The Role of U.S. Media in Shaping Foreign Policy Towards Pakistan a Case Study of New York Times and Washington Post (2001-2008)

The Role of U.S. Media in Shaping Foreign Policy towards Pakistan A Case Study of New York Times and Washington Post (2001-2008)

Submitted by SHAMAILA FAROOQ Ph.D. Scholar

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS UNIVERSITY OF PESHAWAR May 2015

APPROVAL CERTIFICATE “The Role of U.S. Media in Shaping Foreign Policy towards Pakistan” A Case Study of New York Times and Washington Post (2001-2008)

Dissertation Presented By Shamaila Farooq To the Department of International Relations University of Peshawar In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Ph.D. in International Relations May, 2015 We, the undersigned have examined the thesis entitled “The Role of U.S. Media in Shaping Foreign Policy towards Pakistan: A Case Study of New York Times and Washington Post (2001-2008)” written by Shamaila Farooq, Ph.D. Scholar at the Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar and do hereby approve it for the award of Ph.D. Degree.

Approved By: Supervisor: ______

PROF. DR. IJAZ KHAN Professor of International Relations University of Peshawar

Co- Supervisor: ------PROF. DR. MUHAMAD ANWAR HASSAN Professor, Television Communications Vice Chancellor, Preston University, Kohat

External Examiner: ______

Chairperson: ______

PROF. DR. NASREEN GHUFRAN Department of International Relations University of Peshawar Dean: ______

PROF. DR. ADNAN SARWAR KHAN Faculty of Social Sciences University of Peshawar

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation is the outcome of my individual research and it has not been submitted to any other university for the grant of a degree.

Shamaila Farooq

Acknowledgements

All praise to “ALLAH”, Almighty, the most merciful and beneficent and salutations on the

Holy Prophet “Hazrat Muhammad” (Peace Be upon Him), a complete source of knowledge for humanity.

I owe a great intellectual debt and gratitude to Prof. Dr. Ijaz Khan, my supervisor for helping me to render this thesis complete. His valuable advice and guidance in connection with developing theme and transforming into writing has been a great source of inspiration for me. I have always found him a great teacher who guided me throughout my M.Phil leading Ph.D. degree.

I also express my sincere gratitude to Professor Dr. Anwar Hassan, Vice Chancellor

Preston University (Kohat) who constantly guided me as co-supervisor of this thesis. Dr.

Hassan offered his technical insight in statistical analysis. I am thankful to my professors and faculty of Department of International Relations including Dean, Faculty of Social

Sciences, Prof. Dr. Muhammad Adnan Sarwar Khan, Dr. Nasreen Ghufran, Dr. Noor Shah

Jahan, Dr. Minhas Majeed and Dr. Shahid Khattak (Late) who shared their thoughts and encouraged me to complete my thesis. I also acknowledge the technical support of Col®

Amir Hashmi and Mr. Abdul Majid from National Defence University, Islamabad for their generous help in providing research material.

I owe a great debt to my colleagues, Dr. Muhammad Younus, Mr. Aurganzeb and Mr.

Ahmad for their constant support throughout this whole process. I am grateful to my son,

Ammaar and my brother, Mr. Tahir Farooq for their encouragement. I am indebted to my

4 friends including Humaira Saima, Sohail, Ayesha, Tariq, Dr. Bradley Wiggins, Elizabeth

Dooghan and Dr.Marilyn Wyatt who encouraged me and prayed for my success.

Abstract

The U.S.-led Global War on Terror (GWOT) has had profound implications for Pakistan as its front-line state. The alliance between the U.S. and Pakistan brought changes to socio- economic and diplomatic landscape of Pakistan. Though the U.S.-Pakistan relations underwent a revival phase in post 9/11 scenario, this coalition did not help to dispel negative perception of Pakistan in the U.S. media. Pakistan has been working closely with U.S. on military and intelligence front, but failed to raise its case at diplomatic level and correct its position in the media.

With rapid technological development, the news media is considered critical in promoting national security goals. The sophisticated U.S. media having covered foreign policy issues since Vietnam War is considered critical, particularly in wars and international conflicts to promote sense of U.S. national identity. After 9/11, the U.S. through its media portrayed the same sense of unity among allies in its campaign against terrorism and positioned the country as a moral leader among nations. This study presents the media framing of Pakistan; how it is portrayed in the U.S. mainstream media and examine their stance towards U.S-Pakistan relationship after 9/11 while testing the foreign policy decision- making theory. This is done by examining the two U.S. mainstream newspapers: The New York Times and The Washington Post’s editorials from 2001-2008. The methodology has incorporated traditional quantitative method of content analysis and qualitative investigation to examine how the U.S.-Pakistan relations are projected through the dominant U.S. media frames reflecting the U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan after 9/11.

The media framing analysis has verified the media’s role within the domestic input category of foreign policy decision making theory which shows that in foreign policy making process, media contributes in shaping a foreign country’s image, thus influencing policy towards that country, while supporting its national security interests. The study also finds an independent role of the U.S. media which does not follow the U.S policy positions except major national interest, contrary to a perceived notion that media is a propaganda tool of U.S. Government. The independent role of the U.S. media is found in criticizing the U.S. Government’s support for General Musharraf’s military rule over civilian government in Pakistan; the U.S. policy in overlooking the restoration of democracy in Pakistan and positive media framing for the U.S.-India strategic partnership over Pakistan during the first eight years of alliance. The study also proposes policy level recommendations for Pakistan to enhance media’s role in national security policy and improved U.S.-Pakistan’s image through joint media ventures between the U.S. and Pakistani media outlets.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ABC American Broadcast Corporation

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation

ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CNN Central News Network

EU European Union

FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas

G8 Group of 8 Industrialized Nations

GWOT Global War on Terrorism

ISI Inter-Services Intelligence

MNNA Major Non-NATO Ally

MMA Motahida Majlis-e-Amal

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NPR National Public Radio

PML(N) Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz

PPPP Pakistan People’s Party Parliamentarian

PTI Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf

PTV Pakistan Television Corporation

SU Soviet Union

TTP Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

US United States

USG United States Government

USAID United States Agency for International Development

WWI World War I

WWII World War II

CONTENTS

Declaration ………………………………………………………………….

Acknowledgments……………………………………………………………

Abstract………………………………………………………………………

iii

Acronyms and abbreviations…………………………………………………

Chapter 1 Introduction …………………………………………………………

1.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………………..

1.2 Statement of the Problem …………………………………………………………..

1.3 Significance of

Study………………………………………………………………..4

1.4 Objective of Study………………………………………………………………….

1.5 Relevance of Study………………………………………………………………….

1.6 Rationale of Selecting News York Times and Washington Post……………………..

1.7 Literature Review

…………………………………………………………………...12

1.8 Hypothesis

…………………………………………………………………………..18

1.9

Methodology………………………………………………………………………

…18

1.10 Division of

Study…………………………………………………………………….21

References

…………………………………………………………………….……..25

Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework

2.1 News Media-Foreign Policy Relationship…………………………………..

2.2 Media in National Security Framework……………………………………. .

2.3 Media, Tool of Information Warfare………………………………………….

2.4 Media and Strategic Perception Making…………………………………… .

2.5 Implanting Media after 9/11………………………………………………….

2.6 Foreign Policy Decision Making Theory……………………………………

2.7 Media Framing Analysis…………………………………………………….

2.8 Mutual Exploitation Model ……………………………………………….

2.9 Propaganda Model……………………………………………………………

2.10 Agenda Setting Theory……………………………………………………….

References………………………………………………………………….

Chapter 3 U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Issues and Challenges in the Post 9/11 Scenario

3.1 Overview………………………………………………………………………..

3.2 U.S.-Pakistan Alliance in the Cold War………………………………………..

3.2.1 Defense Agreements of Cold War……………………………………………..

3.2.2 U.S. intervention in Afghanistan: Dynamics of the U.S.-Pakistan Relations…..

3.3 Post Cold War Era: Issues and Challenges (1989 – 2001)…………………….

3.3.1 Pakistan’s Pro-Taliban Policy: Regional and International Context………….

3.3.2 Al-Qaeda –Taliban Connection……………………………………………….

3.4 Pakistan-India Relations: Regional and International Implications………….

3.4.1 Nuclear Proliferation of South Asia………………………………………….

3.4.2 Impact of Nuclear Tests on the Political Landscape of Pakistan……………..

3.4.3 U.S.-Pakistan Relations before 9/11..…………………..……………………

3.4.4 US Perceptions about Pakistan before 9/11……….………… ……………

3.5 U.S. Foreign Policy since 9/11: Pakistan’s Alliance in the GWOT…………..

3.5.1 U.S. National Security Strategy after 9/11…………………………………………

3.5.2 U.S.-Pakistan Relations after 9/11………………………………………………..

3.5.3 Reversal in Pakistan’s Pro-Taliban Policy after 9/11…………………………….

3.5.4 U.S. Economic Aid: Impact on

Pakistan……………………………………………88

3.5.5 General Musharraf’s Role after 9/11…………………………………………….

3.5.6 Anti Americanism after 9/11…………………………………………………….

3.5.7 U.S. Drone attacks: Impact on the U.S.-Pakistan Relations………………………

3.5.8 Domestic Instability of Pakistan………………………………………………..

3.5.9 Negative Perception of Pakistan in the U.S……………………………………..

3.5.10 Pakistan-India Relations after 9/11…………………………………………..

3.5.11 U.S.-Indian Nuclear Deal: Implications for Pakistan………

. References……………………………………………………………………

102

Chapter 4 News Media - Foreign Policy Relationship

4.1 News Gathering Process and News Making………………………………….

110

4.2 Factors influencing Media Framing……………………………………………

111

4.2.1 Editorial Policy and Media Framing……………………………………………

112

4.2.2 National Interest and Media Framing………………………………………….

113

4.2.3 Government’s Influence and Media Framing…………………………………

114

4.2.4 Agencies /Military’s influence and Media Framing…………………………..

115

4.2.5 Advertiser’s Influence and Media Framing……………………………………..

116

4.2.6 International Politics and Media Framing……………………………………

117

4.2.7 Technology Influence and Media Framing……………………………………

118

4.2.8 Media’s Independent Role and Media Framing………………………………

119

4.3 Media Framing Analysis: Application in Foreign Policy Issues……………….

120

4.4 Media-Foreign Policy Relationship: Academic Views………………………..

135

4.4.1 News Media-State Relations……………………………………………………

135

4.4.2 News Media and National Security……………………………………………..

138

4.4.3 News Media and Image Setting: Impact on Interstate Relations………………..

140

References……………………………………………………………………….

144

Chapter 5 U.S. Media Frames: Content Analysis

5.1 Methodology…………………………………………………………………..

148

5.2 Quantitative Analysis…………………………………………………………..

150

5.2.1 Categorization………………………………………………………………….

151

5.2.2 Unit of Analysis…………………………………………………………………

152

5.2.3 Reliability in Inter Coding Scheme…………………………………………….

152

5.2.4 Procedure of Inter Coding……………………………………………………..

153

5.2.5 Theme Sketch…………………………………………………………………..

154

5.3 Quantitative Scales……………………………………………………………..

158

5.3.1 Positive Scale………………………………………………………………….

158

5.3.2 Negative Scale……………………………………………………………….

159

5.3.3 Neutral Scale…………………………………………………………………

160

5.4 Limitations of Content Analysis……………………………………………..

160

5.5 Quantitative Findings…………………………………………………………

161

5.5.1 Limitation of Frequency Test…………………………………………………

163

5.6 Tables of New York Times…………………………………………………….

163

5.7 Tables of Washington Post………………………………………………….

171

5.8 Quantitative Analysis of New York Times and Washington Post………….

180

5.9 Findings and Analysis………………………………………………………..

182

References…………………………………………………………………….

188

Chapter 6 U.S. Media Frames: Comparative Analysis of U.S. and Pakistan’s

Perspectives

6.1 Qualitative Analysis……………………………………………………………..

190

6.2 Research Question 1 Since 9/11 how U.S. media frame Pakistan in Editorial Coverage……………………………………………………………….. 196

6.2.1 Theme A: Pakistan’s military cooperation with Bush Administration in GWOT…………………………………………………………………………. 198 6.2.2. Theme B: U.S. Pressure on Pakistan to Restore Democracy………………………

213

6.2.3. Theme C: Pakistan’s Nuclear Development: U.S. policy…………………………..

218

6.2.4. Theme D: Pakistan-India Relations: U.S. Policy……………………………………

222

6.2.5. Theme E: Miscellaneous……………………………………………………………

228

6.3 Research Question 2: To what extent media frames coincide with U.S. policy positions in its relations with Pakistan?...... 230

6.4 Research Question 3: To what extent the U.S. media impact its policy makers in making foreign policy towards Pakistan?...... 240

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………

244

References…………………………………………………………………………

248

Bibliography……………………………………………………………………….

287

Annexure A Statistical Procedure for Frequency Analysis…………………………..………….. 284

Annexure B Coding Sheet: 1 ………………………………………………………

285

Annexure C Coding Sheet 2 ……………………………………………………….

286

Tables

Tables of New York Times……………………………………………

163

Table 1: Pakistan’s Military Cooperation with Bush Administration in

GWOT……………………………………………………………………

164

Table 2: U.S. Pressure on Pakistan to Restore Democracy…………………………

166

Table 3: Pakistan’s Nuclear Development: U.S. Policy……………………………

168

Table 4: Pakistan-India Relations: U.S. Policy……………………………………

170

Table 5: Miscellaneous Issues……………………………………………………..

172

Table of Washington Post ……………………………………………..

173

Table 6: Pakistan’s Military Cooperation with Bush Administration in

GWOT……………………………………………………………………

174

Table 7: U.S. Pressure on Pakistan to Restore Democracy…………………………

176

Table 8: Pakistan Nuclear Development: U.S. policy………………………………

178

Table 9: Pakistan-India Relations: U.S. Policy……………………………………

180

Table 10: Miscellaneous Issues……………………………………………………..

182

Table 11: Most appearing keywords in New York Times and Washington

Post’s Editorials……………………………………………………………

184

Figures

Figure: 1.1 Cascading Network Activation…………………..……….…… 47

Figure 5.1 Graphical Representation of Themes………………………….. 161

Figure: 6.1 Graphical Representation of Key Word Frequency of

New York Times and Washington Post………………………… 188

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

In present times, wars and international political conflicts have largely become mass- mediated due to instant media coverage of events. In International Relations, the news media are considered to be an external, yet critical factor in shaping foreign policy decisions to achieve broader national interest goals.1 The news media’s ability to show real-time coverage of world affairs, particularly in wars and humanitarian crisis/conflicts has extended the terror front to the global viewers by bringing these to their home screens.

Powerful media organizations have all the sophisticated technology to serve this purpose.

Saima Saeed places the importance of news media as such a powerful tool in casing issues, arbitrating with administrations and dealing with conflicts that it has spurred up an academic debate worldwide to see the foreign policy decision making process in the backdrop of “newsroom decision making” (Saeed, 2011, p. 47).

Attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) on the U.S. have reshaped the trends of International

Relations in an intense media driven environment. Once settled with the end of Cold War in 1989, many analysts believed that there will be no challenge to the US and it would remain the sole super power, enjoying the global supremacy, thereafter. The news media had no doubt and reflected that in coverage of international events. However, after two

1 The Commission on America’s National Interests, 1996, states national interest as fundamental building blocks in any discussion of foreign policy. Retrieved from http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu

21 decades or so, things have not remained the same. The world experienced strategic fluctuations and transitions. New challenges such as ‘global terrorism’ appeared as another

‘threat’ to the US national security interests. With 9/11, the news media once again set the scope of work and ‘framed’ for them to cover the events and act more aggressively and broadly than in the past. In the context of 9/11, radical Islam has been branded as ‘threat’ where the Global War on Terror (GWOT) is a top priority, to be fought with a preemptive strategy with the help of allies.

The news media started this task while covering events by capturing the 9/11 incident with more depth. They have taken the stories and war images to a larger public arena that subsequently attracted the scholars of International Relations towards the media effects for many reasons. Kenneth Boulding defines image in the same perspective that in

International Relations, international conflicts, crisis and wars build up the image of a nation, which is equally a significant factor as of country’s geographic position, its geopolitical relations and its economic status (Boulding, 1969, p. 426).

Similarly, the phenomena of GWOT has affected the trends of International Relations and grasped complex national interests in the presence of active presence of news media organizations and news coverage. By creating instant messages and transmitting real-time signals, it has further complicated the relations among states. Media coverage of a foreign country not only sets its image, it builds up schemas2 in public minds on a particular issue or event. It also reflects bi-lateral relations with not only the country involved, but also plays a vital role in shaping foreign policy towards it. The media framing of a country also

2. Schemas refer to the cognitive structures in which an individual's knowledge is retained and organized. Retrieved from http://.pubsonline.informs.org

22 establishes its political, social and economic standing in the international arena largely.

Therefore, if a country’s behavior is portrayed and framed negative, it will largely be affecting its foreign relations with other countries.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

In the GWOT, Pakistan as an ally has acted as a frontline state of the U.S. to help take action against terrorist forces and eradicate the elements involved in harming and threatening America’s national interests. Pakistan has faced serious consequences in its capacity as an ally. Internally, it has experienced severe damage to its economy and creeping division within its society. Moreover, the acts of terrorism also increased in the country considerably after 9/11. This created a situation for Pakistan in which it has become a sufferer rather than an ally resulted in low international investment and trade. This took a heavy toll of Pakistan’s image in the GWOT and generated uncertainties both within the country as well as outside.

Apart from other challenges, the most damaging scenario emerged for Pakistan is its negative image portrayed in the international media. However, there appears to be a little consensus within Pakistan on its existing image and creation of a desirable one. Hussain

Haqqani says, there is an intense debate over the issue that the image of Pakistan is distorted while situation on ground is different so it is simply a matter of projecting the real image.

Some however, disagree with the notion and maintain that there is no difference between reality and what is being projected, supported with conspiracy theories that it is the western media, which is responsible for creating negative image of Pakistan (Hussain, 2007). These conflicting views show that there is a little doubt that problem exists at certain level.

This is evident from one feature published in The Economist, the U.S.’s prestigious magazine which published a picture of a grenade on its cover page with a phrase, “Pakistan:

The world’s most dangerous place” inscribed on it (The Economist, 2008). Statement of

Alfredo Leoni, Ambassador of Brazil to Pakistan further reinstates this perception. He says,

“Pakistan has the problem of image because the way media portrays Pakistan everywhere and in my country also, it is not a positive one: “It is a challenge for us to fight this reality”

(Daudzai, 2012, p. 2). In case of Pakistan, such media frames not only affected the U.S. policy goals to get desired support from Pakistan for achieving national security goals, it has also deepened fissures between the two countries and created further negative public perceptions against each other. Evans argues, such loose actions and public remarks about

Pakistan, its leaders or its engagement in the GWOT, can limit its cooperation with the

U.S. interests in South Asia, particularly in Afghanistan and in wanting Pakistan to move towards normalization of relations with India (Evans, 2011, p. 256).

No doubt, the news media has been part of conflicts concerning foreign policy issues, particularly in conflicting international situations; the involvement has been there since long to a degree. The U.S. media being sophisticated is considered relevant and contributive significantly to the process of foreign policy making by disseminating

American standpoint on various international issues and explain the fundamental objectives of the U.S. foreign policy to domestic and international audience.

1.3 Significance of Study

The war against terror and Al-Qaeda got a central place in the U.S. media’s reporting in the post 9/11 period. Successes and failures of the U.S. in the GWOT alike created

24 headlines involving news editors of big news organizations critically working in coverage.

Pakistan’s position in world affairs was put under a spotlight for different reasons in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. The U.S., in the role of superpower, dramatically changed its modus operandi. Launching the GWOT with the doctrine of pre–emption in the forefront, the U.S. called for international alliances for support. General Musharraf was faced with a stark choice of either joining the U.S. or face dread consequences. Notwithstanding adverse public opinion, he decided to side with the U.S. that led the country to act as a frontline state in the GWOT as a Major Non-NATO ally and the recipient of $3.2 billion of U.S. aid and financial incentives.

The study of the U.S.-Pakistan relations becomes more relevant in the current scenario where Pakistan’s image in the U.S. and the U.S. perception in Pakistan show a negative picture for each other. For Pakistan, the challenge is even greater because a bad news would serve to reinforce the image of Pakistan associated with terrorism. General

Musharraf refers to the negative western perception of Islamic world saying, “Muslims are often seen as fanatics, extremists and terrorists” (Musharraf, 2004, p. 9). Similarly,

Haqqani Pakistan’s former Ambassador to the US (2001-2005), in a TV interview says,

70% Americans do not like Pakistan. While these things are considered important for the

U.S. Government to devise foreign policy that create its image in right direction, are ignored by the Pakistani foreign policy makers (Haqqani, 2012). Furthering these comments, former Ambassador to the U.S., Ashraf Jahangir (2012) in same program says the American public opinion is shaped through “manufactured consent” and media are one of the many factors that shape the U.S. public opinion. In case of Pakistan and the U.S., there is an issue of perception and reality. Why American public does not like Pakistan

25 itself raises a question that leads to the media’s role, active in creating certain perceptions.

Despite equation in the GWOT it is argued, Pakistan has not been able to get positive treatment in the U.S. media which is arguably crafting its image as an adversary rather a country allying in the bigger cause while this also influences other allies (nations) to collectively isolate the adversary.

1.4 Objective of Study

Keeping these facts in view, this study as one of its objectives is aimed to propose measures to dispel the negative perception and improve coordination between the U.S. and Pakistan who are partners in the GWOT. Alexander Evans argues, without concerted efforts by both

Pakistan and the U.S., the problem of extremist violence will not be successfully tackled.

An effective U.S.-Pakistan bilateral relationship needs to be built more than on transnationalism (Evans, 2011, p. 69). Thus, it stresses on Pakistani foreign policy apparatus for a need to restore a desired image for itself to achieve national interests considering media as an indispensable part of foreign policy.

This study argues that such one-dimensional media framing arguably makes the current crisis worse, rather than providing solutions to the problem of terrorism and dealing in the

GWOT. The bilateral relation between Pakistan and the U.S. has seen many ups and downs but both countries need each other’s support. Khalid Iqbal says, it is essential to make amendments in approaches both countries have adopted which makes it impossible to see friend or foe at the same time (Iqbal, 2011). This study is aimed to understand how relations between Pakistan and the U.S. were effected after 911 and what has been the role of U.S. mainstream media in framing GWOT and propagating the U.S. Government policy towards

Pakistan. This study while focusing on the analysis of the dominant U.S. media discourses and frames is an effort to inform the Pakistani public to devise its strategy towards building its image that is in line with its national security goals.

1.5 Relevance of Study

An-eight year time period ranging from 2001 to 2008 has been selected for the study for number of reasons. First, 9/11 attacks on the U.S. turned a huge shift in its global and regional foreign policy. That was the beginning of how the world saw the GWOT, spreading its tentacles, fixing its relations with the rest of world in two distinct poles –

‘enemy vs. allies’. The world became unipolar once again after the Cold War ended. The

Islamic world more seriously felt the jolts of this tectonic shift; catastrophic effects of which were seen in Afghanistan and Iraq while other were directly taken in serious engagement by the sole Super Power. Secondly, the news media have emerged as an active player in the GWOT in terms of disseminating the news of war. Third, the timeframe is conflicting as well as charged, having repercussions for allies and adversaries globally, particularly for Pakistan which holds a strategic appeal in the region.

This whole period brought Pakistan to lime light as what Bernard Cohen says, three years earlier, President Bush could not even name who was the President of Pakistan. The 9/11 attacks changed the dynamics of the U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan as the country acquired a leading status in the GWOT (Cohen, 2004, p. 1). Pakistan became a hotspot of the U.S. strategic and military activities, which became more visible in the second phase of Bush presidency. On the other side, Pakistan seemed continuously facing internal crisis as Mohamed A. El-Khawas says, the period in which Musharraf held his power had grave

27 consequences on Pakistan’s survival in terms of internal security and political crisis.

Musharraf’s attempt to amend constitution in 2004 to legitimize his power once again led towards a diversion in Pakistan’s national interest from political to an active role in GWOT through military regime (El-Khawas, 2009, p. 95).

Another reason for selecting eight years is that Pakistan did not appear instantly in the U.S. game after 9/11 attacks. This is a complex and delicate relationship apparently shown with a clear agenda in terms of the U.S. demanding Pakistan’s cooperation and Pakistan saying

‘yes’ to its demands. The subsequent events that appeared on surface proved this irony.

Explaining the importance of alliance, Evans says, Pakistan’s relations with the U.S. have been unstable, yet crucial throughout this alliance (Evans, 2011, p. 67). This casts for examining the U.S.-Pakistan alliance through media’s perception where its image in eight years has largely been shown in the wake of alliance.

The corporate media framing of the U.S. as a benevolent superpower allows the U.S.

Government with authority to act as global enforcer in the GWOT. McChesney, a prominent media critic (cited in Anthony DiMaggio) calls this a “007 License,” under which the U.S. reserves right to intervene whenever, wherever, and for whatever reason it seems fit (DiMaggio, 2009, p. 213).

The study holds yet another relevance as 2001-2008 is a period during which Pakistan is under one man rule i.e General Pervez Musharraf and the U.S. national security policy is governed under the Republican Party as its government. In this light, the study throws light on the neo-conservatives’ ideology and actions while President Bush and his administration continuously remain in contact with the news media. It is argued, the influence has

28 constantly prevailed over the U.S. media even after the Cold War ended when the U.S. was less involved in foreign affairs. From this perspective, the study garners much significance to see whether this trend continues as 9/11 takes place and President Bush projects his policy and gathers the international support in favor of GWOT.

The qualitative strategy for this study involves a critical analysis of media frames through comprehensive understanding of editorials and opinions of the U.S. policy positions. The questions designed to probe this particular aspect include perspectives on the mainstream

U.S. media coverage of GWOT, use of media to spread across messages, their understanding on media-government relationship, and impact of media within the paradigm of national security and U.S.-Pakistan relations. This strategy presents a holistic picture of an impact of the U.S. media coverage on U.S.-Pakistan relations presenting a statistical data of the editorials of New York Times and Washington Post and comparing with personal opinions of the U.S. policy makers and U.S. journalists collected through interviews.

1.6 Rationale of selecting News York Times and Washington Post

This study is focused on two most popular newspapers of the U.S.; New York Times and

Washington Post, having a proven history and established reputation in the global media industry. Many research works have been conducted concerning both newspapers in different contexts taking the fact that New York Times is the elite U.S. newspaper as Spiro

Koiusis argues, the presence of a story in a prestigious news source is another signal of prominence that relay salience cues to audiences, thus inquires probing elite, national media such as New York Times and Washington Post also are rooting their measures of

29 media salience in prominence (Kiousis, 2004, p. 76). Noam Chomsky also terms them as elite media setting the agenda for the U.S.; these include, New York Times, Washington

Post and major television channels. They set the general framework

(http://chomsky.info/interviews, 1992).

The 9/11 attacks have also proved the relevance of print media though electronic media were running real time coverage of 9/11 attacks. Brian A. Manohan says, September 12,

2001’s edition of New York Times titled, “A Nation Challenged” sold 1.65 million copies

(nearly half a million copies more than on a usual weekday), and a reissue of that edition

(on September 13th ) sold another 100,000 copies. The newspaper continuously provided exclusive information and news on the 9/11 for more than three months after the incident, beginning about a week after the attacks and concluding on December 31, 2001 (Manohan,

2010, p. 65).

Several factors have been taken in while selecting New York Times and Washington Post including wider circulation, readership and proven record of agenda setting role in foreign policy debates as part of newspaper’s policy. The New York Times has been on top of list when examined on these lines. Anthony DiMaggio says, The New York Times has long been a major agenda setter given its overwhelming influence over discourse within the mainstream political framework of discussion and thought. DiMaggio’s study is focused over the U.S. Iraq War, 2003 during the GWOT. He deliberates over the role of New York

Times and Washington Post unconditionally, but quietly supports the Bush administration’s policy of using military force in Iraq and Afghanistan. DiMaggio points out that during the GWOT and Iraq War in 2003, there are no opposing diplomatic views

30 and dissenting opinions covered by these newspapers against the foreign policy decisions

(DiMaggio, 2009, p. 71).

Similarly, within the perspective of GWOT and Pakistan’s image in the U.S. and Canadian newspapers, Mian Hanan Ahmad writes, New York Times publishes significant number of editorials after 9/11 and in just one year, it portrays the image of Pakistan in the world

(Ahmad, 2004, p. 33). The New York Times has long been a major agenda setter given its overwhelming influence over discourse within the mainstream political framework of discussion. The agenda-setting role of New York Times and other elite newspapers is also highlighted having associations with the rest of local, regional, and national newspapers and TV channels. Robert M. Entman says, this association ends up in cuing up for a similar agenda, which the New York Times and elite media create that thoughts and ideas travel through internal links developed, as mentioned in the cascading activation network model.

As a result, writes Entman, comes an interface between administration and elites on frequent occasions with the objective to spread their ideas through elite media (Entman,

2010, p. 420).

In the backdrop of 9/11, this study is more significant for media arguably playing biased role as far as Pakistan is concerned. Carlos Lazado says, Washington Post had published the excerpts of an exclusive interview in 2009 with David Kilcullin, Adviser to U.S.

General, David H. Petraeus during the troop surge in Iraq about Pakistan saying: “where within one to six months we could see the collapse of Pakistani state”. Such frames shape opinions about Pakistan and also shows paper’s specific role (Lozada, 2009). The Pakistani news media also report that after 9/11, American media by and large accept the government propaganda and believes that it’s sharing genuine news. USA Today, accepted those as

31 genuine news and so did Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Chicago

Tribune and Washington Post. The media then continue on ‘manufacturing consent’ of the

American public consent to go to war. (The News, June 14, 2009). Moreover, Washington

Post and New York Times are one of those main prestigious papers of the U.S. which have been covering the foreign affairs since decades.

Keeping these facts in view, the inclusion of two leading U.S. mainstream newspapers is aimed to avoid bias and ambiguity, which might arise in case of omitting the other. Another justification of deselecting television news is better described by Stephen D. Reese and

Seith C. Lewis saying, television channels have embraced the GWOT from the start as an on-screen organizing device while print media provide a more nuanced view of how journalists respond to administration’s framing the events (Stephen & Lewis, 2009, p. 782).

In the light of above mentioned facts, the Washington Post and New York Times have been selected for examination on same scale in the interest of conducting an objective media frame analysis.

1.7 Literature Review

In order to understand the media‘s role in shaping foreign policy, it is important to situate analysis for what shapes the news and how news media framing shape an image of a country especially in wars and conflicts. Finding an answer to these questions has important implications for the way we understand the place of the media in wars as a powerful tool of governments or the active players ruled by its own internal dynamics shaping the reality in public’s minds. It is important to understand what shapes media contents since there are extremely divergent views on what effects these contents can have

32 on public. It also entails the assessment of media organizations’ role in producing content that can direct their readers/viewers whether it is meaningful to pay attention to a certain issue bringing more attention to international conflicts. Philip Seib says, media can perhaps awake the world's conscience (Seib, 2002). All these considerations support the need to assess the nature of news and contributing factors for shaping issues in certain light.

In the context of U.S. and Pakistan, media of both countries have framed the image of this relationship as their own accord. According to S. A. Siraj (2006), Pakistan-U.S. relationship was given favorable coverage after 9/11 incident and unfavorable coverage before 9/11 by the U.S. print media; New York Times and Washington Post. Moreover,

Pakistan was portrayed as foe of America before 9/11, whereas was portrayed as friend after 9/11. Several studies conducted in the same area show that media visualize a country’s role in war periods. Especially in the Pakistan-U.S.’s perspective, Dawn, a widely-read

Pakistani English newspaper framed a negative image of the U.S. after 9/11 by framing it as a “foe” in its 64% editorials and “neutral” in 24.2% editorials (Khan & Safdar, 2010).

This evidence shows that media’s role in both countries reflect an image that suit their policy. Murray Edelman argues that the manifestation constituted by news reporting constantly “constructs” and “reconstructs” social problems, crises, enemies, and leaders and this creates an ongoing cycle of threats and reassurances (Edelman, 1998, p. 1). This assertion from media appears during wars and conflicts especially at international level.

In another instance, PILDAT’s study on “Pakistan’s image in the West” covers a brief history of Pakistan as an Islamic state and how its image is perceived in the West through western media’s projection of Pakistan in post 9/11 scenario. This paper gives a brief overview of factors like nuclear capability, chaotic political instability, military rule and

33 pro-Taliban policy which contributed in shaping the image of Pakistan in the western media. This policy paper has given direction in identifying themes which have been covered by the U.S. media and leads towards media framing analysis for this study.

Jon Western, in his book, “Selling Intervention and War: The Presidency, the Media, and the American Public” covers the area of politics by stating that matters of war and military intervention are almost always politically contested. Political debates and disagreements occur because American political and opinion leaders as well the American public differ widely in their beliefs about the nature and severity of international threats, about when and where the U.S. should use force, and about efficacy of military force. The research has focused on the nexus between public opinion and latent beliefs on the decisions to use force with emphasis on the roles of elite belief groups; presidency and news media by studying the Indochina, Bosnia, Lebanon Grenada, Somalia and Iraq.

The impact of public opinion on “U.S. foreign policy since Vietnam: Constraining the

Clossus” by Richard Sobel, focuses on the impact of public opinion on foreign policy by using the Vietnamese War as case study. Although in its content, it provides a background to historical effects of the public opinion, news media has been used as an instrument to explain the case.

Derek B. Millar through a scientific study, “Media pressure on foreign policy: The evolving theoretical framework”, measured the media pressure on President Bush administration by testing the positioning hypothesis which states that “media pressure is the perlocutionary impact of the media’s communicative acts that demonstrably defame the reputation of the executive, or the executive’s policy.” The author categorically explores the question of media pressure by taking the CNN effect on U.S. policy toward the Iraqi Civil War that

34 emerged in the wake of Persian Gulf War, 1991 in which the media coverage is shown at high point and assumingly put a dramatic change in the U.S. policy in line with the previous work done on the CNN effect. His findings, after a thorough measuring newspapers, channels and press conferences at the White House follows the same analysis of the CNN effect theory that media pressure was an unlikely source of policy change. Instead, he argues, the George H. W. Bush administration, though under heavy pressure at times, maintained its policy of non-involvement in the civil war, and only once its European allies began to call for the U.S. intervention. In making the idea for this study, Miller’s work is a useful source of literature and understanding the measuring of media pressure during the

Iraqi Civil War and establishing the objective case while ignoring personal opinions.

“Headline diplomacy: How news coverage affects foreign policy” by Philip Seib is a work that explores the role of journalists in influencing the President’s foreign policy decision making. The policy makers have to anticipate the mood of public as they make policy, adapting to the opinion shapes their efforts, however policy makers hold a conservative view as trying to keep press apart from their moves. Philip argues with historical evidence such as the Vietnam War case in which the news generated extensive debate about its adequacy and its political impact. President Lyndon Johnson, the first U.S. President who was caught in what Seib declares, "living-room war," came from television. His overall analysis of past events clearly shows that the news media push policy makers to making and even revisit their decisions to maximize public support of their decisions. Therefore, both media and decision making are two distinct and apparently not deeply involved

35 domains somehow are threaded together in handling issues on foreign policy and national security matters.

“Language wars: The role of media and culture in global terror and political violence” is a fascinating account of a relationship between the media, culture and new forms of global, political violence. Jeff Lewis has adopted an innovative approach by inter-linking the language and the media connection and its implications for global terrorism and the U.S.- led revenges in the war on terror. Through an investigation of use of words in terrorism and war, the author has highlighted key events after the 9/11 attacks on New York and

Pentagon, Beslan, the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, the Bali bombings and current suppression and tension in the Middle East. He argues that reporters have changed their language in order to report terrorist incidents. This has been reflected that this change is visible in a wide spectrum of society at all levels and in result, affecting social perceptions.

In attempt of showing this link, Lewis analyzes these news discourses to reveal how Islam has been interpreted as an antagonist religion of freedom, democracy and rule of law. This book presents analysis of media studies and international studies to examine a subtle account of a connection between news language/discourses and culture that reveals a dangerous “east-west divide” in public discourse.

“Mass media, mass propaganda: Examining American news in the War on Terror” is authored by Anthony DiMaggio who has examined how the U.S. media organizations exploit their resources and react to pro-war and anti-war themes throughout the GWOT what is going on in Afghanistan and in Iraq. The author sorts out the ways how media corporations manipulate these resources and emphasize over the official doctrines and propaganda by contrasting the content of American media to that of other global media. A

36 comparison is shown how Pakistani media and the U.S. media differ in framing issues, the former highlighting the dangers while latter being indifferent.

“Media policy and globalization” by Paula Chakravartty and Katharine Sarikakis is about communication and media policies in the context of globalization. Its central focus is the analysis of the conditions and the nature of the policies that have shaped and are actively structuring the world’s communication infrastructure in the age of where processes of globalization have transformed the industry rapidly. The changes experienced in media landscapes as argued by the authors are facilitated by de-facto structural changes in the mode of production and terms of international trade. These changes are also ‘normalized’ through a set of policy-making processes that increasingly involved new regulatory processes and institutional actors, signaling a profound shift in the role of nation-states in the policy-making process. The authors are of the opinion that the study of communications and media policy needs to develop tools for making macro-level observations of patterns without losing sight of the micro-level of realities of experience. A range of topics from examining nature and conditions of global communication and media policy analysis are dealt in depth with policy-making processes based on value-free principles. This book covers a contemporary approach by covering globalization and media in an information age.

”Mass media and American politics”, a Graber Doris’s work is a detailed account of news coverage and cutting-edge theory to prove how the news media through its coverage influence governmental institutions and their actions and how the media is manipulated by the government to turn its focus towards their support. There are three focal points which are covered in this book: first, media’s inherent role in public and private sectors; impact

37 on the attitudes of pubic in this case Americans and political elites and strategies through which news media cover government and politics. This book has also covered the role of internet in 2008 presidential elections, with a focus on its importance over mainstream media’s influence on the political agenda. This includes new media, blogs, social networking, and political entertainment shows, government regulations on media’s wartime reporting, its owners and media content.

“Media impact: An introduction to mass media” by Shirley Biagi covers the phenomena of media’s impact showing how technology and development have changed the landscape of media organisations. The author emphasis over evolution of media to real time facility of media through examples of global events. This book focuses over broader influence of media in covering legal, ethical, social, global, and technological issues. This work gives special emphasis to convergence that the mass media industries are crossing in each sphere of life, and how public is moving along with changing shape of mass media technologies.

1.8 Hypothesis

After 9/11, the U.S. media mostly supported its government’s policy that portrayed negative image of Pakistan, having an impact on U.S. foreign policy.

Research Questions

1. Since 9/11 how the U.S. media frames Pakistan in its editorial coverage?

2. To what extent the media frames coincide with the U.S. policy positions in its

relations with Pakistan?

3. To what extent the U.S. media impacts its policy makers in making foreign policy

towards Pakistan?

1.9 Methodology

The first part of section is based on the analysis of editorial content of selected newspapers.

The sample includes all editorials having the word, ‘Pakistan and War on Terror” from the indexes of New York Times and Washington Post collected through the U.S. Embassy’s

Foreign Desk from the period 2001-2008 in coordination with the Information Resource

Center (IRC), U.S. Embassy Islamabad. There are 114 editorials selected as a sample. The rationale of selection of editorials is based on the editorial policy, which translates the newspaper policy. The literature is collected from the declassified materials from the White

House: https://whitehouse.gov and the Department of State: https://state.gov. The editorials are analyzed through content analysis to get objective results excluding any other feature such as letter to editor and other means of news coverage i.e reports from online news agencies and op-ed columns etc.

The reason of doing content analysis on editorials is explained by Bernard Berelson that this is a research technique for an objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication (Berelson, 1952, p.18). It helps find out what is being said by leaders as in this case, President Bush and his administration during GWOT. A quantitative strategy for exploring content in given time period (2001-2008) is based on the analysis of two broad categories; first, U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan; second, its portrayal in the U.S. mainstream media through analysis of U.S.-Pakistan relations. The content analysis will identify dominant keyword frequencies from New York Times and

Washington Post on the first category while media frames highlighted in editorials will be collected to determine the focus and direction of editorials on second category. Editorial

39 coverage of these newspapers related to two categories will be examined for coding to identify themes under which the quantitative and qualitative analysis are to be conducted.

The study is based on the time period from 2001-2008 when almost two terms of President

Bush from 2001-2009 had been covered and in Pakistan there was a military rule with

General Musharraf as Pakistan’s President until he announced his public resignation on

August 18, 2008 (The Guardian, 2008). This whole duration of eight years covers the spectrum of U.S.-Pakistan relations after 9/11 from September, 2001 to August 2008, and has been justified in rationale for the time period. Therefore, the U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan and Pakistan’s image in the U.S. mainstream media is examined for the given period. As part of first category: U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan, qualitative analysis of news coverage has shown that following themes remain as the issues of convergence and divergence in the U.S.-Pakistan relations after 9/11.

A. Pakistan’s military cooperation with Bush Administration in the GWOT

B. Pakistan nuclear development: U.S. policy

C. U.S. pressure on Pakistan to restore democracy

D. Pakistan-India Relations: U.S. policy

E. Miscellaneous

Of all themes, Pakistan’s military regime cooperation with Bush Administration in the

GWOT however, remains a high point of debate in the U.S. media throughout the given time period. The content analysis identifies keywords which remain consistent and dominant in the editorials of New York Times and Washington Post and identify their frequencies in form of positive, negative and neutral scales showing the base line data in above mentioned themes. The qualitative analysis is based on a thorough review of

40 editorials in light of these themes and keyword appearances to see the direction and total impression in a contextual form. This method presents a clear picture of New York Times and Washington Post’s editorial perspective on above themes and check hypothesis of this study.

In addition, a comparative and critical analysis of the U.S. media frames with U.S.

Government policy positions is done through the interviews of U.S. journalists, diplomats and perceptions of leading Pakistani journalists and diplomats. This presents a pattern of the U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan in particular, and the U.S.-Pakistan relations in general during eight years.

1.10 Division of Study

The study is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1: Introduction introduces the study. It describes ever-expanding role of media in the field of International Relations. This chapter highlights the importance of interdisciplinary research by applying the news media role in foreign policy decision making. The GWOT is taken as case study in the context of U.S.-

Pakistan relations. Putting this into the context of war, this offers a defined theoretical framework, which sets the direction of thesis. The first chapter also raises research questions how mainstream media affect other countries’ image; to what level the news media are engaged in the GWOT and shaping U.S. foreign policy, and what is the difference in reality and perception that news media propagate U.S. Government’s policy positions against Pakistan.

Chapter-2: Theoretical framework presents concepts and relevant scholarly literature presented in support that is being applied in this study. The theoretical framework also

41 demonstrates theories and concepts that are found relevant to the title of research and touches broader areas of knowledge.

Chapter-3: The U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Issues and Challenges in the Post 9/11 Scenario focuses on 9/11 scenario in a holistic manner proceeds by giving a detailed account of the

U.S. national interests to analyze this aspect. This chapter explains the U.S. national security policy in the post 9/11 era reflecting its national interests within the historical context of the Cold War and the post-Cold War era. This would delineate the U.S. engagement in South Asia in quest of achieving its interests and how did those events shape the U.S. foreign policy. A detailed analysis on the U.S.-Pakistan relations and Pakistan’s role in the GWOT constitutes the main part of this chapter. It covers major events that had a prominent effect on the U.S.-Pakistan relations with an emphasis on Pakistan’s internal and external security challenges, shaping its foreign policy towards neighboring states, and how Pakistan’s security was affected during the GWOT. This chapter is followed by an examination of the news media role in foreign policy and international conflicts so to get more focused in particular domain in subsequent chapters.

Chapter-4: News Media and Foreign Policy Relationship expands the universe of work done in the field by grasping the historical perspective of related voices with an extensive background and literature. After noting that much of the work is focused on public opinion, this work takes a new course while testing best arguments in form of media theories with both numerical and qualitative approach i.e taking media frame analysis and interview research to test policy positions of the U.S. Government. The review of literature further strengthens the scope of work in two ways. First, it justifies an analogy between media with contemporary disciplines such as International Relations, helpful in setting political

42 understanding of news media role in foreign policy making. Second, explaining how the news media frame issues and serve national interests has also reflected with the academic legacy. The academic view present their opinions shows implications in international scenario.

Chapter-5: U.S. Media Frames: Content Analysis forms the basis of theoretical framework applied in this chapter. This chapter explains the methodology applied for data analysis including findings and results of quantitative analysis. The methodology includes the rationale of content analysis conducted on the editorials, highlighting key issues between the U.S. and Pakistan. This chapter is comprised of quantitative analysis of editorials presenting most frequently appearing keywords on three scales. The first part of methodology explains the steps taken for performing content analysis, a brief explanation of themes and defining categories. The second part is comprised of tables of both newspapers and their findings followed by conclusion.

The inclusion of editorials is based on the reason that editorials establish views that reflects newspaper’s policy which also address the U.S. policy makers’ comments and present analysis on current issues. This helps identify policy positions and media frames. This treatment helps select frames, identify explicitly which frames whether of government or the news media dominate other, and how views are spread across the public that in turn change public perception towards any issue.

Chapter-6: U.S. Media Frames: Comparative Analysis of U.S. and Pakistan’s Perspectives presents a qualitative analysis of editorials of Washington Post and New York Times, and identifies dominant media frames in the light of keyword frequencies in each theme. These

43 themes remained dominant during the eight-year period of study. The qualitative analysis highlighting media frames presents a critical picture in the light of Pakistani journalists’ views on U.S. media’s role in portraying Pakistan’s image and responses from the U.S. journalists on media’s role, in particular and U.S.-Pakistan relations, in general.

The interviews related to the U.S. diplomats present their views on mainstream U.S. media coverage of GWOT; how has been the use of media to spread across their messages; how do they perceive media – government relationship – does media act as output or input environment, and how much they consider media as an indispensable factor to disseminate their views. The probing also covers comments over impact of media on the paradigm of national security and to what extent such issues are reported in news media. While picking up few consistent frames collected from both papers, the interviews get more focused by understanding how Pakistan is perceived i.e the U.S. Government views about Pakistan, its role in GWOT and how mainstream media perceive and cover Pakistan after 9/11. This analysis not only resolves the issue of dominance of debate between media and government, it also delineates through neoconservatives’ ideology reflected in larger perspective on its media.

