Policy Networks and Paradigm Change in Ontario Forest Policy 1988-2014

Anne Koven

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Faculty of Forestry University of Toronto

Policy Networks and Paradigm Change in Ontario Forest Policy, 1988-2014

2015

Doctor of Philosophy

Anne Koven

Faculty of Forestry University of Toronto

Abstract

This dissertation was developed from documentary research, analyses of public hearing transcripts, and a case study examining 25 years of forest policy change in Ontario from 1988 to 2014.

The ideas and actions of the actors in the policy network, and the political, social, and economic structures in which they operated, are investigated using the Dialectical Model of Policy Networks. The relationships among the key policy actors are traced through significant events and legislation: the Timber

Management Class Environmental Assessment (1988-1994), the Crown Forest Sustainability Act (1994), the Living Legacy-Ontario Forest Accord (1998), The Endangered Species Act (2007), the Far North

Act (2010), and the Ontario Forest Tenure Modernization Act (2011.)

The results of the analyses indicate that Ontario’s forest policy evolved over the study period.

The policy focus was on timber supply for the forest industry in 1988. This gave way in 1994 to sustainable forest management, which also served environmental and social values. By 2007 the ecological values of forest policy began to predominate.

The analyses reveal that as the ENGOs in the forest policy network gained strength, their ideas and their successful political advocacy drove ecological changes. In contrast, the network influence of the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources was weakened by ongoing budget cuts and confusion about its mandate. The forest industry lost its historical power in the network due to the economic crisis and

downsizing of the industry and by tactics that caused further estrangement from the government.

Professional foresters lost their prominence in the network as decisions about forests became associated with political rather than technical and scientific values. Aboriginal Peoples were unable to break into the network for purposes of furthering their treaty and Aboriginal rights and to obtain economic benefits for their remote communities.

Questions are raised about the persistence of the new ecological forest policy network and the acceptance of the network of further reform. The result, however, of these shifts in network dynamics is that Ontario forest policy has experienced a paradigm change.

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Acknowledgements

Thank you to all the study participants who were generous with their time and insights. Thank you to my committee members, who inspired me to make this project ambitious and something of value to the cultural and political conversation about forests. My good fortune was to have Tat Smith as my supervisor; he shepherded me through the process, gave me excellent advice about avoiding distractions, which I should have taken, and challenged me. Grace Skogstad introduced me to the new developments in my first field, political science and public administration, and there were many since my master’s program in 1976. Shashi Kant taught me the importance of being consistently engaged. Neera Singh encouraged me to explore beyond the borders of Canada. Ingrid Stefanovic served on my committee while juggling the pressures of a move to become Dean of the Faculty of the Environment at Simon Fraser. Ingrid and Kenn Maly inspired my interest in the study of environmentalism. Many foresters in business, government and non-profit organizations have inspired me, especially my mentors, John Cary, whose friendship and collaboration on many projects is highly valued, Ken Armson, Carla Grant, Ric Monzon, Bob Staley, Rob Keen, Carol Walker, Andy Kenney and the Ontario Professional Foresters Association. David Balsillie first encouraged me to apply to the PhD programme at the Faculty of Forestry, University of Toronto. Michele Devaul and Elie Martel showed me the importance of valuing northern Ontario and advocating for its interests. I am grateful to the Faculty of Forestry staff and professors and fellow students for welcoming me and helping me in many ways. I am grateful to the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources (and now Forests) for providing statistics on the forest industry and forest management and for their support since the days of the Timber Class EA hearings. Dawn Pollon taught me to use NVivo and other useful things a PhD student needs to know. Thank you to everyone who made it possible for me to study in Haida Gwaii, where I learned about new concepts of Aboriginal governance. Thank you to my friends who encouraged me through course work, oral comprehensive exams and dissertation writing: Cathy Gildiner, Judy Hashmall, Janet Hennick, Betty Anne Jordan, Linda Kahn, Rena Mendelson, Mary Munro, Sharon Sallows, Mona Sherkin and Sally Wright. I am especially grateful to Linda whose knowledge of government was invaluable. To my husband Philip, who makes everything possible, and our sons Peter, who first suggested that I pursue a PhD, and Paul, who reminded me often that I needed to finish and whose Excel skills

facilitated the process. My PhD journey was enriched by the encouragement of my daughters-in-law Katherine and Natalie, and the arrival of our granddaughter Julia. My dear mother Dorothy began the process with me and my father-in-law Jack, Esterita and Marty, have been with me all along. Thank you to Patty, Katie, Bridget, Maddie and Gracie, who make me happy. So many steps, each informed and inspired, by so many people. I am grateful.

Table of Contents Abstract...... ii Acknowledgements ...... iv List of Tables ...... ix List of Figures ...... x List of Appendices ...... xi Glossary of Key Terms and Definitions ...... xii Acronyms ...... xiv Research Motivation ...... xvi Chapter 1: Introduction ...... 1

1.1. THE PUZZLE ...... 1 1.2. THE INVESTIGATION ...... 3 1.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS ...... 3 1.4. KEY POLICY DECISIONS ...... 4 1.5. POLICY NETWORK APPROACH ...... 4 1.6. THE ARGUMENT ...... 6 1.7. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS...... 6 Chapter 2: Forest Sector Transformation ...... 8

2.0. INTRODUCTION ...... 8 2.1. ENVIRONMENTALISM AND ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY ...... 8 2.1.1 History with forests...... 8 2.1.2. Philosophy and ethics and wilderness preservation...... 10 2.1.3. Public opinion and environmental values...... 11 2.2. SUSTAINABLE FOREST MANAGEMENT (SFM) ...... 13 2.3. FOREST INDUSTRY CRISIS ...... 15 2.4. REINVENTING THE PROFESSION AND FORESTRY EDUCATION ...... 17 2.5. TRANSFORMATION OF THE ONTARIO MINISTRY OF NATURAL RESOURCES ...... 20 2.6. SUMMARY ...... 22 Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework ...... 23

3.1. INTRODUCTION ...... 23 3.2. POLICY NETWORK AND POLICY CHANGE CONCEPTS ...... 23 3.3. POLICY ACTORS AND TYPES OF NETWORKS ...... 24 3.4. DIALECTICAL MODEL OF POLICY NETWORKS ...... 28 3.5. POLICY PARADIGM CHANGE ...... 32 3.6. TRANSNATIONAL/INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES ...... 34 Chapter 4: Methods ...... 38

4.0. RESEARCH QUESTIONS ...... 38 4.1. METHODOLOGY ...... 38 4.2. METHODS ...... 39 4.2.1. Document research...... 39 vi

4.2.1. (i) Chronology of Ontario forest policy events...... 39 4.2.1. (ii) Forest policy spectrum...... 39 4.2.1. (iii) Key policy events...... 40 4.2.2 Data collection...... 42 4.2.2. (i) Interview protocol...... 42 4.2.2. (ii) Sampling strategy ...... 42 4.2.3. Interviews...... 45 4.2.3. (i) Interview protocol...... 45 4.2.3. (ii) Ethical considerations (REB protocol reference # 26432)...... 45 4.2.4. Data analysis...... 46 Chapter 5: Paradigm Change in Ontario Forest Policy ...... 49

5.0. INTRODUCTION ...... 49 5.1. FOREST POLICY SPECTRUM ...... 50 5.2. EVOLUTION OF LEGISLATION WITH ECOLOGICAL OBJECTIVES ...... 53 5.2.1. Temagami (1985)...... 54 5.2.2 Timber Class EA (1988-1994)...... 55 5.2.3. Crown Forest Sustainability Act (1995)...... 57 5.2.4. Lands for Life /Living Legacy/ Ontario Forest Accord (1999)...... 59 5.2.5. Endangered Species Act (2007)...... 61 5.2.6. Far North Act (2010)...... 62 5.2.7. Forest Tenure Modernization Act, 2011...... 64 5.2.8. Aboriginal peoples excluded...... 67 5.3. SHIFTS IN THE POLITICAL INTERACTIONS OF THE NETWORK ACTORS WITH GOVERNMENT ...... 69 5.4. CONCLUSIONS ...... 72 Chapter 6: Explaining Ontario Forest Policy Network Change ...... 73

6.0. INTRODUCTION ...... 73 6.1. THE INTERACTIVE RELATIONSHIP: BETWEEN ONTARIO FOREST POLICY NETWORK STRUCTURE AND AGENCY ...... 74 6.1.1. Network membership...... 74 6.1.1. (i) Five major groups...... 75 6.1.1. (ii) State actors...... 77 6.1.1. (iii) ENGOS...... 77 6.1.1. (iv) Excluded interests...... 78 6.1.1. (v) Industry interests...... 80 6.1.1. (vi) Foresters...... 81 6.1.2. Network resources and policy network change...... 81 6.1.2. (i) OMNR resources...... 83 6.1.2. (ii) ENGOs resources...... 83 6.1.2. (iii) Aboriginal peoples resources...... 85 6.1.2. (iv) Forest industry resources...... 87 6.1.2 (v) Professional foresters resources...... 87 6.2. THE INTERACTIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NETWORK AND ITS POLITICAL, IDEOLOGICAL, SOCIO- ECONOMIC AND KNOWLEDGE CONTEXT ...... 88 6.2.1. Political change and policy network change...... 88 6.2.1. (i) Urbanization...... 88 6.2.2. Shifts in the ideas of the network...... 90 6.2.2. (i) Timber supply and policy network change...... 93 6.2.2. (ii) Sustainable forest management...... 94

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6.2.2. (iii) Forest policy with ecological objectives...... 96 6.2.3. Economic change...... 97 6.2.3. (i) Opportunities for ENGOs to bring solutions to government...... 97 6.2.3. (ii) Financial stress on the forestry sector...... 99 6.2.3. (iii) Turmoil at the OMNR...... 99 6.2.3. (iv) Aboriginal peoples’ expectations disappointed by forest policy...... 100 6.2.4. Knowledge changes...... 103 6. 3. CHANGES IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FOREST POLICY NETWORK AND OTHER RELATED NETWORKS ...... 103 6.4. THE INTERACTION OF THE EXOGENOUS/CONTEXTUAL FACTORS AND THE ENDOGENOUS/NETWORK FACTORS ...... 108 6.5 CONCLUSIONS ...... 111 Chapter 7: How Policy Network Change Explains Paradigm Change ...... 113

7.0. INTRODUCTION ...... 113 7.1. TENURE MODERNIZATION: PHILOSOPHICAL CHANGE...... 114 7.2. SHIFTS IN THE INTERACTIONS OF NETWORK ACTORS ...... 115 7.2.1. ENGOs’ success in expanding protected areas...... 116 7.2.2. ENGOs: Market certification/market boycotts...... 118 7.2.3. Collaboration between ENGOs and the forest industry...... 120 7.2.4. ENGOs collaborate with all governments...... 122 7.2.5. ENGOs influence new policy instruments...... 124 7.2.6. Forest industry ‘lost its voice’ with government...... 126 7.3. Shifts in attitudes and values towards ecological sustainability...... 131 7.3.1. ENGOs and industry...... 133 7.3.2 Foresters...... 134 7.3.3. Government...... 135 7.4 CONCLUSIONS ...... 136 Chapter 8: Summary and Observations ...... 138

8.0. INTRODUCTION ...... 138 8.1. ONTARIO FOREST POLICY NETWORK CHANGE ...... 138 8.2. ONTARIO FOREST POLICY: PARADIGM CHANGE ACHIEVED ...... 145 8.3. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FOREST MANAGEMENT PLANNING ...... 146 8.3.1 Evolution of professional foresters...... 147 8.3.2 Relevancy of FMP institutions...... 147 8.3.3. Integrated land use planning...... 148 8.3.4. A New vision for the forest industry...... 149 8.3.5. Federal government partnership is not working...... 150 8.3.6. Learning from other jurisdictions...... 150 8.3.7. Regenerating the forest policy network...... 151 8.3.8. Advancing the interests of Aboriginal peoples...... 152 8.3.9. Government’s responsibility for sustaining Crown Land forests...... 152 References ...... 154 Appendices ...... 171

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List of Tables

Table 2.0. Provincial Forest Industry Statistics ...... 9 Table 4.1. Summary Of Public Hearings On Four Key Forest Policy Events Table 2. OMNR Statistics On Forest Industry Recession ...... 41 Table 5.4.1. Summarizing Paradigm Change In The Political Interactions Of Network Actors ...... 71 Table 6.1. Evolution Of The Ontario Forest Policy Network ...... 75 Table 6.2. Participation Of Network Members In Public Hearings ...... 76 Table 6.3. Network Members’ Resources ...... 82 Table 6.4. Summarizing Paradigm Change In The Dominant Discourse Of The Network ...... 92 Table A 2.1. Provincial Layoffs & New Jobs Summary By Region June 2002 - April 30, 2013 (Actual And Announced) ...... 173 Table A 2.2. Mill Closures By Province 2003-2012 ...... 174 Table A 2.3. Number Of Primary Mills By Mill Type ...... 174 Table A 2.4. Forest Management Revenue, 1997-2012...... 175 Table A 9. Interview Participant Information ...... 264 Table A 11.1. Top Eight Emergent Categories From NVivo Codes ...... 273 Table A 11.2. Top Emergent Agent Codes From NVivo ...... 273 Table A 11.3. Top Emergent Government NVivo Codes From Agent Category ...... 274 Table A 11.4. Top Emergent Sub-Sub Codes For Government From NVivo ...... 275 Table A 11.5. Top Emergent ENGO NVivo Codes From Agent Category ...... 276 Table A 11.6. Top Emergent Sub-Sub Codes For ENGOs From NVivo ...... 277 Table A 11.7. Top Emergent Forester And Forestry Codes From Agent Category ...... 278 Table A 11.8. Top Emergent Categories From NVivo Codes For Foresters & Forestry ...... 278 Table A 11.9. Top Emergent Forest Industry NVivo Codes From Agent Category ...... 279 Table A 11.10. Top Emergent Categories From NVivo Codes For Forest Industry ...... 280 Table A 11.11. Top Emergent First Nations/Aboriginal NVivo Codes From Agent Category ...... 281 Table A 11.12. Top Emergent Categories From NVivo Codes For First Nations/Aboriginal ...... 281

List of Figures

Figure 1.1. Size of Ontario’s Protected Areas ...... 2 Figure 1.2. Fifteen Year Ontario Stumpage Revenue ...... 3 Figure 1.3. Application of the Dialectical Model of Policy Networks and Policy Outcomes ...... 5 Figure 2.1. Ontario Professional Foresters’ Association Membership ...... 19 Figure 3.1. Dialectical Policy Network and Policy Outcomes Model ...... 29 Figure 5.1. Ontario Forest Policy Spectrum of Change ...... 52 Figure A 1. Illustration of Forest Policy Silos with Issues of Interest to the Disciplines ...... 172 Figure A 2. Forest Policy Outcome: Class EA,988……………………………...………………...…….242 Figure A 3. Forest Policy Outcome: CFSA, 1994 ...... 244 Figure A 4. CFSA, 1994 List Of Interests ...... 246 Figure A 5. Forest Policy Outcome: Far North Act, 2010 ...... 251 Figure A 6. Detailed List of ESA Interests ...... 253 Figure A 7. Forest Policy Outcome: Far North Act, 2010 ...... 256 Figure A 8. Detailed List of Far North Act Interests ...... 259

List of Appendices

Appendix 1. Sources for Diverse, Multi-Disciplinary Forest Policy Literature ...... 171 Appendix 2. OMNR Statistics on Forest Industry Recession ...... 172 Appendix 3. Chronology of Ontario’s Forest Policy, December 2014 ...... 176 Appendix 4. Information Concerning the Development of the Ontario Forest Policy Spectrum ...... 205 Appendix 5. Selected Events in the History of Environmentalism and Forests ...... 229 Appendix 6. Questions Generated from the Dialectical Policy Network Model ...... 240 Appendix 7. Analysis of Public Hearings, Parties/Network Agents and their Interests in Forest Policy 241 Appendix 8. Interview Protocol ...... 262 Appendix 9. Interview Participant Information ...... 264 Appendix 10. Letter of Information and Informed Consent Form ...... 267 Appendix 11. NVivo Results Tables ...... 273

Glossary of Key Terms and Definitions

Aboriginal Peoples: Aboriginal Peoples refer to First Nations (defined as status Indians under the Indian Act), Metis and Aboriginal communities in Ontario. Indigenous is coming into more popular use following the 2008 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (D. McGregor, 2006 p. 233). “Aboriginal is used in the inclusive sense when discussing rights as defined under s. 35 of the Constitution Act” (M. A. Smith, 2013).

ENGOs: (Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations): This term is used synonymously with environmentalists, the environmental movement, and environmental groups and communities.

Ecological Forest Policy: The values associated with ecological perspectives are the inherent value of the natural environment, protection and improvement of biodiversity-including old growth forests and wilderness and the protection and recovery of species at risk, and the establishment of parks and extensive protected areas. Examples of Ontario ecological forest policy analyzed in this dissertation are the Endangered Species Act, 2007 and the Far North Act, 2010.

Forest public policy: The definition of forest policy used in this research is a course of action or inaction chosen by Ontario governments to address a given problem or interrelated set of problems concerning Ontario’s public Crown land forests (Pal, 2006). It applies to all government decisions on Crown Lands beginning at the southern boundary of the “area of the undertaking”, which is the term used to describe most of northern Ontario that received a Class Environmental approval in 1994 for timber management, and into the Far North, north of 50 degrees latitude. The issues of southern and urban Ontario forests, mostly privately owned, are not part of this research. Finally, it encompasses all activities associated with forest management such as parks and protected areas, endangered species and habitat protection and land use planning.

Forest policy literature: This is a diverse and multi-disciplinary range of materials. The political science, environmental and forestry disciplines each has different interests in the study of forest policy (Appendix 1).

Forest sector: The forest sector is broadly defined in this research to include the forest industry as well as other policy actors with an interest in forests such as the professions, ENGOs, Aboriginal Peoples, educational and scientific institutions, and consultants, all of whom interact with government and attempt to influence forest policy.

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Silviculture: Generally, the science and art of cultivating forest crops based on knowledge of silvics. More particularly, the theory and practice of controlling the establishment, composition, constitution and growth of forests (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2014j) (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2014e).

Sustainable Forest Management Policy: With the passage of the Crown Forest Sustainability Act, 1995 the objective of forest policy was defined for the first time to be a broader concept of forestry than timber supply and one that was required to serve many interests, not only the industrial. The purpose of the CFSA is “to manage Crown forests to meet social, economic and environmental needs of present and future generations.” Sustainable Forest Management is the legislative, regulatory and policy regime in place in Ontario since 1995 to plan and conduct forest operations on Crown Land.

Timber Management Forest Policy: This was the historical approach used in Ontario until the Timber Management Class Environmental Assessment decision in 1994. The sole purpose of the timber management policy was to supply wood to the forest industry.

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Acronyms

Participant quotes are anonymously identified by an alphanumeric code (i.e. E 1). The letters E (ENGO), G (Government), I (Industry), and FN (First Nations) are used to identify the source’s group. The numbers correspond to the list of interview participants listed in Appendix 9.

ENGOs: Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations

FMAs: Forest Management Agreements

FMP: Forest Management Planning

FMPM: Forest Management Planning Manual

FMU: forest management unit

FPAC: Forest Products Association of Canada

FRI: Forest resource inventory

FSC: Forest Stewardship Council

LCC: Local Citizen Committees

LFMC: Local Forest Management Corporations

MNDM: Ontario Ministry of Northern Development and Mines

MNR or OMNR: Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources (renamed Natural Resources and Forestry in 2014)

MOE: Ontario Ministry of the Environment

NRCan: National Resources Canada, which includes the Canadian Forest Service

OFIA: Ontario Forest Industries Association

OLMA: Ontario Lumber Manufacturers Association

OPFA: Ontario Professional Foresters Association

R.P.F.: Registered Professional Forester

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SFM: Sustainable Forest Management

SFL: Sustainable Forest Licenses (co-operative and single entity SFLs)

WWF: World Wildlife Fund

Research Motivation

This research was motivated and informed by my thirty five year career as a participant and observer of public policy changes involving people, the environment and government. A Master’s degree in public administration and natural resources policy led to my involvement in the mining industry in the late 1970s and early 1980s where the issues were acid rain, the absence of Canadian senior executives and the precarious dependence of ‘single industry towns’ in northern Ontario. This experience was followed by government funded research I undertook into the environmental and health impacts of exposure to toxic substances in a landfill and my involvement in a survey of workplaces to prepare for changes to occupational health and safety legislation. The experience of conducting an environmental assessment of timber management (Timber Class EA, 1988-1994) instigated a respect for northern forests and a process of developing a personal environmental ethic. Since then, I have been involved with organizations that are also concerned with reforestation in the settled landscapes of southern Ontario. These experiences, intellectual, professional and personal, explored the tension between the value of the human and the value of the natural, and the government’s power to affect policy change. Students ask me why decisions are made about trees and forests that appear to go against the science or offend environmental principles. The answer I give them is that trees and forests are in the realms of society and politics: their planning and management, their preservation and use are decisions made within and outside of natural resources’ professions and scientists. My interest ultimately is in the responsibility of forest policy decision-makers to ensure that Crown Land forests continue to be sustainable; this role engages in the conflict with what the public and environmentalists legitimately want from our forests, with governments that will not or cannot provide adequate funding and with industry that is pressured to show profits and support communities.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. The Puzzle Ontario forest policy has undergone a dramatic change from 1988 to 2014. It involved transforming a policy in which the economic goals of timber extraction held priority historically to one in which goals of sustainability and ecological objectives have since achieved prominence. Paradigm change entails a shift in the dominant policy ideas and this analysis of Ontario forest policy change shows the unfolding of a paradigm policy shift from industrial to ecological objectives. This shift is characterized by the introduction of sustainable forest management (SFM) in the 1990s, and then a more singular focus on ecological objectives in forest management planning (FMP) in the 2000s. This development is unexpected from the point of environmental and scholarly literature which has argued that forest policy has been largely shaped by the interests of private forest companies and politicians and government ministries sympathetic to the interests of the industry. Elizabeth May, leader of the federal Green Party since 2006, positioned the critical ENGO perspective: government and the powerful, economic forest industry exclude the public and the environmental interests from forest policy; forest management is “voodoo forestry” and government foresters overestimate the annual allowable cut to benefit industry’s mills (May, 2005). This point of view is being challenged in this dissertation by the significant change experienced in the broader Ontario forest sector from 1988 to 2014. First, the concepts of ecological sustainability and other values of environmentalism have been persuasive with Ontario governments. There is a history of Ontario premiers being persuaded since the 1960s, and at an accelerated pace in the last decade, to leave behind protected areas as their political legacy. The pattern of conservation legacies has been common to contemporary Ontario premiers, and to all three political parties and throughout northern and southern Ontario. Since 1988 all have been in favour of the ecological objectives of forest policy, and none has championed the Ontario forest products industry. Evidence of this change can be observed in the following Figure 1.1 showing some of the increase in the growth of protected areas that, at the same time, shrank the size of the land base available for the forest industry. Also contributing to and accelerating this trend is the 50 per cent conservation goal contemplated in the Far North Act and the removal of other forest industry operating areas through the application of guides and guidelines required by Forest Management Planning.

Figure 1.1: Size of Ontario’s Protected Areas*

10 10%

8 8%

6 6%

4 4% Millions

2 2%

- 0%

Area of PAs (Hectares) Pct. of Province

*Includes provincial parks, conservation reserves and wilderness areas. Source: Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources Second, questions are being asked about whether the “traditional social contract”, which depended on the once powerful forest industry producing revenue for Ontario governments, has lost its relevance as a result of the forest industry decline. The forest industry has been a powerful economic and political force in Canada dating from the logging and sawmilling of the 1800s to the huge pulp and paper operations beginning in the early 1900s. The sharp decline in the contribution to provincial revenue by the Ontario forest industry (called stumpage revenue) is shown in Figure 1.2 below. This dissertation is investigating the puzzle of paradigm change by examining not only the impact of the forest industry but an array of other economic, political and social impacts associated with Ontario forest policy change.

Figure 1.2: Fifteen Year Ontario Stumpage Revenue

350 300 250 200 150

Millions 100 50 0

Revenue

1.2. The Investigation Central to this research are interviews conducted with 23 participants experienced with Ontario forest policy from the perspectives of ENGOs (i.e., environmental non-governmental organizations), the forest industry, foresters, government, and First Nations, Metis and Aboriginal communities. The data derived from the interviews were essential in explaining changes in the Ontario forest policy network that were associated with the emergence of a new forest policy focused more on ecologically sustainable objectives. The focus of this inquiry is Ontario’s forest policy, which is defined to be a course of action or inaction chosen by Ontario governments to address a given problem or interrelated set of problems concerning Ontario’s public Crown land forests (Pal, 2006 p. 99). In analytical terms, this research assumes that Ontario’s forest policy is the dependent variable that can be changed by independent variables associated with the forest policy network.

1.3. Research Questions Three research questions were posed in order to examine the changes in Ontario’s forest policy over the study period: Research Question 1: Has there been a change over the last 25 years in Ontario’s government policies and legislation on public forests?

Research Question 2: How has change occurred over the last 25 years in Ontario’s government policies on public forests?

Research Question 3: Why has this forest policy change occurred?

The nature of these questions justified using a case study method for this research. The case study approach permits an in depth investigation of the numerous historical and current political, environmental and socio-economic factors associated with forest policy change.

1.4. Key Policy Decisions Evidence of changes in forest policy can be traced through legislation, regulation, and policy statements published by successive Ontario governments during the study period. A Forest Policy Spectrum of Change (Chapter 5, Figure 5.1) was developed for the purpose of presenting the results of the analysis of 32 forest policy events. Each event was then categorized as being timber management, sustainable forest management or more focused on ecological objectives and was plotted on the Spectrum. The analysis of the Spectrum suggests that at least four policy events represent milestones or critical junctures in a transition from an industrial focus to sustainable, ecological forest policy. These policy events are: the Timber Management Class Environmental Assessment (1988-1994) circled as number one in Figure 5.1, the Crown Forest Sustainability Act (1995) circled as number five, the Endangered Species Act (2007) circled as number 20 and, the Far North Act (2010) circled as number 25. Additionally, the interviews confirmed that these four policy events were significant. Interview participants, however, noted that there were two additional significant policy events also shown in Figure 5.1: the Living Legacy/Ontario Forest Accord (1999) (bullet number 8), the Ontario Forest Tenure Modernization Act (2011) (bullet number 26).

1.5. Policy Network Approach The Dialectical Model of Policy Networks was selected as a theoretical framework to explain changes in Ontario forest policy (Marsh & Smith, 2000c). The Dialectical Model of Policy Networks (the model) uses an analysis of the interactions between relationships: the network structure and the policy actors, the network and its political, socio-economic and knowledge context, and the network and policy outcomes. This model was deployed because of its utility in focusing on the identification, resources, and activities of policy actors in the network, both groups and individuals, and its illumination of the political constraints and opportunities, the economic context, and the shifts in ideology and attitudes that affect policy networks. The following Figure 1.3 illustrates the adaptation of the model with the incorporation of the three research questions posed in this dissertation.

