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THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY of AMERICA the Possibility of Moral Science in the Philosophy of William Ockham a DISSERTATION Submitted

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THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY of AMERICA the Possibility of Moral Science in the Philosophy of William Ockham a DISSERTATION Submitted THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA The Possibility of Moral Science in the Philosophy of William Ockham A DISSERTATION Submitted to the Faculty of the School of Philosophy Of The Catholic University of America In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree Doctor of Philosophy @ Copyright All Right’s Reserved By Bart Jason Himel Washington, D.C. 2020 The Possibility of Moral Science in the Philosophy of William Ockham Bart Jason Himel, Ph.D. Director: Timothy B. Noone, Ph.D. The essential character of William of Ockham’s moral theory has long been an issue in the secondary literature due to the perceived difficulty of reconciling his claim that morals is a science based upon necessary principles with his equally strong claim that God can issue virtually any command which it would be our moral duty to obey. Most commentators have attempted to resolve this difficulty by focusing on a select group of texts in which Ockham makes these claims, but other texts in which he deals with these issues, sometimes more directly, often have been ignored. The author of the present dissertation attempts to resolve this issue by means of a close reading of all of the relevant texts in Ockham’s works. In the first chapter, the author presents the primary texts of Ockham which have been the focus of discussion; he then surveys the secondary literature, and offers criticisms of the dominant positions that have been taken. In the second chapter the author examines Ockham’s views concerning the nature and requirements for scientific knowledge, especially that it must be in the form of a demonstration; and in the third chapter, he more fully examines one of these requirements, that all of the propositions in a scientific demonstration must be necessary propositions. Having established the requirements for scientific knowledge in general, in the fourth chapter the author attempts to establish that Ockham’s moral theory can yield scientific knowledge of ethical matters even if such knowledge is limited to general propositions as opposed to propositions regarding particular actions. In the fifth chapter, he extends this analysis to Ockham’s natural law theory as presented in his political writings. He shows that, despite a significant terminological difference between Ockham’s earlier academic writings and his political writings, the same tensions are equally present in the latter as in the former, and so the resolution offered in the previous chapter can easily be extended to Ockham’s natural law theory in his political writings. The final chapter sums up the results of the previous chapters. This dissertation by Bart Jason Himel fulfills the dissertation requirement for the doctoral degree in Philosophy approved by Timothy B. Noone, Ph.D., as Director, and by Michael Gorman, Ph.D., and Angela McKay Knobel, Ph.D. as Readers. ___________________________________ Timothy B. Noone, Ph.D., Director ___________________________________ Michael Gorman, Ph.D., Reader ___________________________________ Angela McKay Knobel, Ph.D., Reader ii Table of Contents Introduction…………………………………………………………………….Page 1. Chapter 1: Introduction to the Problem of Moral Science……………………..Page 4. Chapter 2: The Nature of Demonstrative Science…………………………….Page 45. Chapter 3: The Nature of Necessary Propositions…………………………….Page 77. Chapter 4. Can There Be a Demonstrative Science of Morals?.......................Page 104. Chapter 5: The Political Writings: Moral Science and Natural Law…………Page 137. Chapter 6: Conclusion………………………………………………………...Page 175. Bibliography……………………………………………………………..……Page 181. iii Introduction In his writings on moral questions, William of Ockham claims that we can have a scientific knowledge of morals based upon necessary principles that are per se nota, and that are accessible to human right reason; however, there are other passages in which Ockham seems to claim that all moral principles depend upon the will of God for their truth, and that He can change them at will. Thus, there appears to be a conflict between two view of morality in Ockham’s writings: a rationalist view based upon right reason, and a divine command theory view based upon God’s will. In this dissertation I will examine the question whether these two sets of texts can be reconciled, and, if so, in what ways. Over the past century of scholarship on Ockham’s moral theory, different scholars have staked out positions on both sides of this conflict: some have maintained that Ockham’s moral theory is essentially a rationalistic one so that true moral science is possible within it; while others have maintained that Ockham’s moral theory is essentially a divine command theory, and consequently no true moral science is possible within it despite Ockham’s claims to the contrary. I will try to sort out these claims, and, by using a close reading of Ockham’s texts, I will try to resolve whether Ockham is entitled to his claim that we can have a moral science. This dissertation will have six chapters in it. The first chapter is an introduction to the issue to be dealt with. First, it cites the relevant texts in Ockham’s writings. Then it describes the views which different commentators have taken on those texts through the centuries. It attempts to assess the relative merits of each of the views put forward; and it criticizes the shortcomings of each of the views. 