Discussion on media’s biased role is not confined to academic circles. The issue has become a focus of media industry itself and has been a concern of journalists and scholars of International Relations who argue that the U.S. media are acting as propaganda agents against Pakistan. However, sufficient measures are not being taken to deal with this issue at policy level as Dr. Pirzada, former Managing Director (Pakistan Television Pvt Ltd.) asked former Foreign Minister Pakistan, Hina Rabbani Khar in an interview in Sochta

Pakistan (Thinking Pakistan, ATV talk show) that how Pakistani Government is

44 addressing the image issue of Pakistan and raising it to the U.S. Government. This shows a policy gap on media participation in national security.

The critical analysis therefore, takes suggestions from Pakistani policy makers including diplomats from Foreign Office and leading journalists with their perspectives and suggestions on particular issue. These perspectives offer insights from Pakistan scholars to help understand the difference between perceptions and reality in the U.S. media’s role and its impact on affecting Pakistan’s image. The conclusion presents findings and recommendations while covering the validity of proposed theory and measuring the hypothesis. In light of study, various and probable expert opinions are also presented with a framework for joint media reforms for transforming a special U.S.-Pakistan relations described as episodic and anchored on sporadic incidents, towards a sustainable strategic relationship which is vital to build up on its own merits and beyond 9/11 lines.

References

Boulding, K. E. (1969). National image and international system. In N. R. James, International politics and foreign policy (pp. 422-431). London: Collier Macmillan Inc. Chakravartty, P., & Sarikakis, K. (2006). Media policy and globalization. Edinburgh University Press. Christopoulou, N. (2011). The impact of media on the formulation of foreign policy in Turkey and Greece 2004-2011 (Doctoral dissertation, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi). Cohen, B.C. (1994). A view from academy. In L. W. Bennett, & D. L. Paletz, Taken by storm;The media, public opinion and U.S foreign policy in the Gulf war (pp. 3-11). London: University of Chicago Press. Daudzai, R. K. (2012, April 30). Pakistan has image problem, says Brazilian envoy. The News , p. 2. DiMaggio, A. R. (2009). Mass media, mass propaganda:Examining American news in the war on terror. New York, NY: Laxington Books. Edelman, J. M . (1988). Constructing the political spectacle. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. El-Khawas, M. A. (2009). Musharraf and Pakistan: Democracy postponed. Mediterranean Quarterly, 20 (1), 94-1 Graber, D. A. (2009). Mass media and American politics. SAGE.

Haqqani, H. (2012, November 7). Interview by M. Maalick Dunya@8.[Television Broadcast]. Islamabad:Dunya Huntington, S. P. (1997). The erosion of American national interests. Foreign Affairs, 76 (5), 28-49. Khan, M. A. & Safdar, A. (2010). Image of U.S. in Pakistani elite newspaper editorials after 9/11 incident: A Comparative Study of Dawn and Nawa-i- Waqt with special regard to media conformity theory. Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences, 30(2), pp. 325-339.

Kiousis, S. (2004). Expliciting media salience: A factor analysis of NYT issue coverage during the 2000 US presidential election. Journal of Communication, 54(1), 71-87. Lewis, J. (2005). Language wars: The role of media and culture in global terror and political violence, Pluto Press, London, UK. Lozada, C. (2009, March 22). A conversation with David Kilcullen. The Washington Post. Retrieved from http://washingtonpost.com Manohan, B. A. (2010). The shock of the news . New York, NY: NewYork University Press.

Manufacturing consent: Noam Chomsky and the media(1992). Retrieved from http://chomsky.info/interviews McChesney, R. (2003, April 16). Interview: Media Critic Robert McChesney, Indy 25, 2(8) (A. R. DiMaggio, Interviewer)

Miller, D. B. (2001). Media pressure on foreign policy: The evolving theoretical framework. NewYork, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Musharraf, P. (2004).Enlightened moderation. President’s address at the UN General Assembly (pp. 05-91). Retrieved from http://senate.gov.pk Naveh, C. (2002). The role of media in foreign policy decision making. Conflict & Communication Online, 1(2), 1-23. Nye, J. S., & Keohane, R. (1972). Tansnational relations and world politics. NewYork, NY: Harvard University Press. O'Heffernan, P. (2009). Media influence in the US foreign policy. In L. W. Bennett, & D. L. Paletz, Taken by storm: The media, public opinion and the US foreign policy in the Gulf War (pp. 231-245). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Öztürk*, A. (2009). International Politics and the Media:The case of the press/media in the War on Terror. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of Interntional Relations, 8 (3), 42-72. Pakistan’s image in the West is a discussion paper, (April 2008). PILDAT. Retrieved from www.pildat.org Pervez Musharraf resigns as president of Pakistan. (2008, August 18). Guradian. Retrieved May 7, 2014 from http://theguardian.com Ruggiero, G., Sahulka, S., & Chomsky, N. (1991). Copyright© 1991, 1997 by Noam Chomsky A Seven Stories Press First Edition, published in association with Open Media. Open Media Pamphlet Series editors. Saeed, S. (2011). News media, public dilpomacy and the war on terror. In E. C. Mehjoob Zeweiri, New Arab media:Technology, image and perception (pp. 47-69). Reading, UK: Itacha Press. Seib, P. M. (1997). Headline diplomacy: How news coverage affects foreign policy. Greenwood Publishing Group. Siraj, S. A. (2006). Image of Pakistan in the US Media Exploring News Framing (Doctoral dissertation). University of Southern Illinois, Carbondale, USA. Stephen, R. D., & Lewis, S. C. (2009). Framing the war on terror: The intrenationalisation of policy in the US press. Journalism, 10 (6), 777-797. Sobel, R. (2001). The impact of public opinion on US foreign policy since Vietnam: Constraining the colossus. Oxford University Press.

The most dangerous place in the world. Pakistan (2008, January 28). The Economist. Retrieved from http://economist.com Pervez Musharraf resigns as president of Pakistan. (2008, August 18). The Guardian. Retrieved from http://theguardian.com Western, J. (2005). Selling intervention and war: The presidency, the media, and the American public. JHU Press.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Framework

Investigating theory in International Relations gives solid basis to any prospective work in the respective field. It not only presents a frame of reference under which international developments are analyzed objectively, but offers insights to explore state behaviors for academic investigation. Bernard Cohen remarks that foreign policy making is not only a complex interplay of state agencies, external factors also play an important role in this process. Therefore, in the interest of theoretical advancement in media and foreign policy relationship, it is advocated to conduct more academic research works in case of its effects on foreign countries rather than just focusing on episodic case studies as conducted in the

Gulf crisis (Cohen, 1994, p. 11). It has become a concrete area of research in International

Relations, especially after the Cold War. While blending the Political Communications and

International Relations fields, this study not only advances, but sets a solid theoretical framework on investigating the foreign policy decision making process in length and evaluating this aspect on media framing analysis and Mutual Exploitation Model

(explained subsequently). Both models taken together, offer a comprehensive understanding of role of media in foreign policy at broader level and fit well to understand the U.S.-Pakistan relations in GWOT.

2.1 News Media-Foreign Policy Relationship

The U.S. media has been extensively covering the international conflicts and wars even before 9/11. Chris Hedges, says, “Press always masks the war that is shown to public from

Vietnam War till now in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11 (Hedges,

2005). In wars, press is always part of problem and in the age of satellite communication,

49 military has set it to show the candor”. In this context, it justifies placing a question; whether in the war on terror, the U.S. media known for its well-reputed circulation worldwide framed the war and shaped state relations? The U.S. media, as argued, contribute to project the policy positions of the U.S. Government to serve its national interests. In Cohen’s opinion, mass media though have not power to say what their audiences should think, is capable enough to lead their thoughts in to what they should think about means which are generated by media through specific messages and news themes (Cohen, 1963, p. 607). However, this is not just restricted to defining or selecting messages, the news media have been performing a multi-dimensional role besides its role in foreign policy issues. He looks at media as a fast source of information required for policy level decisions; setting agenda to influence; reshaping the U.S. agenda and other nations; a substitute for diplomats performing the role of disseminating agency; a diplomatic signaling system with policy influence; and, a useful instrument for private organizations and terrorist groups to spread the message effectively.

The real significance of television/electronic media though began during the Vietnam War;

Cohen argues, the media-foreign policy relationship was also affected due to press and electronic media’s real time reporting. It naturally raises questions on finding a suitable context in which this relationship has to be placed (Cohen, 1994, p. 8). Foreign policy issues do not seem to be of media’s interest until the end of Cold War. It was by then the job of the policy makers and executers. Samuel Huntington in his thesis gives credit to transnational and commercial interests that heavily influenced foreign policy issues in the absence of Americans, losing their national interests in the world affairs after the Cold War.

Multi-cultural trends in American society after the Cold War; emerging competitors such

50 as China and India as economic giants; U.S. economic crunch of 2008-09; and rapid technological advancements that re-shaped all spheres of state functions are few significant developments that resulted in misidentifying traditional national interests (Huntington,

1997, p. 34).

2.2 Media in National Security Framework

The national security strategy sets the framework for any country, especially in wars and conflicts. The news media are now considered a central part of national security strategy as Ikram Sehgal highlights five main purposes of the national security strategy:

“Communicating strategic vision to both the executive and parliament, and thus legitimizing the rationale for resources. Both parliament and the executive, as the elements of national power, need a common understanding of the strategic environment and the administration’s intent as a starting point for future dialogue; communicating the same common vision to the citizens of the country – the intelligentsia and masses alike; communicating coherence and farsightedness in the security policies of the government – which all citizens fully support; documenting a strategy where none exists. We must have the ability to forge consensus among these competing views on direction, priorities and pace; and contribute in substance and presentation to the overall agenda of the chief executive of the government” (Sehgal, 2007).

This shows that the media occupies a central place in national security agenda to push forward the aims of the strategic vision besides other external factors, which furthers the national strategy vision. In the U.S., the doctrine of national security strategy provides a solid justification for the state and its citizens against a threat whether political,

51 psychological or social with a singular aim to maintaining the unity, integrity and security of a nation. While maintaining its dominance, the U.S. has not only maintained its full- spectrum dominance in areas such as military, intelligence, communication and transmission, navigation and weapons delivery, but its superiority is also visible in setting up the effective information networks and global entertainment streams (Thussu &

Freedman, 2003, p. 5). It further provides a justification for an integration of the foreign policy with the national policy, cross-linking it with the national security goals, to be achieved through engaged media participation at cross cutting levels.

2.3 Media as a tool of Information Warfare

In modern wars, the media are considered as tools of warfare, especially electronic media with their rapid transforming nature and global outreach power. Nothing is hidden from the inquisitive eyes of cameras and reporters. This is the reason media is important for a specific aim - present a particular point of view through presenting half-truths and even rumors as true stories and propagating darker side of a picture of political leaders/governments and enemy. Such tactics are also supported with delaying story filing techniques in reporting facts, causing ambiguity and diverting public attention. Historical evidences also have shown the news media’s contribution/ submission to the governments to achieve national security policy objectives. For instance, during the WWI and WWII, the U.S. Government imposed strict censorship on reporters. Reporters in the war zone were required to be certified and they cooperated with the military. As the U.S. entered the

WWII, both military and political leaders recognized the importance of press coverage of the war to maintain public support and censorship procedures adhered to during the WWI were repeated.

In information age, the news media have become a useful tool for those who possess power and wealth. As compared to developing countries, the world seems to be controlled by the developed world including the British, Americans and Europeans who manipulate media resources as owners of big corporations. By this, they also take control of media of developing countries and their natural resources. “Few people are aware of the power and global influence of these oligarchs because they dominate the major media. As a result, instead of informing us, the media feed us a steady diet of entertainment, disinformation and lies - to distract us and misdirect us - so that the oligarchy can achieve its plan to dominate the globe” (http://beyond the media matrix.com).

2.4 Media and Strategic Perception Making

Media’s involvement in peace is as important as its role during wars to project the national interest, generating public awareness on national security concerns and desired responses.

A correct strategic perception is made when media get in harmony on national security goals to meet national interests. The news media shape public opinion in forming national will for established national interests by perception management and bringing out desired actions. Globally, media also serve as a counter force to the anti-state propaganda and cultural invasion both from within and abroad. For example, Gulf War (1991) brought military and media at a common forum. Pentagon, George H.W. Bush administration and the U.S. media worked together to develop plans that made the Gulf War’s coverage a comprehensive wartime news coverage in history. It was considered the most massive cover-up and disinformation in history to date, released by the U.S. administration and

Pentagon. Meenal Shrivastava says, under the U.S. National Media Pool, the U.S. forces

53 implanted reporters who also visited Saudi Arabia. The media reporters while being escorted with troops received full access to military installations. The U.S. military authorities cleared the stories and allowed reports with which angle they wanted them to disseminate (Shrivastava, 2003). Hangong Wang also reports, national image building is a policy that is integeral to Chinese foreign policy. Historically China has been projecting

Chinese foreign policy from Maoist period till now with the help of image and strategic perception making. It gets clear that foreign policy making has involved the strategy perception making as a critical factor (Wang, 2003).

2.5 Implanting Media after 9/11

The 9/11 has changed the dynamics which has proved the mindset that media are prime stakeholders in disseminating breaking news 24 hours. The news media successfully managed to thrive and flourish in the contemporary world, emerging as a dominant instrument with strength to overpower all approaching as obstacles, so that their authenticity is accepted. Experts who manipulate the resource for their interests can only manifest the supervision of media through expertise of their internal dynamics and management.

The GWOT also engaged media with the first U.S.-led operation in Afghanistan in October

2001 to U.S-Iraq war in 2003. Ahmet Ozturk says, the U.S. policy makers immediately came up with public statements that restrictions on “publications and broadcasting” will become an important comment of war (Öztürk*, 2009, p. 54). The British Broadcasting

Corporation (BBC, 2001) calls it an extraordinary cooperation of media heads from New

York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, CNN and ABC and unparalleled

54 influential role of the U.S. Government to restrain their networks from reporting the other side. The website reports that the heads of these networks entered a deal with the U.S.

National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice who bound them on covering Osama Bin

Laden and his team’s public speeches through their channels. This casts for a patriotic role of journalists and embedded journalism while covering wars and sharing news from other sources termed enemies by the government. From news media’s perspective, questing for sensitive news, the reporters considered the military control and projecting only the U.S. national interest, a central policy to their coverage.

With the passage of time, reporters also got information from public relations agencies and official sources as their first hand sources of gathering information instead of exploring independent sources and investigative towards projected statements from these sponsored sources. An implicit impact on the process of decision making within domestic and abroad is the result of such agreements in favor or criticizing any decision during war times. In nutshell, media as powerful agent of national power are likely to play an expanded role in shaping the situation extensively i.e during the developing stage, during the conflict and making public perceptions in line after the conflict is over at home, and overseas.

2.6 Foreign Policy Decision Making

Foreign policy decision making is a complex process involving various factors at different tiers. As far as its execution is concerned, presidents/heads of states are responsible to announce and execute these decisions while its making involves certain internal and external factors, which help influence the agenda and shape it before execution. In the U.S.,

Executive and Legislative branches along with CIA and Pentagon form the permanent basis

55 for formulating foreign policy. External influences include interest groups, think tanks, journalists, mass media organizations, which through interplay with formal state organs set agendas for foreign policy issues. While understanding this process, it is important to get a clear understanding of political environment of a country, which leads the scholars to the basic theoretical understanding of foreign policy decision making process and grasping this concept. Since this study explores the news media’s role i.e. how this factor gets synchronized in this process, scientific interpretations identifying media’s role in foreign policy decision making process are discussed in detail for conceptual understanding. This understanding of media’s role, in turn, simplifies the complexity, which mostly arises in conducting interdisciplinary researches and naturally directs the research towards meeting study objectives through media framing analysis.

In understanding the concept, a comprehensive explanation of decision making theory states: “Foreign policy decision making is a continuous process of mixing, blending, analyzing and selective use of the contents of three separate streams of information”. One of these is the stream of messages from the outside world; the second is the stream from the actor’s own system and resources; the third is the stream of messages recalled from memory. Any autonomous (self-governing) system, therefore, must contain within itself three operative information processing structures (we might say ‘receptors’, ‘channels’ and the like) with which to do the job that combining and balancing these streams require”

(Deutsch, 1968, p. 81). A successful foreign policy is based on state’s calculation of international environment and sound ability to pursue its national interests within that context as determined by perceptions of self and the World, and on its system of governance.

Within the parameters of aforementioned theory of foreign policy making, the role of news media has emerged as an important and critical factor. One can deduce that while states weighing through various available options in making their foreign policy decisions successful, the news media hold a unique place, being the most important and powerful shapers of perceptions. Two basic arguments justify this statement. First, with information revolution and rapid development in communication technologies as Robert O. Koehane and Joseph Nye say, the agenda of International Relations has become complex. The concept of “hard power” perceived by states has now transformed into the “soft power” with the inception of channels and transnational elements, shaping their national agenda.

Secondly, in light of their argument, though information flow has become fast and free, it is still in the control of power full sources which proves that media being the by-product of information revolution are being treated, manipulated and monitored by some sources which are powerful enough to plan and direct the mews flow to targeted audiences

(Koehane & Nye, 1992). This has generated the academic debate how foreign policy issues are dealt in such a competitive and complex environment.

In a speedy media environment where information is passed through all corners on real time basis, it has become difficult for states to achieve their national interests with a focused approach as they used to do before the Cold War. Today, policy makers have to take certain measures, certain evaluations to direct their strategies and get those achieved by using effective means. Saeed says, in a democratic nation state, fighting a war that involves a heavy loss of life, including the lives of its soldiers, media serve as an indispensable tool in generating popular support that is necessary to legitimize state’s war decisions (Saeed,

2011, p. 51). In the past too, news media has been used particularly, in international

57 conflicts. Deutsch, while explaining these information flows emphasizes over the importance of mass media structures in addition to other sources such as government, elites, opinion leaders that can influence directly their perceptions of themselves and of the outside world, as well as their trust and distrust of one another (Deutsch, 1968, p. 133).

Looking this in a broader spectrum and understanding three fundamental elements of foreign policy decision making inputs stated above, this study proposes a theoretical framework premised on a dynamic conception of media’s role in shaping foreign policy along with proposed models. In order to show validity of foreign policy decision making to the case study, it is important to delineate three streams of information before deliberating on both models, applied in the study. First, it comes to the decision maker who approaches the event through firsthand information that he has on mind. Muhammad

Ashraf Khan explains information in form of remarks and perceptions along with cultural and moral choices effect President’s inclination while making responses on issues (Khan,

2008, p. 3). While applying this to specified study, it shows when a decision maker, in this case, ‘President’ responds to an event, there are already few perceived notions and tendencies that make up his mind (commonly known as schemas). These schemas may be coming from different sources usually serves as first hand information for him before making any decision. For instance, after 9/11 attacks, President Bush took a drastic decision of setting the country on the road of war. His initial statements on the next morning of attacks expressed his pro-war ideas even before a proper national security strategy was formulated much later so much so the U.S. media also started showing news tags as “nation attacked”. This statement further supports the role of presidents as Craig A. Smith and

Kathy B. Smith say the use of specific words used in presidential addresses show their

58 perceived ideas on key issues and how they want their public to believe and perceive (Smith

& Smith, 1994, p. 230). Alexander Moens says, such major decisions of President Bush required style of presidents and role of advisors and decision-making structures to motivate the public and prepare them for specific goal (Moens, 2001). In case of Pakistan, this aspect is covered through framing analysis, as President Bush’s statements in the mainstream news media showing predispositions about Pakistan subsequently determined its foreign policy towards Pakistan during this phase.

Second stream of information is concerned with outside influences which compels the state and its executers to reshape politics as for now state is no more an isolated entity so as the foreign policy — not a static phenomenon. There have been a number of transnational channels operational while observing states’ relations and politics. The idea of complex interdependence has changed the whole scenario. Nye and Keohane argue, transnational interactions have greatly increased the sensitivities of societies to one another thereby, alter relationships between governments such as, international trade and global mass communications have enabled the non-state agencies and informal sections of societies to promote their agenda and affect state politics and relations. The governments can no longer retain a strict control on these resources as informal factors contribute into the game of state politics (Nye & Keohane, 1972, p. xvii).

Third and the last stream of information is associated with mass media structures as channels of transmitting policy decisions to the audiences. This stream falls within the

‘inputs from domestic system” category. This forms the most important aspect of this work, but largely ignored in International Relations. Under this category, “specialized mass media structures” is one important source which exerts pressure. Though it is still debatable

59 to what extent media’s influence over the decisions of authoritative figures impact, but it is clear that being a channel of transmitting and reaching out to a wider audiences, media create perceptions, give clues, show slant and frame issues.

The role of media has not been given much attention in International Relations while its importance is highlighted in many researches. Chanan Naveh describes media are not mere channels of transmitting messages, but important and critical component in foreign policy decision making, setting a two-fold input and output environment (Naveh, 2002, p. 2).

Durga Ray says, the American people and citizens heavily rely on media as major source of information, therefore special messages, which she termed as “frames” are also transmitted to people so they comprehend a problem through media, providing an authentic advice for them particularly, related to some foreign country (Ray, 2004, p. 16). It is this ability of the media through their use of frames that tell people what to think is important about something which makes the study of frames important. However, lack of focus to media and their role has been partially due to the contingent nature of media and lack of interdisciplinary research. This study is perfectly placed to assess the case within parameters of foreign policy decision making and finding the answers how inter-state relations such as of the U.S. and Pakistan are effected in the GWOT, and how far the hypothesis that the U.S. news media support the U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan proves correct.

2.7 Media Framing Analysis

The media frame analysis provides a strong basis for research methodology. The concept of framing has been used in various disciplines as Robert M. Entman says, it is criticized

60 due to multiple uses and relative understanding of the term. In Political Communication, however, framing is defined as “selective and highlighting some facts of event or issues and making connections among them so as to promote interpretation, evaluation and/or solution”. Taking this in media studies strictly, framing of news is more of a bias or a specific tone showing tilt, which reflects a particular stance that is transmitted by media through news analysis. These are the narratives adopted by use of one frame over another inevitably influencing how news consumers view important issues. DiMaggio while explaining the media’s role in shaping pubic opinions says, from media point of view, news stories are presented with certain angle; predicting meaning; giving clues to readers/viewers to make opinion in light of given facts. This places more importance on addressing the news frames because of their effects on audiences (DiMaggio, 2009, p. 21).

Bradley Wiggins analyses it in comparable terms while mechanizing a framework concept, through which reporters tell a story and select a certain theme within which media determines the significance of an issue (Wiggins, 2009, p. 3).

The application of media framing and its analysis equally stands valid in International

Relations. In wars or conflicting situations, the framing of news on wars sometimes overlaps with the concept of propaganda pushed by reporters to achieve favorable public opinion for foreign policy decisions. Wiggins argues that the coverage of U.S. media during the GWOT had a similar pattern as conducted during the Cold War. The coverage of the U.S. mainstream print media such as New York Times and Washington Post were only focused over the military strategy of President Bush and ignored the dissent views and critical views in their reporting of GWOT. The role of reporters in making these thoughtful shifts is also highlighted by Janathon Mermin who says, when news reporters

61 see there is no conflict in government circles on policy issues, dissent views and criticisms, if any, are not covered or given attention in media coverage (Mermin, 1999, p. 5). This shows powerful source of government which compel journalists to not look towards other sources and heavily report from the eyes of governments in foreign policy issues.

In sociological domain, Erving Goffman explains framing as principles of organization which governs the subjective meanings we assign to social events. Hence this concept is more inclined to rely on story lines, symbols and stereotypes in media presentations

(Goffman, 1975, p. 500). He is known as a pioneer of introducing the framing concept – explained that reporters’ perspective of their environment leads for selection of news stories and the way how they share these with the world. This literature has mostly helped how media shape public opinion in national and international crisis. However, in the absence of a clear and standard definition of frame, there are other social scientists who explained the term in respective settings. For example, Milton Lodge and Ruth Hamill understand the frame same as schema or script (Lodge & Hamill, 1986, p. 514). While in impact studies, as referred in (Schefuele, 1999, p. 104) frames have been used as an extension of the agenda setting theory.

As an advancement to the concept of framing in media studies, subsequent to these theorists and their diversified domains of frames and their uses, this study applies the concept of frame derived by Entman who explains frames in the context of applying in ‘substantial’ and ‘procedural’ terms. The substantial function caters to four conditions i.e defining the problem, cause, passing moral judgment to an incident and proposing remedy (Entman,

2003, p. 99). He justifies this by relating these functions to the 9/11 attacks in which the human casualties of thousands of Americans is defined as ‘problem’; terrorists such as

Taliban and their militant leaders as the main ‘cause’; ‘moral judgment’ as he defined as

‘evil against enemies’ and the GWOT as referred as ‘remedy’ to pull out the radical elements. So far, media frames have not been tested objectively in the backdrop of U.S.-

Pakistan relations after 9/11.

Entman also emphasizes that media acted more freely/independently in the times of

Democrats as compared to the Republicans. Quoting the example of Clinton’s intervention in Kosovo, he says, it did not appeal the news media rather media used their internal sources and applied counter news frames instead of relying on the White House’s frames and official reporting lines. The role of a President how he creates a negative rhetoric against the enemy also helps winning the support of news media (Entman, 2003, p. 99). A sudden shift however, is seen during the Republican President Bush and his decision of war on

Iraq in 2003. Media’s interest towards Bush administration after 9/11 also demonstrates same trends that at the end of cold war the U.S. leadership successfully worked out on its anti-communist ideology; after that they faced no direct and visible threat to its national security up until 9/11 took place. This fear was once again pointed out by a Republican

President who not only referred to a great challenge the U.S. would be facing, but also touched back to the cold war ideology in his first speech after 9/11. This framing of U.S. official policy played well in media headlines. Entman says such frames are more evident during the Republican governments than Democrats (p. 105)

The GWOT, framed by the U.S. news media determines scope of this study while applying it to Pakistan as a case study. This analysis will address the third stream of information presented in the foreign policy decision making theory, particularly highlighting the role of mass media structures as a domestic input. Within the framing flow, some actors are

63 more dominant than others, as identified by Entman in his “cascading activation model” that helped elaborate this concept (Entman, 2003, p. 10). While governments, elites are dominant actors, interface between journalists and media organizations also helps drawing a conclusion on ‘who influences whom’. The activation therefore, is designed to help explain how thoroughly the thoughts and feelings that support a frame goes to another level down from administration to the rest of system, whereas media debates are generated based on first made frames and comparing those with other sources. According to this model, if there is a similarity of thoughts between media and sources the frames are generated with more clarity.

This model addresses the objectives of study i.e to understand the processes of how journalists select media frames to project the U.S. foreign policy issues towards Pakistan, and to what extent these frames coincide with the U.S. policy positions. Whether the news media’s actions were proactive, passive or neutral will be construed through taking all factions of cascading activation model into the case study. Similarly, the aspect of influential role of media has also been reflected through this model, i.e in terms of taking public views to the government, shaping decisions and compelling the government machinery to take desired actions. Richard Sobel says, though it doesn’t come into the scope of study, this aspect covers the public opinion domain and is also reflected in media and public opinion studies (Sobel, 2001, p. 192).

While concluding the framing concept and its importance, it can be said that frames help in generating support or opposition, as mentioned earlier, having the power of attracting or gathering support from allies and isolate enemies/adversaries. Media frames give direction to identify problem, cause and suggest possible solutions through remarks and many other

64 forms such as phrases, stories and images etc. In foreign policy issues, frames can become competitive and contesting in such a way that media discourse starts focusing on one dominating issue. Hence, it allows more space and time to revolve around a particular issue in the news coverage. This mostly results into ignoring any dissent with respect to that issue and does not appear on surface with greater frequency. This is the reason why frame conflict does not take place much frequently and policy positions on foreign policy are not challenged much in the news media. Wiggins argues, framing of a news report influences on public and individuals who only focus to what information is passed on to them, but they effectively set the language and tone and control individuals to remain within those frames – constraining the capacity of people or audiences to think otherwise or think critically (Wiggins, 2009, p. 7). This is supported by the fact how news media influence in the distribution of power by using framing, priming and agenda setting research within the context of bias/slant in the news. This study is taken to educate stakeholders of their understanding of biased media in the political domain of the U.S. He says that if news slants are in favor of certain policy or its proponents, they gain more authority as compared to those who get unfavorable news slants.

Figure: 2.1: Cascading Network Activation by Robert M. Entman (2010).This figure illustrates flow of elements active in cascading network. 2.8 Mutual Exploitation Model

The central goal of all the political maneuvering over news frames is mainly to generate support or opposition to a political actor or policy issue. Some frames take hold over other while rejecting other voices, thus leaving vacuum to understand the exact impact of media in society in general, and its relationship with government on foreign policy issues, in particular. Saeed says, one can count number of times from 2001-2007 when President

Bush used his monthly radio addresses to the nation on the issue of GWOT (Saeed, 2011,

66 p. 60). This reflected how much importance the White House gave to the mass media channels to gain support for his war mandate.

This study takes an extra effort in adding the qualitative analysis, which is mostly missing in media frame analysis. Further, it is also observed, frames are only able to generate only the content analysis of news texts therefore, qualitative aspect covers the gap to understand the issue in broader context. Considering the limitation of study for not including the electronic media, application of mutual exploitation model is helpful to clear such ambiguities. By covering media frames only, compactness of research is not achieved therefore, finding the views of stakeholders involved in making policy decisions and journalists is a helpful technique to address the research questions in depth. Patrick O’

Heffernan, the architect of mutual exploitation model says, government’s relationship with media cannot be satisfied by a simple bi-polar competition based on a contest between reporters’ desire for truth and government’s desire for supporting their decisions (O'

Heffernan, 2009, p. 230). This also raises question that government officials usually neglect media’s influencing role neither they admit on directing media reporters for attaining their support. O’ Heffernan thus, outlines the concept of mutual exploitation to solve this ambiguity. He says, the correct dynamics of complex relationship instead requires an in-depth work and exploration of the perceptions of those engaged.

This model presents that the mass media and foreign policy institutions around the world have grown up together, each exploiting the other and learning how to better utilize the other in a dynamic and unending process. This calls for “interdependent mutual exploitation”. As contrary to the concept of propaganda, both institutions have their own

‘wants’ while they manipulate both structure and output of the other for their own interests.

Sometimes the result is mutually beneficial and sometimes it is not (O’ Heffernan, 2009, p. 233). As this model is applied to the Gulf War 1991, known for being the first televised war, is considered as extension of propaganda role of media. Moreover, the strongest findings of research interviews conducted by O’ Heffernan shows that media use in general, and television use in particular, increases among policy makers during Gulf War.

The concept of propaganda is therefore, explained in length with origin and historical perspective in subsequent section.

This study is justified to apply mutual exploitation to all forms of media though having more relevance to television. However, basic contours of model have not changed over the time and debate is still going on perception that the U.S. Government exploits its media to achieve its national interests. Moreover, studies of media’s role in foreign policy decision making lacks clarity itself demanding further investigation in future. Therefore, this model is applied and tested with the help of conducting interviews with diplomats and journalists from both Pakistan and the U.S. The purpose of conducting interviews is to find out the nature of relationship between the news media and the U.S. Government. This discussion revolves around how U.S.-Pakistan relations are addressed in the U.S. media on key issues.

The qualitative aspect by collecting media frames on key issues between U.S. and Pakistan brings in a comprehensive understanding of media and government relationship for academic understanding of the research areas.

The need to include this concept also arises because it carries an objective spirit without indulging into a conventional mindset that still prevails in media effect studies. This also addresses stated objectives of the study i.e to evaluate the importance given by the U.S.

Government in accepting or rejecting media roles. Further, another research question is

68 also answered with the help of interviews to understand the extent with which the U.S. media impact its policy makers in making foreign policy towards Pakistan.

In wars and conflicts, perceptions also play an important role in finding what’s going on within specific operational system and what are those ideas and beliefs exercised behind policy positions. Muhammad Ziauddin in this regard says, in the backdrop of GWOT, terror would not be fought by the use of military force only rather it is dialectic of ideas, beliefs, convictions and perceptions that need to be stopped through dialogue and discussions (Ziauddin, 2012). Thus, engraved is the concept of communications to deal in international conflicts – media being central to such conflicts is helpful to carry these processes.

2.9 Propaganda Model

The role of propaganda as DiMaggio describes is same as of framing news, used interchangeably as both areas reflect systematic bias in covering news coverage, taking side of one view over another (DiMaggio, 2009, p. 23). Propaganda has been defined in different settings. According to a standard definition, “it is the spread of information, ideas or concepts designed deliberately to promote a particular point of view and denouncing the other”. Propaganda has been part of news business since long and even today. The New

York Times reports, how news is prepackaged and journalists are paid to give positive frame to Bush’s administration’s war activities. Noam Chomsky’s classic work on propaganda sets the rule applied in subsequent studies within the stream of political economy” (Barstow

& Stein, 2005). Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model which is based on government setting the media agenda by forceful and coercive means stipulates that news is first passed

69 through five filters before it reaches to the masses. The five filters narrow down the range of news that passes through gates, and even more sharply limit what can become the “big news”, subject to sustained news campaigns carried out in support. Of five filters, first filter relates to the dominant and elite mass media firms which take hold in setting the news agenda. These firms because of their resourcefulness are closely interlocked and have important common interests with other major corporations, banks and governments. This is the most powerful filter that influences news choices. Large governments have enough setups and resources to provide news on daily basis – thus controlling the media’s own sources. The Pentagon and the U.S. State Department have huge setups and resources to throw bulk of information to the media, limiting their capacity of independent reporting.

The second filter is related to monetary business, which media have to look seriously in corporate world – required to endure sustenance in market; third filter - sourcing mass media, states that media need reliable source of information and meeting daily demands compel them to rely on government and official sources. Fourth factor identified through this model is “flak” or criticism to discipline media and building up resistance against media firms. Edward S. Herman and Chomsky define ‘Flak’ as a negative response to a media statement or program (Herman & Chomsky, 1980, p. 216). Niki Cristopoulou says, if 'flak' is produced on a large scale, or by individuals or groups with substantial resources, it can be uncomfortable and costly for the media, therefore, probability of flak being used can be a deterrent for the media to be objective (Cristopoulou, 2011, p. 32). DiMaggio says, fifth filter mentioned is anti-communism ideology that still prevails as reporting and editorializing in the mainstream media favors state capitalism over socialist or other non- capitalist frameworks of analysis, particularly in the case of more openly conservative

70 television such as Fox News, and print media such as The Weekly Standard, and

Washington Times while “Liberal” media establishments, such as New York Times are also pro-capitalist in orientation” (DiMaggio, 2009, p. 43).

Taken together, these five filters provide a framework that illuminates why and how structural dimensions encourage a systematic right-wing bias and limited range of debate within mainstream media discourses. The five filters provide a basis for the Propaganda

Model’s general argument that the news, which is deemed ‘fit to print’ will overwhelmingly be that which is politically and ideologically advantageous to the interests of power (http://globalissues.org). It is observed that the model describes the U.S. media’s critical and objectivity on domestic policies while get biased in covering foreign policy issues. This fits accurately with the devised propaganda model.

The propaganda model however, is not a comprehensive concept. It has its own demerits.

For example, Denial C. Gitlin and Todd Hallin point out, it is shown in one direction with no other outside factors being influential on model (Gitlin & Hallin, 1994, p. 14).

Moreover, this model has seriously challenged journalistic ethics, a prerequisite of this profession by saying that journalists ignore objectivity in reporting events rather rely on government sources, thus promote their agenda. Another criticism comes from the role of opposition, which is as active as government to counter the propaganda while the news media cannot ignore the other side of opposition’s perspective for the sake of criticism. In addition, this media driven age, the use of propaganda in wars has become more complex as governments now have less control over what images and stories reach the public domain.

Similarly, the feeling of propaganda gets apparent during wars where media are used as a military tool for the successful implementation of war goal. G. Wolfsfeld argues, media’s help is more important to set and shape the opponent’s war strategy. Citing reference of the

Israeli Palestinian conflict, he finds the role of international media as a main information giver to Palestinians and as a source where they could harness support for their cause while he investigates the role of media as powering agent to neutralize the damage supposed to be done to other countries (Wolfsfeld, 2003, p. 115). This way the role of media is also tilted to specific events. Michael C. Adams argues, this manipulation of the media, during war times, has led to significant problems for the possibility of the media playing as an impartial information source outside of the war (Adams, 1994, p. 52).

2.10 Agenda Setting Theory

The agenda setting theory comes from the field of media influencing the public opinion.

Mostly studies of public opinion seem testing these theories on public opinion research.

The benchmark is still up to date and applicable in current studies of public opinion. As according to Cohen’s ideology that media (Press) may not tell people what to think have the ability to lead their thoughts in certain direction fits well here (Cohen, 1994, p. x).

Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw conclude that mass media and their reporters altogether set the news and shape political reality for the masses who not only read news stories selected by the media, but also make decisions of its importance according to their placement in different sections of newspapers such as front page, back page or headline stories are placed as reporters, writers and media staff think they should be placed

(McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Their selection proves the function of agenda setting as the most important factor for studying the political consensus and usually in political

72 campaigns. This concept has been of importance in this study because of media’s agenda setting role that quite often comes in discussion therefore needs a brief explanation of term.

For some time, Sean Aday, Steven Livingston and Maeve Hebert argue, researchers have called for examining the influence of frames on the news agenda (Aday, Livingston, &

Hebert, 2005, p.15).

Linking framing theory with the news agenda is likely to have more explanatory power for assessing public opinion. Framing adds to the understanding of the relationship between framing and agenda setting by showing how the former can give dimensions and influence to the latter. “In other words, media frames are specific about what to think, not merely about what to think about, the basic power ascribed to traditional agenda setting” (Diddi,

2006, p. 129).

The power and reach of the news media have grown tremendously in recent times. It has generated global awareness on international issues and continues to be promoting cross- cultural understanding in communities across the world. Media’s power has been a great factor in effecting inter-state relations and play important role in geo-politics. Since in the mass media industry, major agencies that control the global flow of information are located in the West, it gives them an arguably more autonomy to control over the air waves and confirm wider outreach. Virtual monopoly of the West over international media, both print and electronic arguably defines what is newsworthy and determines to a large extent the global opinion. This has led to serious debate over its independent role and framing issues at international level.

As per general perception, governments in the West particularly, the U.S. systematically use the news media to further their national interests around the world. Having enormous power of reach to shape and influence global public opinion by disseminating messages, media are criticized for creating and reinforcing stereotypes and misconceptions. They are also pressured for sabotaging diplomatic efforts in the name of objectivity and investigating features, thus affecting the desired outcomes at diplomatic levels and government-to- government level.

Pakistan has been continuously subjected to criticism in the western media, mostly on the questions of Islamic extremism, terrorism, nuclear proliferation and human rights after 9/11 etc. The level of criticism however, has been calibrated by the degree of convergence or otherwise, of political or strategic interests. Pakistani policy makers as well as media on the other hand have not been able to effectively counter this media outrage owing to its inherent limitations. Pakistani media though made tremendous developments in General

Musharraf’s era is not capable enough to counter pressures and place Pakistan correctly.

Therefore, this study is ideally placed to analyze the mainstream U.S. media and ascertain its drivers, modes of exploitation, influences and biases, with a view to recommending appropriate counter measures for Pakistan.

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Chapter 3

U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Issues and Challenges in the Post 9/11 Scenario

The events of 9/11 posed a great challenge to the believers of America’s undaunted and unchallenged power. The 9/11 incident altered the entire focus of the United States

Government while changing dynamics of International Relations. All future collaborations, regional alliances and strategic fixations began to make through GWOT’s perspective. This shift in the U.S. foreign policy again brought regional and international players at one platform within, laying the basis of future relations between the U.S. and Pakistan.

This chapter explains the U.S. national security policy in the post 9/11 era reflecting its national interests in the context of the Cold War and the post Cold War era. This would delineate the U.S. engagement in South Asia in quest of achieving its interests and how did those events shape the U.S. foreign policy. A detailed analysis on the U.S.-Pakistan relations and Pakistan’s role in the GWOT constitutes the main part of this chapter. It covers major events that had a prominent effect on the U.S.-Pakistan relations with an emphasis on Pakistan’s internal and external security challenges, shaping its foreign policy towards neighboring states, and how Pakistan’s security was affected during the GWOT.

3.1 Overview

The relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan has seen many difficulties in last sixty years as Cohen says, two main reasons diverted Washington’s attention towards Pakistan; first, religion i.e Islam as a countering force to resist communism, second, country’s critical geographical position having close proximity with two great communist powers: USSR and China (Cohen, 2004, p. 302). Pakistan’s prime geographical location placed the country into a strategic focus as documented by President Truman i.e “Pakistan’s

79 friendship for the West may become an important factor in giving stability to the Near East.

At the same time Pakistan is valuable ally in South Asia because of its strategic location on Indian ocean and its control of land passes from Central Asia” (United States. Mutual

Security Agency Program, p. 31). Therefore, the study of Pakistan from any perspective is interesting and needs analytic approach for understanding its role in world politics and its relations with other states. Pakistan’s weak domestic situation from the beginning also laid the basis of a dependent and ‘look outside’ approach in foreign policy making. Thus, the foreign policy lines drawn reflect ‘dependent’ approach, adopted by Pakistani establishment, both from military perspective and ensuring economic survival.

3.2 U.S.-Pakistan Alliance in the Cold War

During the Cold War, though the U.S. national security interests had a major role in governing its relations in the region, Pakistan’s need for security also shaped these relations. Pakistan was also concerned on its eastern border, as India was a clear threat to the country’s security. The U.S. on the other side was also in search of finding an “ally” to offset the communist challenge as part of containment policy, a Cold War policy as a response to resist the Soviet Union’s expansionist designs. It had a desire to attract India first, having better resources and larger size than Pakistan. India constantly rebuffed this desire as Raja McMohan states, the US viewed India’s cooperation with the US cold war policy as a win-win situation for boosting its influence in South Asia. However, Indian leadership constantly reiterated towards ‘nonalignment’ policy, which wiped out the U.S. enthusiasm. In result, despite its internal challenges, Pakistan appeared as an alternate to the U.S. policy makers for its prime geographic location, which could help the U.S. in achieving its strategic interests in the region (McMahon, 1994, p. 112). Shaheed

Soharwardi says, this relationship was like a ‘marriage of convenience’ as the U.S. found an ally in pursuance of its national interests while Pakistan secured security interests by getting the “most allied ally” status by attaching itself to a superpower (Soharwardi, 2010, p. 22).

In 1954, and one year later in 1955, Pakistan signed two mutual defense agreements with the U.S., thus became a member of the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Eastern Treaty Organization (CENTO). K. Alan Kronstadt says, the security cooperation between the two countries that began in 1950’s was envisaged in response to the U.S. concern on Soviet Union’s expansion and Pakistan’s policy to get support against

Indian threat (Kronstadt, 2002, p.2). Through these alliances, Pakistan allowed the U.S. to get maximum strategic benefits it could get during the cold war period (1959-68). Abdul

Sattar says, it supported the U.S. with facilities during the U2 surveillance flights and an intelligence base at Badaber (near Peshawar, in the North of Pakistan) against Soviet

Union. However, Pakistani military leadership having prioritized a defense build-up vis-a- vis India received significant military and economic assistance under this alliance (Sattar,

2010, p. 50). Pakistan not only faced condemnations at the disclosure of deal it also damaged its relations with Soviet Union in later years. The Nation quoted the Soviet

Premier, Nikita Khrushchev bluntly informing the then Pakistani Ambassador in Soviet

Union that Moscow had identified Peshawar being used as a center to allow U-2 flight on

Soviet Union and warned Pakistan of serious consequences in future (Lifschultz, 1986).

However, the US media response remained positive towards Pakistan over Pakistan’s cooperation. It criticized over India’s indifferent, rather negative opinion on the U.S.-

Pakistan alliance (The New York Times , 1950).

3.2.1 Defense Agreements of Cold War

The defense agreements of the Cold War era, however, turned out as a mismatch between

U.S. aiming for global dominance and Pakistan having narrow security interests. While

South Asia already affected with an unfinished agenda of partition in 1947 with Kashmir as a source of conflict between Pakistan and India was further affected due to the politics of international players. As Wirsing cited in (Stanley Wolpart) says, the Cold War further worsened the India and -Pakistan’s dispute over Kashmir. This was evident from various pacts which were signed by Pakistan with the U.S. under SEATO and CENTO while India receiving weapons and artillery from USSR (Wolpart, 2010, p. 27). The engagement of super powers affected regional peace while continuously keeping India and Pakistan in the line of conflict. The news headlines of the U.S. media were also highlighting the U.S.’s dual role of catching India despite repeated refusals from India. Wagonner reports how the U.S. was at the same time signaling its sympathy to India and assuring Pakistan for arms aid under its signed defense pacts. President Eisenhower wrote a letter to Nehru assuring that military aid to Pakistan would not affect Indian position and the newly emerged alliance would not be counter-productive for India (Waggonner, 1954).

In 1960’s, Pakistan became active within the region by establishing relations with China.

The U.S. became wary of newly established Pakistan-China relations. Cohen says as a result of this, the U.S.-Pakistan relations further frayed when latter looked towards China for assistance while the U.S. had already backed India in the Sino-Indian war (Cohen, 2004, p. 302). The Sino-Indian war (1962) was a turning point in U.S.-Pakistan relations in which

Pakistan firmly supported China. Pakistan, apprehensive of dual policy of the US moved towards China as an opportunity to ensure balance of power in the region. However, in

1970s, Washington again sought Pakistan’s cooperation in approaching China. Ijaz Khan says, Pakistan proved its worth and arranged a secret visit of then U.S. foreign Secretary,

Henry Kissinger (Khan, 2010, p. 68).

In 1965, Pakistan once again faced a threat from India. The U.S. refused to help Pakistan as under SEATO and CENTO, allies could get assistance only in case of a communist aggression. The U.S. did not consider India as a communist threat to the U.S. while

Pakistan’s policy behind signing these agreements was to get strong hold against Indian threat. The 1965 war proved this wrong and Pakistan felt betrayed. The U.S. not only rejected Pakistan’s request but suspended its military aid to both Pakistan and India. This indifferent attitude of U.S. had a negative impact on Pakistan for being dependent and relying on the U.S. than India. Nasr says, Pakistan defied Moscow’s warnings and signed agreement with Washington on March 9, 1959 under which the U.S. had committed to provide support to Pakistan and protect its sovereignty from any outside threat (Nasr, 1994, p. 8). Rubin says, this agreement created confusion between the U.S. and Pakistan and paved for strained relations in future. The U.S. only looked this agreement through the perspective of Cold War while Pakistani military understood it in terms of unconditional support from the U.S. being ‘the most allied ally’ (Rubin, 2012, p. 47). Marvi Memon says, the superpowers’ alliances and containment politics was responsible to defend it and affect balance of power and insecurity in the region, which had a devastating effect on Pakistan’s foreign policy (Memon, 1994, p. 80).