Figure 1.3: Application of the Dialectical Model of Policy Networks and Policy Outcomes

1.6. The Argument The argument is that the pre-1988 integrated, stable and exclusive policy community of industry, foresters and government agents managed to control forest policy changes leading into the Timber Class EA hearings. During the hearings, the ENGOs then began to insert themselves as a larger presence in the network, and the forest industry’s influence began to wane. Since then the forest industry has mostly opposed government’s forest policy decisions, which have moved away from the sole objective of supplying wood to industry. The documentation of paradigm change in forest policy is discussed in Chapter 5 with regard to six Ontario governments supporting increasingly ecologically focused legislation and other policy events advocated by ENGOs. Based on interviews with individuals closely involved with Ontario forest policy in the past 25 years, five major factors account for the shift in the paradigm of Ontario forest policy: 1. ENGOs successfully advocated for ecological and sustainability objectives and influenced government to pass legislation that represented ENGOs’ interests, within the context of other major policy actors who saw their own influence with government eroded by a variety of economic, social, political, and environmental factors. 2. The Ontario forest industry declined as an economic and political force in the province as the result of an ongoing crisis that began in 2004. Additionally, its strategies and tactics may have been misguided. 3. Professional foresters lost their influence on forest policy for a number of reasons including a reputation of being closely associated with the old forest industry model. 4. The Ontario government, specifically the Ministry of Natural Resources, experienced 20 years of budget cuts and associated changes that weakened its previous monopoly on forest policy. 5. Aboriginal Peoples unsuccessfully attempted to achieve their treaty and aboriginal rights through forest policy but their interests, nonetheless, are required by legislation to be considered in forest policy. In summary, this dissertation weaves together the policy network actors and events from historical to contemporary times, and it asserts that change has taken place; the power to influence forest policy has evolved from the traditional OMNR and forest industry actors to greater gains by the ENGOs.

1.7. Overview of Chapters Chapter Two, Forest Sector Transformation, lays the foundation for understanding the analysis and findings in subsequent chapters. It discusses the influence of environmental philosophy and ideas on forest policy; it presents relevant details about the 1990s shift to sustainable forest management and the forest industry crisis; it describes changes in the forestry profession and forestry education relevant to the forest policy network; and presents a brief review of the factors involved in the downsizing of the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources.

Chapter Three, Theoretical Framework, discusses the theoretical framework selected to answer the three research questions: what changes have been experienced in the Ontario forest policy network? How did these changes happen? Why did the changes occur? Policy network approaches, specifically the Dialectical Model of Policy Networks (Toke & Marsh, 2003) were used to investigate network and policy changes and their association with paradigm policy change. Chapter Four, Methods, describes those methods used in conducting the study: a case study approach looking at Ontario forest policy history, documentary research on public and legislative hearings, personal interviews with 23 participants who had extensive experience in the forest policy network and the use of NVivo, which is a qualitative social science software, to analyze the results of the interviews. Chapter Five, Paradigm Change in Ontario Forest Policy, examines 25 years of Ontario forest policy history, including the development of a Forest Policy Spectrum tracing the evolution of policy changes: from a timber supply focus into sustainable forest management and since 2007, another shift towards forest policy that is driven more by ecological objectives. The change in interactions observed among network members is characteristic of the paradigm change being examined, most notably the position of the forest industry shifted from traditional support of government’s forest policy to industry opposition. The exclusion of Aboriginal Peoples from the forest policy network is examined. Chapter Six, Explaining Ontario Forest Policy Network Change, discusses network change involving the prominent policy agents: the ENGOs, the forest industry, professional foresters, Ontario premiers and the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources and the First Nations, Metis, and Aboriginal communities. It also describes the changes within the Ontario forest policy network as they relate to the resources of the network agents, the changing contexts in which they operate, and their relations with other networks. Chapter Seven, How Policy Network Change Explains Paradigm Change, identifies the major shifts in the ideology of the network, examines the significance of tenure modernization, and identifies and discusses the critical shifts in interactions of the network agents and in their attitudes and values. Chapter 8, Summary and Conclusions, assesses the utility of the dialectical policy network model in explaining paradigm change. The chapter concludes with recommendations for ecologically sustainable forest management planning.

Chapter 2: Forest Sector Transformation

2.0. Introduction The major social and economic changes observed in the forest sector over the study period are the starting point for analysis of forest policy change. The changes need to be described in order to set the stage for understanding the broader dimensions of the findings in subsequent chapters. Prominent among the forest sector changes are the influence of environmental ideas and values on forest management, the shift to sustainable forest management in the 1990s, the forest industry crisis that has been underway since 2004, the changing role of foresters and forest education and the downsizing of the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources. Always present is the complexity and interaction of the policy actors: ENGOS, the forest industry, the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, First Nations, and foresters. In the 1980s, the topics of interest with respect to the forest sector were mostly about sustained yield1 and security of long-term timber supply. The latter has remained an ongoing concern of the forest industry (Kimmins, 1997, 2nd edition; Luckert & Williamson, 2005). In the 1990s, the focus shifted to sustainable forest management, in recognition that the non-timber features and resources espoused by ENGOs were equally important to the needs of the forest industry (Adamowicz, Boxall, Luckert, Phillips, & White, 1996). In the 2000s, the forest sector expanded its focus on addressing biodiversity, ecosystem landscape management, the conservation of the Boreal (Greenpeace Canada, 2012) and enhancing the participation of First Nations and Indigenous communities in decisions made about forests (Fraser, 2002; Krott, 2005).

2.1. Environmentalism and Ecological Sustainability

2.1.1 History with forests. There is a long history between environmentalism and the forest sector. The founders of the early mainstream conservation movement were foresters such as Bernhard Fernow and Gifford Pinchot and deforestation was at the centre of the conservation paradigm.2 Another forester, Aldo Leopold, conceived of a land stewardship ethic that challenged the economic development priority and it has been influential since the 1940s on foresters, conservation biologists, and ecologists (Leopold, 1968 (1948 first

1 Central to the practice of forestry has been the European concept of sustained yield, which translated in Ontario into maximum allowable depletion (i.e., MAD) of planned harvests over long rotation ages. This concept has been blamed for the rationalization of overharvesting in forest management (Environmental Assessment Board of Ontario, 1994) and for viewing other forest users as mere constraints on extraction (Lawson, et al., 2001). 2 The environmental conservation movement in Canada began with lumbermen, farmers, and governments concerned about deforestation. Its inauguration was at the 1892 meetings of the American Forest Congress in Montreal and Cincinnati and reached its apex with the federal government’s Commission of Conservation in 1909- 1921 (MacDowell, 2012). Forest conservation in Ontario is associated with E.J. Zavitz. Appointed the second Provincial Forester in 1917, he began the provincial government’s tree planting operations and was regarded as the “father” of reforestation in Ontario (Gillis & Roach, 1986).

9 published); Steen, 1999). John Muir, a naturalist and writer, broke up the mainstream conservation movement to promote wilderness, in opposition to forest management, and was described as a ‘true preservationist’ (Lawson, Levy, & Sandberg, 2001). Modern environmentalism, whose beginnings date to the 1962 publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, concerning the harmful effects of pesticides on the environment, has situated forests in the wider concepts of protecting ecosystems and biodiversity, making all development sustainable, linking ecology to human health, and looking globally to solve environmental challenges such as climate change (Gore, 2006). “First generation” environmental policy was associated with “end- of- pipe” pollution abatement such as the Canadian forest industry example of government banning chlorine in the pulp and paper processes in the 1980s; contemporary environmental policies are associated with ecosystem planning, and are results oriented and more collaborative (VanNijnatten & Boardman, 2009). Environmental campaigns in the 1980s and 1990s, known as the “war of the woods” in Canada, attracted public opposition to clearcutting forests and the incursion of logging into wilderness areas of old growth forests. Most publicized were those in British Columbia3 such as the Walbran and Carmanah Valleys. At Clayoquot Sound in 1993, over 800 protesters were arrested in one of the largest acts of civil disobedience in Canadian history (Blake, Guppy N., & Urmetzer P., 1997). The international environmentalist campaigns focused public attention on tropical deforestation4 and then shifted to global climate change and biodiversity (Flannery, 2010; Monbiot, 2006), (Wilson, 2008). These issues then became associated with the boreal forest and endangered species, particularly northern caribou (Hummel & Ray, 2008) which are important ecological and political elements of Ontario’s forest policy. The public discussion about forest sustainability now involves discussion of the environmental concept that standing forests are as valuable, if not more so, than forest products (The Globe and Mail,

3 British Columbia is used as the standard against which other provinces’ forest policies are measured because of ENGO campaigns to protect coastal old growth forests and wilderness and the overwhelming importance of the forest industry to BC’s economy:

Table 2.0. Provincial Forest Industry Statistics. BC Quebec Ontario Population 4.6 8.2 13.6 Area harvested (annual hectares) 188,926 88,883 115,358 Volume harvested 68.8 29 12.6 (annual cubic metres) Value of domestic exports $11.5 $7.9 $3.6 ($billion 2013) Employment 58,300 71,400 43,800 Source: (Natural Resources Canada, 2012)

4 The global focus on the Amazon rainforest began in the 1980s and reached its height in the 1990s; in 2012 the international REDD partnership (Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) was formed with the objective of halving tropical deforestation in developing countries by 2050 (Astill, 2010).

2008). This conception involves economic analyses of the value of carbon retention and storage in forests to address climate change mitigation, and other non-timber ecological values and services such as recreation and wildlife habitat.

2.1.2. Philosophy and ethics and wilderness preservation. It is argued that the discipline of philosophy and its concern with ethics are needed in public discourse to assist in society’s pursuit of sustainable development (Stefanovic, 2000). In 1987 the Brundtland report Our Common Future broke new ground in introducing the concept of environmental sustainability: “Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). The Brundtland report acknowledged the perspective that environmental conditions are deteriorating and resource scarcity is looming. Subsequent United Nations activities, including the 1992 United Nations conference on the Environment and Development and the 2005 World Summit on Sustainable Development, identified sustainability goals to have three main pillars: environmental protection, social equality, and economic growth. This concept of sustainability has remained a guiding principle for many in the environmental movement and is the foundation for Ontario forest policy through the Crown Forest Sustainability Act (Ontario, 1994). The notion of a “three legged stool”- environmental, social, economic- to support sustainability has become the hallmark of Ontario forest policy. The value of human life in relation to the value of the non-human natural world was identified as one of the most important ethical and controversial questions for environmentalists (Curry, 2006; White, 1967). Among the environmental philosophies, such as ecofeminism (Mies & Shiva, 1993), ecophenomenology (Brown & Toadvine, 2003), and some aspects of conservation biology (Cox, 1997 ), one of the most powerful of the philosophies influencing the modern environmental perspective on nature and forests is Naess’ ecocentric-based Deep Ecology (Sessions, 1995). Deep ecologists promote social change that rejects anthropocentric (human-centred) uses for forests in favour of preserving forests for ecocentric (earth-centred) and biocentric (the value of life itself in all forms) values (M. Hessing, M. Howlett, & T. Summerville, 2005b; Naess & Rothenberg, 1989). ENGOs have promoted wilderness protection and preservation in Canada that is associated with the idea of the “wild” within the environmental movement. Wilderness is characterized to be “the biological ground of our being” (Shepard, 1998) and the basis of the concept of the “ecological footprint”.5 Associated with the concept of wilderness is the protection of old growth forests and this topic is explored

5 Rees’ concept of “ecological footprint” was built upon by the Earth Manifesto group who argued that the Earth’s maximum carrying capacity is 2 billion humans compared to the current population of about 7 billion, if natural resources and wild spaces are to be sustained (Curry, 2006).

11 at length in contemporary environmental writing in Canada and elsewhere (Suzuki & Grady, 2004) (Beresford-Kroeger, 2010). The collaboration of environmental and indigenous environmental ethics, the latter associated with traditional environmental knowledge (D. McGregor, 2002), was seen in the case of Haida Gwaii, formerly called the Queen Charlotte Islands, in BC. The Haida First Nation and environmentalists fought successfully from the 1970s to stop logging of old growth forests and then advocated for a wilderness area that eventually became Gwaii Haanas National Park Reserve and Haida Heritage Site in the 1990s, covering almost one-half the land base of the islands (Takeda & Ropke, 2010). The relationship between environmentalists and Aboriginal Peoples, and differences in their ethical frameworks, have also led to conflict in situations where environmentalists endorsed the preservation of wilderness in parks but First Nations were more focused on economic self-sufficiency and natural resources management (Wilson, 1998). In Ontario, parks have been the disputed ground for wilderness protection among the wilderness preservationists, who were perceived to be “urban elitists” (MacDowell, 2012); commercial loggers in provincial parks; and First Nations, whose communities were removed to make way for parks beginning with the creation of Algonquin Park in 1893 and continuing today as evidenced by the dispute over Ipperwash Park and the death of Dudley George (Forkey, 2012; Hedican, 2008). Having examined some of the concepts associated with ecological sustainability, and some of the origins of conflict over the value of wilderness and actively managed forests, it is now useful to explore the influence of environmental ideas on the opinions and values of the public and governments. The effects of environmental values on Ontario forest policy change are discussed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.

2.1.3. Public opinion and environmental values. Public awareness and concern about the environment and its appearance on the political agenda have been credited to the educational campaigns of environmentalists (Pelletier, Legault, & Tuson, 1996). At the same time explanations for rising and falling levels of environmental concern have identified the impact of postmaterialist values (Inglehart & Abramson, 1994),(Nordhaus & Schellenberger, 2006); the domination of economic concerns over environmental ones (Bakvis & Nevitte, 1992), although not always (Beltrame, 2009); and cognitive mobilization and health (Nevitte & Kanji, 1995). Being younger, better educated, urban and of left leaning political ideology were associated with increased environmental concern (D. E. Blake, 2001; Wall, 1995). How environmental concern translates into political outcomes is not well understood. Resources and the environment were described as being non-issues in the federal elections of 1988, 1993 and 1997 (Frizzell & Pammett, 1997). In the 1999 Ontario election, in which the Harris Conservative government won a second majority, the results of an Environics poll indicated that 33 per cent of Ontario voters identified health care as the single most important issue compared to less than one per cent who identified

12 the environment (McKenzie, 2002). In the Ontario election campaigns of 2003 and 2007, in which the McGuinty Liberals won majority governments, there was a “third wave” of public concern for the environment with air quality the leading issue and wilderness far behind. By 2011, when Premier McGuinty won a minority government, the economy was once again the public’s first concern (Winfield, 2012). In the 2014 election campaign won by the Wynne Liberals, environmental issues were hardly mentioned (Abacus Data Poll, 2013; Nanos, 2014), although the media reported on opposition to the Endangered Species and Far North legislation, issues that were salient in rural and northern Ontario. Despite criticisms about the absence of social scientists in forestry (Luckert, 2006), there is literature on the values and attitudes that stakeholders (Aboriginal Peoples, the forest industry, forest dependent communities and forest sector workers) hold towards forests and forest management (Beckley, Boxall, Just, & Wellstead, 1999; Lee & Kant, 2006). For example, the residents of single-industry resource towns are expected to have forest orientation values that are associated with jobs at risk (Blake, 2001) and are often, therefore, constrained from expressing environmental values, which they perceive to negatively affect job security (McFarlane & Hunt, 2006). Research done on Local Citizens’ Committees (LCCs), required for public consultation in forest management planning in northern Ontario since the Timber Class EA decision (Robson & Kant, 2007), indicated that their members are mostly middle aged males employed in natural resources (Hunt & McFarlane, 2007) and Aboriginal Peoples and ENGOs are not represented (Robson & Hunt, 2010). LCC members held more anthropocentric (i.e., utilitarian, human economic use) forest value orientations than did southern Ontarians, who were, in the words of those researchers, more “biocentric” (i.e., “forests have a right to exist for their own sake”) and are less likely to agree with economic use of forests (Hunt & McFarlane, 2002; McFarlane & Boxall, 2000). Southern Ontario residents were found to be the least supportive of natural resources development, to be the least knowledgeable about forest issues, and to be infrequent forest users (Hunt & McFarlane, 2002). In summary, environmental philosophies and ethics, and concepts such as wilderness preservation, appear to have influenced the public and government to think about the value of forests beyond economics. The urban public appears to be adopting environmental values. Public opinion is often supportive of the environment and sometimes the environment is a major political issue. The objective of the forest industry, harvesting trees in order to sell forest products at a profit, fundamentally contradicts the more ecocentric values introduced into the public discourse by environmental concepts. The onus, therefore, has been on the forest industry to develop and implement more sustainable forest management practices. The influence of environmental sustainability concepts on changes in the Ontario forest policy network is discussed in Chapter 6.

2.2. Sustainable Forest Management (SFM)

The Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) regime developed in Ontario and elsewhere in the 1990s was in response to the forestry practices criticized by environmentalists and the public and included: destruction of wilderness, logging of old growth forests, excessively large clear cuts, inadequate buffering of streamside riparian areas, inadequate regeneration, the absence of sound wildlife management standards, pesticide spraying, concepts of sustained yield that resulted in overcutting and regulations and legislation that favoured the forest industry, lax government oversight, and inadequate public participation (Bergeron, 2004) (Bourgeois et al., 2007). Governments came under pressure from environmentalists and the public to improve the forestry practices and impacts listed above (Howlett, 2001; Wellstead, Leslie, & Weetman, 2007). Ontario’s total land base is about 107.6 million hectares, of which about 85 per cent is Crown Land. Of Ontario’s total of 71 million hectares of forested land, almost 57 million hectares are Crown Land and of this amount, the SFM planning system applies to about 36 million hectares in the Area of the Undertaking, of which 27 million hectares is licensed, making it the primary land use and planning system for approximately one quarter of Ontario’s land base (Winfield, 2005) The implementation of sustainable forest management was assisted with the development of the Criteria and Indicators (C&I) approach of using mostly objective measurements of forest sustainability, stemming from federal government commitments at the 1992 United Nations-sponsored Rio Summit, the Montreal Process international working group, and the Canadian Council of Forest Ministers (Canadian Council of Forest Ministers, 2003). The finalization of Ontario’s C&I approach was reported in the 2001 State of the Forest Report. The SOFR is required to be submitted by the OMNR to the Legislative Assembly of Ontario every five years. The sustainable forest management policy regime introduced in Ontario in 1994 was described as the “new management paradigm to replace sustained yield” (Luckert, 2006). It was characterized as changing forest management from “management by exclusion to management by inclusion of stakeholders” (Kant and Lee, 2004). The role of government in forest management had shifted from being managers under the old Crown Timber Act to becoming forest stewards (Bourgeois, et al., 2007). This change involved regulating the forest industry as the preferred governmental policy instrument. Before the 1994 Crown Forest Sustainability Act (CFSA), the OMNR was responsible for the direct management of Ontario’s Crown forests, including regeneration; under the CFSA, however, licensed forest management companies became responsible for forest management planning and carrying out forest management operations. Twenty years later, through the CFSA’s forest management planning manual (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2014e) and other requirements, Ontario’s contemporary

14 forest policy framework continues to reflect the initiatives stemming from the policy and legislative activity of the 1990s (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 1994 2014g). Under the SFM regime, the forest industry assumed more costs for forest management planning (FMP), such as silviculture and road access, but problems arose when the industry was hit by a deep recession. The OMNR was then required to resume paying some of the costs such as regeneration through the Forestry Futures Trust and the Forest Regeneration Trust during the industry downturn (Ministry of Finance, 2011; Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 1999). The issues associated with the Ontario government’s obligation to manage and conserve Crown land forests, and the costs required to do so, have been contested since the 1800s: politicians have little incentive to invest money in projects such as regenerating forests whose benefits are decades beyond the electoral cycle (Kuhlberg, 2009). The government’s role in sustainable forest management was also influenced by the environmental community’s initiation of the Forest Stewardship Council’s certification process (Forest Stewardship Council, 2014). SFM certification in Canada was voluntarily accepted by the forest industry through the initiative of the Forest Products Association of Canada (FPAC). OMNR required forest companies to adopt one of the certification processes; additionally the Independent Forest Audit of the forest industry is required by the Crown Forest Sustainability Act and there have been complaints about the duplication of certification efforts (Ministry of Finance, 2011). Despite criticisms, for example, about potential conflict of interest with the compliance self- inspection system for annual operations by the forest industry (Winfield, 2005) and ensuring that the Forestry Renewal Trust and the Forestry Futures Trust are sufficiently funded (Office of the Auditor General of Ontario, 2011), the OMNR asserts in its State of the Forests Reports (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2006; Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2014j) and environmental assessment review (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2009) that Crown Land forests are being managed sustainably. Research by consultants found that Ontario was the only jurisdiction in Canada and the United States that requires a determination of sustainability in each forest management plan (ArborVitae Environmental Services & Koven, 2012). Ontario’s forest management regime has been described as being complex but also praised for being “the most comprehensive in Canada and instrumental in enabling many licensees to achieve Forest Stewardship Certification (FSC)” (Williams, Clark, & Wedeles, 2010). On the other hand, Ontario’s SFM regime has been criticized by the forest industry for being too costly and highly regulated. Some of the direct costs of FMP to the forest industry include producing a FM plan (forest management plans are required by the CFSA), which was estimated to cost over $1 million (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2013a). The plan period was moved back from five to 10 years. In addition, there are the costs of two audit processes. The Independent Forest Audit (Ontario

Ministry of Natural Resources, 2006 to 2011), which is paid for by the Forestry Futures Committee through the Forestry Futures Trust (funded by the forest industry and the OMNR), costs about $100,000 per audit every five years (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2014j). The forest companies pay for SFM certification audits.6 No comprehensive research has been reported on the overall costs involved for the forest industry to comply with the guides and guidelines in the FMPM that restrict industry operations regarding wildlife habitat and stream protection and species at risk, for example. The Minister’s Council on Forest Sector Competitiveness, however, concluded that while Ontario was the highest cost producer, it was energy and transportation/roads costs in northern Ontario that were the most significant factors compared to the costs for the forest industry operating in other jurisdictions (Millard, 2005).

2.3. Forest Industry Crisis Although the Ontario forest industry had survived depression before, and numerous recessions, including a significant one in 1992, the downturn experienced since 2004, beginning with pulp and paper and then extending into lumber, was described by the industry as “a perfect storm” and by government as “unprecedented” (Parfitt, 2006). No one anticipated how deep and long lasting the industry depression would be, but it had crippling effects on the Ontario forest industry. Statistics showing the effects of the forest industry crisis on employment, mill closures, harvest volume, and stumpage are found in Appendix 2 (p 193). In summary, northwestern Ontario disproportionately experienced more layoffs than other regions (Appendix Table 2.1). Pulp and paper companies experienced the greatest job loss, over 17,000 but some new job creation reduced this number to under 16,000 by 2013 (Appendix Table 2.1). The decline of Ontario forest industry employment is stark in the direct employment estimates of 80,744 workers in 1989 (Timber Class EA, p 28) compared to 48,300 in 2013. Sixty- nine mills had closed in northern Ontario by 2012 and Ontario accounted for about 25% of forest industry job loss across Canada (Appendix Table 2.2). The number of primary mills in Ontario declined from 68 in 2004 to 30 in 2012 (Appendix Table 2.3). Annual timber harvest volume was 17.8 million cubic meters in 1990 (Environmental Assessment Board of Ontario, 1994). It peaked to over 26 million cubic meters in 2000 and plummeted to 10.7 million cubic meters in 2011 (Appendix Table 2.4). As shown in Figure 1.2 in Chapter One, the stumpage paid by the Ontario forest industry declined from almost $300 million in 1997 to about $70 million in 2012. The factors associated with the industry’s crisis and decline, are multi-faceted and include: the

6 The frequency with which companies have to pay for third party forest certification audits depends on the forest certification standard they are certified to (FSC, SFI, or CSA). All three certification standards require an initial (one time) certification audit (which cost about $100,000 or more) and then annual surveillance costs (which cost about $20,000 to $25,000). FSC requires recertification audits every five years while CSA & SFI require recertification audits every 3 years (which cost about $60,000). Surveillance audits are not conducted in years where recertification audits are conducted (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2014b).

16 rising value of the Canadian dollar that eroded the profits of forest company exporters7 and discouraged new investments in upgrading mills; historically low investments and mill productivity;8 depressed commodity prices; oversupply of key markets in pulp and paper products by low cost competitors from emerging counties such as Brazil and decreasing demand for newsprint in the digital age; rising energy costs for hydro and fossil fuel that made Ontario’s delivered wood costs higher than Manitoba or British Columbia; the collapse in the US housing market impacting demand for Ontario lumber; the ongoing US- Canada softwood lumber disputes; concerns about wood supply and the reliability of Forest Resource Inventory (FRI); and the global recession (Parfitt, 2006) (Millard, 2005) (Mockler & Robichaud, 2011). The forest industry was historically at the locus of power in resource rich northern Ontario and at Queen’s Park and this remained true into the 1990s (Environmental Assessment Board of Ontario, 1994). In 1910, direct forest revenues in the form of stumpage charges paid by the Ontario forest industry contributed 30 per cent of total provincial revenues (Armson, 2001). In 2012, as shown in Chapter One, stumpage revenue was almost negligible. The concept of a “social license to operate” is relevant to an examination of the role of the forest industry in the Ontario policy network. It has been discussed as an outgrowth of corporate responsibility; for the natural resources sector, companies are expected to produce economic benefits to society while minimizing the environmental damage associated with their operations (Prno, 2013). The potential for communities to fail, as well as mills to go bankrupt, required a response from the McGuinty government and it eventually responded with over $1 billion in support, including loan guarantees that the industry claimed could not be used by their failing mills (Millard, 2005). Relevant to the argument in this dissertation is that some grants were given to forest companies that later failed, but there was no significant attempt by the McGuinty government to keep mills operating, as was the case with the Rae government’s assistance for Tembec to begin purchasing the failing Spruce Falls mill in the early 1990s (Rae, 2006). Associated with the support of the forest industry, the McGuinty government also funded other initiatives that would help create jobs for northerners, such as expanding northern highways, promoting emerging technologies for the Northern Ontario Heritage Fund Corporation, and for telemedicine and hospitals (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2006).

7 The Ontario industry has traditionally depended on commodity exports of softwood lumber and pulp and paper to markets in the United States and for every one cent gain the Canadian dollar makes over the US dollar, the Ontario forest industry loses $80 million annually (Parfitt, 2006). 8 The results of an analysis of Ontario’s value added wood products potential warned that the Ontario sawmill industry needed to invest in higher value kiln dried lumber, engineered wood and building components, if they were to remain competitive (Woodbridge, 2003). The results of another study showed that Quebec provided more wood to Ontario value added wood processors such as furniture, manufactured housing and others, than did Ontario itself (Manson & Rose, 2005, November/December).

