason and divine precepts, in fact yield extensionally equivalent results.”304 This would give us two moral sciences, one based on

302 William of Ockham, OTh IX, QQ, 585. 303 Marilyn McCord Adams, “The Structure of Ockham’s Moral Theory,” 32. Italics in original. 304 Marilyn McCord Adams, “Ockham on Will, Nature, and Morality”, 266.

110 right reason, the other on divine precepts. But this is a rather extreme solution to the puzzle. While Ockham does claim that Christians have a motivation for behaving morally that pagans do not, i.e., for the love of God, he nowhere claims that this means that there are two different sciences of morals, or, indeed, that what is known to be morally right by pagans and what is known to be morally right by Christians differ in any case.

Before we consider just what kinds of propositions can be the conclusions of moral science, or put another way, what kinds of actions can be directed by moral science, we should look at the kinds of propositions that can be the premises of moral arguments. As we have seen, Ockham consistently maintains that such propositions are of two types, those that can be known through teaching, and those that can be known only through experience. We should look at Ockham’s examples of these types of principles.

Let us start with self-evident (per se nota) propositions. In each of his discussions of moral science, Ockham gives one or two examples of self-evident propositions, and he also gives examples of such sporadically throughout his works. Here are the examples he gives in the main discussions of moral science we have examined: “every benefactor should be treated well.”305 “The will should conform itself to right reason”306, “every vituperatively bad thing should be avoided.”307 These are the examples Ockham gives when he is trying to make a case for a demonstrative science of morals based upon self- evident principles that can be known apart from any experience.308 He also gives examples of such propositions in other places. One of the most interesting for our

305 “omni benefactori est benefaciendum,” William of Ockham, OTh VIII, Connex., 330.The same example is given in Circa Virtutes et Vitia, William of Ockham, OTh VIII, CVV, 281. 306 “…voluntas debet se conformare rectae rationi…” William of Ockham, OTh IX, QQ, 178. 307 “…omne malum vituperabile est fugiendum…” Ibid. 308 It is important to keep this distinction between what can be known through experience and what can be known through experience alone. Elsewhere Ockham is perfectly willing to admit that the same proposition could be known through multiple sources, such as experience and through syllogistic reasoning.

111 purposes is: “no one should be induced to do something against the command of his

God.”309 Now, although this proposition occurs in a discussion of the wickedness of fallen angels tempting men, it would surely allow us to conclude that for Ockham it is also self-evidently true that “no one should act against a divine command.” So far as I know, this is the only place in Ockham’s writings in which he explicitly states that to follow divine commands is a self-evident principle. He does say that “…everything that pleases God should be done…”310 but he does not tell us whether this major premise is self-evident or can be evidently known only through experience, or perhaps through faith alone.

There are a couple of places in his works, however, in which Ockham says that the duty to obey God follows upon our having knowledge of Him. In the forty-eighth distinction of his Ordinatio, Ockham addresses the question of “Whether any created will is obligated to conform itself to the divine will?”311 After drawing some distinctions regarding what it means for a will to conform itself to another will, Ockham answers the main question. First, he affirms that “every created will either in this life or in heaven is obligated to conform itself habitually mediately to the divine will.”312 This is a habit, and the habit in question is “some such habit by which the will is pleased by everything which pleases the divine will, and this [habit] should always be in everyone having the use of reason after he attains or could attain a cognition of God. However, this habit does not incline immediately to do everything willed by God. For it is necessary to presuppose

309 “…nullus est inducendus ad faciendum contra praeceptum Dei sui…” William of Ockham, OTh VIII, Connex., 366. 310 “…onme quod placet Deo (est fuciendum)…” William of Ockham, OTh VIII, Connex., 365. 311 “Utrum quaelibet voluntas create teneatur se conformare divinae voluntati.” William of Ockham, OTh. IV, 686-691. 312 “…quaelibet voluntas create quae est in statu viae vel patriae, tenetur se conformare habitualiter mediate voluntati divinae…”Ibid, 687-688.

112 a cognition by which it is known what is willed by God, and so it inclines the will to act through this cognition.”313 So every created will is indeed obligated to conform itself to

God’s will, after it has a knowledge of God and that God has willed something. But the created will is not obligated to obey everything commanded by God, “because it is not obligated to know that this is willed by God, and consequently it is not obligated to will it habitually and immediately.”314 So, we are obligated to obey every divine command we know about, but we are not obligated to know everything commanded by God.

But this is not all. Ockham draws out some implications for what it means to follow God’s will. Not only are we not obligated to conform our wills to what God has willed if we do not know He has willed it, we are also “not obligated at all times to obey affirmative divine precepts.”315 This is because an affirmative precept commands us to do something specific, so that if we were always obligated to obey such a precept, we would be sinning whenever we were not doing it. So, we are commanded to worship God by attending Mass, for example; but if this command obligated us at all times, we would be violating it whenever we were not at Mass -- while we were sleeping, for example. It would be ridiculous if we were always sinning whenever we were not praying, or helping others, or any such thing. However, negative divine commands, such as “Do not kill”, do hold always and everywhere. Ockham also points out that, among things commanded by

313 “…aliquis talis quo complacet voluntati omne quod placet divinae voluntati, qui debet esse semper in omni habente usum rationis postquam ad aliqualem Dei cognitionem attingerit vel potuit attingere. Iste autem habitus non inclinat immediate ad omne volitum a Deo. Nam oportet praesupponere cognitionem qua sciatur hac esse volitum a Deo, et mediante illa inclinat ad actum.” Ibid., 688. 314 “…quia non tenetur scire illud esse volitum a Deo, et per consequens non tenetur velle illud habitualiter immediate.” Ibid., 689. 315 “…non tenetur semper implere pracepta divina affirmative.” Ibid.

113

God, some things are precepts or commands, others are merely counsels. We are obligated to obey the first, but not the second.316

Now let us turn to those examples of propositions that Ockham says can be known only through experience. In de connexione virtutum he gives the following example: “any irascible person should be mollified with beautiful words.”317 In Circa virtutes et vitia, he gives the similar: “any irascible person on such an occasion should be mollified and calmed with beautiful words.”318 Presumably this can be known evidently only through experience because prior to any experience we would have no way of knowing whether beautiful words would have a calming effect. This is likely an application of Ockham’s view that no causal relations are self-evident, but can be known only through experience. In question 14 of his second Quodlibet, however, Ockham refrains from giving an example of a principle known only through experience, but he claims that there are “many such principles, as is manifestly clear to someone who follows experience.”319 He also gives other examples of such principles; one of the most fascinating for our purposes is this: “…God should be loved because of the delight we have in Him which is greater than we have in other things.”320 He goes on to say that this is an example of a proposition that cannot “be evidently and scientifically known through self-evident propositions.…”321 Furthermore, he adds that it cannot be known through

316 "…si sit praeceptum et ita volitum a Deo voluntate signi, tenetur se voluntas conformare. Si autem sit volitum voluntate signi quia est consilium divinum, non tenetur.” William of Ockham, OTh VIII, Connex., 688. 317 “…quilibet iracundus per pulchra verba est leniendues.” Ibid., 330. 318 “…quilibet iracundus ex tali occasione est per pulchra verba leniendus et mitigandus…” William of Ockham, OTh VIII, CVV, 282. 319 “…per experimentum sciuntur multa principia, sicut manifeste patet sequenti experientiam.” William of Ockham, OTh IX, QQ, 178. 320 “…Deus sit diligendus propter delectionem quae habetur in eo plus quam in aliqua alia re…” Ibid., 373. 321 “…non possunt evidenter sciri per experientam per se notas..” Ibid.

114 other men’s experience. So, we cannot know it on faith either! The more general reason seems to be in this case, however, that the results of virtuous acts in general can be known evidently only from performing such acts. I can know that I derive greater joy from loving God than temporal things only by actually loving God. Similarly, I can know that performing acts of courage inclines me to further acts of courage only by so acting.

The interesting implication here is that the value of the different virtues, and the means for achieving them, cannot be known from self-evident principles, but only from practicing the virtues. Only by being courageous, temperate, or just can I understand the value of being courageous, temperate, or just. Similarly, we likely cannot understand the benefits of faith, hope, and charity except by actually possessing those theological virtues. Thus, we can safely say that the subject matter of the particular virtues will not be knowable through self-evident propositions, though they can be known through experience.

Having seen what kinds of propositions can serve as the principles of demonstrations in moral science, we should consider another limitation on what kinds of actions can be the subject matter of such demonstrations. Probably the most important such limitation is Ockham’s view on contingently versus necessarily virtuous acts, and his resulting claim that only an act of the will can be necessarily virtuous. Ockham discusses this most fully in his Quodlibetal Questions, especially the fourteenth question of his third Quodlibet. There Ockham explicitly tells us that an act of the will is necessarily and intrinsically virtuous; furthermore, he tells us that only an act of the will can be necessarily and intrinsically virtuous. First, he argues that there must be some act that is necessarily and intrinsically virtuous. For if no act were necessarily and

115 intrinsically virtuous, that is, if no act were virtuous in itself and not because of its relation to another act, then no act at all could be virtuous. For if an act is contingently virtuous, which he takes to mean that it can be either virtuous or not through its conformity to another act, that act is virtuous only if it is in conformity with a necessarily virtuous act, that is, an act that is virtuous is such a way that it cannot be vicious. But obviously, not every act can be contingently virtuous in this way, or there would be no virtuous acts at all. Therefore, there must be some necessarily virtuous act. But only an act of the will can be necessarily virtuous in this way.322 This is based upon Ockham’s claim that any exterior act can be virtuous or vicious depending upon whether it is elicited in conformity with either a good intention or an evil intention. His favorite example of this is going to church: if one does it to praise God, then it is a virtuous act; if one does it out of vainglory, then it is a vicious act, either pride or hypocrisy.

Finally, the fourth conclusion of this question says that “only a habit of the will is intrinsically and necessarily virtuous.”323 This is because every other habit inclines us to acts that are indifferently praiseworthy or blameworthy. But it seems that a habit of the will – the habit of loving God or obeying right reason, for example – is such that it inclines us only to necessarily virtuous acts.

From the foregoing, we can draw an important conclusion about the subject of any demonstrative moral science: insofar as it addresses specific acts at all, it can only be about interior acts of the will. Every exterior act, whether going to church, or helping others, or any other ‘good’ act, is good and virtuous only insofar as it is elicited in

322 “Praeterea, solus actus voluntatis est intrinsece laudibilis et vituperabilis.” William of Ockham, OTh IX, QQ, 256. 323 “…solus habitus voluntatis est intrinsece et necessario virtuosus…” Ibid., 257l.

116 conformity with a good intention. Furthermore, we can also say that even acts normally thought of as archetypically evil – killing, stealing, lying – can also be good if done with a good intention. Only a necessarily virtuous act can be commanded by moral science, and only a necessarily vicious act can be categorically forbidden by it.

Thus, a command like ‘Do not steal!” cannot be the necessary conclusion of a demonstrative syllogism in moral science; for if it were, it would be necessarily vicious regardless of the intention of the will in conformity with which it was elicited. In fact, it is quite clear from Ockham’s writings that he does not consider the prohibition against stealing to be necessarily wrong, or wrong in such a way that it can never be done virtuously. In the most famous text in his Commentary on the Sentences which is used to established that his ethics is based upon divine commands, Ockham explicitly says that

“hatred, theft, adultery, and similar things have bad circumstances attached to them under the current law, insofar as they are done by someone who is obligated by a divine precept to do the contrary.”324 Also, not only could “everything absolute in these acts”325 be done by God without any bad circumstances, but “they could even be done meritoriously by a wayfarer if they were to fall under the divine precept, just as now in fact the opposites of them fall under the precept.”326 He does, however, point out that if they were to fall under the divine precept, then “they would not be called theft, adultery, etc.”327 That is because, as Aristotle points out, these names name acts that are always wrong. Ockham here is not denying this; but he is denying that the bare physical acts they describe are always wrong.

324 “…odire, furari, adulterari et similia habeant malam circumstantiam annexam de communi lege, quatenus fiunt ab aliquot qui ex praecepto divino obligantur ad contrarium…” William of Ockham, OTh V, Sent., 352. 325 “…omne absolutum in illis actibus possunt fieri a Deo…” Ibid. 326 “…etiam meritorie possunt fieri a viatore si caderent sub praecepto divino, sicut nunc de facto eorum opposite cadunt sub praecepto.” Ibid. 327 “…tunc non nominaretur furtum, adulterari, etc.” Ibid., 353.

117

Thus, the act of hating God is always wrong if done freely by a creature, but not if God overrides that creature’s will and causes the hatred himself. This is important for

Ockham’s answer to the question asked, which is whether a fallen angel is always committing a bad act?328 In other words, are the fallen angels always in an act of hating

God, or could they repent? Ockham’s solution to this question is to claim that the fallen angels will never repent because God Himself is eternally causing an act of hating God in the wills of the fallen angels. There is an objection to this, based upon Aristotle’s claim that the names of certain acts indicate that they are inherently wrong or base, and so such acts cannot be done rightly.329 But, the objection says, hatred is one of these things, so “it cannot be caused by God alone.”330 So the question being asked is, how is it that God can do something that would always be wrong if a human were to do it? Thus, Ockham never really discusses a question much of the older secondary literature accuses him of asking, whether God could command a creature to hate Him. While he does say that any such act could be done meritoriously if it were commanded by God, he never directly addresses the question here of whether such a command could be issued by God, or whether it would be a contradiction for God to issue such a command.331 It is simply not germane to the question he is addressing, which is whether it is wrong for God Himself to cause such an act in the will of a creature.