The year 1971 was disastrous for Pakistan with internal and external security challenges and geopolitical changes happening simultaneously in the region. The 1965 and 1971 wars not only had a negative impact on the domestic situation of Pakistan but affected its

83 relations with U.S. The New York Times reports, though President Richard Nixon favored

Pakistan in 1971 war, nonetheless it did not match the expectations of its “friend”. India won and Pakistan dismembered (New York Times, 2001). Pakistan appeared as an economically smashed and complicated partner in the eyes of U.S. policy makers.

According to a common perception in Pakistan, U.S. did not fulfill commitments to its cold war ally. Pakistan on the other side had placed unrealistic expectations on the U.S. during

1971 crisis. Dennis Kux quotes Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Sultan Muhammad Khan as he explained the myopic attitude of Pakistani military leadership, which instead of making a war strategy to check Indian troops who were progressing in Dacca, relied over on the

U.S. and China’s intervention (Kux, 2001, p. 199). The dismemberment of Pakistan on

December 16, 1971 further resulted in humiliation at home and abroad. Domestic public opinion in Pakistan also turned against the leadership’s pro-American policy.

India acquired nuclear program before Pakistan, which it demonstrated through nuclear tests in 1974. Resultantly, it accelerated the need of acquiring same technology in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s efforts for developing a nuclear program raised serious concerns in the U.S. As a result, the U.S. imposed economic sanctions through Foreign Assistance Acts –

Symington (1976)3 and Glenn Amendment (1977),4 aimed to stop funding to those countries acquiring or delivering nuclear enrichment technology. Sattar says, apparently meant for nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia, it only targeted Pakistan because Israel

3 1976- Congress adopts the Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This amendment prohibits most U.S. economic and military assistance to any country delivering or receiving nuclear enrichment equipment, material, or technology not safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Retrieved from http://armscontrolcenter.org

4 1977- Congress adopts the Glenn Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This amendment prohibits U.S. assistance to any non-nuclear weapon state (as defined by the Non-Proliferation Treaty), Retrieved from http://armscontrolcenter.org

84 and India were waived off from sanctions which had already declared their nuclear status

(Sattar, 2010, p. 164). Colonel Randall L. Koehlmoos says, general public in Pakistan viewed it as a dual policy because India was not treated in same manner after it conducted its nuclear tests neither the US objected over the Indian-Soviet Union mutual defense deals

(Koehlmoos, 2010, p. 51). Overall this period as Kux mentions, is marked with cooling of

U.S.-Pakistan’s ties at the same time opening of strategic relationship between the U.S. and

India. This double-edged U.S. policy of ‘regional influential’ brought India as a pivotal icon in the U.S. circles and Pakistan as a troubled ally (Kux, 2001, p. 235). This change brought a visible shift to the U.S.-Pakistan relations.

3.2.2 U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan: Dynamics of the U.S.-Pakistan Relations

In 1979, following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan once again came onboard with the U.S. Both domestic and regional factors brought the U.S.-Pakistan alliance again on surface as interests converged between the U.S. and Pakistan. In order to get security, Pakistan expressed willingness to side with U.S. on containment policy.

Hussain cited in (Qaseem Ahmed, Shaeq.) says, Pakistan agreed to serve as channel to supply military and financial assistance to Mujahedeen with an assurance from President

Carter that it would get hidden assistance of $10 billion from the U.S. to support these forces. During their influx from Afghanistan to the North West Frontier province, Pakistan also allowed zealots from other Arab countries to settle down in refugee camps (Qaseem,

2009, p. 83). Peter Bergan says, this gave opportunity to Bin Laden to exert his influence by setting up offices in Pakistan and the U.S. He deployed people from Muslim countries and raised funds from personal resources to form bases in Afghanistan (Bergen, 2001, p.

29).

Indeed domestic turbulences and external security challenges had also been contributive in indulging Pakistan in Afghan jihad. General Zia-ul-Haq through a military coup in 1977 came into power and altered the state behavior from a liberal set of mind to Islamization of state institutions. He presented everything in religious color to justify the need for jihad which was quite flagrant during his regime. A similar shift also appeared in the US policy due to change in regional situation. Michael Lind describes President Carter switched his human rights strategy back to the containment policy following the Soviet Union intervention in Afghanistan. Once again, the US wanted the support of an ally to achieve its interests and Pakistan again got the US attention and acquired “front-line ally” status

(Lind, 2006, p. 121). Julian Schofield says, both Pakistan and U.S. had different interests in their joint efforts for liberation of Afghanistan from Soviet Union (Schofeld, 2012, p.

56). The U.S. had a clear policy i.e ‘containing communism’ had begun since the cold war whereas Pakistan wanted ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan as a core national policy which was aimed to promote Islamic movements and avoid ethnic revolts in form of ‘Pashtun nationalism’. This shows how the U.S.-Pakistan relations took off in spite of varying nature of interests. Pakistan and the U.S. in pursuance of diverged interests agreed to make joint efforts of confront Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

The US media also supported the revival despite troubled relations and trust deficit prevailing between the two countries. The New York Times published a report that Pakistani leadership persuaded the U.S. officials to let go of its reservations about Pakistan and think seriously about long-term U.S. interests in the region (Qaseem, 2009, p. 81). With President

Reagan taking over President Carter, the U.S.’s hard stance on Pakistan’s nuclear program also softened; with this as Wolpart mentions, a threefold increase in U.S. aid of $10 billion

86 to the new “front line ally” and significant military assistance was witnessed (Wolpart,

2010, p. 70). The U.S. intelligence agencies were however, continuously watching

Pakistan’s development in nuclear technology but the U.S. Government did not pay attention because of former’s indispensible role in the Afghan war. Due to Reagan administration’s support to Pakistan and ignoring the nuclear weapon development taking place in Pakistan, Ahmad says, Pakistan apparently gained numerous short term benefits.

These included a free hand on nuclear technology build up, stronghold of Zia’s military regime; U.S. funding in form of refugee aid, U.S. military aid to fight the Afghan war;

Pakistan’s longstanding policy goal to counter, and if possible eliminate Indian influence in Afghanistan (Ahmad, 2005, p.87).

Pakistan also gained the U.S. supporting stance that it would not accept any aggression from outside. This further strengthened it against Indian threat. In result of this cooperation,

Pakistan was able to weed out the Soviet forces as Ahmad says, “Pakistan made

Afghanistan a bleeding wound for Soviet adventurism in Afghanistan” (Ahmad, 2005, p.

89) However, it turned out be a huge liability for Pakistan in coming years as it had lost more than the gains. Pakistan’s internal security situation worsened to an unprecedented level causing a severe economic backlash. This myopic approach of the military elites put the country in serious trouble and made it dependent on foreign aid.

3.3 Post Cold War Era: Issues and Challenges (1989 – 2001)

With the disintegration of Soviet Union in 1990, the U.S.-Pakistan relations touched the lowest ebb. Due to diminishing interests of the U.S. in South Asia in the post cold war era, a pause in U.S.-Pakistan relations happened. To fill this vacuum other regional states came

87 forward to play their role. It included India, Iran, Turkey and Central Asian Republics having their own interests to follow in Afghanistan and Central Asia. This made the regional stability factor more intricate. Pakistan however faced a profound impact on its domestic and foreign policy due to its direct engagement in cold war politics. Of all its policies it executed towards the end of Cold War era, Pakistan got isolated for the coming decade until 9/11 changed the whole scenario radically. Pakistan became a state that mattered the most in the next phase of U.S. power politics after it became the sole world power.

The Post-Cold War period is marred with negative perception of Pakistan’s role on the rise.

The period, however, was accounted for number of regional issues and challenges that changed the image and perception of Pakistan from “ally” to a “controversial” state. In this period the U.S. and Pakistan remained no more ally’s period also created an impact on the

U.S.-Pakistan relations in a different perspective other than Pakistan’s conventional role as

“U.S. ally”. Three different scenarios such as Pakistan’s pro-Taliban policy, antagonistic relations with India and nuclear development program got much attention of international media. These are briefly discussed in the following section.

3.3.1 Pakistan’s Pro-Taliban Policy: Regional and International Context

After the defeat of Soviet Union Pakistan accommodated thousands of refugees from

Afghanistan. Shaista Malik & Zafar Iqbal say, because of fighting in Afghanistan, over three million Afghan refugees crossed over to Pakistan and the then military government helped them dwell in Pakistan (Malik & Iqbal, 2009). The initial wave of refugees that started settling in Pakistan in the 1970’s and 80’s were mainly conservative Islamists.

Traditionalist Islamic parties and ISI as a fertile ground for ideological trainings and

88 recruits viewed these refugees. Pakistani government and external funders such as Saudi

Arabia and CIA poured in funding for madarassas in the refugee camps. These camps provided a nurturing ground for recruits from other countries as well. Ahmad Rashid said the brand ‘Taliban’ emerged in 1994 were actually the refugees trained in Islamic madarassas (Islamic schools) of Pakistan. Most of them had affiliation with Sunni sect with a conventional view of Islam (Rashid, 2006, p. 24). As a result of political vacuum created after the proxy war against Soviets, fundamentalists from diverse nationalities such as Pakistan, Iran, Central Asian Republics and Xinjiang got united under the umbrella of

Taliban’s ‘Islamist model’ with a single aim to establish and promote this system to their countries as well (Rashid, 2006, p. 23).

Taliban offensive remained on rise throughout this period in the North of Afghanistan and spreading its influence to the Central Asian Republics. Similarly, the Islamic agenda also played well to expand the Taliban network to regional level. Pakistan, playing key role in recruiting these forces in 1980’s with the spirit of unifying Muslim Ummah and envisaging it as a leader in the Muslim community helped connected Al-Qaeda and Taliban. Taliban provided safe haven to Bin Laden and refused to hand him over to the U.S.

3.3.2 Al-Qaeda –Taliban Connection

In late 1990’s, Al-Qaeda had expanded and strengthened its network in Afghanistan with the financial support of Bin Laden while there was no close watch by the U.S. over its expansion and increasing control in Afghanistan. The U.S. response over increasing influence of Taliban was there in policy circles in the beginning. As reported in American media, Halliday writes that Americans had built connection with new Taliban leadership

89 and supported them via Pakistan. Americans at that time were not worried over Pakistan’s approach of sponsoring and training Taliban (Halliday, 1996, p. 22). The emergence of

Taliban did not come up as a threat to the U.S. until it captured Kabul in 1996, killing

Najibullah and declaring as a regime in power. Maley writes in The World Today,

Taliban’s capture of Kabul in 1996 changed the international players’ perception towards the politics played in Afghanistan. They realized that the politics played in Afghanistan during the communist regime (1979-92) and post-communism period (1989-1992) was moderate (Maley, 1996, p. 276). Burns also points towards a shift in the U.S. policy after

Taliban threw the Soviet backed Government in Kabul. He says, Washington then changed its stance for backing Taliban and renewed its backing for a United Nations-led peace effort which was sputtered for years (The New York Times, 1996).

Pakistan’s policy of getting strategic advantage in Afghanistan had more stakes than other states. It introduced the ‘Taliban policy’ as an alternate to its failed policy of achieving strategic goal in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion. Ayesha Saddiqua cited in (Usher) says, “Pakistani military thinking was that Taliban had been an asset. So why destroy an asset, especially if the foreign powers withdraw and there is a power vacuum in

Afghanistan?” (Usher, 2007). This resulted in formulating a huge workforce who after getting enough training capable of expanding its scope in line with Pakistan’s strategic goal. As result of this policy, Pakistan solely appeared as a lead player leaving behind India,

Turkey and Iran.

The 1990’s stand out as a cliché on strained U.S.-Pakistan relations. Pakistan’s support to

Taliban at the time when the U.S. had backed off further affected these relations. The world perception regarding Pakistan’s role also changed with time and turned into negative that

90 the country supported Taliban. It also became matter of intense debate in western media’s news analysis. The international media continuously covered these developments from the lens of Pakistan supporting Taliban and relating it to cross border terrorism in Kashmir. As one example proved, Bearek filed a news story in New York Times while critically reporting on Pakistan’s support to Taliban, “Pakistan's government today welcomed the peaceful end of the hijacking ordeal in neighboring Afghanistan and, like a proud older brother, praised the country's Taliban leaders for ''showing great responsibility and maturity'' in managing the crisis” (Bearek, 2000). Pakistan already supporting the freedom struggle in Kashmir received criticism for supporting terrorists in Kashmir. Indian lobby contributed largely to create this negative perception in the U.S. and European countries. Haqqani says, support of Pakistan for terrorists was a hard hit to the annoyance of U.S. leaders that in 1992

Nicholas Platt, the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan warned Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of

Pakistan’s support to the terrorist groups and that the U.S. was near to announce Pakistan a state supporting terrorism. Though this did not materialize, the U.S. penalized its one- time ally (Haqqani, 2013).

To sum up, Pakistan received severe criticism in the U.S. policy circles for its pro-Taliban policy and being its sole supporter. Kux says, the U.S. Intelligence and media reports were critical of ISI’s role in sponsoring state terrorism in Kashmir, facilitating Kashmiris and activating ‘Afghan mujahideen’ against India’s rule (Kux, 2001, p. 316). The U.S. now cited Pakistan as a terrorist state evident from their policy statements taking space in the print media reports. Douglas published a story in The New York Times, quoting Director

CIA, R. James Woolsey, the country was being considered to be placed amongst terrorist states for supporting Taliban as ‘a spur to fundamentalists’, creating a negative impact on

Pakistan’s economy which was already dependent on the U.S. aid. This was in stark contrast of what had been the U.S. policy during the Soviet Union pullout (Douglas, 1993).

In 1998, Rashid says, Pakistan was the only supporter left to advocate for providing funds to Taliban while the other states opposed Taliban’s stern attitude towards the Western democratic system, noncooperation with the United Nations (UN) and showing its toughest stance on handing-over Bin Laden to the U.S. (Rashid, 2000, p. 78). This resulted in severe criticism on Pakistan from international community. Zachary Laub says, the UN Security

Council also passed two resolutions against Taliban in 1998 urged them to end its abusive treatment of women. The following year the Council imposed sanctions for harboring al-

Qaeda (Laub, 2014). Pakistan was the only country standing against the UN resolutions and international pressure. The support to Taliban at this stage clearly put the country on the edge of an international isolation.

The decade of 1990’s proved hard for Pakistan as besides nuclear weapons program,

Pakistan’s support for Taliban also emerged as a bigger threat to the U.S. security. After

1998, Pakistan faced immense pressure from the U.S. to persuade Taliban in handing over

Bin Laden for a trial. Sattar terms the U.S. policy unrealistic and inactive for it sought to pressure Pakistan instead of checking Taliban itself (Sattar, 2010, p. 253).

3.4 Pakistan-India Relations: Regional and International Implications

Throughout the history of 65 years, Pakistan and India have acted as hostile neighbours.

Kashmir, being the core issue of confrontation has indulged the two countries to fight four major wars. When the Kashmir issue was addressed at international level, the UN agreement also stipulated that a plebiscite should be held in Kashmir to take into account

92 the will of people. The government of India, however, failed to implement the last recommendation of the UN, which became a sore point between India and Pakistan. The two countries have denied each other’s claims on Kashmir resulting in a conflict which has gone on for more than six decades with no plausible solution in sight and resulted in close calls and full-scale wars. Because of this security dilemma, Pakistan’s foreign policy remained always Indian centric. The feeling of mutual distrust has vitiated the environment whenever any development takes place to build up confidence between the two countries.

Thus, when Pakistan mentions national interest, it usually envelops Kashmir to be an integral factor of this context.

Influence in Afghanistan has also been a contentious issue between Pakistan and India and it is a continuation of security threat from each other. Pakistan’s Afghan policy i.e to have a friendly government in Afghanistan is also aimed to counter India’s increasing regional influence. Anatol Lieven says, Pakistan’s support to Taliban in 1990’s was not because of its soft corner to Taliban but a strategic move to exploit this resource against increasing

Indian strategic influence in South Asia (Lieven, 2002, p. 107).

Pakistan’s security climate is thus, linked with the situation in Afghanistan; instability in the neighborhood has ever been a matter of concern for Pakistan. Afifa Kiran mentions,

Pakistani military views Afghanistan as its strategic backyard while India’s strategic interests are aimed to control and influence Afghan nation with a view to winning friendship, investment and political support against Pakistan (Kiran, 2009, p. 14). Thus, the national security paradigm of both Pakistan and India extend beyond borders, best described as a South Asian regional paradigm involving South Asia in regional and international conflicts. In the post 9/11 scenario, these implications are discussed in detail.

Given the complexity and competing interests of India and Pakistan in the region nuclear proliferation and terrorism both appeared as major international issues in the context of the

India-Pakistan conflict at three distinct levels; bilateral, regional and international. The internationalization of India and Pakistan conflicts also affected bi-lateral relations. In the past few years, both India and Pakistan became involved in a race to acquire more and more nuclear weapons to strengthen their front against the other. Subsequently, international terrorism has grown manifold ever since the bilateral conflicts reached its peak marked by heinous acts of terror during the late 1990’s.

India posed a significant threat to Pakistan by conducting its first-ever nuclear tests in 1974.

This drive accelerated Pakistan’s nuclear program though denying at official level in the beginning. The Washington Post covers General Zia’s comments who denied the fact that

Pakistan was making any bomb although the country was in desperate need to meet the energy demand (Pakistani President denies, 1979). The article quotes President Zia who lamented on the U.S.’s decline from financial aid to Pakistan though it had not shown any evidence of nuclear development whereas not objecting India despite it had already conducted tests in 1974. The media continued to comment over Pakistani leaders’ statements on denying nuclear weapon development, yet pursuing it on ground.

3.4.1 Nuclear Proliferation of South Asia

The nuclear proliferation of South Asia was one such significant area, which spurred anxieties in the U.S., particularly. The immediate response of U.S. over the nuclear proliferation same on both India and Pakistan, but created a different impact on both countries. The U.S. imposed economic sanctions, aimed to roll back Pakistan’s nuclear program while India survived this pressure being a stable economy and having strong

94 democratic system. Nevertheless, Pakistan firmly stood by its viewpoint on continuing its program, the geopolitical situation of South Asia after 9/11 brought change to Bush administration’s policy. Hussain says, nuclearization of South Asia coupled with the rise of terrorism has given a new foresight to the issue and now it requires comprehensive and multilateral approach for settlement. The issue requires new approach by the P-5s, especially the U.S, who is exploiting the condition rather than containing it (Hussain, 2010, p. 5).

3.4.2 Impact of Nuclear Tests on the Political Landscape of Pakistan

Pakistan remained at backbench during 1990’s because of worsening economic situation internally and lack of communication between government and Army that became obvious during Kargil crisis (1999). Misperceived policies between the Nawaz Government and the military establishment, and negative impact on national economy due to Pakistan’s nuclear tests, the nation witnessed another military coup by General Musharraf in October 1999.

Pakistan got isolated amidst wider acceptance of Indian stance at international level by blaming Pakistan as a terrorist state and promoting terrorism in South Asia. Highlighting the reasons of failure of Kargil war, Donald A. Wisecarver says, Pakistan was blamed for triggering the Kargil conflict, as a ‘unilateral act’ by Pakistan, posing security threat to regional stability and bringing South Asia to the brink of unprecedented nuclear confrontation (Wisecarver, 2007, p. 27).

The history saw a lack of cognizance between Pakistani Army and the government’s information sharing mechanism, resulting in wider criticism in local media, which provoked public outrage and open criticism of the operation due to differences appeared in the press between government and military. The international pressure particularly, from

95 the U.S. compelled Nawaz Sharif to back off its forces from its position, which was a great set back to country’s morale and humiliation of its armed forces. In result of this mismanagement, India played a great lobby to win public opinion and get positive perception in the wake of Kargil Conflict. Feyyaz says, Pakistan failed to get international support like EU, G8, ASEAN Regional Forum, China, and the U.S. pressured Pakistan to draw back its border. It also faced domestic pressure as could not run its information drive to strive public opinion at domestic level, which ended up in severe public outrage and critical image of Nawaz government, which could not manage an effective media campaign to declare its position. This divide in military and government was taken ny media sources in a negative manner (Feyyez, 2010). The General Musharraf became the chief executive officer of Pakistan through a military coup, and internationally Pakistan faced humiliation for taking reverse step from democracy.

3.4.3 U.S.-Pakistan Relations before 9/11

The U.S.-Pakistan relations are best described in Cohen’s words i.e “episodic and discontinuous” (Cohen, 2004, p. 304). The decade of 1990’s saw same discontinuity and mistrust in these relations. Pakistan was facing three major challenges at the time when

General Musharraf took over on October 12, 1999 as chief executive officer of Pakistan.

These included religious militancy, Kashmir dispute and worsening economic situation of

Pakistan. In the beginning, he was able to rectify the increasing debt burden and taking

Pakistan off the fiscal crisis despite the U.S. had put embargoes in response to the military takeover declaring it an assault on the institution of democracy. Nevertheless, General

Musharraf was able to take Pakistan out of isolation at international level. This yielded out with support from China, Saudi Arabia, Japan and Oman etc. on various development

96 projects. On another front, General Musharraf was able to move against religious organizations. Jones describing as one of Musharraf’s biggest challenges and the reason of getting international support was his candid speech on June 2001 against Islamic extremism and banning prominent religious organizations such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and

Sipah-e-Mohammad (Jones, 2002, p. 25).

The U.S. expressed trust in Musharraf as compared to two leading political parties:

Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) and Pakistan People Party (PPP) which could not lead the country in right direction during 1990’s. General Musharraf ran progressive and realistic policies such as freedom of press, women participation in parliament as bold decisions that no previous governments had ever taken. The move against religious groups somehow established General Musharraf’s stature at international level, later on, becoming the corner stone of the U.S.-Pakistan relations after 9/11 attacks with his clear willingness to side with the U.S.

It is a fact that religious extremism was penetrating fast in Pakistan, griping military to political organizations, and playing havoc to country’s security from Afghan border to

Kashmir. General Musharraf’s sudden shift from a conventional security approach started attracting the U.S. policy makers’ attention. The impact created because of this alliance was evident in terms of a steady improvement and upward trend in Pakistan’s economic growth from 2001-2008. According to the IMF statistics, Pakistan’s GDP had reached up to 5.4% on average basis mainly with the help of U.S. and international support in various developmental projects (http://imf.org, 2003). This assistance however, had its own implications in coming years on Pakistan-India relations and U.S. national interests in

South Asia, particularly its foreign policy towards Pakistan. The 9/11 incident proved this argument and more engaged role of U.S. and Pakistan in post 9/11 period.

In short, before 9/11 Pakistan was used to be a world pariah: censured and sanctioned for its nuclear ambitions, which culminated in five successful nuclear tests announced on May

28, 1998. It also actively supported the Taliban and was one of very few countries to recognize Taliban rule in Afghanistan as legitimate. These views presented on the Council for Foreign Relations website reflect the perception of U.S. about Pakistan (http://cfr.org).

They are explained in detail in subsequently.

3.4.4 U.S. Perceptions about Pakistan before 9/11

Nevertheless, revival in relations took place between Washington and Islamabad in the newly emerged situation it only brought temporary benefits to Pakistan. A feeling of mistrust about Pakistan was already existed among U.S. policy makers even before 9/11.

The 9/11 National Commission Report (2001) mentions three troubled areas in which the

U.S. expressed concerns about Pakistan. These stated below also became the major conflicting issues in the post 9/11 period:

“On terrorism, Pakistan helped nurture the Taliban. The Pakistani army and intelligence services, especially below the top ranks, have long been ambivalent about confronting

Islamist extremists. Many in the government have sympathized with or provided support to the extremists. Musharraf agreed that Bin Laden was bad. However, before 9/11, preserving good relations with the Taliban took precedence.”

“On proliferation, Musharraf has repeatedly said that Pakistan does not barter with its nuclear technology but proliferation concerns have been long-standing and very serious.

Most recently Pakistani government has claimed not know that one of its nuclear weapons developers, a national figure, was leading the most dangerous nuclear smuggling ring ever disclosed.”

“Finally, Pakistan has made little progress toward the return of democratic rule at the national level, although that turbulent process does continue to function at the provincial level and the Pakistani press remains relatively free” (p.368).

After 9/11, Pakistan came under constant pressure from the U.S. to revisit its policy on these issues and reshape its future associations in the new role as “front-line state”.

Realizing that Pakistan had already reached to the extent of becoming a ‘failed state’ due to U.S. economic sanctions, it could not afford another blow for declared as a ‘terrorist country’. Thus, any signal of non-cooperation in this regard would mean an unprecedented damage to the state institutions. The U.S. policy came up with a clear demand list for

Pakistan presented in the seven-point agenda5. Major points of this agenda included: break relations with Taliban and Al-Qaeda network; provide bases to the U.S. military forces for a direct access to Afghanistan; provide intelligence information to the U.S. and; formulating public opinion in Pakistan in favor of WOT and against Taliban. Pakistan worked closely with U.S. as an ally and provided its territory during the U.S. invasion of

Afghanistan in October 2001 but ultimately fell pray of its half-hearted and ill-planned counter insurgency efforts against militants. It also resulted in severe mistrust on Pakistan that even after eight years of the war on terror and despite numerous agreements and internal security turbulences faced by Pakistani people, General Musharraf’s government could not win any international sympathy rather a bad name for spreading terrorism to other regions.

The New York Times (2008) depicted this in its report that due to militants finding safe havens in the tribal areas of Pakistan, foreign fighters from Iran and Central Asia started building up network with these militants against the West, cautioning that Pakistan could soon become a hub of international terrorism. While it was not even possible for Pakistan to do much against militants on its own, it merits mentioning that there has been a tradition of inaction in U.S. policy while dealing with Al-Qaeda. Jones says, the U.S. had supported

Pakistan and invested over US$ 7 billion to establish a systematic force, called mujahedeen

5 The 9/11 Commission Report. Retrieved from http://dtic.mil

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(Jones, 2002, p. 27). Under such circumstances, the U.S. pressure on Pakistan was not practical as there were internal and external factors which were also involved and beyond

Pakistan’s control.

3.5 U.S. Foreign Policy since 9/11: Pakistan’s Alliance in the GWOT

The 9/11attacks was an unprecedented event that took place since the Cold War ended.

Many analysts believed that the U.S. had a daunting task ahead that had not only challenged its global supremacy but in how the country defines future strategy to eradicate terrorist elements checking its global hegemony. It is in place to say that three main periods of the

U.S. foreign policy patterns appeared with changing U.S. national interests in the past.

Kristol et al. say, these were: 1990’s when the Cold War ended – started earlier with the beginning of Cold War in 1940’s uptil 1989; fall of the Berlin Wall in 1992-with the disintegration of Soviet Union, and in 2001- with September 11 attacks with which the third era of U.S. foreign policy began (Kristol, Berkowitz, Weisglass, Rabinovich, & Shain,

2005, p. 7). South Asia was on the backburner of American foreign policy agenda, with an assumption that this region had lost all vitality for U.S. strategic interests after the cold war, so America virtually disengaged itself from the region after the collapse of Soviet

Union and ensuing end of the Cold War. South Asia however, remained the focus of the

U.S. involvement through all these periods.

3.5.1 U.S. National Security Strategy after 9/11

The 9/11 transformed the U.S. relationship with the world altogether. It was now seen through the perspective of “allies and adversaries”. President Bush presented his agenda

101 known as “Bush Doctrine6 in response to deadly 9/11 attacks, defining set of policies as

Samuel Hirsh says, it became the living perception of American foreign policy while diverting the focus of administration towards the challenge. Before deliberating on the

U.S.-Pakistan relations, it is imperative to sketch the main contours of Bush doctrine so that the relationship and subsequent events from 2001-2008 are understood within a larger framework (Hirsh, 2002, p. 33). The fundamental contours of the U.S. foreign policy reflecting Republicans’ thought show the dynamics and challenges to U.S. foreign policy after 9/11 while the National Security Strategy (NSS) 2002 as a means to achieve the goal.

The strategy justified the need for a firm affirmation overseas again ever done since during the Cold War ended, almost positioning the American hegemony in a more broader and wider sense after 9/11 (The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,

2002).

Under the Bush doctrine, the scope of war on terrorism was not a simplistic challenge. It entailed many factors i.e. use of power from traditional security perspective – a prime concern of Republican foreign policy to adopting new ideas i.e. promotion of democracy overseas, and engulfing the states with a mission to transform the world based on American wishes. The NSS 2002 stated the larger scope of this challenge insisting for the unilateral take on states and regimes, irrespective of their economic strength, whether weak or strong and check mate whenever deems right. Collin Dueck comments on Bush policy that reflected the tone in the NSS 2002 was significantly far-reaching, motivated and optimistic, as compared to what it has been before 9/11 (Dueck, 2010, p. 273). However, the neo-

6 The term "Bush Doctrine" applies to the foreign policy approach that George W. Bush practiced during this two terms as president, 2001-2009. Retrieved from http://usforeign policy.about.com

102 conservative thought overwhelmed with the overseas adventure after 9/11 reflected no big difference what the U.S. had exercised in the past. Chomsky terms it as ‘grand imperial strategy’ the goal of which was to prevent any challenge to the ‘power, position and prestige of the United States’ (Chomsky, 2003, p. 14). In historic context, the NSS 2002 presents a similar line of action by the U.S., which it had planned during the WWII.

Chomsky says, it was envisaged by the U.S. policy makers even before the U.S. engaged into WWII that it would go far to set up an ‘unquestionable power’ and limiting states with any power to interfere or challenge its ‘global designs’ (p.15).

On similar footsteps, the NSS 2002 had incorporated the need for defense agreements with its allies as one of its important component to achieve national security goal. Pakistan was part of game play of the U.S. during the Cold War and now again after 9/11. This time the strategy however, expanded the scope of its reach, as Chuk Hegal says, challenges to the

American leadership emanate from weak states, not its competitors. Terrorism finds safe havens in failed states, in unsettled regional disputes, poor economy and hopelessness

(Hegal, 2004, p. 65). This posed a major challenge to the U.S. national security as compared to fighting the super power i.e the Soviet Union during the cold war. The weak states despite having no economic resources now presented a great challenge to the

American leadership for a correct mechanism and approach. Therefore, not only preemptive but also preventive mechanism became part of NSS 2002, marking for a unique and an over-reaching approach – rarely seen in the cold war period. Hegal’s argument that only military will not be enough to deal with such diverse threats therefore by carefully using force on states which support terrorism and terrorists themselves would be indispensable to achieve foreign policy goals (p.66). This meant the U.S. as a supreme

103 power would be able to forcefully use both preemptive and preventive means to implement its policy during the post 9/11 period for achieving national security goals such as promotion of democracy abroad and freedom from the oppression and tyranny.

This premise presents the basis to examine the relationship of U.S. as a great power with weak states such as, in this case, Pakistan and dynamics in the post 9/11 period. S.M. Burke says, the Bush administration identified the threat within the nature of enemy. It had identified two main elements to address the issue; first, the terrorist networks and second, states supporting them. To get security from any emerging nuclear, chemical and biological threat, there would be a need to break these networks and sponsoring states (Burke, 2011, p. 46) thus, demanding for a precise preventive role and justification for waging a global military war to curb these elements. Critics present a critical analysis of this strategy by comparing it with the past U.S. presidents’ doctrines and they find similar trends in previous national security strategies particularly, during the Republican governments.

From the perspective of cold war and in the post 9/11, Dueck says, there was a common trend in the national security strategy since 1950’s in the Republican and neo-conservatives schools of thought. This included the use of ‘force’ in dealing with international affairs thereby setting national defenses, maintaining unilateral stance internationally and a hard stance on possible adversaries overseas (Dueck, 2010, p. 4). He further said, similar trend could be seen again in the aftermath of September 11 attacks with a conservative and republican foreign policy tendency reflected through President Bush leadership.

3.5.2 U.S.-Pakistan Relations after 9/11

The 9/11 incident again brought Pakistan onto the same page with the U.S. After ten years of minimal association, the terrorist event transformed this relationship into a critical

104 alliance for the GWOT. Cohen says, once the relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan dried off imposed with three major sanctions in these ten years, the latter reappeared as a critical strategic ally for the U.S. (Cohen, 2004, p. 301). Several factors contributed in re- engaging Pakistan in the GWOT despite the status varied from ‘most trusted’ to ‘least trusted’ ally in the past.

It was this strategic position of Pakistan as a buffer zone between the Middle East and

South Asia that Burke says, had given it an edge over other countries (Burke, 2011, p. 530), thus made it a crucial partner in the GWOT. Hirsh underlining the contours of this involvement said, it was clear in the Bush doctrine that Pakistan was to face pressure to abandon its longtime support of the Taliban and its forbearance for Al-Qaeda (Hirsh, 2002, p. 19). Taking this statement as the basis of forthcoming the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, it was evident that Pakistan was already under a close surveillance and observation even before 9/11 took place. The renewed alliance was naturally seen through clouds of mistrust and apprehensions on both sides, reflected in the coverage of U.S. media about Pakistan.

Berry Bearak reports in The New York Times describes Pakistan as a country where

Islamists were already operating while Bush administration having identified ‘Islamists’ a real threat to the U.S. national security would have to deal delicately with this kind of

Pakistan - a companion of cold war, forced back into alliance to fight against terrorism after 9/11 (Bearak, 2001). The remainder of this analysis is organized to explain the U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan throwing light on the U.S. interests in South Asia in the post 9/11 period. It also brings about Pakistan’s major foreign policy decisions made in consequence to its longstanding threat perceptions and its emerging role in the GWOT.

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Explaining the grave nature of alliance particularly for Pakistan, Sattar says, it was coming clearly in tone and statements of the Bush administration. Richard Armitage, then Deputy

Secretary State said to Lt. Gen. Mahmud Ahmed, the Pakistan Ambassador and ISI

Director General, that ‘the future starts today’, the situation was ‘black or white, Pakistan had a choice to make – either it was with the U.S. or not,’ there was ‘no room for maneuver’

(Sattar, 2012, p. 46). President Bush had demanded a clear role from Pakistan and made it clear to General Musharraf which way to go in future. The then U.S. Deputy Secretary of

State, Richard Armitage met with the head of the ISI, Hahmud Ahmed and Maleeha Lodhi, the Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States to state the seven steps required of Pakistan stated below:

1. “Stop al Qaeda operatives at its border and end all logistical support for Bin Ladin.

2. Allow the U.S. blanket over flight and landing rights for all necessary military and

intelligence operations.

3. Provide territorial access to U.S. and allied military intelligence and other personnel

to conduct operations against al Qaeda.

4. Provide the U.S. with intelligence information.

5. Continue to publicly condemn the terrorist acts.

6. Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and stop recruits from going to

Afghanistan; and,

7. If the evidence implicated Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda and the Taliban continued to

harbor them, to break relations with the Taliban government” (Musharraf, 2006, p.

200).

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Besides critical geographic location, Pakistan’s strategic role in Afghanistan also compelled US policy makers towards Pakistan. Hassan Rizvi points out; the foremost reason was Pakistan’s support for Taliban since 1980’s, while at that time no other state supported them (Riedel, 2013, p. 14). Woodward cited in (Nauahin Jabeen) says, Pakistan was the only country in South Asia that had diplomatic terms with Taliban (Jabeen, 2009, p. 177). The Bush team had measured the importance of Pakistan to influence Taliban and reach out to terrorist elements required by the U.S. Hassan Rizvi says, after 9/11 Pakistan’s unrivalled geographic location and common border with Afghanistan compelled the U.S. to consider Pakistan as an essential factor for designed operation in future (Rizvi, 2004, p.

24). Thus apprehension as well as the need reconnected the two countries despite unequal power dimensions and diverged interests which became more evident after 9/11 innocent and through this alliance.

3.5.3 Reversal in Pakistan’s Pro-Taliban Policy after 9/11

In the post 9/11 scenario, Pakistan pro-Taliban strategy did not bring about desired results as its military establishment had planned in 1990’s. The Bush administration had unilaterally decided for Pakistan to wrap up its pro-Taliban policy without taking into account Pakistan’s security risk calculations vis-a-viz India. This trend shows lack of continuity in the U.S. policies evident in two major incidents. In 1980’s, when the U.S. did not work on the future of mujahedeen and in 1990’s the U.S. national interest shifted towards nuclear proliferation of South Asia, thus could not devise a post-conflict policy. It is thus evident that with changing U.S. national interests, the policies of allies are also affected without deliberating on their security perspectives and repercussions. In this respect, a shift in Pakistan’s foreign policy after 9/11 created more complexities to its

107 national security challenges such as on Kashmir, nuclear proliferation and on its strategic relations with Afghanistan.

After 9/11, the worst effect occurred to the ongoing freedom movement of Kashmir. The

Pakistan Army, which supported these groups to fight in Kashmir later on, faced severe criticism from U.S. and India for infiltration in Kashmir and even inside India.

Furthermore, Pakistan’s decision to support the U.S. in the post 9/11 turned the domestic public opinion, particularly the religious groups very critical and negative. The reason was

General Musharraf’s announcement as he also supported religious elements for Pakistan’s strategic interests suddenly changed his stand in support of the U.S. after 9/11. Musharraf ruled out any support to Taliban by stating Pakistan’s national interests come first in his first public broadcast speech through Pakistan Television Corporation Ltd. (PTV) and

Radio Pakistan on 19th September, 2001.7

3.5.4 U.S. Economic Aid: Impact on Pakistan

In the wake of 9/11, Bush administration repeated the President Jimmy Carter’s policy of lifting sanctions and offering financial assistance in return of Pakistan’s support of the U.S. combat in Afghanistan. In support of assistance to the U.S. in the GWOT, Pakistan received the U.S. economic assistance, which was stopped before 9/11 due to Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 1998. After 9/11, General Musharraf was able to get assistance and offering a great relief for the beleaguered economy. The U.S. media report the downside of aid’s disbursement showing the trust deficit between the U.S. and Pakistan. Jane Parlez published a report in The New York Times published a report on the United States Agency

7 General Musharraf’s Address. Retrieved from http://gritzie.com

108 for International Development (USAID) Program in Pakistan promoted by then Senator

John Kerry, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee promised Pakistan $7.5 billion over five years, but the mistrust in the U.S. about Pakistan’s civilian bureaucracy slowed down the process of aid disbursements (Parlez, 2002). The New York Times also reports, global and domestic reaction over the announcement of aid and rescheduling of debt to

Pakistan. They said the Bush Administration decision may lead to a situation when money would be misused to strengthen the hands of military or terrorist organizations which are supported by the Pakistani establishment in disputed Kashmir rather on improving infrastructure, on health and education (Kahn, 2001).

Similar thoughts reflected in Pakistani mainstream newspapers as Sherani writes in The

Dawn, because of procedural delays and high operational contract costs, the aid program is trapped in the U.S. bureaucratic restraints (Sherani, 2013). The Pakistani Army officials, reports Joby, had lamented about the impact of $ 11 billion aid disbursed to Pakistan by

Bush Administration since 2001 that could not produce desired results nor gained any trust between the two countries (Joby, 2007). Internally the economic assistance from the U.S. and other countries during this period though gave Pakistan a lifeline support, but plunged the country into a never-ending internal security disaster and caught in dependency syndrome. Benet Jones also reflects the donors’ thoughts of financial aid and its impact on

Pakistan as recipient. He says, the international community though spent a huge sums i.e. million dollars to help Pakistan in introducing judicial reforms and other development programs still the country as the World Bank said is “a graveyard of development programs” (Jones, 2011, p. 89).

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This shows the trust deficit on aid program prevailed across the board, which made a limited impact on Pakistan economic condition and its stature at international level.

However, it was noticed that during the second term of President Bush the U.S. civilian assistance program was also enhanced. The Dawn mentions Secretary Rice’s comments that she confessed in an interview: U.S. ignored Pakistan in the past that was a great flaw in bi-lateral relations and assured, ‘the U.S. will be a friend for life’. The U.S. apprehensions on spending on aid and the billing claims were also picked by news analysts besides media channels. Fair says, as part of GWOT alliance, U.S. provided $20.7 billion to Pakistan since 2002 in which $4.8 billion fixed for “economic support funds” did not create much impact as Pakistan government did not invest money on areas prioritized by the U.S. Government. Secondly, Christine Fair mentions the U.S. had also concerns on how Pakistan spent money under the military aid. She quotes General Musharraf’s statement that he delivered in 2009, toeing the same line pursued by Pakistani military rulers that the country’s security concerns were more important and whatever might be the

U.S. wishes, Pakistan will use the aid for its security interests against India (Fair, 2012, p.

125). The media reports on both sides reflect a wide gap between the U.S. and Pakistani governments on the economic aid issue.

3.5.5 General Musharraf’s Role after 9/11

It is imperative to delineate the influence of major decisions made by the Presidents of U.S. and Pakistan. The war on terrorism presents an interesting pretext for understanding the

Bush administration’s perspective that saw in the President Musharraf government the best option to achieve the war goals. Admitted by himself, President Bush in an interview on

PTV on 26th February 2006 during his visit to Pakistan from 3rd to 4th March, 2006 said the

110 relations between the U.S. and Pakistan have been mainly determined by the leaders. “A good relationship between me and the President tends to permeate throughout our government.”8 This explains more clearly the nature of relations prevailed between U.S. and Pakistan influenced by the U.S. Presidents since the cold war began and continued in the GWOT.

Keeping in view an “Indian centric focus” of Pakistani military leadership, General

Musharraf was also concerned on Indian hegemony and its expanding role in Afghanistan after 9/11. This factor also compelled him to take a snap decision to side with the U.S. and retain strategic hold in Afghanistan over India. Reese as cited in (Riedel) says, Musharraf had imagined what would happen if Pakistan remained on the Taliban side. In this scenario,

India would get the edge and become a greater beneficiary in the war on terror while

Pakistan’s nuclear status would fail to ensure equality vis-a-viz India acquired after

Pakistan conducted its nuclear tests (Riedel, 2013, p. 144).

From the U.S. perspective, General Musharraf was more accessible and trustable ally to the U.S. officials than convincing a political leadership therefore, his support was crucial for them to achieve desired objectives. General Musharraf in hope of receiving foreign aid provided several airfields, facilities and other logistical support for the U.S. operations in

Afghanistan. He also ordered for the crackdown on major militant groups and closed down madarasas to satisfy his American counter parts. Hathaway says, in the following period,

Pakistan extended its political, operational, intelligence and logistical support to the deployed U.S. forces deployed in Afghanistan. He also allowed U.S. forces to establish its

8 Interview with President George W. Bush. Retrieved from http://ptv.archives.com

111 bases on its soil and permitted the use of its fly zone for air operations against Afghanistan

(Hathaway, 2008, p. 13). These efforts helped in breaking the ice between the U.S.

Government about Pakistan and led to the signing of strategic partnership between the U.S.

Government and Government of Pakistan. President Bush during his first visit to Pakistan issued a joint statement for a “strategic partnership” calling for a strategic dialogue and expansion of bi-lateral economic ties between U.S. and Pakistan.9 Nonetheless, the effort proved successful to bring the leadership of both countries closer it did not change the U.S. perceptions about Pakistan. Haqqani cited in (Jabeen) argues, almost 25,000 private

Islamic schools operating in Pakistan were closed down but the Americans considered those as a superficial, useless and the decision made in result of the immense International pressure on Musharraf (Jabeen, 2009, p. 134).

On the other hand, critics also believed that General Musharraf policies led Pakistan into a troublesome situation. Tariq Fatimi says, Pakistan experienced in General Musharraf’s eight turbulent years, the trashing of the constitution, brutal imprisonment of an elected prime minister, forcible exile of another referendum, creation of a fake political party to give a civilian facade to an authoritarian rule and tricky policy of hunting with the

Americans and running with the Taliban (Fatimi, 2013, p. 06). Commentators also make much the same argument about the biased approach of Bush administration on indifferent attitude on democratization of Pakistan, an important foreign policy goal set after 9/11.

Despite the fact, General Musharraf refused to hold elections as he promised while the U.S. leadership’s offered patronage to General Musharraf as he was required to achieve major

9 Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan: United States-Pakistan Strategic Partnership. Retrieved from http://ebscohost.com

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U.S. foreign policy goal of killing terrorists and stopping nuclear weapon development program. Later on, President Bush himself expressed apprehension on his relationship with

General Musharraf. The President confessed (as cited in Bruce Riedel, 2013) that the

Pakistani General was unable to fulfill his commitments, as Pakistan was entirely obsessed with India as in all of his dealings with Musharraf India was the center of his contention

(Riedel, 2013, p. 143).

3.5.6 Anti-Americanism after 9/11

Anti-Americanism has remained as a constant gesture of Pakistani masses throughout in the past. It did not appear all of a sudden with the Pakistani establishment’s support in the

GWOT, rather prevailed since 1965 war when the U.S. betrayed its most trustable ally of cold war where as India received a huge support from Soviets. This resentment within

Pakistani populace remained there over the years with varying degrees. However, the sentiment touched all time high after General Musharraf’s public declaration of supporting the U.S. after 9/11. It also posed a challenge for the ruling elite to change negative perception of masses and rebuilding its relations marred with U.S.’s role in 1990’s.

After 9/11, the biggest challenge for the Pakistani military establishment was to win public support against Taliban, earlier seen as warriors and freedom fighters and used for Jihad.

Now they suddenly became a target of a large- scale anti-terrorist campaign by the establishment. A sudden shift in the foreign policy of Pakistan made a reverse trend within the Pakistani populace. This led to the emergence of a coalition form of religious groups gathered under the Motahida Majles-e-Amal (MMA), a dominant religious political party that came into power in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2002 elections to counter the official policy line. Naushin Tabassum says, MMA categorically expressed their sympathies and

113 support to the cause of Talibanization in their election campaign, which also alerted the western world. Thus, despite the Pakistani leadership’s commitment to comply with the

U.S. and continuously pressures of ‘do more’ from Bush administration, the goal of eradicating Taliban and Islamic radical elements in North Waziristan could not be achieved

(Tabassum, 2012, p. 236).

3.5.7 U.S. Drone Attacks: Impact on U.S.-Pakistan Relations

Another dimension that added to the miseries of people and strained relations between U.S. and Pakistan was the launch of drone strikes on Waziristan and tribal areas, comes administratively under Pakistan’s control. In pursuit of capturing Al Qaeda and terrorists the U.S. drone attacks provoked serious debate at home because of civilian’s casualties and violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty. Pir Zubair Shah says, the drone campaign is one of the

U.S. government's most secret programs. Although the most authoritative study on the subject, by the New America Foundation last year, calculated that 283 drone strikes had occurred in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region since 2004 (Shah, 2012).