Job loss is magnified in northern Ontario’s remote and resource-dependent communities where well-paying jobs are scarce: the OMNR reported that more than 200 communities in northern Ontario remain dependent on the forest industry for employment (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2014a). Despite the downturn, the forest industry is still important to the Ontario economy, as it remains a significant employer in northern Ontario. Before the recession, the forestry sector supported almost 200,000 direct and indirect jobs across 260 Ontario communities. Employees and businesses pay taxes that sustain tax bases in northern municipalities and its exports made it a major contributor to provincial balance of trade, second only to auto exports. In 2011, Statistics Canada estimated the value of the Ontario forests products sector to be $11.9 billion, with over $4 billion dollars in exports mostly to the US (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2014a). In 2013, the Canadian forest industry was projecting the hiring of 60,000 new workers over the next seven years, a change from the “dark decade” when the sector was described as a “basket case” (Marotte, 2013). ENGOs called for the forest industry to focus on higher value products requiring less wood than pulp and paper in order to reduce its footprint in the forest (von Mirbach & Johnson, 2009). Transformation of the forest industry has involved investigation of higher value products such as biomass for bioenergy, and for biochemicals associated with new materials such as cellulose-based nanofibres and specialty dissolving pulp used in rayon (FPInnovations, 2014; Mockler & Robichaud, 2011). The forest industry crisis occurred across Canada and the Forest Products Association of Canada (FPAC) advocated for, and received, federal government assistance to encourage investment in the emerging bio-economy (Lazar, 2009). FPAC was quoted as saying “the sector wants smart help from Ottawa, not massive bailouts” (Marotte & Ebner, 2008) (Natural Resources Canada & NRCan, 2013). In summary, the ripples from the decline of the industry, which was described in 1988 to be the “economic engine” of northern Ontario (Environmental Assessment Board of Ontario, 1994), have been experienced not only by struggling mill towns and restructuring (AbitibiBowater in 2008), bankruptcy protection (Tembec in 2008), and bankruptcies (Grant Forest Products in 2009) of forest product companies, but also in the broader forest sector (Taylor, 2008). The economic decline of the Ontario forest industry is associated with the industry’s loss of influence with government and within the Ontario forest policy network. The forest industry has complained that the three legged stool of sustainability- environmental, social and economic- has been “ grossly out of balance for the last 10 years” with government focusing too much on ecological objectives (Grech, 2009).

2.4. Reinventing the Profession and Forestry Education Foresters and their profession have been identified as important policy actors with disproportionate influence over forest policy decisions (May, 2005; Wilson, 1998) and “overwhelming

18 political importance in determining policy over the large majority of Ontario’s forest lands” (Lawson, et al., 2001). The identification of foresters with industrial forestry models (Luckert, 2006) has been criticized and the incorporation of too few non-utilitarian values in forest management systems by foresters has also been examined (Jonasse, 1995). Crucial among the factors influencing government is “the distribution of power among various types of actors over policy outcomes” (Hoberg, 1996). Foresters were active participants in policymaking and exerted an influence on how government made forest policy decisions. Since 1988 Ontario professional foresters have experienced significant change that challenges the perception of their power in forest policy decisions. The changes are associated with legislative requirements, trends toward a declining and more diverse membership, declining enrolment in forestry education and negative public reputation. With the passage of the Professional Foresters Act, 2000, the Ontario Professional Foresters’ Association (OPFA), which was founded in 1957, became a self-regulating profession in Ontario, with responsibility for licensing and disciplining Registered Professional Foresters (R.P.F.s).9 Under this legislation, R.P.Fs are required to consider the public interest in Ontario’s forests and are held publicly accountable for their decisions and actions. The OPFA has experienced difficulties in pursuing unlawful practice by non-licensed foresters, an issue that weakens its credibility with its members.10 The following graph shows the decline in members over the study period of this research, with a trend of even faster decline predicted because Ontario professional foresters are aging: about 65 per cent of the members in 2012 were age 49 or older (Ontario Professional Foresters' Association, 1988-2013). If the OPFA cannot recruit younger members, it will become irrelevant.

9 Originally incorporated in 1957, the OPFA advocated for self-regulated professional status at the Timber Class Environmental Assessment hearings (1988-1994); and the Class EA approval made foresters central to the planning process by requiring R.P.F.s to approve forest management plans and prescriptions. The Crown Forest Sustainability Act of 1995 created a “monopoly” for positions in forest management planning on Crown lands requiring the participation and approval of registered professional foresters, thereby laying the groundwork for the public accountability that followed with legislation for a regulated profession (Bourgeois, et al., 2007). The OPFA became one of 34 self-regulating professions in Ontario, with responsibility for licensing and disciplining members with the passage of the Professional Foresters Act, 2000. Its members became subject to professional standards of practice and adherence to a Code of Ethics (Irland, 1994). The OPFA has been advocating for more regulation of other natural resource professionals (Ontario Professional Foresters' Association, 2010). 10 The number of foresters employed by the OMNR in the 1980s was estimated to be 178 (Environmental Assessment Board of Ontario, 1994) compared to about the same number, 175 OMNR foresters, in 2012. Not all foresters employed by the OMNR are R.P.F.s, however, and this has been a source of contention between the ministry and the OPFA. Unauthorized practice is an important issue for R.P.Fs. At the time of the Timber Class EA hearings, it was estimated that about 30 per cent of foresters in Ontario were not members of the Ontario Professional Foresters Association (Environmental Assessment Board of Ontario, 1994). The OPFA grappled with this issue by attempting to use persuasion; however, it changed course and pursued its first application in court against an individual for unauthorized practice: the OPFA lost when its application was dismissed by the court (Ontario Professional Foresters Association, 2014a).

Figure 2.1: Ontario Professional Foresters’ Association Membership

1000

950

900

850

800

1993 1995 2006 2008 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 No. of Members

About 35 per cent of registered professional foresters in Ontario were traditionally employed by industry, another 35 per cent employed by government. By 2003, before the forest industry crisis, 32 per cent were employed by industry and 21 per cent by government. More foresters are being employed as consultants and by environmental and other non-governmental organizations (Ontario Professional Foresters' Association, 1988-2013). This trend suggests decreasing influence by professional foresters on forest policy through their employment in government and industry but perhaps more influence through ENGO employment. The problems experienced in forestry education over the study period are associated with some of the same challenges facing the foresters’ profession. For example, the Faculty of Forestry at the University of Toronto, the first forestry school in Canada founded in 1907, has experienced a challenging relationship with university administrators (Kuhlberg, 2009) (Bradshaw, 2011) who call for transformation of forestry education.11 Decline over the last 15 years in forestry schools’ enrolment is a phenomenon observed in countries with large forest industries, including Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States. Some of the factors associated with fewer students entering forestry programs were the public’s negative views of the forest industry and foresters and demographic trends associated with urbanization (T. Smith & Koven, 2010).

11 The forestry profession, as represented at the national level by the Canadian Federation of Professional Foresters Associations and the Canadian Forestry Accreditation Board, has responded to negative trends in forestry school enrollment by engaging with the Deans of the Association of University Forestry Schools of Canada to make changes to the accreditation of university forestry programmes. This was done by developing new competencies required in the practice of contemporary professional forestry and to accredit non-traditional forestry programmes. The first two Masters’ degree programmes have recently been accredited under the new competencies: Sustainable Forest Management at the Faculty of Forestry, University of British Columbia and Forest Conservation at the Faculty of Forestry, University of Toronto.

The decline of foresters’ reputations has been associated with factors such as foresters’ own perceptions of their “omnipotence” in managing forests rather than working for society’s vision of forests, the public’s dissatisfaction with forest management quality and the growing development of multidisciplinary approaches to land management (Luckert, 2006). Foresters have complained that the public’s perception of lumber jacks and forestry as a low technology sector has not kept pace with the skills of foresters in science and technology and contemporary forestry careers (Interim National Recruitment Strategy Steering Committee, 2006 ).

2.5. Transformation of the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources The dual mandate of the OMNR for both forest management and forest preservation and conservation has been criticized for its conflicting priorities as opposed to being praised for its multiple management objectives. It was asserted that OMNR’s responsibility to supply wood for industry has ‘limited and contained the interests of environmentalists, including forest preservation and tension is growing between the traditional industry-governmental forest interests ( i.e., perpetual revenues) and preservationist ones (i.e., “the delights of the primitive”) (Lawson, et al., 2001) p280-281. Similarly, the OMNR has a complicated mandate in aggregate extraction: the OMNR is charged with protecting the provincial interest in securing low cost, future supplies of sand and gravel for the construction industry but it also has legislative and regulatory responsibilities for controlling the environmental impacts of mining aggregate (Baker, Slanz, & Summerville, 2001). Some light was shed on the conflicting mandate and perceived division of resources within the OMNR between forest management and forest preservation and conservation in 2009 with the McGuinty government’s decision to transfer the forestry business and economic functions to the Ontario Ministry of Northern Development, Mines (OMNDM) with the science and ecology functions remaining in the OMNR. The commercial side of forestry involved the eventual transfer of only 86 OMNR staff (presumably the other 3,000 plus employees were seen to be on the ecological side of forestry (Lindsay & West, 2009). The re-organization process was reversed in 2011, suggesting that it was poorly conceived. Then Minister of MNDM Michael Gravelle said that it “may have been the many forest contractors protest signs waving outside… his Thunder Bay office over the past months that prompted the Premier to make the changes” (The Working Forest, 2009). The OFIA had initially supported the idea because the OMNDM and Gravelle himself were seen to be promoters of economic development but two years into the experiment, the forest industry supported moving all forestry functions back into OMNR because it had to deal with “two sets of government bureaucracies with different sets of priorities” (Grech, 2011, fall). Following her election win on June 11, 2014, Premier Wynne announced that the OMNR would be changed again into the Ministry of Natural Resources and added Forestry to its name, reflecting, perhaps,

21 the complaints of the forest industry for more attention to their file. Natural Resources Minister Mauro described the change as a way for the Premier “to highlight the importance of forestry, certainly to northerners and as a government, we take it very seriously" (CBCnews, 2014). Another policy factor associated with OMNR’s conflicted mandate is its relationship with Aboriginal policy agencies. When the Rae government, which was motivated to initiate land claim and self-government processes, took power in 1990, the Office of Indian Resource Policy was taken out of the OMNR and combined with the Ontario Native Affairs Directorate to form an upgraded Ontario Native Affairs Secretariat (ONAS). The OMNR was characterized as having a more “detached” view as compared to ONAS’ role of representing the interests of Aboriginal Peoples (Malloy, 2001a). A Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs was established in 2007 but it is not apparent that there has been an improvement in serving the needs of Indigenous Peoples in Ontario. It was recognized in the 1980s that governments could not afford ever escalating public spending on programs that had proliferated since the 1960s and in a setting of predictions of a shrinking state. With relevance to forest policy, the Ontario Environmental Commissioner reported over the years on spending cuts disproportionately directed at the budgets of the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Ministry of the Environment and their impacts as government attempts to pay for burgeoning health care and education costs that account for almost 70 per cent of annual expenditures. The combined budgets of the two ministries are less than one per cent: a figure which lags behind other provinces (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2012 Sept 19). More often, the Environmental Commissioner of Ontario has also been highly critical of the OMNR’s performance.12 It was the Harris government’s “Common Sense Revolution” (Bradford, 2003) that entailed budget cuts that shrank the staff of the OMNR by almost half, from 6000 to about 3500 in 1995-1996 (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2007). OMNR’s staff strength in 2013 was about 3,700 (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2014h). The OMNR continued to experience spending cuts, including the McGuinty government’s plans to reduce OMNR’s budget by $65 million (or about 13 per cent of the approximately $700 million 2012 OMNR budget) in 2012 to 2015 (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2012) as announced in the Budget Act, 2012 (Commission on the Reform of Ontario's Public Services, 2012). The OMNR was also influenced by public sector reforms. During the decentralization movement in the 1980s, the “head” offices moved to Sault St. Marie and Peterborough, effectively isolating many

12 The Environmental Commissioner of Ontario was critical of the OMNR’s performance as outlined in his 2001 publication, A Special Report to the Legislative Assembly of Ontario: Broken Promises: MNR’s Failure to Safeguard Environmental Rights (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2001); the 2001/2002 annual report Developing Sustainability, in which OMNR is criticized for neglecting to develop a biodiversity strategy to protect boreal woodland caribou, among other species; and the 2012 annual report Losing Touch, where OMNR was described as a chronic offender for refusing to post important proposals on the Environmental Registry.

OMNR staff from Queen’s Park. The Harris government introduced a “New Public Management” approach, in conjunction with budget cuts, to improve efficiency and effectiveness in delivering public services. The objective was for government to be primarily concerned with “steering” public policy by setting broad directions for non-governmental organizations who would then carry out the “rowing” work of implementation (Winfield, 2005) p 253.

2.6. Summary The social and economic changes experienced by the forest sector provide the background to this research and inform the research questions concerning Ontario’s public policy on Crown Land forests. The changes observed in the forest sector over two decades are associated with the environmental movement, including the public consciousness raising “war of the woods” campaigns, the appeal of environmental ethics in sustainable development and the value of wilderness protection to the public and governments, and the concept of the environment as an election issue. Ontario governments and the forest industry have responded to the environmental discourse beginning in the 1990s with the implementation of Sustainable Forest Management. In 2004, the forest industry began experiencing an unprecedented financial and market recession that lasted ten years. An outcome of the industry crisis is the adverse impact on its formerly close relationship with government. The industry was critical of the Ontario government for not providing the assistance it expected for its bankrupt mills and for promoting environmental values over economic ones. The Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources faced criticism from the environmental community for its support for the forest industry. The OMNR also experienced ongoing budget cuts that cut its staff by almost 50 per cent in the mid-1990s and have continued into 2014. The pattern of government spending cuts suggests weaker political support for the forestry sector, and more pressure on the OMNR to change.

Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework

3.1. Introduction This dissertation explores how governments make decisions concerning Crown Land forests, specifically the forest policy decisions of six Ontario governments since 1988. The central premise of this research is that the network interactions among the major policy actors in Ontario forest policy, government, industry and the foresters they employ, Aboriginal Peoples and the ENGOS, have affected forest policy decisions. Changes in the membership of the policy network and interactions among its members have produced policy changes that are tantamount to a paradigm shift in the goals of Ontario forest policy and the nature of the network interactions. This chapter discusses the policy network approaches, specifically the Dialectical Model of Policy Networks (Toke & Marsh, 2003) that were used to investigate network and policy changes and their association with paradigm policy change.

3.2. Policy Network and Policy Change Concepts Policy networks have been defined as a model for conceptualizing the relationship between state and non-state actors in the policy process or, in other words, a model of “state-interest group intermediation” (Skogstad, 2008 p. 205). Researchers in the United States had conceptualized the interactions of policy actors occurring within an “iron triangle” of political, bureaucratic, and business interests that were stable and insulated from outside pressure (Pal, 2006 p. 239-241). Hugh Heclo was credited with coining the concept of “issue networks” in 1978 to describe the fragmentation of power and expertise from government agencies in Washington to new players in the policy process such as interest groups, industry associations, and think tanks (Jordan & Maloney, 1997). Research based on regional development in Europe conceived of the role of the state in policy networks to be empowering stakeholders and facilitating cooperation among them, an approach which was described as “multilevel governance” and raised concerns about accountability in democratic government as the non-state networks take on roles that were previously done by elected governments (Ansell, 2000). Canadian scholars contributed to the literature on policy networks with examination of the relationship of key societal actors at the meso level (sectors of the economy) and categorized six types of policy networks (Atkinson & Coleman, 1989). Canadian researchers have also contributed to the literature on the impacts of transnationalism on domestic politics and paradigm policy change (Skogstad & Schmidt, 2011). Given the complex relationships between the Canadian and United States’ forest industry and ENGOs, and the shift towards environmental concerns globally, the impact of international and transnational factors was identified as a salient factor in the analysis of the Ontario forest policy network. There was caution about some theoretical models having been developed primarily to apply to the United States, where the pluralist system contrasted with the concentration of power in a

24 parliamentary system of government and differences between policy networks in the two countries (Montpetit, 2005; Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Further, there was a large body of British and German literature on policy networks that was associated with issues of governance and internationalization; the latter was distinguished by its “institutionalized, often non-hierarchal, exchanges between the state and civil society actors” (Ansell, 2000; Borzel, 1998). Critics of policy network analysis have viewed it as being more of a “metaphor” for cataloguing different types of networks and failing to develop as a theory (i.e., developing and testing formal, predictive models). This failure was attributed to the researchers being focused on the properties of the network members (i.e. capacities of individual actors ) rather than the characteristics of the network (i.e. ideas and belief systems, power relations between the actors) (Dowding, 1995). The concept that policy networks should represent social capital concerning civic engagement and the norms of reciprocity and trust has been examined in the context of local organizations and collective action problems such as watershed management (Lubell & Fulton, 2007). The research that was referenced for social capital include Ostrom’s work (Ostrom, 1990, 1994) on Common-Pool Resources (CPRs), which analyzed numerous communities around the world that have successfully self- organized to sustain their forest, lands, and water resources, and Putnam’s study (Putnam, 2000) on the depletion of social capital (i.e., “social norms and networks that enhance people’s ability to collaborate on common endeavours”) associated with declining civic life in the US. The role played by ideas and interests in public policy making was examined through research on four Canadian federal policy sectors, transportation, trade, education and banking. Each sector has policy subsystems involving a discourse community of the larger set of actors who have some knowledge and construct a policy discourse, and they interact with an interest network, which is a subset of participants who are policy makers (Howlett, 2002). The type of subsystem structure was found to be related to policy change. For example, the degree of insulation of the discourse community from the interest network is a significant factor in understanding the movement of ideas. The change in the episteme or knowledge base of ideas results in policy change. Paradigmatic policy change, discussed below, occurs only when new ideas and interests penetrate policy subsystems.

3.3. Policy Actors and Types of Networks Policy actors have been prominent and easily identifiable in Ontario’s forest policy. The government agents include the Premier, his or her political staff and the Cabinet, the bureaucrats at the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources (OMNR), which include all civil servants working for the ministry from the broad strategic/policy decision makers, such as the deputy minister, assistant deputy ministers and directors, to operational civil servants such as managers and foresters. Non-state actors are most

25 prominently the forest industry and its Ontario Forest Industry Association, ENGOs, and Aboriginal Peoples. The latter groups and individuals are discussed in Chapter 6.1.1. The early Canadian typology (Skogstad, 2008) began with the concept of dividing the policy community into the sub-government and the attentive public. The former comprised small and static “specialized publics” within a specific policy sector and included the Minister, senior government officials and key “institutionalized” interest groups in the sector. The attentive public was a loose constellation of public and private actors who were affected by or interested in the policies of specific agencies; the attentive public might attempt to influence but did not participate in policy making on a regular basis. The demand for change originated from the attentive public’s constant critique of sub-government (Pross, 1986). Subsequent research described the policy network as “capturing the power relationship” among the actors in the sub-government of the policy community (W Coleman & Skogstad, 1990). This conception of the power relationship distinguishes between the policy actors who actively engage in policy change and those who are less involved. The latter are described as the policy community of actors with varying degrees of interest and less influence over policy change than the more powerful actors in the sub-government. This structural approach devised a typology of policy networks determined by state capacity, state (bureaucratic) autonomy and the organizational development of interests across sectors and three types of networks were identified, state-directed networks, clientele pluralist networks and corporatist networks (W Coleman & Skogstad, 1990). The British typology defined the policy community to be a particular kind of policy network that is “integrated, stable and exclusive” as compared to the other end of a continuum in which issues networks comprise “loosely connected, multiple and other conflict-ridden members.” The British typology developed by Marsh and Rhodes (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992) became the most widely referenced among researchers (Skogstad, 2008). Research on policy cycles and subsystems, mentioned above, also stress the relationship between attentive public members and those who make up the policy network (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). Four types of policy-community configurations were identified; one of which was the “fractious community”, which was described as best characterizing the Canadian forest policy community where there was a dominant set of ideas but a split between those in the network and those in the policy community. An issue central to Ontario forest policy is how new policy actors, such as the ENGOs and Aboriginal Peoples, might break into the network and policy network approaches are useful in understanding these changes. One policy regime analysis examined the “interactions existing among institutions, actors and ideas that tend to congeal into relatively long-term, institutionalized, patterns of policy and policy-making” (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). The results of that analysis identified new policy actors entering Canadian forest policy communities and networks (i.e., non-timber businesses such as

26 fishers and tourist operators, ideologically committed environmentalists and the First Nations). These new forest policy actors challenged the “dominant set of ideas” arising from policy experiments with integrated resource management in the 1970s and 1980s, and ecosystem management in the 1980s and the 1990s. It was concluded that Canadian forest policy was a closed business-government network characterized by “a quasi-corporatist Canadian timber management policy style” (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). Over a similar time period, research on the government’s policy on the sand and gravel industry concluded that the OMNR and the aggregate industry were successful in pushing Ontario municipalities out of the core of the policy network (Baker, et al., 2001). It was also noted that the network became more pluralist after legislation in 1989 that addressed the environmental and social impacts of aggregate extraction. The establishment of forest science through forestry education in Canada and the “growing ascendancy” of professional foresters in the bureaucracy during the 1950s, were identified as one explanation for over-harvesting and other forest management practices that historically favoured the needs of industry over those of conservationist and preservationist policies. The industrial-government interests, as the Ontario forest policy network was described, were the “principal promoters and users of Crown lands” and their dual goal was to extract as much fibre from the forest as possible while viewing other forest users as mere constraints on extraction” (Lawson et al., p. 281). Early work on the concept of policy networks identified the major dimensions of policy networks to include the number and type of actors, the function of the network, the structure of the policy network, the degree of institutionalization, the rules of conduct, the power relations, and actor strategies (Van Waarden, 1992). The role of bureaucrats, and the tools they use, in managing policy networks has been examined on the dimensions of synthesizing relations, activating/deactivating participation, manipulating knowledge and belief structures (i.e., framing) and increasing/decreasing resources. Researchers caution that if network managers ignore the social, political, and economic context in which the network operates, they will fail (Rethemeyer & Hatmaker, 2007). One approach related to policy networks, the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), which emphasizes the role of ideas more than the policy network approach, has been applied to resource management and environmental problems and the actors in the policy subsystem who coalesced around their development. Originally introduced by Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith in 1988, the ACF tried to explain the process of policy change by considering the role of beliefs, the mobilization of information, and the power struggles among competing interests of the state and non-state actors in the policy process (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). The key elements of the ACF are: that belief systems (which are slow to change among policy elites) are more important than institutional affiliations; that policy

27 change is a function of the competition of the advocacy coalitions within the policy subsystem; and major policy shifts are caused by policy learning and events external to the policy community (major perturbations). Ontario foresters and other natural resource professionals are experts in forest science; the interests of groups of scientific experts have been conceived as epistemic communities and discourse coalitions. Epistemic communities were defined to be a network of professionals, usually scientists, with recognized expertise and “an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area”. They were distinguished from interest groups because they share “causal beliefs” and “cause and effect understandings” (Haas, 1992 p. 18). The Ontario Professional Foresters Association, however, is identified in this dissertation to have been a major forest policy actor beyond the scientific expertise of its members. With the ACF approach, foresters could also be seen as policy participants in “mature” policy subsystems, who “regard themselves as a semi-autonomous community who share an expertise in a policy domain and who have sought to influence public policy in that domain for an extended period” (Sabatier & Weible, 2007 p. 192). The technical norms and the scientific education required to conduct forest management were identified as professional barriers that excluded the participation of ENGOs, for example, in the forest policy network and limited change to the dominant policy infrastructure (Wellstead, Davidson, & Stedman, 2006). The persistence of policy communities or sub-governments is relevant to Ontario forest policy because many of the same individuals and organizations had been associated with it for 25 years. Research on this topic suggests a number of characteristics associated with network stability, although it was recognized that networks have become increasingly open since the 1980s: civil servants and network members were “bound together in a web of interdependencies” involving information, consent, and assistance; there were attempts to accommodate new actors, unless they were seen as making illegitimate demands; and while conflict existed, bargaining and accommodation continued (Jordan & Maloney, 1997 p. 570-580). Research also suggests that it is unlikely that a single policy community can manage policy change and that different policy communities might be active at different stages of the policy process (W. Coleman & Perl, 1999). This insight raises the issue of examining the influence of other policy communities and networks related to the Ontario forest policy network. Forest policy networks have been examined in explaining how North American forest products companies responded to external pressures for increased environmental protection through sustainable forest management certification. Companies that chose to acquiesce to pressure for environmental improvements were identified to be clientele-pluralist networks (i.e., the state’s bureaucratic agency had a dependent relationship with a sectoral-level business association) and legal coercion (i.e., strong legislation and regulation) was the policy tool selected by the state in dealing with these companies

(Cashore & Vertinsky, 2000). The researchers recommended future study of pressure-pluralist or other non-business dominated policy networks, which were acknowledged to have become more typical since the 1990s, and to investigate the relationship between high compliance by companies and encouraging corporate “green innovation”.

3.4. Dialectical Model of Policy Networks

The dialectical (i.e., defined by the authors to be dynamic and interactive)13 model of policy networks (Marsh & Smith, 2000c), is built on an earlier structural model of interest group intermediation (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992), and was applied in a case study of the genetically modified (GM) crops controversy in Britain (Toke & Marsh, 2003). As discussed below, the Dialectical Model of Policy Networks offers the advantage of understanding network transformation and it was used in this dissertation to analyze Ontario forest policy change. The Dialectical Model of Policy Networks (the model) uses an analysis of the interactions between relationships: the network structure and the policy actors, the network and its political, socio-economic and knowledge context, and the network and policy outcomes. These are displayed in Figure 3.1.

13 Marsh and Smith’s definition of ‘dialectical’ has been criticized as being too conservative and restricted to a broad concept of interaction while ignoring other dimensions (Evans, 2001).

Figure 3.1: Dialectical Policy Network and Policy Outcomes Model

Casual influence Feedback

Marsh & Smith, 2000 Toke & Marsh, 2003

The Dialectical Model of Policy Networks, particularly its application to the GM policy network case study, offered relevant insights into this research on the Ontario forest policy network. The application of the Dialectical Model of Policy Networks to the three research questions examined in this dissertation was depicted in Figure 1.3 in Chapter 1. The model conceives of policy networks to be political structures that can change. Network structures reflect the “institutionalization of power relations” inside the network and within the broader context in which it operates; the latter is discussed in Chapter 6.2. Network structures define the role of policy actors, the issues discussed, sets of rules and organizational imperatives. As mentioned earlier, policy outcomes in this dissertation are defined as a course of action or inaction chosen by Ontario governments to address a given problem or interrelated set of problems concerning Ontario’s public Crown land forests (Pal, 2006). Both the GM and the Ontario forest policy case studies were concerned with the changing influences of network actors such as conflict between environmentalists and a strong industry lobby, shifts in the strategies of political, and bureaucratic actors and their political negotiations, environmental regulation and ideas about the value of biodiversity, controversy among scientific experts and the role of public opinion. While there have been criticisms of the model, the following discussion identifies its utility in examining Ontario forest policy.14 Another strength of the model is that it requires identification of the wide range of interests of policy actors that are found in Ontario forest policy, such as government (politicians and bureaucrats in natural resources/agriculture and environmental portfolios), a large industry, and numerous ENGOs. Importantly, the dialectical policy model raises questions, as did the Canadian typology, about identifying and examining policy actors that are excluded from the policy network and this was relevant to the position of Aboriginal Peoples in Ontario forest policy. Further, the Dialectical Model of Policy Networks focused on groups and individuals as actors in the network structure. This is useful in examining Ontario forest policy where the Ministry of Natural Resources, the Ontario Forest Industry Association, the Ontario Professional Foresters’ Association, and ENGOS such as World Wildlife Fund and CPAWS-Wildlands League, were engaged policy actors representing large numbers of members who could not otherwise be captured in the analysis. It also made a case for the exceptional position of Ministers and other politicians who can be responsive to the industry, for example, or the ENGOs and their ability to change policy.