The only text in which Ockham explicitly claims that God could issue a command to hate Him and that it would obligatory for someone to obey it is in the sixteenth

328 “Utrum angelus malus semper sit in actu malo?” Ibid., 338. 329 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. II, ch 7., 1107a9-26. 330 “…non potest causari a solo Deo.” William of Ockham, OTh V, Sent., 347. 331 Ockham does address the question of whether God could command someone to not love Him in his Quodlibetal Questions, but that is clearly not the same question. But some commentators have tended to conflate these two questions; see, for example, Linwood Urban, “William of Ockham’s Theological Ethics”, Franciscan Studies 33 (1973). 344/

118 question of Book IV of his Commentary on the Sentences. Here, it is true, Ockham says quite directly:

Futhermore, every will can conform itself to a divine command. But God can command that a created will hate Him. Therefore, the created will can do this. Furthermore, everything which can be a righteous act on earth can be so in heaven. But to hate God can be a righteous act on earth, if it were commanded by God. Therefore, it can be just in heaven.332

Clearly, here Ockham is willing to say that God can command a created will to hate Him, and that such an act of hatred by the created will would be righteous, even in heaven.

But, before we allow this one text to carry the entire argument, we should notice that

Ockham presents this case as a mere possibility; he does not argue for it, neither for the possibility that God could issue such a command, nor that the created will could obey it.

This makes a marked contrast with how he discusses the question of whether God could issue a command that he not be loved in Quodlibetal Questiones 3.14. Also, we should be aware of the context in which he says this. The subject of this question in the Reportatio, is “whether the blessed will necessarily enjoys God?”333 This text appears in the third section of this question, which asks “whether an act of enjoyment is necessarily elicited by the will?”334 So, all that Ockham is trying to establish here is that the blessed in heaven do not necessarily love and enjoy God, because for him if this were necessary, then not even God could stop it, which Ockham thinks is clearly false. So, what is vital here is that the wills of the blessed could hate God, if it were commanded by Him that they do so, much like his concession in the question previously discussed. In neither case

332 “Praeterea, omnis voluntas create potest se conformare praecepto divino. Sed Deus potest praecipere quod voluntas create odiat eum, igitur voluntas create potest hoc facere. Praeterea, omne quod potest esse actus rectus in via, et in patria. Sed odire Deum potest esse actus rectus in via, puta si praecipiatur a Deo, igitur in patria.” William of Ockham, OTh VII, Sent., 352. 333 “Quearo utrum voluntas beata necessario fruatur Deo.” William of Ockham, OTh VII, Sent., 340. 334 “Utrum fruition necessario eliciatur a voluntate?” Ibid., 350.

119 can it be said that Ockham has seriously considered the possibility that God could issue such a command, nor whether such a command in fact could be obeyed. Such extreme cases in Ockham’s writings are not substantive discussions of ethics, but are instead ways for him to evaluate the absolute necessity of certain theological claims. As we shall see later, Ockham is also quite certain that God will never change the commands and counsels He has already given regarding morals and salvation; we shall have to consider if this is enough necessity for a moral science.

Earlier in the Sentences Commentary Ockham had even more directly addressed this question. In the 47th distinction of Book 1 of his commentary on the Sentences,

Ockham directly addresses the question, “Whether God can command that evil be done?”335 There the argument for the positive answer is: “Since God commanded the sons of Israel to steal from the Egyptians; therefore, He commanded theft; but theft is evil; therefore, He commanded evil.”336 To answer this objection, Ockham draws on

Aristotle’s claim that not everything just is done justly. For if someone were to do a just thing but for the wrong reasons, it is not properly speaking a just act. Ockham therefore claims that “For an act to be evil is nothing other than that it is done by someone with a bad will, and for an act to be good is nothing other than that it is done by someone with a good will.”337 But, Ockham goes on, God cannot be said to do evil or to will anything with a bad will, “for then God would be doing something or willing something the opposite of which He is obligated to do or to will, which is completely absurd.”338 Thus,

335 “Utrum Deus possit praecipere malum fieri” William of Ockham, OTh IV., 680. 336 “Quia Deus praecepit filiis Israel spoliare Aegyptios; igitur praecepit furtum; sed furtum est malum, igitur praecepit malum.” Ibid. 337 “Quia actum esse malum non est aliud quam fieri ab aliquo male, et actum esse bonum non est aliud quam fieri ab aliquo bene.” Ibid., 683-684. 338 “…quia tunc Deus faceret aliquid vel vellet, cuius oppositum teneretur vel velle, quod est omnino absurdum.” Ibid., 684.

120

God cannot be obligated to will or to do anything; therefore, He cannot will or do something which He is obligated not to do; therefore, He cannot do or will something wrongly. Nor can God command something that is wrong; whatever He commands is right. Thus, in the answer to the original argument concerning the command to the

Israelites to take the Egyptians’ goods, Ockham says that “God commanding the theft of the Egyptians’ goods did not command evil, nor did the sons of Israel sin in taking the goods, except for those who took the goods with a bad intention, not precisely obeying the divine command.”339 Thus taking another’s goods is just if done in obedience to a divine command. But it is still wrong if done out of covetousness or some other bad motive rather than precisely because it is commanded by God. Thus, even obeying a divine command is not enough to guarantee that one is acting righteously; one must also be acting from a good reason, although Ockham does not use that term here.

In his later political works, Ockham will give us another situation in which it is permissible to take another’s goods without their permission, in the case of extreme necessity. “In a time of extreme necessity, it is licit to use goods against the will of the owner.”340 It seems that such necessity can make what would ordinarily be a wrong action, taking another’s goods, a right action. So long as I do it with a good will and for a right reason, it seems, the action is right. And we can assume that even in this case

Ockham would claim that such use of another’s goods would not properly be called

“theft” or “stealing”, at least insofar as those words connote that the action is wrong or wrongly done.

339 “…Deus preacipiendo spoliare Aegyptios non praecepit malum, nec filii Israel peccaverunt in spoliando, nisi illi qui malo animo, non praecise obediendo divino praecepto, spoliaverint.” Ibid., 685. 340 “…in tempore necessitates extremae licet uti ea, domino ipsius invito.” William of Ockham, OP IV, Breviloquium, 160.

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So, we can say that the command, “Do not steal!” cannot be a necessary truth if it is taken to mean that one can never use the goods of another without her permission.

Thus, it cannot be the conclusion of a demonstration in moral science. On the other hand, if it is taken to mean “Do not take or use the goods of another wrongly or without a good reason or contrary to right reason”, then it might be such a conclusion. But then it is of course much less stark, and it is not the kind of thing that people usually have in mind when they think about moral commands.

The reason for pursuing this example was to make the point that specific types of acts, such as stealing, killing, lying, etc., cannot be the subject matter of a demonstrative science of morals for Ockham. There are just too many possible circumstances in which any one of these acts which are usually wrong might turn out to be permissible or even obligatory. The principles and the conclusions of moral science must be far more generic than that. Because the principles and the conclusions of demonstrative arguments must be necessary truths, moral science must be concerned with the properties of actions that must necessarily be a part of morally good or morally bad actions. And when we turn to

Ockham’s discussions of moral science, this is precisely what we see. He always gives us very generic principles such as “the will ought to conform itself to right reason.”341 This is a principle that Ockham never tires of insisting upon, that no act of the will, even obeying a divine command, can be good unless it is in conformity with right reason; moreover, that it must be done precisely because it is dictated by right reason.” And so if it is to be intrinsically and necessarily virtuous, then it must have right reason for an

341 See note 14 above.

122 object, and that kind of act alone will be necessarily virtuous.”342 Moral science must be able to tell me this. It also must be able to tell me that right reason and all of the other circumstances of an action must be objects of that action for it to be virtuous. “I thus claim, in short, that all the circumstances are partial objects of a necessarily virtuous act, and that the end is the principle object.”343 Because moral science tells me that right reason and all of the other circumstances of a given action are partial objects of that action, and because it could turn out that virtually any type of action could be right or wrong, good or bad, in various circumstances, it turns out that moral science cannot dictate any specific type of action at all. As David Clark points out, “Morality presupposes the deliberate and voluntary activity of agents; it includes situational factors.

Necessary moral rules must signify or connote all these relevant items.”344 Thus, moral imperatives such as those of the Decalogue simply cannot be commanded or prohibited, as the case may be, by a true moral science, because a universal command of that form would have to command or prohibit an entire class of actions, a class of actions the members of which would have to be right or wrong regardless of any conceivable circumstances. But this is just not possible in Ockham’s moral theory. Any outward action which is done in the right circumstances and for the right reason is right; any outward action done in the wrong circumstances or for the wrong reason is wrong. Moral science can tell me that, but it cannot tell me much more than that.

342 “…et ita si sit intrinsece virtuosus et necessario, oportet quod habeat rectam rationem pro obiecto; et ille solus erit necessario virtuosus.“ William of Ockham, OTh IX, QQ, 264. 343 “Dico igutir brevitur quod omnes circumstantiae sut obiecta partialia actus necessario virtuosi, et finis est obiectum principlae.“ Ibid., 265. 344 David W. Clark, “William of Ockham on Right Reason,” Speculum 48 (1973), 24.

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What about divine commands? How do they fit into this concept of moral science? Putting it bluntly, they are just one more circumstance of an action that contributes to its being either right or wrong. When a person is in a given situation, right reason must take into account all of the relevant facts before dictating what should be done. If there is a command of superior, human or divine, that is a relevant fact. Ockham seems to assume that usually a divine command will be decisive; but his position need not be taken to indicate that it is always so.345 Rather, a standing divine command gives one a good reason for doing a given action, or a good reason for avoiding it. More importantly, even if we follow a divine command, we must do so precisely because it is a divine command and because right reason dictates that we should do it. Ockham even goes so far as to say that an act elicited in conformity with right reason, and that has God as its object insofar as the act is done for the sake of God, would still not be necessarily and intrinsically virtuous because it would not have right reason as an object! ‘…right reason would dictate that he should will to abstain for the sake of God, etc., and that in conformity with right reason, that is, because it is dictated by right reason; otherwise it would not be right reason but erroneous reason. But a volition that has God and other circumstances for its object but not reason, is neither numerically nor specifically the same as a volition which is elicited because it is dictated by right reason, because of difference in objects.”346 Further in the same text he says, “Therefore it is necessary that

345 As John Kilcullen points out, in the Dialogus Ockham makes it explicit that in a case of necessity it is permissible to violate even a divine command. As this text is in one of Ockham’s political works, we shall discuss it more fully later. See John Kilcullen, “Natural Law and Will in Ockham,” A Translation of Ockham’s ‘Work of Ninety Days’ 346 “…recta ratio dictaret quod volendum est abstinere propter Deum etc., et hoc conformiter rationi rectae, hoc est, quia sic dictatum est a ratione recta, aliter non esset recta sed erronea; sed volitia habens Deum et alias circumstantias pro obiecto praeter rationem, non est eadem numero nec specie cum volitione quae eliceretur quia sic esset dictatum a ratione recta, propter variationem obiecti…” William of Ockham, OTh VIII, Connex., 389.

124 an act which is intrinsically and necessarily virtuous, so that it cannot be made indifferent or vicious, has not only other circumstances but also right reason as its object.”347 Right reason is such a requirement for a virtuous action, that not even doing something for the sake of God can be virtuous without it. But, of course, doing something for the love of

God or in obedience to a divine command will often be a good reason for doing it, or putting it another way, right reason will dictate that it should be done. Finally, we should remember that infamous text from Ockham’s commentary on the Sentences which is often used to suggest that he is a divine command theorist, which says explicitly that acts called theft, adultery, and hatred are wrong or sinful because someone doing them is under a divine command to avoid them; but this fact of being against a divine command is described as a “bad circumstance”348 That is, in the circumstance that taking what belongs to another or having sexual relations with someone not one’s spouse are prohibited by divine commands, they are wrong. And in the circumstance that they were commanded by God, then they would not be wrong but would be right.

But what if there were no divine command one way or the other? Ockham never addresses this case, but I think it is likely he would say that they are generically bad, and therefore right reason would dictate that they should not be done. Ockham says that if we abstract from any particular circumstances, someone's being willing to study is generically good.349 Such an act becomes necessarily virtuous only by being willed in the appropriate circumstances and because it is dictated by right reason. And unlike other

347 “Igitur oportet necessario quod actus qui est intrinsece et necessario virtuosus, sic quod non potest fieri indfferens vel vitiosus, quod habeat non tantum alias circumstantias sed etiam rationem rectam pro obiecto…” William Ockham, OTh VIII, Connex., 400. 348 “…habeant malam circumstantiam annexam de communi lege…” William of Ockham, OTh V, Sent., 352. 349 “…aliquis vult studere circumscribendo omnem circumstantiam. Iste actus est bonus ex genere.” William of Ockham, OTh VIII, Connex., 384.

125 more typical examples such as adultery or honesty, there is no standing divine command that we should heed; at least, there is no command in the Decalogue. Certainly, Ockham never suggested that, absent a divine command indicating the evaluative character of actions one way or the other, we have no reason to do or to avoid anything. If the more extreme interpretations of Ockham’s moral theory as voluntarist were accepted, this would have to follow.

But not only is it nowhere suggested by Ockham’s texts that in the absence of any divine command there is no reason to do anything or to avoid so acting, he does say that pagans can be virtuous even if they do not have the same ends as the Christian who acts out of love for God. For example, Ockham says that the first degree of moral virtue is when someone ‘wills the performance of just works in conformity with right reason…on account of the worthiness of this work itself as an end.”350 Similarly, even though he grants that the virtues of a pagan are not the same as those of a Christian, insofar as the pagan does not have God as an object of his actions, he says that the

Philosopher does not suppose that ethical precepts are commanded by God, but instead

“that such acts should be willed simply because they are worthy or preserve nature or for some merely natural end.”351 Thus, right reason can dictate that an action be performed precisely because of the worthiness of that action or for some other natural end; and performing acts for such ends dictated by right reason constitutes true moral virtue, even if it is not the full virtue that a Christian has.

350 “…aliquis vult facere opera iusta conformiter rationi rectae dictanti…propter honestum ipsius operis sicut propter finem…” William of Ockham, OTh VIII, Connex., 335. 351 “…talia esse volenda quia honesta vel conservative naturae vela liquid aliud mere natural.” William of Ockham, OTh VIII, Connex., 403.