Apart from public rage, the military regime could not speak up over the real facts behind the use of drone attacks on its soil. Tariq Fatimi in The Express Tribune writes, these strikes started in 2004….while recognized for its success in the destruction of big Al-Qaeda’s top leadership also the cause of killings of innocent civilians…as a result they have invited a widespread anti-American sentiments in Pakistan (Fatimi, 2013, p. 06). Despite common interests of Pakistan and the U.S. in the GWOT the gap has widened between the Pakistani masses and the Pakistani leadership that has resulted into generating a wide spread anti-

Americanism. Similarly, Imtiaz quotes the former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Cameron

Munter (2010-2012) on the U.S. drone policy in The Express Tribune. He says, there was

114 no clear policy between Washington and Islamabad on drone issue, thus not clearly communicated by the U.S. administration to their counterparts in Pakistan and Pakistanis, urging to address the issue at both levels about drones’ scope and their significance (Imtiaz,

2014).

Consequently, the political landscape in Pakistan continuously criticized the U.S. policy on drones, termed it a conspiracy of Pakistani military establishment and previous democratic government of PPP who followed the foreign policy priorities of the U.S. It gained greater momentum with a new political party, Pakistan Tehreeq-e-Insaf (PTI) formed its government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North West Province of Pakistan) in 2011.

The PTI presented resolution against drone attacks saying they led to a rise in terrorist attacks inside Pakistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and have caused irreparable damage to the province’s economy. The resolution also urged the federal government to immediately take effective steps to stop drone attacks, and to announce a clear policy on the issue

(Sherazi, 2013). Rubina Naz, Member Provincial Cabinet, PTI (personal communication,

June 1, 2014) laments, the U.S. Government could not justify the drone attacks publically rather the U.S. media turned down the issue in their routine coverage while getting brutally negative towards Pakistan after 9/11 on its role and sacrifices made in GWOT. She argues the U.S. policies represent a tricky policy i.e “feeding us and killing us on ground” notion.

Despite the commitment of the USAID to rehabilitate the victims of GWOT and drone attacks, says Naz. She adds, are still waiting for their help. This had spurred more public anger against the U.S. support to the military regime from 2001-2008, over its hidden drone policy.

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3.5.8 Domestic Instability of Pakistan

Pakistan’s domestic political instability also gave a safe passage to the U.S. to work closely with Pakistan army, suppressing the desperate need for a political stability, resultantly allotted it a favorable place in international politics. Since independence, Pakistan’s foreign policy has relied on three variables i.e security and survival in the region, checking India’s hegemony in the region, and its excessive reliance on other countries for economic survival. After 9/11, Pakistan constantly pursued its relations with U.S. to achieve these goals. Due to this dependency syndrome, Pakistan could not move beyond as the U.S.’s influence overpowered the country’s foreign policy and diverting it to its national interests.

It is generally perceived, the U.S. foreign policy is driven on the U.S. national interests, but another perspective should also be observed that domestic factors in Pakistan also contributed to widen the bridge between the two countries. The Pakistan’s troubled political history which resulted in four military coups and three wars with India had an enormous backlash on country’s socio-economic prosperity and its repeated failure to establish democratic institutions.

These internal factors had always placed Pakistan’s foreign policy in the hands of military dictators. The argument is evident that the U.S.-Pakistan relations have always shown improved trends during military dictatorships such as in the cold war when General Ayub

Khan had relied on U.S. support; during 1979 invasion when General Zia had built a strong relationship with the U.S. and in 2001 with General Musharraf’s compliance in the GWOT.

This reflects the need to stop ‘one-man show’ phobia and involve its populace through consensus to fight terrorist elements with the help of media and civil society.

3.5.9 Negative Perception of Pakistan in the U.S.

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Pakistan could not handle its image problem because of intense pressures internally and external level. The role of international media also contributed in shaping Pakistan in certain angle, which also affected bi-lateral relations with the U.S. The main credit goes to bad information sharing mechanism between the two countries during the GWOT. The highly sophisticated U.S. media being more responsive and far reaching covered Pakistan while making no effort to create understanding of its critical place and potential to enhance its specified role and project joint efforts of the U.S. and Pakistan in GWOT. Throughout major events even before 9/11, international press minutely covered Pakistan’s foreign policy issues. The role of Indian press is also worth noticing for proactively covering its relations with Pakistan, holding it responsible for nuclear proliferation and terrorism in

South Asia. This hype in particular after December 2001 attacks on Indian Parliament, associating it with Pakistan was the most damaging incident for Pakistan image. Thus, at regional as well as international level Pakistan is under immense image pressure, resulting in mistrust, narrow perception and anti-Pakistan sentiments in other countries.

3.5.10 Pakistan-India Relations after 9/11

Pakistan’s Western borders crisscross with the strategic interests of the U.S. and other states in the region including China, Iran and India. Therefore, whatever happens to

Pakistan would have serious implications on the region. The newly defined role as a

‘frontline state’ has had not only effects on Pakistan’s internal as well as its relations with its nearest neighbours in the region.

Pakistan and India relations saw many highs and lows after 9/11, having a far-reaching impact in regional security dynamics. India’s desire to become a dominant state player in

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South Asia while Pakistan’s quest in achieving strategic position drove the two countries to grave conflicts. In its dealings with India, Pakistan and India deals in three levels which effect at bilateral, regional and global level. At bilateral level, Kashmir issue has remained a core issue; at regional level the region became destabilized as far as Afghanistan is concerned. Pakistan-India relations affected with shifts made in the wake of regional developments. Globally this is associated with GWOT when NATO’s presence remained in Afghanistan, causing instability in the region and changes in the Pakistan and Indian foreign policy. The Huffington Post writes, in its dealings with the U.S., Pakistan starts from the threat it perceives from India. The U.S. will always be used as a “balancer” between India and Pakistan, barring a major improvement in bilateral relations between

India and Pakistan. The Indian government offered ‘unconditional and unambivalent’ support to America to achieve its objectives in Afghanistan (http://huffingtonpost.com,

2001).

Having geographic proximity of Pakistan with Afghanistan and looking at Pakistani support crucial for U.S. military and intelligence operations against Afghanistan’s Taliban regime, Pakistan took an advantage over India. The revival of the U.S.-Pakistan relations after 9/11 as Rizvi says made Indian leaders uncomfortable with the new U.S. policy

(Rizvi, 2004, p. 25). Salmi says, Indian perspective of such engagement in which Pakistan has an inevitable role in the GWOT would make the country go unchecked for carrying out terrorist attacks in India. Nonetheless, both India and Pakistan claimed to be on same side in GWOT, their rivalry within the interstate relations paradigm would remain a prominent feature of South Asian region (Salmi, 2003, p. 89). This became obvious in successive events that took place after 9/11 including attacks on Indian Parliament on December 13,

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2001 and numerous attempts from Pakistani military to resolve Kashmir issue. After this incident, Wisecarver says, India deployed 500,000 troops in Kashmir and Punjab as compared to Pakistan, which deployed only 150,000 troops for its defense on eastern border (Wisecarver, 2007, p. 41).

The U.S. policies within the region also raised negativism due to its inclined attitude and its support towards India in making it a big player in the region. The role of U.S. media is also worth noticing. For example, The Washington Post reports, in the backdrop of Indian

Parliament attacks, Pakistani nation from liberals to fundamentalists having an ever growing industry with the brand of Taliban got united to support the Pakistani military government and Army against the Indian threat (Rondeaux, 2008). The newspaper reflected that though Pakistan having divided over ethnic to religious issues and knowing that Talban killed 1200 armed forces formed a typical national sense of unity, which would always prevail in Pakistan against India.

This shows that after gaining nuclear status, South Asia became apparently more vulnerable for a bigger disaster for which Washington again had to intervene and restrain both countries from further escalation. The U.S. media’s criticism over Pakistani military shows that US had planned to see India in a bigger role. Richard Hoagland writes in the

Washington Post that Pakistani General pressured President Bush for a retaliatory strike on

India did not work well rather intense pressure from Washington extracted promises from

General Musharraf that Pakistan's intelligence service and army will cease giving food, weapons and other logistical help to infiltrators who carry out terrorist raids into India and

Indian-controlled Kashmir. The army will no longer provide mortar fire to cover the infiltrators. (Hoagland, 2002)

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Pakistan faced tremendous pressure, as India was ready to attack on Pakistan and putting it in great fix to concentrate on its eastern border with its troops were already deployed on northern border to hunt for Osama Bin Laden. This situation forced the international players to intervene and settle down the conflict between Pakistan and India. J. Lloyd &

N. Nankivel say, the region became a hotspot of conflicts and terrorist activities that caught attention of international media and organizations towards South Asia, in turn restrained

India to attack on Pakistan. For example, India also received international criticism when it tested AGNI II on 25 January 2002, while movement of Indian troops to the border also yielded international pressure for India to ceasefire and stop border cross firing (Lloyd &

Nankivel, 2002, p. 276).

3.5.11 U.S.-Indian Nuclear Deal: Implications for Pakistan

As 9/11 took place, Pakistan and India had already become de-facto nuclear states with the nuclearization of South Asia affecting the security dimensions of both Pakistan and India.

There seems a stark contrast on the nuclear program of India vis-a-vis Pakistan. Jessica says, Pakistan’s nuclear tests were questioned regarding their credibility as well as Indian diplomats gave precise interviews in the U.S. press calling the Pakistan’s program covert and unoriginal, hired by China. Hoagland’s analysis in the Washington Post clearly reflects this thought when he writes, “Pervez Musharraf's Pakistan is a base from which nuclear technology, fundamentalist terrorism and life-destroying heroin are spread around the globe” (Hoagland, 2002)

If Bush policies for relying on Musharraf, and role of Pakistan after 9/11 is criticized in the international press, his breakthrough decision of signing the civil nuclear deal with India also created trouble and imbalance of power in the region. This factor added a risky element

120 to involve India and Pakistan in nuclear arm race. The tacit acceptance by the U.S. of

India’s nuclear status in the eagerness to set the scale of balance vis a vis China South Asia and also showing it as a responsible state on the face of Pakistan pursuing covert nuclear program set the U.S. policy framework in the region. Reidel argues, the deal was ‘bomb- friendly’ and part of the U.S. strategic move to facilitate towards making India a global power through military aid. Pakistan categorically opposed that “India had been given special treatment” (Riedel, 2013, p. 154). However, despite Pakistan’s reiteration of its crucial role in the GWOT, its alliance with U.S. could not convince the U.S. policy makers to take any practical steps. Rather, more friction between Pakistan and U.S. surfaced in later years as Bush administration’s commitments to Pakistan on resolving India’s deadlock on Kashmir issue, installing Pakistan’s friendly government in Afghanistan, and

U.S. nuclear deal were not honored as claimed. This was another proof of a usual U.S. betrayal, resulted in negative sentiments for the US disturbing the third time alliance.

The U.S. support for India in the nuclear deal had a spillover effect on the regional stability and relations between U.S. and Pakistan. The fast changing situation emerged in South

Asia since 9/11 alerted other regional states on U.S. engagement in South Asia. For instance China categorically rejected the Bush doctrine and upheld the stance of fighting the GWOT in spirit of abiding by the UN charter. Certain factors such as U.S. pressure on

Pakistan in GWOT and on the other side full cooperation with India through the U.S.-

Indian civil nuclear deal had cautioned China that it might cause imbalance of power and regional instability. Keeping this in view of growing Indian hegemony, Pakistan had to rely on China as key balancing factor, which remained evident through various joint developmental projects despite several terrorist attempts on Chinese professionals. The

121 involvement of U.S. and China in South Asia in turn led to add tensions in Pakistan-India relations. The Bush administration also took Pakistan and China relationship with grain of salt, by perceiving that the former has acquired China’s help in nuclear armament and especially in a scenario considering China as a competitive strategic power in South Asia.

This in fact became a vicious cycle with the big powers entangled in their competitive move has further engaged with India and Pakistan thus upsetting the stability of South Asia.

South Asia acquired much significance after 9/11 though it remained the epicenter of wars during the Cold War between the superpowers and later, as a nuclear flash point in 1990’s between India and Pakistan. With the 9/11 incident, the region has become more prone to conflicts due to GWOT because of the involvement of U.S. policies. The difference during the Cold War period was that the threat was visible for the U.S. in form of communism, and enemy identifiable i.e Soviet Union. In the GWOT, the threat has transcended its boundaries with no specific states as invisible rivals, but between the ‘good vs. evil’ stated in the Bush doctrine.

An in-depth analysis of the U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War and assessing in the perspective of 9/11 scenario reflects that the U.S. foreign policy has been on same course as assessed from the policy positions during the Cold War and GWOT. The statement of then US Secretary John Foster Dulles; ‘if a country is not with us, it is against us’ (p.703) shows a continuous trend with the present US policy. President Bush’s remarks proves this argument as he states in the National Security Strategy 2006, “the United States is in the early years of a long struggle, similar to what our country faced in the early years of the

Cold War” (para:1) shows that the U.S. foreign policy has not changed over time.

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Pakistan has remained on top of the U.S. foreign policy making agenda through all these times. Pakistan’s geopolitical location in South Asia and its appropriateness to the U.S. national interests placed it on U.S. agenda. Changing international security environment had though engaged Pakistan started with ‘containment policy’ to the current war on terrorism, its foreign policy has affected due to the involvement of external factors.

Pakistan had to abandon its pro-Taliban policy by entering into the GWOT alliance. Mostly it created the worst effect on its Kashmir policy as General Musharraf’s government took a u-turn for not sending troops to Kashmir. Despite the fact, Pakistan took the U.S. line but it did not convince the U.S. to intervene and lead in resolving Kashmir issue.

During the President Bush era, the U.S. national interests towards Pakistan included nuclear terrorism in South Asia, particularly, U.S. insecurity towards Pakistan’s strategic assets; and Pakistan’s support for Taliban. Pakistan nuclear weapons program also faced widespread criticism from the U.S. and Indian media. Therefore, it had to reverse its course on further development on nuclear program. Therefore, perceptions and pressures played importantly on setting the course for Pakistan after 9/11 subjecting it to serious security issues and public criticism.

The U.S. interests in South Asia within the paradigm of Indo-Pakistan relations also present an interesting picture. Despite the U.S. policy claims of engaging India and Pakistan on independent basis, balance has not been achieved between the two archrivals. The U.S. was able to play effectively its part in Afghanistan due to Pakistan’s support while the latter has not earned many benefits as it had envisaged. The U.S. being much concerned on

Afghanistan did not find out the real cause of trouble between India and Pakistan i.e the longstanding dispute on Kashmir issue. U.S. gave strategic place to India where as with

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Pakistan there has been only the convergence of interests between Washington and

Islamabad. However, this does not mean that Pakistan will lose its importance. Its geographic location holds significant importance on strategic side i.e connecting with the emerging powers – China, with which long-term interests in energy and trade are envisaged and nuclear India with which Pakistan has also an efficient system in place, and

Afghanistan through which Pakistan is connecting with Central Asian Republics.

Therefore, the need for ‘alliance,’ considered vital in the past will remain inevitable for the

U.S. in future as well to ensure peace and security amongst the key players of South Asia.

Pakistan’s foreign policy having consistently based on external reliance since its inception could not devise an independent foreign policy. External interests shaped its national interests even effecting its relations at bi-lateral and regional level. While the fact remains that countries only place their national interests as the basis of international relations, in

Pakistan’s case mostly converging and diverging national interests have shaped up its policy directions. This proves correct in the context of U.S.-Pakistan relations as there has been no improvement nor any sign of complete disengagement except a troubled pattern remained flagrant during the President Bush period. The Pakistani policy makers are also required to shape foreign policy as per its national interests. Pakistan’s place in the GWOT remained as a buffer and garrison state, relevant only in times of military operations.

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Chapter 4 News Media - Foreign Policy Relationship

This chapter presents a detailed analysis on media and foreign policy relationship in a particular context of interstate relations. It forms the basis of understanding the role of news media effecting interstate relations while the process of foreign policy making takes place. In order to understand the phenomena of how this is done in the foreign policy arena and perceived in international conflicts, it is imperative to explore various dimensions of news gathering process, media frame analysis and its applications in different fields.

In the context of 9/11 and GWOT, a diverse literature review presents a holistic picture of research area, supported with the perceptions of academia from Mass Communications and International Relations taken together to get their understanding of media and foreign policy relationship particularly, about media-state relations, media and national security and image building/perception making. This preliminary data makes a good start for data analysis of study sample and in response of collected media frames of New York Times and Washington Post’s editorials, interviews from the U.S. journalists in the subsequent chapter further addresses the qualitative aspect of study.

In modern times where technology has redefined the outlook of mass media and its dissemination techniques, news media now are considered part of a nation’s power potential, most commonly known as the fourth pillar of a state, advancing state’s interests. Besides innovation in print and electronic media, new media such as internet and social media have also become evident to the horizon. In connection to this, M

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Mcluhan highlights the importance of media said, “media are the message”. Whatever goes to the public is through media; therefore, it is the message (Mcluhan, 1964, p. 18).

The rise in media power has coincided with globalization turning the world into a global village. In present era, it is said that in foreign policy issues through which the national strategy is executed is incomplete, both during peace and war, without the involvement of media, constituting a powerful relationship of media and foreign policy.

The news media’s reach and spontaneous nature makes them indispensable in the politics of any nation. The news media play a diverse role during peace, wars or crisis. In democratic societies, the media’s place is more significant and powerful. Therefore, in western countries, media imply an influencing role in forming domestic and international public opinion, and arguably in shaping policy makers’ decisions. Global media therefore, have the ability to shape the will of nations thus making major changes in international politics due to this factor. The media outlets set the frames within which people interpret and discuss developments in international arena. Tuchman cited in

(Saleem) considers it the most distinguished trait of the U.S. media which influences the other nations with same frequency because of its far reaching and globally acceptable coverage. It leaves an impact on foreign policy making of other nations. Nausheen

Saleem further says, the concept of framing is now more or less established as a field in mass communication studies (Saleem, 2007, p. 133).

Similarly, the real time coverage by the news media outlets has shortened the reaction time for governments as they are expected to immediately respond to events being covered. Seib says, due to change of pace in technology the news coverage is influencing governments’ reaction and presidents’ decision making while contemplating with pressures (Seib, 2006,

134 p. 13). The wars are particularly treated with such media discourses complimented with images and news reports as powerful evidences to shape public opinion and decisions of policy makers. The media impact on a society has therefore, intrigued academic debates from different perspectives. These include themes and topics of stories, selection of messages, prominence of one over other issues, coverage impact on government’s policy and public opinion etc.

By taking these factors in view, the study’s focus is based on a broader level by relating the news media’s role in the U.S. foreign policy decision making process for Pakistan. Seib also underscores the importance of media and government and despite indistinct relationship between the two fields, he said, their roles have become indispensable for each other and needs academic investigation (Seib, 2006, p. 15). Chang, Shoemaker, and

Brendlinger, Chang and Lee, cited in (Durga Ray) say, news coverage of the U.S. media has always shown interest in foreign coverage from several factors i.e gauging the U.S. national interest, perceiving external threat to its security and promoting global peace and freedom (Ray, 2004, p. 22).

The media coverage of Pakistan’s alliance with the U.S. after 9/11 and media frames would determine its policy makers’ positions on key issues towards Pakistan. The media frames repeatedly appearing in the editorials of U.S. mainstream media reflect the tone of

Pakistan’s role and military regime’s cooperation and relationship with the U.S. Few questions therefore, are incorporated in this study such as, Does the news media shape relations with other countries by influencing on a state’s foreign policy machinery through informing the stakeholders including general public; Would it effect country’s image through its coverage and build-up perceptions which effect the relationship, and what

135 measures need to be adopted to rectify negative perceptions, in case. These questions are addressed in the context of the U.S.-Pakistan relations that reappeared on surface in the

GWOT.

4.1 News Gathering Process and News Making

It is imperative to understand the process of gathering news before deliberation on media framing. The frame analysis provides an insight on internal and external factors that are involved in the news production process particularly, in foreign policy issues. These factors play an important role in news formulation and framing. The news is not an isolated entity rather a by-product of society. So historical, economic, political and social circumstances of societies also influence the news content and produce cause and effect relationship for each other.

In International Relations, Zengjun Peng states, the image of a country is shaped by a number of political and social factors such as its diplomatic relations and its involvement in international politics, whereas economic and political changes taking place at international level also construct its image (Peng, 2004, p. 56). The international news media through its coverage of related areas shape the global public perception and image of a country as they deal and interact with other states more swiftly, distinctively setting a particular agenda at global level. For American public, the U.S. media act as a prime source for gathering information about foreign countries, so it can be said that particular media frames, as defined by the country’s policies and their treatment measures help in a great way to shape the perception about another country.

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The way media report on political conflicts directly impacts the proposed solutions, policy decisions, and the lives of citizens. The media's preference or opposition to a certain issue and proposed solution also help in identifying which solution is to be selected. These factors are so subtly knitted together that they form an overall concept of thematic coverage without pointing out any sharp line of a news frame and inclination. While supporting the argument Kimberly A. Powell says, thematic news frames related to the issue of terrorism in the backdrop of 9/11 were composed of labels, common themes, and rhetorical associations in the news coverage. These frames while repeatedly appearing in the news coverage formulated opinion and set an visual image of “terrorism” as a dominating frame throughout the given time period (Powell, 2011, p. 94). Such thematic frames not only influence the coverage of other countries, but help in internationalizing a specific issue for achieving national interests. Dickson argues, since international issues are out of access of public outreach therefore, public dependency on media gets higher than experiencing it physically. This is the reason “legislators, as well as the public, may form negative or positive stereotypes of a country based on media portrayal that is disproportionate and distorted” (Dickson, 1992, p. 569).

4.2 Factors Influencing Media Framing

Media framing of an issue involves many dimensions influencing decisions especially in wars and humanitarian crises as Saqib Riaz says several internal and external factors also influence the media content and set its agenda. These include personal attitudes and orientations of media workers, professional routines, commercial policies, ownership patterns, economic policies, advertisers, and governments. These factors influence the media content and its presentation because media content is necessarily manipulated when

137 events are relocated and reproduced into news stories (Riaz, 2008, p. 78). Some major factors mentioned below, are mostly instrumental in connecting news media and foreign policy issues to each other.

4.2.1 Editorial Policy and Media Framing

The editorial policy of a newspaper or a media channel is a reflection of ideology through which an agenda is set and messages are devised. The selection of words, tone and portrayal in an editorial is a practical manifestation of news organization’s ideology and it sets perception of public in massive manner. Beckar, cited in (Pamela J. Shoemaker, and

Stephen D. Reese) says, ideology is an integrated set of frames of reference through which each of us sees the world, and to which all of us adjust our actions. They argue that media carefully disseminate this ideology by reflecting that theme which are culturally familiar to the public and reflect the interest of locals, where by their selection is also done with care (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 213). The editorial desk is mainly responsible to set the overall line of news coverage. The editor or owner is the main driver of this policy to run and execute this ideology therefore, the concept of absolute media freedom and objectivity no longer exist in practical terms. Various economic and political factors also place demands externally on its editorial desk operations. Thus, editorial policy places great influence on overall spectrum of reporting.

In the analysis of the relationship between the media and state during the GWOT, historical facts shows that another era in media studies and examination of its relations with state started after 9/11 events because of the impact and significance of the developments happening in this era.

4.2.2 National Interest and Media Framing

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In foreign policy issues or in international conflicts, the media and government relationship mainly revolves around achieving respective national interests. The national interest is a set of goals which a state pursues through various means. Media support or opposition to it depends on how the national interest is clearly defined and communicated to media by the state agencies. If there is a speculation in policy lines, the media would become critical and take its own course in debates and news analyses. The argument of Andrew Arno and

Wimal Dissanayake, makes it clear that the media are no more side-line actors in the issues of national interest. The frequency with which international conflicts take place is now more inclined towards “social drama” than dealing with mere “strategic game” (Andrew

& Dissanayake, 1984, p. 231). This shows media’s dominance in projecting international conflicts is critical for achieving national interest and security goals. In the case of the U.S. media, they are rather more active as one of the vital U.S. national interests is the expression of freedom, where naturally media get a central position. However, it is commonly observed that in pursuance of this, the U.S. media get arguably more confirmative to the U.S. national interests. Seib contends, it is this stereotypical role of media that they overlook the diversity of issues happening globally. Their interest is to be selective about those issues which have cultural similarity. That is why other issues and crisis happening in Sudan, Rwanda and Congo for example are not covered or even given less space. Thus they are either ignored and turn out to be less important in international issues (Seib, 2006, p. 9).

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4.2.3 Government’s Influence and Media Framing

The framing of news is also shaped by the information available for reporting. The quality and authenticity of news is dependent on how and through which sources information is collected. Government sources/officials mostly provide key information to journalists that may compromise the neutrality and value of media reports. Government source holds a unique place in forming and influencing the news gathering process for several reasons.

First, it has a controlling authority where it can exert pressure on news organizations to place a certain point of view or omit any frame which is against their interest. Second, government has a power of imposing laws and regulations, license issues and declaration authority which can pressure editors and owners to change their lines. Third, government sources are more powerful and authoritative and offer inside access to those journalists who are in their list and conform to their agenda. For example, Wiley Noakes & K. G.

Wilkins explain, the reporters tend to rely upon the government and government agencies for information about protest groups and their causes which can cause problems, particularly when the protest groups are mobilizing against the government or a government policy (Noakes & Wilkins, 2002, p. 649).

Journalists tend to depend upon this information because it adds prestige to their stories, and believed in the objectivity of the official source, and easy access to available data.

Since news stories are always time sensitive, because of the fast nature of news production, their reliance on government data as a key information source gets much greater in time of national crisis. Thus, in many ways the media and government make a symbiotic relationship when it comes to information collection.

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On the other hand, government is also dependent on media from the perspective of media’s ability to interpret issues and transmit messages to the public. The U.S. policy apparatus also takes interest in shaping and making adjustments to its foreign policy taking in media as its necessary dissemination source and gaining public support. Cynthia Boaz says, in liberal democracies though media are not declared part of policy process, in real world, it is so much important and contributive that earned the status of “fourth estate (Boaz, 2006, p. 349). Pena concludes that though news media do not have that power to force a complete change in foreign policy however, possess the ability to lead to change policies on issues covered (Pena, 2003). O’ Heffernan’s Mutual Exploitation Model also conforms to this argument that the U.S. policy makers gave much importance to the news media and involved them in policy-making process pressuring them to take urgent steps (O'Heffernan,

1991, p.235). They also took notice of media importance in terms of speed and as a primary source of information for them.

Similarly, Raju, Jagadeswari and Dissanayake say, the functions of media and how they handle issues of international conflicts hold an important place in communicating messages within a system that influence political thinking of the stakeholders such as policy makers and larger systems at international levels (Raju, Jagadeswari & Dissanayake, 1984, p. 101).

For instance, Nancy Bernhard refers to a close relationship between the U.S. media and the

U.S. Government in setting “anti communism” theme and making a cultural familiarization around it. The media acted as meaningful resource in creating a bad image of Soviet

Union’s crumbling economy (Bernhard, 1999, p. 210). Nevertheless media also shapes the perceptions of leaders and people, and on the basis of these perceptions, political actors formulate their policies, especially during the situations of crisis or political changes i.e.

141 elections. Hussain argues that media can never be independent; either it works under the government pressure imposed through laws or under the influence of financer as it has become a moneymaking industry”. Thus government’s influence as an official source takes extra advantage in facilitating reporters while taking their control in its hands (Hussain,

2008, p. 97).

This also leads to the concept of media management which has become a specialized field to mould and shape media and streaming the flow and trend of coverage. In foreign affairs and international conflicts, media management is done at every level ranging from foreign office to presidencies. For example in the U.S. Iraq war, 2003 the Bush administration took special care in handling the issue. It hired a public relations company “Rendon Group” to build up a communication campaign in favor of President’s war decision. Brooke writes in USA Today, since 2000, the U.S. Government has spent more than $100 million worth of taxpayer funds with the company, primarily designated for painting a positive image for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Their job was to disseminate propaganda, not only to those living in Afghanistan, but also to the American public (Brooke, 2012)

Diddi concludes his study on media framing of the Iraq war issue in the 2004 U.S. presidential campaign. He says sound professionals were hired to project specific message which became their election agenda. This study found that during the election, Bush campaign masters got successful in peeving failure of John Kerry’s agenda to fight against in the GWOT, while media having noticed the complex and deeper dimensions attached to the issue further projected the Bush Government’s line although there were other critical views which could be focused by media on the U.S. Iraq policy (Diddi, 2006, p. 126). The media ended up projecting only a few of those frames that were sponsored by President

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Bush’s public relations team. Hence media management has become an essential tool for governments to win foreign policy objectives.

4.2.4 Agencies /Military’s influence and Media Framing

Mizari says, in today’s world, war for hearts and minds of people has replaced the war for territory (Mizari, 1999). Though government and various agencies play directly, yet critical role in case of national security issues, there have been cases on record where during wars, the U.S. media heavily covered military views and projected the war coverage of events.

This coverage helped in raising morale for military and keeping readers/viewers on one page through controlled information flow. During such crisis, the use of media in selling war messages to build up perception becomes critical which is otherwise difficult in covering domestic issues. Paletz and Entman say, there were instances when media was funded by CIA to build up a specific public perception on foreign policy issue, and in return the media was bound to slip some messages as desired by CIA (Paletz & Entman, 1981, p.

189).

4.2.5 Advertiser’s Influence and Media Framing

The role of big companies as advertisers of media houses has shifted the balance of news in last few decades. Owners of media outlets keep good relations with advertising agencies to gain monetary benefits. Ahmad describes the role of financers as following:

1)They can provide or pull ads from a particular media organization 2) increase the

advertisement quota 3) they can sponsor programs, such as soap opera, discussion

shows 4) they can introduce special characters into programs, especially in

children’s programs; when the characters become popular, they can turn them into

toys or introduce special toys related to existing characters of the show; and 5), they

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can pull advertisements when program content is grim—the kind of content that

can produce an atmosphere of tension or economic uncertainty , such as war,

disasters or economic crises (Ahmad, 2003, p. 115).

The news content often gets compromised due to the interests of owners and pressures from big financers. Elite influence is also an important factor which inclines news coverage towards certain interests. This argument is supported by the propaganda role of media which says that the mass media serve the interests of elites or ruling class and further their cause. Furthering this kind of media role and coverage of other states, Michael Parenti says, it is not only natural limitations on journalists such as timeliness and space, rather presentation of opinions on any situation that depends on how they conform to the interests of elites who have the economic power. In other case the media organizations are now occupied by industrialists and conglomerates that possess the power to control news media

(Parenti, 1993, p. 8).

4.2.6 International Politics and Media Framing

Framing is an important factor in determining public perceptions and changing government’s policy decisions. Within the international political context, media create a significant impact on how readers understand their world. Walter Lippmann says, images in our minds about foreign nations are mostly set by media as they are the windows through which we perceive an image of a country. Since few people experience international events physically, they rely on media and their presentations of facts (Lippmann, 1922, p. 102).

Simultaneously, a reader adopts those frames used by the media to shape their understanding of events. Thus, media are a decisive force in determining which events will become part of public discourse.

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The media also play an agenda-setting role in the political realm. For instance, the government has a distinct interest in how a story is presented which it creates support for a new policy or rejects it in the eyes of public. “In the context of mass media and policy,

"agenda setting" refers strictly to the salience of issues" and "[i]n policy situations, this involves...placement of an issue or region or country on the US foreign policy agenda that was not already there [and] involvement to a higher level of policy consideration of an issue or region or country presently on the agenda" (O'Heffernan, 1991, p. 45). The foreign journalists have to rely on their official sources for news stories, which is also in the interest of governments who have their own interest to work closely with media. It helps them know which stories are in focus and their angle with which coverage is framed.

The media’s role in making stereotypical reflection of a certain entity has been there since ages. What media portray and reproduce makes a stereo image in readers’ minds making certain perceptions. For example, the word ‘Taliban’ was pegged in a different context in

Pakistan before 9/11 terrorist attacks. It was until Pakistani media which constructed a new dimension to the word and interpreted its meaning, later on. Malik and Iqbal find out that constant coverage on an issue and media position can change its dimensions. For example,

Considering the media position on Swat issue, The News, a leading International Daily of

Pakistan describes `the start of the Malakand operation produced the most amazing spectacle of all….anchors and reporters… changed their tune about the Taliban…. the term

‘Taliban’ has all but disappeared from the lexicon altogether, replaced by ‘terrorists’ or

‘militants’. It was after that, the Malakand operation grabbed much attention of media reporters and analysts towards the term (Malik & Iqbal, 2009, p. 7). This stereotypical image frame of Taliban created by media reflects that media has the capacity to shape a

145 reality in its own way. Diddi says, in doing framing researches, all these aspects are covered with different dynamics, therefore attached greater importance to how media formulate and direct influence on policy formulation and spur discussions (Diddi, 2006, p. 13).

Similarly, foreign government’s role in using media for getting positive public opinion in favor of its agenda has also been reported in various cases. This becomes relevant in case of regional and international conflicts. The U.S. media has a dual role to play; first, in influencing foreign policy agenda by examining whether objectives are met or require remedial action, second, informing and presenting analysis to the audiences which may in turn pressure policy makers to review their decisions. This underlying process is visible in

Entman’s cascade activation which has been mentioned in detail in second chapter (p.47).

It highlights different phases of media influencing various stakeholders at various levels within the model.

4.2.7 Technology Influence and Media Framing

With globalization and rapid advancement in Information Communication Technology, the work of news media has become more complex. Certain factors also compel media to adopt in shaping their news on situations that erupt suddenly, thus effecting its pace and nature of work. It has also turned media’s scope of work from national interests which are permanent in nature to temporary issues which require urgent attention. For example, international news media started covering the issue of terrorism in their routine coverage and news debates. In wars and crisis, such as 9/11, the news media are considered instrumental in passing information because of their real time coverage and reach through online services. Therefore, by covering terrorism as a constant theme it generated fear in the public. Ahmad argues, after 9/11 there was no difference in the role of electronic and

146 print media - both acquired similar characteristics and lead, be it CNN or New York Times.

Both media outlets were effective in reaching out and covering terrorism taking in views from foreign countries and shaping international public opinion (Ahmad, 2007, p. 5). The technology has helped diminish the technical limitations of print and electronic media.

4.2.8 Media’s Independent Role and Media Framing

Besides external and internal factors which influence over media and news coverage, there is another parallel view which supports the fact of ‘media driving policy’. It is argued that media by very nature of creating news stories engage the targeting audiences at two main levels; first, on government or policy makers, second on masses by shaping public opinion.

Media’s ideological views influence foreign policy issues. This means process of policy making is to some extent altered through media intervention. In support of this argument,

Entman argues that in the run up to the U.S. Iraq war 2003, the U.S. media exerted initial pressure on Bush administration for delaying the war decision and seeking approval from the United Nations at least in the beginning. The media incorporated foreign analysts in its coverage despite there was very wide agreement within the American government. The technological power helped media to get dissent opinions from outside the U.S. on

President Bush’s decision on “war soon” in Iraq, which delayed the process of the U.S.

Government’s decision making (Entman, 2003, p. 153).

According to Danny Schecheter, New York Times did not cover terrorism as its main theme before 9/11 took place. It reported with lesser interest unless terrorism had stuck the U.S. through attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon. Similarly, a review of mainstream media such as the U.S. News and World Report show that after September 11 attacks the reports were mainly based on blaming the Al-Qaeda as main perpetrators of

147 attacks while not deliberating on an ineffective U.S. Homeland Security and passive foreign policy decisions over the strategic interests of the U.S. on Afghanistan (Schecheter,

2003, p. 17).

This leads to another debate on media’s deliberated approach which restricts the audiences to think and read only what the news media project and cover. This also reflects that framing is also applicable in such cases. Ahmad refers to similar themes that appeared in different media including war and U.S. military response after 9/11 attacks and unification of American nation etc. She says that of all those themes collected from different media sources, journalists expressed personal opinions and debate on these themes (Ahmad, 2007, p. 8). Supporting this argument on foreign media, Spencer says, it is not that the theory of CNN effect fits well in humanitarian actions only to notice the effectiveness of media – particularly, television’s power, the power of news media is also seen in matters of national interest. If western media cover an event on continuous basis, it would have an impact on other countries’ media and their debates at global level.

Therefore, says Spencer, with the globalization of technology the western media is more advantaged in setting its own agenda in illicit manner on other countries (Spencer, 2005, p. 37).

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4.3 Media Framing Analysis: Application in Foreign Policy Issues

Framing has been explained in a broader perspective, particularly in the International

Relations domain in first chapter; its application in the field of political communications is discussed here. In the field of communications, several theorists have embarked upon expanding the media framing concept as per their understanding. Khan says, media framing is a special technique used by media editors through which circumstances can be shown in a completely different picture that are quite opposite to its actuality (Khan, 2014). She says the American media outlets showed the IS (Islamic State) militants group’s through poor quality video of American aid worker, Peter Kassig, to prove that powerful U.S. air strikes had disrupted the IS network. Therefore, framing is relevant to project international events.

This statement is supported by Gaye Tuchman’s work, relevant in explaining how media frames operate in the news making. Tuchman says, frames in news arrange reality of everyday happenings and form a major component of daily events “an essential feature of news” (Tuchman, 1978, p. 193). Tuchman argues, the mass media play a central role in setting the frames used by media consumers to assess events and see the events through their lens.

The concept of frames into media studies has been linked with news coverage and journalists’ preferences to a great extent. As an important factor in media, Gitlin cites frames as "...principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters." He further says, framing is a process that yields power of shaping ideology of masses and these frames are helpful for journalists to easily pick certain angles and revolve their debates around them (Gitlin, 1980, p. 7). Though Scheufele deliberates on media effects as part of interactive model

149 construction of reality, his concept also coincides with its applications as frames being tools for journalists covering activities as they already provide them readily available information collected from different sources and transmit them effectively (Scheufele,

1999, p. 106). His study has described the application of “frame typology” which describes the applications of media frames introduced by different contributors in media framing.

Having said that, frames because of their wider application in various disciplines has remained as a vague concept from conceptualizing to their practical application. Entman says, there has been a fine line between understanding this concept and its presence in various fields. Despite the fact that it is present across all fields of social sciences and humanities, yet there is a vague understanding on framing theory that shows exactly how frames have rooted within and how frames manifest in a text or influence public thinking

(Entman, 1993, p. 51). A gradual development of media frame analysis has been possible by contributors who originated the concept of ‘frame’ in respective settings. These include

Gamson and Modigliani in the cultural setting to Entman who focuses on media framing analysis exerting political influence on different groups of society. The following are the studies from media framing perspective and literature offering a clear understanding how media framing has been examined in foreign policy issues.

B. Van Gorp studies the Chinese media in framing the political handover of Hong Kong to

China. It is covered under an “issue framing” where the problem is identified as a central theme by engaging the whole Chinese nation and highlighting the issue as a central theme.

He says the news media specified an overarching theme which described the problem i.e.

“the Western Imperialists bear the causal responsibility, and the solution was one country with two political and economical systems” (Gorp, 2007, p. 65). This frame package is

150 persistently repeated in the media to highlight the problem. This reflects that frame packaging is also a workable methodology to understand interstate relations.

The frames that are projected in media though show a particular angle to an event, yet there is another aspect of understanding framing that Gamson cited in (Ahmad Uysal) refer another aspect while conducting the framing analysis of Turkey’s welfare party Reffeh.

Through this study, Uysal confirmed Gamson’s argument that media framing is also recognized by the non-coverage of certain issues which are subsequently ignored by public

(Uysal, 2004, p. 203). In their study, ‘framing of political inclusion and exclusion: media, state, and Islamic party interactions in Turkey, 1995 to 1998’, say mainstream print media coverage of Turkish political party, Reffeh identified critical events supported by the content analysis of newspapers to identify media orientation by news content on the issue and number of times those emerged in opinion columns and editorials. The tone was noted at three levels while specific framings were highlighted in study findings.

Manu Bhagavan and Faisal Bari present a different view of media coverage in ‘the comparative studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East’ by which they created and established perception of South Asia after 9/11. The authors argue that western media misrepresented South Asia in such a pessimistic manner that after 9/11, South Asia faced serious economic setback. Relating the coverage of India and Pakistan, they say media representations remained instrumental in creating an image of the South Asia. This biased trend resulted into low capital flow and economic activity towards the region, in turn increasing poverty level (Bhagavan & Bari, 2001, p. 99). The work examines how the western media i.e New York Times, Time Magazine and National Geographic framed South

Asia in successfully building the Americans’ perception of cost of doing business in

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Pakistan while the country had no problem in continuing business with the U.S. as its ally.

The region is highlighted as an economically tarnished and poverty driven that will not appear as a potential for mutual trade in future.

In another study of media discourse after 9/11, David Altheide examines the contents of

New York Times and Washington Post on “mass media and terrorism”. The study highlighted themes coinciding with the U.S. policy positions in German reports. For example, in comparison to the U.S. news media coverage of 9/11 in the U.S, it underlined patriotic themes during the WOT. He found the German news reports also focused for an international coalition with the U.S. in WOT. This study while comparing New York Times with Washington Post found , politics of fear was adapted by the U.S. media and that regenerated the fear domestically as well as globally with repeated use of key words like

“terrorist, Al-Qaeda, homeland, policy, combatant, attack, war, Iraq” etc in their news reports. Similarly, the U.S. media used frames depicted as a revenge and reaction to Al-

Qaeda terrorists (Altheide, 2007).

Bush Monahan’s study on “framing September 11: Overview of the media and the audience’s response” explores media framing by the U.S. electronic channels to know construction of an overall meaning of 9/11. Monahan examines, television was granted number one status in fixing “news holes” for 9/11. The live coverage frames started appearing such as “Who did this?” “How did this happen?” “How should the United States respond to these attacks?” These frames became prominent in the U.S. media in support for a military action. These frames had already set the schema to deal with the threat

(Monahan, 2010, p. 64). This reflects before any policy action taken to deal with the threat, media had already begun to set a “retaliation frame” in public minds, setting a moral

152 justification to the Bush administration for a pro-military decision. Over all the media coverage and framing the incident from different angles contributed together to make evaluations and collective understanding of 9/11 attacks in the study.

Mark J. Gonzalas examines a study on the news framing analysis on “Israel-Palestine statehood conflict”. The study was conducted to check how media framing was done during this conflict through online coverage of CNN and Al-Jazeera’s articles. The study analyses the concept of media power in setting agenda of public and media framing of headlines, story leads and the news content. The research found out the element of national interest was influential on the coverage of CNN and Al-Jazeera while covering Palestinian statehood (Gonzalas, 2011).

Tijana Milosevic’s study on “media framing of geostrategic outcomes of war in Iraq” focuses on the news media framing in the U.S. Milosevic explored the U.S. media treatment of Iran issue in the backdrop of the U.S.-Iraq war, 2003 and how it affected the public opinion towards geo-political decisions and impacted the U.S. government policies during the war period (Milosevic, 2009). The work examines the content analysis of eight years from 2001-2008 of both print media i.e. New York Times and NBC, the U.S. TV channel and their coverage from the perspective of media framing of Iranian geo-political gains from the War in Iraq, 2003. The findings suggest the coverage failed to alert the public to inform them with necessary tools for questioning government policies and pressuring the policy makers by defining the whole policy as a strategic failure of the U.S. government.

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“Framing of Iranian Threat: An analysis of Canadian and American Newspaper Coverage of the Iranian Nuclear Project, September 11, 2000-September 11, 2002” by R. Suzanne covers the spectrum of Iran’s nuclear program as one of the US foreign policy issue after

9/11. Most of the studies engaged media within the backdrop of 9/11 e.g. how media frames were used to project Iranian nuclear project as the prime focus of this study. Suzanne covers the news coverage of Canadian newspapers and two U.S. newspapers: Toronto Star,

National Post, Chicago Tribune and New York Times, and examined how frame selection operated to present a particular image of reality and the power of critical events to reframe issues (Suzanne, 2010).

Vimay Klocke works on “Framing the world: Elite ideologies in U.S. media discourse of the war on terrorism campaign”. He deliberates on the implementation of the first year of the U.S. war on terrorism and how the elite i.e. government officials and members of private institutions framed the related events. This study focused on the strategic aspect of frames exploited by influencing people which effectively supported the U.S. government’s policy positions with regard to GWOT policy. Thus, the specific role of elites was studied in the speeches of President Bush, staff commentaries and guest op-Eds and editorials of

New York Times and Wall Street Journal. The study findings reflect the dominance of elite discourse in coverage that not only “delegitimized terrorists’ but also supports

“Americanization’ of global economy and culture (Klocke, 2004).

Arvind Diddi explores “news media framing of Iraq issue in the 2004 U.S. Presidential

Campaign” as part of election agenda. This study performs a content analysis which selected 445 stories from three networks and three media channels for media framing of how issue of Iraq was discussed in the U.S. presidential campaign. The study analyzes

154 different factors that influenced framing by assessing the influence of nature of medium

(networks vs. cable), nature of journalists (race and gender) and nature of sources (partisans vs. non-partisans) on the Iraq issue frames. The data of the study reveals that the news media largely emphasized negative frames sponsored by President Bush and John Kerry partisans. Overall, stories with dominant frames were more likely to favor John Kerry than

President Bush (Diddi, 2006).

Crispin, C. Maslog, Seow L. Ting, Cing, S, Hun have worked on the framing analysis of “how newspapers in five Asian countries covered the Iraq War on U.S. intervention in Iraq”. This five-country study examines the extent to which the news coverage of the war on Iraq by newspapers from India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and the Philippines is framed according to the principles of war/peace journalism outlined by Johan Galtung. The findings, based on a content analysis of 442 stories from 8 newspapers, suggest a strong peace journalism framing. Two important factors shaping the news framing of the conflict, and support for the war and for the protagonists in the war (Americans/British and Iraqis) are religion and sourcing. Newspapers from the non-Muslim countries have a stronger war journalism framing, and are more supportive of the war and of the Americans/British than the newspapers from the Muslim countries, which are more supportive of the Iraqis. The study sorts out stories covering war journalism frames and peace journalism frames

(Maslog, Ting & Hun, 2007).

Jonas Siegel and Saranaz Barforoush, conduct a study on “media coverage of Iran’s nuclear program: An analysis of U.S. and UK coverage, 2009-2012”. This covers the Iran’s nuclear programme as the most contentious issue in the U.S. national security. The failure of the U.S. Iraq war, 2003 reflects criticism on media narratives. The leading U.S.