14 The Dialectical Model of Policy Networks was criticized for failing to show how the model should be used to guide research, for the unexplained inclusion of the innate skill of the policy actors, and for assumptions that actors’ skills, learning, perceptions of resources, and bargaining can be known and that all the relationships are of equal value (Raab, 2001). The model was also criticized for the lack of attention paid to the role of ideas in explaining policy making (Kisby, 2007).

Another advantage of the Dialectical Model of Policy Networks is that it focuses on the context of political constraints/opportunities that affect the network as well as the economic context. This is relevant in Ontario forest policy, as discussed in Chapter 2, where government budget cuts and industry recession have been experienced. The model also considers how the network affects policy outcomes and, in turn, the effect of policy outcomes on the network. This “iterative” process of policy change is relevant to Ontario forest policy in which the legislative and regulatory outcomes appear to have changed from 1988 to the present, as they did in the GM crops case. The latter used the British typology in which the policy network changed from a stable policy community of government and industry agents and interests to an environmental protection policy network representing more diverse interests (Rhodes, 1990). The Dialectical Model of Policy Networks seeks to overcome the theoretical debate on whether policy actors or network structure is more determinative of policy change. For this purpose, the model attempts to combine four approaches to policy networks- rational choice, personal interaction, formal network analysis, and the structural approach- to build a definition that integrates network structure and network agency or interaction (Marsh & Smith, 2000c). The model seeks to define the actors’ roles, the issues they discuss or dispute, and if there are any rules and pressures to maintain the network. The model relies on Hay’s proposition that agency and structure are not necessarily oppositional; he asserts that policy actors are “crucial” with respect to policy making because structures do not change unless agents act (Hay, 2002; Hay & Wincott, 1998; Skogstad, 2008). This perspective was instructive for Ontario forest policy change and broadened the analysis of numerous agency and structure-related factors relevant to the Ontario network. The structural power of industry is important in understanding political changes associated with environmental issues such as forestry and this is acknowledged throughout the dissertation. There is agreement in the political and environmental literature that government and business have a privileged relationship because of the former’s dependence on the latter’s ability to provide jobs and other economic benefits. Consequently industry has guaranteed access to government policy makers that ENGOs have not shared. Macdonald points out that business also pursues legitimacy goals in society and does not always achieve its objectives in environmental policy through adaptation and intervention strategies. He concludes, nevertheless, that “environmentalism has never gained sufficient political power to threaten their dominant social position” (Macdonald, 2007). The issue of contingency is also relevant to policy network theory: policy actors change their position in the network for many reasons and it needed to be acknowledged in this dissertation. For example, an election can trigger a policy shift resulting from the introduction of a new government with new policy ideas, or a shift in the current balance of power can be the catalyst for determining the

32 outcome of a policy process years later (Bressers & O'Toole, 1998). Another definition of contingency is “relatively small events, if they occur at the right moment, can have large and enduring consequences” (Pierson, 2000b). The Dialectical Model of Policy Networks emphasizes the importance of the changing resources of network agents, including their skills and learning and talents and strategies and tactics. This was identified as important in understanding Ontario forest policy, especially given the long, 25-year study period. Consequently, it is possible to observe extensive network interaction, the honing of political and technical skills and the policy learning of the Ontario forest policy actors.

3.5. Policy Paradigm Change The nature of the policy change experienced in Ontario forest policy is described here as a paradigm change and it involves a change in actors’ social learning and a change in the interpretive framework, including policy goals. Policy paradigm change is associated with policy actors’ social learning in response to “past experience and new information” (Hall, 1993 p. 278). It is also associated with changes in fundamental ideas and beliefs (p. 289) and it is often triggered by policy failures.15 Hall defined policy paradigms to be “interpretive frameworks” in which normal policy making is carried out by policymakers within a setting of ideas and standards that are taken for granted. Two types of policy changes can occur that are within the normal range: policy instrument settings, an example in forest management is the level of stumpage tax charged for timber harvest, and the policies themselves. The “third order of change”, however, is the unusual and infrequent situation of paradigm policy change involving a radical shift in ideas and beliefs into a new policy discourse. These ideas and beliefs associated with a policy discourse have been described as normative (i.e., appropriate standards of behavior; what the policy goals should be) and cognitive or epistemic (i.e., what constitutes knowledge and legitimate expertise) (Skogstad & Schmidt, 2011 p. 9). Theoretically, it is useful to recall why critical junctures are important in policy change because the argument in this dissertation relies on analyzing key legislative and regulatory events that represent important turning points in Ontario forest policy. Critical junctures in paradigm policy change are described by Hall to represent “disjunctive…periodic discontinuities” and policy experimentation and policy failure (Hall, 1993 p. 279). For epistemic communities, Haas defined critical junctures to be “crises that challenge its ability to provide advice” (Haas, 1992 p. 33). Sabatier defined critical junctures to be external shocks or perturbations such as economic recession that can lead to replacement of the previously dominant advocacy coalition (Sabatier & Weible, 2007).

15 Hall borrowed the concept of paradigm change from Thomas Kuhn’s (1970) seminal work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, and applied it to public policy change (Skogstad & Schmidt, 2011).

In the context of Canadian forest policy, the ideal but as yet unattained paradigm shift in British Columbia was defined to be the abandonment of the goal of commodity production levels (i.e., Allowable Annual Cut) as the central focus of forest policy in favour of maintaining healthy forest ecosystems, with fiber being the output, not the input of forest planning (Lertzman, Rayner, & Wilson, 1996). The BC government’s decision to implement ecosystem management for Clayoquot Sound following domestic and international protests was described as representing “comprehensive and wide- ranging normative changes” in forest policy (Bernstein & Cashore, 2000 p. 88). Paradigm change can occur quickly or slowly. Hall (1993) pointed to anomalous outcomes and subsequent policy failures to correct them (i.e., a crisis) as triggers for policy change in his study of the shift from a Keynesian to a monetarist economic model brought in by the Thatcher government following the 1975 election. He described that policy change as the culmination of the highest third-order level of ideational change. On the other hand, for Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, a major policy change involving the deep core beliefs of advocacy coalitions of experts can be slow to change: policy oriented learning and external perturbations and shocks can take 10 years or longer to result in major policy change within the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). The proposition that paradigm change need not be driven by crisis but by a slower “cumulative negotiated path” where ideational change occurs through small adjustments over time in “relatively closed policy communities”, called corporatist policy networks, that are “engaged in policy feedback” was also documented in research on agricultural policy change (W Coleman, Skogstad, & Atkinson, 1996 p. 276). Schmidt contended that policy paradigms are driven by different types of ideas: she located policy paradigms between public philosophies or world views (Weltanshauung) and programmatic ideas, the latter being shorter lived and easier to change (Schmidt, 2011 p. 44). The issue has also been raised of how the new policy paradigm needs to be institutionalized within government so that it would not be easily reversed (Hall, 1993). Distinguishing between “significant policy shifts and incremental tactical adjustments” was investigated in the case of forest policy learning in British Columbia (Lertzman, et al., 1996 p. 130). They conclude that the “single biggest obstacle to policy learning was the power of entrenched interests”. Professional foresters are identified as key members of the dominant industry-government development advocacy coalition and their ideas most often prevail because their career paths and professional education reflect the norms of the industry and government.16

16 An exchange of letters in the Canadian Journal of Political Science followed with critical comments by Hoberg concerning Lertzman, Rayner and Wilson’s conceptual problems (i.e., their failure to distinguish learning from policy change), and their disregard for synthesizing idea based and interest based arguments. Hoberg proposed elections, shifts in public opinion and commodity markets to be as important as ideas in his alternative account of policy change (Hoberg, 1996).

The warning was given to examine carefully the outcomes of the “frenetic” forest policy activity of the 2000s decade in Canada for what was described as a situation of “dynamics without change”. In other words, despite the policy changes associated with SFM certification, for example, key features of the old forest management paradigm, such as the setting of allowable cuts and forest tenure, were too deeply entrenched and consequently “very little has actually changed on the ground” (Howlett, Rayner, & Tollefson, 2009 p. 192-193). Skogstad and Schmidt extensively reviewed the literature on paradigm change dealing with many questions that raise issues relevant to analyzing changes in Ontario forest policy (Skogstad & Schmidt, 2011). These include: identifying the moment when a new paradigm is in place (e.g., evidence of new policies and organizational structures); the persuasion skills of the policy actors such as creating a “crisis narrative” to open the way for policy change; policy reformers being impeded by institutionally embedded veto players (single or multiple), which can lead to the recruitment of new policy actors with new ideas; the election of a political party sympathetic to an alternative paradigm; and the skills and resources of policy actors in “constructing truth claims” that can undermine scientific experts because they are consistent with the argument that the “everyday legitimacy” of the public is necessary for transformative policy change. Hall’s social learning concepts incorporate aspects of other theories of policy learning. Bennett and Howlett provided a literature review of these, boiling them down to the questions of who learns and what is learned. To Heclo, the “policy middlemen” (policy innovators outside the state actors) were key in two types of policy learning: incrementalism and trial and error. To Etheredge, the bureaucrats learned from political conflict to make government policy more “intelligent” and effective. For Sabatier, the advocacy coalition network was the agent of learning and policy change reflected their changing values (core beliefs) (Bennett & Howlett, 1992 p.279-281). Strategic learning by policy actors was also described as a process of “revising perceptions” of what was feasible and desirable while assimilating new information and adjusting strategies depending on the “structured terrain of opportunity and constraint” (Hay & Wincott, 1998 p.956).

3.6. Transnational/International Influences Situating the Ontario forest policy network in the context of economic globalization and the influences of international policy actors and events is also examined in this dissertation. SFM certification was identified as an example of private, market-based authority in the global arena in which governments share power with private organizations and policy networks to regulate an economic activity such as forestry (Skogstad, 2000, 2003).

Of relevance to Ontario forest policy is the role of non-state actors, particularly ENGOs, in influencing international public opinion and organizing direct market pressure on the Canadian forest industry through consumer boycotts beginning in the 1990s. Consumer boycotts provided the opportunity for ENGOs to influence a company’s stakeholders and consumers; “these economic stakeholders grant them (ENGOs) the indirect influence that they could not obtain directly” (Cashore & Vertinsky, 2000 p. 9). A case study of eco-forestry in British Columbia described the successful efforts of transnational actors in launching market boycott campaigns in Europe and the United States against the British Columbia government’s 1993 decision to log old growth forests in Clayoquot. The findings of the case study suggested that “the policy network is relatively unimportant because the coercive force of the market dependence path affects business interests as much as the state” (Bernstein & Cashore, 2000 p. 77). On the other hand, the case study also observed that it is domestic politics that determines the policy response to market campaigns, and that normative change among policy makers in response to external pressures might only be partial. As a result, “coercive pressure must be maintained to be durable”, otherwise the domestic policymakers weaken the forest policy reforms achieved through such ENGO pressures as market campaigns. Sustainable forest management certification was developed in response to ENGOs’ market campaigns against the forest industry. In this dissertation, SFM certification will be evaluated as an opportunity for ENGOs to penetrate the Ontario forest policy network and expand their influence as policy actors. It was the ENGOs’ initiative, led by the World Wildlife Fund among others, which resulted in the establishment of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and its standards. The FSC pioneered the concept of a voluntary, market-based tool for forest conservation: in 2012, FSC had certified over 60 million hectares of forests in Canada, which was about 31 per cent of all the world’s FSC-certified forests, and over 25 million hectares were in Ontario (Certification Canada, 2013). The competing Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI) certification, which included about 9 million hectares in Ontario, was developed by the American Forest and Paper Association partly in response to international forest certification such as the FSC, as well as domestic pressures on improving forest company practices and to keep “control in the hands of the industry”. The American Forest and Paper Association’s industry members were required to comply with the SFI guidelines beginning in 1997 (Cashore & Vertinsky, 2000 p. 21). The Canadian Standards Association’s Sustainable Forest Management System (Canadian Standards Association Group, 2014) which covers about two million hectares in Ontario, and the SFI were recognized by the Program for the Endorsement of Forest Certification, which is an umbrella organization of independent forest certification schemes (Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification, 2014). Since 2006, the Ontario Forest Industry Association has required its member companies to be certified by CSA, FSC, or SFI processes.

Two other transnational issues are identified for their influence on the Ontario forest policy network. The first is the involvement of the federal government in the development of Canada’s National Forest Strategy process, which was associated with the internationalization and capacity change in the development of new governance strategies, beginning with sustainable forest management initiatives in the 1990s (Canadian Council of Forest Ministers, 1998, 2008; Howlett, et al., 2009). Another transnational issue of interest to this dissertation is the role played by philanthropic foundations in the United States with respect to funding Canadian ENGOs involved in forest policy. Some in the business press have been highly critical of this relationship, beginning with commentary in 2011, which is now aimed more at ENGO advocacy around climate change and development of the oil tar sands (Corcoran, 2013; P Foster, 2011 April 23).

3.7. Summary

Policy network theory, specifically the Dialectical Model of Policy Networks, offers at least four advantages for this research. 1. The first is that the model seeks to overcome the theoretical debate on whether policy actors or network structure is a more important determinant of policy change by relying on Hay’s proposition that both agency and structure are necessary; he asserts that policy actors are “crucial” with respect to policy making because structures do not change unless agents act (Hay, 2002; Hay & Wincott, 1998; Skogstad, 2008). This perspective broadens the identification and analysis of numerous state and non-state policy actors (and those that are excluded from the network) and the structure in which the Ontario forest policy network operates. 2. The model opens wide the examination of the changing political, social, economic and knowledge contexts of the network. This is helpful in assessing the impacts of six provincial governments over 25 years, an unprecedented forest industry recession and international developments such as the emergence of sustainable forest management certification, associated with the ENGOs’ market boycott campaigns. 3. The model was applied to an environmental case study that provided insights into policy change involving the conflict between environmentalists and a strong industry lobby, shifts in the strategies of political, and bureaucratic, actors and their political negotiations, environmental regulation and ideas about the value of biodiversity, controversy among scientific experts and the role of public opinion. 4. Network theory identifies the pivotal role played by the ideas and beliefs of the policy actors. The concept of a discourse community forcing its way into the policy network would be relevant to the attempts by ENGOs in the Ontario forest policy network to redefine forest management and to introduce biodiversity and ecosystem values. Network theory also asserts that the structure of the network is

37 associated with types of policy change: significant paradigmatic policy change occurs only when new ideas and interests penetrate the network.

Chapter 4: Methods

4.0. Research Questions The focus of this inquiry is Ontario’s forest policy. The method used in this research is a qualitative, single-case study design.

Research Question 1: Has there been a change over the last 20 years in Ontario’s government policies (legislation) on public forests?

Research Question 2: How has change occurred over the last 20 years in Ontario’s government policies on public forests?

Research Question 3: Why has this change occurred?

4.1. Methodology The first research question, “Has change occurred?” was addressed through the historical research of documents, leading to the creation of a Chronology of Ontario Forest Policy Events (Appendix 3), and the development of a Forest Policy Spectrum of Change (Appendix 4), which is discussed in Chapter 5. Interviews with 23 respondents from government, Aboriginal peoples, the environmental community, and the forest industry provided data to address the second and third research questions, “How?” and “Why?” has change occurred. A qualitative approach was selected for several reasons. The first was that qualitative research conceptually allowed for the central research questions to be “open ended, evolving and non-directional” (Creswell, 2007 p. 107). This approach was better suited to investigating a “little understood phenomenon” such as forest policy where patterns related to the phenomenon also needed to be explained (Marshall & Rossman, 2011). A quantitative survey of registered professional foresters had been initially considered, but eventually discarded. It was determined that a wider range of views, available through a qualitative approach, was needed to provide insight into the research questions. Among the qualitative methods examined, the case study approach was selected, drawing on Yin’s advice about it being a comprehensive research strategy (Yin, 2009). The Ontario forest policy case fit within Yin’s (p.18) technical definition of case studies: it is an empirical inquiry that “investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real life context.” The focus on important contextual conditions was relevant to the need to examine the political, environmental, and socio-economic factors associated with forest policy. After examining descriptions of case study research as a strategy of inquiry or a methodology, Creswell (p. 73) asserted that case study research “involves the study of an issue explored through one or more cases within a bounded system (i.e., a setting, a context).”

The justification of a single-case study such as this research involves, rather than multiple cases, was also considered, given the caution about making inferences from “crucial” single case studies (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994). The rationale for using a single-case design in this study was that forest policy change in Ontario is a longitudinal case of change over 25 years and it may be considered “critical” or “revelatory” in the sense that the success of environmental influences on changing Ontario’s forest policy has not been well documented in the literature. In keeping with Yin’s advice about single case studies, when examining the issue of ecological change, multiple alternative interpretations were considered including the environmental activism of the McGuinty government, the forest industry recession and the permanency of ecological forest policy changes.

4.2. Methods This case study used various approaches and techniques to collect and analyze data; the study was designed to obtain data from the analysis of documents and interviews with key informants.

4.2.1. Document research.

4.2.1. (i) Chronology of Ontario forest policy events. A chronology of forest policies in Ontario (Appendix 3) was produced for two reasons: none could be found elsewhere in its entirety and it was helpful for the researcher to understand the evolution and pattern of forest policy decisions from the earliest days of Ontario’s history. A chronology of selected events in the history of modern environmentalism was also compiled to broaden understanding of the context of forest policy events in Ontario (Appendix 5). The chronology of forest policy required researching the history of forest policy in order to identify significant Ontario forest policies, events, and legislation, and to do so in reference to influential national and international events related to forests. The Chronology begins in 1763 with what was described as the “Unregulated Era” or the “Age of Waste (Howlett, 2001). This study defines 1988 to be the beginning of the “Sustainable Forest Management Era” in Ontario and 2007 for the emerging Ecological Forest Policy Era. Once developed, the Chronology was circulated to people in government, the environmental community, and the forest industry for review so that important events were not inadvertently excluded.

4.2.1. (ii) Forest policy spectrum.

Over 30 Ontario forest policy events, mostly within the jurisdiction of the OMNR, were analyzed for the study period, 1988-2014 (Appendix 4). The proof of forest policy is described as that which is enacted in forest policy outcomes (Howlett, 2001). The first criterion, therefore, used in selecting policy events required that there be concrete evidence associated with policy outcomes in the form of:

40 legislation, reports and recommendations to government, planning processes such as land use, policy strategies and frameworks, and business plans, manuals and guidelines that regulate forest operations, and agreements with ENGOs, industry, First Nations, or other stakeholders. The next step was to analyze the forest policy events and then assign each to one of three categories of forest policy that best describes its goal, purpose, objective or mandate: timber management, sustainable forest management (SFM), or ecological objectives (Appendix 4). Definitions for each of these types of forest policy are shown in the Glossary, p. xiii-xiv. The criteria for a timber management policy event involved wood supply as the primary objective. The difference between sustainable forest management (SFM) and ecological forest policies is not as evident and this is discussed in Chapter 5. An event qualified for sustainable forest management if SFM wording and concepts were found. Policy events were qualified as ecological if ecological objectives were stated to be the primary focus. The results for each policy event were then plotted on the Forest Policy Spectrum, which is shown as Figure 5.1 in Chapter Five.

4.2.1. (iii) Key policy events.

From the development of the Forest Policy Spectrum emerged four policy milestones associated with key policy shifts: the Timber Class EA hearings and approval (1988-1994), the Crown Forest Sustainability Act (1994), the Endangered Species Act (2007), and the Far North Act (2010). The rationale for selecting these four events was two-fold: each event involved extensive public hearings and public conflict among interests such as the forest industry, First Nations, and the ENGOs; and each event represented turning points in the ideas about the values and use of Crown land forests, a process that could be traced over time. The large scope of the document analysis of public hearing transcripts is summarized below in Table 4.1. Subsequently, the interviews of key informants confirmed that these four policy events were representative of significant changes in forest policy; and two other policy events were suggested as additions by the participants. The first of these was the Lands for Life/Living Legacy/Forest Accord processes culminating in 1999 with expanded parks and protected areas. The second event was the Ontario Forest Tenure Modernization Act, 2011. Both events had already been plotted on the Forest Policy Spectrum and were incorporated into the data analysis.

Table 4.1. Summary of Public Hearings on Four Key Forest Policy Events

Class Environmental Crown Forest Assessment for Endangered The Far North Sustainability Policy/Legislation Timber Species Act, Bill Act, Bill 191, Act, Management, 184, 2007 2010 Bill 171, 1994 1988-89 Ontario Ministry Ontario Ministry Ontario Ministry Lead Agent Ontario MNR/MOE of Natural of Natural of Natural Resources Resources Resources Multiple Use Sustainable Biocentric Non- Biocentric Non- Policy Objective Timber Management Forest timber Values timber Values Management Standing Standing Standing Mandated under Committee on Committee on Committee on Public Hearing Venue Environmental General General General Assessment Act Government Government Government 45, plus more than Number of 500 witnesses and 66 32 37 Parties/Interveners members of the public 18 (6 locations 7 (4 locations in Number of Hearing 411 (15 locations, in the North and 3 (Toronto only) the North and Days mostly in North) Toronto) Toronto)

Number of Pages of 70,000 plus exhibits 2,200 84 1,200 Transcripts

After completion of document analysis, three steps were completed before data collection began: 1. The document analysis indicated a complex array of policy actors and policy events associated with Ontario forest policy. A theoretical framework was sought. As discussed in Chapter 3, this resulted in identifying policy network theory and specifically Toke and Marsh’s dialectical policy network model,

42 which offered advantages to this research by helping to narrow the focus on a complex policy area such as Ontario’s forest policy (Toke & Marsh, 2003). The dialectical approach generated a series of questions to guide the application of the model to any policy area and these questions were used to guide the discussion in the dissertation. The questions are listed in Appendix 6. Given the numerous theoretical approaches to policy networks, terms such as policy community and policy network have different meanings. In this dissertation the “old” pre-1988 Ontario forest policy community is described to be “an integrated, stable, and exclusive policy community” of government, industry and foresters. The “new” ecological forest policy issues network that has emerged comprises “loosely connected, multiple and often conflict-ridden members” (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992). The term “Ontario forest policy network” is used to describe the network and the changes it experienced from 1988 to 2014. Policy network actors are individuals and groups with an interest in Ontario forest policy and they are identified in Chapter 6 and in more detail in Appendix 7. 2. The research questions were finalized. 3. A qualitative research design was developed and a case study approach was chosen.

4.2.2 Data collection.

4.2.2. (i) Interview protocol. This study accepted Yin’s view that the interview is “one of the most important sources of case study information” and that the case study interview is closer to a “guided conversation” than “structured queries” (p. 106). Although a list of questions was prepared for the interviews, Hammer and Wildavsky observed that in open-ended, semi-structured interviews, much is provisional and questions should be kept to a minimum but are useful for preventing the interviews from unproductive deviations (Wildavsky, 2010). With this guidance, 10 open-ended questions were designed for the purpose of eliciting data to answer research questions 2 and 3: “How?” and “Why has Ontario forest policy change occurred?” A pilot test of the questions was conducted with one informant as suggested by Maxwell (Maxwell, 2005 p. 58). The interview protocol is presented in Appendix 8.

4.2.2. (ii) Sampling strategy

Purposeful sampling was employed to ensure that that there would be representation of key forest policy network actors and organizations (i.e. ENGOs, industry, government, and First Nations/aboriginal communities). This type of sampling took the form of being theory based (e.g., policy network constructs). Yin described data triangulation as “collecting information from multiple sources but aimed at corroborating the same fact or phenomenon”; he noted that this strategy addressed issues of construct

43 validity “because the multiple sources of evidence essentially provide multiple measures of the same phenomenon” (p. 16). Further, Creswell notes that sampling needs to cover the dimensions of the case (p. 127) and it needs to be done at both the event or process level (i.e., forest policy event) and the participant level (i.e., network policy agent) (p.126). The following issues were considered in selecting participants. The public hearing transcripts were used to identify the network actors, their policy thrusts, and their ideas for policy change and these are shown in Appendix 5. During the interviews, each participant was presented with a list of policy actors derived from public hearing records and asked to make deletions/additions. Interviews with 23 participants were staged among government, ENGOs, industry, and First Nations participants, so that if the first five or six interviews were to give names of agents/organizations not on the public record, the sampling strategy would be reassessed. This did not occur and, therefore, should be an indication of representativeness. It was not a snow balling approach but it was flexible and sensitive to emergent phenomena, as Creswell advised. An overview of the study participants and some of the dimensions they represented are summarized in Appendix 9. The research assumed that the major policy actors could be captured in the transcripts and other public records because the Ontario government, the ENGOs, the forest industry, and the First Nations have been represented by many of the same individuals and organizations since 1988 and they identified themselves and their advocacy publicly through public hearing processes and in the media. This does not mean, however, that there was no bargaining and negotiating taking place outside the hearing processes. a. Participants:

The categories of participants are described as follows and the number of participants in each category is shown in Appendix 9.

ENGOs: There was a diversity of views about forest policy among environmental organizations, which can be characterized as activist, on the one hand, compared to conservation organizations, which also had different philosophies and mandates. The dimensions of a citizen activist and the differences between ENGOs in southern Ontario and northern Ontario were also captured.

Forest Industry: The attributes sought in the forest industry were represented historically by large forest products companies operating on Crown land and represented by the Ontario Forest Industries Association (OFIA) and also by the Ontario Lumber Manufacturers Association (OLMA). The latter’s members were mostly privately owned sawmillers.

Foresters: About 60% of participants sampled (and interviewed) had forestry education, were registered professional foresters (i.e., members of the Ontario Professional Foresters’ Association), or worked in

44 forestry. The environmental literature identified foresters and the forestry profession historically as being important policy agents and having disproportionate influence over forest policy decisions. The forest policy decision-makers in government and the industry in the 1980s included many foresters, some of whom were retired and others who became senior managers. The participant sample reflected the reality that in 1988 many of the key policy agents were foresters, especially in the influential Forest Management Branch of the OMNR, and not accountants, biologists, or other occupations or professions.

Consultants: The important role that consultants served in the forest policy network by way of their ideas and influence is recognized in the literature (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Consultants worked for government, industry, and ENGOs and could also speak to the 2012 tenure reform legislation.

Government: In selecting government participants, consideration was given to obtaining the experience and perspective of bureaucrats (as described in Chapter 3) and politicians, and the political system in which they operated.

Aboriginal Peoples: Forest policy literature identified Aboriginal peoples as one group of policy actors that emerged in Canada over the last twenty-five years (Wellstead, et al., 2007) (Tindall, Trosper, & Perreault, 2103) (M. A. Smith, 2007). It was anticipated that the experiences and influence of First Nations, Metis and Aboriginal communities would be different than that of government, ENGOs, or industry, and therefore, participants were selected to provide these unique perspectives. b. Distribution: One reason for selecting more government participants was recognition in the policy network literature that “the state retains (at least theoretically) ultimate authority” (Skogstad, 2008 p. 218). The attribute of “forest policy internationalization” was also represented in the sample by the federal government perspective.