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Returning to our examples, Ockham would accept, I think, that love, honesty, and fidelity are all generically good, even in the absence of a divine command to pursue them. Even in the absence of a divine command to pursue them, right reason might very well dictate that they should be done, so long as no other circumstance overrides their generic goodness. If God were to command me to lie, or to fornicate, that would give me a good reason to do them, so much so in fact that those acts would be virtuous in those circumstances. This is how, I think, Ockham wants to handle the typical medieval examples of the divine commands to Abraham to kill Isaac, of the Israelites to take the

Egyptians’ goods, and Hosea to marry a harlot. Rather than argue that such commands constitute dispensations from unalterable moral laws, Ockham says that in the circumstance that God orders one to do something, that thing is virtuous in that circumstance.352 But other unusual circumstances could also make such actions, normally vicious, virtuous. Killing is justified in self-defense; though, in that case we do not call it murder, indicating that the circumstances are such that killing is not wrong in this case.

Lying might be appropriate in the case in which it will prevent a greater harm from occurring; though, unlike killing, lying is still called lying whether we think it justified in a given case or not. Thus, the fact that a divine command can make something that is normally wrong to be right presents no more difficulty for Ockham’s moral theory than the fact that generically the same act can be right or wrong in different circumstances.

Thus, the fact that divine commands can make what would otherwise be indifferent acts right or wrong is no more reason to think that God’s freedom to issue different commands makes moral science impossible any more than the dependence of the

352 In this case, Ockham’s position should be compared to Thomas Aquinas’s, who also does not want to call such cases ‘dispensations’. See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologicae I-II, q. 100, a. 8, ad 3.

127 rightness or wrongness of actions on other circumstances in which they are performed does. “It is characteristic of Ockham’s ethic that the framework or structure of the moral life is rationally certain and constant, but the content is mutable.”353

This also explains why, when considering the possibility of a necessarily virtuous act, Ockham insists that the act of loving God is necessarily virtuous “given the divine command.”354 This is because, like any circumstance, the divine command has to be a partial object of any necessarily virtuous act. Therefore, an act can be necessarily virtuous only on the assumption that it either is elicited in conformity with a divine command or at least not in opposition to one. Clearly, a necessarily virtuous act cannot be one that the actor is obligated not to perform. The question is, whether mere conformity is enough for a necessarily virtuous act, or if it must also be willed precisely because it is commanded by God. However, if this were true, then Ockham would not be able to affirm that pagans can be genuinely virtuous, but he clearly thinks that they can. So, it must be the case that, so long as the act is in conformity with (or at least not in opposition to) a divine command, and there is a dictate of right reason to perform the act, the act can be virtuous.

But what about the worry that some authors have shown, that God might change

His commands at any time, so that what was morally good until now could be morally bad tomorrow and thereafter, and vice versa? Ockham would certainly admit this could have been a possibility. After all, God did change His decrees concerning the economy of salvation once before, so that before the coming of Christ one needed to be circumcised to be saved, but now only baptism is necessary. Might God not make a similar change in

353 David W. Clark, “William of Ockham on Right Reason,”, 26. 354 “…stante divino praecepto.” William of Ockham, OTh IX QQ., 256.

128 the purely moral laws? Yes, but this is a possibility only in the sense that it is possible by

God’s absolute power. Any change that is to take place in God’s commands would have been ordained from eternity, and so it would be a product of His ordained power. In other words, God can change His decrees but this will never be based upon an arbitrary decision but will always have been based on His providential concern for us.

In a fascinating question from first book of the commentary on the Sentences,

Ockham points out that God is not only prepared to cooperate with any created will in a meritorious act, but that He will never command anything else. “For it is clear that God gives to every natural power anything from which a meritorious act can follow. And God is prepared to cooperate in any meritorious act, and the opposite is also clear, namely, that He does not want him to elicit a contrary act, since He will never command the opposite…”355 Later in the same question, he reiterates this position, that God will never command the opposite of the commands and counsels He has already given.356 So

Ockham claims that we can be quite certain that God’s commands will not change.

Perhaps this is related to his claim in the Sentences commentary that “God by necessity of His nature loves justice, charity, etc. …and He loves not only virtues but all creatures, and especially rational creatures.”357 Granted that this love God has for his creatures and their virtues does not obligate Him to do anything for them, still it may give us a reason to suppose that He does love us sufficiently to always will our good, including giving us

355 “Nam manifestum est quod Deus dat cuilibet naturalia quibus potest consequi actum meritorium, et Deus paratus est coagere cuilibet ad actus meritorium, nec manifestum sibi contrarium, scilicet se nolle eum elicere actum contrarium quia numquam praecipiet contrarium….” William of Ockham, OTh IV Sent., 674. 356 :…dat eis antecedentia quibis possunt consequi salutem cum praecepto et consilio exsequendi, et numquam eis praecipiet contrarium…” Ibid., 676. 357 “…Deus de necessitate naturae diligit iustitiam, caritatem, etc., delectione vel complacentia primo modo dicta,et non tamen sic diligit virtutes sed omnes creaturas, et maxime creaturam rationale.” William of Ockham, Sent., OTh III, pg. 464.

129 unchanging moral precepts such that we can rely on his commands not to change. This gives His commands and counsels at least an immutability if not a type of necessity. At least, they could have the type of conditional necessity that was discussed in the previous chapter.

Although Ockham explicitly denies that everything that is immutable is also necessary,358 still he is also willing to say that the laws God has willed for salvation have a certain type of necessity, even if it’s only a conditional necessity. If the Treatise on

Predestination, God’s Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents is, in fact, an early work of Ockham, as Boehner suggests, perhaps he had changed his mind about the claim that immutable propositions need not be necessary by the time he was writing the final two sets of quodlibetal questions. If this is so, then, “God commands that A is morally right, therefore A is morally right” is at least conditionally necessary. Just as created grace is necessary due to God’s free but unalterable commands, so we can say that the moral laws are necessary given God’s free but unalterable commands. Thus, they have enough necessity to be the major or minor premises of a demonstrative argument in moral science. God’s desire for us to act well and meritoriously is firm, reliable, and unalterable enough that we can be absolutely certain of what He commands us to do, and what He expects from us.

But we should also remember that God’s commands, as important as they are for

Ockham’s moral philosophy in general, are not the principal propositions that are the building blocks of moral science. “Do not steal”, no matter the source, is simply not as foundational to moral science as “The will ought to conform itself to right reason”.

358 William of Ockham, Praedest., OPh IV, pp 530.

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Taking another’s goods is not always wrong, depending upon the circumstances it might even be necessary. But there are absolutely no circumstances in which someone should not act according to a dictate of right reason. Any rules prescribing or proscribing generic types of acts can only be conditionally necessary, because of the changing circumstances in which we have to act. Thus, the conditional necessity of God’s commands is only to be expected.

But if moral science is only concerned with the generic aspects of moral actions and virtues and vices, how can it ever be immediately directive of actions? While it certainly can be mediately directive, can it be immediately directive? Ockham suggests, contrary to Scotus’ opinion, that it can, though most often it will be prudence in the more narrow sense of that term that will be directive of our actions. His most explicit argument for this is in his question Circa virtutes et vitia. There, he gives the following argument as an example: Every good person ought to do good works, this person is a good person, therefore he ought to do good works.359 Ockham is willing to admit that the second proposition (this person is good) is only a contingent singular proposition, but he insists that it is “not an act of prudence because it is not directive.”360 Nevertheless, a directive conclusion does follow from this singular proposition and the first, universal proposition.

Ockham claims “this conclusion is acquired through teaching and not through experience.”361 So moral science can be immediately directive of our acts even if we do not have an act of prudence as well. Although, it is clear that much of moral science will

359 William of Ockham, OTh. VIII, Circa, 283. 360 “…cuius notitia non est prudential quia non est directive.” Ibid. 361 “…ista adquiritur per doctrinam et non per experientiam.” Ibid.

131 not be so immediately directive; and that usually it will be an act of prudence, which is gained through experience alone, that directs our acts.

But another aspect of this argument must be taken account of in relation to

Ockham’s views on moral science; and that is that the second proposition is a singular, contingent proposition. It is not universal, and certainly not necessary. If Ockham is willing to allow that this argument is an example of moral science (and it is virtually the only example of such an argument to be found in his works) then the requirements of moral science are somewhat less than his general account of science would indicate. It seems that so long as at least one of the premises is a necessary, universal proposition, gained either through teaching or through experience, then we can have a true moral science even if the other premise is singular and contingent. In the Summa Logicæ,

Ockham had denied that any proposition that was “merely affirmative and merely categorical and merely concerning the present, can be a principle or a conclusion of a demonstration, because all such propositions are contingent.”362 The view here is that the conclusion always has the modal status of the weakest premise: if either premise is merely contingent, the conclusion can be only contingent. Indeed, it would appear that when Ockham is discussing moral science, he has in mind one of the lesser of three meanings of scientia that he discusses in the prologue to his exposition on Aristotle’s

Physics.363 Indeed, what he seems to have in mind is a mixture of the second and third senses of science – the evident cognition of a contingent truth, and the evident cognition of a necessary truth.364 For it is clear that in the argument under discussion there must

362 “…mere affirmative et mere categorica et mere de praesenti, potest esse principium vel conclusion demonstrationis, quia quaelibet talis est contingens.” William of Ockham, OPh I, SL, pp. 512-513. 363 See the discussion in chapter 2, above. 364 William of Ockham, OPh IV, 4.

132 first be an evident cognition of the necessary major premise; and an evident cognition of the contingent minor premise. Clearly, these two cognitions together suffice for an evident cognition of the conclusion. Again, it is not an argument all of whose propositions are necessary, which Ockham claims in both the prologue to the Sentences commentary and the prologue to the exposition on the Physics is the most proper meaning of the word ‘science’, but it does seem to be what he has in mind when he discusses moral science.

But we should be wary of a possible temptation to say that this moral science is more like positive moral science rather than non-positive moral science. That distinction is based upon the further distinction between propositions that guide our acts due to the arbitrary decisions of a legitimate superior, and those that direct our act apart from the decision of any superior. Although the first type of directive propositions are contingent, they are not like the singular proposition in this argument. The real problem with the premises of positive moral science is that they are arbitrary principles, not that they are contingent. Surely there is enough of a difference between legislation that requires us to drive on the right side of the road, and the recognition that someone is a morally good person. Even though someone becomes a good person through his own free acts, nevertheless, he has to earn this goodness – it cannot be conferred upon him by legislative fiat, like a title of nobility. So, it is perfectly legitimate to claim that contingent propositions that are not based upon arbitrary determinations are cognitively different from those that are. Knowledge of legal statutes is not the same thing as knowledge of someone’s character, even if both are contingent facts.

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However, it must also be admitted that Ockham may not have thought all of these issues through in a systematic way. After all, in the very work we are discussing, he says that this argument is an example of moral science, since although the second premise is singular and contingent, it is not an act of prudence because it is not directive. But just a few lines later, in the very same discussion, he claims that the distinction between moral science and prudence is precisely that moral science is always of universals whereas prudence is always of singulars.365 Even if we allow that prudence is only of directive singular propositions, it must be admitted that his second premise in his example argument is not universal, so it would seem to be excluded from moral science. But perhaps it is enough for Ockham that at least one of the premises is a universal proposition to ensure the argument’s status as an example of moral science. Perhaps his real claim here is: neither of the premises is an act of prudence, but the conclusion is directive, only moral science and prudence can be directive, therefore it is moral science.

Again, Ockham does not seem to be aware that he is using a lesser notion of science here, yet that does seem to be the best interpretation of his text.

But is every syllogism in moral science ‘compromised’ in this way? Will all of them be a mixture of a necessary and a contingent premise? Consider the most generic possible example of an argument of this type:

1. The will ought to conform itself to right reason.

2. Right reason dictates that in these circumstances I ought to do X.

3. Therefore, I should will to do X.

365 William of Ockham, OTh VIII Connex., 286-287.

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It is clear that the second premise is not necessary, because whatever the particular circumstances are, they are not necessary. They are certainly not absolutely necessary, because, as we have seen, Ockham is committed to the view that only God Himself is absolutely necessary. But neither are they conditionally necessary, except in the sense that given that God has willed thus, it must be the case; but Ockham nowhere suggests that he believes this, as it would make every circumstance and event in the world necessary, which is certainly a view he rejects. No, the only necessity that could attach to it would be of the form: given such and such circumstances, right reason dictates that one should do X. This is not a form of necessity that Ockham ever seems to have explicitly discussed, but it would seem reasonable to believe that he would accept this. After all, to say that it is contingent would be to claim that right reason might just as well have dictated otherwise than it did in precisely the same circumstances; and that seems to be a wholly unacceptable position. Right reason, it seems, simply must dictate as it does in a given situation; but, if the circumstances were to change, however subtly, then, of course, right reason’s dictate might also have to change. And it should be remembered that one of the most important aspect of the circumstances of any action or decision is the relevant divine command. So, taking all of this, the above argument can be recast as:

1. The will ought to conform itself to right reason.

2. If the circumstances are such and such, right reason will dictate that I ought to do

X.

3. Therefore, if the circumstances are such and such, I ought to will to do X..

The most important point is, that there does seem to be a case for arguments in moral science, such as this one, which do meet the most stringent requirements of a

135 demonstrative science - that both of the premises are necessary, thus yielding a necessary conclusion, although this conclusion will be conditionally necessary, rather than absolutely necessary.

To sum up. In his discussions of moral science, Ockham seems to have in mind arguments that are based upon both necessary truths known either through teaching (self- evident truths366) or through experience alone, as well as certain contingent, singular propositions. This is, after all, what we should expect, since moral science is supposed to be directive of human actions; and since humans only act in concrete, contingent circumstances, it must be the case that any knowledge, whether moral science or prudence, must be able to address those concrete circumstances. Thus, necessary truths cannot be the only types of truths with which moral science can deal; it must also take into consideration contingent truths. Among the most important circumstances of any act are any relevant divine commands; and these must be taken into account when deciding on a course of action.

But there are some demonstrations in moral science that are wholly necessary, that use only necessary premises in order to arrive at necessary conclusions. And if it is allowed that conditional necessity is an acceptable form of necessity, then the range of necessary propositions available as premises of moral science can be increased to include

God’s unalterable commands. Perhaps it should be said that Ockham really has two notions of moral science, one strict and one more broadly understood. But this difference should not be conflated with his distinction between positive and non-positive moral science in his second quodlibet. That distinction is between a science based upon

366 Per se nota propositions.

136 premises that are not due to the arbitrary will of any superior and that based upon premises that are due to such wills. Clearly, not every contingent proposition is based upon arbitrary decisions like this.