155 newspapers were selected and checked whether they framed their coverage of Iran’s nuclear program in a manner that emphasized official narratives of the dispute and a relatively narrow range of policy choices available to officials. They conduct this study which highlighted the framing characteristics of leading six newspapers of U.S. and UK, mainly on the “he said/she said” aspects of the policy debate, without putting analysis and informing over basic issues to build up objective assessment of the issue adequately (Siegel

& Barforoush, 2013).

The media coverage lacked clarity without enough sources being mentioned which was responsible to leave little choice for the U.S. foreign policy makers. Mostly government officials were quoted describing a narrow outlook of dealing with the issue for government.

The coverage also reflects the views of people from the U.S, Europe and Israel with accusing comments and blaming Iran to deal with the matter single handedly. The editorials and opinions of the sample newspapers expressed intensity of nuclear issue by giving more coverage on policy official’s veto that Iran nuclear program was a serious threat to the U.S. national security interests and generated interest of public as well. The coverage also generates negative sentiments about Iran in the broader public of Israel, U.S. and European countries which affected the relations and regional tensions where national security interests came into clash on accepting acceptable outcomes. This coverage lacks broader analysis where all parties could deliberate on consensual solution.

Hossain has worked on “framing the Liberation War of Bangladesh in the U.S. and UK media: A content analysis of New York Times and the Times London”. The work deliberates on media framing during wars. The study focuses on the U.S. media’s projection of international issue such as, Liberation war of Bangladesh. The study highlighting the tones

156 and sources of news finds that both publications used three main media frames: “military- conflict frame, prognostic frame and human interest frame” and reflected more neutral tone than positive and negative tones while both newspapers quoted official sources as the primary sources in their reports (Hossain, 2010).

Pamposh Raina’s work on “framing of the Mumbai terror attacks by the Indian and the

Pakistani print media” focuses on print media of Pakistan and India covering the Mumbai terror attacks in India in 2008 and print media’s building up a negative plot. The work quotes journalists’ comments on terror attacks. The research question as who were the major sources of this description such as political elites of India and Pakistan and how did this narrative help in building up a perception in the public of both countries is dealt with the help of content analysis. The study finds that negative trend in coverage had hardened the peace process between the two countries (Raina, 2011).

Noshin Saleem’s study on “U.S. media framing of foreign countries image: An analytical perspective” covered the image of a country and print media’s role. Saleem explores the nature of how the U.S. media framed the image of a foreign country in the socio- economic, political, military, cultural, and ideological paradigm. This study also applied framing as well as image concepts under the context of patterns of news coverage. Her analysis of framing and image theories led to a conclusion that the U.S. media supported the U.S. policy lines in matters of foreign affairs, and mostly framed overseas countries and their image as per directions of national interests set by the governments (Saleem,

2007).

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Ghulam, Ali and Iqbal’s study on “US mass media and image of Afghanistan: Portrayal of

Afghanistan by Newsweek and Time”, covers a broad spectrum of comparative media content analysis. They work at examining the role of Afghanistan’s image in the U.S. magazines. This work performs a content analysis and found out ratio of positive and negative coverage through media frames. The significance of this work became more important after the U.S. attacked Afghanistan and its coherence with the U.S. policy positions of attacking Afghanistan. Issues like safe harbor of terrorists, narcotics den, and center for Islamization and Al-Qaida have been framed in these magazines (Ghulam, Ali,

& Iqbal, 2011).

The above mentioned literature with support of research studies has proven the fact that media frames are critical stimulants in upholding a favorable or unfavorable position to any significant issue. The literature on framing indicates that, media frames can play a vital role in stimulating opposition to or support for an event or issue, and also define problem, justify a problem with a clear judgment and identify cause and propose solution to an issue, leading readers or viewers towards a clear action. They also present an ideological stance to a problem and set a total impression or tone of a news story. Media frames generally represent specific ideology through attractive words, images, metaphors, and phrases. This also helps to determine the “tone” of media coverage of an event or issue. This analysis therefore, complies with Entman’s concept of framing which he applied in the GWOT scenario using media frames and examining their effects and influence on public and policy makers.

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4.4 Media-Foreign Policy Relationship: Academic Views

The aforementioned sections gave a detailed account on news making processes and academic work conducted on media framing and foreign policy issues. This section presents diverse perspectives of academia from the field of foreign policy and media as how they perceive this relationship in the light of convergence or divergence on national interest and national security perspectives. The academia from Mass Communications and

International Relations present their views on media-state relations; how media effect or act in foreign policy making process within national security paradigm, and role of media in shaping image, particularly, shaping foreign policy towards other countries. These views hold specific value because of an interdisciplinary nature of this study and offer an understanding on news media’s role in foreign policy decision making process. That said, these are personal views which only describe the relationship and an understanding of the fact in academic arena.

4.4.1 News Media-State Relations

Dr. I. Khan, Professor of Mass Communications, Department of Journalism and Mass

Communications, University of Peshawar (personal communication, March 15, 2014) explained the media-state relationship from the perspective of national interest, that when the question of foreign policy comes to front, media corporations tend to cooperate much with their governments as compared to domestic politics where they get more critical to their government’s policies. He said, from selling point of view, and especially in the post

9/11, no media organization in all over the world confronted its government in pursuance of national interest and foreign policy actions. The only exception, he added, diminishing too was the British media where as the U.S. media in this context were more conformist of

159 national pride particularly, if relationship is of “us and them”, “we in the U.S. and the world”. In this case, he says, the U.S. media could not criticize its government on foreign policy issues. Although in the past there are examples like Vietnam War and Korean War where public opinion did stand against their government and media also condemned the

U.S. foreign policy. In post 9/11 scenario, the U.S. media is cooperated beyond its normal routines. He further elaborates on “embedded journalism” an age old concept but still workable in congruence with state agenda. Citing the example of CNN, I Khan said, “whole scenario can be seen in media–state paradigm of the most important person talking as foreign policy specialist is somebody from the White House”, adding, “White House correspondent has become the most important person to quote in such shows after 9/11.”

Dr. N. Ghufran, Professor of International Relations, Department of International

Relations, University of Peshawar (personal communication, April 23, 2014) contended, that the relationship is two-way, complimenting each other when their interests match, otherwise collide in case of divergence. Citing example from atrocities in a military operation after 9/11 that took place in Afghanistan, she said, when war journalists covered the U.S. marines urinating over mutilating bodies of Taliban or in case of Iraqi prisoners being mistreated, such issues made policy makers defensive in other parts of world.

Similarly, the U.S. media highlighted images which naturally impacted the foreign policy maker’s decisions. Thus foreign policy is shaped on media presentations of events.

Dr. S.Jahan, Professor of Journalism, Former Dean Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Peshawar (personal communication, May 17, 2014) argued, it matters how national interest is defined in foreign policy issues. In liberal democracies, he said, media representatives are more mature. They already have a sense of state limitations and follow

160 policy lines. In Pakistan, while there is a stark contrast of our conceptualization of national interest where national interest is still a vague term. Therefore, it depends on how state defines national interest in its national security policy and communicates it further to institutions. The role of media, says Jahan, is secondary in foreign policy issues.

Dr. N. Hussain, Professor of Political Science, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad

(personal communication April 14, 2014) said, media and state relations can now be seen in the backdrop of what Ikraam Sehgal, a senior news analyst said: “fourth pillar of state”, but media’s use is also seen as a propaganda tool of state. For example, CNN and other channels such as, Arti Russia and Al-Jazeera etc. cover the same issue in different perspectives which suits their line. “Thus propaganda role is more contrived in their reporting of issues, giving their national interest a paramount importance”, adding,

“CNNization or CNN effect of 1991” and “embedded journalism” are still seen in today’s media landscape.”

Dr. B. Wiggins, Professor Communications, Department of Communication, Arkansas

University USA (personal communication, May 24, 2014), said, the patriotic element remains on top within this interesting relationship. He says the meta-frames set the use of images, use of text and videos e.g showing deceased soldiers have an effect through media.

He said, there is a tendency in the media – not as subservient or as a mouthpiece of government, but in real terms - some subjectivity – some objectivity, depending upon situation. For instance he refers to political parties in government, adding, it’s not that media that support Republicans and Democrats, it is furthering the political agenda which attracts the news media at a particular point. However, the most troubling symptom is that journalists do not question the government, even though there are alternate options. “I don’t

161 think that Republicans and Democrats are involved with media. So media are not controlled by any government. Generally, in U.S., everyone has a patriotic element which overwhelms issues”, adding, “it is curious, the U.S. mainstream media don’t want a critical analysis of issues e.g. in Ukraine crisis, there is no political discussion on CNN or FOX etc. rather people are focusing on immediate reactions. They are reporting on what President Obama’s policy should be. The media in this country has the right and the obligation to criticize the government. They are supposed to be the watchdog on international affairs, but in last twenty years, it has been less and less”, he remarked. This is how Entman further confirms these remarks on mainstream media performing gate keeping role in U.S. He reports, if

New York Times, Washington Post, USA Today, CNN, NBC, NPR, Time Magazine and few other mainstream media don’t write about something, the issue does not exist (Entman,

2010).

4.4.2 News Media and National Security

Similarly, on media as an indispensable part of national security policy of a state, and to what extent the role is perceived in national security policies, Dr. I. Khan said, in existing systems, political borders and geographic boundaries are no more. The ideology has been diminished as determining factor, anymore. In an era of rapid communications technology, the role of media in popularizing foreign policy in making people accept decisions is enormous. A common man learns from media. Even interpretation comes from media when experts appear in talk shows, and people began to know in detail of any issue from them.

Media are a window through which we see and interpret messages. This trend is global not only confined to Pakistan. He refers Arundhati Roy’s statement, ‘mediatization of politics has made politics a 9-5 job.”

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Dr. T. Ameen, Professor Political Science, Chairman School of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-e-

Azam University, Islamabad (personal communication, April 14, 2014) responded, media again became “issue specific” even during President Bush and General Musharraf’s tenure when bi-lateral relations were seen through the lens of “Bush and Mush”. Thus, Americans took lot of advantage and the CIA penetrated in Pakistan. It would be difficult if there had been a democratic government in Pakistan. Although media may not be the determining factor in foreign policy making process, they are certainly the influencing factor. The determining factors are the U.S. Congress, U.S. National Security Council, Senate and

Pentagon. Nevertheless, the U.S. media influence its government and shape public opinion to a great extent. So the U.S. media act as a tool to propagate U.S. national security agenda.

Dr. N. Hussain further says, especially in wars and conflicts, the media can go for attaining war objectives. And state use other means like media to attain power and remain instrumental in opinion making, creating heroes and villains, creating monsters & enemies.

Dr. A. Sarwar, (Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Peshawar) also supports this aspect of media’s support with its government He referred to news leaks which are passed through media-government interaction. He said, when a government wants to convey message to another country and wants it to think that this is being though in policy circles, it uses media and leaks that through media. This role, though tricky, seems to be in place in case of developed and established democracies where media are supposed to be independent and critically pointing towards their governments. Therefore media’s role in foreign issues shows a systemic and systematic nature (personal communication, February

11, 2015).

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In the context of state’s role in media’s domain particularly, Dr. I. Khan throws light on media partisanship in post 9/11 scenario. He says the U.S. newspapers could be relatively independent but channels such as Fox News are highly conservative which only demonstrated Republican’s thought, so whatever they say it gets on-air and whatever

Democrats say, “it is nonsense”; same goes with CNBC which represents Democrats’ views. The New York Times, Washington Post and Huffington Post, he said, at times acted as mouth pieces of government because all these leaks happening around the globe appear in these papers.

Answering same question, Dr. I Khan says it’s not something that government forces media into conformity, first foreign policy is too complex even for best minds in journalism to understand because there are lot of things going on there which always needs somebody from the government to explain it to media. Second, in the foreign services there are “spin doctors” and they make it work for media. Also there is a certain amount of respect when a spokesperson speaks from Foreign Office. All press conferences, be it in Pakistan or

Washington, there is uniformity everywhere. As a member of nation state, I consider myself responsible to support my country’s initiative. “This kind of a fellow feeling”, he said, “is a common gesture in foreign policy issues in U.S. too. Similarly, journalists who quote good stories get perks and privilege. By conforming to the government view, journalists can access to the world’s “classified zones” where others can’t. So government’s foreign policy machinery is more influential than media and sets the agenda.”

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4.4.3 News Media and Image Setting: Impact on Interstate Relations

On an intrinsic role of media’s image building role particularly, in foreign country’s image,

I. Khan supports the idea of media to media interaction to improve interstate relations by positive bridging and messaging. He said media possess a dominant role. In this regard,

Pakistan is a classic example nowadays. “You are seeing “Aman ki Asha” (joint effort of leading Pakistani newspaper, The News, and Indian newspaper, Hindu between Pakistan and India”, he said, “it is media”. The rest of track-II diplomacy is a decade-long concept.

It didn’t work there so when it is possible with India, why not Afghanistan? “The conformity comes from media. Media played a strong part in unifying Germany and France which has made the European Union, a success model. “If you take out the negative discourse and make it positive, things will change”.

Dr. T. Ameen however, does not support this idea. He said, media set an image in a certain light in international affairs. Referring to Pakistan’s role in GWOT, he said, the U.S. media portrayed Pakistan very critical during 2007-2009 on its initiative of a peace process with the Tehreeq-e-Taliban (TTP) Pakistan. The issue became the story for U.S. Government and American news analysts. The U.S. media started framing ‘Taliban’ and Pakistani military establishment, having links with Taliban and created media frame that Taliban having influence in Swat valley (Northern area of Pakistan) were ready to take over

Islamabad (Capital of Pakistan) which was just 170 kilometers away. Such reports and stories, said T. Ameen, hampered the U.S.-Pakistan relations and stalemated the process of bringing peace to the region. “One could understand the facts and how those leaks were planted to U.S. media,” remarked T.Ameen.

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Dr. N. Guffran perceives media and image setting as alone they cannot set an image however a powerful country can definitely influence this factor due to its extensive reach and power. Yet, the answer cannot be “yes or no”. Media in one way or other are “tool”.

They have to project certain issues and ignore others, and there is when media–state nexus comes in, their engagement mostly complements each other; collaborating, and leaving some space for other to make policy briefs.

Media framing analysis offers a clear insight for this study, providing foundation for defining problem, interpretation, causes and suggestive action. The review of case studies show that media framing is a helpful technique in identifying media as contributor in understanding relations between states, defining problems, tendency, setting impression of key players in foreign policy issues. The studies covering issues since the end of cold war particularly present media as an essential factor in pushing national security policies and state interests The analysis has emphasized over the importance of media presence and its involvement in national security issues by adding case studies from a wide range of issues, highlighting relationship between media and foreign policy through academic researches and their findings in this study. The collection of analysis shows media’s ability to shape and form public opinion and a key player in international conflicts. Their framing of another state through news coverage places it importance to examine its role in foreign policy. Its role has been explored on security, military and inter-state relations in international crisis. This base work presents a framework to analyze the U.S. news media role in the context of GWOT.

Similarly, personal communications from academics also adds an interesting dynamic and brings significance to the research by knowing their understanding of matter. There are

166 dissent, yet converging views of academics from International Relations and Mass

Communications on media-state relations, media role in the foreign policy issues and national security paradigm. The discussion also reveals that certain internal and external factors also effect media’s performance especially, in wars where the demand for support is increased and news objectivity gets compromised. Ranging from editorial policy to international pressures the news gathering process has highlighted these issues.

Entman’s framing analysis as it implies media treatment is also relevant to this study.

Foremost, because the frames direct towards how reality is constructed by interpreting events and coverage in the news content. The study on the mainstream US media will identify how the U.S.-Pakistan relations are defined and interpreted. Since this study is related to foreign policy making, framing of issues will clearly define sources and their perceptions which are transmitted to the audiences and finally, the process of identifying framing will also clarify the level of media’s involvement in foreign policy making inputs and mutual exploitation model by media framing analysis and interviews of journalists and diplomats. The highlighted features will lay the basis whether media framed the U.S.-

Pakistan relations and related statements of policy making sources reflected change in critical relations with the military regime in Pakistan after 9/11.

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Chapter 5

U.S. Media Frames: Content Analysis

The methodology applied for data analysis includes findings and results of quantitative analysis. The methodology includes the rationale of content analysis conducted on the editorials, highlighting key issues between the U.S. and Pakistan. This chapter is comprised of quantitative analysis of editorials presenting most frequently appearing keywords and their overall direction. The first part of methodology explains the steps taken for performing content analysis, a brief explanation of themes and classification of categories. The second part is comprised of tables of both newspapers and their findings, followed by conclusion.

5.1 Methodology

The first part focuses on quantitative analysis i.e. the content analysis of the editorials of two newspapers, Washington Post and New York Times. The type of data is nominal i,e editorials, focusing the word “Pakistan”, received from the Information Resource Center

(IRC), U.S. Embassy, Islamabad through the USA e-library database on eight-years period from 2001-2008. The editorials have been critically analyzed on both quantitative and qualitative research methods. About content analysis, Gao cited in (Silver Stemler) says, the content analysis offers researchers a mechanism to sort out a huge amount of data and information in a systematic and quick fashion (Stemler, 2001). For quantitative analysis, the Berelson’s method of content analysis has been used to identify most appearing key words in editorials. This is done through coding media frames in form of keywords and processing them through scientific investigation (Berelson, 1952, p.18).

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This method is appropriate for identifying media frames in qualitative analysis. From the perspective of media frames Entman says, framing in a news text is an impression of force and shows authority. It highlights the participants’ power and their control over news, particularly, in the field of political communications (Entman, 1993, p. 54).

Frames also show whose thought is dominant which is evidenced through frequency of appearances in the news texts. Keeping this in view, content analysis is a standard procedure to identify these frames and gather desired results. Entman further stresses the importance of framing and describes content analysis as the best method because it helps researchers in finding conceptual meanings of text through framing, rather focusing entirely to get results on positive or negative categories. Most of the studies, he said, ignore this aspect while doing content analysis. Gamson further supports this idea that in the field of mass communication “framing” presents a central idea in an event or any issue that gives a sense to its readers (Gamson, 1989, p. 159).

Donald Treadwel also explains the limitation of quantitative analysis through content analysis that it does not help in interpreting the content because content analysis only focus on the counting of keywords or observable content quantitatively (Treadwel, 2010, p. 217). Therefore, this is the reason this study has adopted the qualitative analysis through which media framing analysis is conducted on editorials. Denis McQuail also supports this methodology. He says, qualitative analysis is used to explain the quantitative data and help in interpretation of frames. This combination of two type of analysis helps in answering the research questions in an effective manner (McQuail,

1987, p. 187).

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This method is adopted to overcome the problem of content analysis which often leaves the qualitative aspect. The qualitative analysis is treated in the next chapter in a specific manner. It is divided in two parts. The first part of qualitative section is aimed to interpret the quantitative information derived from the content analysis on selected themes. This is comprised of interpretation of keywords and how they are reflected in each theme. The media frames collected through this interpretation show the direction of editorials on each theme. In second section, theses frames are analyzed in light of gathered material i.e editorials, policy briefs and statements from the U.S. government archives and personal interviews/communication with the U.S. diplomats and journalists. These results give a critical analysis of media frames and help in understanding the research questions of study. It also offers a balanced understanding and helps in meeting the research objectives which is not catered in most of research studies. This type of analysis helps in inferring reciprocal influences, which cannot be examined through content analysis, or just critically examining the media frames in themselves. A detailed explanation of qualitative analysis is given in next chapter.

5.2 Quantitative Analysis

There are different methods of processing the data for content analysis. This study covers the frames, key phrases, words and impression of text based on positive, negative and neutral scales which are reflected in the editorial coverage. Based on research questions two categories are identified, which are explained below:

5.2.1 Categorization

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There are two categories defined for this study. The first category is the US foreign policy towards Pakistan after 9/11. This category entails the coverage of New York Times and

Washington Post’s editorials which shows the U.S. policy actions and demands from

Pakistan’s military government for the given time period on defined themes which remain as key issues between U.S. and Pakistan. The second category is based on how New York

Times and Washington Post cover the U.S.-Pakistan relations in its editorials. This is reflected through how military government’s role is projected in editorials in response to the US demands and former’s actions in GWOT. The way this relation is analyzed through a totality of impression by fixing three scales i.e. 1: Positive, 2: Neutral, 3:

Negative. The tone of coverage in editorials clearly determines the U.S.-Pakistan relations in eight years after 9/11. The reflection of issues in New York Times and

Washington Post shows that the mainstream media prominently highlight these issues.

These three scales define those editorials which display their impression in defined themes.

This study also determines the image of Pakistan in the U.S. media while presenting the newspapers’ coverage about Pakistan, and identifying major issues under which

Pakistan’s image is reflected in these newspapers. Image is a relative term used in different connotations in different studies. A country’s image is shaped by news media as Saleem says, it is critical for constructing a general image shaping it through its news coverage and analysis. Today, in the age of information technology the dependency of world’s audiences has increased than ever to rely more on the news media while setting an impression of a country (Saleem, 2004, p. 130). In the age of rapid information technology, there has been a great realization for an improved ‘national image’ among

175 governments and their political leaders particularly, in liberal democracies. Their focus is always greater on presenting better image while formulating policies. How these newspapers present Pakistan to the world largely depends upon their editorial stance as a very important piece of public information. Ramesh Rao says, editorial holds a great significance as it is an official version showing an authority and at the same time analyzes the situation in objective manner (Rao, 2003) The manner by which an editorial is written has the capacity to influence opinion of people in important circles.

5.2.2 Unit of Analysis

The main unit of analysis for this study is each single sentence of editorials while a conclusion drawn on the totality of impression is done on contextual lines. The whole editorial is coded under the scales of positive, negative and neutral, as mentioned above.

This trend is shown while keeping in view the coverage of mainstream newspapers on key issues. Each theme determines Pakistan’s image, stereotypical characteristics of

Pakistan’s military leadership and policies they represent during the study period. As

Keus Krippendorff says, there are many ways to count and analyze the content ranging from letters, words to phrases; the categorization is then done through explanation of keywords, phrases, suggestions, implications. This offers an analysis from different perspectives (Krippendorff, 1980, p. 78). About extracting meaningful information from keywords, Ole R. Holsti says, content analysis forms a useful technique that helps in gathering systematic and neutral meanings or findings from messages or texts (Holsti,

1969, p. 608). For this matter, it is imperative to establish a coding scheme for conducting an objective analysis. This is discussed subsequently.

5.2.3 Reliability in Inter-Coding Scheme

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The inter coder reliability is an important part of content analysis. Young Ik Cho says, inter-coder reliability is a critical stage for understanding a contextual meaning of given content otherwise, neutral and correct analysis is difficult to achieve, though there are other ways and means through which reliability can be confirmed, but inter coder reliability is used mostly in researches for correct coding process (Cho, 2008). This study has adopted the inter-coding method for achieving a higher reliability on established rules. The identification of themes is dependent on this process which helps to perform content analysis in an easy manner on selected themes. This involved two coders, one person with Master’s in Economics background being unfamiliar with communication studies and another, the researcher herself. The rationale of having a coder from a different background is to maintain objectivity and reaching to agreement level without any bias. Of 114 editorials from both newspapers at least 10% is considered as a benchmark for the inter-coding reliability process. Since the study period is comprised of eight years, it was decided to get representation from each year, and from each newspaper. Therefore, one editorial from each newspaper has been selected for each year based on systematic random selection method. In this manner, 16 editorials are collected i.e. eight from New York Times and eight from Washington Post from for each year.

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Total number of editorials of Washington Post and New York Times from 2001-2008

Washington Post New York Times Total No of editorials 65 49 114

5.2.4 Procedure of Inter-Coding

Two separate sheets are prepared for the coding of sample. One related to category 1: U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan and category 2; The U.S.-Pakistan relations from the coverage of New York Times and Washington Post. The inter-coder reliability is calculated in a systematic form regarding two categories for both newspapers. Two separate coding sheets as attached in Annexure B&C are prepared taking in the units of analysis in consideration. The Holsti’s reliability method has been applied to see the level of agreement between two coders. The results concluded on agreements on themes are gathered and calculated in percentages as per Holsti’s described method (Holsti, 1969).

Reliability =2M/N1+N2

N1 and N2: Total number of coding decisions made by two coders, respectively.

M: Total number of agreed coding decisions by the two coders in a combined form

After application of this method, agreements are found on five themes and the direction of editorials was decided on three scales. These are described in detail below:

5.2.5 Theme Sketch

The final coding sheet identifies five themes:

A. Pakistan’s military cooperation with Bush Administration in the GWOT B. U.S. Pressure on Pakistan to restore democracy. C. Pakistan Nuclear Development: U.S. Policy D. Pakistan -India Relations: U.S. Policy E. Miscellaneous Issues

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Figure 5.1 Graphical Representation of Themes

The role of U.S. Media in Shaping Foreign Policy towards Pakistan A Case Study of New York Times and Washington Post (2001-2008)

U.S. Foreign Policy U.S.-Pakistan relations after 9/11: towards Pakistan after Washington Post and New York Times’ 9/11 Editorial Coverage

THEMES A: Pakistan’s military cooperation with Bush administration in the GWOT B: U.S. pressure on Pakistan to restore democracy C: Pakistan’s nuclear development: U.S. Policy D: Pakistan-India relations: U.S. Policy E: Miscellaneous

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. Since 9/11 how U.S. media frame Pakistan in its editorial coverage? 2. To what extent the media frames coincide with the U.S. policy positions in its relations with Pakistan? 3. To what extent the U.S. media impact its policy makers in making foreign policy towards Pakistan?

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A. Pakistan’s Military Cooperation with Bush Administration in the GWOT

This theme is related to the time period beginning since 9/11 attacks and shows news analysis on Pakistan’s military regime’s coordination in the U.S.-led GWOT. The 9/11 brought Pakistan to the center stage of global politics. Instead of being marginalized as a failed or failing state bordering on economic bankruptcy and implosion, Pakistan emerged central to the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism. However, this cooperation went under different stages from favor to facing severe criticism on its military’s role. While dealing with a significant regional and international change, the Pakistani military government grappled with domestic and international challenges while joining the U.S. war in

Afghanistan in 2001. Pakistan’s stature was negative up until 9/11, but changed to monumental shift of U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan in the backdrop of cooperation of Pakistan’s military and Bush administration in US-led GWOT. The theme therefore, covers all those events which show the relations, over reliance, pressures and reactions on

General Musharraf and his military establishment.

B. U.S. Pressure on Pakistan to Restore Democracy

This theme refers to those events which reflect the policy statements over the fact that Bush administration showed undue cooperation to General Musharraf’s regime and on the other side, media’s criticism over his administration’s cooperation and soft tone to a military dictator. Those events and statements that reflect a perspective over this policy position became part of this theme identified through frequency, tone and direction of editorials.

This also reflects key issues encompassing the argument over the U.S. principle of promotion of democracy in comparison with media frames that highlight and pressure its government towards the issue.

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C. Pakistan’s Nuclear Development: U.S. Policy

This theme covers the U.S. policy variations and perceptions towards Pakistan’s nuclear development program which remained a point of contention and a dominant media frame in the U.S.-Pakistan relations. In the context of estranged relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan, nuclear proliferation issue remained a controversial matter before 9/11. The

U.S. policy shift after 9/11 and actions on Pakistan’s nuclear development program presented a comparative picture on how the nuclear issue was addressed and what changes in the U.S. policy positions were seen. The media frames about this issue particularly highlight the perspective of U.S.-Pakistan relations on nuclear issue.

D. Pakistan - India Relations: U.S. Policy

After 9/11 the flow and trend of bilateral relations between Pakistan and India took a u- turn. The GWOT added another angle to already complicated relations between the two countries. The U.S. reaction and policy towards Pakistan and India relations appeared as an emerging, yet dominant theme after 9/11 in the U.S. mainstream media. How media covered the U.S. relations with India on one side and Pakistan on the other side is reflected under this theme. Similarly, how the U.S. media framed Pakistan – India relations and U.S. efforts in diffusing tensions regarding Kashmir issue, nuclear program development, combating cross border terrorism were also covered with great interest. These issues remained dominant during the period after 9/11 particularly during General Musharraf’s regime. The media frames collected on this theme through analysis also made the ground for the U.S.-Pakistan relations during the whole period.

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E. Miscellaneous issues

This theme focuses all those issues which were covered by both newspapers though, but with less intensity. These include drone air strikes, U.S. financial assistance to the military regime in the context of GWOT, humanitarian aid because of natural calamities and women rights issues. The editorials which did not cover any of identified themes, but show perspective on them have been categorized as theme E. These issues appeared with less frequency in both newspapers so they were considered as miscellaneous issues.

5.3 Quantitative Scales

Quantitative scales help in determining the direction of an editorial through tone and language related to any issue or theme. The direction sets the editorial perspective under which a statement is passed and determines its frame of reference, thus variations give a clear picture on data for a long timeframe which is difficult to manage otherwise. This method is in line with the Berelson’s method and introduces different scales for qualitative analysis. Berelson introduces units of analysis, procedure for inter-coding to cover the qualitative aspect of content (Berelson, 1952, p. 220)

5.3.1 Positive Scale

The degree with which an editorial shows a positive scale is that when general stance is constructive, positive and supportive towards Pakistan. This also reflects the newspaper’s stance on the U.S. foreign policy making towards Pakistan. The language in form of words, sentences and tone presents a positive reflection towards all themes particularly, first four themes. This is applied to both categories i.e U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan and U.S.-

Pakistan relations in the GWOT: Coverage of New York Times and Washington Post. For example, words like Pakistan, critical ally, a major Islamic nation, military’s positive

182 response in support of Bush administration, Musharraf’s crack down policy against

Taliban, joint cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan are considered positive regarding

U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan and Pakistan’s firm response on combating terrorism and attacking safe havens of terrorists from Pakistan.

Similarly, an editorial statement: “He hinted as much in his Jan. 12 speech. General

Musharraf unequivocally condemned all acts of terrorism, including those carried out in the name of freeing Kashmiri Muslim majority from Indian rule. He also pledged to combat

Islamic extremism and lawlessness within Pakistan itself” (No Rewards for Pakistan, 2002

) falls into the positive scale. Such media frames are gathered for qualitative analysis section in next chapter with more depth.

5.3.2 Negative Scale

The editorials which display keywords and phrases criticizing Pakistan’s role in the war on terror, e.g on its military regime’s fake role or double game with U.S. are considered negative. Those editorials setting direction in tone towards Bush administration, criticizing it for keeping relations with military regime would reflect negative image of Pakistan and the U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan. For example, “Washington failed to protest when

General Musharraf cut short the prosecution of the nuclear scientist at the center of the scandal, Abdul Qadeer Khan, with a presidential pardon. It did not object when he blocked the investigation of any military involvement” (Pakistan changes the subject, 2004) or

“President Musharraf’s heavy-handed tactics can only undermine the nation and weaken its ability to fight terrorism” (Pakistan's perpetual president, 2002).

Similarly, in the Washington Post’s editorials, covering U.S. foreign policy and U.S.-

Pakistan relations under all mentioned themes showing criticism and negative projection

183 towards Pakistan are categories fallen on negative scale. Similarly, key words like Islamist extremist, military dictator or intimidation, evils of terrorism, religious extremism, Islamist fundamentalists fall under the negative scale. These statements give a clear sense of direction which shows how Pakistan’s role is seen in the U.S. media. These keywords, phrases and statements reflecting negative tone over five themes show an analysis of the

U.S. foreign policy positions on South Asia, especially Pakistan.

5.3.3 Neutral Scale

An editorial reflecting a balanced tone showing both positive and negative tone at the end while coming up with a balanced argument is categorized under the neutral scale. The key words, key phrases and paragraphs showing balanced statements reflect the editorial perspective on the U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan while the overall tone or total impression show the U.S.-Pakistan relations and predict its image in these elite newspapers.

For example, statement, “Paradoxically, U.S. military strikes in Afghanistan seem to have inhibited India and Pakistan from going to war themselves. With so much American muscle in the area, even regional powers carefully calibrate their steps” (No rewards for Pakistan,

2002). The frames of these scales are collected in qualitative analysis.

5.4 Limitations of Content Analysis

The content analysis covering the empirical aspect of this study covers all these themes based on scales. The selection of mainstream media having international repute comprising

New York Times and Washington Post shows these issues remained dominant and consistent in the U.S. Pakistan relations. Also the selection of editorials is deliberately done to avoid bias and reporter’s choice of topics. This analysis also caters to the objectivity

184 element as far as frequency is concerned. However, there can be a tendency to see the subjectivity to the scale of direction aspect. Similarly, some entries are deliberately missed out which reflected a very low frequency because those issues were not highlighted mostly in the editorials. This also suggests that sometimes newspapers do not touch and focus certain issues although they are quite prevalent in inter-state relations.

The content analysis gives base work to build up an assessment of data and contributes to the qualitative procedures which otherwise cannot be done to test the foreign policy decision making inputs. However it only presents a picture based on the collected empirical data. This study has taken in this factor particularly to fill the gap that is found in various quantitative research works, giving a narrow picture based on interpretation of news texts.

Though framing has provided the bases to conduct analysis for this study, it is imperative to analyze the frames for a comprehensive understanding of foreign policy decision making theory and other related models referred in this study.

5.5 Quantitative Findings

Following are the themes that are defined in the coding scheme

A. Pakistan’s military cooperation with Bush Administration in the GWOT

B. U.S. pressure on Pakistan to restore democracy

C. Pakistan’s nuclear development: U.S. Policy

D. Pakistan - India relations: U.S. Policy

E. Miscellaneous issues

The content analysis determines the direction and the editorial coverage on each theme.

These themes then cover the two main categories; first, U.S. foreign policy towards

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Pakistan, secondly coverage of two newspapers showing editorial perspective on the U.S.-

Pakistan relations. For content analysis, frequency test is applied to know about the frequencies of the keywords against the scale given as negative, neutral and positive. The software for analyses is the Statistical Package of Social Sciences (SPSS) used in this study.

Regarding application of frequency test Campbel and Campbel say, it can be done using

“summarizing univariate analysis” which is suitable to apply same variables to different themes as explained in Annexure A (Campbel & Campbel, 2008, p. 15 ). Dr. R. Qureshi,

Professor Sociology SZABIST University, Islamabad says, frequency test is recommended to find occurrences of keywords in data while qualitative analysis helps explain the context and serves the content analysis in effective manner(personal communication, June 12,

2014).

With the help of SPSS, five different variable sheets are developed for each newspaper, which are according to the main themes of the study mentioned above. Simple frequency test is conducted which shows percentages drawn with the help of SPSS to know the distribution and occurrences of key words appeared on themes A, B, C, D and E. This also determines the mean values of keywords which appear in more than one scale and mode values that show the occurrences of keywords reflected in one of the three scales. The frequency test is conducted for the category 1 i.e the U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan after 9/11. In order to know those selected keywords, via inter-coder reliability test are either discussed negatively, neutrally or positively in the selected editorials while the category 2 i.e the coverage of New York Times and Washington Post on the U.S.-Pakistan relations is reflected through qualitative analysis which determines its image whether it is reflected in positive, negative and neutral towards Pakistan through totality of impression.

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5.5.1 Limitation of Frequency Test

According to frequency test, the procedure of finding keyword frequencies in SPSS offers the simplest way to get both frequency distributions. However there are certain limitations which can influence the objectivity of frequency test. For example, the mean value is not found on those cells where variables remain empty or shows no entry. In such case, the mean value is not helpful, therefore not calculated in this study. For a clear understanding of this, the tables show those cells and reveal that extra care is required while interpreting the quantitative results. However, to overcome this problem, the keywords, number of lines in a sentence appeared on each theme is collected against each scale. It is also supported with the help of “totality of impression” which will be conducted in the qualitative part of this study.

5.6 Tables of New York Times

The frequencies tables cover the category1: The U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan after

9/11 on the basis of keyword search for each theme of New York Times. The coded data is calculated from positive, negative and neutral scales. These tables also present percentages, their mean values for how many key words are reflected in either one, two or all defined scales. The mode values show the most occurring key words appeared in the negative as 1, neutral scale as 2 and positive as 3 for each theme. After collecting the most appearing keywords from all themes, the graphical picture of New York Times shows the overall findings in order to give a comprehensive perspective of editorials in quantitative manner.

The image however, is depicted through critical analysis of editorials in the next chapter in respective manner.

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Table 1

Pakistan’s Military Cooperation with Bush Administration in the GWOT

Theme A S. N. Key words Negative Neutral Positive Mean Mode No. of 1 2 3 Editorials 1. Osama bin Laden 3 (27.27%) 0 0 1.00 1 11 2. Pervez Musharraf 5 (45.45%) 3 (27.27%) 3(27.27%) 1.82 1 11 3. Terrorism 4 (36.36%) 2(18.18%) 0 1.33 2 11 4. 9/11 1 (9.1%) 3 (27.27%) 0 1.25 2 11 5. Nuclear weapons 3 (27.27%) 1 (9.1%) 0 1.25 1 11 6. Military aid 1 (9.1%) 4 (36.36%) 5(45.45%) 1.67 3 11 7. Pakistan’s military 3 (27.27%) 0 0 1.00 1 11 dictator 8. Intelligence 6 (54.54%) 0 1 (9.1%) 1.29 1 11 agencies 9. Islamist extremists 7 (63.63%) 0 0 1.00 1 11 10. Pakistan 3 (27.27%) 0 1 (9.1%) 1.50 1 11 11. Army 3 (27.27%) 1 (9.1%) 1 (9.1%) 1.60 1 11 12. Taliban 7 (63.63%) 1 (9.1%) 0 1.13 1 11 13. Islamic extremism 2 (18.18%) 0 0 1.00 1 11 14. Al-Qaeda 6 (54.54%) 0 0 1.00 1 11 15. Militants 2 (18.18%) 0 0 1.00 1 11 Total 56 15 11

The quantitative findings of theme ‘A’ show the frequencies of keywords related to the

Pakistan’s military cooperation with Bush administration in the GWOT. In total, 11 out of

49 editorials of New York Times covered the theme A in which greater focus is on

Pakistan’s military regime’s role. The overall frequency of keywords under this theme

shows that it covered the keywords in negative scale with 56 times, while 15 times covered

on neutral and 11 times on positive scale.

The major keywords showing highest percentages under negative scale proved that theme

A was considered negative largely as most of the mode values were reflected in negative

scale. These included intelligence agencies covered on negative scale (55%), and (9%) in

188 positive scale with a mean value i.e 1.29; Taliban (64%) on negative scale and only (1%) on positive scale with mean value at 1.13; Pervez Musharraf (45%) appeared on negative scale, while (27%) on both positive and neutral scales with mean value at 1.82 and mode value on negative scale; military aid reflected mode value on positive scale with (45%) while (9%) on negative and (37%) on neutral scale with mean value at 1.67. Few keywords were only found on negative scale such as, Pakistan’s military dictator with (27%); Islamic extremists (64%) with mode value on negative scale; Al-Qaeda appeared on negative scale

(55%) and Osama Bin Laden on negative scale (27%).

Table 2

U.S. Pressure on Pakistan to Restore Democracy

Theme B

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S. N Key words Negative Neutral Positive Mean Mode No. of 1 2 3 Editorials 1. Osama Bin Laden 4 (28.60%) 0 0 1.00 1 14 2. Pervez Musharraf 10 (71.42%) 0 0 1.00 1 14 3. Democracy 6 (42.85%) 7(50.42%) 0 1.54 1 14 4. Terrorism 7 (50.42%) 2(14.30%) 0 1.22 1 14 5. Bush Administration 3 (21.40%) 3(21.42%) 0 1.34 1 14 6. Pakistan military 3 (21.42%) 3(21.42%) 0 1.34 1 14 dictator 7. Islamist extremists 6 (42.85%) 0 0 1.00 1 14 8. Army 4 (28.60%) 0 2(14.30%) 1.67 1 14 9. Taliban 7 (50.00%) 1 (7.14%) 0 1.32 1 14 10. President Bush 3 (21.40%) 2(14.30%) 1(7.14%) 1.34 1 14 11. Al-Qaeda 3 (21.40%) 1 (7.14%) 0 1.25 1 14 12. Militants 3 (21.40%) 0 0 1.00 1 14 13. Elections 4(28.60%) 6(42.85%) 1(7.14%) 1.87 2 14 14. Constitution 3(21.40%) 1 (7.14%) 0 1.10 2 14 15. Supreme court 0 3(21.40%) 4(28.60%) 1.21 2 14 Total 66 29 8

The quantitative findings of theme B shows the U.S. Pressure on Pakistan for restoration

of democracy. The frequencies that generally appeared on three different scales show the

newspaper’s policy through revealing specific key words. In total, 14 out of 49 editorials

of New York Times covered this theme. This theme is related to U.S. pressure and how the

newspaper gives space to the issue of democracy in the backdrop of Pakistani military

regime’s cooperation and the U.S. principle of promotion of democracy. The overall

frequency of key words under this theme shows that it has covered the keywords in

negative category i.e 66 times, while 29 times covered in neutral and 8 times in positive

scale.

In total the major key words show highest percentages under negative scale, indicting their

presence in negative terms as their mode values are reflected in negative scale in editorials.

Major keywords associated with theme B included: democracy (43%) on negative scale,

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(50%) on neutral scale with mean value at 1.54 and mode value on neutral scale; constitution (21%) on negative scale, and (7%) on positive scale with mean value at 1.10 and mode value at neutral scale; elections is also shown with (43%) on neutral scale and

(28%) on negative scale with mean value at 1.87 and mode value on neutral scale; army with (29%) negative, (14%) positive with mean value at 1.67 and mode occurrence on positive scale. Similarly, few codes such as President Bush is indicated on negative (21%),

(14%) on neutral and (7%) on positive scale, respectively; Bush administration on negative

(21%) and neutral (21%). However the mode value remained negative and mean value at

1.34 for both keywords. Other keywords shown in table were either negligible or implicitly covered therefore, did not show significant mean values.

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Table 3

Pakistan’s Nuclear Development: U.S. Policy

Theme C S.N Key words Negative Neutral Positive Mean Mode No. of 1 2 3 Editorials 1. Osama bin Laden 2(28.60%) 0 0 1.00 1 7 2. Pervez Musharraf 3(42.85%) 1(14.28%) 1(14.28%) 1.60 1 7 3. Kashmiri terrorists 2(28.61%) 0 0 1.00 1 7 4. Nuclear weapons 6(85.71%) 4(57.12%) 2(28.61%) 1.43 1 7 5. Pakistan’s military 3 (42.8%) 0 0 1.00 1 7 dictator 6. Nuclear transfer 2(28.57%) 0 0 1.00 1 7 7. Intelligence agencies 3 (42.8%) 0 0 1.00 1 7 8. Islamist extremists 2 (28.6%) 1(14.28%) 0 1.33 1 7 9. N. weapons 3(43.15%) 1(14.28%) 0 1.67 1 7 proliferation 10. Pakistan 4 57.14%) 1 14.28%) 0 1.40 1 7 11. Taliban 3 (42.8%) 1(14.28%) 0 1.25 1 7 12. A.Q. Khan 6(85.71%) 2(28.60%) 0 1.43 1 7 13. Al-Qaeda 5(71.42%) 0 0 1.00 1 7 Total 44 11 3

This table displayed the U.S. policy on Pakistan’s nuclear development program. Out of

49, 7 editorials appeared in New York Times, which show few key words related to theme

C and their mode values showing largely on negative scale. The overall frequency of all

key words occurred under negative scale i.e 44, while 11 under neutral and 3 found under

positive scale. The most occurring keywords that appeared under this theme included: A.

Q. Khan (86%) appearing on negative while (29%) on neutral scale having mode value on

negative and mean value at 1.43, and nuclear weapon proliferation (43%) on negative and

(14%) on neutral scale with mode value on negative scale and mean value at 1.67.

Similarly, these keywords presented only negative appearance: nuclear transfers (29%) on

negative scale; intelligence agencies on negative scale (43%), Al-Qaeda (71%) on negative

scale; military dictator (43%) on negative scale.

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Table 4

Pakistan - India Relations: U.S. Policy

Theme D S.N Key words Negative Neutral Positive Mean Mode No. of 1 2 3 Editorials 1. Osama bin laden 2(18.18%) 1 (9.09%) 0 1.33 1 11 2. Pervez Musharraf 2(18.18%) 3(27.27%) 4(36.36%) 2.22 3 11 3. Democracy 0 3(27.27%) 0 2.00 2 11 4. Terrorist attacks 2 18.18%) 0 0 1.00 1 11 5. Bush administration 2(18.18%) 1 (9.09%) 1 (9.09%) 1.75 1 11 6. Kashmiri terrorists 8(72.70%) 0 0 1.00 1 11 7. Intelligence agencies 5(45.54%) 1 (9.09%) 0 1.17 1 11 8. Islamist extremists 2(18.18%) 0 0 1.00 1 11 9. N.weapons 5(45.54%) 1 (9.09%) 0 1.33 1 11 Proliferation 10. Indian Parliament 7(63.63%) 4(36.36%) 3(27.27%) 1.65 1 11 11. Pakistan 8(72.70%) 3(27.27%) 3 (27.27) 1.59 1 11 12. Army 4(36.36%) 0 1 (9.09%) 1.15 1 11 13. Taliban 2(18.18%) 3(27.27%) 0 1.15 2 11 14. India 1(9.09%) 2(18.18%) 6(54.54%) 1.20 3 11 15. Kashmir 7(63.36%) 8(72.70%) 0 1.39 2 11 16. Militants 8(72.70%) 0 0 1.00 1 11 17. Militant Camps 6(54.54%) 0 0 1.00 1 11 Total 71 30 18

The findings on U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan under theme D focused on the U.S.

policy actions on India-Pakistan relations. This theme shows that 11 out of 49 editorials

were written on relations between Pakistan and India after 9/11, referring to number of

issues which have already been discussed in themes A and B, while adding more that

particularly effected Pakistan-India relations. The U.S. reaction and their policy actions are

covered in detail in the qualitative analysis, however this table only reveals range of

keywords and their frequencies in three scales.

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The findings show that all key words that occurred on negative scale were 71 while 30 under neutral, and 18 on positive scale. The mode value remained higher at large on neutral and positive scales in this theme as compared to other themes. The major keywords include:

Indian parliament (63%) under the negative scale, (36%) on neutral and (27%) on positive with mean value at 1.65 and mode value on negative scale; India on positive scale (66%), neutral (18%) and negative scale (9%) with mean value at 1.20 and mode value on positive scale; Pakistan at (72%) negative, (27%) both on neutral and positive scales with mean value, 1.59 and mode value on negative scale. Similarly, keywords that appeared on negative scale included: nuclear weapons proliferation on negative (29%); Taliban on negative (12%); Kashmiri terrorists (47%) on negative; militants (47%) and militant camps

(35%) appearing only on negative scale. The rest of key words show negligible values, thus not added in analysis.