In addition to the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, the Ontario Ministry of the Environment was identified as a state network actor and this viewpoint was represented by those participants who had worked for both Ministries.

c. Socio-demographic Characteristics: These were evaluated but not anticipated to drive the sample. Participants were mostly older than 50 years of age and were experienced in one or more policy events. Some individuals participated in all four events and they provided an important “longitudinal” perspective. Retired participants were expected to be more forthcoming and uninhibited in their responses and views of past events (Wildavsky, 2010). Wildavsky advised that the “outsider” with a different experience was also salient and Creswell advised being sensitive to “the small voices and the voices on the periphery.” This was somewhat captured in the Aboriginal peoples, federal government,

45 and consultant perspectives. The inclusion of only two female participants reflects the fact that forestry has historically been a male preserve. d. Size of the Study: The size of the study was assessed considering the feasibility of a single researcher and the limitation of a PhD candidate’s resources. A long list of potential participants was developed on the basis of factors described above; 26 individuals were invited to participate and interviews were completed with 23 participants. The literature on qualitative methods suggested this was an acceptable number of participants given the in-depth interview process and time required to code the large amount of data obtained from interviews (Creswell, 2007).

4.2.3. Interviews.

4.2.3. (i) Interview protocol. Personal or telephone interviews were conducted with 23 participants representing the perspectives of ENGOs, the forest industry, foresters, government, and First Nations. Interviews took place between September 2011 and May 2012 and were 60 to 180 minutes in length. The researcher looked for ‘saturation’, which was the point when participants would be repeating similar experiences and this occurred before each of the 23 interviews was completed. The personal and telephone interviews were recorded with a digital voice recorder. None of the participants refused to have the interview recorded. The audio MP3 files obtained by the digital recorder were emailed to a transcription company operating in Canada and India. This third party signed a confidentiality agreement. The researcher spent considerable time auditing the interview transcripts. Although the researcher provided glossaries of forestry terms, the names of organizations, locations, and other details to assist the transcribers, mistakes in the transcripts were a problem. The mistakes tallied on average to less than five per cent of the transcript word count, which is considered to be an acceptable industry standard, but the errors were serious and included mishearing of the negative verb and missing words and phrases.

4.2.3. (ii) Ethical considerations (REB protocol reference # 26432). This research involved personal interviews and, therefore, required obtaining the proper consent of research participants, the protection of confidentiality of participants and other ethical considerations. The research protocol was approved by the University of Toronto’s Social Sciences, Humanities and Education Research Ethics Board (REB) and is valid to June, 2015. The REB approval required consideration of any conflicts of interest with “any group or individual- level vulnerability related to the research that needs to be mitigated.” It was determined that there was none in the participant sample or between the researcher and the participants. Due to the researcher’s

46 prior work in sustainable forest management and non-profit organizations there were pre-existing professional relationships with some participants but none of these relationships resulted in “power-over” relationships or conflicts of interest. Participants who were interviewed were “arms-length” professional relationships. Further, to protect their confidentiality, all potential participants were contacted confidentially, and responded to the request for participation under their own free and informed volition. All participants were advised that only they and the researcher would be aware of their participation, and for this reason they should feel comfortable refusing to participate or withdrawing from the interview at any time. In the letter of information and informed consent form (Appendix 10), two types of consent were offered to participants. The first offered complete anonymity, while the second alternative waived confidentiality with the participant freely choosing to be named “because I wish to receive credit for my comments” and “I believe that the citation of data generated from my interview will ensure due credit to me and that the minimal risk posed by this waiver is greatly outweighed by societal benefits.” Fifteen of the 23 participants chose to waive confidentiality. Due to the risk of identification of certain participants, however, the researcher has decided to maintain the anonymity of all participants. When quoting participants in the findings chapters, participants are numbered and categorized as being ENGOs (E), industry (I), government (G) and Aboriginal peoples (AP).

4.2.4. Data analysis. The results from the data analysis are reported in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8. The data analytic strategy consisted of an adapted, emergent, iterative, line-by-line analysis of the transcript data obtained through the interviews of key informants; the data were compiled and analyzed using the qualitative software NVivo 9 (NVivo qualitative data analysis software; QSR International Pty Ltd. Version 9).

Adapted: Pure Grounded Theory (Creswell, 2007) looks to build a theory but this research did not do that. Rather, the researcher adapted a classical Grounded Theory approach to data analysis by analyzing the data and sorting it into codes and categories. Using the dialectical policy network model, the researcher was able to develop some pre-defined codes which assisted in looking for alignment between the theory and other codes as they emerged. For example, the researcher was mindful of agency and structural factors such as the resources of the policy actors, changes in the political, social and economic context of the network, the power relationships, and the exclusion of particular interests during the pilot coding process to ensure that coding captured these theoretical considerations.

Emergent/Open Coding: The value of NVivo software for qualitative research is that it allowed the themes of the coding to emerge from the words of the key informants while reducing the bias of the researcher.

Iterative Process: The researcher was cognizant of Seidel’s advice on the responsibility of the researcher coding qualitative data: to remain open minded and carry forward what is emerging from the coding, to respect the repetitive process that involves examining the data in processes described to be the sifting, the sorting, the thinking, bringing forward and folding back in, balancing and braiding of codes and themes that emerge from participants (Seidel, 1998).

Line-by-line analysis: The researcher read carefully many times through the transcripts and coded “by a single word by a phrase by a paragraph” (Seidel, 1998) using the words of the participants.

The steps taken in coding the data are:

1. Data preparation for coding involved entering 23 interview transcripts into NVivo software, version 9. 2. Pilot coding was conducted on seven transcripts, and then repeated twice, for all emergent codes until no new codes/categories/themes appeared. The need for double and triple coding was utilized as the data were interconnected. 3. Grouping the emerging codes (and sub-codes) into larger categories involved observing thematic similarities within the codes; like sub-codes codes were grouped into codes, which formed larger categories. Numbers of sources and codes were not compared or quantified across the larger categories because the themes were already captured multiple times in each of those categories and the duplication is documented in the codebook. 4. Sorting the preliminary larger categories involved the researcher identifying the overlap but also paying attention to the outliers. With respect to the latter issue of voices that are small in number, for example, First Nations participants emphasized the importance of their treaty and Aboriginal rights, which might not have been captured by the perspectives of other participants. 5. Three coding passes were conducted across all transcripts for coding consistency and revising codes. 6. The top codes for the analysis were selected from the codes most frequently sourced and referenced in the transcript data. Eight categories and five codes within each category emerged. Outliers were coded and considered, everything that was reported by participants was coded. The number of sources and references were considered in the eight categories and five codes but there was no comparison of numbers across codes.

7. For each of the five codes there were sub-codes, and the top four sub-codes for each was selected because these were determined to be sufficient to represent the emergent themes and answer the research questions. The NVivo codebook resulting from the process described above is attached as Appendix 11. Themes emerged from the data during coding. There was extensive “cross talk” or cross over between the themes and the narrative. Attention was paid to the patterns of major themes reported for each of the major groups of policy actors to learn if they were common to all sources or isolated to or important to a subset. After noticing these patterns, the data were revisited to look at the quotes themselves to see the larger meaning behind them and to portraying the narrative and comparing it to other narratives. The decision was made to write up themes according to agents first because of the importance of policy actors in network theory. The forest policy events comprised forest policy upon which much was contingent and other themes were under consideration because of what was found in the literature review. Writing up the government agent category, as reported in Appendix Table A11.3 was the first attempt to make sense of the themes. It was found that redundancy was occurring after the first three or four major sub codes. Appendix Table A11.4 is an example of how empirical findings were compared to the quotes, these sub-sub codes were identified by the same sources and were uncovered as major themes. Similarly, the ENGO “story” did not make sense until the narratives of the government and industry were examined and narratives were compared across each policy actor group and individual interview source.

Chapter 5: Paradigm Change in Ontario Forest Policy

5.0. Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to document the paradigm change observed in Ontario forest policy from 1988 to 2014. Hall’s perspective is a useful way to question how the forest “policy paradigm” changed over the time period of this research (Hall, 1993). At policy time-0, in (pre-) 1988, could the policy paradigm be characterized as timber management? In the 1990s had the policy paradigm evolved into sustainable forest management? Looking still further, by 2007 had the policy paradigm further transformed into an emphasis on ecological forest management? In answering these questions, it is important to keep in mind both empirical conditions and theoretical factors. Empirically, although logging protests had occurred earlier in Algonquin Park and Lake Superior Park (MacDowell, 2012) among others, the Temagami conflict in the 1980s was identified in this dissertation to be the critical juncture representing the beginning of environmental change in forest policy. Theoretically, it is useful to recall that the indicators or critical junctures in policy change are often associated with conflict and policy failure. In Hall’s first and second order changes, adjustments would be made that did not radically alter the goals behind the policy. In the third level of change, however, there would be a radical shift in ideas and beliefs that would indicate a paradigm policy change. Using his analysis of paradigm policy change in Britain’s 1970s-1980s shift from Keynesian to monetarist economic policy, Hall identified five characteristics of paradigm change that are relevant to understanding the Ontario forest policy experience and its paradigm policy shifts. Using Hall’s benchmark of paradigm policy change the following policy shifts could be seen in Ontario. 1. The problem was not being ameliorated by conventional approaches. The problems in Ontario forestry that were being observed and defined by the public and environmentalists in the 1980s were not being ameliorated by foresters and the forest industry at the time. For example, the practices to which the public objected, such as the large-scale clear cutting of old growth pine to build a logging road in Temagami, was an acceptable silvicultural method. In the forest policy shift represented by the Endangered Species Act, 2007 the context of the problem had changed; it was defined by the ENGOs through a “crisis narrative” they developed about the urgent need to protect endangered species. 2. Policy failure was recognized. The forest industry practices used in Temagami into the early 1990s were acceptable to foresters and approved by the OMNR but they eventually lost credibility with politicians and the public who perceived them to be environmentally harmful.

The ENGO campaign “Save Our Species”, begun in 2005 in the run up to the 2007 election, identified the policy failure to be the existing outdated endangered species legislation. 3. Locus of authority over the policy issues shifted away from the Ministry which had responsibility for it, providing outsiders with influence over a formerly closed policy process. In the Temagami situation, large public protests and the associated concerns of Aboriginal Peoples became a political problem for the Premier and Cabinet, consequently spreading beyond the technical and scientific expertise and bureaucratic control of the OMNR. The ENGOs advocating for protection of endangered species avoided the OMNR; they had obtained an election promise from the Premier and worked with his staff and politicians to develop the new legislation. 4. New ideas were the subject of intense public debate. The protests at Temagami were associated with environmental, First Nations (Wilkes & Ibrahim, 2013) and political issues (Bray & Thomson, 1996). The Timber Class EA hearings began in 1988 and it was at these public hearings that new ideas for sustainable forestry, and issues which had spilled over from Temagami, were debated for four years. The debate over the proposed new endangered species legislation was evident in the legislative committee hearings, with opponents from the forest industry and others, weighing in on topics such as the role of scientific experts (Ontario, 2007a). 5. The new policy paradigm was institutionalized by government. The Rae government instituted sustainable forest management through the Crown Forest Sustainability Act. This process has been called the “new forestry” and “scientific ecosystem management” (Kohm & Franklin, 1997). The McGuinty government worked with ENGOs to develop and pass the Endangered Species Act. This represented a focus on ecological sustainability that has been described as the “ecosocialization” of forest regulation (Prudham. W.S., 2005). Hall found that the media played an important role in influencing public opinion and while this might have been relevant for the Temagami conflict, it is unclear what role the media played in other Ontario forest policy shifts. Media influence is a factor that could not be thoroughly analyzed in this research.

5.1. Forest Policy Spectrum

The idea of developing a forest policy spectrum derived from the concept of Robin Eckersley’s “Green Spectrum” (McKenzie, 2002 p.15). She identified “different kinds of environmentalism along a green continuum” with ecocentrism corresponding to the “greenest values” at the opposite end of the axis

51 from resource conservation, which was identified to be the least green, anthropocentric environmental ideology. The Forest Policy Spectrum of Change developed for this study examines the evolution of forest policy from a focus on timber supply (i.e., the least green policy), through integrated sustainable forest management and towards more emphasis on ecological values, signaling a shift in the direction of ecocentric values.17 As reported earlier, after compiling the Forest Policy Chronology (Appendix 3), research for the Forest Policy Spectrum of Change was then concentrated on events since 1988. This was a year which was identified as a critical turning point for contemporary Ontario forest policy for two reasons: first, because of political attention to public protests over logging in Temagami; and second, because the Ontario Environmental Assessment Board public hearings began on the Timber Class EA, an event that marked the first time forest policy had received extensive public scrutiny. The summary results of the analysis of the forest policy events are shown in Appendix 4. As described in Chapter 4, 32 forest policy events were examined in order to determine if their goal, purpose, objective or mandate qualified the event to be described as timber management, sustainable forest management (SFM), or having ecological objectives. The results for each policy event were then plotted on the Forest Policy Spectrum, which is shown as Figure 5.1 below. The issue of differentiating between SFM and ecological forest policy was raised in Chapter 4. Conceptually, it is useful to think of SFM as representing three pillars: the social, economic and environmental aspects of sustainability. Over time each of these can be pulled into prominence. In this analysis there is evidence suggesting that the environmental pillar of SFM has received more attention in Ontario’s forest policy through policies focussed more on ecological objectives since the early 2000s. The implication for paradigm change is that in comparison to the earlier dramatic shift from timber to forest management policy, the shift to ecological policy is more incremental and might be seen, in part, as the consolidation of gains made by the implementation of SFM in the 1990s. The new ideas behind these paradigm policy shifts are discussed in Chapter 6.2.2. The results of the Forest Policy Spectrum of Change suggest that the objectives of forest policy events, initiated by successive Ontario governments, have been evolving from the earlier purpose of supplying wood to the forest industry into a “greener” policy in which ecological sustainability is the primary goal.

17 The Forest Policy Spectrum relied on evidence of Ontario forest policy in legislation, regulation or policy statements published by Ontario governments; in other words documentary evidence of governments’ decisions. The proof of forest policy is that it is enacted in forest policy outcomes (Howlett, 2001).

Figure 5.1: Ontario Forest Policy Spectrum of Change

* See Appendix 4 for a description of the analysis and results of the Spectrum.

Policy Priority

#1: Timber Management Class Environmental Assessment -1988-1994

#5: Crown Forest Sustainability Act, 1995

#20: Endangered Species Act, 2007

#25: Far North Act, 2010

5.2. Evolution of Legislation with Ecological Objectives

The changes in Ontario forest policy that have been tracked in this study have occurred under six Ontario governments since 1988: the Peterson Liberal governments (1985-1990) including the Liberal- NDP Accord of 1987-89, the Rae NDP Government (1990-1995), the Harris Conservative Governments (1995-2002), the Eves Conservative Government (2002-2003), the McGuinty Liberal Governments (2003-2012), and the Wynne Liberal Government (2012-present). The legislation and policy decisions associated with each government are shown above in the Forest Policy Spectrum of Change. As discussed in Chapter 3, the dialectical policy network model brings together a number of theories about how governments make decisions. The election of governments was characterized as an exogenous factor in this research, although the decisions of these governments as described here were influenced by the forest policy network and are also endogenous factors. Elections and government changeovers are associated with paradigm change; of particular interest in this research is that the outcomes of government decision-making on forests have consistently changed toward sustainable ecological forest policy, regardless of the politics of the government in power. With respect to Ontario’s legislative history, it was the passage of the Ontario Environmental Assessment Act in 197518 that set the stage for the eventual pressure by ENGOs on the Minister of the Environment, Jim Bradley, for the OMNR to undergo an environmental assessment process.19 The OMNR fought the Ministry of the Environment against complying with the Ontario Environmental Assessment Act but finally submitted the EA document to the MOE in 1985. Its submission was seen as evidence of a shifting power relationship between the two ministries. Negotiations between the Ministries was also affected by the Minister of the Environment’s controversial decision against requiring an Ontario Environmental Assessment Board hearing on the OMNR’s construction of a logging road in Temagami and the 1988 promise by the OMNR to create 53 new provincial parks and stop non- conforming uses in parks (Winfield, 2012). The differences among these governments with respect to forest policy can be briefly characterized as follows: the Peterson Liberal government was confronted with the Temagami protests and forced the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, which initially opposed the idea, into compliance with the Timber

18 There were controversial legislative amendments to the Ontario Environmental Assessment Act (pursuant to the Environmental Assessment and Consultation Improvement Act, 1996), giving new statutory powers to the Environment Minister to scope issues and impose deadlines. ENGOs argued that these powers undermined the fair hearing process and benefited proponents (Levy, 2001) (Levy, 2002).The Ontario Environmental Assessment Board was subsequently merged with the Environmental Appeal Board and was renamed the Environmental Review Tribunal pursuant to the Red Tape Reduction Act, 2000. 19 Jim Bradley, first elected to the Ontario legislature in 1977 and the Minister of the Environment in the 1980s with the Peterson government, and again serving as Environment Minister for the Wynne government in 20011, was a policy actor for 25 years on environmental and forest policy.

Class EA; the Rae NDP government created sustainable forest management through the Crown Forest Sustainability Act and funded the Forestry Branch to implement it over the protests of some in the forest industry; the Harris Conservative government slashed OMNR’s budget and staffing and downloaded costs onto the forest industry and created the Living Legacy of protected areas; and the McGuinty Liberal government created the Endangered Species Act and the Far North Act, both of which reflect ecological interests rather than those of the ailing forest industry or First Nations, Metis or Aboriginal communities. Ontario governments do not operate in a political or administrative vacuum; therefore, global and national events are predicted to have impacts on the province’s forest policy. These are listed in the Chronology of Ontario Forest Policy Events Appendix 3. The relevance of global and national events to the Ontario forest policy network is discussed in Chapter 6.

5.2.1. Temagami (1985). Interview participants identified the Temagami protests of the 1980s as representing the moment when public opinion turned against traditional forestry practices in Ontario and when the province’s “war of the woods” received media attention. Temagami was located in a Crown forest management unit in northeastern Ontario, north of North Bay. For Ontario, Temagami was comparable to the logging protests by the Haida on Lyell Island in the 1970s and 1980s (Pinkerton, 1983), the Clayoquot Sound protests in the 1990s in British Columbia (Mabee, Tindall, Hoberg, & Gladu, 2013), and the logging protests that culminated in the spotted owl controversy in the northwestern United States (Thomas et al., 1990). The Temagami disputes have been characterized not only as old growth forest and wilderness protection, but also a long struggle for the rights of the Teme-augama Anishnabai on their traditional territory, including legal challenges in the 1970s and negotiations with the Ontario government in the 1990s, and a proposed land claim settlement in 2002 (May, 2005) (Wilkes & Ibrahim, 2013). Then future Ontario premier Bob Rae chained himself to a bulldozer and was arrested in1989 at the protest. He “always maintained that his arrest had more to do with the disenfranchisement of the First Nations than it had to do with the forest” (E7). The Temagami protests of the 1980s were described by a government participant (G15) as a “benchmark in the progress towards sustainable forestry.” Temagami precipitated scrutiny of Ontario’s traditional forest practices by the public and between 1987 to1990, it was “probably the biggest item” preoccupying the Peterson government. It began in the fall of 1984 when the OMNR approved removal of old white pine trees to extend the Red Squirrel Road for future logging access. The OMNR “did not consult with anybody” in those days and when recreationists went into the woods the following spring they were “shocked by what they saw because all of the trees were cut and just left there” (G15). Given

Bob Rae’s involvement in the Temagami protests, it was unsurprising then that the NDP government produced the Crown Forest Sustainability Act when it took office. Temagami could be characterized as the turning point where it became apparent that public support had moved away from supporting traditional forestry practices condoned by the OMNR and industry, and that such protests were not unique to Ontario but occurring across Canada and in the United States. The Temagami protests also added more urgency to the broader public examination of timber management through the Timber Class EA. In this research, Temagami is identified as a triggering event for paradigm change.

5.2.2 Timber Class EA (1988-1994). Supplying wood to the forest industry was the historical objective of Ontario forest policy. It was the Crown Timber Act (dating from the 1940s and rescinded in 1995) that determined the management of forest lands, outside of provisions for parks and protected areas.20 The OMNR sought approval from the Ontario Environmental Assessment Board for timber management planning for building access roads, cutting timber, regenerating and tending new forests on over 385,000 square kilometers of public lands (i.e., the size of France) in northern Ontario (Environmental Assessment Board of Ontario, 1994). Protection of the forest environment for non-timber values had not previously been an objective of forest management planning. Consequently the Timber Class EA process and hearings signified a profound change in the direction of forest policy. At the time, there was a “poisonous” relationship between the Ministry of the Environment, considered to be the weaker organization, and the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, as the Minister pressured OMNR to undertake an environmental assessment as prescribed by the 1975 Ontario Environmental Assessment Act. From the viewpoint of the OMNR, Minister Bradley and his assistants were “very effective at manipulating the media” and more interested in “making life miserable” for the OMNR than stimulating innovation. For its part, the OMNR did nothing to address the inadequacies in timber management identified by MOE (G13). The standoff resulting from this “war of words” had begun to change by the time David Balsillie, a former ADM at the Ministry of the Environment was

20 The Crown Timber Act specified that production levels for timber supply were required to meet a standard of “sustained yield”. The statistical concept of the ‘ideal forest’ is a European concept that had been taught in North American forestry schools since the first North American forestry school was opened at Yale University in 1900, followed by the University of Toronto in 1907. The ‘ideal’ forest is theoretically of a uniform age class distribution in which the annual incremental growth available for harvest could be reliably projected. The Crown Timber Act defined sustained yield as “the growth of timber that a forest can produce and that can be cut to achieve a continuous approximate balance between growth of timber and timber cut” (Environmental Assessment Board of Ontario, 1994). It is this concept of maximizing timber supply that has been the most contentious dispute between ENGOs and professional foresters.

56 promoted to ADM at the OMNR, and given charge of preparing the Timber Class EA and navigating it through the public hearing process. The motivation of ENGOs to become involved in Ontario forest policy processes preceded the Timber EA and the Temagami crisis (Stefanik, 2001). ENGOs had been advocating the prohibition of logging in parks since the 1960s but it was a “dichotomous conversation”: to log or not to log. The Timber Class EA was an opportunity for a public examination of the planning process and the practice of forestry and, according to one ENGO participant interviewed, there was “a lot of interest in the environmental community for engaging” in the hearings (E2). “Forests for Tomorrow” was a main influence at the hearings, along with the forest industry. “Forests for Tomorrow” was an ENGO coalition of the Botany Conservation Group of the University of Toronto, the Federation of Ontario Naturalists, the Sierra Club of Ontario, the Temiskaming Environmental Action Committee and the Wildlands League that represented environmental interests at the Timber Management Class EA hearings. ENGOs credited the hearings as an opportunity to learn about forest policy, hearing processes, forest ecology, and forest economics. The Timber Class EA hearings were described as “a four-year graduate level seminar that increased peoples’ knowledge and capacity and, at the same time, the debates over these issues attracted both public support in terms of individual donations to conservation groups but also philanthropic interest” (E 2). As discussed in Chapter 6, it was the ENGOs who first advocated for sustainable forest management, a concept that was initially opposed by the OMNR at the Timber Class EA hearings. Near the end of the hearings, the OMNR agreed to work towards sustainable forest management and this commitment was incorporated in the Timber Class EA decision which granted OMNR an approval contingent on 115 legally binding terms and conditions. In 2003, the MOE extended the approval with revisions, known as the Declaration Order MNR-71 (Ontario Ministry of the Environment, 2003) and it has remained in place since then. However, the Timber Class EA process had detractors (Spears, 1989). Even the Environmental Assessment Board hearing panel complained of the cost, estimated to be in excess of $20 million, and timeliness of the six year process. An ENGO participant (p. 9) described the hearing as ruining the reputation of environmental assessment within government because of its length and complexity. A government participant (G 14) called the Timber Class EA a “showcase provincial level bright shining lights activity” that attracted ENGOs. Since then, in his opinion, there have been few “big forest policy events” of that magnitude but ENGOs have been active in consultation about changes in OMNR’s guidelines and the Environmental Registry postings required by the Environmental Bill of Rights.

This research has identified the Timber Class EA, and the public hearings associated with it, as policy events that contributed to a significant paradigm change in forest policy. This first stage of paradigm change involved a policy shift away from focusing solely on supplying timber to industry towards sustainable forest management where the values of the non-timber users were also considered.

5.2.3. Crown Forest Sustainability Act (1995). Bob Rae’s left- leaning New Democratic Party, which supported the Peterson Liberal government through an Accord in 1985-1987, was elected as a majority government in 1990 and held office until 1995. The NDP were involved in the years leading up to the Timber Class EA hearings, which began in 1988, and they were in office when the final decision was released in April 1994. It was the NDP government that decided to accept the terms and conditions of the Timber Class EA decision and shortly after that, to develop the Crown Forest Sustainability Act, which was introduced for first reading in June 1994 and passed third reading in December. Although the Rae government has been viewed as being less able to wield power in most policy fields than the Harris government that followed (Wiseman, 2002), it is the Rae administration’s forest policy legacy that has continued for 20 years through the CFSA. With the passage of the Crown Forest Sustainability Act, the objective of forest policy was defined for the first time to be a broader concept of forestry than timber supply and one that was required to serve many interests, not only the industrial. As described in Chapter 2, the purpose of the Crown Forest Sustainability Act, (CFSA) 1995, was “to manage Crown forests to meet social, economic and environmental needs of present and future generations.” The purpose of the CFSA also specified two science based principles of sustainability: ecological processes and biological diversity should be conserved; and forest practices should emulate natural disturbances and landscape patterns while minimizing adverse effects on plant life, animal life, water, soil, air, and social and economic values. Sustainable forest management (SFM) activities include evaluation and public reporting of forest sustainability, promotion of public participation in environmental decision-making, and conducting forest management according to the most recent scientific understanding of forest ecosystems. In the Rae government, northern MPPs were represented in Cabinet portfolios associated with forest policy: Floyd Laughren, who represented the Sudbury area riding of Nickel Belt, was Finance minister; Bud Wildman, the MPP for Algoma, was minister of Natural Resources, Aboriginal Affairs and the Environment; Shelley Martel, who represented the ridings of Sudbury East and Nickel Belt, was minister of Northern Development and Mines; and Howard Hampton, MPP for Kenora - Rainy River, was minister of Natural Resources and the Ministry of Northern Development and Mines. Elie Martel, a retired NDP MPP from Sudbury East, was a member of the hearing panel for the Timber Management Class EA and had close contacts with the Rae government during the hearing and the development and passage of the Crown Forest Sustainability Act.