Chapter 5: The Political Writings: Moral Science and Natural Law

Having looked at the question of moral science in Ockham’s academic writings, we can now turn to his political writings to see whether what he says there about natural law is similar to what he says about moral science in the earlier writings. In general, the relationship between Ockham’s academic writings and his political writings has been a subject of debate and controversy. There are a number of reasons for this. The first has to do with the contexts and styles adopted in the two bodies of writings. Stylistically only the Summa Logicæ stands out among his academic writings, because it is structured more as a treatise in the modern sense in that it does not use the typical scholastic formats of questions, objections, and responses. It is not unique in this – one thinks of Thomas

Aquinas’s De ente et essentia367 and Walter Burley’s De puritate artis logicæ368 – but it is still the kind of writing that medieval academics only occasionally produced.

Ockham’s political writings are very different in form and content, and the context very much influenced the form. In 1324 Ockham was summoned to the papal court at Avignon, for what reasons we are not exactly sure369. At some point, an inquiry into the orthodoxy of some of his theological opinions was begun, but it was never finished even though a list of his opinions was drawn up for censure; however, none of the opinions which were selected for censure were political in any way. But, at some point in his four year stay at Avignon, the Minister General of the Franciscan Order,

367 Thomas Aquinas, Sancti Thomæ Aquinatis doctoris angelici Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII.O.M. edita., cura et studio Fratrum praedictorum, (Rome: 1882- ), Tomus XLIII. pp. 369-381. 368 Walter Burleigh, De puritate artis logicæ. Tractatus longior, with a Revised Edition of Tractatus brevior, ed. By Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1955. 369 For a good discussion of the possible reasons, see George Knysh, ‘Biographical Rectifications Concerning Ockham’s Avignon Period,’ Franciscan Studies 46 (1986), pp. 61–91. 137

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Michael of Cesena, asked Ockham to look into several recent pronouncements on the

Franciscan ideal of apostolic poverty that had been made by the current pope, John XXII.

Ockham himself says that, because he did not want to believe that a sitting Pope would defend heresies370, he had never looked into the issue before; since none of his writings produced before 1324 mentions this issue in any way, this is likely true. But after his

Minister General ordered him (superiore mandante) to look into the issue, Ockham vigorously examined the bulls and encyclicals of the pope, and came to the view that not only had John XXII condemned the Franciscan ideal of poverty, he had done so by contradicting the pronouncements of previous popes. The Franciscans believed that by living lives of both personal and corporate poverty, they were emulating the lives of Jesus and the Apostles as related in the New Testament. Others in the church disagreed with this interpretation, but several popes had adjudged the Franciscans’ view of apostolic poverty as at least acceptable; and, thus, the Franciscans had considered the issue settled.

John XXII had reopened the issue, but, because he contradicted the writings of previous popes, Ockham and other Franciscans came to believe that he had rejected settled

Catholic doctrine on faith and morals; and, so, they concluded that John had fallen into heresy and had thus de iure ceased to be pope. After coming to this conclusion, and after realizing that the papal process was going against them on the issue, Ockham, Michael and other Franciscans fled the papal court in 1328, taking with them the seal of the

Franciscan Order, and eventually finding refuge at the court of the Holy Roman Emperor,

370 “Quia nolens leviter credere quod persona in tanto officio constituta haereses definiret esse tenendas…” William Ockham, Epistola ad Fratres Minores, OP, H. S. Offler, ed., vol. 3 (Manchester, 1974): 6.

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Louis of Bavaria.371 From this time, Ockham and the other dissident Franciscans at

Louis’ court engaged in a propaganda war with the pope and his supporters.

What are called Ockham’s “political writings” are the writings he produced in this effort, which stretched from 1328 until his death in 1347 or 1349. Thus, his political writings were not written as academic exercises but were produced as pamphlets in an on-going political and theological controversy. Some commentators have preferred in fact to refer to these writings of Ockham as “polemical” rather than “political” to stress this point. Because these writings were produced in the heat of controversy, they do not exhibit the orderly presentation of ideas and arguments one would expect in academic writings, but more the rhetoric occasioned by arguments and counterarguments that come from debating one’s political opponents.

Another issue in the interpretation of these writings is that they were not written entirely by Ockham himself. Several important works, such as the Work of Ninety Days, were written as group efforts, presenting the views shared by other Franciscans and

Ockham. So in these writings we are not always entitled to assume that what is said is exactly Ockham’s own opinion or the arguments he thought best, i.e., just what he himself would have said or argued if he had been speaking only for himself without the need to have others sign off on it.

A final issue that may be related to this is the fact that many of these works claim to be “recitative” instead of “assertive”; that is, they claim to be merely rehearsing the

371 In fact, Louis was technically only King of the Romans. He had been elected Holy Roman Emperor by the German electors, but had failed to have the pope, John XXII, ratify his election and crown him Emperor. Thus, Ludwig was willing to help other enemies of the pope. For a brief account of Louis’s reign see Peter H. Wilson, Heart of Europe: A History of the Holy Roman Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016), pp. 69-70.

140 arguments on both sides without deciding between them. This style of writing was not an invention of Ockham; Peter John Olivi often claimed that he was merely “reciting various opinions, while assenting to none of them.”372 Whether Olivi wrote in this way to avoid censure, as a “diplomatic tactic”373, or merely as a method of objectively exploring the theological dimensions of any view374, is not to the point here. The Master in Ockham’s

Dialogue also claims merely to be exploring the issues objectively. Why Ockham chose to write the work this way is an open question: was it, as he himself suggests, just a way of trying to explore the questions, or was it a clever ploy to ensure the book would not be seen as promoting heresy and so would circulate more widely?375 Whatever the answer, it is clear that if a work explicitly claims not to be presenting the author’s own position, we must be careful in claiming that a specific position or argument in the text is that of the author. Luckily, not all of Ockham’s political writings fit this model; some are indeed assertive, giving his position explicitly; and so, we can be sure that the views expressed in his assertive works are Ockham’s own. This is the procedure Ockham himself recommends in the preface to the Dialogue.376 Thus the interpretation of Ockham’s political views as found in his political writings is a bit more complicated than the

372 “…recitavi opinions varias, nullam earum asserens…” Damase Laberge. "Fr. Petri Iohannis Olivi, O.F.M., tria scripta sui ipsius apologetica annorum 1283 et 1285", Archivum Franciscanum Historicum. 29 (1936): pg. 405. 373 “…die diplomatisch gehaltene Taktik…”, Bernhard Jansen, Die Erkenntnislehre Olivi, (Berlin: Duemmlers, 1921), pg. 18. 374 Carter Partee, OFM, “Peter John Olivi: Historical and Doctrinal Study,” Franciscan Studies 20 (1960), pg. 254-256. 375 This view is suggested by John Kilcullen and George Knysh in their introduction to the online critical edition of the Dialogus, “Ockham and the Dialogus,” https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/pubs /dialogus/wock.html 376 “…nemo mihi debet quamcumque opinionem qualitercumque hic discussam vel recitatem imponere, nisi quam a me alias vel in aliis operibus scriptam vel dictam assertive vel opinative cognoverit.” William of Ockham, Dialogus, “Preface to the Dialogus”,https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/pubs/dialogus /tpref.html.

141 interpretation of his more theological and philosophical views in his academic writings, where it is usually very clear where he is speaking in his own name.

Another major difference between Ockham’s academic writings on ethics and his political writings is more substantive. In fact, it is terminological. In his academic writings on ethics Ockham never uses the language of “natural law”. He presents his ethical views in terms of God, will, freedom, and right reason; but he never uses the term natural law. Of course, other major scholastic thinkers before Ockham, such as Albert the

Great, Thomas Aquinas, and Duns Scotus had used the language of natural law; so, we must assume that Ockham’s decision not to use such language was quite deliberate, although we are not sure just why he made this decision. But in the political writings,

Ockham often uses the language of natural law and natural rights. Why the change? This issue has been debated for decades. Some writers have believed that Ockham used natural law language only for rhetorical purposes: these were the terms in which Pope John XXII had attacked the Franciscans, and Ockham used this language merely to attack the Pope’s arguments and to defend Franciscan poverty. Gordon Leff argued this way, claiming that especially in the Work of Ninety Days Ockham “was still accepting the pope’s doctrine and the pope’s arguments as the basis for his own replies…”377 and that “Ockham employed the, by then, stock arguments of St. Bonaventure, Bonagratia of Bergamo, and

Michael of Cesena….”378

One view argues that there is no major inconsistency between his academic and his political writings in this respect, but the similarity here is between the emphasis on freedom of the will in his academic works and a theory of subjective, natural rights in his

377 Gordon Leff, Heresy in the Later Middle Ages, 2 vols. (Manchester, 1967), vol. 1, pg 250. 378 Ibid., pg 253.

142 political writings. “With a perfect consistency, Ockham the lawyer follows the same road as Ockham the philosopher.”379 His moral theory and his political theory are in fact entirely similar despite a terminological difference in how he presents them. This view is usually taken by scholars such as Georges de Lagarde380 and Michel Villey381, who generally see Ockham’s nominalism as having driven him to defend individual, subjective rights at the expense of the older medieval theory of objective right as defended by theologians such as Thomas Aquinas. That is, Ockham is seen as having replaced natural law with natural rights. This shift can be seen as either a corruption or an advance depending upon the scholar’s preference.

Others have maintained that, while Ockham never presented his ethical theory in terms of natural law, nevertheless, his ethical theory is a natural law theory. That is, that despite the fact that he never used the term in his academic writings, his claims that certain moral principles are per se nota makes his view in fact a natural law theory. This view argues that Ockham’s moral doctrine and his political theories are united by the fact that right reason plays a role in both sets of writings. Versions of this view are defended by Jürgen Miethke,382 Janet Coleman,383 and H. H. Bleakley.384 These scholars point out that right reason plays an important role both in the nature of virtuous acts in his academic writings as well as in the knowledge of natural law in his political writings.

379 “ Avec une coherence parfaite, Occam-juriste suit la voie d’Occam-philosophe.” M. Villey, La formation de la pensée juridique moderne, 4th ed. (Paris: Montchrestien, 1975). 224. 380 Georges de Lagarde, La naissance de l’esprit laïque au déclin du moyen âge, 5 vols. (Louvain – Paris: Nauwelaerts – Béatrice, 1956-70). 381 Michel Villey, “La genèse du droit subjectif chez Guillaume d’Occam,” Archives de philosophie du droit 9 (1964), pp. 97-127. 382 Jürgen Miethke, Ockhams Weg zur Sozialphilosophie (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1969, XI, 586 S.). 383 J. Coleman, “Ockham’s Right Reason and the Genesis of the Political as ‘Abosolutist’ “, History of Political Thought, 20 (1999), pp. 35-64. 384 H. H . Bleakley, “Some Additional Thoughts on Ockham’s Right Reason: An Addendum to Coleman”, History of Political Thought 21:4 (2000), 565-605

143

Thus, although Ockham never uses the term “natural law” in his academic writings on ethics; nevertheless, because right reason is the source of our knowledge of the principles of moral science and prudence, and because it is the source of our knowledge of natural law, these concepts are really the same. In his discussion of Ockham’s moral theory in his academic writings, Miethke presents recta ratio as a type of “moral insight” (sittlich

Einsicht)385; and when discussing Ockham’s theory of natural law, he says that “natural law is determined by recourse to the moral law contained in this moral insight.”386

Yet other writers have claimed a moderate position between these two claims.

They believe that, though there is a great difference between Ockham’s ethical theory as we find it in his academic writings and his political theory, yet they are not inconsistent with one another. This is the view that Philotheus Boehner, for example, defended when he described the attempt “to base Ockham’s political ideas on, or to develop them from, his so-called Metaphysics…appears to us more as an adventure and certainly as a construction of the writer.”387 Boehner sees Ockham’s political writings as dealing with the issues of Franciscan poverty and the limits of papal authority, issues not raised at all in any of his academic writings. Thus, Ockham’s ethical theory is one thing, his political theory is another, and they are separate and unrelated; and, although Boehner does not deny that there may be “inner connections”388 between Ockham’s metaphysics and his political ideas, yet, he maintains that “Ockham’s political ideas in their great outlines

385 Jürgen Miethke, Ockhams Weg zur Sozialphilosophie, pg. 330. 386 “…bestimmt auch das Naturrecht durch einen Rückgriff auf das in dieser sitlichen Einsicht gegenwärtige Sittengestz.” Ibid., 481. 387 Philotheus Boehner, “Ockham’s Political Ideas”, Collected Articles on Ockham (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., Louvain and Paderborn, 1958), pp. 445-446. For a general critique of attempts to derive political and ecclesiological theories from the metaphysics of any medieval thinker, see C. Zuckerman, “The Relationship of Theories of Universals to the Theories of Church Government in the Middle Ages: A Critique of Previous Views”, Journal of the History of Ideas 35 (1973), pp. 579-94. 388 Ibid.

144 could have been developed, as far as we can see, from any of the classical metaphysics of the 13th century.”389 Similarly, George Knysh claims a methodological rather than a substantive connection when he writes that “Ockham’s method does not appear to have radically varied; only the objects to which it was applied changed.”390 Ockham uses the same logical and argumentative strategies he had used in his academic works, but on questions of Franciscan poverty, ecclesiology and political theory rather than semantics, metaphysics and ethics. Copleston expresses a similar view when he says “the same personality and the same original mind manifested itself in different ways according to the different circumstances of Ockham’s life and the different problems with which he was faced.”391 All of these scholars deny there is any great difference between Ockham’s ethical theory and his natural law theory of politics.