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Table 5

Miscellaneous Issues

Theme E S. N Key words Negative Neutral Positive Mean Mode No. of 1 2 3 Editorials 1. Pervez Musharraf 2 (33.33%) 1 (16.66%) 0 1.13 1 6 2. Democracy 2 (33.33%) 0 0 1.00 1 6 3. Terrorism 2 (33.33%) 0 0 1.00 1 6 4. Bush Administration 1 (16.66%) 1 (16.66%) 1(16.66%) 2.00 1 6 5. Nuclear weapons 1 (16.66%) 0 0 1.00 1 6 6. Pakistan’s military 4 (66.66%) 0 0 1.00 1 6 dictator 7. Islamist extremists 2 (33.33%) 0 0 1.00 1 6 8. War on terrorism 1 (16.66%) 3 (50.0%) 0 1.75 2 6 9. Deobandi 1 (16.66%) 0 0 1.00 1 6 10. Madrassa 3 (50.0%) 0 0 1.00 1 6 11. Pakistan 2 (33.33%) 1 (16.66%) 0 1.33 1 6 12. Army 1 (16.66%) 0 0 1.00 1 6 13. Taliban 5 (83.33) 1 (16.66%) 0 1.17 1 6 14. Weapons 1 (16.66%) 0 0 2.00 2 6 15. Kashmir 1 (16.66%) 0 0 2.00 2 6 16. Ally 1 (16.66%) 1 (16.66%) 0 1.50 1 6 17. Aid 2 (33.33%) 3(50.0%) 1(16.66%) 1.21 1 6 18. Mukhtara Mai 0 1 (16.66%) 2(33.33%) 2.00 3 6 19. Al-Qaeda 2 (33.33%) 0 0 1.00 1 6 20. Militants 4 (66.66%) 0 0 1.00 1 6 21. US Aid 0 0 5(83.33%) 3.67 3 6 22. Pakistani Woman 1 (16.66%) 0 0 1.00 1 6 23. Earthquake 1 (16.66%) 0 0 1.00 1 6 24. Supreme court 0 1 (16.66%) 3 (50.0%) 2.75 3 6 25. Justice 1 (16.66%) 0 0 1.00 1 6 Total 41 13 12

This theme also shows generic issues which are also observed during analysis but do not

affect the results significantly. The key words which are included in this theme included;

ally with (17%) at neutral and positive scales with mean value 1.50 and mode value on

negative scale, Mukhtara Mai (34%) at positive scale while (17%) at neutral scale with

mean value 1.67 and mode value on positive scale; US Aid (83%) on positive scale with

195 mode values on positive scale; earthquake with (17%) on negative scale with mode value on same negative scale; supreme court (50%) on positive, while (17%) on neutral scale with mean value 2.75 and occurrence on positive scale; Justice and Raping, both observed on negative scale (17%). The table reveals that these key words appeared occasionally in editorials or in implicit manner. The New York Times’ focus is not reflected in themes related to these keywords.

5.7 Tables of Washington Post

The frequency tables for Washington Post are shown in same manner for the category: U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan based on the keyword search for each theme. The coded data is assessed on positive, negative and neutral scales presenting percentages, mean values for how many key words are shown on identified scales while mode values also present keyword occurrences as they appear on positive, negative and neutral scales for each theme. After collecting the most appearing keywords from all themes, the graphical picture of both New York Times and Washington Post editorials showing percentages of most appearing keywords and phrases reflect the findings and presents a comprehensive perspective of editorials in statistical order. The image however, is depicted through critical analysis of editorials in the next chapter by following the aforementioned steps.

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Table 6

Pakistan’s Military Cooperation with Bush Administration in the GWOT

Theme A S. No. Key words Negative Neutral Positive Mean Mode No. of 1 2 3 Editorials 1. Osama bin Laden 5 (33.33%) 0 0 1.00 1 15 2. Terrorist network 4 (26.66%) 0 0 1.00 1 15 3. September 11 attacks 0 4 (26.66%) 0 1.00 2 15 4. Pervez Musharraf 5 (33.33%) 1 (6.66%) 2(13.30%) 1.40 1 15 5. Troubled ally 4(26.66%) 0 0 1.00 1 15 6. Cross border terrorism 4 (26.66%) 2 (13.30%) 0 1.40 1 15 7. Religious extremism 7 (46.66%) 0 0 1.00 2 15 8. Bush administration 3 (20.0%) 4 (26.66%) 1 (6.66%) 1.67 1 15 9. Pakistan’s military 6 (40.00%) 1 (6.66%) 1 (6.66%) 1.53 1 15 dictator 10. Islamic extremists 5 (33.33%) 0 0 1.00 1 15 11. Pakistan military 8 (53.38%) 1(6.66%) 2(13.33%) 1.53 1 15 cooperation 12. Pakistan 4 (26.66%) 3 (20.0%) 1 (6.66%) 1.63 1 15 13. Taliban 6 (40.00%) 0 0 1.00 1 15 14. Terrorist Funds 4 (26.66%) 0 0 1.00 1 15 15. Afghanistan 5(33.33%) 2(13.33%) 3(20.00%) 1.81 1 15 16. Terrorism 8(53.38%) 0 0 1.00 1 15 17. President Bush 7 (46.66%) 3 (20.0%) 3(20.00%) 1.89 1 15 Total 85 21 13

This table shows quantitative findings of Washington Post on theme A: Pakistan military

regime’s cooperation with the Bush administration in the GWOT. There are 15 editorials

appeared out of 65 editorials under this theme out of which 79 are negative, 19 are neutral

and 16 are positive. The results reveal that Washington Post reflected Pakistan’s

cooperation in the GWOT mostly on negative scale. The major key words captured in

editorials show their percentages, mean and mode values. These included Osama bin Laden

(33%) with mode value on negative scale; terrorist network (27%) with mode value on

negative scale; 9/11 (27%) occurred on neutral scale with mode value on neutral scale;

Bush administration (27%) on neutral scale, 20% on neutral and (7%) on positive scale

197 with mean value 1.67 and mode value on neutral scale; President Bush is however, covered with (47%) on negative scale, and (20%) on both neutral and positive scales. Their mean value is recorded at 1.89 with mode value on negative scale. Pakistani military cooperation is seen on negative scale (53%) while (7%) on both neutral and positive scales; Preemptive

(7%) on both neutral and negative scales while (20%) on positive scale with mode value on positive scale and mean value, 1.35; Afghanistan (33%) on negative scale, (13%) neutral and (20%) on positive scale with mean value at 1.81 and mode value on negative scale; Pervez Musharraf (33%) on negative, while (13%) positive and (7%) neutral scale with mode value on negative scale and mean value at 1.40. Military dictator shows mode value on negative scale with (40%) on negative while (7%) on both neutral and positive scales, mean value at 1.87. The keywords, reflecting mode values on negative included: troubled ally (27%); intelligence agencies (33%); Islamic extremists (33%); religious extremism (47%); Taliban (40%), and terrorist funds (27%).

Table 7

198

U.S. Pressure on Pakistan to Restore Democracy

Theme B S. N Key words Negative Neutral Positive Mean Mode No. of Editorials 1. 9/11 4(23.52%) 1 (5.9%) 0 2.00 2 17 2. Pakistan 6 (35.29%) 0 0 1.00 1 17 3. Pervez Musharraf 8 (47.05%) 3 (17.6%) 1(5.88%) 1.43 1 17 4. Democracy 6 (35.29%) 5 (29.4%) 4 (5.9%) 1.59 1 17 5. Bush administration 7 (41.17%) 3(17.6%) 2(11.76%) 1.50 1 17 6. Nuclear weapons 3 (17.64%) 1 (5.9%) 1(5.88%) 1.11 1 17 7. Emergency 10(58.82%) 3(17.67%) 1(5.88%) 1.54 1 17 8. Pakistan’s military 6 (35.29%) 1 (5.88%) 1(5.88%) 1.14 1 17 dictator 9. Intelligence agencies 4 (23.52%) 0 0 1.00 1 17 10. Islamic extremists 7 (41.17%) 0 0 1.00 1 17 11. Democratic rule 2(11.76%) 8(47.05%) 1(5.88%) 1.82 2 17 12. India 1 (5.9%) 3 (17.6%) 7(41.17%) 1.75 2 17 13. Military/Army 5 (17.64%) 1(5.88%) 1(5.88) 1.23 1 17 14. President Bush 4 (23.52%) 2(11.76%) 2(11.76%) 1.32 1 17 15. Political leaders 3(17.67%) 0 0 3.00 3 17 16. Dictatorship 8(58.05%) 0 0 1.00 1 17 17. Police state 3(17.67%) 1(5.9%) 0 1.00 1 17 18. Elections 4(23.52%) 3(17.64%) 12(70.58%) 1.65 3 17 19. Constitution 12(70.58%) 3(17.64%) 4(23.52%) 1.83 1 17 20. Supreme court 3(17.64%) 3(11.76%) 10(58.82%) 1.75 2 17 Total 106 41 46

Quantitative findings of this theme show the U.S. pressure on Pakistan’s military

government to return to democratization. Out of 65 editorials, 17 are published in this

theme with 95 times on negative, 46 positive and 39 on neutral scale. Major keywords

appeared in this theme included: constitution with (71%) negative, (18%) neutral, and

(24%) on positive scale with mean value at 1.83; dictatorship with (59%) on negative scale;

democratic rule shows (47% ) on neutral while (12%) on negative and (6%) positive scale

with mean value shown at 1.82 and mode value on neutral scale; emergency shows (59%)

negative, (18%) on neutral and (6%) positive with 1.54 and mean value recoded at 1.82

199 and mode value on negative scale; elections reflects (71%) positive, (24%) on negative and (18%) on neutral scale with mean value at 1.65 and mode value on positive scale; supreme court shows (59%) positive, (18%) negative and (12 %) on neutral scale with mode value at positive scale and mean value at 1.75; Bush administration shows (41%) negative, (18%) neutral and (12%) positive scale with mean value at 1.50 and occurrence on negative scale.

Similarly, President Bush shows (24%) negative, (12%) both on neutral and positive scales with mean value: 1.32 and mode value on negative. This show that Bush administration and President Bush show mostly negative occurrences in Washington Post’s editorials.

Similarly, Pervez Musharraf is shown (47%) on negative, (18%) neutral and (6%) positive with mean value at 1.43 and mode value on negative scale; while Pakistani military dictator shows (35%) negative and (6%) on positive and neutral scales with mean value at 1.14.

This also reflects that both keywords belong to same category showing negative occurrences. India is also shown on positive scale (42%) while (18%) neutral and (6%) on positive scale with mean value 1.75 and mode on positive scale. This shows that India is reflected positively in editorials as compared to Pakistan with (36%) only on negative scale.

Table 8

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Pakistan Nuclear Development: U.S. Policy

Theme C S. N. Key words Negative Neutral Positive Mean Mode No. of 1 2 3 Editorials 1. Pakistan 4 (40.0%) 0 0 1.00 1 10 2. Islamic terrorist 4 (40.0%) 0 0 1.00 1 10 organizations 3. Pervez Musharraf 6 (60.0%) 4 (40.0%) 0 1.40 1 10 4. Terrorism 6 (60.0%) 0 0 1.00 1 10 5. Bush administration 5 (50.0%) 2 (20.0%) 0 1.50 1 10 6. Kashmiri terrorists 2 (20.0%) 0 0 1.00 1 10 7. Nuclear weapons 8 (80.0%) 2(20.0%) 0 1.62 2 10 8. Abdul Qadeer Khan 6 (60.0%) 0 0 1.00 1 10 9. Nuclear transfer 6 (60.0%) 0 0 1.00 1 10 10. Intelligence 4 (40.0%) 0 0 1.00 1 10 agencies 11. Islamist extremists 6 (60.0%) 0 0 1.00 1 10 12. N. weapons 8 (80.0%) 0 0 1.00 1 10 proliferation 13. Pakistan military 7(70.0%) 2(20.0%) 4(40.0%) 1.71 1 10 cooperation 14. India 0 2 (20.0%) 4 1.43 3 10 (40.0%) 15. President Bush 3(30.0%) 4 (40.0%) 0 1.52 2 10 16. Al-Qaeda 8 (80.0%) 0 0 1.00 1 10 17. Rogue State 4 (40.0%) 0 0 1.00 1 10 Total 87 16 8

Out of 10 editorials from 65 editorials, 86 key words appeared on negative scale,8 on

positive, and 16 on neutral scale. There are few keywords which appeared frequently and

show higher percentages than others. These included: nuclear weapons proliferation (80%)

on negative scale with mode value on negative scale; Pakistani military cooperation (70%)

on negative, (40%) on positive scale and (20%) on neutral scale with mean value shown at

1.71 and mode value on negative scale; nuclear weapons (80%) on negative scale and

(20%) on neutral scale with mean value 1.62 and mode value on negative scale; Pervez

Musharraf (60%) negative and (40%) natural with mode value on negative scale and mean

201

value at 1.40; Al Qaeda (80%) on negative scale; India (40%) on positive scale and (20%)

on negative scale with mode value on positive scale and mean value at 1.43; President Bush

on (30%) negative and (40%) on neutral scale with mode value on neutral scale and mean

value at 1.52. The keywords with negative scale included: Islamist extremists (60%); rogue

state (40%); Pakistan (40%) and terrorist organization with (40%).

Table 9 Pakistan – India Relations: U.S. Policy Theme D S.N Key words Negative Neutral Positive Mean Mode No. of 1 2 3 Editorials 1. Terrorist Assault 4(30.76%) 0 0 1.00 1 13 2. Pervez Musharraf 4(30.76%) 1 (7.7%) 1 (7.7%) 1.67 1 13 3. Democracy 3 (23.1%) 3 (23.1%) 0 1.50 1 13 4. Bush administration 2(15.38%) 0 1 (7.7%) 1.67 1 13 5. Kashmiri terrorists 4(30.76%) 0 0 1.00 1 13 6. Madrassas 2(15.38%) 0 0 1.00 1 13 7. Pakistan’s military dictator 3(23.07%) 1(7.7%) 2(15.38%) 1.32 1 13 8. Taliban 4(30.76%) 0 0 1.00 1 13 9. Nuclear transfer 4 (30.76) 0 0 1.00 1 13 10. Intelligence agencies 7(53.84%) 0 0 1.00 1 13 11. India 1 (7.7%) 4 (30.7%) 5(38.46%) 1.63 3 13 12. Pakistan 2(15.38%) 1 (7.7%) 6(46.15%) 1.17 3 13 13. Indian Parliament 5(38.46%) 3(23.1%) 2(15.38%) 1.35 1 13 14. Lashkar-e-Taiba 3(23.1%) 0 4(30.76%) 1.21 3 13 15. Deobandi 3(23.1%) 0 0 1.00 1 13 Total 51 13 21

Of 65 editorials of Washington Post, 13 editorials covered theme D: Pakistan–India relations: U.S. policy, depicting 54 keywords on negative scale, 21 on positive, and 17 on neutral scale. Frequent keywords appeared: Pervez Musharraf with (31%) on negative scale and (8%) on positive and neutral scale with mean value, 1.67 and mode value on negative scale; Pakistani military dictator appeared with (23%) negative and (8%)on neutral and (15%) on positive scale with mean value 1.32 and mode value at 1.32; nuclear weapons (15%) on negative scale; while nuclear transfer is reflected on (31%) negative scale; intelligence agency appeared (54%) on negative scale; Lashkar-

202

e-Taiba (23%) on negative scale; Deobandi, (23%) on negative; India reflected on positive scale with (39%), neutral (31%), and (8%) negative with mean value at 1.67 and mode value on positive scale. Pakistan is covered on positive scale (46%) while (15%) negative and (8%) on neutral scale with mean value at 2.17 and mode value on positive scale;

Table 10 Miscellaneous Issues Theme E S Key words Negative Neutral Positive Mean Mode No. of N. 1 2 3 Editorial s 1. Terrorist network 2 (20.0%) 0 0 1.00 1 10 2. Sept. 11/9/11 0 3 (30.0%) 0 2.00 2 10 3. Taliban 1 (10.0%) 0 0 1.00 1 10 4. Pakistan 3 (30.0%) 0 0 1.00 1 10 5. Terrorist organization 5 (50.0%) 1 (10.0%) 0 1.33 1 10 6. Pervez Musharraf 5 (50.2%) 0 0 1.00 1 10 7. Military aid 1 (10.0%) 2 (20.0%) 0 1.67 2 10 8. Pakistan military 5 (50.0%) 0 0 1.00 1 10 dictator 9. Army 3 (30.0%) 2 (20.0%) 0 1.40 1 10 10. Al-Qaeda 3 (30.0%) 0 0 1.00 1 10 11. Weapons 0 4 (40.1%) 0 2.00 2 10 12. Justice 0 3 (30%) 0 2.00 2 10 13. Kashmir 3(30.0%) 6 (60.1%) 0 2.00 2 10 14. US Aid 1 (10.0%) 0 4 1.21 3 10 (40.0%) 15. Violence 4(40.0%) 0 2.00 2 10 16. Mukhtara Mai 0 0 4(40.0%) 1.00 1 10 17. Duplicitous, leadership 2 (20.0%) 0 0 1.00 1 10 18. Misogynist 1 (10.0%) 0 0 1.00 1 10 19. Pakistani women 2 (20.0%) 0 0 1.00 1 10 20. Extremists 8 (80.0%) 0 0 1.00 1 10 21. Earthquake 5 (50.0%) 1 3(30.0%) 1.46 1 10 22. Drone aircraft 1 (10.0%) 1(10.0%) 2(20.0%) 1.10 1 10 23. Air Bombs 1 (10.0%) 0 4(40.0%) 1.23 1 10 24. Tribesmen 4 (40.0%) 2 (20.0%) 0 1.33 1 10 Total 60 24 17

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This table reveals 10 out of 65 editorials which show 66 key words on negative scale, 26 at neutral and 6 on positive scale. Different keywords appear in this theme related to those issues which did not appear with much focus in editorials. These include perspectives on earthquake appeared with (50%) negative scale and (30%) positive scale with mean value at 1.46, US Aid or financial assistance with (30%) on positive and 10% on negative and neutral scale and 20%on positive scale with mean value at 1.21 and, mode value on positive scale, drone aircraft with (10%) on negative scale and neutral scales and 20 % on positive scale with mean value at 1.10 and mode value on positive scale. Similarly, air bombs appeared on positive scale (40%) and (10%) on negative with mean value at 1.14 and mode value on positive scale; Mukhtara Mai (40%) on positive scale and Pakistani women appeared (20%) on negative scale. This theme reveals that discussion or analysis on these issues remained low profile throughout the given period.

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5.8 Quantitative Analysis of New York Times and Washington Post

Table 11

Most appearing keywords in New York Times and Washington Post’s Editorials

Key words New York Times Washington Post Negative Neutral Positive Negative Neutral Positive 1. Osama Bin Laden 11 1 0 5 0 0 2. Pervez Musharraf 22 7 4 2 9 4 3. Terrorism 13 6 2 15 0 0 4. September11/9/11 attacks 1 3 0 4 1 0 5. Nuclear weapons 10 5 2 11 3 0 6. Military aid 1 4 5 0 0 0 7. Pakistan’s military dictator 13 3 0 17 3 4 8. Intelligence agencies 14 1 1 15 0 0 9. Islamist extremists 15 1 0 18 0 0 10. Pakistan 18 8 5 19 4 7 11. Army 9 1 1 3 2 0 12. Al- Qaeda 10 1 0 11 0 0 13. Militants 18 0 0 0 0 0 14. Democracy 8 10 0 9 6 4 15. Taliban 18 6 0 11 0 0 16. President Bush 10 2 1 14 9 4 17. Elections 4 6 1 4 3 12 18. Constitution 3 1 0 12 3 4 19. Supreme court 0 4 5 3 3 10 20. Bush administration 10 9 3 17 9 9 21. N. Weapons proliferation n 8 2 0 19 2 0 22. Nuclear Transfer 2 0 0 10 0 0 23. Kashmiri terrorists 8 0 0 2 0 0 24. Indian Parliament 7 4 3 5 3 2 25. Kashmir 8 8 0 0 0 0 26. Militant camps 6 0 0 0 0 0 27. India 1 2 6 2 9 16 28. War on terrorism 1 3 0 0 0 0 29. Deobandi 1 0 0 3 0 0 30. Madrassa 3 0 0 2 0 0

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31. Ally 1 1 0 0 0 0 32. Mukhtara Mai 0 1 2 4 0 0 33. US aid 0 0 5 2 4 5 34. Pakistani women 1 0 0 1 0 0 35. Earthquake 1 0 0 5 1 3 36. Justice 1 0 0 0 3 0 37. Troubled ally 0 0 0 0 0 0 38. Cross border terrorism 0 0 0 4 2 0 39. Religious extremism 0 0 0 7 0 0 40. Afghanistan 0 0 0 5 2 3 41. Terrorist assault 0 0 0 2 0 0 42. Terrorist funds 0 0 0 4 0 0 43. Air bombs 0 0 0 1 0 4 44. Drone aircraft 0 0 0 1 1 2 45. Duplicitous leadership 0 0 0 2 0 0 46. Violence 0 0 0 4 0 0 47. Political leaders 0 0 0 3 0 1 48. Emergency 0 0 0 10 3 1 49. Police state 0 0 0 3 1 0 50. Terrorist network 0 0 0 2 0 0 Total 264 105 37 299 87 84

Figure 6.1 Key Word Frequency of New York Times and Washington Post Graphical Representation

New York Times Washington Post Negative Neutral Positive Negative Neutral Positive

26% 18% 9.1% 18% 65% 64%

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5.9 Findings and Analysis

The coverage of the U.S.-Pakistan relations in New York Times and Washington Post’s editorials from September 2001–August 2008 shows one of the critical eras between the two countries. This alliance is considered to be critical as revived since the cold war ended. The editorial analysis deliberates on the U.S. policy actions and Pakistan’s role as an ally after 9/11 on various issues. The quantitative analysis of editorials has been measured with Berelson’s content analysis method (as described earlier) based on two factors. First, to examine demands placed by the Bush Administration to Pakistan’s military regime reflecting over the U.S. foreign policy actions towards Pakistan after

9/11; second, how Pakistan is shown in the coverage through military regime’s performance, bearing an impact on bi-lateral relations between Pakistan and the U.S. on important themes.

The overall coverage in these newspapers is heavily inclined toward negative than positive and neutral scales. The results show that journalists tend to cover conflicting events and tensions rather than positive ones in foreign affairs analysis, highlighted through keywords which appeared with high frequency in each newspaper. This reveals the editorial policy of U.S. elite media in particular, New York Times and Washington

Post which are known to be the mainstream media of U.S. The editorial perspective of

New York Times and Washington Post holds particular importance as these newspapers have the power to generate the flow of news and inform the readers worldwide with their analysis. The critical analysis in next chapter will be measured from the viewpoint of balanced and prudent news policy versus biased reporting while covering the U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan on five stated themes.

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Table 11 reveals the final picture of New York Times and Washington Post’s editorial keyword search. The total number of editorials published by both newspapers is 114, out of which Washington Post publishes 65 (57%) and New York Times publishes 49 (43%) editorials. This shows that Washington Post publishes more editorials than New York

Times which is why it shows higher frequencies than the latter. With respect to theme wise result, the analysis also reveals the number of editorials published by both newspapers which also throws light on the fact that which newspaper chose one issue excluding the other. For instance, under theme A, the Washington Post publishes 15 editorials and New York Times publishes 11 editorials. On theme B, Washington Post publishes 17 editorials and New York Times publishes 14 editorials. Similarly on theme

C, 10 editorials are written by Washington Post and 07 by New York Times. On theme D,

Washington Post produces 13 editorials while New York Times publishes 17 editorials while theme E is also covered with greater number i.e 10 editorials in Washington Post and 06 by New York Times.

The findings further lead to the keyword analysis of both newspapers, showing frequencies and percentages of most appearing keywords in 114 editorials. The keyword search shows that in total 501 keywords appear commonly in Washington Post and New

York Times. The keywords which show negligible entries are already excluded for comprehensive analysis. The overall frequencies are also revealed for each scale for both newspapers and shown in Table 11. In total, Washington Post shows 299 keywords on negative scale while New York Times shows 264 keywords. Similarly, Washington Post shows 84 entries on the positive scale and New York Times shows 37 numbers of

208 keywords on positive scale. On the contrary, New York Times shows greater number on neutral scale i.e 105 than Washington Post, which shows only 87 entries on neutral scale.

Certain key words that appear frequently in both newspapers include: Pervez Musharraf, which gets maximum negative coverage in New York Times than Washington Post. On the neutral and positive scales, both newspapers give significantly same coverage to

Pervez Musharraf, which shows that General Musharraf’s role is greatly seen in negative terms in the U.S. mainstream media. Terrorism is covered with similar higher negative frequency in the Washington Post than New York Times. It also reflects that Washington

Post’s editorials use specific keywords and phrases which associate terrorism with Islam, such as, Islamic terrorist organizations, terrorist funds, terrorist networks and cross- border terrorism etc. In total, Washington Post’s editorials show more frequencies than

New York Times on these keywords.

Similarly, Islamist extremists, is covered with almost similar frequencies in both newspapers, with slightly greater frequency in Washington Post. Similarly, religious extremism shows reflection in Post’s editorials. This shows that both newspapers also associate extremism with Islam and Muslims. These keywords are particularly highlighted in Theme A which focuses Pakistan’s military regime’s role in GWOT and

Theme D where Pakistan-India Relations are discussed. Both newspapers term fundamentalism and extremism associated with religious parties operational in Pakistan.

According to them they are the main perpetrators of cross border terrorism in Kashmir and India. Pakistan’s military dictator is the term alternatively used with General

Musharraf which shows same frequency in Washington Post and New York Times.

Similarly the keyword, Pakistan receives similar negative coverage in Washington Post

209 and New York Times. However, framing of Pakistan is to be analyzed in next chapter to see the media framing with which Pakistan is presented. On the contrary, overall coverage of India shows positive entries than negative ones in both newspapers showing same policy towards India. Moreover, editorials favored India, particularly, in Theme D where India is projected in a positive light in different policy issues between Pakistan and India such as nuclear development and Kashmir dispute. The negative projection for

Pakistan in editorials is seen from the backdrop of Pakistan as an Islamic country and a nuclear-armed state while India as the largest democracy of the world, placing strategic importance to the U.S.

Similarly, Al-Qaeda is given higher negative coverage in the Washington Post. Though

New York Times covers less than Washington Post, the editorials give more negative entries than other scales. Similarly, Osama Bin Laden gets more negative coverage in the

New York Times than Washington Post. Though frequency might vary but both newspapers cover on negative scale. Other keywords such as nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon proliferation and nuclear transfer are covered on negative scale with much higher frequencies in Washington Post than New York Times on average. This indicates that the

U.S. mainstream media are critically negative towards Pakistan’s nuclear development program as far as Pakistan is concerned, shows that all three keywords have been covered in negative scales. Militants show highly critical frequencies covered by New York Times in negative terms only. Taliban on the other side is covered by both papers with New

York Times on higher side. The newspapers have also covered President Bush and Bush

Administration in negative terms as Washington Post covering them with higher frequencies than New York Times.

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The findings also reveal newspapers’ focus on issues which remain a matter of debate in

Pakistan, but not covered by the U.S. media extensively during 2001-2008. These include drone aircraft and air bombs which only appear once in the Washington Post and New

York Times’ editorials. As far as U.S. drone attack campaign is concerned, it became a serious issue between Pakistan and the U.S., and a major cause of anti-Americanism in

Pakistan. Despite the fact, there has been a casual reflection in the U.S. newspapers over the issue, mostly positive in Washington Post’s editorials. Similarly, keywords such as military aid, U.S. assistance, are only shown on positive scales with relatively low frequencies as compared to other keywords. This also indicates that the U.S media does not cover the issue about the U.S. civilian assistance however, remains critical towards military assistance given to military regime. The military and civilian aid is mostly highlighted explicitly in the wake of military regime’s coalition in the U.S.-led GWOT.

On intelligence agencies and army, New York Times and Washington Post have shown negative scale reflection. Though less number of editorials is published in New York

Times as compared to Washington Post, the frequencies are relatively higher for these keywords. This shows the media in the U.S. does not see this coalition with same perspective as the Bush administration had envisaged for achieving goals set to win the war on terrorism in Afghanistan. This coverage is indicative of lack of trust and divergence of interests between the governments of both countries. Similarly, Kashmiri terrorists, Indian Parliament, militant camps, Deobandi, madrassa are few keywords which also appear in the editorials but with less frequency ratio in both newspapers. This reflects that US media does not cover these issues with much focus as they are not the

U.S. policy goals when examined in the perspective of U.S.-led war on terrorism.

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The quantitative analysis of this study shows that U.S. foreign policy issues are well covered in New York Times and Washington Post from 2001 to 2008. The coverage of both newspapers reveals that Pakistan’s entries are largely reflected negatively. The study also supports another study conducted by Ali, Jan and Saleem that focuses on image portrayal of Pakistan in the U.S. mainstream media. The content analysis of their work proves that besides the sacrifices of Pakistani military and nation, the U.S. media remain critical on Pakistan for particularly in supporting Taliban and religious extremism in the country (Ali, Jan, & Noshina, 2013).

Summing up the analysis, the numerical data of this study show that over all findings of both newspapers have portrayed negative image of Pakistan. Washington Post has shown greater interest while covering the issues more explicitly and descriptively. Its editorials have focused on the key issues between the U.S. and Pakistan with an in-depth analysis.

The editorial policy of New York Times however, remains liberal while deliberating on the U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan on key issues. However, the content analysis only shows the frequencies of keywords and phrases which have appeared in both newspapers. The content analysis has made inferences objectively from the editorial content.

The next chapter presents qualitative analysis by explaining, comparing and construing analysis on all themes, covering the issue of how Pakistan is covered in 114 editorials.

The qualitative analysis has been incorporated as both methods are to be used to answer the main research question to achieve accuracy and soundness of research findings. Thus, both content analysis and qualitative analysis assure scientific approach to the study and generate accurate findings. The qualitative analysis is critical to grasp underlying

212 meanings with support of personal interviews and communication from U.S. journalists and diplomats. Therefore, a combination of both approaches presents a practical dynamic of study.

References

Ali, Z., Jan, M., & Noshina, S. (2013). Portrayal of Pakistan by U.S. leading news magazines. Retrieved from http://sci-int.com Berelson, B. (1952). Content analysis in communication research. New York, NY: Free Press.

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Campbel, D., & Campbel, S. (2008, October 28 ). Introduction of regression and data analysis. Retrieved from http://statlab.stat.yale.edu

Cho, Y. (2008). Inter coder reliability In P. Lavrakas (Ed.), Encyclopedia of survey research methods. (pp. 345-346). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc.DOI: 10.4135/9781 412 963947.n228 Entman, R. E. (1993). Framing: Towards clarification of a fratcured paradigm. Journal of Communication, 43 (4), 51-58. Gamson, W. (1989). News as framing: Comment on Garber. American Behavioral Scientist, 2 (33), 157-169. Holsti, O. R. (1969). Content analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities. Reading: Addison,Wesley. Huntington, S. P. (1997). The erosion of American national interests. Foreign Affairs, 76 (5), 28-49. Krippendorff, K. (1980). Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology. Beverly Hill: Sage Publications. Kunczik, M. (1997). Images of nations and International public relations. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers. McLaughlin, E. (n.d). Television coverage of the Vietnam War and the Vietnam Veteran. Retrieved from http://warbirdforum.com McQuail, D. (1987). Mass communication theory. London: Sage Publications. No rewards for Pakistan.[Editorial] (2002 , January 17). The Washington Post, p. A22. Pakistan changes the subject. [Editorial] (2004, March 20). The New York Times, p. Section A . Pakistan's perpetual president. [Editorial] (2002, April 17). The New York Times, p. Section A. Rao, R. N. (2003). Assessing an Indian Government: The New York Times' and The Washington Post's editorials on India,1998-2000. Retrieved from http://infinityfoundation.com Saleem, N. (2004). U.S. media framing of foreign countries image: An analytical perspective. Canadian Journal of Media Studies, 2 (1), 130-162. Shinar, D. (2004). Media peace discourse: Constraints, concepts and building blocks. 3 (1/2), 82-102. Steininger, M. Y., Lanham. (2010 ). The United States and Iran: Different values and atttudes towards our nature scrtaches on our hearts and minds. Maryland: United Press of America.

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Stemler, S. (2001). An overview of content analysis. Retrieved from Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation. Retrieved from http:// pareonline.net Treadwel, D. (2010). Introdcuing communicaiton research: Paths of inquiry. California: Sage Publications. With a partner like Pakistan, who needs enemies? (2011, May 13). Kansas City Star. Retrieved from http://kansascity.com

Chapter 6 U.S. Media Frames: Comparative Analysis of U.S. and Pakistan’s Perspectives

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The qualitative analysis of editorials of Washington Post and New York Times devises media frames in the light of keyword frequencies collected for each theme. These themes remain dominant during the eight-year period of study. The qualitative analysis highlighting media frames critically analyses U.S. media portraying Pakistan, which is supported with Pakistani journalists’ opinions on U.S. media’s role in portraying Pakistan’s image and responses from U.S. journalists on U.S.-Pakistan relations and news media’s role.

6.1 Qualitative Analysis

The analysis and interpretation of text comprises the main section of this study by reading editorials and examining those themes which remain prominent in the given time period.

Yekta Steininger, Maryam Y. Lanham, in this regard say, the quantitative analysis gives output on the frequencies of an element in the data while the qualitative analysis draws the conclusion whether the element is present in the data or absent (Steininger & Lanham,

2010, p. 2). The content analysis is a helpful approach for quantitative analysis as it gives revealing results by analyzing the available data.

The qualitative analysis of editorials is aimed to understand the meanings associated with communication or messages, rather frequencies. This required understanding the main themes and their context. The study has adopted this method to analyze editorials on qualitative basis, identify media frames through frequency analysis done in the quantitative section, listing media frames and summarizing those editorials under specific themes to get a totality of impression. To handle personal inclination, the researcher reviewed the text of editorials and got a comprehensive understanding. The total impression of text is a helpful

216 technique derived for qualitative analysis. By looking into the complexity of research questions of this study, content analysis on five themes presents a clear picture of issues in the media coverage that help identify the key issues between the U.S. and Pakistan during

2001-2008. Through a combination of both quantitative and qualitative analysis, the study has overcome the limitations of content analysis, and added an analytical perspective of the editorial coverage.

The study of U.S. media is therefore, critical in this respect because before 9/11, the U.S. media does not report the issue of terrorism as an apparent threat to the U.S., but in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, media coverage is seen highly ‘terrorism specific’. Pakistan once again becomes the focus of U.S. media’s news analysis which is widely perceived to be projecting the U.S. Government line on U.S.-Pakistan relations. The argument is supported by M. Maalick, Pakistani journalist (Managing Director, PTV) saying, it is true that U.S. media is fiercely independent on domestic issues while this is not true in foreign policy issues, and dependent on U.S. policy guidelines, further adding, in the past, journalists were lapping into the U.S. State Department sources to cover wars and international conflicts and after 9/11 when their operations came to South Asia what was happening here was directly affecting the U.S. policies. So everything was being covered that had a direct impact back in the U.S. Similarly, Maalick added, there would not be any coverage from US media where the U.S. Government had not set preference. There will be nothing in their news headlines for Chad or Somalia. “So it’s clear that where foreign policy decisions are affecting domestic realities, you see the U.S. media getting interested, making visuals and framing issues” says Maalick (personal communication, May 15, 2014).

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There is an argument in academic circles on different aspects of news media and their power of influence exerted through various forms of news coverage. This includes news reports, letter to editor, editorial and op-ed columns etc. Page however, highlights the significance of editorials and calls it a great source of influencing power than other forms.

He says, there is a solid reason for editorials to show policy as they tend to highlight current issues with their choice. This is one of their aims to bring the readers with an angle to perceive an issue (Page, 1996, p. 22). This is the reason, analysis on editorials have been selected in this study. While this section presents media frame analysis of editorials of

Washington Post and New York Times, it is aimed to understand how Pakistan as an ally in the GWOT is projected in the U.S. media and help in understanding media effects on interstate relations as in this case, U.S.-Pakistan relations.

The framing analysis leads to a discussion on application of foreign policy decision making theory and O’ Heffernon’s mutual exploitation model that have been discussed in detail in the second chapter. The sixth chapter focuses on testing these concepts with the help of perspectives of diplomats and journalists in order to answer the main research question of this study.

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6.2 Research Question 1: Since 9/11 how U.S. media frame Pakistan

in editorial coverage

By qualitative analysis of editorials, a comparison is made that reflects media coverage indicating convergence or divergence in the U.S. policy positions demonstrated through policy statements. The direction of editorials is a theme wise collection of data which reflects the editorial perspective of both New York Times and Washington Post on U.S.-

Pakistan relations reflecting Pakistan’s image. The following section covers a qualitative analysis based on findings and present answers to subsidiary research questions.

6.2.1 Theme A: Pakistan’s military cooperation with Bush Administration in GWOT

The U.S.-Pakistan relations underwent a renewal phase since 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Declined at the end of cold war and revived with Pakistan’s cooperation during the Soviet invasion in 1979, there have been ups and downs in bi-lateral relations. After 9/11, Pakistan became a vital strategic partner of the U.S. with which began a new era of partnership between the governments of the two countries. This period witnessed an unprecedented revival of military to military cooperation including arms sales, joint military trainings and intelligence sharing, reaching its peak ever seen during the past alliances. The succeeding period after 9/11 attacks, termed by Ramachandran as ‘third marriage’ began when General

Pervez Musharraf casted as an ally of the United States in the war on terrorism

(Ramachandran, 2014, p. 41). The U.S. policy position was also made clear to Pakistan in a meeting held between then U.S. Deputy Secretary, Richard Armitage with Pakistani

Intelligence (ISI) Chief, Mahmud Ahmed, in which he said, "Pakistan must either stand with the United States in its fight against terrorism or stand against us. There was no maneuvering room." Armitage adamantly denied Pakistan had the option of a middle road

219 between supporting the Taliban and the U.S., he said, "this was a black-and-white choice, with no grey”. In response to this, Mehmud assured that the U.S. could count on Pakistan's unqualified support, that Islamabad would do whatever was required of it by the U.S."

(U.S. Department of State, Cable, 2001, p. 9).

With the beginning of this alliance, Pakistan faced several internal and external security challenges which brought incalculable sufferings to the nation. A detailed historical basis of the U.S. security interests in South Asia and Pakistan’s security concerns has been presented in 3 Chapter, while a brief on U.S.-Pakistan’s relations in pre-9/11 period is also critical to study before media frames are examined, covering the post-9/11 period.

Three major turning points had an impact on Pakistan’s relations with U.S. in the pre-9/11 period. They not only posed domestic and regional challenges on Pakistan’s security but affected its stature at international level. The first was Pakistan’s political instability that resulted into another military coup under General Musharraf in October 1999. This was the fourth military coup, proving a continuous failure of political governments and leading the country towards further political instability and facing coup related U.S. sanctions. Second major effect that stemmed from regional perspective having special significance for the

U.S. was the increasing influence of ‘Talibanization’ in Pakistan. Describing its effects on domestic landscape of Pakistan, Ayaz Amir said, Pakistan became home to Afghans after its active engagement in defeating the Soviet Union forces in Afghanistan. Following this,

Afghans gained support from clerical forces and religious fundamentalists of Pakistan who promoted the Taliban cause and housed them in Pakistan. The internal administrative structure of Pakistan was so weak that it was unable to reverse the Afghan tide and plunged the country into regional conflicts (Amir, 2000, p. 4). Third turning point was Pakistan-

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India relations which had already soared in 1990’s. The Kargil War (1999)10 and nuclear weapons’ testing by Pakistan and India in May 1998 had regional and global consequences.

This posed a direct challenge to the capacity of major powers such as U.S. to preserve the credibility of nuclear non-proliferation regimes. These events kept the U.S. and Pakistan apart from each other up until 9/11 attacks took place but they continuously became a matter of debate in the U.S. media after 9/11.

After coming into power, General Pervez Musharraf took measures to take Pakistan away from increasing international isolation. In this regard, mending relations with the U.S. was his prime agenda after coming in power. General Musharraf introduced the agenda of bringing internal reforms and economic stability to the country. While reaching out to international community, Ahmad said, he also made adjustments to his political ideology.

History shows that all military regimes in Pakistan had wanted to bring country towards economic progress with an ‘outward look’ approach while safeguarding their military’s corporate interests for political endeavors. In the name of “national interest”, General

Musharraf also altered his pro-Taliban policy in order to receive international support for his military rule and bring economic benefits to the country (Ahmad, 2000, p. 106).

The 9/11 incident gave rationale to General Musharraf for a policy shift and justify his agenda in rapidly changing demand from international community after deadly terrorist attacks on U.S. “Pakistan was at the crossroads either to act in a pragmatic and rational manner to be a part of the international community or proceed irrationally to get isolated”

10Kargil was the first publicized limited military exchange between Pakistan and India after the nuclearisation of South Asia. Retrieved from http://issi.org.pk

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(Jabeen, Mazhar & Goraya, 2010, p. 187). For the U.S., a major factor that contributed for this shift was realization of Pakistan’s strategic place as a neighboring country to

Afghanistan for smooth sail of U.S. invasion in Afghanistan. This reality compelled Bush

Administration to revisit its policy towards Pakistan which in result, laid the basis for a renewal in U.S.-Pakistan relations.

These shifts in U.S.-Pakistan relations are critical to study to understand the U.S. foreign policy towards South Asia before and after 9/11. How Pakistan is viewed in the backdrop of such regional and international events is based on how it is being covered in the news headlines of international media. Media framing, as Smith says, directly influences on public perceptions when published or aired to millions of people worldwide (Smith, 2013, p. 2). Taking the major events in pre and post-9/11 period, the case of Pakistan presents a unique opportunity to investigate media framing of Pakistan in the U.S. media’s headlines as a strategic frontline state in the GWOT, having weak democratic governance and critical geographic situation. The following analysis of Washington Post and New York Times editorials determines media framing of the U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan and

Pakistan’s military role in their editorial construction.

Media Framing of New York Times

The New York Times presents a detailed perspective about the military cooperation with

Bush administration, deliberating on the U.S. foreign policy and performance of Pakistani military government. It also reports on the U.S.-Pakistan relations, which shows its image in the U.S. media. Main media frames from each year’s editorials are stated below with their qualitative analysis and totality of impression. In 2001, New York Times publishes two editorials on this theme:

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The United States can help the General by showing the public that supporting the destruction of terrorism under Mr. Bin Laden will bring its rewards in the form of American economic and perhaps military aid to Pakistan (Anxious days in Pakistan, 2001).

General Musharraf made a bold decision to side with the United States after Sept. 11. In return, Pakistan has been given more than $1 billion in loans and debt relief and is likely to benefit from the influx of aid to reconstruct Afghanistan. But now that General

Musharraf has turned Pakistan's foreign policies around, he has to go after the forces at home that want to keep terrorism alive, provoke a war with India and eventually unseat

General Musharraf himself and make Pakistan an Islamic fundamentalist state (The pressure rises in Pakistan, 2001).

The editorials cover the U.S. foreign policy in term of cooperation with Pakistan’s military regime through economic and military aid that has been assured after General Musharraf’s decision to act as frontline state with Bush administration. Despite this cooperation, editorials portray Pakistan’s image by reflecting its role in GWOT as a great challenge to

General Musharraf to deal within home. The media frames show that Pakistan is a home to growing terrorism and close ally of Taliban. It is a state that is developing nuclear weapons and troubling in South Asia region especially with India. The editorial tone is soft and presents strategic importance of Pakistan. At the same time, suggests Bush administration to work closely with General Musharraf, and in return offer economic aid for destroying Terrorists’ network in Pakistan. These media frames show credible character of General Musharraf’s and his capability in confronting internal extremist forces in

Pakistan. The editorial policy at this point seems in line with U.S. policy stance.

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President Bush continues to support the general and credit his efforts (General Musharraf's travails, 2002).

In the 1980's, the United States did business with all these groups, as the Central

Intelligence Agency and Saudi Arabia poured billions of dollars through Pakistan into the anti-Russian rebellion in neighboring Afghanistan. In some respects, the United

States is now facing deformities in Pakistan that it helped create (General Musharraf's travails, 2002).

Since Sept. 11, General Musharraf has engaged in an impressive balancing act, shifting his nation from its longtime support for the Taliban in Afghanistan to an alliance with the

United States against the Taliban and Al Qaeda (Political quicksand in Pakistan, 2002.).

The editorials in 2002 present a cooperative stance on Bush administration of continuing pressure on General Musharraf as well as praising his role in curtailing support to

Taliban. While the editorials praise General Musharraf’s actions, there is a criticism on

U.S. polices too by reflecting its role in creating those religious groups who worked against Soviet Union in 1980’s. This way, New York Times’ editorials also present a balanced picture on both sides of the U.S. government’s foreign policy. The direction of these media frames show that there is an appreciation for General Musharraf in showing cooperation with the U.S., describing him as a most important ally in GWOT. The tone and language of editorial is soft and positive thus image of Pakistan is shows in positive light.

Yet beneath the surface of Washington's new closeness with Islamabad, mutual suspicions continue to fester. The Bush administration has withheld trade benefits Pakistan deserves.

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General Musharraf has failed to sever all links with international terrorism (Pakistan, a troubled ally, 2003).

Pakistan has never adequately sealed the Afghan border. That made it possible for key

Qaeda fugitives to escape and now allows Pakistani recruits to join a reviving Taliban

(Pakistan, a troubled ally, 2003).

These editorials, a manifestation of Pakistan’s image in GWOT show mistrust both for

Pakistan and U.S. This editorial construction indicates that after two years of alliance since

9/11, U.S. media have shown apprehension over the relationship. This is evident from criticism of American role in not facilitating trade with Pakistan except only military aid to Pakistan would not help the country to revive economic growth. On the other side with unsatisfactory performance of Pakistan in sealing off the border, the editorials blame

General Musharraf that Pakistan has started in reuniting the Taliban and sending them across Afghan border. The editorials of 2003 show a clear shift in media’s coverage on

Pakistan. The editorial recommendation on U.S. foreign policy is indicated through failure of opening up to Pakistan while image is reflected through Pakistan’s failed efforts to capture and destroy Taliban within country. It can be said that New York Times, being the mainstream U.S. media perceive the Bush administration’s policies moving in wrong direction reflected through such media frames.

The problem is, in part, a legacy of the Pakistani Army's close cooperation with the Taliban until General Musharraf officially severed these ties after 9/11(Pakistan changes the subject, 2004).