Why did the northern NDP MPPs support SFM, a new regime that might have put forestry jobs in Northern Ontario, and therefore their chance for re-election, at risk? This research suggests several reasons. The first was the belief that the north could not have forestry jobs without a sustainable wood supply. The NDP member for Cochrane North, Len Wood, opened the public hearings on the CFSA on August 15, 1994 with this explanation of his government’s positon: “By putting the health of our forests first, we will be able to make sure that we can sustain our forest industries, the jobs those industries provide and the many communities that forest industries support, while providing for a wide range of other economic and environmental values.” Other reasons discussed here and in Chapter 6 include the Timber Class EA hearings, the personal involvement of Bud Wildman and the influences of ENGOs, mostly from northern Ontario. A review of the transcripts confirms little discussion of job loss in the submissions to the Standing Committee on General Government that held public hearings on the CFSA between August 15th to September 15th, 1994. The close connection and overlap between the Timber Class EA and the CFSA contributed to the paradigm shift from timber to sustainable forest management. The OMNR, under the Rae government, developed the Old Growth Forest Policy, the Red and White Pine Old Growth Forest Policy, and most significantly, the Policy Framework for Sustainable Forestry, which received 3,000 submissions from the public, before the conclusion of the Timber Class EA hearings (Duinker, Wanlin, Clark, & Miron, 1993). One government participant who was involved in both processes noted that the CFSA did “not drop out of the sky”; it was gestated during the Timber Class EA hearings as the government responded to the issues being debated and the CFSA was written and passed in a ‘record breaking six month’ period (G14).21 The results of a judicial review filed by the Sierra Legal Defense Fund on deficiencies in the OMNR’s incorporation of the terms and conditions of the Timber Class EA attest to the conflict associated with forest policy change and were also identified to have sped up the implementation of the CFSA (G 14). The Rae government was motivated to be activists on sustainable forest policy because of the interests of its northern caucus of Ministers and MPPs and also the influence of the environmental

21 Running concurrently with the end of the Timber Class EA were political processes initiated by the Rae government that introduced sustainable forest management in Ontario’s Crown land forests. These included the 1990 Pearse Report Renewing Ontario’s Forest Policy, submitted to OMNR, the 1991 introduction of the Sustainable Forestry Initiative, the 1993 Ontario Cabinet approval of the Policy Framework for Sustainable Forestry, which was recommended by the Ontario Forest Policy Panel’s report Diversity: Forests, People and Communities: A Comprehensive Forest Policy Framework for Ontario, and the passage of the 1993 Environmental Bill of Rights (and office of Environmental Commissioner.) In 1994, Robert Carman, a former Secretary of Cabinet and a professional forester himself, undertook an initiative called “Achieving Sustainability: A New Ontario Government/Forest Industry Business Relationship”, which addressed revising the stumpage system to improve the funding of silviculture, helped establish the Forest Renewal and Forest Futures Trust Funds, and examined tenure arrangements and compensation for withdrawals of land base. The passage of the 1994 Crown Forest Sustainability Act (CFSA), which came into effect April 1, 1995, emerged from all of these initiatives and made sustainable forest management (SFM) the law in Ontario.

59 organizations. NDP promises in the 1990 election to “green the province” and plans for an “environmental revolution” in Ontario led to high expectations by ENGOs, although once elected, the Rae government contended that “we did not actually think we were going to win the election, you cannot possibly hold us to everything that was in the election promises” (E7). Additionally, the Rae government was described as being aware that it would likely be a one-term government and, therefore, needed to take the opportunity to achieve a legacy of which it would be proud. Part of this legacy was the Timber Class EA and the CFSA (G13).

5.2.4. Lands for Life /Living Legacy/ Ontario Forest Accord (1999). Although a government participant described the Harris years as being “policy numb”, one important forest policy initiative of the right leaning Harris government was the conservation success achieved by the Living Legacy/Lands for Life negotiations (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 1999). When the Harris government set aside 378 parks and protected areas (2.4 mil hectares) through the 1999 Living Legacy/Forest Policy Accord between conservation ENGOs and some of the forest industry, it was considered to be an unprecedented conservation success. It was then the largest one time expansion of protected spaces in Ontario. This policy event contributed to the further consolidation of the paradigm change achieved through the Timber Class EA and the CFSA. The Living Legacy is an example of paradigm policy change being associated with political change. Mike Harris was the only candidate in the 1995 Ontario election who made a commitment to the World Wildlife Fund’s National Endangered Spaces goal of 12 per cent, taken from the Brundtland Commission (Bernstein & Cashore, 2000). The political commitment to endangered spaces was implemented with the Lands for Life process and the famous last minute bargaining between industry and ENGOs at the Fern Resort. The result was the Ontario Living Legacy/Ontario Forest Accord (Ballamingie, 2009). The commitment to expand protected areas put Premier Harris in line with similar “legacy” decisions of other Ontario Premiers and this is discussed in Chapter 7. Another motivation is that it helped the Harris government divert public attention from its “appalling record” on the environment in order to win re-election in 1999 (Winfield, 2012). The Living Legacy appears to be ideologically at odds with the Harris government’s Common Sense Revolution that was aimed at reducing the role of government and placing low priority on environmental issues, initiatives that were considered responsive to business interests. The forest industry is not among the “key beneficiaries” of the Harris government’s neo-liberal deregulation activities identified by Winfield, which include aggregates, waste management and rural land developers (Winfield, 2012). The Ontario Forest Industries Association, with the exception of two companies that broke ranks, was opposed to the Living Legacy and this is discussed in Chapter 7.2.3. Although Premier Harris

60 represented the northern riding of Nipissing he was not identified in the interviews as a supporter of the forest industry and this is discussed in Chapter 7.2.6. The “Lands for Life Round Tables” was a public consultation process to advise government on the strategic use of Crown land in northern and central Ontario (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 1999). One initiative emerging from this land use planning exercise22 was the 1999 Ontario’s Living Legacy, which was an agreement between environmental groups (the Partnership for Life composed of the World Wildlife Fund, Federation of Ontario Naturalists, now Ontario Nature, and the Wildlands League), the forest industry (notably Tembec and Domtar), and the OMNR, which resulted in the formation of the Ontario Forest Accord. These relationships contributed to the expansion of the Ontario forest policy network to include ENGO policy actors. The process that led to the Accord was criticized by some environmentalists for its secrecy, for “selling out” to industry, and for excluding First Nations (Lawson, et al., 2001). The World Wildlife Fund Canada, the ENGO most closely associated with the Accord, was described as being among the “best bankrolled group in the world and the best connected to business” (McKenzie, 2002 p. 68). Anticipating industry opposition, the Living Legacy Trust was a $30 million fund set up by the Ontario government in 1999 to invest in natural resource projects. It was run by an independent board of forest industry, academics, and government members, and funded projects that would bring economic, social, and recreational benefits to the people of Ontario and serve as models of excellence for forestry, fish, and wildlife practices. It was wound down in 2004. The Living Legacy’s objective of protecting 12 per cent of the land base for conservation was extremely ambitious in that it required a one hundred per cent increase from what was then about six million hectares of protected areas, as shown in Chapter 1, Figure 1.1; but this has yet to be fully achieved. The observation was made that although a 12 per cent land withdrawal seems large, the alternative perspective, held by some ENGOs, is that the Living Legacy was “a contract to remove 88 per cent of the landscape for industrial use with minimal encumbrance” (G 12). The 88 per cent of Crown lands that were intended to provide forestry and other development with greater certainty have not, however, been exempt from even more ambitious conservation targets since the Living Legacy. The Ontario Forest Accord promised the forest industry no long term wood supply reduction but this commitment changed with more protected areas required by legislation to protect endangered species, for example, and this trend culminated with plans to conserve 50 per cent of Ontario’s Far North boreal region (as discussed below). ENGO (P 15, P21), government (G12, G14) and

22 The issue of land use planning to determine the location of resource extraction versus protected areas in Ontario was addressed in the 1970s-1980s through District Land Use Guidelines and Strategic Land Use Planning (Environmental Assessment Board of Ontario, 1994). The OMNR developed a Crown Land Use Policy Atlas in 2005-2006 to assist with mapping of land use planning issues (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2014b).

61 industry (I 17, I 19) participants credit this outcome to the strategies of the ENGOs, the collaboration that occurred with the Canadian Boreal Initiative, and the receptiveness of the McGuinty government to Far North legislation.

5.2.5. Endangered Species Act (2007). The election of the first McGuinty Liberal government in 2003 brought in a new era of environmental policymaking that built on the conservation gains of previous governments and went beyond the issue of protected areas into green energy and technology and expanding the protection of endangered species habitat (Winfield, 2012). The ESA represented a paradigm shift in government’s thinking about endangered species: no longer was it sufficient to protect species’ habitat. The new requirements called for improvement of habitat impacted by development and the determination of the status of species was to be left to a scientific panel, with less influence by the Minister of Natural Resources. The new ideas associated with the ESA are discussed in Chapter 6. People in the McGuinty government such as Gerald Butts, the Premier’s former Chief of Staff, and subsequently President of WWF-Canada, had close ties with ENGOs and were influential in promoting the government’s environmental legislation. The McGuinty government, it has been observed, received a free ride from criticisms because of staff ties with ENGOs (Winfield, 2005). A government participant (G 11) identified the “strong presence in the Premier's office by the environmental community where people were placed in the Premier's office from the environmental community”. Their influence “manifested itself” in the Endangered Species Act and the Far North Act, as well as other green legislation such as the Green Energy Act and this legislation was developed to “secure the support of a well-organized environmental community”. The ESA provides an example of a politically successful campaign triggered by obtaining an election promise from Premier McGuinty to develop new endangered species legislation. At the time, even some in the forest industry acknowledged that it was outdated (I 19). Reminiscent of the Harris election promise to ENGOs about endangered spaces, the tactic of wringing commitments from politicians during election campaigns was again successful in the case of the species at risk objectives of ENGOs. With the McGuinty government’s re-election, the ENGO community was prepared to advocate for specific provisions, or as they described it “helping the Premier and his government to turn a campaign commitment into an effective law” (Ivey Foundation, 2007 p. 2). In 2005 a group of ENGOS formed the ‘Save Our Species’ (SOS) coalition. The partners were the David Suzuki Foundation, Environmental Defence, Ontario Nature, the Sierra Legal Defence Fund (now Ecojustice), and CPAWS-Wildlands League. Their successful strategies in advocating for the new legislation, as discussed above and in Chapter 7 were published in a report by the Ivey Foundation. The ESA was described as leading the world in progressive legislation for the protection of endangered

62 species (Ivey Foundation, 2007). The forest industry held a more skeptical view of the tactics of the SOS, observing that caribou was already “the poster child” of the Boreal campaign and that the endangered species advocates then capitalized on caribou because of its media attention and fundraising appeal (I 19). The new ideas about managing for endangered species, and the responsibilities and limits that would accrue to the forest industry and private landowners, have caused opposition to the legislation that has continued for seven years. Conflict is a feature of paradigm change that is identified in the literature (Skogstad, 2011). From the industry perspective (I 19), the ESA could be used by ENGOS as a “de facto land use planning” strategy to prevent or shut down any development that did not receive an exemption from the ESA by the Minister. The implementation of the ESA provoked reaction from local communities such as Renfrew County, which complained that it lost 30 per cent of its available forest land base in protecting habitat for wood turtles and other endangered species under measures required by the legislation (Grech, 2010). Northern communities supported the protests of the forest industry in their campaign against the ESA and the Woodland Caribou Recovery Strategy, arguing that caribou habitat had been managed under the Crown Forest Sustainability Act since the 1990s and should continue to be so (Northwestern Ontario Municipal Association, 2012, 2013). From a public policy perspective, the 2007 ESA was the most progressive endangered species legislation in the world (G 15). In a letter co-signed by 54 ENGOs, in protest of the 2012 proposed exemptions to the ESA, it is described as being: “Celebrated nationally and internationally by scientists and the environmental community as a gold standard in species-at- risk legislation, it greatly enhanced the government’s credibility as a green leader” (Ontario Nature, 2013). Its passage underscored the shift by the McGuinty government towards privileging the viewpoint of ENGOs and ecological forest policy and the reduced role of the forest industry in influencing policy decisions.

5.2.6. Far North Act (2010). The ENGOs’ campaign to conserve the boreal forest, referred to as the Canadian Boreal Forest Initiative (CBFI),23 began in the early 2000s, with leadership from the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), and some support from Canadian Federal and Provincial governments, industry, and First Nations/aboriginal communities such as the Dehcho and Innu (Boreal Leadership Council, 2003) (Canadian Boreal Initiative,

23 The engagement of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and other ENGOs in the conservation of the boreal forest has been a global campaign, with Canada in a leadership role: the Canadian boreal contains one-quarter of the world’s intact frontier forests and is Canada’s largest ecosystem, covering 58 per cent of the country. Canada has 290 million hectares of the world’s 1.7 billion hectares of boreal forest. Ontario’s share is about 50 million hectares: it is 74 per cent forest cover and comprises about 50 per cent of Ontario’s area (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2014f).

2003). The CBFI received funding from the American Pew Foundation. It has been successful in drawing global attention and support for other forest policy initiatives in Ontario, such as the Far North legislation and the Canadian Boreal Forestry Agreement (CBFA) between ENGOs and the forest industry (Gray, 2010). Central to the Far North legislation (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2014c), and what has fuelled the conflict surrounding it, is the Boreal Forest Conservation Framework provision of protecting 50 per cent of Boreal landscape north of 50 degrees latitude. In Ontario, this was manifested in the Far North Act, which is aimed at permanently protecting 225,000 square kilometres of Ontario’s northern boreal. The Far North Act, which the ENGOs successfully persuaded Premier McGuinty to support, represents a paradigm policy shift in two respects: first, land was permanently protected in advance of development applications, and, second, the size of the land withdrawn for protection was unprecedented in Ontario. The announcement about the Far North legislation issued from the Premier’s Office (Office of the Premier, 2008 July 14) stated that “Scientists have said that in order to preserve a healthy ecosystem in the Far North, a minimum of half of the land be protected while allowing carefully managed sustainable development in remaining lands”. The conflict between some ENGOs and some in the forest industry over the 50 per cent objective highlighted the mistrust about each other’s intentions with respect to land uses: “…I have discovered that what your worst enemy thinks about you usually has at least a grain of truth. We always suspected that the industry would want to chew up their half and then come looking into ours, and industry said we would protect ours and then start looking to protect every pocket of theirs we could, and I think in fact, both were right” (E 7.) As was the case with the ESA, the Far North Act was also the direct result of successful ENGO advocacy (Wilson, 2003). Rick Smith from Environmental Defence, Bruce Lawrie from the Ivey Foundation, Janet Sumner from the Wildlands League, and Tzeporah Berman from Green Peace, self- described to be a “home grown bunch of conservation activists”, approached Premier McGuinty and Gerald Butts and persuaded them to undertake a major initiative in the Far North (E 4). A First Nations participant (AP 22) observed that the ENGOs “protection target was the driving force behind the Far North Act”. The success of the ENGOs, as manifested in the Far North Act, caused a further rupture in the already antagonistic relationship between ENGOs and First Nations and this is discussed in Chapter 8. There was heated debate during passage of the Far North legislation. Then Conservative MPP and Party

Critic for Northern Development, Mines and Forestry, Randy Hillier24 criticized Premier McGuinty for having “given away 42% of this province to environmentalist friends in downtown Toronto. This is a land grab, plain and simple” (Murray, 2010). The Far North legislation continues to be opposed by the First Nations and some in the forest industry. The McGuinty government faced opposition in the 2011 election because of the ESA and Far North Act, both of which were unpopular with northern voters. The OFIA campaigned publicly for the Conservatives, and the forest industry organized northern mayors to protest both pieces of legislation. An ENGO participant attributed the loss of northern seats and a Liberal majority government to the animosity of northern Ontario to the ESA and the Far North Act, signaling a change in the political context and the influence of network policy actors. From this perspective, the McGuinty government had been “on a short string to the environmental community and it hurt them politically” (E 4). The Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement (2010) between company members of the Forest Products Association of Canada (FPAC) and ENGOs was perceived as an “historic truce” between the two groups and progress towards “business friendly” environmentalism (Watson, 2013). The CBFA involved an agreement by FPAC members to defer harvest on 29 million hectares of boreal forest across Canada (i.e., about 80 per cent of licensed boreal forest), including woodland caribou conservation habitat (The Canadian Press, 2013 May 21) and an agreement by ENGOs to suspend ‘do not buy’ market campaigns against FPAC members. The CBFA was described as “a combination of economic desperation and environmental enlightenment that led to a new paradigm in the relationship between the forest industry and its critics” (Yakabuski, 2013). Some environmentalists, however, had grown suspicious of such co-operative relationships and coined the term “green wash” to describe the undermining of the green movement by corporations who wish to be associated with environmentally sustainable products and the mantle of corporate social responsibility (Esty & Winston, 2006 p. 248).

5.2.7. Forest Tenure Modernization Act, 2011. As mentioned in Chapter 4, interview participants identified tenure modernization as an important policy event in addition to those discussed above. The Forest Tenure Modernization Act of 2011 also represented the paradigm change that has occurred in Ontario over the study period and is discussed in Chapter 7.

24 The 1990s in the U.S. saw a backlash against environmentalism with the emergence of organizations such as the Yellow Ribbon Coalition, backed by resource industries, which favoured government abolishing environmental legislation (MacDowell, 2012). In 2003, Randy Hillier co-founded the Lanark Landowners Association in the Ottawa Valley and expanded it into the Ontario Landowners Association. Its slogan, “this land is our land, back off government”, was in protest of government regulation that was perceived to favour urban environmentalists and to destroy the rural way of life. Randy Hillier was elected to the Ontario legislature in 2007 as a Progressive Conservative and became an opponent of environmental legislation.

Ontario’s approach to licensing commercial access to timber on Crown land forests is called the tenure system and licenses and it is a political decision by the Ontario government. Sustainable Forestry Licences (SFLs) are issued under the Crown Forest Sustainability Act. Licensing of most of the Crown timber has been, since the early 1900s, to large corporations with pulp and paper mills through ‘evergreen agreements’ that did not expire unless the company walked away from the agreement. The latter was rare but has occurred during times of industry recession, or if the government decided to revoke or not to extend the licence in unusual cases, such as failure to pass the third party Independent Forest Audits (IFA) (Ministry of Finance, 2011; Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2009). One incentive for the OMNR to pursue tenure reform was evidence from the economic downturn beginning in 2004: few mills were closed by shareholder, co-operative SFLs, in contrast to the huge shuttering of capacity by single SFLs,25 and this persuaded government that co-op SFLs were a preferable model for tenure modernization. A supporter of co-op SFLs explained that they needed to be cost efficient because even in good times for the overall sector, one of their shareholders would be facing pulp or lumber or oriented strand board market fluctuations. Unlike the single entity SFLs in which there “was a linear integration of forest management, same producers, same products, same forest manager”, the co- op SFLs “had to answer to a diverse group of products”; consequently “they were well set up for the global economic crisis that has ensued” (I 20). On the other hand, a single SFL, AbitibiBowater, was content with the status quo. It contended that the tenure system did not play a role in the financial difficulties it encountered nor in the general downturn of the forest products industry in Ontario, and that the commitment of fibre under the old system had been viewed as a competitive advantage (Ontario Forest Tenure Modernization Act, S.O., 2011, c. 10, 2011.). Another major driver of tenure modernization was the view that the large Ontario single, SFL licence holders ‘hoarded wood’ and prevented new entrants, including First Nations and other Aboriginal Peoples, from accessing timber. Companies from outside Canada with a potential interest in setting up operations during the recession were told “There is nothing available, even though the harvest on an annual basis might be 50 per cent of what was allowed, and everything else was tied up, so people were realizing that the tenure system was not working in the best interests of the sector as a whole” (E 9). Responsibility for tenure reform passed back and forth between the OMNR and the Ontario Ministry of Northern Development and Mines, with the same responsible Minister, Thunder Bay MPP Michael Gravelle, who supported the initiatives of the OMNR bureaucrats in the Forest Branch as it moved between the two ministries. The public consultation process involved the release of a discussion

25 The single SFL licences were held mostly by large forest product companies; in contrast, large companies were but one shareholder along with local communities and First Nations on the boards of shareholder, co-operative SFLs.

66 paper (Ontario Ministry of Northern Development Mines and Forestry, 2009). It was relevant to the forest policy network that the results of at least two of the studies done in response to the tenure discussion were partially incorporated into the government’s proposed legislation. The first was conducted by a University of Toronto forest economist who was retained by the Ontario Professional Foresters Association (OPFA) and supported by OMNR funding, to do an international comparison of tenure systems (Kant, 2009, 2010). Kant concluded that Ontario lagged behind other countries in making the transition to competitive market pricing and making wood supply available for new forestry businesses and community interests. He found that the concept of creating business enterprises within state agencies was more acceptable than privatizing the ownership of Crown forest land; the latter was an issue that had been discussed but rejected in the context of tenure reform (Nelson, 2008; Silcoff, 2007). The second study was conducted by forestry consultants who successfully approached the Ivey Foundation to fund their research (Williams, et al., 2010). They proposed moving away from a ‘cost- driven’ to a ‘sustainability-driven’ model that would involve treating forest management as a profit, not a cost, centre (thereby eliminating mill appurtancy by separating the wood producer from the wood manufacture); harvest levels would be determined by forest productivity, not mill demand; wood supply not being used in long-term contracts would be sold on the open market to any interested buyer; and First Nations and local communities would participate directly. Their recommendation for not-for-profit ‘local independent forest enterprises’ similar to the Westwind Forest Stewardship and the Algonquin Forest Authority models, was adapted with modifications by the OMNR as were their suggestions about making sustainability the focus of a new tenure model. The government released a proposed framework and planned for public consultation round tables (Ontario Ministry of Northern Development Mines and Forestry, 2010). The new tenure system proposal called for the creation of five to 15 non-profit Local Forest Management Corporations, compared to the 40 existing SFLs, which would carry out all forest management operations on the management units. The focus would be on forest productivity and sustainability and the available wood would be sold into open, competitive markets. This proposal potentially opened the doors to new entrants and responded to the concerns of First Nations, Aboriginal, Metis, and local communities. The survival of northern Ontario communities depends on forest industry revenue; when mills close, these communities need to attract new business. At public hearings on the proposed legislation in the spring of 2011 (Ontario Forest Tenure Modernization Act, S.O., 2011, c. 10, 2011.; Ontario Forest Tenure Modernization Act, S.O., 2011, c. 10 2011.), forest industry representatives, from Georgia Pacific, Tembec, St. Mary’s Paper, Domtar, EACOM, AbitibiBowater, the OFIA and smaller companies, had many objections to the proposed legislation. Their objections were mostly associated with threats to existing companies: the Minister

67 could cancel licences, commitments, and supply agreements for unspecified reasons and without compensation and appeal procedures; cancellation of licences would cause financing problems for large and small companies; additional LFMCs could be allowed beyond the two negotiated by the industry working group, which also called for an objective independent evaluation of LFMCs; businesses needed certainty about the rules for accessing fibre if they were to continue operating in Ontario; the reputation of Ontario as a secure, stable, and predictable jurisdiction in which to invest scarce forestry capital would suffer among industry leaders, investors, shareholders, customers, and employees; the confidentiality of a company’s timber transaction pricing and other sensitive business information could be in jeopardy; and the industry needed government to support a secure, predictable, and affordable long-term wood supply. To emphasize the last argument, an industry executive called wood supply “the lifeblood of our business”. For example, he said, two thirds of the input costs for operating sawmills are timber costs. The First Nations and Aboriginal groups were also opposed to aspects of the proposed tenure legislation. The Union of Ontario Indians expressed concerns about their aboriginal and treaty rights, and the ability of Local Forest Management Corporations to bring more Aboriginal involvement into forest management. They pointed to the findings of the 2007 IFA for the Algoma Forest, which was associated with seven First Nations. IFA for the Algoma Forest reported that slow progress had been made in identifying and implementing ways of achieving more equal participation by Aboriginal Peoples (Ontario Forest Tenure Modernization Act, S.O., 2011, c. 10, April 13, 2011,). Representatives for aboriginal communities who were shareholders in Miitigoog General Partner Inc. and the management company of Miisun Integrated Resource Management were concerned about the proposed new tenure models threatening the ‘landmark’ partnership that they had developed in the Kenora area with the forest industry –Weyerhaeuser, Kenora Forest Products, Wincrief Forestry Products, and a number of smaller, independent sawmills. They were in the second year of operation and satisfied with their board of directors, consisting of equal numbers of First Nations and industry and an independent chair. The legislation was then amended by the government to satisfy some of the objections raised by the forest industry and others during public consultations and the Standing Committee on General Government hearings. Even if there were some backtracking on Bill 151, the Minister of Natural Resources still had discretion under the CFSA to make any changes in licensing and tenure deemed necessary (E 9).

5.2.8. Aboriginal peoples excluded. Successful collaborations between First Nations and ENGOs have occurred in forest policy. One example was the Northwatch coalition with the Northshore Tribal Council and the Union of Ontario Indians at the Timber Class EA hearings. These collaborations have since been overshadowed, although

68 the Forest Stewardship Council has attempted to incorporate the interests of Aboriginal Peoples in SFM certification (Forest Stewardship Council, 2014). The perception of being wrongly excluded from the 1999 Living Legacy/Ontario Forest Accord agreement, between ENGOs and the Ontario forest industry, signaled the beginning of difficulties in the Aboriginal Peoples and ENGO relationship. Strong feelings were expressed by an Aboriginal Peoples’ participant about the disappointment of being left out of the “deal.” The First Nations saw themselves as being excluded from the “higher level, more politically connected” forest industry and the Wildlands League: “And I lost a lot of respect for the NGOs …I think that relationship was fairly strong in the 90s and I do not think that relationship was anywhere close to what it used to be since. Actually we felt betrayed by the ENGOs going behind our backs in doing a deal and I do not think there is …the same the level of dialogue at all anymore, and I do not even think people pretend in the ENGOs. There was a pretty emotional response” (F 23). An ENGO participant (E 4) acknowledged that First Nations, along with the mining industry, were excluded from the Living Legacy negotiations; the suggestion was made that ENGOs attempted unsuccessfully to engage both groups. The 2010 Far North legislation was the second forest policy related incident that increased the polarization between First Nations and ENGOs: First Nations perceived it to be an experience similar to their exclusion from the Living Legacy negotiations. First Nations were surprised to have been left out of the negotiations because there were only two municipalities in the Far North, and First Nations communities were the majority. Attempts had been made to involve First Nations; there had been a Far North table with Nishnawbe-Aski Nations that had foundered, again because of the failure of the province to acknowledge aboriginal and treaty rights. A First Nations participant observed that the government expected a positive reaction to the Far North announcement despite unsuccessful aboriginal involvement in its development: “I think Premier McGuinty saw it is a good news story: how can anybody go wrong with setting a target for 50% protection, who is not going to like that? It was political expediency because there was opportunity for a good news announcement and good words about the environmental movement being progressive” (F 22). From one ENGO perspective, the Far North legislation did not jeopardize treaty and aboriginal rights. Furthermore, there were pressing political reasons that required ENGOs to support the Far North legislation. The First Nations’ opposition concerned the ENGOs and there was discussion about “should we cut and run, should we withdraw our support” (E 4). The realpolitik of the decision was expressed simply: “Do you ever want to do business with a provincial government of any kind in the future ...and

69 the answer is fairly self-evident” (E 4). Ultimately, the ENGOs decided to support the legislation in order to preserve their relationship with the government, which had developed the legislation in response to ENGOs advocacy. The 2010 Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement was the third example of the exclusion of Aboriginal Peoples by ENGOs. In this case, ENGOs rationalized that the interests of First Nations were similar to governments, and no governments were signatories to the CBFA. First Nations criticized the ENGOs for being “wrongheaded” and pretending to be “progressive” in recognizing a non-existent government status for First Nations. First Nations were concerned with the effects of the CBFA on their Aboriginal and Treaty rights: “...there was acknowledgement of First Nations roles and their rights but in the end that is not what it was about and there is still no discussion going on with First Nations unless…there is going to be protected areas to be established and they are in favour of it” (F 22). Some ENGO perspectives were critical of the role played by other ENGOs in the estrangement between First Nations and ENGOs. One aspect of the “polarization” between First Nations and ENGOs was the observation that ENGOS were impatient with the slower decision-making processes of the First Nations, such as the Pikangukum land use planning. Instead of multi-year community consultation processes, “…organizations such as the Wildlands League are basically taking the position of we are going to Queen’s Park. We are going to get what we want and it is as crude as that” (E 1). The question needs to be asked if there is evidence of any network learning by either Aboriginal Peoples or ENGOs, resulting from the experiences of the Living Legacy, the Far North legislation and the Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement. This analysis suggests that the two groups of network actors have remained estranged since at least 1998 over important forest policy matters because of political, economic, and cultural differences that have been unsatisfactorily dealt with by the network. A comment from a First Nations participant (F 22) identified the overall problem of network exclusion and powerlessness for their communities: “when you look at the other side of it, and you take an eagle’s eye view, in some ways it just seems to be the same old, same old because the power relationships have not changed.”