Finally, there is another possible position, though I know of no writer who defends it. One might claim that there is a difference between his ethical and political theories, and that this difference was due to Ockham having changed his mind on the basis of morals. That is, that while in his academic writings Ockham had intended to defend a fully divine command theory of morality, when he came to write his political writings, he had come to accept a natural law theory of morality. Of course, Ockham never says explicitly that he changed his mind on this issue, but of course he never claimed to be fully defending a divine command morality either. Insofar as this view requires an interpretation of Ockham’s moral theory as wholly based upon divine

389 Ibid. 390 George Knysh, Political Ockhamism (Winnipeg: WCU Council of Learned Societies, 1996), pg. 36, note 58. Italics in original. 391 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy: Volume III: Late Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy (New York: Doubleday, 1993), pg. 47

145 commands, it is inconsistent with the interpretation of Ockham’s moral theory I have already defended in this dissertation, and so, I will not discuss it much below. But I have included it here just to be complete.

For our discussion below, however, we will not concern ourselves with the question of whether Ockham’s nominalism influenced his theories of church government or even his views of legitimate secular rights. As interesting as these questions are, they are not especially germane to the question of whether Ockham’s views on moral science and divine commands find a counterpart in his natural law theory, or whether this theory represents a total volte-face for Ockham. It is only the connection between Ockham’s views on moral science and his natural law theory as found in his political writings that will concern us here.

In attempting to determine if Ockham’s use of natural law language is similar to his views on moral science, we must be cautious and be sure to keep in mind that natural law would be analogous not to Ockham’s doctrine of moral science only, but rather to his entire moral philosophy. So, in examining his discussions of natural law we will be paying close attention to how the precepts of natural law are true, how humans can know them to be true, and, finally, what role God plays in his natural law doctrine. Concerning this last issue, we must see if God is presented as the author of natural law, and if so, how this might affect humans’ ability to know natural law; and we will have to see if God can dispense with natural law or make exceptions, and what significance this has for

Ockham’s overall theory.

146

The earliest of Ockham’s political writings in which he discusses natural law seems to be the Work of Ninety Days392. This is a work that presents the main interpretive difficulties discussed above. It is not a political treatise in the conventional sense. Rather, it is a very close commentary on Pope John XXII’s bull Quia Vir Reprobus.393 Thus, we should not expect Ockham’s work to be exhibit the logical ordering of a political treatise but to follow the order of the pope’s arguments in his bull. Also, Ockham is here concerned primarily with criticizing John’s arguments and interpretations of Scripture; only secondarily is he trying to present his own views. This is not to say that Ockham did not believe what he wrote; but we should always keep in mind that his distinctions and counter-arguments are put forth only to show that John’s arguments do not follow or that his scriptural exegesis is faulty, rather than to present positions that Ockham is willing to fully endorse.

Despite these caveats, the Work of Ninety Days has been very influential in the interpretation of Ockham’s theory of natural law due to his discussion of it in the sixty- fifth chapter of the work. To understand Ockham’s arguments in this work, we should first sketch the opponents’ positions against which he was arguing. John’s overall argument in his bull had been that the Franciscans could not consistently claim that they used things without owning them, because to do so with things consumable by use would be to use the items unjustly. It was a well-established point in Roman law (and Pope John

XXII was a trained lawyer) that one could legitimately use the property belonging to another if one had the permission of the owner and one returned it or left the property in

392 Opus Nonagenta Dierum, OP, H. S. Offler, ed., vols 1-2 (Manchester, 1963-1974): 287-858. 393 John XXII, “Quia Vir Reprobus,” in Bullarium Franciscanum, C. Eubel, ed., 5 (Quaracchi, 1898), 408- 449.

147 the condition it was in originally. Thus, one could use someone else’s boat if one returned it in without any damage; or, one could use or rent the home of someone else so long as one did not damage it in any way. Payment (rent) may or may not be part of the transaction, but it was crucial that the property remain undamaged so that the owner’s use of it not be hampered. If any damage were to occur, then usually the user would be required to compensate the owner for the cost of repair or at least the decline in value of the property. Of course, it would be absolutely absurd to claim that the user could utterly destroy the property without compensating the owner. If the boat sinks and is not recoverable, the user would be required to compensate the owner for the full value, in effect, buying it ex post facto. It followed from this that anything that could not be used without being consumed, that is, could not be used without being destroyed, could not be used without being owned by the one using it.

The Franciscans claimed that both individually and as an order they owned nothing, that everything they used was simply borrowed from the owner. The Latin term for ownership or property was dominium, it was usually construed as a type of right, a ius. If someone gave something to the order for their use, he usually was supposed to have retained ownership. If he did not wish to retain ownership, the compromise that had been reached with the consent of previous popes was that the property used by the

Franciscans was in fact owned by the papacy. This included their convent houses, clothes, sandals, books, etc., everything, in fact, used by the order. John argued that this arrangement might be acceptable in the cases of buildings and books, but in the cases of things like clothes, sandals, and especially food, it was a groundless fiction. If someone eats another’s food, that food is destroyed in the act of eating and cannot be returned to

148 the owner after it has been used. If only the owner of something can legitimately destroy it, then it seems that everyone, including the Franciscans, must be the owners of everything they eat, drink, or wear.394 Basing his argument to some extent on the various meanings of the Latin meaning “right” but also “just”, John argues that anyone who uses something without a right (ius) to it uses it unjustly (iniuste). Everything that is used is used either rightly or wrongly, where “rightly” is taken to mean “with a right”; and since the Franciscans claimed to have renounced the rights of ownership, they used whatever they used wrongly. Of course, to say that the Franciscans used whatever they used wrongly was to claim that far from pursuing a life of apostolic perfection, they were in fact pursuing lives of injustice. Thus, it was absolutely necessary for the Franciscans to refute this argument.

Ockham’s response comes in chapter 65 of the Work of Ninety Days. There he lays out a distinction drawn ultimately from Saint Augustine395, between a “right of the forum” (ius fori) and a “right of heaven” (ius poli). The case Augustine discusses is that of a man who, being childless, had donated all of his possessions to the church on condition that he would be able to enjoy them while he lived; but, after having children unexpectedly late in life, he had requested to have the possessions returned to him so that he could establish inheritances for his children. The bishop returned the money, even though, Augustine says, he had the right to keep it “by a right of the forum, not by a right of heaven.”396 The bishop had the legal right to retain the money, but it would not have

394 Clothing, of course, is not destroyed precisely in the act of wearing it as food is by eating, but it does wear out over time; thus, the argument works for it too. 395 Saint Augustine, Sermones 355, 4.5, in Patralogia Latina 39:1572 (1861). 396 “…sed jure fori, non jure poli.” Saint Augustine, Sermones 355, 4.5, in Patralogia Latina 39:1572 (1861).

149 been morally right to do so. Thus, the difference between a right of the forum and a right heaven is the same as the difference what modern thinkers would call a positive (or civil) right and a natural right.397 Ockham defines a right of the forum as “a right established by humans or explicit divine pact or ordinance.”398 Also, a right of the forum that is based upon human law or agreement is a right one may defend in a court of law. It is a right that one does not have by nature but by virtue of the laws of the government under which one is living. Examples from modern life would be voting, driving a car with a license, owning stock in company, etc. All of these activities depend upon human invention or agreement, and so are not had by nature.

A right of heaven, on the other hand, is “natural equity that is in harmony with right reason without any human ordinance or any merely positive divine ordinance”399; and later he describes a right of heaven as “nothing but a power conforming to right reason without a pact.”400 Thus, a right of heaven is a right that every human being has

“in the state of nature” we might say, that is, apart from any human agreement or law, and even apart from any merely positive divine ordinance. In general, a right of heaven is a right someone has just by virtue of being a human being; it is a right had due to the nature of human being; thus, it can be called a natural right or a human right.401

But what about the claim that there might be “merely positive divine ordinance”?

What can Ockham have meant here? The clear cases he would have had in mind are the

397 Very modern writers might use the term “basic human right” instead of “natural right”, but the meanings and the contrast with a positive or civil right are the same. 398 “…ius fori vocator iustum, quod ex pactione seu ordinatione humana vel divina explicita constituitur...” William of Ockham, OND, 573. 399 “…aequitas naturalis quae absque omni ordinatione humana et etiam divina pure positive est consona rationi rectae…” Ibid., 574. 400 “Ius autem poli non est aliud quam potestas conformis rationi rectae absque pactione…” Ibid., 579. 401 Not to say that other non-human beings such as angels or non-human animals might not also have similar rights, but Ockham never addresses these cases as far as I know, so I shall ignore them.

150 explicit grants of ownership of land or the granting the right to rule to certain people in the Bible.402 Thus, the Israelites’ right or ownership of the land of Israel, and Samuel’s anointing Saul as king of the Israelites, were made directly by God. Ockham explicitly says that Samuel’s right to anoint Saul as king was given “only by the mandate of

God,”403 but that this conferred no continued right to Samuel or other priests to anoint kings. Specifically, he says that from it “nothing can be proved concerning what ought to be done concerning Christian emperors and kings,”404 so that from such examples no arguments can be made about the rights of the popes to anoint kings and emperors. Such direct ordinances by God confer what Ockham calls, not a “natural right”, but a “divine right”, which he defines as “in harmony with right reason taken from things revealed to us by God which are not in harmony with purely natural right reason.”405 Ockham’s phrase here, “not in harmony with” (non consona), may be a little misleading. All he seems to mean by this is that such rights “cannot be proven by means of purely natural reason”406, but there is no indication that such rights would be in contradiction with purely natural reason. As an example he uses the right of those who preach the Gospel to be provided for by those to whom they preach407; surely such a right can be neither proven nor disproven by purely natural reason. Thus, there is a category of things that, while not accessible to natural reason apart from any divine revelation, are nevertheless not opposed to such purely natural reason. So, we can say that right reason is not

402 See Jürgen Miethke, 481-482 for a discussion of this. 403 “…solummodo de mandato Dei…” William of Ockham, Breviloquium. OP IV, ed. H. S. Offler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 234. 404 “…nichil potest probari faciendum circa imperatorem vel reges Christianos…” Ibid., 233. 405 “…quia multa sunt consona rationi rectae acceptae ex illis, quae sunt nobis divinitus revelata, quae non sunt consona rationi pure naturali…” William of Ockham, OND, OP II, 575. 406 “…per rationem puram naturalem probari non potest…” Ibid. 407 Ibid.

151 equivalent to natural reason: right reason takes it norms from every available source, natural or divine. This is a clear difference between Ockham’s natural law theory and more modern theories, which studiously avoid even the consideration of God as a standard of morality. But for our purposes, notice that this is in harmony with our interpretation of Ockham’s moral theory advanced above: that it takes as its premises not only principles that are per se nota or known by experience, but also commands issued by

God. Both nature and God are again independent sources of norms, at least, relative to us.

The one new element here is Ockham’s claim that anything issued by divine ordinance must also be “in harmony with right reason”, that is, it seems that even divine ordinances must not conflict with right reason. God’s ordinances can extend right reason beyond what is available to purely natural reason but it cannot contradict it. What this means in practice will become clearer as we proceed to Ockham’s discussions of divine exceptions to natural laws.

After he had written the Work of Ninety Days, Ockham went on in other works to critique the arguments of pope John XXII and his successors (all of whom Ockham considered equally pseudo-popes) and to present his own views on the relations between secular and ecclesiastical government, and the legitimate rights of popes and secular rulers. His most important political work is undoubtably the Dialogue Between a Master and a Student, which is currently being edited and published online,408 although one volume has appeared in print.409 It is in this work, which is concerned in general with the proper relationship between secular and ecclesiastical governments, that Ockham gives

408 William of Ockham, Dialogus, http://www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/dialogus/ockdial.html. 409 William of Ockham, Dialogus: Part 2; Part 3, Tract 1, John Kilcullen, John Scott, Jan Ballweg, & Volker Leppin, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

152 his most extensive discussions of natural law and natural rights. Although he does discuss these issues in other places, these discussions are usually far less extensive than what he says in the Dialogue, and, as we shall see, they never seem to contradict or seriously amend his positions in the Dialogue.

There are four texts in the Dialogue in which Ockham distinguished between types or modes of natural law. There is some question over the order in which Ockham actually wrote the various tracts of the Dialogue. For example, the work is supposed to be divided into three major parts, but it seems that only the first part was written in full. The second part, dealing with the teachings of Pope John XXII, was either never written, or at least it was not written in the form of a dialogue; rather, two tracts which deal with the

Pope John XXII’s teachings and his alleged recantation of those teachings were copied as part 2 of the Dialogue, and are printed there in the critical edition currently being published.410 The third part of the work was projected to contain nine tracts411, but only the first two have come down to us, and there is no reason to believe that the others were ever written. Also, there are cross references between 3.1 and 3.2. Does this mean that

Ockham was writing them both at the same time, or that perhaps he had completed one of them but revised it and added the references to the other part after he had written the latter? Not necessarily, as it cannot be assumed that when Ockham refers to another work or part of the same work, that that work already exists.412 Also, neither tract of the third part of the work seems complete; for example, in book 1 of tract 1 of Dialogus 3.1, the

410 Ibid., pp. 17-102. 411 “…in novem tractatus volo secar…” Ibid, pg. 115. 412 John Kilcullen, “Introduction” to Dialogus Part 3, Tract 1 in William of Ockham, Dialogus: Part 2; Part 3, Tract 1, John Kilcullen, John Scott, Jan Ballweg, & Volker Leppin, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pg. 111.

153 pupil says that later he will discuss the powers of the clergy413, but no such discussion exists in any extant manuscript. Because there are such issues with decisively dating any passage in the Dialogue, it seems best to discuss the relevant texts in a systematic order rather than a chronological order.

The first text we will look at occurs in chapter 15 of book 1 of tract 2 of the third part of the Dialogue. There the question being discussed is the emperor’s duty to study natural law, even those parts of it “about which it is possible for even the learned to err or doubt.”414 Although the Master and the Student agree in general that an emperor should devote himself to studying natural law, so long as this does not distract him from his other duties, the Student raises the question of whether there can even be a natural law about which experts may err or doubt. After all, if it is even possible for experts to err about a natural law, that would mean that virtually no one is obliged to obey it because ignorance of such a law would excuse any failure to follow it. After all, if an expert is blamelessly in error about the content or requirements of the natural law, how much more so would be a simple person who is no expert? In the standard gloss, Gratian had maintained that, in all adults, ignorance of the natural law deserves condemnation415. This would seem to imply that the natural law is fairly easy for any adult to understand, and so should not be the kind of thing about which experts could err or doubt.