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The New York Times’ editorials of 2004 support the U.S. foreign policy agenda on pressuring Pakistan to announce a clear policy towards Taliban. This is indicative of apprehensions over Pakistan’s military cooperation and Army’s inherent support to Taliban in news analysis. The cooperation and reliance over General Musharraf seem decapitating in editorials as time passed and progress made in GWOT.

He has also proved to be unable or unwilling, to close down the sanctuaries that three different groups of terrorists -- Qaeda, Taliban and Kashmiri -- have established along three

Pakistani borders (Straight talk needed on Pakistan, 2006).

The New York Times presents a balanced picture of weaknesses of both General Musharraf regime and Bush administration in dealing with terrorists. The editorials of 2001 condemn the U.S. civilian and Pakistan’s military relationship, stating that Bush administrations shows extra favor to General Musharraf despite he has remained unwilling to stop terrorist networks. In this time period the editorials reflect that terrorist organizations have grown and expanded to eastern, northern and western border of Pakistan. These media frames clearly reflect lack of coordination between the governments of both countries. Taking the media’s role in viewpoint, New York Times’ editorial perspective is unbiased and balanced, criticizing both military government and Bush administration while the overall impression towards Pakistan is negative.

Pakistan is now the third-largest recipient of American foreign aid. Yet more than five years after 9/11, the Bush administration has still not been able to secure Pakistan's active and consistent support against the Taliban. The very least Washington should be demanding of President Musharraf to win the GWOT is that he enforces an immediate halt

226 on Pakistani military support for the Taliban insurgents who are crossing the border and killing American troops (From Pakistan with Jihad, 2007).

Pakistani authorities are encouraging and perhaps sponsoring the cross-border insurgency.

That is a role that Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, denies (From Pakistan with

Jihad, 2007).

On the same issue, the editorials of 2007 show criticism on Bush administration’s foreign policy objective which demands cooperation from Pakistani military government, saying despite giving maximum aid to Pakistan, Washington should pressure Musharraf to stop supporting Talban insurgents and actively attacking U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Editorials reflect that it is Pakistan’s military support which is behind the support of networks causing trouble in Afghanistan. The newspaper portrays a stark image of Pakistan for assuring cooperation to the Bush Administration and at the same time encouraging Taliban to grow their network in other provinces of Pakistan.

Despite promises, very little money is going toward development, education and other public services in the frontier region's hot zones. This has led to the belief that this war is for ''Busharraf'' rather than the Pakistani people. (In Pakistan, Islam needs democracy, 2008)

On the day the new prime minister, Yousaf Raza Gillani, was sworn in, the two visiting

American diplomats chose to meet with Mr. Musharraf. That timing left the impression that Washington is still not listening to Pakistanis (A fresh start with Pakistan, 2008).

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The United States must condition future military aid on more focused and effective

Pakistani counterinsurgency efforts and carefully monitor how that aid is spent (Pakistan

Without Musharraf , 2008).

With Mr. Musharraf finally out of the picture, it is time to focus American policy on his dangerous and dangerously neglected country (Pakistan Without Musharraf , 2008).

The editorials of 2008 suggest a renewed policy to the U.S. administration with upcoming political government in future in Pakistan. In 2008, New York Times comes up with a highly negative image towards the U.S. coalition with Pakistan’s military regime, particularly solely relying over General Musharraf. It suggests to condition military aid, investment in economic sector by keeping up pressure to send armed forces for attacks on Taliban. The

New York Times supports U.S. foreign policy to work with Pakistan but portray the military regime’s role in negative sense. It also criticizes the Bush administration for relying too much on General Musharraf while embracing his character and capacity to deal with

Afghani Taliban in initial years of GWOT. The change in editorial perspective appears vividly in 2008, getting critical on Pakistan’s intelligence agencies and Army’s role on showing lack of commitment and failed promise. This shows that New York Times presented critical remarks on the alliance and the frames of the U.S. mainstream media consistently remain largely critical to the U.S.-Pakistan relations on theme A. Through these editorials, it gives a message that Pakistani military government’ image is dubious thereby, to receive military and civilian aid in the name of cooperation with Bush administration which in turn was used to strengthen Pakistani Taliban.

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Media Framing of Washington Post

Pakistan is home to 1,200 militant training camps and 12,000 madrassas or Islamic schools that turn out young men with potential for the kind of fundamentalist fervor seen on Sept.

11(Terror's aftermath, 2001).

But isolating Pakistan's government while at the same time inflaming Islamic radicalism with an attack on Afghanistan is a recipe for disaster (The Pakistan connection, 2001)

The administration and Congress are gearing up to help Pakistan with debt relief and aid, and both steps are welcome (Open up to Pakistan, 2001)

Bush administration must continue to bolster Mr. Musharraf's position with aid and market access. (Pakistan's choice, 2001)

The editorials of Washington Post in 2001 highlight few dominant frames supporting the

U.S.-Pakistan alliance in the U.S. war in Afghanistan. It cautions that isolating Pakistan would be a bad option for achieving US policy goal. It supports the U.S. foreign policy on making alliances and engagement with allies to win the GWOT, Pakistan being crucial member. However, the editorial perspective keeps raising concerns from the beginning that

Pakistan is a country harboring terrorism and providing safe havens to terrorists and religious groups. Therefore, winning the U.S. war would require helping Pakistan through economic aid and ensuring waivers on economic sanctions that were imposed on Pakistan due to military coup of 1999 and nuclear sanctions in 1998.

He stands by as Afghan and Arab radicals, likely including Osama bin Laden, establish bases on Pakistani soil from which to attack American troops (Out of Pakistan, 2003).

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Mr. Bush has placed another huge stack of chips on Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the self- appointed president of Pakistan, which since 9/11 has become the world's single largest haven of Islamic terrorists (Betting on the General, 2003).

Mr. Musharraf's ability to deliver on his promises to stand with the United States against terrorism and Islamic extremism is in doubt (One man’s fortune, 2003).

Is it U.S. policy to protect Pakistan at any cost? (Pakistan's broken promises, 2004). His army was defeated in its attempt to eliminate the al-Qaeda sanctuary by force; since launching the campaign in 2003 (Pakistan's separate peace; President Musharraf strikes a deal that may spare himself and his troops, at the likely expense of Americans, 2006).

The Bush administration is still providing Gen. Musharraf $600 million in annual military and economic aid and treating him as a major ally (The war in Pakistan, 2006).

Action must be taken against Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces in Pakistan before spring, when another major offensive against U.S. and NATO forces can be expected (Al-Qaeda's

Sanctuary; Pakistan's tribal areas look a lot like Afghanistan in 2001 and the Bush administration are tolerating it, 2006).

The analysis of three years’ editorials from 2003 to 2006 shows a stark criticism on General

Musharraf’s character that he signed deals with terrorists who were intending to plan an attack the U.S. In the meantime, U.S. troops faced the danger of terrorist forces due to the fact that Al-Qaeda influence was on the rise while Pakistan became the home to such networks. The editorials however, critically report over Bush administration’s support to

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General Musharraf. These frames during the continuous effort of fight against terrorism even view “terrorism” as a sponsored project of Pakistan’s military regime.

Pakistan is a key U.S. anti-terrorism ally and has interdicted more than 700 terrorists from its mountains and cities (Pakistan is doing its part, 2007)

No action has been taken, either by the United States or by Pakistan, its nominal ally in the war on terrorism (A problem of passivity; Once again the United States stands by while al-

Qaeda operates in a safe haven, 2007).

The Bush administration continues to publicly insist that Mr. Musharraf is "indispensable" to Pakistan -- a stubborn and illogical position that is serving only to heighten the twin dangers (A crisis foretold; Pakistan's Pervez Musharraf impedes fair elections and action against al-Qaeda. So why is he 'indispensable?, 2008).

The CIA believes that some militants have been tipped to U.S. raids by Pakistani intelligence (A strategy for Pakistan; the United States must support the new democratic government but also do what is needed to stop al-Qaeda, 2008).

The editorials of 2007 and 2008 show a reaction against General Musharraf’s peace deal with Taliban and unrest of U.S. government over Swat Peace Deals that took place in 2008.

S.H. Tajik reflects on U.S. reaction that was slightly apprehensive about peace agreements between military regime and Taliban (Tajik, 2011, p. 10). The editorials also predict the same line by describing the events and raising U.S. concerns that peace agreement was not the job of General Musharraf which he did to gather Islamic political parties in his favor.

One such statement that reflects this sentiment comes from then U.S. Deputy Secretary of

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State, John Negroponte who says, “United States had advised Pakistan not to negotiate with militants, telling the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We have real reservations about negotiated agreements with extremists. There is a lot at stake here and we have made the point repeatedly” (http://changinguppakistan.wordpress.com). These editorials reflect same policy in their analysis which is shown through media frames collected on the topic.

Given Pakistan’s worsening security scenario in later years, the editorials relate them to

Afghanistan’s situation. The editorial perspective of Washington Post particularly, casts for same military action that was done in Afghanistan. The editorials present reasons why such action is being demanded from Bush administration. The tone of editorials is highly negative towards Pakistan and critical towards Bush administration for not taking any appropriate measures in Pakistan. The analysis also reveals mainstream media’s criticism on Bush administration for giving leverage to Pakistan’s military and coming up softly especially on peace deals with Taliban.

6.2.2 Theme B: U.S. Pressure on Pakistan to Restore Democracy

Promotion of democracy has remained a rationale of national interest in the U.S. Strobe

Talbot states that the U.S. national interest is always dependent on how countries adopt governance structures, as democracy outside the U.S. will equally benefit the U.S. citizens.

Since there is no country in the world which is independent and free from other, this interdependence advocates for the promotion of democracy abroad. Thus it has been a key instrument of the U.S. foreign policy goal (Talbott, 1996). Based on this principle, a democratic country not only is committed to international bindings, it not only helps establish democratic set ups within, but deals with other countries in stable manner.

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When President Bush took charge as President in 2001, his understanding of democracy as a basic principle of national interest presented a different outlook i.e. from promotion of democracy to enforcement of democracy as Thomas Carothers argued, as WOT was a leading agenda in U.S. foreign policy, democracy became less significant (Carothers, 2003).

Since 9/11, Bush administration had to fight against Al-Qaeda and dealing closely with militaries and dictatorships in the Middle East and Asia, thus the implementation on enforcement of democracy seemed not practical. Kronstadt further highlights that President

Bush waived off economic sanctions on Pakistan and India on September 22, 2001 related to nuclear proliferation, which were then passed by the Congress, and entered into law. Under this law, the Congress let off all sanctions related to democracy by authorizing President

Bush to put aside sanctions for Pakistan (Kronstadt, 2003). These policy positions on democracy allowed the Bush administration to deal with Pakistan’s military government on direct basis after 9/11. Pakistan is an obvious example of this exception where President Bush worked with a military dictator to fight against Al-Qaeda. How this issue is covered in the mainstream media is analyzed below:

Media Framing of New York Times

The United States must be alert to possible backsliding and keep pressure on the general to return democracy to Pakistan. Standing with Pakistan now is the best way for the United

States to root out terrorist groups and bring stability to the nation and the region (General

Musharraf's travails, 2002).

Administration spokesmen have meekly expressed concern and reiterated America's support for an eventual return to democratic rule (Power grab in Pakistan, 2002).

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These editorials show that in 2002, New York Times has pressured the Bush Administration to press upon Musharraf for elections while showing that cooperation of Musharraf is also required despite he was a military chief. It is also seen that New York Times, since the beginning of alliance did not project an independent view. This shows that it is in complete harmony with the Bush decisions to work closely with a military set up in Pakistan for successful invasion in Afghanistan.

Washington should make clear that it will provide all the military support Pakistan needs to fight terrorism and defend its borders. But it will not underwrite Pakistan's efforts to acquire the advanced weapons it seeks unless the army shows more effectiveness against terrorism and more enthusiasm for democracy (Digging in deeper in Pakistan, 2007).

Congress and the administration took some steps to restrict aid to Pakistan after Mr.

Musharraf declared emergency rule, but more pressure may be necessary to get the former general's attention (Weakening Pakistan, 2007).

The editorials of New York Times in 2007 present a softer tone on the issue of democracy. In depth reading of editorials on democracy indicated New York Times’ vigorous support to the

Bush administration as well as support to positive image of this alliance.

The general’s proven less committed to the anti-terrorism fight than expected (Al Qaeda and the Taliban are resurgent on the border with Afghanistan), but now he has abandoned any pretense of moving toward democracy (Conspiracy and democracy in Pakistan, 2008)

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President Bush can show his commitment to democracy and stability by increasing nonmilitary aid for projects that would strengthen the country's battered democratic institutions and improve Pakistanis' lives. (Afghanistan, Pakistan forgotten, 2008).

The editorials of 2008 show that New York Times though criticizes Bush administration for supporting military dictator, its tone remain soft in the beginning of alliance while criticizing over the efforts of General Musharraf in curbing terrorist networks which was required under this alliance. The New York Times’ focus on democracy has not been a continuous focus of its editorials. This shows that it largely supports the U.S. foreign policy with Pakistan’s military regime on GWOT than democracy. With change of government, the policy also changes i.e to give more aid to the civilian government and strengthen democratic institutions of Pakistan which would benefit the citizens.

Media Framing of Washington Post

The war on terrorism will never be won unless the political program articulated by Mr.

Musharraf is successful in Pakistan (Mr. Musharraf speaks, 2002).

The political transition could overlay the battle Musharraf has declared between a moderate

Muslim state and religious extremism with a more familiar contest between the Pakistani military and civilian elites (Pakistan's thorny transition, 2002).

The Bush administration has largely overlooked Mr. Musharraf's political maneuvering, but it should be pressing him to seek accommodation with the civilian leadership (Pakistan's poor results, 2002).

In editorials of 2002, Washington Post support General Musharraf’s policy that he adopted to convince the Bush administration that his governance would be essential to defeat

235 religious extremists from spreading their ideology in Pakistan. The Post also follows and supports this stance that General Musharraf would be helpful to the U.S. in succeeding in the

GWOT. This debate is covered as battle of Islamic fundamentalism and moderation. Thus the greater role of Musharraf was projected positively with a positive image of Pakistan until this time period.

What was initially called a war on terrorism is a struggle against terror motivated by Islamic fundamentalism -- and for democracy and modernity in the Islamic world (Two years later, abroad, 2003).

Mr. Musharraf has promised to return Pakistan to civilian democratic rule; Mr. Bush need only urge that he fulfill those commitments. That the president does not do so only shows that he continues to prefer expediency to the more difficult pursuit of his own doctrine

(Another pass for Pakistan, 2004).

The general, who seized power in a coup six years ago, has reneged on promises to retire from the army or restore democracy (Gen. Musharraf 's lies, 2005).

He should also make clear to Gen. Musharraf that his alliance with the White House and the

Pentagon cannot preclude American support for building democratic institutions in his country (A message for Gen. Musharraf, 2006).

About restoring democracy is almost the universal assumption in Washington that only a dictator can deliver Pakistani military cooperation (Straight talk needed on Pakistan, 2006).

Does the Bush administration really believe that its unqualified declarations of support will change this military strongman's behavior? (Democracy under Arrest; Why is the Bush administration 'proud' to support Pakistan's military ruler?, 2007).

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President Bush, who claims to believe that the replacement of autocrats with secular democratic governments is a key U.S. interest, should act on his own principle (A new

Pakistan, 2008).

One crucial reason General Musharraf gets so little pressure from the Bush administration

(Pakistan's postponement, 2008).

The editorials of Washington Post from 2003-2008 are grouped together for consistently highlighting the same message i.e. the need of restoration of democracy in Pakistan. The media frames show that Washington Post criticize General Musharraf who backed off from his promise, instead attempted to impose his rule through referendum. On the other hand, editorials also question Bush administration for ignoring the General’s dubious policies rather continuously aiding his regime as contrary to the commitment for promotion of democracy agenda in Pakistan. In conclusion, it is clear that Washington Post has shown an independent policy by criticizing both the U.S. and Pakistan on the issue of democracy.

6.2.3. Theme C: Pakistan’s Nuclear Development: U.S. Policy

Pakistan’s nuclear development program was a result of regional and internal concerns related to security and strategic needs in the perspective of Indian nuclear development that started in 1974. The acquiring of nuclear weapons has been in debate at international level, associated with terrorism and the fear of falling nuclear arsenals into the hands of terrorists.

In September 2001, the U.S. Congress adopted a policy position and passed the law to lift sanctions on Pakistan that were imposed in the wake of nuclear tests of 1998, conducted by India and Pakistan. In March 2003, U.S. Congress pressured President Bush to reinstate

237 the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (the Symington Amendment)11 on reports that Pakistan was continuously selling the nuclear technology to North Korea. President Bush administration however, decided not to impose any sanctions keeping in view the shared interest of Pakistan and U.S. in fighting against terrorists and militancy in South Asia.

During General Musharraf’s regime, the nuclear proliferation issue was covered in international media from different perspectives, highlighting mostly over the U.S. policy concerns from selling the nuclear program to increasing hold of radical elements in

Pakistan. Nuclear proliferation thus, became an intense debating issue in policy circles as well as in the mainstream media. The statements from editorials below show how the U.S. media covered the U.S.-Pakistan relations over the nuclear development program.

Framing of New York Times

A cycle of commitment and abandonment by Washington has sometimes reflected

American selfishness and sometimes an American refusal to tolerate Pakistani misbehavior, like its covert nuclear program (On the front lines in the global war against terrorism; Pakistan confronts a familiar dilemma over the Afghanistan crisis, 2001).

Were Pakistan and its nuclear weapons to fall under the control of Islamic fundamentalists, American security would be gravely threatened (Political quicksand in

Pakistan, 2002.).

11In 1976- Congress adopts the Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, prohibits most U.S. economic and military assistance to any country delivering or receiving nuclear enrichment equipment, material, or technology not safeguarded by (IAEA). Retrieved from http://armscontrolcenter.org

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Pakistan's actions are not those of a reliable partner. Washington must make plain to its leader, Gen. Pervez Musharraf (Nuclear duplicity from Pakistan, 2002).

Pakistan has behaved extremely irresponsibly with respect to nuclear weapons (Pakistan, a troubled ally, 2003).

Pakistan now appears to be one of the world's leading suppliers of illicit nuclear technology (Pakistan's nuclear responsibility, 2004).

There is no escaping the fact that Iraq, which did not sell such arms, has been subject to military conquest, while Pakistan, the biggest violator, has been congratulated (Ending

Pakistan's nuclear trade, 2004).

Americans are at least as threatened by rogue states and terrorists armed with Pakistani nuclear. (Pakistan changes the subject, 2004).

Pakistan has nuclear weapons. It is next door to Afghanistan. Does Washington need any more reasons to worry about what happens there (Sense and insensitivity in Pakistan,

2008).

The editorial analysis of New York Times under this theme has emphasized over the U.S. policy for Pakistan on two main factors: first, how this nuclear program could be made more safer and be prevented from falling into terrorists’ control while conditioning U.S. economic assistance with military cooperation; second, encouraging India-Pakistan dialogue for a better regional security environment which will abandon the use of nuclear weapons. The editorials however, criticize Pakistan’s attitude on handling covert nuclear deals and securing Dr. A. Q. Khan from international trail, simultaneously being critical

239 toward Bush administration’s soft and mild policy in the wake of military cooperation in

GWOT. Pakistan was also projected as an unreliable country reaching to the point where cooperation in the GWOT was also treated with serious criticism. The New York Times has shown tendency of cooperation with the U.S. policy since the beginning of alliance, but at the end of President Bush’s tenure, the editorials indicate negative role of military in stopping the sale of nuclear technology to other countries.

Media Framing of Washington Post

Mr. Musharraf still refuses to allow U.S. or other foreign investigators to question A.Q.

Khan, the director of the largest smuggling network for nuclear weapons material and know-how in history (Another pass for Pakistan, 2004).

Now the administration must confront the reality that Pakistan's military leadership has done more to threaten U.S. and global security with weapons of mass destruction than either Al Qaeda or Saddam Hussein (Pakistan's nuclear crimes, 2004).

He has pardoned and protected the greatest criminal proliferator of nuclear weapons technology in history, A.Q. Khan, who aided Libya, North Korea and Iran (The war in

Pakistan, 2006).

No one pretends that there are easy answers in Pakistan, where nuclear weapons and growing extremism could come together in the ultimate nightmare scenario (A bet goes sour; President Bush can hardly be surprised by Pakistan's state of emergency, 2007).

Bush administration is unprepared to cope with the imminent danger of destabilization in a country that holds nuclear weapons as well as terrorist training camps (A crisis foretold;

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Pakistan's Pervez Musharraf impedes fair elections and action against al-Qaeda. So why is he 'indispensable?, 2008).

The editorials of Washington Post have less likely covered the nuclear proliferation issue over others. In all editorials, it is observed that Washington Post focuses General

Musharraf’s poor performance on dealing with nuclear proliferation issue and Dr.A.Q.

Khan’s involvement in nuclear trade with other countries. The editorials also identify a weak role of Bush administration and policy positions in handling the issue, while attaching the nuclear issue with a great fear of Islamic fundamentals/extremists taking over the control of nuclear arsenals.

6.2.4. Theme D: Pakistan-India Relations: U.S. Policy

After 9/11, South Asia becomes more noticeable to the U.S. security interest particularly,

Pakistan and India as key players in the region. Pakistan’s importance in fighting the Al-

Qaeda terrorists in the WOT while India, appeared as a diplomatic hotspot after 9/11. The bi-lateral relations also created an impact on the U.S. foreign policy on matters such as, nuclear proliferation, Kashmir issue and stability in South Asia that appeared prominently in reviewing the U.S. policy towards Pakistan and India after 9/11. The U.S. perspective on India and Pakistan is spelled out in the newspapers on these key issues.

Media Framing of New York Times

Washington must still strive for a peaceful resolution of nuclear tensions in the subcontinent, including treaties and agreements to control testing and production of nuclear materials. There must also be a peaceful settlement of Pakistan's dispute with India over the future of Kashmir (On the front lines in the global war against terrorism; Pakistan confronts a familiar dilemma over the Afghanistan crisis, 2001).

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A war between India and Pakistan would be ruinous to both nations, and devastating to

American efforts to sustain an international coalition against terrorism (South Asian brinkmanship, 2001).

It is up to India now to take General Musharraf's welcome gesture, build on it, and bring both countries back from the brink of a war that would be catastrophic for the region and for the world (Pakistan's welcome gestures, 2002).

At a time when the world is pleading for statesmanship, Prime Minister Atal Behari

Vajpayee of India and Gen. Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan have irresponsibly escalated threats of war (Stoking the South Asian fire, 2002).

In the past, America has generally confined its high-level involvement in the subcontinent's affairs to short-run crisis management. Now there is an opportunity and a need for a more sustained role (Back from the edge on Kashmir, 2002).

It shared nuclear bomb technology with Iran and North Korea, sponsored terrorism in

Indian-ruled Kashmir and backed the Taliban government that sheltered Osama bin Laden

(Pakistan's nuclear commerce, 2003).

Pakistan and India relations remain critical to the U.S. security interests after 9/11. The

U.S. foreign policy over nuclear weapons development, growing terrorism and bi-lateral tensions remained a debate in New York Times editorials. Mostly, the editorials suggest

Bush Government to help nudge India and Pakistan towards a peaceful resolution and calls for ease in tensions so that terrorism and nuclear proliferation could end up in South Asia.

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This was crucial for U.S. foreign policy goals in South Asia and fulfilling GWOT agenda.

The editorials also demonstrated interest of U.S. towards India for a strategic partnership, while criticizing Bush alliance with Musharraf for WOT. These editorials though give a balanced perspective of the U.S. foreign policy on Pakistan and India, but largely cover

Pakistan within negative context. Mostly media frames selected in editorials also present a comparative outlook of U.S. relations with Pakistan and India. The changing dynamics of

U.S. national interests are also reflected from statements from U.S. officials and editorial policy supporting those were visibly mentioned in editorials. This presents how the image of Pakistan was projected through the U.S. media.

Media Framing of Washington Post

The last time Pakistan was provided with such aid, it effectively channeled it into building the world's largest terrorist infrastructure. This network targets Jammu and Kashmir states in India (Terror's aftermath, 2001).

Pakistan's leaders have long nurtured enmity with India and have tolerated fundamentalist terrorists in Indian-ruled Kashmir (On to Pakistan, 2001).

Pakistani militants have been trained in Mr. bin Laden's Afghan camps before going on to fight the Indian authorities in Kashmir. It is therefore, tempting to see Pakistan as an enemy in the war on terrorism rather than as a potential ally (The Pakistan connection, 2001).

Bush administration has scored its first clear diplomatic success abroad -- if it can now consolidate the uneasy stand down between New Delhi and Islamabad (Pakistan's poor results, 2002).

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Mr. Musharraf's renewed tolerance of the terrorists threatens not just to spoil Kashmir's fragile political progress, but also to return Pakistan and India to the brink of war. The Bush administration must hold him accountable (Healing in Kashmir, 2002)

Mr. Vajpayee has improved relations with Pakistan, gone out of his way to forge an alliance with the United States and advanced the remarkable program of liberalization that has turned India into a star economy (The upset in India, 2004).

For the United States to sell its products to these countries may save domestic jobs, but it is not so smart for two poor, neighboring countries to spend their scarce funds on arms rather than infrastructure (Money badly spent in Pakistan, 2005).

He has never dismantled the Islamic extremist groups that carry out terrorist attacks against

India (The war in Pakistan, 2006).

Indeed, the Bush administration has confronted Pakistani leaders with evidence of links between Pakistan's military intelligence service and Islamist militants, including a behind- the-scenes role in a Taliban attack on India's embassy in Kabul (The perils of Pakistan,

2007).

The Washington Post editorials have seen the bi-lateral relations between Pakistan and

India from the perspective of U.S. national interests in South Asia after 9/11. The editorial perspective examine these conflicts in the backdrop of U.S. invasion in Afghanistan after

9/11 and achieving its security goals. It is observed from the U.S. policy positions that the success in GWOT was based on regional peace and security of South Asia. This was only possible when India and Pakistan had better relations. The U.S. interest was to get undivided attention from Pakistan’s army in dismantling Taliban groups and work jointly

244 with NATO forces on northern border near Afghanistan, which was only possible if

Pakistan’s eastern border was safe from Indian threat.

In the same context, Washington Post has consistently shown a discourse on Pakistan-India relations through the lens of cross-border terrorism. The projection of Islamic fundamentalists, Islamic extremism and religious leaders in editorials indicates that in the context of war on terror, a cleavage between West and Islam becomes more apparent. This editorial stance of Washington Post is in harmony with the policy statement mentioned in

9/11 Commission Report which stated: “the catastrophic threat at this moment in history is more specific. It is the threat posed by Islamist terrorism – especially the Al-Qaeda network, its affiliates, and its ideology”12.

The Washington Post however, presents a different angle while showing negative image of Pakistan, contrary to the policy position of Bush administration which decided to line with Pakistan than India in the WOT. It’s editorials throughout claim that Pakistani military supported the Islamic fundamentalists and Muslim factions for cross-border infiltration in

Kashmir, responsible for cross border terrorism.

On nuclear development in Pakistan and India, and U.S. policy, the bias became more apparent that instead of showing a neutral position towards India and Pakistan on nuclear proliferation, the Bush administration expedited to sign a nuclear deal with India. This development ignited unstable situation in South Asia due to a dual U.S. policy. The vigorous support to India and framing negative image of Pakistan reflected in editorials

12National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, p.360. Retrieved from http://9-11commission.gov

245 also accounts for U.S. shift in building strategic partnership and preference to India than

Pakistan.

6.2.5. Theme E: Miscellaneous

These editorials cover diverse issues which do not appear with high frequency. However, media frames of both newspapers are listed with their analysis.

Media Framing of New York Times

The American government has been quick off the mark, sending supplies and using its helicopters to take the injured to hospitals (Earthquake in Pakistan, 2005).

It is the same government that has allied with the West in the war on terrorism, but seems quite prepared to allow a war of sexual terror to be waged against its female citizens (India and Pakistan's code of dishonor, 2005).

Those strikes (drone) were legitimately aimed at top fugitive leaders of Al Qaeda, but hit innocent women and children (Straight talk needed on Pakistan, 2006).

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Media Framing of Washington Post

At least three times in the past year, drone aircraft armed with missiles have attacked terrorist targets; most recently, a strike on a Pakistani village this month killed at least 13 people, several important al Qaeda operatives possibly among them (The war in Pakistan, 2006).

In miscellaneous theme, New York Times and Washington Post’s focus remain on two issues that had not effected greatly on the U.S.-Pakistan relations. First, devastating earthquake that took place in Pakistan, in October 2005, human rights issue particularly,

Mukhtara Mai’s case in which General Musharraf was criticized heavily, U.S. civilian assistance , U.S. drone campaign etc, These are not covered in any of newspapers’ editorials except one or two times. The U.S. government was appreciated by sending supplies to Pakistan in the wake of earthquake. The editorials praise General Musharraf’s attempt to Jewish community for help and support while at the same time, Washington Post links the aid to Islamic terrorists who would attack on western countries if they were refused of aid to earthquake affected areas. Similarly, New York Times publishes a signed editorial by Suleman Rushdi who criticizes General Musharraf’s role in curbing the human rights with regard to the rape case of Mukhtara Mai. The editorials project Pakistan negatively as far as totality of impression is concerned on these issues.

The editorials also criticize the U.S. drones attacks on Pakistan and its effects in increasing anti Americanism sentiment in Pakistan. The New York Times only publishes one editorial

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(Straight talk needed on Pakistan, 2006) in which it demands for an open debate from the

U.S. government on drone attack policy. It also indicates growing anti-Americanism in

Pakistan due to the U.S. drones while stressing that the justification of attacks should be explained to the Pakistani public. According to the news report since President Bush ordered to start the program in 2004, 390 attacks have been conducted in Pakistan.

According to the London-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism report13, the drone campaign became a burning issue in Pakistani media which consistently raised questions and reported over the civilian causalities took place due to drones, which they said, further added to deaths due to suicide bombing in Pakistan. The analysis on the contrary reveals that the editorial policy of both newspapers did not frame the U.S. drone attacks despite it was a pressing issue between the U.S. and Pakistan.

6.3 Research Question 2: To what extent media frames coincide with U.S. policy positions in its relations with Pakistan

The analysis of New York Times’ editorials on above mentioned themes depicts a consistent approach of following the U.S. foreign policy and presenting image of Pakistan through totality of impression. From the beginning of GWOT, the policy of newspaper shows consistency with President Bush’s agenda of alliance with Pakistan. The newspaper though quotes a number of times that President Bush does not change his pro-Musharraf stance and relied on military government during the alliance period, it refers to certain points where General Musharraf fails to fulfill his promise to U.S. The New York Times publishes

49 editorials and supports U.S. foreign policy over Pakistan’s alliance with U.S. in the war

13Cover drone war - Examining the remote warfare. Retrieved from http://f thebureauinvestigates.com

248 on terrorism, but cover Pakistan in a negative manner regarding misuse of civilian aid and criticizing Bush administration on overlooking the disbursement of aid in Pakistan.

The editorials also caution Bush administration for showing mild tone towards General

Musharraf as an indispensable ally, making him responsible for bad policy positions. It is important to mention that New York Times though publishes less number of editorials in eight years as compared to Washington Post, theme wise analysis show that both newspapers cover five themes as key issues between the governments of two countries.

On Pakistan’s military cooperation with Bush Administration, New York Times has mostly criticized General Musharraf’s policy which is contradictory of his commitment he made to

President Bush. The perception of General Musharraf as a military chief of Pakistan made the U.S. Government believe that military would be the only institution essential for a smooth sail in war on terrorism while civilian leaders and politicians would have no power and authority in Pakistan. This overwhelming stance remains consistent in New York Times’ editorials until U.S. policy agenda changes towards the end of President Bush’s second term.

D. Walsh, Foreign Editor, New York Times Pakistan (2002-2004) agrees with the fact that

New York Times was focused on General Musharraf as he presented himself as the gate keeper of Pakistani government. He said, Musharraf knew about Al-Qaeda and militants associated with Pakistan and claimed for knowing the answers of all complicated questions, and he had a personal relationship with President Bush and support of many in Washington.

“This was a guy, although fraud could be trusted”, he remarked. That’s the reason,” Walsh added, “New York Times’ coverage was personalized”. However, he said, editorials and opinions may carry bias and angle; the news reports are carried with objectivity and facts

(personal communication, May 12, 2014).

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The Washington Post’s editorials offer an in-depth analysis of military cooperation with U.S. in the GWOT. There are 15 editorials, published on this theme which largely focus on military regime’s performance during Musharraf’s years. It is generally perceived that U.S. media always prefer to ally with its government on matters of national interest, but

Washington Post also presents a critical picture of situation while supporting the U.S. national interest. Most of its editorials portray General Musharraf, ISI and Pak Army with stark comments on their performance from the beginning.

This analysis have remained consistent throughout the alliance, indicating that Washington

Post’s editorial policy acts upon its own agenda which does not necessarily get in line with

U.S. Government agenda. However, its criticism on Pakistani military gets more apparent as years passed and complications surfaced between the Bush administration and Pakistani military government. By consistently referring to Pakistan’s military supporting Taliban, the editorials confirm that terrorists in Pakistan worked under the protection of military government. The keywords like “terrorist networks”, “militants”, “fundamentalists”,

“Islamic extremists”, “troubled ally,” and “military dictator” have been used more frequently in connection with the military support to these networks.

On theme C, the U.S. pressure on Pakistan to restore democracy, New York Times expresses mixed opinion on democracy in Pakistan. For example, the newspaper supports General

Mushararf’s rule and his regime to deal with threat of terrorism. At the same time, criticizes over his inaction in restoring democracy in Pakistan. This shows the newspaper tends to be neutral towards restoration of democracy in Pakistan. Though very few i.e 14 editorials appear on democracy, the editorial perspective raises questions on General Musharraf’s dubious role in prolonging his rule in the country. In this light, it can be said, New York

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Times over all supports the U.S. foreign policy of supporting military rule in Pakistan over democracy by lifting economic sanctions in 2001.

The critical positioning of Washington Post’s editorials is seen in most of the editorials especially, in later years, it has published 17 editorials. On theme C, despite Bush administration’s continuous support to General Musharraf to crush terrorist outfits and forming a coalition against them, the purpose is shown to be meeting its targets. The editorial stance changes from a supporting role to critical one when General Musharraf resigns from the COAS position in November 2007 under immense pressure. The editorials also change their direction and suggest Bush administration to move its focus to upcoming civilian government and stop praising Musharraf on his performance against terrorism. The framing on democratic rule, Military/Army rule, political leaders, dictatorship, police state, elections, constitution, and Supreme Court show explicit references to military’s sluggish behavior for restoration of democracy in the country.

The positive portrayal of Pakistan in the beginning of GWOT in the two U.S. mainstream newspapers shows that the U.S. media support the U.S. Government towards Pakistan. In the later phase of General Musharraf era: both newspapers stress for restoration of democracy in Pakistan and go critical to even their own government though Washington

Post remains more critical than New York Times. Over the removal of General Musharraf, the U.S. media especially New York Times and Washington Post support the civilian governments in Pakistan.

On Nuclear proliferation, 07 editorials cover a broader spectrum of issues related to nuclear development program of Pakistan. The New York Times reports largely that radical groups

251 in Pakistan would gain control of nuclear assets if the U.S. Government does not address the situation in hand. When comes the issue of how terrorists could be prevented from obtaining nuclear bombs, reports highlight the concerns of U.S. policy makers who refer to the hidden links of individuals from retired military community and ISI’s links with

Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The editorials however, completely ignore Pakistani officials’ views on safety of nuclear weapons and their demand for a long term partnership with U.S. in which they desire to build up strategic ties on civilian nuclear deal. The editorials thus, explicitly show mistrust between the U.S. and Pakistani leadership in the backdrop of complex history of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and U.S. perceptions to continuously focus on U.S. position on Pakistan’s nuclear program having links with states through Dr. A Q Khan.

Similarly, Washington Post also pursues the U.S. foreign policy on nuclear program of

Pakistan. It publishes 10 editorials slightly more than what New York Times covers on nuclear issue. This shows that by not reporting much on nuclear issue it has supported the

U.S. policy indirectly. The editorials however, deliberate on the U.S. challenges to deal with nuclear armed country, criticizing military leadership for blatantly damaging the trust of President Bush. It reports that Pakistan has become more dangerous country than other adversaries in the presence of growing terrorist organizations and having evidences of selling nuclear technology to North Korea, Syria, Iran and Libya. On this topic, Washington

Post challenges the U.S. Government policy in more direct manner than New York Times.

The U.S.-Pakistan relations witnessed another challenging situation when the issue of drone strikes comes on surface. In this critical partnership, drones came as a counter strategy of joint efforts against Taliban and Al Qaeda. These strikes conducted on settled

252 areas of North Waziristan have resulted in lots of human casualties and loss to infrastructure. According to available statistics on U.S. drone campaign, from June 2004 through mid-September 2012, it killed 2,562-3,325 people in Pakistan, of which 474-881 were civilians, including 176 children (The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2005).

Where media accounts do report civilian casualties, rarely is any information provided about the victims or the communities they leave behind. While Ayuob and Ahmad write,

Pakistani media projected the U.S. drone strikes which resulted in creating negative perception for its own government and U.S.-Pakistan relations, the U.S. media coverage/editorials of New York Times and Washington Post have not picked this issue with same intensity and independently (Ayoub & Ahmad, 2013, p. 56).

The eight-year editorials of New York Times and Washington Post reveal that both newspapers do not debate over the issue except one editorial except one published in New

York Times, mentioned earlier. The Washington Post only touches this issue indirectly relating it to joint efforts against terrorists, particularly in the theme A, Pakistani military cooperation in the GWOT.

The mainstream media also reflect this skepticism in editorials as Washington Post in its editorial, (A strategy for Pakistan; the United States must support the new democratic government but also do what is needed to stop Al-Qaeda, 2008) reports that it is Pakistani government which condemns publicly unilateral attacks while fails to execute such attacks on Al-Qaeda on getting intelligence reports from military and ISI. This shows that mistrust already prevails between the U.S. and Pakistan at government level as they proceed in the war on terrorism. When asked from the representative of Washington Post over its unclear editorial policy on U.S. drone issue, G.Witte, Foreign Editor, Washington Post, Pakistan

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(2007-2008) says, the reason might be the drone issue came on surface after 2010. Though it started in 2004, the focus was not still on the news coverage. It might be not a critical issue in the U.S. foreign policy agenda at that time, thus media did not pick up with same intensity (personal communication. September 30, 2014).

The New York Times covers U.S. drone strikes as a human right issue, blaming Pakistani government for not sharing credible information with its public. It demands Bush administration for an open discussion on drone attacks. The New York Times comparatively reflects a liberal policy in demanding U.S. Government for a fair and open policy on drones. The Washington Post is appeared to be showing negative image of Pakistan as compared to New York Times, showing a conservative policy in support of Bush administration on drone issue. G.Witte also comments on this saying, “the editorial line of

Washington Post is totally different from news reports; therefore, it depends on the editorial board to include or exclude issues”. Both G. Witte and D.Walsh hold a view that journalists are totally independent in reporting the facts. They report facts based on journalistic standards and journalistic ethics in U.S.

On the other side, a continuous pressure from Washington Post and New York Times is also visible in editorials, reinstating comments from the U.S. policy makers for extended military operations where Taliban sanctuaries are traced by CIA. Due to this factor, anti-

Americanism gets on rise in Pakistan as a result of this partnership. This issue remains mostly missing in editorials, which show that U.S. media remain selective in choosing over other issue based on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. This is the reason, why such important issues have been occasionally covered in the miscellaneous theme of this study.

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On Pakistan-India Relations: theme D, New York Times and Washington Post also deliberate how these relations impacted the U.S. national interest in South Asia.

Specifically, three issues remain the focus of editorials on three important points; nuclear development program, Kashmir issue and cross border terrorism. The New York Times shows positive image of Pakistan when General Musharraf extends his cooperation and vows to help in finding terrorist links. India blamed that these terrorists were trained in

Pakistan to attack the Indian Parliament in 2002. As a foreign policy action, New York

Times suggests the Bush administration should resolve the conflict of Kashmir issue and ease tensions between the two key players for peace in South Asia. The reason of this mediatory role by New York Times could be associated with U.S. foreign policy action because Bush administration also does not want to see any escalation on eastern border between India and Pakistan. A study by Joeck also supports this argument, that deadlock between India and Pakistan ended when the U.S. officially intervened and then U.S. Deputy

Secretary of State, Richard Armitage convinced both India and Pakistan in his visit to South

Asia, he assured the Indian leadership that General Musharraf was ready to end infiltration

(Joeck, 2005, p. 31). As mentioned in New York Times editorials, the U.S. is reluctant in mediating between Pakistan and India, but due to its active engagement in the GWOT, U.S. policy makers show interest and active role of mediation. Thus the U.S. mainstream media also support the fact that U.S. should play mediation.

On nuclear proliferation, the editorials of New York Times and Washington Post criticize

Pakistan and defend India at large level. There is a consistent trend reflecting bias for

Pakistan with a subjective look, concentrating on one issue, excluding the other. For

255 example, the U.S. Indian nuclear deal that took place in 200514, Washington Post appears biased towards nuclear program development in Pakistan thus justified the mutual nuclear deal between U.S. and India. This indicates that editorials of the New York Times and

Washington Post demonstrate convergence in media framing regarding nuclear proliferation between India and Pakistan.

Another debatable point between India and Pakistan relations is Kashmir issue, covered in great length in Washington Post and New York Times in the light of U.S. national security interest in South Asia. After 9/11, Kashmir appears more frequently in media analysis.

India adopts an aggressive policy to stress Pakistan on diplomatic front and raising cross- border terrorism as a main threat towards regional stability. At diplomatic level, India succeeds in associating attacks on Indian Parliament with 9/11 and named Lashkar-e-

Taiba, and Jaish-e-Mohamad having support from ISI. Similar references are found in the editorials of Washington Post and New York Times, identified through keywords, such as cross border terrorism, Jihad, Kashmiri terrorists, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Islamist terrorists and infiltration etc which present a detailed perspective on their links with Pakistan. The direction of editorials on this topic pick dominant media frames focusing Pakistan’s military and ISI responsible for cross border terrorism in Kashmir.

Summing up the analysis, it can be predicted that both newspapers have relayed the U.S. foreign policy issue and show that alliance of U.S. and Pakistan essential for achieving the

U.S. national interest and critical for U.S .in the war on terror. To support the American

14Joint statement between President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh regarding civilian nuclear energy cooperation. Retrieved from http://.cfr.org

256 foreign policy towards Pakistan, the U.S. mainstream media thus present Pakistan as a progressive Muslim state along with assurances from the U.S. administration for a continued and strategic partnership, thereafter.

They also portray a positive frame of American strategies and frame Pakistan as an indispensable partner in the war on terrorism. However, both newspapers remain issue- specific when reflect Pakistan image on nuclear development program, Pakistan’s military cooperation and joint efforts in capturing Al-Qaida & Taliban and a country with weak democratic, home to religious extremism and worsening economic infrastructure. While both newspapers show same line in supporting U.S. national interest, a comparative analysis reveals a more critical stance of Washington Post on American policies by allying with Pakistan as compared to New York Times. These issues show negative trend and cover with more depth and higher frequency in Washington Post while New York Times proves to be holding a liberal policy. This is evident through a relatively less number of editorials appeared in New York Times than Washington Post.

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6.4 Research Question 3: To what extent the U.S. media impact on its policy makers in making foreign policy towards Pakistan

After 9/11 attacks, Bush administration came up with a renewed approach, prescribing for the U.S. global engagement making alliances and identifying adversaries. Various media outlets reveal this policy, commenting over the ways and means of engagement from different perspectives. In the context of U.S.-Pakistan relations, Washington Post and New

York Times also frame four main thematic areas where the impact of relations needs to be examined further leading to describe an overall image of Pakistan in the U.S. mainstream media. Within this context, relations between U.S. and Pakistani military are covered in an extensive manner that mostly effected the relations and counted Pakistan’s image than other themes.

On foreign policy issue, the equation of Bush administration with Pakistan’s military regime is not an unprecedented decision. Major U.S. military global interventions that had required Pakistan’s support was always possible with the help of military rulers in the past.

In 1979, General Zia-ul-Haq supported the U.S. in the fight against communism; in return of this he was able to remain as president for eleven years. Similarly, General Musharraf’s decision in the GWOT can be seen as continuation of same. The U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan and its effects on U.S.-Pakistan relations are also covered from this aspect in both newspapers. A major development in this regard is covered from Bush administration’s change in policy by lifting economic and military sanctions on Pakistan after 9/11.

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In the cover of this alliance, Pakistan’s progress towards restoration of democracy is also covered and lastly, Pakistan and India relations after 9/11 also gets the attention of newspapers that determined the U.S.-Pakistan relations. In this respect, Pakistan through alliance with U.S. gained support to counter Indian threat as well as resisting Indian influence in Afghanistan. This is considered as a big achievement for Pakistan in fulfilling their strategic goals in the region during the General Musharraf’s regime.

An overall analysis of New York Times shows that total 49 editorials were published on five themes. As far as impact of New York Times is concerned, sense of harmonization of policy positions of Bush administration with the editors of New York Times on foreign policy agenda is evident. On military cooperation, main focus of U.S. foreign policy agenda however, is to show smooth working relationship with military regime. The qualitative analysis shows that New York Times also projects this policy through positive media framing. In one of its editorials, it writes that Pakistan will face real challenge from within country as General Musharraf would have a tough task ahead in dismantling terrorist elements (The pressure rises in Pakistan, 2001). Similarly, another editorial embraces

Muahararf’s role in defusing tensions with India. As the U.S. policy statements are recorded in favor of reconciliation, the media also follow the same line (Redefining

Pakistan, 2002). The impact on Pakistan and India Relations of U.S. policy could be seen with normalization of bi-lateral relations between two hostile neighbors, showing no large scale intensification witnessed on the eastern border in eight years.

The New York Times takes a liberal position on the U.S. policy for pressuring Pakistan to return to democracy. While there is a limited opinion presented with narrow view in

Washington Post that shows symmetry with U.S. policy position over General Musharraf

259 role. The Washington Post states this posture: on one side Musharraf’s is appreciated in capturing Taliban, it blames ISI as main cause of supporting militants while keeping up the pressure on General Musharraf to restore democracy (General Musharraf's travails, 2002).

This indicates that democracy is discussed in broader context as part of military efforts on capturing Taliban and cooperation with Bush administration. The direction of editorials also remains much over military cooperation than democracy.