5.3. Shifts in the Political Interactions of the Network Actors with Government

Table 5.4.1 documents the broad shifts in the forest policy network relationships associated with paradigm policy change as forest policy moved towards sustainable ecological objectives. Most notable is the evidence that the ENGOs moved from opposition to support for the government for their ecological legislation, and the forest industry moved from supporting to opposing the government for the same reason. Tensions and conflicts among the network actors can result in “a breakdown in the network or the development of new policies” both of which are associated with paradigm change (Marsh & Smith,

2000c). The Ontario Professional Foresters Association did not participate at the public hearings for the ESA and the Far North Act but their absence cannot be construed to mean that they did not have conversations with the government about the legislation.

Table 5.4.1. Summarizing Paradigm Change in the Political Interactions of Network Actors

Network Members Pre 1988 Timber Class EA CFSA ESA Far North 1988-1994 1995 2005 2010 state state OMNR state actor state actor state actor actor actor some opposes supports supports ENGOs opposes gov’t support gov’t gov’t gov’t for gov’t opposes opposes opposes opposes Aboriginal Peoples some oppose gov’t gov’t gov’t gov’t gov’t some supports opposes opposes Forest Industry supports gov’t support gov’t gov’t gov’t* for gov’t supports supports no no Foresters supports gov’t gov’t gov’t participation participation

* OFIA opposed; Tembec, Domtar, Alberta Pacific in support.

See footnote for sources26,27,28,29

26 Environmental Assessment Board, Reasons for Decision and Decision: Class Environmental Assessment by the Ministry of Natural Resources for Timber Management on Crown Lands in Ontario. April 20, 1994. Toronto (Environmental Assessment Board of Ontario, 1994). 27 Crown Forest Sustainability Act, S.O. 1994, c. 25, Bill 171, An Act to revise the Crown Timber Act to provide for the sustainability of Crown Forests in Ontario. Legislative Assembly of Ontario. Standing Committee on General Government. Committee Transcripts. 35th Parliament, 3rd Session (Crown Forest Sustainability Act, S.O. 1994, c. 25, 1994) (Public hearings: Aug 15 ,16, 17, 18, 22, 23 , 24, 25, 29, 30, 31:,Sept 12, 13, 14, 15, Nov 3, 17, 24, 1994). 28 Endangered Species, S.O. 2007, c. 6, Bill 184, An Act to protect species at risk and to make related changes to other Acts: Legislative Assembly of Ontario. Standing Committee on General Government. Committee Transcripts; 38th Parliament. 2nd Session. (Ontario, 2007a) (Public hearings: May 2, 7 & 9, 2007). 29 Far North Act, S.O. 2010, c. 18; and Mining Amendment Act, S.O. 2009, c. 21, Bill 191, Ontario Far North Act; and Bill 173, An Act to Amend the Mining Act: Legislative Assembly of Ontario. Standing Committee on General Government; Committee Transcripts. 39th Parliament, 2nd Session (Far North Act, 2010) (Public hearings-August 6, 10, 11 12 &13, 2009).

5.4. Conclusions

Chapter 5 provides evidence to answer the first research question: what has changed over the last 25 years in Ontario’s forest policy? In summary, paradigm change was observed in the evolution of legislation away from the interests of the forest industry and towards more ecological objectives. The nature of the paradigmatic change refers to a radical shift in ideas and beliefs about forest management. A Forest Policy Spectrum of Change was used to identify the pattern of increasingly ecological legislation supported by six Ontario governments representing the Liberal, Progressive Conservative and New Democratic parties. The public protests over old growth white pine forests in Temagami were associated with political reactions such as the government’s decision to require the Ministry of Natural Resources to obtain approval for timber management operations under a Class Environmental Assessment. The activist Rae New Democratic Party government, influenced by northern Ontario cabinet ministers and environmentalists, hastened the transition to sustainable forest management through the Crown Forest Sustainability Act in the 1990s. The Harris Conservative government promoted conservation gains in the Living Legacy over privileging the forest industry. The McGuinty Liberal government moved forest policy beyond SFM into stronger ecological protection measures such as legislation for species at risk and protection of the Far North. By 2011, the McGuinty government, under the lead of bureaucrats in the Ministry of Natural Resources, was attempting to make legislative changes to the long standing tenure arrangements favoured by the forest industry. The evidence of paradigm change was also observed in shifting political interactions as the traditional government and forest industry relationship came under pressure and the ENGOs became supporters of government policies. The question of how these changes occurred is discussed in Chapter 6.

Chapter 6: Explaining Ontario Forest Policy Network Change

6.0. Introduction This chapter uses the dialectical policy network model, shown in Chapter 1, Figure 1.3 and in Chapter 3, Figure 3.1, to explain how the policy network of Ontario forests has changed over time. This chapter addresses research question two: how has Ontario forest policy changed? Shifts in the Ontario forest policy network contributed to the paradigm change, towards more ecological objectives, and are discussed in Chapter 7. Who possesses political power and, therefore, is assumed to have the most impact on a policy area is identified in the literature as the core question in uncovering the relationship between policy networks and policy communities and public policy outcomes (Skogstad, 2008). In this study, attention focuses on the shifts in network influence among four groups of network agents: ENGOs, the forest industry, Aboriginal Peoples, and the foresters as they attempted to influence the decisions of the principal state network members, namely Ontario premiers and the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources. This research shows that among the non-state network agents, the ENGOs and the forest industry were more influential than Aboriginal Peoples and foresters. The argument in this research follows the network approach of Marsh and Rhodes. The pre-1988 policy community (characterized to be “an integrated, stable, and exclusive policy community” of government, industry and foresters) was gradually replaced by a contemporary ecological forest policy issues network comprising “loosely connected, multiple and often conflict-ridden members” (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992). As seen from the dialectical policy network model, the theoretical questions examined in this dissertation were about the strategic interactions (Hay, 2002) between structure and agency; between the network and its political, ideological, economic and knowledge-based context; and between the network and policy outcomes (Hay, 2002). The structural or institutional approach “holds that the preferences and values of policy actors are shaped fundamentally by their structural position”; and that political institutions “take on a life of their own” and promote and constrain the ideas and actions of the policy agents (W Coleman & Skogstad, 1990). Market structures and economics are identified in the literature to be important considerations in understanding policy networks and policy communities, specifically the forest industry. In this research, the economic decline of the Ontario forest products industry, the ENGOs’ use of market mechanisms such as voluntary sustainable forest management certification by the Forest Stewardship Council, and more than 20 years of ongoing budget cuts to the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources are identified as significant economic variables in the Ontario forest policy network and these were discussed in Chapter 2.

Historically, forest policy changes were decided by the OMNR in consultation with the forest industry and foresters; however, following the Timber Class EA and with the passage of the Crown Forest Sustainability Act, the industry began to oppose the government’s sustainable forest management regime and this opposition built in intensity during the development of the Endangered Species Act, the Far North Act, and tenure reform. In contrast to the forest industry, ENGOs worked collaboratively with all governments and were successful in achieving much of their environmental agenda and, in doing so, influenced changes in the structure of the network. Aboriginal Peoples, however, continue to struggle to define their relationship with the Ontario forest policy network.

6.1. The Interactive Relationship: Between Ontario Forest Policy Network Structure and Agency

6.1.1. Network membership. Policy network theory places importance on membership in the network. In the dialectical policy network model the role of agents is as important as the structure of the network. As Marsh and Smith (p. 6) described it “the outcomes cannot be explained solely by reference to the structure of the network, they are the results of the actions of strategically calculating subjects” (Marsh & Smith, 2000c). Toke and Marsh (p. 242) observed that, unlike Marsh and Smith, they focused on groups rather than individuals as network agents, except for ministers who had unique power in the network (Toke & Marsh, 2003). In this research, it was observed that differences within groups, such as dissension within the forest industry and the different objectives of ENGOs, could influence forest policy outcomes. Therefore, both individuals and groups needed to be included in the consideration of network agents. In summary, the Ontario forest policy network, as defined by the dialectical approach has experienced a transformation from a pro-forest industry policy community to an environmental policy network that is more concerned with ecological objectives. The network members identified below comprise a partial list; see Appendix 7 for a full listing of Ontario forest policy actors emerging from this research.

Table 6.1. Evolution of the Ontario Forest Policy Network

Evolution of the Ontario Forest Policy Network Membership of Membership of the Ontario the Ontario Industrial Forest Ecological Policy Community Forest Policy Before 1988 Network 2014 Ontario Premiers ● ● Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources - State Actor (OMNR) ● ● Ontario Forest Industries Association (OFIA) ● ● Ontario Lumber Manufacturers’ Association (OLMA) ● Ontario Professional Foresters Association (OPFA) ● ● Ontario Ministry of the Environment (MOE) ● Environmental Commissioner of Ontario ● Northern Ontario ENGOs (e.g. Northwatch) ● National Conservation ENGOs (e.g. CPaws/Wildlands League & the WWF) ● Southern Ontario ENGOs (e.g. Ontario Nature & Environmental Defence Canada) ● ENGO Activists & Campaigners (e.g. Greenpeace & Earthroots) ● ENGO Funders (e.g. Canadian Ivey Foundation & the US Pew Foundation) ● Ontario Federation of Anglers & Hunters ● Forest Product Companies that Withdrew from the OFIA (e.g. Tembec & Domtar) ● Forest Products Association of Canada (FPAC) ● Canadian Boreal Initiative (CBI) ● Forest Management Planning Consultants, Auditors & SFM Certifying Orgs. ●

6.1.1. (i) Five major groups. There are many organizations with an interest in forest policy, but the interests accounted for in this analysis included the five major groupings shown in Table 6.2 below. For example, there was a wide divergence of viewpoints among ENGOs, ranging from the “multiple use of resources” and road access mandate of the Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters, whose 85,000 members make it an influential conservation agency (Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters & OFAH, 2014) to the wilderness protection objectives of Wildlands League, a chapter of the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society (CPAWS) (Wildlands League & CPAWS, 2014), to the environmental political activism of Earthroots, formerly the Temagami Wilderness Society (Earthroots, 2014) and Greenpeace (Greenpeace Canada, 2014a). They were all grouped, however, as ENGO interests because, despite their differences, they share a common cause of supporting the conservation and preservation of forests. Another example of grouping interests within a larger category is the northern municipalities, many of which, although not all, have traditionally supported the OFIA’s position on forest policy, including the recent public campaign

76 against tenure modernization (Northwestern Ontario Municipal Association, 2012). Resource dependent northern Ontario communities and the forest industry share economic interests, suggesting that the interests of the former are at least partly represented by the industry.

Table 6.2. Participation of Network Members in Public Hearings *

Network Pre 1988 Timber Class CFSA ESA Far North Members EA 1995 2005 2010 1988-1994 OMNR state actor state actor state actor state actor state actor ENGOs excluded 77 15 10 10 Aboriginal excluded 68 4 1 15+ Peoples Forest Industry included 127 40 6 4 non- non- Foresters included 55 6 participants participants

* Denotes number of individuals and organizations that participated in the public hearings for these policy events. See footnote for sources30,31,32,33. While the number of participants does not necessarily indicate the influence of the major groupings of network members, it can be seen in Table 6.2 that the level of participation in public hearings concerned with forest policy issues, peaked at the Timber Class EA and has been declining since then.

30 Environmental Assessment Board, Reasons for Decision and Decision: Class Environmental Assessment by the Ministry of Natural Resources for Timber Management on Crown Lands in Ontario. April 20, 1994. Toronto (Environmental Assessment Board of Ontario, 1994). 31 Crown Forest Sustainability Act, S.O. 1994, c. 25, Bill 171, An Act to revise the Crown Timber Act to provide for the sustainability of Crown Forests in Ontario. Legislative Assembly of Ontario. Standing Committee on General Government. Committee Transcripts. 35th Parliament, 3rd Session (Crown Forest Sustainability Act, S.O. 1994, c. 25, 1994) (Public hearings-Aug 15 ,16, 17, 18, 22, 23 , 24, 25, 29, 30, 31:,Sept 12, 13, 14, 15, Nov 3, 17, 24, 1994). 32 Endangered Species, S.O. 2007, c. 6, Bill 184, An Act to protect species at risk and to make related changes to other Acts: Legislative Assembly of Ontario. Standing Committee on General Government. Committee Transcripts; 38th Parliament. 2nd Session. (Ontario, 2007a) (Public hearings-May 2, 7 & 9, 2007).

33 Far North Act, S.O. 2010, c. 18; and Mining Amendment Act, S.O. 2009, c. 21, Bill 191, Ontario Far North Act; and Bill 173, An Act to Amend the Mining Act: Legislative Assembly of Ontario. Standing Committee on General Government; Committee Transcripts. 39th Parliament, 2nd Session (Far North Act, 2010) (Public hearings-August 6, 10, 11 12 &13, 2009).

The forest industry presence at public hearings has dropped dramatically from 127 participants at the Timber Class EA hearing to four at the Standing Committee on General Government hearing on the Far North Act, perhaps reflecting the effects of the industry recession beginning in 2004. This trend might also reflect a public participation process that is not performing well, as suggested by research on Local Citizens’ Committees operating within forest management planning (Robson, 2004).

6.1.1. (ii) State actors.

In the network literature, the state actors are described having “the supremely important resource of being the body with statutory responsibility” (Toke, 2000) and in this research the important state actor is the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, established in 1857, and represented by the Minister and historically by the Forest Branch (Lambert & Pross, 1967). Historically, the OMNR had the bureaucratic and financial capacity to operate independently of the forest industry had it wished to do so: “they had a firm hand on the public lands in the province of Ontario and they could bring a forestry company to heel if it was necessary” (G12). Ontario premiers and their staff were observed to have been important forest policy network actors, although not in their support of the forest industry since 1988, but rather in the decisions of each premier, regardless of political ideology, to leave behind a legacy of expanded parks and protected areas (as discussed in Chapter 7). The interviews also identified the importance of the Minister of the Environment (MOE) in requiring the OMNR to comply with the Environmental Assessment Act. It is worth noting that the ENGOs took credit for persuading the MOE to design the Timber Class EA with the OMNR as the proponent instead of the province acting as a “corporate” proponent. The latter approach would have made it more difficult for ENGOs to oppose the specifics of OMNR’s environmental assessment (E 1). In the years following the Timber Class EA hearings, the Minister of the Environment has kept a lower profile in forest policy, focusing instead on processing environmental assessments.34

6.1.1. (iii) ENGOs.

As mentioned above, the ENGOs include a wide range of forestry, conservation, and environmental interests. The organizations that were identified, in the public hearing records and confirmed in the interviews, to have had significant influence on Ontario forest policy were the national conservation organizations, such as CPAWS-Wildlands League and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF.) The provincial organizations identified were Northwatch and the Ontario Federation of Anglers and

34 The Environmental Commissioner, however, a former PhD candidate and lecturer at the Faculty of Forestry, University of Toronto, has been vigilant over OMNR’s activities through the environmental registry and his annual reports to the Ontario Legislature.

Hunters, the latter described itself as a fish and game organization in support of Crown Lands providing multiple benefits rather than being an ENGO. ENGOs such as Greenpeace and Earthroots were also identified to be forest policy influencers in Ontario. ENGOs operating in southern Ontario, such as the Ivey Foundation and Environmental Defence, have been prominent in the ESA, for example, as has the province-wide Ontario Nature (formerly the Federation of Ontario Naturalists.) The differences between northern Ontario ENGOs and those in the south became apparent with the former supporting the Rae NDP government and serving in official capacities, such as Brennain Lloyd from Northwatch, who was appointed chair of the old growth committee. With the long serving McGuinty government, ENGOs at the national level such as the WWF, whose president Gerald Butts was formerly Premier McGuinty’s Principal Secretary, and southern Ontario ENGOS such as Environmental Defence Canada, worked closely with the Premier and his staff and publicly advocated for passage of the ESA and the Far North Act. ENGO members of the network also had divergent interests in forest policy that could be observed between those involved in local planning issues compared to those with national and international policy objectives. The latter were participating less or were even absent from the local forest management planning processes, having refocused their effort on the boreal forest, which was described by a northern Ontario ENGO to be “a very cerebral exercise and remote from the nuts and bolts of forest management plans” (E3). The same ENGO participant explained that northern ENGOs are frustrated with the “romanticizing of the pristine” Far North when the southern boreal forest is ignored but is at risk from road access and forestry and mining operations.

6.1.1. (iv) Excluded interests.

(a) Aboriginal Peoples The First Nations, Metis and Aboriginal communities have tried, the interview data would suggest unsuccessfully, breaking into the network for the purpose of persuading government to recognize their treaty and aboriginal rights in forest policy. Their interests are acknowledged to be significant to the policy network and from a government perspective as, “you cannot have a meaningful consultation about resource management in Northern Ontario right now whether it is fishery discussion, a wildlife discussion, mining or forestry… if you do not have some kind of working solution on the Aboriginal issues “ (G11). For Aboriginal Peoples, the failures of Ontario’s forest policy are formidable: treaty and Aboriginal rights have not been adequately recognized, the consultation process has been flawed and few economic benefits have accrued to First Nations. It is within this context that the Ontario government’s relationship with Aboriginal Peoples has been defined to be central to the future of forestry and other natural resources

(M. A. Smith, 2013). From a government perspective, the public has not realized how profoundly the history “around Native schooling and taking people away from their family units in the lost generation of parenting skills” has impacted resource management in northern Ontario (G 11). The Federal government was also blamed for “setting the stage for a lot of that antagonism” (G11). First Nations leadership, especially in remote communities burdened by health and educational crises, did not always have the capacity to deal with economic development (G14). Defining the problems was one thing but, as one government participant observed, finding solutions has not been advanced and nothing that has been tried so far has been successful: “…because it is a conversation that it is hard to get started. It is one that goes on 101 tangents mostly historical issues and grievances that cannot be solved by the people around the table today and I worry about it” (G 11). Another government viewpoint was that some progress is being made in government by listening to what Aboriginal Peoples want. Government was seen as being too solution oriented and taking “our paternal, materialistic view of knowing what is right” (G 14). Instead this government participant observed: “Every community wants to be treated uniquely ...it is very revealing to hear First Nation communities talk about community land use planning, and although they are interested in what has happened at the neighbouring community, there is no way they want a cookie cutter of that process of development areas, protection areas, or indeed preservation areas. They want it to reflect the knowledge of their elders and what is common is respect for youth” (G 14). From the First Nations’ perspective, however, their interests are outside of those represented by the Ontario government in forest policy. A First Nations participant (F 22) asked “who within government and who within MNR is speaking on behalf of First Nations in forest policy and I think that is a very important question and I do not have any answer”. First Nations are sophisticated in their understanding that economic self-interest was the motivation of the Ontario government to rebuild a relationship with First Nations that had faltered during the years of the Harris government. The Ring of Fire mining development, that was eventually postponed, was identified as one of the economic interests at stake that motivated the McGuinty government to work with the First Nations. As one First Nations participant noted, there were no “higher level principles” involved (F 23).

(b) Labour Unions The Rae government was supported by the labour unions, which had a strong presence in northern Ontario because of the forestry and mining industries. The United Steelworkers of America, International

Woodworkers of America-Canada, the Canadian Paperworkers Union, the Ontario Federation of Labour, District Labour Councils, the Ontario Public Service Employees Union, even the Swedish Forest Workers’ Union, participated in the Timber Class EA hearings. No unions were involved in public hearings for the Endangered Species Act or the Far North Act, an absence pointing to a change in their engagement with the forest policy network, as well as the forest sector downturn. Organized labour has not participated publicly in the forest policy network since public hearings into the “communities devastated by mill closures and cutbacks in recent years” were co-sponsored by the union (Communications Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, 2007). CEP was dissolved in 2013 and merged into Unifor, which reported representing 25,000 forestry sector workers across Canada (Unifor, 2014).

6.1.1. (v) Industry interests.

Some network actors are more important than others, or their influence greater or lesser depending on the government in power; it was argued that business interests have a “privileged” position in policy networks (Lindblom, 1977). In the 1980s, the results of an analysis of wilderness politics in British Columbia concluded that the forest sector was a “contested concertation network”, closed to the influence of the environmental movement’s values (Wilson, 1990). The structural approach identifies six different groupings of policy networks and defines a contested concertation network to be a closed network involving one strong business association and a strong state agency that share in formulating and implementing policy. An analysis of the Canadian pulp and paper industry found that the forestry issue networks resembled “company states”, in which provincial, and to a lesser extent federal, governments provide favourable conditions for larger business operations (Grant, 1990). In Ontario, the close relationship between the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources and the forest industry, as represented by the Ontario Forest Industries’ Association, began to fray with the passage of the CFSA in 1994 and reached a low point during the McGuinty government (2003-2012). The size of the Ontario forest policy network is sufficiently small that the network agents know one another. From the perspective of the forest industry: “When you are at Queen’s Park the deputy and the assistant deputies and directors....they know all of the environmental organizations by their first names, they know the association people by their first names, and they know most of the industry captains by their first names… it is just a very small fraternity of people” (I 21). The forest industry has been represented in the network by two provincial associations, the Ontario Forest Industries Association (OFIA) and the smaller Ontario Lumber Manufacturers Association (OLMA). The latter was dissolved in 2010 because its member companies, mostly sawmillers, could not

81 afford to operate it, thereby ending the tradition of Ontario lumbermen associations going back to the 1880’s and reducing the presence of the industry in the forest policy network (Armson & Mcleod, 2007) (Gillis & Roach, 1986). The industry was also represented by its individual companies, some of whom left the OFIA in disagreement with its government relations and other tactics. There was an ‘informal agreement’ that the national industry association, the Forest Products Association of Canada (FPAC), ‘stays out of Ontario’ but questions have been raised about which association should speak for the sector as a whole. FPAC has been viewed as a more progressive organization with respect to collaborating with ENGOs and the Ontario government (G 11, E 4, E 2).

6.1.1. (vi) Foresters.

In this research foresters are represented in the network by the Ontario Professional Foresters Association. They were also active in the network through participation with their employers and clients in government, industry, ENGOs, Aboriginal Peoples and consultants.

6.1.2. Network resources and policy network change. The resources of policy network actors, human and financial, have been identified as being critically important to their success within the network and achieving their goals for policy change (Toke & Marsh, 2003). The state of the resources of the major Ontario forest policy network groups, at the time of the major forest policy events being analyzed, is summarized below in Table 6.3 and is discussed in detail following it.

Table 6.3. Network Members’ Resources*

Network Members’ Timber Class EA CFSA ESA Far North Pre 1988 Resources 1988-1994 1995 2005 2010 large budget large budget and continued continued OMNR budget cuts and staff staff budget cuts budget cuts gov't and NDP/SFM new sources intervenor private ENGOs excluded funding for of funding funding for some funding for some for some some intervenor NDP/SFM no funding some gov't Aboriginal Peoples excluded funding for some funding identified funding still recession recession Forest Industry profitable profitable profitable began 2004 continued Changing Changing stable stable stable mandate, mandate, Foresters membership membership membership membership membership decline decline

See footnote for sources35,36,37,38

35 Environmental Assessment Board, Reasons for Decision and Decision: Class Environmental Assessment by the Ministry of Natural Resources for Timber Management on Crown Lands in Ontario. April 20, 1994. Toronto (Environmental Assessment Board of Ontario, 1994). 36 Crown Forest Sustainability Act, S.O. 1994, c. 25, Bill 171, An Act to revise the Crown Timber Act to provide for the sustainability of Crown Forests in Ontario. Legislative Assembly of Ontario. Standing Committee on General Government. Committee Transcripts. 35th Parliament, 3rd Session (Crown Forest Sustainability Act, S.O. 1994, c. 25, 1994) (Public hearings-Aug 15 ,16, 17, 18, 22, 23 , 24, 25, 29, 30, 31:,Sept 12, 13, 14, 15, Nov 3, 17, 24, 1994). 37 Endangered Species, S.O. 2007, c. 6, Bill 184, An Act to protect species at risk and to make related changes to other Acts: Ontario. Legislative Assembly of Ontario. Standing Committee on General Government. Committee Transcripts; 38th Parliament. 2nd Session. Retrieved from: (Ontario, 2007a) ( Public hearings-May 2, 7 & 9, 2007). 38 Far North Act, S.O. 2010, c. 18; and Mining Amendment Act, S.O. 2009, c. 21, Bill 191, Ontario Far North Act; and Bill 173, An Act to Amend the Mining Act: Legislative Assembly of Ontario. Standing Committee on General Government; Committee Transcripts. 39th Parliament, 2nd Session (Far North Act, 2010) (Public hearings-August 6, 10, 11 12 &13, 2009).

6.1.2. (i) OMNR resources. As described in Chapter 2, the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources has experienced downsizing, budget cuts, and loss of staff/expertise since 1995, most recently with the Budget Act. Numerous interview participants (G11, I21, F23, G14, G12, E4, E2, E5) observed that the financial pressures on the OMNR are requiring it to change its mandate and its operations. This situation suggests that the Ontario government, if not deliberately attempting to withdraw from the management of Crown land forests, will in effect achieve this result through budget cuts. The OMNR was characterized as a “tired bureaucracy” during the Harris budget cuts of the 1990s: “…they talked about the downsizing, the moving, and how many days to retirement, house prices in Peterborough. The MNR staff were very focused on their position in the civil service and so that took away a lot of creative energy going into forest policy development” (E3). Since then, the Ontario government has continued committing fewer resources: the OMNR announced further cuts of $65 million to the 2012 budget, which was approximately $700 million. With the closure of district offices and budget reductions in science and research spending already announced (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2013; Lalonde, 2013), further limitations on OMNR’s capacity to achieve its mandate can be anticipated. As one participant reported, the OMNR is predicted to become “policy shy or limited or inhibited” in the future because of budget constraints (E9). These implications are discussed in Chapter 7.