The Master responds by drawing distinctions between three types of natural law.

The first are “self-evident principles, or follow or are taken from such self-evident

413 “Postea autem nunnulla similia de potestate cleri perscrutare propono.” William of Ockham, Dialogus: Part 2; Part 3, Tract 1, pg. 119. 414 “…circa quod contingit errare aut dubitare etiam eruditum", William of Ockham, 3 Dial. 2.1.15, (http://www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/dialogus/w32d1btx.html). 415 “Item ignorantia iuris alia naturalis, alia civilis. Naturalis omnibus adultis dampnabilis est…” Corpus Iuris Canonici editio Lipsiensis secunda post Aemilii Ludouci Richteri curas, Pars Prior: Decretum Magistri Gratiani, ed. A. Friedberg (Graz : Akademische Druck- U. Verlagsanstalt, 1959) pg. 27.

154 principles of morals; and about such natural laws no one can err or even doubt.”416 The

Master does, however, say that one may be ignorant of such natural laws because one may simply have never thought about them, but such ignorance excuses no one “because even if we have never before thought of them, such natural laws occur to someone who is bound to do or to omit something by them…”417 The Master does concede that one may not think of such a law even then, but only if he chooses to act without deliberation, which of course is a moral failing and excuses no one; so that it is impossible to act morally at all against such a natural law. The example the Master gives is that of killing an innocent person. He says that, if one is tempted to do this, then if he deliberates at all,

“however briefly”418 he will immediately see that he should not kill the innocent.

The second type of natural laws are “other natural laws that are drawn plainly and without great consideration from the first principles of the law.”419 Clearly, ignorance of such laws cannot excuse anyone, because their derivation from the first type of natural law requires no great erudition. There is a question here of how such laws could be distinguished from those of the first type that were said to follow from or are taken from the self-evident principles. Perhaps the difference here is just that, while these laws can be derived from the first principles without great consideration, still some consideration is necessary, so that it is possible to doubt them or to err regarding their content. Such errors would have to be quite elementary, however; perhaps they are the kinds of errors one would expect only in very young people. Perhaps these natural laws are similar to

416 “…sunt principia per se nota, vel a talibus principiis in moralibus per se notis sequuntur vel sumuntur; et circa talia iura naturalia nemo potest errare vel etiam dubitare.” Ibid. 417 “…licet quis antea nunquam cogitaverit ea, statim occurrunt quando secundum ea aliquis tenetur facere aliquid vel omittere…” Ibid. 418 “…etiam breviter…” Ibid. 419 “…sunt iura naturalia quae ex primis principiis iuris patenter et absque magna consideratione eliciuntur…” Ibid.

155 those precepts of which Thomas Aquinas says that the wise judge that they “are to be observed after a more subtle investigation by reason”, and that these laws of nature

“require teaching by which the less wise are instructed by the wiser.”420 These descriptions of Thomas and Ockham are clearly not the same, but they both refer to precepts of the natural law that are, unlike the primary precepts, not immediately obvious but have to be deduced or derived from the primary precepts. The difference is that while

Thomas suggests this derivation will require a subtle use of reason, Ockham claims that the derivations will be easy.

The third type of natural laws are those “that are inferred from the first natural laws by few even of the experts, with great attention and study, and through many intermediate propositions.”421 The Master says that ignorance about these natural laws excuses, but “especially in omitting to do something that should be done if he were not ignorant of the law…”422 Why especially in omitting something rather than in committing something? The Master does not say, but perhaps it is because failing to do something that one should do is failing to follow a positive precept, which, unlike negative precepts, are often said to obligate “always but not for always”, whereas negative precepts obligate at every moment. So, for example, while we are never allowed to harm others unnecessarily, we are not required to always be conferring benefits. But, in general, we

420 “…quaedam vero sunt quae subtiliori consideration rationis a sapientibus iudicantur esse observanda, et ista sic sunt de lege naturae, ut tamen indigeant disciplina, qua minores a sapientioribus instruantur.” Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 100, a. 1, resp., Sancti Thomæ Aquinatis doctoris angelici Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII.O.M. edita., cura et studio Fratrum praedictorum, (Rome: 1882- ), Tomus VII. pp. 206-207. 421 “…quae a paucis, etiam peritis, et cum magna attentione et studio et per multa media colliguntur ex primis iuribus naturalibus…” Ibid. 422 “…praecipue in omittendo aliquid facere quod tamen faciendum esset si non ignoraretur ius…” Ibid.

156 can say that if even experts can disagree about such natural laws, it is certainly excusable that someone who is not an expert to be ignorant of them.423

There are a couple of things to notice about this discussion. First, as has already been said, there seems to be some overlap between some of the first type of natural laws and the second type. Second, it does not seem to be quite an exhaustive list. After all, it would seem possible to claim there is a type of natural law between the second and third types, which would be natural laws that are not self-evident nor are immediately derived from self-evident law, but are known with a bit of study such that no experts would be in doubt of them. It is curious that Ockham does not present us with such a type of natural laws, since without such a category it seems that the experts in natural law are almost useless. For, as it stands now, natural laws are divided between ones the knowledge of which does not require expertise, and others for the knowledge of which such expertise is no guarantee. Being an expert in natural law would seem to bring no extra obligations, because it brings no assured knowledge beyond what any simple person should know.

But the most important aspect of this division of natural laws is that it is wholly epistemic; that is, it divides natural laws according to the certainty with which they can be known by human beings, instead of any claims about their relative importance. There is no guarantee that the more basic or more important natural laws will be those which are easier to know, although it seems likely that Ockham thought that they would be.

A second division of natural law occurs at chapter 6 of book 3 of tract 2 of the third part of the Dialogue. This crucial text is available in two versions, at the online

423 Thomas’s third type of natural laws are such that someone cannot know them without divine revelation. See ST I-II, 90, art 1. Note that Ockham has no such category of natural laws here, but see his mention of “merely positive divine laws” in chapter 65 of Opus Nonagentum Dierum, discussed above, on page 7.

157 critical edition of the Dialogue, and in an article published by H. S. Offler.424 The discussion in the text here centers on the question of the kind of right the Romans have to elect the pope, the head of all Christians. In answering this question, the master had claimed that the Romans have this right by “divine law”, extending this term to include all of natural law. The Student demands to know how all of natural law can be called divine law.

The Master begins by distinguishing three modes of natural law. The first mode is

“natural law which is in conformity with natural reason which in no case fails.”425 He goes on to give as examples the commandments “Do not commit adultery” and “Do not lie,” and “things of this type.”426 Natural laws of this type are later said to be “immutable, invariable, and indispensable.”427

The second mode of natural law is “what is to be observed by those who use natural equity alone without any custom and human legislation.”428 This mode of natural law is said to be natural because what is contrary to it was contrary to the original state of nature (that is, before the Fall), and even now its contrary should not be done “if all men lived according to natural reason or divine law…”429 In the prelapsarian state, men’s

“natural reason would have been consonant with divine law.”430 Ideally, all men should still act according to these natural laws, without the need for any external political

424 H. S. Offler, “The Three Modes of Natural Law in Ockham: A Revision of the Text,” Franciscan Studies 37 (1977), 207-18. 425 “…ius naturale illud quod est conforme rationi naturali quae in nullo casu fallit…” Ibid., 212. 426 “…’Non moechaberis’, ‘Non mentieris’ et huiusmodi.” Ibid. 427 “…ius naturale primo modo est immutabile et invariabile ac indispensabile.” Ibid., 213. 428 “…servandum est ab illis qui sola aequitate naturali absque omni consuetudine et constitutione humana utuntur…” Ibid. 212. 429 “…si homines omnes viverent secundum rationem naturalem aut legem divinam…” ibid. 430 Janet Coleman, “Ockham’s Right and the Genesis of the Political as ‘Absolutist’ “, History of Political Thought, XX (1999), pg. 53.

158 authority or positive laws. As examples of such natural laws, he cites from Gratian the claims that all things are common by natural law; and that there is a one liberty for all men, that is, that no man should be enslaved to another. Ockham here takes the stance that private property and slavery were licitly introduced into the world “because of wickedness.”431 Not that it was wicked that such things were introduced; rather, because not all men were living by natural law and reason, it was necessary to introduce these things. Elsewhere, Ockham gives as a reason for introducing private property the fact that what is common to all is often neglected because no one feels a particular responsibility for it. He thus appeals to what in contemporary philosophy is called “The Tragedy of the

Commons.”432 But what is more important here is the claim that, although these natural laws are no longer binding or obligatory, nevertheless, it is still the case that all men should follow them. This makes these natural laws sound somewhat like what are called the “counsels of perfection”, those moral counsels in the Gospels that we are not bound to adopt but should if we want to be perfect. This also seems to be connected to Ockham’s defense of Franciscan poverty; for his view seems to be that owning property is not currently immoral or against natural law; nevertheless, nothing would be owned “if after the fall all men lived according to reason.”433 It is the corrupting effects of the fall which have created the need for human government and positive laws, and so created the need for a third type of natural law.

This third mode of natural law is what “is gathered by evident reasoning from the law of nations or another law or from some act, divine or human, unless the contrary is

431 “…propter iniquitatem…” Ibid. 432 Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons", Science 162 (3859): pp. 1243–1248. 433 “…si post lapsum omnes homines secundum rationem viverent…” Offler, 212.,

159 enacted with the consent of those concerned.”434 This is what Ockham calls natural law

“on supposition.”435 This is because such laws are not based upon natural reason alone, but require the supposition that either some human agreement or pact has been made, or that some action has been taken. An example of the first type of law is the duty to repay money lent or to return something that has been borrowed, supposing that private property and money have been instituted by human law. An example of the second type of law is the right to repel someone by force “supposing that someone unjustly inflicts violence on another.”436 Normally one does not have the right to use force against anyone, but supposing force and violence have been initiated by someone, it is legitimate by natural law to use force to repel this initial use of it. The general reason he gives, however, is interesting: it is because the first use of force is “not in accord with natural law but is contrary to natural law.”437 So as a general matter we can use force to defend ourselves or others against acts that are contrary to natural law, or perhaps we can say, that we can use force to defend our natural rights. Ockham does notaddress the question, but it would seem plausible to conclude that we can defend ourselves and property against violations of the first and third modes of natural law, but not the second.

Why not the second mode? Because though it is in accord with natural reason, it is not actually binding on us anymore. In fact, one of the suppositions grounding the third mode of natural law, that private property has been instituted by human legislation, is in fact directly in conflict with the common possession of all things, which is a natural law

434 “…ex iure gentium vel alio, aut ex aliquo facto (divino vel humano), evidenti ratione colligitur, nisi de consensu illorum quorum interest contrarium statuatur.” Offler, 213. 435 “…ex supposition…” Ibid. 436 “…supposito quod aliquis violentiam de facto iniuriose inferat alteri…” Ibid. 437 “…non est de iure naturali sed contra ius naturale…” Ibid.

160 or right of the second mode! It is obvious that there is a crucial distinction here between the first and second modes of natural law, that is, between those laws that are in conformity with natural reason that cannot be changed or overwritten by human laws and agreements; and those laws that, despite being in conformity with natural reason (and divine law!), can be changed or overwritten by human laws and agreements. How are we to know into which mode a given dictate of reason falls? Ockham does not tell us, and it is unlikely he thought much about this issue; very likely, he thought it would always be quite obvious with which mode we are dealing. It is, after all, quite possible to imagine a community living either with private property or without it; but it is very dubious that one can imagine a community of people who do not recognize a duty to tell the truth.

Allowing lying or adultery would sow such distrust in a group of people that it is doubtful they could be called a community in any sense.

Despite these questions concerning our knowledge of these three modes of natural law, it is important to recognize that these modes are not distinguished epistemically, as in the previous division of natural law. Rather, the three modes are distinguished according to the conditions under which they hold. The first mode always holds; the second holds in the absence of any positive laws or agreements; and the third mode holds given such positive laws or agreements. The fact that both texts divide natural laws into three categories should not mislead us into assuming an isomorphism between them. The first mode of natural laws which never fail will not all be the first type of natural laws which are self-evident or indubitably inferred from self-evident principles. In fact, all three types of natural law discussed in the first text would seem to fit into the first and second modes of natural law of the second text. Indeed, the first division of natural laws

161 makes no mention at all of human agreements or ordinances, which play a decisive role in distinguishing the second and third modes of natural law in the second text. Thus, we are presented with two independent classifications of natural laws, each of which is designed to answer a specific question.

After this discussion of the three modes of natural law, the Student again asks how, granted that the Romans have to right to elect the pope by natural law, they can also be said to have this right by divine law; that is, how is every natural law considered to be divine law? The Master gives two explanations for this equivalency. The first is that,

“every law that is from God, who is the creator of nature, can be called a divine law; but every natural law is from God, who is the creator of nature; therefore, etc.”438 This seems clear cut enough: since God created nature, both in the sense of causing it to exist and in the sense of causing it to be how it is, then whatever laws follow from or depend upon nature are also from God; thus, every natural law is also a divine law. This means that anyone may well be able to know what the divine law is without being a Christian or indeed believing in a God at all. As long as natural laws can be read off of nature itself or follow immediately from natural reason, they should be accessible to anyone, and since these natural laws are also divine laws, there are divine laws that are accessible to anyone.

But the Master’s second explanation is also critically important. “Also, because every natural law that is contained explicitly or implicitly in the divine Scriptures can be called a divine law, because ‘divine law is contained in the divine Scriptures,’ dist. 8, c

Quo iure; but every natural law is contained explicitly or implicitly in the divine

438 “…omne ius quod est a Deo, qui est conditor naturae, potest vocari ius divinum; omne autem ius naturale est a Deo, qui est conditor naturae; ideo, etc.” Ibid., 216.