Similarly, by reading media frames on nuclear proliferation there is an independent role seen on the U.S. Government decisions and media’s policy. Rather, New York Times questions Bush administration for being lenient with Pakistan. For example, in one of editorials, it criticizes Bush administration for not publically demanding Musharraf for Dr.

A. Q. Khan’s trail over nuclear proliferation. (Pakistan changes the subject, 2004). The

Washington Post however appears conservative, favoring U.S. policy but vividly hostile towards Pakistan in its editorial position.

It indicates the nature of alliance was to ultimately expect General Musharraf clearing out the Taliban hide-outs that had grown extensively in Pakistan. Another editorial (Pakistan's choice, 2001) indicates that Pakistan is the epicenter of terrorism and the U.S. should see

Pakistan as the next staging ground for such attacks. Another editorial shows a more in- depth and broader side of GWOT, taking “Islamic fundamentalism” as the real threat (Two years later, abroad, 2003).

This shows, Washington Post’s conservative thought of engaging with world by declaring

Islam and extremism associated together as a real cause of terrorism, to be dealt not only in Pakistan, but expanded to other Muslim states. This approach which encompasses

260 ideology and religion within the war on terrorism seems to raise pressure on foreign policy of both countries at the same time, portraying negative image of Pakistan, in result widens up the gap between the U.S. and Pakistan. In another study, (Shami, 2013, p. 183) also finds the media’s role in effecting and impacting relations between U.S. and Pakistan through negative portrayal of the U.S. in Pakistani elite newspapers.

Similarly, if editorials are read on the issue of democracy, Washington Post has consistently criticized Bush foreign policy for working with a military ruler and ignoring the American principle of promotion of democracy. At the same time editorials show a mixed approach by supporting policy of President Bush with General Musharraf in fighting terrorists, Musharraf’s double game, yet getting critical towards Government’s decisions on favoring Musharraf. In one of its editorials this personal favor is clearly highlighted

(Another pass for Pakistan, 2004).

The editorials of New York Times and Washington Post depict a shadowy image of

Pakistan; a country providing safe havens for terrorists, duplicitous leadership, unreliable and a troubled ally. This makes the relationship even worse which need much careful imaging and perceiving situations from an objective view. The image of Pakistan’s Army and ISI has been negatively portrayed supporting as confirm hypothesis of this study that the U.S. media always support the U.S. national interest and impact on foreign policy decision making process.

The journalists of Washington Post and New York Times and leading Pakistani journalists who worked with these papers in Pakistan express opinions about media impact on foreign policy which is helpful in understanding to which extent U.S. media follow the policy

261 position. T. Hussain, leading journalist of Aaj TV (Pakistani private channel) and having worked with New York Times and Times for five years said, there is no great divergence in stated objectives of the U.S. Government policy and editorial line of U.S. media that comes out in these newspapers. Although New York Times at time would tend to take a liberal line, but in terms of deviating too much in opposition from that line from what the U.S.

Government states, it is not the case (personal communication, May 21, 2014). On the other side, D. Walsh said, ideological stance of papers in the U.S. newspapers goes by standards and ethics than ideology. In New York Times there is a strict line between news coverage and opinion coverage. There can be an article having opinion but news coverage is entirely objective. Having said that, D. Walsh added, it does not mean a complete objectivity; every newspaper has particular bias even the Wall Street Journal is more conservative and New

York Times is liberal (personal communication, May21, 2014).

I.Khan, Bureau Chief Peshawar, The Dawn (leading Pakistani English newspaper) says, in terms of editorial policy on foreign affairs, the U.S. media tend to side with the U.S. State

Department or Pentagon. The journalists have a normal routine with President on morning breakfasts. They do try to influence the reporting as well. For the U.S. it’s very inward looking nation and they have a limited interests overseas. Their foreign policy is reflected in their editorial policy though it’s very limited. Once they are in Iraq, then they are in

Syria so they keep in spotlighting the issues and the U.S. presence. So the coverage about foreign issues in media is very limited. It is heavily domesticated. They know very little about other countries, he remarked. They are doing that with the help of reports in foreign countries (personal communication, October 21, 2014).

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To understand the official perspectives on editorial policy of Washington Post and New

York Times towards Pakistan as U.S. ally in GWOT, there is no answer found from the editorial board however, having bureaus and local journalists working on assignments in other regions, general editorial policy is stated on the Washington Post’s website:

“The Board highlights issues it thinks are important and responds to news events, mindful of stands it has taken in previous editorials and principles that have animated Post’s

Editorial Boards over time. Articles in the news pages sometimes prompt ideas for editorials, but every editorial is based on original reporting. News reporters and editors never contribute to editorial board discussions, and the editorial board members do not have any role in news coverage” (http://washingtonpost.com).

Similarly, New York Times’ editorial board’s reply over the editorial policy is same of

Washington Post. International Assistant Editor (Pakistan), Foreign Desk Section, D.

Douglas Schorzman, in this regard says, a uniform policy is applied to all issues of international affairs apart from the U.S. Government’s foreign policy agenda on any issue.

The editorial policy is devoid of any bias with a global perspective for global audience.

The editor further says, New York Times offers a comprehensive coverage of world events with a distinguished team of correspondents, reporters and editors across regions (personal communication, October 21, 2014).

6.5 Conclusion

This part covers the gist of study in light of media frame analysis performed on the editorials of New York Times and Washington Post. Expert opinions are also presented

263 along with recommendations from the U.S. and Pakistani diplomats and journalists for improving the U.S.-Pakistan relations through media.

The studies of media and foreign policy relationship have factored in different aspects to find out an exact place where the news media stands in the foreign policy domain. This study is a continuation of examining the relationship by taking the foreign policy decision- making theory as its basis. As explained in Chapter 1, the foreign policy decision-making theory formulates three major postulates, which explains how decisions making process takes place. The first element is the decision maker’s role in foreign affairs. In foreign policy making process, President has a central role therefore; his statements and policy positions sets a direction of future policy and his knowledge and appreciation play a pivotal role in this regard. The second stream of information is based on influences and external forces, which make amendments in the state’s policy, posing challenges to take desirable decisions, suitable to its national interests, and the third stream of information is comprised of how mass media structures play their role in influencing the policy makers and transmitting messages to various target audiences. These are the structures, which are active in governance systems. The role of mass media structures has been examined in this study while examining the U.S. mainstream media’s role in addressing the U.S.-Pakistan relations, projecting Pakistan’s image in the U.S. media and media-state relations:

History of bi-lateral relations between the U.S. and Pakistan shows a complex and strained connection, whether it is during an alliance or normal times. Similarly, the mass media coverage has shown a consistent approach in showing this relationship with same frequency, swinging between engagement and disengagement phases between the U.S. and

Pakistan. After 9/11, when Pakistan decided to side with U.S. in the GWOT, the media

264 coverage also focused on Pakistan as a country critical to the national interest of the U.S.

While justifying the statement, D. Walsh said, “For United States, Pakistan is one of the many issues, the trend goes up and high as priorities are shaped at the State Department”

(personal communication, April 30, 2014). This shows when the U.S. government highlights an issue which is critical to its national interest in its foreign policy agenda the news media follow the same line and give space to news and opinion analysis, showing an episodic approach of media by following government’s priorities in foreign policy issues.

Taken this statement within the domain of foreign policy decision-making theory, it verifies that media are considered to be the important factor in transmitting the messages to various tires of its target audiences. Former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Munter also endorses the argument when asked about the event driven coverage of U.S. media. He says,

“There is a tendency toward an event-driven coverage which gets in the way of deeper understanding of issues. In Pakistan, the fact that the government can't or would not eliminate terrorism means that there are constant reminders (assassinations, mosque bombings, attacks) that reminds the rest of the world that Pakistan is a country that is in many ways not very good at governing itself”. He further said, sadly stories about bombings are too often not accompanied by analysis of all the problems, corruption, and ignorance that is the real problem in Pakistan (personal communication, June 2, 2014 via email). This also throws light on media–state relations, particularly, from the perspective of media following the national interest of its government. This is explained subsequently with more contextual analysis.

The media framing analysis of this study has shown strong evidences where media also tend to take a divergent line from the U.S. Government on certain issues, if not all. From

265 the analysis of editorials of New York Times, under theme B: The U.S. pressure on Pakistan to restore democracy, it is clear that there is a subtle tone of criticism on Bush administration. This shows that while taking national interest as prime agenda, the editorial policy indicates compliance with the U.S. Government policy on Pakistan. The editorials under this theme also criticize over President Bush’s lenient attitude towards General

Musharraf. However, the editorial analysis of Washington Post presents a different picture.

It shows a consistent criticism over Bush administration for not pushing General Musharraf on restoration of democracy in Pakistan. This editorial stance proves an independent role of U.S. media where the news media frame an issue according to its ideology. This shows consistent and critical media framing on President Bush for backing General Musharraf as a military dictator.

The analysis of media frames of editorials also shows a blend of conservatism and liberalism outlook of both newspapers, evident through frames shown in editorial policy.

The Washington Post uses media frames that show conservative approach, such as

“Religious/Islamic extremism”, “Islam”, “anti-western sentiment” and “Islamic radicals” with much higher frequency than New York Times, framing same keywords, with a lesser frequency. The tone of language is more powerful in Washington Post than New York

Times. The use of provoking words including headlines are shown while framing Pakistan in respective themes is concerned. This shows that the former indicates a greater tendency in associating war from an ideological perspective than the latter.

Another aspect of media framing analysis indicates active participation of media taking convergence with Bush administration on major U.S. national interest. This conforms to

266 the cascade activation model explained in Chapter 1 p.24). According to Entman’s cascade activation network, media frames flow within the model from government officials to various levels. According to this model media and government interaction is also evident.

This is done through frequent interaction between senior government officials and leading journalists. Through this interaction news frames are generated much easily which helps the Government sources to spread their messages through media sources to the public.

Media structures transmit these to the target audiences and relatively more swiftly than finding their own sources. In case of this study, Schorzman, says, “It is sometimes convenient to gather information from official sources than exploring on our own”. He further says that in covering Pakistani military’s support with Bush administration, media inclined towards official agencies, formally and informally. This is because, first they did not have physical access to Pakistan after 9/11, second, initial frames of White House after

9/11 attacks were so overpowering that finding alternate source on ground was very difficult for the reporting staff of New York Times (personal communication, October 25,

2014). This also proves that media-state relations are already established as far as getting first hand information from official sources is concerned.

While on one side, media portray positive frames of American strategies towards Pakistan by portraying it as an indispensable partner in the GWOT, the stance gradually changes into negative image portrayal of Pakistan as Bush administration changes its stance.

Similarly, over other key issues including nuclear proliferation issue, Pakistan’s military cooperation in capturing Al-Qaida and Taliban, causes of violence, weak governance and economic structure of Pakistan, growing religious extremism, role of military establishment in supporting terrorist links and Pakistan-India relations, Washington Post

267 covers these themes with more depth and higher frequency. The New York Times on the other side manifests a liberal policy as far as number of editorials covering same themes and totality of impression are concerned. Most of them reflect neutral to negative tone over the image of Pakistan than Washington Post, which continuously manifests a negative projection of Pakistan in mentioned issues.

This is also verified through the perspective of domestic input category of foreign policy decision-making theory that the news media transmit messages, which shape an image of a country in its own environment. After 9/11, the image of Pakistan is largely reported through the news coverage of international media. The statement of Ambassador Munter also verifies this role. He states, “The stories I recall during this period about Pakistan started out generally positive with Musharraf portrayed as someone who was resolute and fought terrorism. But when it became clear that he was not effective, that the ISI was supporting terrorism at the same time that Pakistani soldiers were dying in the field, that the Mumbai attack was clearly linked to Pakistan, all these stories led to an increasing frustration that Pakistan was a country that was not interested in or able to fight terrorism”.

He further says, image of Pakistan, already very badly hurt in the 1990s by nuclear proliferation, the criminality of A. Q. Khan that hurt world peace, and Pakistani support for the Afghan Taliban, became even worse, based on the facts that the rest of the world reported from Pakistan” personal communication, June 2, 2014 via email). Conforming this statement, Schorzman says, it is correct to large extent that the U.S. media covered

Pakistan in first eight years of alliance from two perspectives, violence and terrorism

(personal communication, October 25, 2014). Selling those stories which could build up the positive image very rarely appeared in its news coverage during the time period in the

268 editorials of both newspapers. This framing remains consistent as Pakistan termed as a safe haven of terrorists, funding terrorists through U.S. financial aid and involved in supporting cross-border terrorism into Indian held Kashmir.

The image construction of Pakistan amongst academics, diplomats and media accounts for an open debate as the editorial policy of the two leading newspapers of U.S. lack any background information on U.S.-Pakistan relations, which is passed on to the public except that only one is published in New York Times (Redefining Pakistan, 2002). In this editorial, a background is given on the U.S.-Pakistan alliance in 1980’s over the role of U.S. and

Saudi Arabia in supporting religious groups in Pakistan. The editorial has informed its readers about the historical analysis of alliance which helps in understanding the issue in holistic manner. This kind of background in editorial analysis is missing in both newspapers largely, though it is critical for audiences to understand an issue having international significance.

The study therefore, supports the fact that news media also filter out background information and narrow down the scope of issue by excluding some information. This is another attribute of media framing which omits important information in news analysis. In this case, when U.S.-Pakistan relations are examined, the editorial coverage of both elite newspapers of U.S. have restricted their focus on the U.S. policy positions on Pakistan in the wake of 9/11 attacks. When U.S. media takes this position, the media outlets of other countries generally follow it. This reinforces the frames presented by the leading media organizations.

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In support of above argument, media frames appearing with consistency also shapes opinion. During U.S.-Pakistan alliance of eight years, a thematic coverage on terrorism, violence and Islamic extremism is reflected in most of the editorials of Washington Post and New York Times. This reflects Pakistan’s image being constantly projected in U.S. with certain frame. The reflection of U.S.-Pakistan relations, which shows Pakistan’s image as the second category focuses on the image of Pakistan shown through media frames.

The study concludes that U.S. media stance though largely in support of the U.S. foreign policy lines keep on depicting the performance of Pakistan’s military regime on negative scale. They remain in contrast against the major policy stand of Bush administration for an anti-terrorism alliance with General Musharraf. This contrast is visible in the policy statement of then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, Christina Rocca who calls the anti-terrorism partnership [U.S.-Pakistan] “excellent” and “100 percent solid.”15

Kronstadt on other side, points out a wide gap when he writes, while there was an appreciation from the U.S. State Department and White House for Pakistan in the beginning of alliance, apprehension remained in the U.S. military’s leadership and

Congress on Pakistan’s military cooperation with Bush Administration (Kronstadt, 2003).

A close examination of Washington Post and New York Times’ editorials confirms this gap, evident through media frames getting slightly deviating from official positions of White

House and the State Department. The findings show that media frames also indicate this gap through different phases of alliance. As time passes of this alliance, the editorials become more responsive on the utility of alliance. However, the degree with which both

15Transcript: Hearing of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House International Relations Committee (March 20, 2003). Retrieved from http:// fednews.com

270 newspapers discuss this issue varies. This shows mainstream media do get critical and take an independent line when observe a lack of coherence in the policy positions of government.

The contrast and ambiguity in policy statements leave space for journalists and reporters to take their agenda in news analysis. The findings show that editorials pursue their independent policy at certain places where they see an ambiguity in foreign policy. During eight years of alliance, several media frames appear suggesting and pressuring Bush administration to change its support on General Musharraf’s policies. Through these editorials, Bush administration later on, is convinced to work with the political government which would come through elections, support India in civilian nuclear development and put more pressure on Pakistan to enhance anti-terrorism efforts. This indicates an independent role of U.S. media particularly, on themes A: Pakistan’s military regime cooperation with Bush administration in GWOT, theme C: Pakistan’s nuclear development: U.S. policy, and Pakistan-India relations: U.S. policy.

This study also finds out that during eight years, the U.S.-Pakistan relations mainly revolve around Pakistan’s military cooperation in the fight against terrorism than other stated themes. Though this alliance produced positive results, yet there remained wide-scale concerns and mistrust in U.S. policy circles and media reports about prospects of this alliance. As a result of this portrayal, Pakistan is depicted in negative light, shown through the U.S. media coverage during eight years. When the mainstream media of U.S. highlight this image as managed by New York Times and Washington Post, it gives a message to the world about Pakistan. The findings show that Pakistan not only loses its global image rather becomes more controversial after 911. The thematic coverage of Pakistan in the U.S.

271 mainstream has branded the country with attributes of religious extremism and terrorism, while ignoring other aspects of Pakistani nation’s resilience and efforts against terrorism.

Stating alarming figures, Express Tribune publishes a report, according to the attorney for

ISI, Pakistan lost more than 24,000 civilians and troops who were killed in terrorist attacks during the period between 2001 and 2008. The last five years, the report says, have proved costlier in terms of human losses. “Another 25,000-plus people died during military offensives against Taliban insurgents in the restive tribal regions since 2008, (Raja, 2015).

It also raises a question that how many reports on such issues appear in the U.S. media and news analysis while the media frames of eight years do not highlight these issues.

Since this is an interdisciplinary study of Political Communication and International

Relations, effects of media framing have been studied through media frame analysis in the perspective of U.S. media’s coverage of U.S.-Pakistan alliance. The image of a country is crafted through its reflection in the news analysis and it also impacts audiences at regional and global level. This is related to the basic concept of media framing as defined by Entman in (Chapter 1 p.21). The study identifies all the elements of media framing fully functional and evident in the analysis. The editorial frames under each theme have clearly stated four main functions i.e problem, causal justification, moral judgment and remedy as per

Entman’s media framing concept which states, “Frames can perform up to four functions: define problems, specify causes, convey moral assessments, and endorse remedies”

(Entman, 1993, p. 53).

The editorials of New York Times and Washington Post maintain a central focus on

Pakistan, referring its military regime’s cooperation in fight against terrorism. In this analysis, very occasionally the U.S. Government officials are blamed or questioned on

272 responsibilities of the U.S. to resolve differences between the leadership on both sides. The editorial coverage reports Bush administration’s leverage to General Musharraf and complete trust over him, but it does not recognize the gruesome challenges Pakistani nation faced with the threat of terrorism and extremism that could prove to be devastating for the future of country. Secondly, the pressure of “do more” on Pakistan again proves that problem lies with Pakistan’s military regime which is not working extensively despite the

U.S. civilian aid is given to enhance its capacity. According to editorials, the frames are entirely antagonistic about military’s behavior for their unwillingness and backing Taliban.

The coverage also explains what action is desired from Pakistan in dealing with terrorists.

This shows that frames from White House, State Department and Pentagon remain dominant verifying an earlier study by Entman where same level of dominance of U.S.

Government’s interest remains dominant in news frames of Time and Newsweek in case of Korean Air Lines and Iranian air incidents (Entman, 1991, p. 1). This verifies when news frames critically frame Pakistan’s military role; it seems Pakistan is defined as ‘problem’.

According to the second element of framing i.e. “causal interpretation” the editorials explain this element in form of Pakistan’s military regime behavior adopted in addressing the militancy and surrendering to the U.S. demands in curbing terrorist networks. At several points, the editorials highlight the cause of growing terrorism in Pakistan is due to the support of ISI and Army, which makes General Musharraf’s task more difficult and challenging. Similarly, on democracy, i.e. Theme C, General Musharraf is identified as the main cause in not fulfilling his promise. In fact, his cooperation with U.S. is also unfolded in editorials as a hidden deal to prolong his military rule. On Pakistan-India relations i.e

Theme D, the role of General Musharraf and military support to Islamic militants is also

273 reported widely in editorials. On nuclear proliferation, same is evidenced in editorials identifying cause of problem related to Pakistan, shown through framing Dr. A. Q. Khan’s involvement in nuclear trade with other countries. These interpretations of issues show that the real causes are within Pakistan and agencies. When this kind of thematic coverage takes place in news analysis or editorials, it clearly verifies the elements being active in framing process as has reflected in Entman’s framing analysis.

A “moral judgment” is another element of this process through which a justification is established how to address and resolve issues. The news media exert this power, especially in wars and conflicts, calling for a concerted effort from partners for joint military coalitions. The media frames deducted from editorial analysis reveal the perception of

Pakistan in negative context after 9/11. The work finds and concludes that judgment has been placed on Pakistan by reflecting it in conflicting context showing gaps between policy statements that its military leadership makes and actions they take to deal with eliminating terrorism. The editorial coverage by showing these gaps has justified that violence and extremism are imminent from allying and trusting Pakistan, especially in later years of alliance. As a result of this projection, the focus of international community is diverted towards Pakistan, calling for more pressure on military regime as part of moral justification to the cause.

It is also observed that the U.S. media are more inclined towards shifting the alliance from

Pakistan to India. This is depicted through positive media frames generated for India in these editorials, such as prominent media frames favoring the U.S.-India strategic partnership, while Pakistan is blamed despite cooperation on the U.S. counter terrorism efforts. Sehgal’s statement in a TV interview also refers to framing role of media that how

274 in 2001 Pakistan’s dispute with Afghanistan gets internationalized, while Pakistan’s dispute with India is ‘localized’. This is how the U.S. media treat issues according to their national interest. Therefore, he says, media as a tool of soft power should be considered as an important element to build up image in war times (Sehgal, 2015).

Media framing takes an important place in justifying or disapproving the decisions taken by policy makers particularly, in international conflicts. Through this conformation from media, it shapes public opinion and helps generate support or reaction for the policy actions. The analysis has proved that constant remarks and suggestions to Bush administration are evidently presented in 114 editorials. This is evident through change in media policy as immediately after the 9/11 incident, the mainstream media takes a very simple stance of supporting Bush administration’s pro-war stance. Thus, support for alliance with Pakistan in this case comes as naturally. It is in later years; the news media raise questions of legitimacy of U.S.-Pakistan alliance. This change could be referred to editorial policy’s subtle shift that is adopted by both newspapers, but it certainly questions the credibility of Pakistan as an ally, which appears in news analysis frequently.

Taking this in the perspective of public opinion in Pakistan which gets very critical in the wake of U.S.-Pakistan partnership the figures of Failed State Index show an interesting picture. As per statistics of Index, the percentage of Pakistanis who disapproved the alliance of their government with U.S. in the GWOT increased from 46% in 2006 to 86% by 2008 (Freedom House USA, 2007). Both Washington Post and New York Times have largely ignored this aspect. This shows that media also help in legitimizing certain actions over others. In this case, the U.S. media legitimize the Bush administration’s action by overlooking the dissenting opinion of Pakistanis over the issue. This also points towards

275 the short sightedness of the U.S. media having global reach and coverage, which could analyze possible consequences of an uneven partnership between the U.S. and Pakistan took place between military and a political government. Taking historical analysis of past alliances between the U.S. and Pakistan, and differing viewpoints of Pakistani nation, the editorials could indicate the potential obstacles of future. In this scenario, it seems challenging for a country like Pakistan to present its policy statements in effective manner while its image is projected with certain angle. Media management in such cases gets more challenging and questionable. The media frame analysis of editorials verifies the involvement of four functions of media framing in the U.S.-Pakistan alliance.

Frequency of news coverage i.e number of times a story appears also proves the importance of an issue for news media outlets. For example, New York Times publishes lesser number of editorials than what appear in Washington Post. This shows that the New York Times follows relatively a liberal policy than Washington Post over the alliance. This fact is reported with limitation on the part of researcher because in accessing the material, the data is collected from IRC, U.S. Embassy Islamabad so the researcher was dependent on what was provided by the official sources.

Findings also verify the presence of connect between Political Communication and

International Relations. On basis of quantitative and qualitative analysis, the validity of foreign policy decision-making theory has been assessed that media structures play an important role in the foreign policy making process. Certain factors such as scope, tone, language or content of news coverage prove that they play important roles in determining the link with policy makers in wars and international conflicts. They support their countries’ foreign policies on major goals except where they see divergence in interests.

276

The media framing analysis on editorials served as the basis of verifying foreign policy decision-making theory. In addition, personal communication with journalists and diplomats also confirm this connection. To sum up, the U.S. media coverage of Pakistan not only addresses the U.S.-Pakistan relations, but covers a wide range of issues that appeared in

South Asia after 9/11. In light of findings of the study, media’s interest increases towards

Pakistan after 9/11, there is a causal relationship that prevailed between media and image building role and the U.S.-Pakistan relations. It also verifies visible media-state relations within foreign policy decision-making theory. However, as media is considered to take the policy line and abide by the national interest, the U.S. media have also shown an independent nature contrary to the assumption and views of Pakistani journalists on certain key issues as far as media frames are concerned. The news editorials have also shown clear criticism on

Bush Administration. At the same time there are convergences found on key issues which affected Pakistan’s position at diplomatic front.

In this era of globalization, media play a crucial role in shaping world opinion and their significance has increased to a level where it can no longer be ignored especially, in the post 9/11 era. A nation can only benefit in this age of information technology from the effective use of media. The media not only provides a link between nations and civilizations but also reveal events effecting daily life in all fields. It is also being used to an extent to manipulate facts, influence public opinion and mold people perceptions to own favor for a cause, right or wrong, during peace as well as war. With media touching every corner of the world, the meaning and scope of power has been extended beyond military and economy as tools of power. In modern times, states heavily depend on the news media in projecting their views to get desired outcomes. While devising foreign policy issues,

277 policy makers now look through the lens of media and take calculated measures. Thus, the news media has acquired an important place in foreign policy decision-making process.

After 9/11, the news media in the U.S. have given relatively greater coverage to Pakistan.

The general perception regarding coverage of media is not positive or friendly.

Consequently, Pakistan developed and negative predisposition the way U.S. media portrays its alliance with U.S. in GWOT. In the light of findings, this study makes following recommendations.

The study emphasizes over a significant role of news media which has not been addressed in depth in the context of Pakistan. It has been observed that there is no mechanism available to follow the decision making process in Pakistan, there has been a sense of adhoc-ism while looking at the wider national interest except in the military establishment i.e General Head Quarters (GHQ). This shows that a wide gap is in place between the perspectives of military, political government and general masses. This calls for increasing media’s role in understanding the national security goals and disseminating them to all levels.

The study offers an insight from diplomats and journalists who put forward certain recommendations to generate the importance of media’s role in foreign policy issues, generally, and how Government of Pakistan needs to safeguard its image and stress for a balanced picture in the western media. In this regard, Dr. R. Hussain, Pakistan’s Defence

Analyst and former Foreign Minister Information and Broadcasting (1994-1997) says, it is the Foreign Office which should act pro-actively to dispel misconceptions and address the issues highlighted by the U.S. media. “During the political government of Benazir Bhutto, the U.S. print media such as Washington Post, Wall Street Journal or New York Times were

278 very fair. He said, we had a record of correspondence, and made sure that Pakistani opinion was published in the “Letters to Editor”, saying, 75 letters were published in these newspapers, which never happened in history. Since 9/11, coverage of South Asia by New

York Times and Washington Post, Dr. R. Hussain is of view, became limited which created more gaps between Pakistan and the Pentagon. After 9/11, a complete cut-off could be seen. Dr. R. Hussain therefore, recommends that Pakistan’s Foreign Office should take up this issue to speed up diplomatic efforts as if compared with India, there is a cascaded

Indian lobby in America and American cooperate interest is in India therefore, we see a different angle to same issue happening in the U.S. media for India and Pakistan (personal communication, June 2, 2014). Endorsing this point, Dr. A Sarwar, Dean Faculty of Social

Science and Humanities University of Peshawar says, it was General Musharraf’s tenure, when for the first time in Pakistan’s history private media channels became functional in

Pakistan. “It was the responsibility of journalists, intellectuals and academics to clarify

Pakistan’s position and approach the western media on respective issues,” he maintained

(personal communication, February 11, 2015).

This study period is a reflection of active engagement of Pakistan with the U.S. during the

GWOT. That is the reason its impact is long lasting in the years to come. For a continuous and sustainable relations between the U.S. and Pakistan, the study stresses that Pakistan adopts strategic steps in its national security policy and realizes the role of media for effectively projecting a world view of its nation. The role of media has been addressed as pivotal to the U.S. national security agenda, as in the words of Mr. T. Fatimi, Special

Assistant to the Prime Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, the

American media is perceived to be more strong, robust and independent. There is of course

279 a great deal of truth to this impression. But when it comes to foreign policy matters especially, those that relate to America, the U.S. media tip toes around the water’s edge. It is very conscious of the fact that when all is said and done, American newspapers do not report anything which harms America’s core interests. He further adds, after 9/11, the administration led by President Bush saw in it an opportunity to promote its own narrow agenda which they had been espousing for many years. The major newspapers and networks happily participated in promoting this point in domestic and foreign policies. In subservient manner, the U.S. media acknowledged that they found some of activities of

CIA and drones through their sources, but withheld it on the advice of the U.S. administration. So a country prided itself on being bastion of democracy, free speech and human rights disappointed the world (personal communication, May 14, 2014). In light of this comment, the study recommends that Pakistan’s diplomatic front should build-up deeper connections with the U.S. media and its own media agencies to keep them informed about developments. It is clear that Pakistani journalists are also serving the leading U.S. newspapers and TV channels due to limitations of U.S. journalists in coming to Pakistan especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (North West Province of Pakistan) and regions where war stories would be covered, this also calls for the Foreign office to bridge-up with

Pakistani journalists in order to pitching positive aspect of Pakistan.

Keeping this in view, if Pakistan wants to take out the label of terrorism it must take solid action against non-state actors within country. The national security strategy which was mainly seen through the lens of U.S., efforts did not and would not help for Pakistan’s future. The reflection on such issues is also found in news editorials and shared by senior

U.S. diplomats. Ambassador Munter in this respect refers to the internal political instability

280 of Pakistan as the main cause of creating negative image of Pakistan. He says, Pakistan's image is very negative, and most of Pakistanis seem to think this is because of biased reporting rather than the fact that Pakistan is a place where a lot of things don't work. The political corruption, the role of the military, the cowardice of leaders in facing radical

Islam, the economic disasters, and the cultural savagery of such issues as acid throwing make it very easy for honest foreign journalists to write stories that are accurate and that portray Pakistan negatively. This opinion from a savvy U.S. diplomat is understandable as both countries see each other from a certain angle. This has also been raised by Pakistani scholars as Abdul Shakoor also finds out the fact that Pakistan has to take concrete actions and understand the loopholes which are prevalent in its social system adding, this has been pointed out in the news analysis of Pakistani newspapers (Shakoor, 2013).

While dealing with military has been the most desired options of the U.S. Government, the study covering President Bush and General Musharraf’s period also presents an interesting context that how media cover this unequal relationship in terms of a stable democratic country with a country having weak structure, inefficient governance and a military government particularly, a personal partnership between President Bush and General

Musharraf. This over reliance of one person on another has been pointed out in the editorials in negative context, which proves that leadership of both countries should expand the scope of partnership through multidimensional levels, ensuring people to people contact to build up better understanding of each other’s perspectives.

Therefore, for a long-term partnership between the U.S. and Pakistan, there is a need to correct the perception also through media from both sides. In this respect, joint media activities should be held between the scholars and experts rather than focusing only on

281 military exchanges as an ally in the GWOT. As argued by M. Maalick, Managing Director

PTV and a senior news analyst, there is already a very less understanding of American journalists on Pakistan. This interaction even became more nominal and rare after 9/11.

That is the reason that dependency on officials became greater on the U.S. Government sources (personal communication, May 15, 2014). Similarly, T. Hussain, a leading

Pakistani journalist says, there would never have a report on the finer side of Pakistan.

Nobody talks about resilience of this country. Even when the media coverage of judiciary crisis of 2012 came it had an angle. “This country is much more than broken hearts and blown up images of schools”, he remarked (personal communication, May 21, 2014).

While Dr. A. Sarwar urges that media organizations of Pakistan should also inculcate this factor and reach out to international media on diversity of Pakistani nation to bring about positive image of Pakistan.

These viewpoints lead to the need of abridging ideas and perception management at media level. Therefore, there should be joint media programs where Pakistani and U.S. journalists exchange ideas and cover other aspects of Pakistan and the U.S. It is true that national security paradigm will always remain on top of foreign policy, but in the wake of U.S. ending its operations in Afghanistan; a vacuum would be more costly to already strained relations. In purview of joint media initiatives for positive image building, the journalists had critical opinions towards each other’s media. D. Walsh Foreign Editor says, if the U.S. media are perceived among Pakistani journalists to be biased towards Pakistan, it is because, Pakistani media are heavily manipulated by the military and ISI whereas journalists in the U.S. are fairly free as compared to Pakistani journalists. He adds, it is not the job of a journalist to do national building or bridge building. “We are not diplomats but

282 to give a perspective that promotes understanding and shed light on how it is on ground, hope fully these things should have been done like there is “Aman ki Asha” which is helping to running stories to promote understanding between India and Pakistan, adding, it’s a good idea to have a positive angle and could be done at some level” (personal communication, April 30, 2014).

Similarly, M. Maalick suggests that Pakistanis need to see real America. It is easier to hate

America than to praise it. Besides political legitimacy to declare “America as enemy No.

1” in Pakistan but America has also a good story to tell and strengthening media to media exchange could go a long way to build up positive perception through joint exchange programs.

Pakistan needs to take this huge disconnect at its own end. It is also observed that very basic fabric of Pakistani society has been damaged by internal security situation, especially after 9/11. This has resulted in negative portrayal of Pakistan in the international media with highly superficial coverage largely focusing on violence and terrorism. While this is true to great extent, there has been no serious and deliberated effort of restoring Pakistan’s image at international level by Pakistani media. This is also verified that editorial discourse has interconnected terrorism with Islam and Pakistan as an Islamic state with terrorism, providing an ideological basis to the issue. With this framing, it has shown a trend in depicting Pakistan as a dangerous Muslim country and posing serious challenges to its image abroad.

The democratic set up in Pakistan is weak and facing governance issues, creating gaps for formulating a firm national security strategy that translates country’s values and policies in effective manner to outside world. Media certainly can act as a mechanism, which needs

283 to be factored in translating national values to the masses. Though media industry particularly, electronic media emerged in Musharraf’s years, media importance has been a low point in policymaking circles. It is an admitted fact that it is not plain sail for Pakistani media to break through the Western media as Western societies enjoy abundant media coverage, which makes it unnecessary for them to look outside and understand diverse perspective. Nevertheless, this is critical for Pakistani policy makers to devise a focused and sustained promotional drive in line with its cultural traditions.

There should be a concerted effort to reaching out to media representatives so that Pakistani policy makers are able to address issues that are not only related to the U.S. but finding opportunities to project softer side of Pakistan in the U.S. This diversion from terrorism, extremism and violence will progressively yield better image building of Pakistan in US, though the fact cannot be rooted out that transparency in sharing information publicly from both Pakistani government and U.S. is critical to implement these recommendations. The conclusion, in addition to opinions and suggestions from U.S. and Pakistani diplomats and leading journalists attach importance to media’s active role in foreign policy relationship.

However, national security will always remain a major debating point in U.S.-Pakistan relations.

This study adopts an inter-disciplinary approach by involving Political Communication and

International Relations; it also investigates perceptions of foreign policy and political communication experts to understand the dynamics of media-foreign policy relationship.

It is therefore, deducted from opinions that there is a strong association of media and foreign policy, stating that both journalists and government exploit media for their interests and therefore interaction should be enhanced to overcome perception problem. This

284 methodology of collection of opinions in literature review has been examined at academic level. Therefore, personal communication with experts brings attention towards establishing links between media representatives and formulating a suitable atmosphere for joint research between scholars and experts from Pakistan and U.S. in the field of media studies and International Relations. This would be helpful to promote mutual understanding of diverse cultures and bring tolerance for each other’s point of views.

This work has also confirmed the O’ Heffernan’s Mutual Exploitation Model (Chapter 2. p.48) conducted with the help of interviews with journalists and diplomats. According to model, both government agencies and media sources exploit each other for their own interest. The personal opinion of journalists and diplomats also point out certain factors that fall under this model such as, S. Safi, a senior Pakistani journalist (Program Anchor

Jirga, Pakistani private channel Geo News) says, national interest as prime factor will always rule media’s therefore, in the context of U.S.-Pakistan relations, this has to be weighed in that sense so that joint media efforts translate those in their messages to the public (personal communication July 12, 2014).

The study also raises few research questions. It suggests examining the comparison of editorials with other forms such as news reports, or op-ed columns etc in order to identify gaps and convergence in newspaper’s overall policy. Though this study has made an extra effort in getting opinions from journalists from both the U.S. and Pakistan based on media frames of Washington Post and New York Times, reflect interesting comments, which identify mistrust between the U.S. and Pakistan at diplomatic fronts. A future work of semi- structured interviews in the same manner would also make way for a qualitative research to media framing analysis that mostly is limited to numerical studies.

285

As this study focuses on editorial coverage, it covers views of U.S. journalists working on

Foreign Desks while a deliberated approach of getting opinions from editorial boards would make the case more clear in future studies. In addition, as the communications landscape gets denser, the new media, such as twitter, facebook and other social media websites have complicated the International Relations domain. The pace with which news disseminate has become more faster around the globe and it is now easy to exchange views across globe. An in-depth analysis on examining news and opinions on new media forums particularly, in the U.S.-Pakistan relations context is beneficial for examination through framing analysis.

286

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A bet goes sour; President Bush can hardly be surprised by Pakistan's state of emergency [Editorial]. (2007, November 12). The Washington Post, p. A26.

A crisis foretold; Pakistan's Pervez Musharraf impedes fair elections and action against al- Qaeda. So why is he 'indispensable? [Editorial] (2008, February 12). The Washington Post, p. A14.

A fresh start with Pakistan. [Editorial] (2008, July 16). The New York Times, p. Sect A.

A message for Gen. Musharraf. [Editorial] (2006, March 2 02). The Washington Post, p. A20.

A new Pakistan. [Editorial] (2008, March 08). The Washington Post, p. A14.

A problem of passivity; Once again the United States stands by while al-Qaeda operates in a safe haven. [Editorial] (2007, January 21). The Washington Post, p. A14.

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A strategy for Pakistan; the United States must support the new democratic government but also do what is needed to stop al-Qaeda. [Editorial] (2008, August 18). The Washington Post, p. A14.

Ali, Y. A. (2013, October 9). Turkey and Afghanistan peace. The Nation, p. 06.

Al-Qaeda's Sanctuary; Pakistan's tribal areas look a lot like Afghanistan in 2001 and the

Amir, A. [Editorial] (2000, January 19). A glimpse of the future. Dawn, p. 6.

Another pass for Pakistan. [Editorial] (2004, December 31). The Washington Post, p. A14.

Anxious days in Pakistan. [Editorial] (2001, October 9). The New York Times, p. A3.

Back from the edge on Kashmir. [Editorial] (2002, June 11). The New York Times, p. A28.

Betting on the General. [Editorial] (2003, June 20). The Washington Post, p. A14.

Bush administration are tolerating it. (2006, December 21). The Washington Post, p. A26.

Coll, S. (1990, February 22). France to sell nuclear power plant to Pakistan. The Washington Post, p. A.25.

Conspiracy and democracy in Pakistan. [Editorial] (2008, January 07). The New York Times, p. Sect A.

Daudzai, R. K. (2012, April 30). Pakistan has image problem, says Brazilian envoy. The News, p. 2.

Democracy under Arrest: Why is the Bush administration 'proud' to support Pakistan's military ruler? [Editorial] (2007, March 2007 18). The Washington Post, p. A41.

Digging in deeper in Pakistan. [Editorial] (2007, November 23). The New York Times, p. Sect A.

Earthquake in Pakistan.[Editorial] ( 2005, October 13). The New York Times, p. Sect A.

Ending Pakistan's nuclear trade. [Editorial] (2004, February 12). The New York Times, p. Sect 4

Fatimi, T. (2013, May 28). Though inadequate, welcome step. The Express Tribune, p. 06.

Fatimi, T. (2013, October 22). First the tragedy then the farce! The Express Tribune, p. 06.

From Pakistan with Jihad. [Editorial] (2007, January 12). The New York Times, p. Sect A.

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Gen. Musharraf’s lies. [Editorial] (2005, October 01). The Washington Post, p. A16.

General Musharraf's travails. [Editorial] (2002, March 25). The New York Times, p. A2.

Halliday, F. (1996, November 22). Kabul's patriarchy with guns. The Nation, p. 26.

Healing in Kashmir. [Editorial] (2002, December 12). The Washington Post, p. B06. Hussain, T. (2007, September 13). Our image abroad. The Dawn, p. 7.

In Pakistan, Islam needs democracy. [Editorial] (2008, February 16). The New York Times, p. Sect A.

Khan, A. (2014, November 20). The art of framing a story. The Express Tribune, p. 6. Lifschultz, L. (1986, November 29). From U-2 to P-3: New US spy flight from Pakistan. The Nation, p.A1.

No Rewards for Pakistan. [Editorial] (2002, January 22). The Washington Post. p. A24.

Nuclear duplicity from Pakistan. [Editorial] (2002, December 22). The New York Times, p. A2.

On the front lines in the global war against terrorism; Pakistan confronts a familiar dilemma over the Afghanistan crisis. (2001, September 17). The New York Times, p. A34.

On to Pakistan. [Editorial]. (2001, December 27). The Washington Post, p. A27.

One man’s fortune. [Editorial] (2003, December 16). The Washington Post, p. A.24.

Open up to Pakistan. [Editorial] (2001, October 31). The Washington Post, p. A.24.

Out of Pakistan. [Editorial] (2003, February 25). The Washington Post, p. A16.

Pakistan changes the subject. [Editorial]. (2004, March 20). The New York Times, p. A4.

Pakistan confronts a familiar dilemma over the Afghanistan crisis. The New York Times, P A34.

Pakistan is doing its part. [Editorial]. (2007, January 05). The Washington Post, p. A26.

Pakistan without Musharraf. [Editorial]. (2008, August 19). The New York Times, p. Sect A.

Pakistan, a troubled ally. [Editorial](2003, September 21). The New York Times, p. Sect.4

Pakistan's broken promises. [Editorial] (2004, February 12). The Washington Post, p.A30.

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Pakistan's choice. [Editorial] (2001, November 27). The Washington Post, p. A26.

Pakistan's nuclear commerce. [Editorial] (2003, December 2003 01). The New York Times, p. A26.

Pakistan's nuclear crimes. [Editorial] (2004, February 19). The Washington Post, p. A26.

Pakistan's nuclear responsibility.[Editorial] (2004, January 2004 10). The New York Times, p. Sect A.

Pakistan's perpetual president. [Editorial] (2002, April 17). The New York Times, p. Section A.

Pakistan's poor results. [Editorial] (2002, 2002 17). The Washington Post, p. A16.

Pakistan's postponement. [Editorial] (2008, January 12). The Washington Post, p. A41.

Pakistan's separate peace; President Musharraf strikes a deal that may spare himself and his troops, at the likely expense of Americans. (2006, September 13). The Washington Post, p. A26.

Pakistan's thorny transition. [Editorial] (2002, February 18). The Washington Post, p. A41.

Pakistan's welcome gestures. [Editorial] (2002, January 13). The New York Times, p. A2.

Political quicksand in Pakistan. [Editorial] (2002, June 03). The New York Times, p. A22.

Power grab in Pakistan. [Editorial] (2002, August 23). The New York Times, p. A1.

Redefining Pakistan. [Editorial](2002, January 1) 5). The New York Times. A.24.

Sense and insensitivity in Pakistan. [Editorial] (2008, March 14). The New York Times, p. A14. South Asian brinkmanship. [Editorial] (2001, December 11). The New York Times, p. A28.

Stoking the South Asian fire. [Editorial] (2002, May 18). The New York Times, p. A2.

Straight talk needed on Pakistan. [Editorial] (2006, January 28). The New York Times, p. Sect A.

Terrorism on the front lines in the global war against crisis: Pakistan confronts a familiar dilemma over the Afghanistan. [Editorial]. (2001, September 21). The New York Times p. A34.

The Pakistan connection. [Editorial] (2001, September 18). The Washington Post, p. A26.

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The perils of Pakistan. [Editorial]. (2007, May 25). The Washington Post, p. A26.

The pressure rises in Pakistan [Editorial]. (2001, December 20). The New York Times, p. A38.

The upset in India [Editorial]. (2004, May 11). The Washington Post, p.26.

The war in Pakistan [Editorial]. (2006, January 19). The Washington Post, p.A41.

Times, T. N. (2001, September 21). On the front lines in the global war against terrorism; Two years later, abroad. [Editorial] (2003, September 18). The Washington Post, p. A22.

Weakening Pakistan. [Editorial] (2007, November 23). The New York Times, p. Sect A.

Ziauddin, K. (2012, November 20). Civilians should take charge of war on terror. The Express Tribune, p. 06

Online News Sources/ Blogs

Barstow, D., & Stein, R. (2005, March 13). How the government makes news: Under Bush a new age of pre packaged news.Retrieved from http://nytimes.com Bearek, B. (2000, January 1). Pakistan welcomes hijacking's end and praises the Taliban. Retrieved from http:// nytimes.com

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Frant, D. (2005, September 23). From Patriot to Proliferator. Retrieved from http:// latimes.com Hoagland, J. (2002, January 17). No rewards for Pakistan. Retrieved from http:// washingtonpost.com

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Pervez Musharraf resigns as president of Pakistan. (2008, August 18). Retrieved from http://guardian.com

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Annexure A

Statistical Procedure for Frequency Analysis

311

Annexure B

Coding sheet: 1

U.S. Foreign Policy towards Pakistan after 9/11

The coding is done on one editorial each from New York Times and Washington Post from

2001- 2008. In total 16 editorials are selected for reliability check on US foreign policy towards Pakistan after 9/11. The scale of agreement is selected from 0-10 with degree on higher side.

Direction: positive, negative and neutral (total impression by tone)

1. Coder :------

2. Newspaper ------

3. Dateline ------

4. Title of editorial………

5. Central idea……….

6. Unit of analysis: key words, key phrases, frames in editorial

7. Theme:------

8. Tone/ impression of editorial

Negative Neutral Positive

9. 1 2 3

10. Memo: ------

312

Annexure C

Coding Sheet: 2

U.S.-Pakistan Relations after 9/11

The coding is done on one editorial each from New York Times and Washington Post from

2001- 2008. In total 16 editorials are selected for reliability check on Pak U.S. relations after 9/11. The scale of agreement is selected from 0-10 with degree of agreement on higher side.

Direction: positive, negative and neutral (total impression by tone)

1. Coder:------

2. Newspaper ------

3. Dateline ------

4. Title of editorial------

5. Central idea------

6. Component of analysis: key words, key phrases, frames in editorial

7. Theme: ------

8. Tone/ impression of editorial

Negative Neutral Positive

9. 1 2 3

10 memo: ------

313