1 2 The second chapter begins the close reading of Ockham’s texts by looking at his various discussions of what constitutes scientific knowledge in general. It shows that, for Ockham, the requirements for a truly scientific knowledge of any subject matter are very strict. Specifically, it shows that scientific knowledge in the strictest sense is always of necessary propositions which are deduced from necessary premises. It also discusses the various lesser types of scientific knowledge which Ockham is willing to accept. The third chapter elaborated on the nature of necessary propositions. It having been shown in the second chapter that scientific knowledge is always of necessary propositions, this chapter more fully discusses what Ockham believes is required for a proposition to be truly necessary. It is shown that for Ockham a necessary proposition is one which can never be false, but only true. Together, the second and third chapters establish the criteria necessary for claiming any subject matter is susceptible to scientific knowledge; the following chapters will evaluate whether Ockham’s views on moral principles can be assimilated within such criteria such that a moral science is possible. The fourth chapter directly deals with this challenge. It looks at Ockham’s texts in which he discusses moral science and moral principles, and it attempts to apply the criteria discussed in the previous two chapters to them to see if a true science of morals can be defended within Ockham’s works. This chapter will look at several possible solutions, and it will in the end conclude that at least a limited science of morals is possible. The fifth chapter extends this discussion into Ockham’s political writings. First, it explains why it was desirable to segregate Ockham’s political writings from his academic writings: they were written at distinctly different periods in Ockham’s life, they are 3 motivated by different circumstances, and there is a distinct terminological difference between the two sets of texts which must be explained. This chapter argues, first, that it makes sense to read Ockham’s political writings in the light of his academic writings, that they are not so distinct in content as they may at first appear and that the same sets of issues appear in both sets of texts; and, second, it argues that the same reconciliation of these issues is possible in both. The sixth chapter is a conclusion. It sums up what has gone before, and briefly recites the position argued for in the other chapters. Chapter 1: Introduction to the Problem of Moral Science William of Ockham never wrote a systematic work on moral theory, nor did he ever comment on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. However, he did discuss issues dealing with moral philosophy throughout his works. Despite the fact that these discussions are thus scattered, there is a remarkable consistency between his discussions of individual topics, such as virtue, right reason, moral science and divine commands, when he discusses these in separate works. However, the overall nature of his moral theory suffers from an apparently significant inconsistency. When he discusses moral science, Ockham is adamant that there are certain moral truths which are accessible to reason alone, and these are the subject matter of moral science. However, when he deals with the role that God’s commands play in moral theory, he is equally adamant that acts are immoral only because God has commanded the opposite of these, and that God could have in fact commanded something completely different, which would then be virtuous or meritorious. So, Ockham seems equally committed to a moral theory that is based upon reason and so is accessible to any person, and a theory based upon divine commands, the content of which would seem to be available only through revelation. How do we reconcile these different points of view? That has long been a contentious issue among scholars of Ockham’s moral theory. Some have maintained that Ockham’s theory is predominantly a divine command theory1; others have claimed that Ockham’s theory is based on right reason, which orders us to obey divine commands2; 1 For the most recent statement of this position, see Thomas M. Osborne, “Ockham as a divine-command theorist,” Religious Studies 41 (2005): 1-22. 2 Marilyn McCord Adams, “The Structure of Ockham’s Moral Theory,” Franciscan Studies 46 (1986): 1- 35; John Kilcullen, “Natural Law and will in Ockham,” in A Translation of William of Ockham’s Work of Ninety Days, Vol.
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