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Scriptures, because in the divine Scriptures there are certain general propositions from which, either alone or with others, can be inferred every natural law, spoken of in the first way, in the second way, and in the third way, though it may not be found in them explicitly.”439 This is a remarkable claim. First of all, it obviously gives a prominence to a

Christian theologian like Ockham, that is, someone who is an expert in the Scriptures; they, more so than canon or civil lawyers, are the real experts in natural law.440

More striking is Ockham’s claim that all of the natural laws in the third mode can be found either explicitly or implicitly in divine Scriptures. After all, natural law in the third mode is often the result of human law or agreements, and it would not seem that it is possible that every possible human agreement or law that is in conformity with natural reason would be inferable from divine Scriptures. Perhaps Ockham just means to suggest that we can find the general claim that human agreements, laws, and rulers should be followed and obeyed. Certainly, this would be consonant with the many injunctions in the

New Testament for Christians to obey even pagan rulers; and it may be that this is all that

Ockham is claiming. But, again, Ockham is claiming that Christians have, as it were, a back door to knowledge of the natural law not available to others: by natural reason and by the divine Scriptures.441 This dual knowledge of natural law is similar to the dual motivations that Christians would also have for virtuous actions: right reason and love of

439 “Tum quia omne ius quod explicite vel implicite continetur in scripturis divinis potest vocari ius divinum, quia "ius divinum in scripturis divinis habetur", dist. 8, Quo iure; omne autem ius naturale in scripturis divinis explicite vel implicite continetur, quia in scripturis divinis sunt quaedam regulae generales ex quibus, vel solis vel cum aliis, colligi potest omne ius naturale et primo et secundo et tertio modo dictum, licet in eis non inveniatur explicite.” Ibid. 440Takashi Shigomen Ockham and Political Discourse in the Middle Ages (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), note 126, pg. 64. 441 Of course, insofar as the relevant precepts are found in the Old Testament, Jews would also have this dual access, but not to precepts found only in the New Testament. Are there such precepts? Clearly the legitimacy of the papacy cannot be found in the Old Testament, but I am not sure if there are any more purely moral natural laws that Ockham would think are found only in the New Testament.

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God. Just as Christians have a reason to act virtuously that pagans lack, so they also have a way of knowing natural laws that pagans lack.

Another discussion of natural law occurs in the tenth chapter of the first book of the second tract of the third part of the Dialogue. The general question of this book is whether it is beneficial for the whole world to be ruled by one secular ruler, an emperor.

The Master had raised a number of arguments for this position. One says that it would be against natural law for the whole world to be under one emperor if it were not beneficial for this to be the case. So, the Master then explains why it is not against natural law for there to be a single secular ruler of the world. He begins by pointing out that “natural law is a natural commandment.”442 This is from the ordinary gloss443. He then goes on to point out that, just as there is a twofold division of natural commandments, so there is a twofold division of natural laws. “Some natural commandments are absolute and without any condition, qualification, specification, or determination.…”444 He then goes on to give examples: “‘Do not worship strange gods’, ‘Do not commit adultery’, ‘Do not bear false witness’, ‘Do not lie’, and the like.”445 It seems as if here Ockham is placing all of the precepts of the Ten Commandments into the category of having no exceptions. He does not articulate all of them, but I think we can see that his list is drawn from the

Decalogue and that the others “of this type” are the other commandments.

442 “…ius naturale sit naturale praeceptum…” William of Ockham, http://www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/dialogus/w32d1btx.html 443 “Fas lex divina est: ius lex humana.” Corpus Iuris Canonici editio Lipsiensis secunda post Aemilii Ludouci Richteri curas, Pars Prior: Decretum Magistri Gratiani, ed. A. Friedberg (Graz : Akademische Druck- U. Verlagsanstalt, 1959) pg. 1. 444 “Praeceptum autem naturale quoddam est absolutum, absque omni conditione, modificatione. specificatione seu determination...” Ibid. 445 “…’Non coles deos alienos", ‘Non moechaberis’, ‘Non falsum testimonium dices’, ‘Non mentieris’, et huiusmodi.” Ibid.

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On the other hand, “some are not absolute but are subject to some condition, qualification, specification, or determination…”446 As examples of this type of natural law, he gives these two: “Use something of another’s even against the owner’s will – if you are in a situation of extreme necessity…” and, “Cut off one of your members – to preserve the health of the body…”447, and as usual he indicates there are others. Based upon this distinction, the Master says that having a single emperor cannot be against natural law in the first sense because then no one could have ever legitimately been emperor; and, although Ockham doesn’t say so here, he likely thinks this would contradict the Bible’s injunction to “Render to Caesar”, which implies that Tiberius

Caesar was a true and legitimate emperor. In other writings Ockham says both that the

“Roman Empire in the time of Christ was true and legitimate,”448 and that the current emperor is legitimately elected by a college of German princes.449 But, he does point out that, if it would for some reason harm the common good for there to be a single emperor, it would be against the natural law in the second way for there to be a single emperor.

But the basic division here is between natural laws that have no exception or dispensation, and those that can have exceptions or that can be modified to suit particular circumstances. This seems to be the same distinction that distinguished the first mode of natural law from the second and third modes in the previous discussion; so that, although there are only two categories of natural law here instead of three, nevertheless, the

446 “Quoddam autem non est absolutum, sed cum aliqua conditione, modificatione, specificatione seu determination…” Ibid. 447 “’Uti alieno etiam invito domino, si fueris in extrema necessitate constitutus’, ‘Abscinde unum membrorum tuorum pro sanitate corporis conservanda’…”Ibid. 448 “…tenendum est pro certo quod Romanum imperium tempore Christi verum fuit et legitimum…” William of Ockham, Breviloquium. OP IV, ed. H. S. Offler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 449 “…successores Karoli, tam ante institutionem principum electorum quam post, filios suos et alios constituerunt imperatores, consortes imperii vel successores…” William of Ockham, Octo Quaestiones de Potestate Pape, OP I, pg. 140.

165 distinctions are at least consistent with one another. The justification for the difference in number of categories would seem to be based upon the use the distinction is being put to in the particular argument.

A similar division of natural laws occurs in Ockham’s Breviloquium, his most sustained work on the powers of the pope. In the second book the question of just what fullness of power the pope has is raised. One argument claimed that popes can do things which conflict with natural equity because they can commit the care of souls to boys, that is, to people normally without the intellectual and moral maturity to direct others.

Ockham denies this, of course, and proceeds to distinguish two types of natural equity.

The first meaning of natural equity is “what is in conformity with natural reason, which cannot be false or not right…”450 He goes on to say that neither the pope nor anyone else can do anything against this type of natural equity, “which is natural law.”451

He then goes on to give the second meaning of natural equity as “what should regularly be observed by those who have the use of reason unless there is some special reason why it cannot be observed.”452 Although in this text Ockham does not call this a species of natural law, it is sufficiently similar to versions of natural law that we have already seen that we can assume that Ockham would not object to its being labeled a type of natural law. And once again, the basic division between the first type of natural equity and the second is between laws that cannot have an exception or dispensation, and those dictates of reason that do admit of such exceptions or dispensations.

450 “…quod est conforme rationi rectae, quae non potest esse falsa vel non rectae.” Ibid., 160. 451 “…quod est ius naturale…” Ibid. 452 “…quod regulariter ab utentibus ratione servari debet, nisi subsit causa specialis quare servari non possit aut nequeat…” Ibid.

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The final discussion of natural law that we will examine occurs in twenty-fourth chapter of the second book of the first tract of the third part of the Dialogue. This discussion will, however, show a small though marked difference with the previous three discussions regarding just the persons who are not allowed to make exceptions or dispensations and those who may. Here the Student asks the question whether the pope can contravene a commandment of God, that is, can he dispense someone from having to follow a divine commandment in a given case. The Master responds, quite bluntly, that no one, including the pope, may dispense with any commandment of God, unless to dispense simply means to interpret. Ockham has the Master say that, so long as the meanings of the words of the Scriptures are clear, then there should be no dispensation nor even interpretation necessary, because the meanings are perfectly clear. He allows that some prophecies in the Bible, such as those in the book of Revelations, may be very unclear, but in that case “the interpretation of such a commandment must be awaited from God alone.”453 Ockham seems to think that any commandments that are truly necessary for us now will be easily understandable, and that they should always be obeyed without exception.

But then the Student asks the question about how to deal with what appear to be exceptions to commandments in the Scriptures themselves. If God Himself can except someone from a commandment, cannot the pope, who claims to have be given “fullness of power” by Christ, also allow exceptions? The Master’s response to this is clear: “If they are simply commandments of natural law, no case should be excepted for any

453 “…tunc interpretatio talis precepti expectanda est a deo solo.” William of Ockham, Dialogus: Part 2; Part 3, Tract 1, John Kilcullen, John Scott, Jan Ballweg, & Volker Leppin, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 217.

167 necessity or utility whatever, unless God specially excepted some case (as, notwithstanding the commandment of purely natural law about not knowingly killing the innocent, God made a special exception in commanding Abraham to sacrifice his son).

However, if they are purely positive commandments, a case of necessity and utility should be excepted in the same way in one as in another, unless it can be especially gathered from the Scriptures that in some such commandment a case of necessity and utility should not be excepted.”454 So, once again, as in the Work of Ninety Days, we have the division between natural law and purely positive divine commandments. The implication of the division here is that, while God, and only God, can issue exceptions to natural law, we cannot make exceptions even for necessity or utility; whereas in the case of purely positive divine commandments we may make exceptions for necessity or utility unless God has specifically commanded us not to do so.

So, how do we know the difference between natural laws and purely positive divine commandments? It is almost certainly not because the latter are commanded by

God whereas the former are; Ockham never says the natural law commandments are not commanded by God. Probably he believes that the purely positive commandments are things like the ceremonial and cleanliness commandments in the Old Testament, grants of land455, and perhaps the sacraments of the Christian churches. All of these are examples of divine commands which do not establish a law that is binding on all humanity, as

454 “Si enim sint simpliciter precepta iuris naturalis, nullus casus excipi debet propter quamque necessitatem vel utilitatem, nisi deus specialiter aliquem exciperet (quemadmodum, non obstante precepto iuris meri naturalis de nullo innocente scienter interficiendo, deus precipiendo Abrahe ut immolaret filium suum, specialem excepcionem fecit.) Si autem sint precepta mere positiva, casus necessitatis et utilitatis ita debet excipi in uno sicut in alio, nisi ex scripturis specialiter colligi possit quod in aliquo tali precepto non est excipiendus casus necessitatis et utilitatis.” Ibid., 219. 455 This is supported by Ockham’s claim that certain unbelievers had true lordship of land given to them by God. See William of Ockham, Brevil. OP IV, 164-167.

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Miethke points out,456 because they cannot be demonstrated to someone who does not already have the Christian faith. Whatever he means by the purely positive divine commandments; Ockham seems utterly sure that we will have no difficulty in distinguishing between those and the commandments of the natural law.

The main example of an exception to a natural law that Ockham gives in this case is the commandment of God to Abraham to sacrifice Isaac. The Master says that when

Abraham was given this direct command, he was obliged to sacrifice his son, “yet he was obliged to take care not to kill other innocents, because it was commanded to him simply to sacrifice his son, and not others, and he could not have drawn any other meaning from the words of the commandment except that which they first expressed.”457 Thus, a clear exception in one case is just that, a one-time only exception, and we cannot legitimately assume that there are any other exceptions. Although in this case the exception was made to test Abraham’s faith, a similar scenario is not likely to arise again; we may take it from the passage as a whole that, even if God had allowed an exception due to utility or necessity, such an exception could not be taken to imply a general exception to the natural law against killing an innocent in cases of necessity or utility.

Curiously, Ockham discusses this case of Abraham being ordered to kill Isaac in another work, his Whether a Prince Can Receive the Goods of the Church for His Own

Needs, namely, in Case of War, Even Against the Wishes of the Pope (usually abbreviated to An Princeps).458 There, Ockham is discussing the issue of in what sense the pope has

456 Jürgen Miethke, 481-482. 457 “…et tamen ne occideret alios innocents debuit sibi cavere, quia simpliciter erat sibi preceptum ut immolaret filium suum, et non alios, et ideo alium intellectum non potuit elicere ex verbis precepti nisi quem primo sonabant.” Ibid., 218-219. 458 William of Ockham, An Princeps pro suo Succursu, scilicet Guerrae, Possit Recipere Bona Ecclesiarum etiam Invito Papa, OP vol 1, ed. by H. S. Offler (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1964), pp. 228- 267.

169 fullness of power (plenitudo potestatis). Just how much power did the popes receive from

Christ Himself when he created the papacy, using the words “I will give you the keys…”? Supporters of the popes’ power sometimes argued that the pope had such fullness of power that he was bound by no human law, even his own, and that he could do anything God Himself, in the person of Christ, had the power to do. Ockham considers this position absurd, because if the pope had such fullness of power, “he could act against divine law and natural law, at least in those things the contrary of which God can order.”459 As an example of this power that the pope claims, Ockham says that he could order the faithful to kill innocents “…in the same way that God ordered Abraham to kill his innocent son – which was not ordered against natural law, since God is the lord of life and death, even though it pertains to natural law and divine law not to kill an innocent person.”460 God can command an exception to the divine or natural law (fas) forbidding the killing of an innocent because He is the lord of life and death; thus, we now have a reason God can command exceptions to natural law. We may generalize to say that

Ockham’s position is that God can command exceptions to natural law because He is the author of nature – nature and natural law are the way they are because God has created them, so He is not bound by them. But divine dispensations do not invalidate natural law: they are merely one-time exceptions.

But does all of this mean that for Ockham natural laws are nothing but divine commandments to which there happen to be no exceptions? After all, in the text quoted

459 “…posset contra legem divinam et ius naturae, praesertim in his, in quibus potest Dues conrtra huiusmodi…” Ibid., 243. 460 “…quemadmodum Deus praecepit Abrahae, ut filium suum innocentem occideret – nec contra fas praecepit, quia Deus est dominus vitae et mortis, cum tamen ad legem divinam et ius naturae pertineat non occidere innocentem…” Ibid.

170 above from An Princeps he seems to equate divine law and natural law (lex divina, ius naturae); does this mean that there is not a clear difference between them? Clearly not, since, as we have seen, he consistently draws a distinction between natural law which is accessible by purely natural human reason, and “purely positive divine commandments” which clearly are not. Furthermore, he claims that, while no exceptions not specifically condoned by God Himself can be admitted to natural laws, not even for necessity or utility, nevertheless, it is permissible to not comply with, though not to change, a purely positive divine commandment for reasons of utility or necessity. So he clearly believes that we can usually discriminate between natural laws which admit of no human exceptions, and purely positive divine laws which do allow such exceptions. But just how do we tell the difference between these classes of divine laws? A similar question can be asked about the difference between the first and second modes of natural law discussed in the famous text from the Dialogue. How are we to know the difference between those dictates of natural law which have always and will always hold without exception, and those that held absolutely before the Fall, but the contrary of which are now permitted because of sin?

Ockham never seems to have gone into detail about such differences. But can we do better for him? The text from the Breviloquium might be of interest here. There,

Ockham says that the first type of natural equity, which is the type he equates with natural law, is “what is in conformity with right reason, which cannot be false or not right.”461 This is similar to what he says about the first mode of natural law, that it is what is in conformity with natural reason, “which in no case fails.”462 But what is most

461 See note 42 above. 462 See note 22 above.

171 interesting about the definition from the Breviloquium is how similar it is to his definition of a necessary proposition in the Summa Logicae. There, as we saw in chapter three, he defined a necessary proposition as one that “if it is formed, it is not false but always true.”463 If we only make the connection that for a dictate of right or natural reason, to be

“right” is the same as for a proposition to be “true”, we can say that Ockham usually held the standard of what counts as a natural law for which no exceptions are possible to be the same as for what counts as a proposition to be necessarily true. Thus, Ockham thinks that at least some natural laws are necessary, even though he never explicitly uses these terms.

But if natural laws are necessary in this sense, then how can God command exceptions? After all, Ockham’s usual definition of what it means for God to be omnipotent is that He can do anything that does not involve a contradiction for Him to do. And it is beyond doubt that Ockham thinks that God can make exceptions to natural laws even in this sense. But to make a necessary proposition false would seem to be a contradiction, so how can God do it?

I am not aware of any text in which Ockham addresses this question, but I suggest that his answer might be along the following lines. There is a difference between a theoretical or descriptive proposition, which describes the way the world actually is, and a practical proposition or dictate of right reason which only enjoins how one ought to act.

It is clearly impossible that it be both raining and not raining at the same time in the same location, and it is impossible in such a way that not even God can make it true. But though it may be impossible for it to be permissible as a general rule to kill innocent

463 William of Ockham, SL, OPh I., “si formetur, non est falsa sed vera tantum.” Ibid., 512.

172 people, it is clearly the case that it is not impossible that people do it. Indeed, the very nature of a normative proposition is to tell us how the world ought to be, rather than how it is; and we are usually interested in normative propositions precisely because the world is not how it ought to be. So there is no reason why, although it may not be possible to imagine a given general law not holding, yet this does not mean that special exceptions might not occur in which that law should not be followed. Ockham thinks that only a direct, unambiguous command from God can justify such an exception; and clearly, such commands are themselves exceptionally rare.

But what gives God this extraordinary right or power? The only answer given is that God is the “lord of life and death”, that is, human life is His to command. This would seem to be Ockham’s take on St Paul’s rhetorical question in his Epistle to the Romans:

“Or does not the potter have a right over the clay…”? God is the author of nature, and so

He has the right to create us however He likes; and He even has the right to make exceptions to rules to which no human may make an exception. This answer may not be completely satisfying, but it is a standard answer in Christian theology.464

But how do we square this with his claim that these natural laws “in no case fail”?

Or, at least, are they products of right reason which “in no case fails”? The only answer here is that each of these natural laws has a hidden caveat: “Unless God commands otherwise.” “Do not lie – unless God commands otherwise!” Or, perhaps we can say that one natural law is always, “Obey God in all things!” And that, whenever this commandment conflicts with another one, it always trumps the other commandment. But

464 See Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 100, a. 8, ad. 3m, Sancti Thomæ Aquinatis doctoris angelici Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII.O.M. edita., cura et studio Fratrum praedictorum, (Rome: 1882- ), Tomus VII. pg. 215.

173 this is not a pure divine command theory of natural law because, although Ockham believes that God may permit exceptions to any natural law, he does not seem to believe that God can command the opposite of any natural law as a general rule. That is, not even

God can make it be the case that we should always lie, or kill innocents, or worship false gods. Indeed, this last example is perhaps the ultimate test case, and it would be analogous to the questions in Ockham’s academic writings concerning a divine command to hate or not love God. If God commanded us to worship other gods, would it be right to do so? Could it be done meritoriously? Unlike the academic question, Ockham never addresses this question in his political writings. But based upon the texts we have examined, I think it is clear that Ockham believes that, while God may command us to worship a false god once, or perhaps to offer a sacrifice to such a god, still He cannot command us to always worship false gods. For, “Worship a false god” would seem to be the kind of command that reason simply could not consistently dictate. God may command someone to worship a false god to appease his neighbors, to avoid persecution, or to test his faith (as His command to sacrifice Isaac was a test of Abraham’s faith), but

He could not command it as a general rule; He cannot establish a false religion.

Thus, Ockham’s natural law theory is not a divine command theory, but it is a theory that takes note of God, and is comfortable in granting Him a significant prerogative to dispense with any natural law but only in specific cases. In this way, it is similar to his moral philosophy in general, in that it too allows God to contravene any particular moral rule at His discretion. And so, we can see that, far from being a decisive break with his academic moral philosophy, the natural law theory in his political writings reproduces the structure of that moral philosophy. Right reason (or natural reason) is our

174 main guide to action, but it must always take note of all of the circumstances in which we act. Whether someone is acting before the Fall or after it; whether in the latter case he is acting only among people who use their natural reason, or among people who are acting out of sinfulness; whether he is acting in a situation with or without human legislation or agreement; and finally, whether he is acting when God has given a specific command for the particular situation or He has not. All of these circumstances can make a difference for what natural laws govern a given situation, and the last circumstance can overrule seemingly any natural law.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

Let us review what we have found in this dissertation. Although Ockham claims adamantly several times that there can be a science of morals, it has often been objected that his views on the normative status of divine commands should prohibit this.

Ockham’s views on the nature of science in general require that the first principles of any science be necessary propositions that are known either per se or through experience. But if the basic moral principles are true only because they are ordained by God, and exactly the opposite principles would be equally true had they been ordained by God, it is alleged that Ockham cannot allow that the basic premises of moral science can be necessary in the way required to serve as the premises of scientific demonstrations. For Ockham, not even God can make what is necessary false, for the opposite of what is necessary would involve a contradiction being true, and not even God by His omnipotence can do or make something that includes an evident contradiction.465

We have seen, however, that this objection does not hold good. While it is true that Ockham does believe that divine commands must be obeyed, and that whatever God commands or prohibits is right or wrong precisely because God commands or prohibits it, he does not think that divine commands are the only moral principles, or even the most basic moral principles. Principles such as “the will ought to conform itself to right reason”, and “every blameworthy evil is to be avoided”466 are, he says, known per se; and he also insists that many other principles are known through experience. Ockham always insists on the necessity of such principles and never calls them into question. Indeed, while he does seriously ask whether it is always right to love God even if God commands

465 William of Ockham, QQ, 6.6, Opera Theologica 9, pg. 604. 466 William of Ockham, QQ, 2.14, Opera Theologica 9, pp. 177-178. 175

176 that He not be loved, he never seriously entertains the question of a divine command to not conform the will to right reason. Indeed, it seems that the force of this example is based precisely on the fact that right reason would always dictate that God be obeyed.

Based on this alone, it would seem that for Ockham the principle to conform the will to right reason is not open to question any more than the duty to obey a divine command.

Thus, we can see that Ockham does recognize certain principles that are necessary.

But is this enough to construct a true science of morals? The answer has to be

“yes”, because for Ockham all that is needed, strictly speaking, for there to be a science of morals is for there to be just one demonstrative argument based upon necessary moral principles which yields a moral conclusion. Scientific knowledge is, strictly speaking, just the knowledge of a necessary proposition, which is caused by demonstrative argument using other necessary propositions as premises. We have seen that it is possible to create such a demonstration, so that it is the case that there is a science of morals, for example: every blameworthy act should be avoided; every act lacking generosity to a benefactor is blameworthy; therefore, every act lacking generosity to a benefactor is to be avoided.

But Ockham also allows for ‘lesser’ types of scientific knowledge, and if we allow such lesser types to count, then the claim that there can be a science of morals is even easier to make. Such lesser scientific knowledge must be allowed, because for moral science to be actually directive of human acts, which is part of its definition according to

Ockham, it must be applied to concrete circumstances; and there will never be any concrete circumstances which can be described by absolutely necessary propositions alone.

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Divine commands could partake of either conditional necessity or of accidental necessity, otherwise known as necessity of the past. Given that the hypothetical conditional “If God commands A, A is to be done” seems self-evident, and so necessary; and given that all divine commands are in the past and will never be altered, we can have a moral science that dictates that we obey all existing divine commands. Although

Ockham asks about the limits of what God could command, he never seriously entertains the view that God will change the basic moral commands He has issued. Indeed, we can be certain that God will never change such commands. Thus, moral science is no more threatened by the possibility that God could change His current commands than natural science is threatened by the also very possibility that God could alter the nature of any creatures. Hypothetical necessity and the knowledge or faith that God will not alter His creation are enough for certainty.

But, given this, we can also ask why Ockham entertained the possibilities of such altered divine commands. The answer seems to be merely that for Ockham maintaining divine omnipotence was the paramount theological issue. After the condemnations of

1277, theologians felt that defending the freedom of God from more necessitarian views associated with Arabic thinkers was the most pressing issue467. So, rather than describing moral norms as depending upon God’s goodness or some other attribute, Ockham is concerned to show how God freely commands whatever He commands. It is here that

Ockham’s use of the distinction between God’s absolute and His ordained power is

467 Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 2nd ed., corrected & enlarged. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1952), pp. 83-84. For further discussion of the issue of the effects of the condemnation, see Jan A. Aertsen, Kent Emery, Jr. and Andreas Speer (eds.), Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzen Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), as well as Piché, D. (ed.), La condemnation parisienne de 1277. Texte latin, traduction, introduction et commentaire, (Vrin : Paris, 1999).

178 useful: God’s absolute power refers only to those things which God might have commanded or done but did not and will not; whatever God does He does by his ordained power. The very real concern that Ockham used this distinction to address is the danger of confusing what God has done as being in some sense necessary, as if God had to create the world He in fact created, or had to command the moral order that actually exists.

Ockham is always concerned to avoid such conclusions.

Yet there is also a sense in which Ockham’s language may well be misleading here. For in truth Ockham recognizes no real distinction between God’s knowing and His willing, at least not on the side of God. For Ockham, God is absolutely simple, so that there are no distinctions in God whatsoever, either real or formal468, so that “there is only the one divine reality and many words and concepts which signify and stand for it when we think and speak about it.”469 In fact, God is so simple that He knows through His will just as He knows through His intellect.470 Divine willing and divine knowing are the same act; and in fact everything that God knows or does are nothing apart from the one simple reality that is the divine essence. So that, we may say that God’s commanding that something be done is the same thing as saying that God knows that that same thing should be done or that it will be done. Thus, in the final analysis Ockham’s position on

God’s role in morality may be no different from saying that God simply knows the dictates of morality.

468 However, Ockham does accept that the persons of the Trinity are “…distinguuntur formaliter, quamvis nonrealiter.” Williaam of Ockham, Sent., OTh II, pg 365. 469 Armand Mauer, The Philosophy of William of Ockham in the Light of Its Principles (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1999), pg. 187. 470 “…erit vera ‘actus dicendi est actus voluntatis,’ et ‘Deus intelligit per voluntatem’ sicut haec ‘intelligit per intellectum’…”William of Ockham, Ord., OTh 2, pg. 46.

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So why does he insist on using the language of command and prohibition? Aside from asserting the freedom of God with reference to His creatures, Ockham may also have another reason. To say that God knows a creature has a different connotative meaning from saying that God wills the same creature; whereas both statements denote only the one divine reality, the former does not connote that the creature actually exists while the latter does connote the existence of the creature. So saying that God commands that “every created will ought to conform itself to right reason” actually implies that created wills exist that are bound by this precept, whereas saying that God merely knows that “every created will ought to conform itself to right reason” does not imply the actual existence of any created will to whom this precept might apply. Thus, God’s knowing moral precepts describe only a morality that might hold, while God’s willing the same precepts asserts that such precepts in fact hold. It is this point, that a certain moral order actually exists, that is asserted forcefully by stressing that God has commanded it. Of course, it might still be asked why Ockham never uses the language of divine knowing in reference to morals instead of the language of divine willing. Most likely, the answer to this is just that the questions Ockham is dealing with were often dealt with more easily in the latter language than in the former. Also, there is the literary character of medieval philosophical writing; insofar as it is based on lectures and questions posed to the author, he had to respond to the issues in the text he was commenting on and to the questions often raised by such texts. Ockham never wrote a systematic treatise on ethics; rather, he is usually responding to a question such as, ““Whether God can command that evil be done?”471 Never is he asked a question along the lines of, “Whether God knows what is

471 “Utrum Deus possit praecipere malum fieri” William of Ockham, OTh IV., 680.

180 right?” If he had been asked such a question, he certainly would have answered affirmatively.

But the fact that Ockham never discussed his views on moral science and divine commands in the language of knowing is the reason that such a discussion has been put off to this conclusion, and it is the reason it can only be stated in a cursory way. Because

Ockham never in fact deployed his strong views on divine simplicity in the context of a discussion on morals, it would have been inappropriate to bring it into the main discussions in this dissertation. Any defense of his views should remain as close to possible to the language that he actually used. His strong stance on divine simplicity and the corollary that God’s willing and His knowing something are identically the same act are well documented and understood; but as he never deployed it to solve the relationship between moral science and divine commands, we can go only so far in assuming that he would have seen such use of divine simplicity as a valid extension of such language.

Thus, it seemed better to remain within the language he used in such cases. What we can say with some certainty, however, is that even if Ockham thinks moral imperatives hold only because God has commanded them, he would also point out that God commanding something is not the same thing as a human being commanding something. Of no person or being other that God can it be said that his willing and his knowing are the same act; and so, the dependence of moral imperatives on God’s will does not raise the same concerns or questions as their dependence on lesser wills would.

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