6.1.2. (ii) ENGOs resources. The ENGOs involved in forest policy experienced growth in resources and their capacity to influence forest policy over the study period from 1988 to 2014, beginning with the Forests for Tomorrow coalition at the Timber Class EA hearings and continuing today with fundraising successes. ENGOs have become more professionalized and they can offer long-term careers in their organizations. This increased professionalization has facilitated greater success in fundraising and more effective government relations. The Timber Class EA hearings and intervenor funding were identified to have been instrumental in ENGOs’ capacity building. A total of $1.83 million was awarded by Orders-in Council to the parties. Funding, however limited, enabled ENGOs and First Nations to hire staff, legal counsel39 and expert witnesses and to participate as full time parties to the quasi-judicial hearing process. Intervenor funding was described to be a unique opportunity for two reasons: first, it was financial incentive to ENGOs and

39 Canadian law schools began to offer environmental law courses in the 1970s. The Canadian environmental movement experienced some success in pursuing legal approaches through organizations such as Ecojustice (formerly the Sierra Legal Defence fund) that brought cases against the Ontario government during the implementation of the CFSA in 1998 and for perceived backtracking on its 2007 Endangered Species Act. The Sierra Legal Defense Fund was created in Canada in 1991 with financial support from US foundations (Bernstein & Cashore, 2000). The Canadian Environmental Law Association (CELA) led the environmental coalition, Forests for Tomorrow, at the Timber Class EA hearings (1988-1994.)

84 others to be part of a process that they could not afford otherwise; and second, without intervenor funding to civil society actors, the “conversation would have been very lop-sided” and dominated by the forest industry and the OMNR (E 2). However, the Intervenor Funding Project Act, 1988, disappeared in 1996 when the Harris government refused to extend it (Levy, 2002). From a government perspective, the Timber Class EA hearing process and the financial support for the ENGOs were factors in the coalescing of the environmental community interests around forest issues. One participant described the ENGO network today as being “stronger now than it ever was, held together by common interests and having a phenomenal capacity to harness volunteer energy and to rally around a cause” (G 14). Since the Timber Class EA hearings, ENGOs have experienced revenue and capacity growth with the support of experienced fundraisers and from charitable foundations such as the Ivey Foundation in Toronto and the Pew Foundation in San Francisco (Wilson, 2003) (Libin, 2010). This is discussed further in section 6.3 (Libin, 2010). Environmental Defence led a group of ENGOs that participated in a “Priorities for Ontario initiative” set up before the 2006 provincial election (E7). For southern Ontario ENGOs, funding has come in since 2006 from the Greenbelt Foundation to the Ontario Greenbelt Alliance. The situation for employment and careers with ENGOs today is described as being very different from the limited career opportunities available in environmental organizations in the 1980s: the World Wildlife Fund used to run its office in Toronto with eight people compared to more than 70 people in the organization today. The number of environmental organizations has also multiplied. One reason for this is that ENGOs are providing better paying jobs so their employees can afford longer careers and are not forced to look outside to government or industry employment. (E2). ENGOs have experienced successful fundraising that has, in turn, increased their capacity and effectiveness; among the Canadian foundations, the Ivey Foundation was influential in forest policy. Its forest biodiversity program began in the early 1990s and since then the Ivey Foundation has invested heavily in forest policy and market reform although in recent years it has shifted its attention away from forest issues. An ENGO participant observed that about 15 people in environmental organizations across Ontario have been fundraising successfully for two decades and this has been a big influence in growing ENGO capacity (E2). Philanthropic foundations in the United States are also acknowledged to have assisted the capacity building of Canadian environmental organizations. This is discussed in the section on related networks. Not all ENGOs, however, have benefited from professionalization. As one participant observed: “I think it is a less level playing field among the civil society organizations now than it was in the 1980s or 1990s. A smaller number have become more professionalized and the

gap between the more professionalized groups and, what I would call the citizens’ groups, is larger than it was in the 80s and 90s. I think it was catalyzed by the Harris years” (E3). From a government perspective, participants identified one of the ENGOs’ most effective resources for influencing governments is to speak with a unified voice. During the development and passage of the ESA, for example, the SOS Coalition was effective in identifying experts who shared their views and were able to work with the government: “…all speaking out with one voice along a solid agenda representing a cohesive plan.” (G14). In summary, many ENGOs are stronger today because they have had the money to employ staff full time. These ENGOs, therefore, have institutional strength based on professionals who are well versed in government relations, and the requisite political acuity. Many of the individuals have worked within the same organizations for decades and, therefore, have the added asset of institutional memory.

6.1.2. (iii) Aboriginal peoples resources.

Aboriginal Peoples rely on the courts to pursue their rights, and interview participants identified the implementation of Aboriginal and treaty rights to be a conflict in the forest policy network. It was observed that “big court cases” in the 1990s, such as Sparrow and Delgamuukw, that clarified the 1982 constitutional changes and decided in favour of a broader interpretation of Aboriginal rights, opened the possibility that consultation, accommodation, and self-government could happen (Hessing, et al., 2005b) (Appendix 3). More recent Supreme Court decisions add to this expectation on the part of First Nations (Coates & Newman, 2014). Ontario forest policy was described by a First Nations participant to be a “muddling through” process in the absence of formal consultation guidelines (FN 22). First Nations acknowledge that some attempts have been made since the late 1980s to bring First Nations’ interests into the “mainstream” of SFM planning, but none has succeeded and First Nations remain “sidelined.” It has been extremely puzzling for observers to understand how this situation can continue in light of the bar set by the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions. The Ontario government, like other provincial governments is blamed for a lack of accountability, and lack of direction in specifying guidelines of good consultation to forest management units (F 22). First Nations question why they cannot mimic the success of ENGO strategies and tactics, which were judged to be highly successful. The ENGOs’ ability to play “good cop, bad cop” with government, described as a situation in which a “well-respected” organization such as the World Wildlife Fund makes a productive contribution concurrently with a “pit bull” ENGO such as Earthroots that is espousing “controversial things” on the same topic, was identified as one of their effective strategies (G 11).

Outside of the pursuit of treaty and aboriginal rights in the courts, there is no evidence that Aboriginal Peoples have learned successful strategies from the Ontario forest policy network. The experience of Clayoquot Sound in British Columbia was seen as having “put environmental groups on the map as a force to be reckoned with” and they continued to move ahead with “staying power”, even though the Comprehensive Planning Board in that situation no longer exists. Aboriginal Peoples were described by a First Nations participant as having “a limited envelope of tools”, fewer voices and a mode of operation they tend to follow: “They have a way of doing things, and it seems that they do not often learn from others unless they break away and there are some of these ENGO- First Nation alliances that have formed, that have benefited First Nations” (F 22). One forest industry perspective is that First Nations would improve their effectiveness in Ontario forest policy if they engaged more actively in policy processes and the example of tenure reform was used. A forest industry participant observed the advantage held by First Nations is that government and industry are afraid of their “uproar” and First Nations tend to “scream and yell” about policy decisions, but do not become engaged and try to steer it: “I find with the First Nations that… they really alienate themselves from the process itself…and I think it is a bad strategy on their part, I think you are more effective if you can get affect change instead of just fighting it. I think they make people nervous but really to date I am not sure they have affected a lot” (I 20). From another ENGO participant, using the example of the Temagami First Nation, there exist divisions in all communities in Ontario, including Aboriginal Peoples. The fundamental issue is always whether forests should be preserved or developed for economic benefits: “…white activists have to get over the idea that other communities are somehow supposed to be homogeneous although they are not. There are always going to be differences of opinion…the traditionalists who say we have to protect mother nature and there should be no more incursions into the natural forest, and another point of view (about) our forests, our business, butt out” (E 7). First Nations have received limited government funding for forest management and land use planning for projects such as the White Feather Environmental Assessment (Pikangikum First Nation, 1996-present day) and the Far North community planning. The Far North Planning Advisory Committee recommended that the Ontario government spend up to $300 million over 15 years to support community planning and Aboriginal government support and a new Ontario/First Nation government-to-government implementation body (Far North Planning Advisory Council, 2009). First Nations have not grown in network influence as expected from the Timber Class EA hearing. They are not, however, without political resources. One of their most strategic resources in the forest policy network is to protest or to

87 blockade resource development: the blockade of a logging road by the Grassy Narrows First Nation has continued since 2002, the longest in Canada (Chiefs of Ontario, 2014).

6.1.2. (iv) Forest industry resources.

Among the Ontario forest policy network members, the forest industry has experienced the most apparent economic transformation from a once powerful economic and political presence into a much smaller sector that continues to struggle. This transformation was discussed in Chapter 2 and the effect of declining resources on the industry’s role in the forest policy network is examined in this chapter. In what has been seen as a fight for survival, the OFIA strategies were perceived to be out of a “tactical toolbox rooted back in the 1950s” including “name calling”, an approach that does not work with “solution-oriented governments now” (E4). The antagonism of the industry-government relationship during the McGuinty government became such that a government participant (G11) described the OFIA to be “persona non grata”. The FPAC criticized the McGuinty government for its inadequate financial support during the recession, especially in comparison to what it did for the auto manufacturing industry (Lazar, 2009). Further evidence of the forest industry’s loss of resources and decline in positioning its interests with government came with tenure reform. It was initiated by bureaucrats in the OMNR Forestry Branch (G11) over the objections of the large forestry companies who believed they had financial interests to defend in maintaining their single entity Sustainable Forestry Licences. Tenure modernization is discussed in Chapter 5.

6.1.2 (v) Professional foresters resources.

If professional foresters were once the powerful forest policy actors who “ruled the hill and did not feel terribly beholden to anybody” (E 4), such is no longer the case. Foresters have experienced a loss in their once strong position in the forest policy network, in part, the result of their decline in resources through shrinking membership as discussed in Chapter 2 (Kaknevicius & Bros, 2012). With the decline in the resources of the traditional major employers of foresters, the OMNR, and the forest industry, it is unsurprising that the profession has experienced a drop in membership and influence. What explains these changes in the resources of network members, and by extension, the network itself? The next section of this chapter answers this question.

6.2. The Interactive Relationship between the Network and its Political, Ideological, Socio- Economic and Knowledge Context

6.2.1. Political change and policy network change. As discussed in Chapter 5, six Ontario governments, New Democratic, Liberal and Conservative, were in power from 1988 to 2014. These governmental shifts were accompanied by other contextual shifts. First, demographic changes, particularly those associated with urbanization, reduced the political visibility of northern Ontario and, consequently, support for its forestry resource based communities. Secondly, Ontario governments, with a few exceptions, such as the Rae government’s involvement in the 1990 restructuring of the Spruce Falls Pulp and Paper Mill in Kapuskasing and its purchase by Tembec’s Frank Dottori from Kimberly-Clark (Rae, 2006), have not perceived the forest industry to be a government priority. Thirdly, Ontario governments of all political stripes have supported and taken steps to expand provincial parks and protected spaces. These latter initiatives were advocated successfully by ENGOs and have the result of limiting the size of the forest land base upon which industry is permitted to operate, a topic that is discussed in Chapter 8.

6.2.1. (i) Urbanization. The Greater Toronto Area (GTA), disparagingly described by a conservationist to be a “city- state”, has preoccupied the provincial political agenda and distracted government’s attention from natural heritage (E 6). The importance of cities, and their concentration of populations of new Canadians, have been examined by the environmental community in order to develop strategies and approaches for urban environmental issues (Canadian Environmental Grantmakers' Network, 2005). Even less has been done to engage Ontario’s urban populations, including new Canadians, in Crown Land forests. The Ontario government, compared to the other provinces, was observed to have been more sensitive to ENGOs’ advocacy for reason of demographics. To northerners, the French River is the demarcation line, south of which is located most of the voter base. Participants identify the influence of GTA voters as the route by which environmental communities have dramatic impact on the laws and rules around development in the north (G 16). Of Ontario’s 13 million residents, the population of northern Ontario was estimated to be about 800,000, after shrinking five per cent from 1996-2001, and it was predicted to fall lower with the spin-off effects of forest industry layoffs (Millard, 2005). The cleavage between urban and rural Canada, particularly the single industry resource communities, has been investigated (Hessing, et al., 2005b). The resentment of resource-dependent northern communities for southern urban society is historical and can be seen throughout Canada. “Northern Ontarians have a self-image as dependent subjects in an empire rather than as full-fledged participants” was the way one scholar described the alienation of northerners

(Wiseman, 2002). When Gilles Bisson, an NDP MPP for Timmins-James Bay, objected to the Standing Committee on General Government’s decision to hold public hearings on tenure modernization only in Toronto (March 30th, 2011), he described the demographic division between north and south in this way: “Here we go again. Queen’s Park is going to tell us what’s best and we’re going to be there, trying to pick up the pieces when everybody’s gone. I just get really irked, as I think most people in northern Ontario do, that we’re put in this situation again. I don’t know what the upside is in dividing the north from the south.” The decline of Northern Ontario’s political power was associated with the comparably small number of MPPs representing northern interests at Queens Park.40 Adding to its political isolation is the fact the Northern Ontario voters have traditionally supported the NDP, which has elected only one government, the Rae government of 1990-1995. The political issues and interests of the north have begun to disappear, as voiced by one industry participant: “In reading the...press over those years between the Star, the Globe and the Post …I have a sense of desensitization of the politicians in the area south of the French River about things that were important to the north of the French River people, which were mostly natural resources” (I 18). The economic and political power of Northern Ontario was historically derived from the wealth produced by its natural resources. Historically, northern Ontario was counted on to raise thirty per cent of the money for a political leadership event or an election because of the forestry, mining, and smelting industries operating there. As one participant reflected, these industries were headed up by “the mine managers who were powerful people, or in the forestry sector there was the middle managers or the woodlands manager. These titles were well known to people and these were powerful people who lived in the community and so they did influence events” (G 12). Urbanization is also associated with the perceptions of southern Ontario residents concerning the employment of forestry workers in the bush and the anti-industrial viewpoint. The observation was made that urban society is less accepting of industrial activities and development associated with environmental damage and this has contributed to a negative reaction to forestry. “We see a different type of worker. The forest industry ….is experiencing significant difficulty in attracting workers for their wood based operations. People simply do not want to be involved and engaged in any of the activity that in some cases has higher risks

40 The influence of northern members of Ontario’s Legislative Assembly has also changed over time. Of the 116 ridings in 2014, 12 are located north of Parry Sound -Muskoka, as compared to 15 in 1990 when there were 132 Members of Provincial Parliament (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 2014). Northern Ontario voters have traditionally supported the NDP party, which has elected only one government, the Bob Rae government of 1990- 1995.

and being away from family for extended periods and ….all of that is part of the whole societal change“(G 14). Associated with urbanization is the negative portrayal of the forest industry, which was perceived by participants to begin early in the school system: “I think kids are being taught that forestry is bad despite the fact that we live in wooden houses and that has been going on …since 1983, so it is at least a full generation of people that have been taught forestry is bad” (I 21). By the time students are entering university, their exposure to the negative messages in the public education system has limited their interest in the option of forestry education. The same industry participant observed that “now universities offer a whole stream of environmental studies so those who once used to go into geology and forestry now go into environmental studies and they are not taught about forest sustainability, they are taught about other more delicate things” (I 21). If negative portrayals of foresters and forestry are being taught in the public education system, they are on a collision course with the aspirations of northern Ontario residents for job training and employment, especially Aboriginal Peoples. More problems were predicted for the burgeoning youth populations of First Nations, Metis, and aboriginal communities: where else are they expected to find jobs and economic opportunities if not in forestry and mining? A government participant predicted that demographics will require the integration of First Nations into society: “…even if you did not want to do it for the right reasons, the majority of the population west of Thunder Bay will be Aboriginal in nine years, they are the work force in the area and it will be social ticking time bomb if we do not do something” (G 15).

6.2.2. Shifts in the ideas of the network. In this analysis, ENGOs are identified as the chief drivers of new ideas in the Ontario forest policy network. The history of environmentalism and its connections with forest sector transformation are discussed in Chapter 2, and evidence of value shifts towards ecological sustainability is reported in Chapter 7. The emergence of an environmental discourse about forests was described in Chapter 2 as recognition that forests are valuable for more than timber; forests have intrinsic, as well as economic value, wilderness for wildlife habitat, clean water, and carbon capture. The environmental discourse has overtaken the traditional forest industry narrative which placed employment, tax revenue, and resource community stability at the centre of government policy. The ENGOs in the Ontario forest policy network are generators of the discourse. The dominant discourse of a policy network is defined by to be “ideational structures that can constrain and facilitate in the same manner as social, economic or political structures” and “the dominant

91 discourse delineates what counts as knowledge and thus exercises a powerful effect on thinking…and (consequently) government policy” (Toke, 2000; Toke & Marsh, 2003). In other words, it operates as a “key structural constraint”; if network agents do not accept the government policy, Toke and Marsh argued that they face exclusion from the network. This appears to have been the case for ENGOs before 1988, to have been experienced by the forest industry during the McGuinty government era, and is the situation that continues to challenge Aboriginal Peoples. The dominant discourse has also been described as the “storyline” and tracing its development also helps explain the formation of the network (Toke, 2000 p. 840). Consequently, simply describing the ideas of the network would be insufficient; new ideas need to implemented, as they have been in Ontario’s forest policy events, in order to make the argument that ideology is associated with network and paradigm policy change. The shift in ideas within the forest policy network, as represented by the policy actors during the major forest policy events, is summarized in Table 6.4. The ENGOs have been consistent in their pursuit of ecological objectives since 1988 and the OMNR has incorporated these ideas into legislation. So too have the forest industry and foresters moved towards supporting ecological objectives but they are also pursuing wood supply objectives through SFM. Aboriginal Peoples have not changed in their advocacy of forest policy that recognizes their treaty and aboriginal rights.

Table 6.4. Summarizing Paradigm Change in the Dominant Discourse of the Network

Network Timber Class CFSA ESA Members Pre 1988 EA Far North 2010 1995 2005 1988-1994 sustainable biodiversity biodiversity forest OMNR wood supply wood supply conservation/ conservation/ management SFM preservation (SFM) biodiversity biodiversity biodiversity biodiversity biodiversity ENGOs conservation/ conservation/ conservation/ conservation/ conservation/ preservation preservation preservation preservation preservation treaty and treaty and treaty and treaty and Aboriginal treaty and aboriginal aboriginal aboriginal aboriginal Peoples aboriginal rights rights rights rights rights wood supply/ SFM and some Forest wood supply/ wood supply/ wood supply wood supply support Industry SFM SFM biodiversity conservation wood supply/ wood supply/ wood supply/ SFM and support Foresters wood supply wood supply SFM SFM biodiversity conservation See footnote for sources41,42,43,44

41 Environmental Assessment Board, Reasons for Decision and Decision: Class Environmental Assessment by the Ministry of Natural Resources for Timber Management on Crown Lands in Ontario. April 20, 1994. Toronto (Environmental Assessment Board of Ontario, 1994). 42 Crown Forest Sustainability Act, S.O. 1994, c. 25, Bill 171, An Act to revise the Crown Timber Act to provide for the sustainability of Crown Forests in Ontario. Legislative Assembly of Ontario. Standing Committee on General Government. Committee Transcripts. 35th Parliament, 3rd Session (Crown Forest Sustainability Act, S.O. 1994, c. 25, 1994) (Public hearings-Aug 15 ,16, 17, 18, 22, 23 , 24, 25, 29, 30, 31:,Sept 12, 13, 14, 15, Nov 3, 17, 24, 1994). 43 Endangered Species, S.O. 2007, c. 6, Bill 184, An Act to protect species at risk and to make related changes to other Acts: Ontario. Legislative Assembly of Ontario. Standing Committee on General Government. Committee

6.2.2. (i) Timber supply and policy network change.

As described in Chapter 5, supplying timber was the historical objective of Ontario’s forest policy. In 1988, the purpose of the Timber Class EA (p 43) was still narrowly defined by the OMNR “to provide a continuous and predictable supply of timber to the Ontario forest products industry.” Despite their limited financial resources, it was the ENGOs who introduced the concepts of sustainable forest management at the Timber Class EA hearing against the initial opposition of the OMNR. The Forests for Tomorrow Coalition (FFT) argued that OMNR should be ordered to develop and implement an “integrated” forest management planning process within five years so that “no wildlife populations decline”. The Northwatch Coalition proposed protection of the old growth ecosystems, of which less than one per cent of Ontario’s original white pine forest was estimated to remain. By 1992, the OMNR had proposed new measures for dealing with old growth and the Rae government established an advisory committee to review the issue of old growth. Further, the Coalition of the Ontario Federation of Ontario Naturalists and the Northern Ontario Tourist Outfitters Association and other ENGOs proposed habitat supply analysis and landscape management methodologies as a means of ensuring the preservation of biological diversity. The newness of these concepts in timber management was noted in the Timber Class EA decision. These issues were introduced as the parties’ thinking on these matters evolved; for example, FFT introduced the term “landscape-based management” on October 1, 1990, more than two years into the hearing. ENGOs were the first to introduce the discussion of conserving biological diversity, landscape management and climate change at the Timber Class EA. An ENGO participant expressed “pride” in the Forests for Tomorrow environmental coalition for being in the forefront of forest policy change (E 1). Forests for Tomorrow successfully convinced the Timber EA Panel to require OMNR to implement the new concepts. From the ENGO perspective, this was accomplished by “guerrilla forces with no budget and just ideas” that pushed “the forces that were good inside the Ministry” to move towards ecological forestry “10 or 20 years” faster than they might have otherwise (E 5). The evolution of the OMNR’s thinking about biological diversity in timber management was influenced by the concerns and proposals of the ENGOs, whose positions were supported by the Rae government. The OMNR began at the Timber Class EA hearings with the view that its “featured species” approach to wildlife management adequately addressed concerns about wildlife habitat. The ENGOs

Transcripts; and Hansard Transcripts. 38th Parliament. 2nd Session. Retrieved from: (Ontario, 2007a) (Public hearings-May 2, 7 & 9, 2007). 44 Far North Act, S.O. 2010, c. 18; and Mining Amendment Act, S.O. 2009, c. 21, Bill 191, Ontario Far North Act; and Bill 173, An Act to Amend the Mining Act: Legislative Assembly of Ontario. Standing Committee on General Government; Committee Transcripts. 39th Parliament, 2nd Session (Far North Act, 2010) (Public hearings-August 6, 10, 11 12 &13, 2009).

94 countered this introduction by disagreeing that it was sufficient to protect wildlife habitat, never mind the more important goal of maintaining landscape level biodiversity. As the hearing progressed, the OMNR did an about-face in response to political and ENGO pressure; it gave evidence that OMNR had changed policy direction and was, in fact, moving towards managing for biodiversity after all. OMNR testified that their change in direction was the result of a number of initiatives by the Rae government including: MNR’s Direction ‘90s policy (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 1994 ), a Wildlife Strategy (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2001), several Sustainable Forestry initiatives, the Endangered Spaces initiative, and proposals for habitat supply analysis and modelling and forest ecosystem classification mapping. Notably, this issue was one of the few where the forest industry opposed the OMNR at the hearings; the industry predicted legal and practical difficulties with using ecosystem management to achieve biodiversity and contended that “these concepts are grounded in land use planning rather than timber management” (p. 395). Throughout the hearings, the environmental organizations protested the restricted timber supply definition and argued for a “more holistic management approach which recognizes and elevates all other values associated with the forest environment of Ontario” (Environmental Assessment Board of Ontario, 1994 p. 54). Such an expansion of the purpose of the undertaking would, in their view, have entailed the broader concept of integrated forest management. As the hearing neared its conclusion, the OMNR again gave evidence that its thinking had changed profoundly since 1988 and that it was now committed to implementing forest, rather than timber, management.45

6.2.2. (ii) Sustainable forest management. Some of the central ideas underlying the development of a sustainable forest management approach were proposed by ENGOs during the Timber Class EA hearing and OMNR committed to implement them before the conclusion of the hearings. OMNR’s commitments were then legally required by the Timber Class EA approval and were subsequently enshrined in legislation, the Crown Forest Sustainability Act, 1994. This was the first major legislative reform since the decades old Crown Timber Act.

45 The hearing panel determined in the context of the Environmental Assessment Act, 1975 the OMNR was permitted to define the purpose of its undertaking; however, the legally binding terms and conditions of the approval required the OMNR to move in the direction of forest management from solely timber management. A letter from the Hon. Bud Wildman, then Minister of Natural Resources stated: “Ontario’s forests are a critical element of our environment that must be maintained and enhanced for future generations. To ensure these needs are met, the provincial government and the MNR have announced their commitment to sustainable forestry. The enclosed information package describes how Ontario will shift to forest management based on sustainability” (Environmental Assessment Board of Ontario, 1994). MNR’s assistant deputy minister for policy, Dr. David Balsillie, told the hearing panel that MNR was in ‘the midst of a dynamic change’ and they expected to implement forest management during the nine year term of the Class EA approval, but needed to do more scientific research and technical development for the transition from timber management.

The evidence on the connection between ideas introduced at the Timber Class EA hearings and incorporated in the CFSA, and the actions resulting on the ground, suggest that paradigm change beginning in the 1988-1994 period could be characterized as both incremental and at times, rapid. With respect to slow change, the OMNR began working on implementing Landscape Ecosystem Management through forest management guides during the Timber Class EA. The development of ecosystem landscape management for biodiversity conservation, the OMNR Forest Management Guides for Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Forest Landscapes and for Boreal Landscapes, has been in progress since 1994 and are only now being implemented (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2012b, 2014d). Network policy research highlighted the importance of a state actor, pointing out that “if a minister, or particularly the Prime Minister, is prepared to bear the costs of breaking up a policy community, he or she has the resources and the authority, although the cost of doing so may be high” (Marsh & Smith, 2000a p. 8). All Ontario premiers since 1988 have been receptive to changes towards more ecological forest policy, but two governments are associated with significant realigning of the network. Minister Bud Wildman was given a mandate by the Rae government to create sustainable forestry, over the opposition of the forest industry, and the result was the CFSA. A government participant claimed that the 1991 Sustainable Forestry Initiative, followed by public consultation through the Ontario Forest Policy Panel and seen as the precursor to the CFSA, was written by MNR bureaucrats in four hours under pressure from Mr. Wildman; and also made the observation that “one man can change a lot if he has the passion and the knowledge” (G 10). As reported earlier, the Rae government was influenced by its northern Ontario ministers, who were ideologically motivated to change forest policy. The observation that “a Minister is likely to construct his self-interest in terms both of implementing Cabinet priorities and safeguarding/advancing his own personal political position” is relevant in this regard (Toke & Marsh, 2003 p. 243). The actions of the Rae government could be characterized as being successful in endeavoring to “break up” the existing government-industry policy community and in being the architects of the emerging sustainable forest management regime that replaced it. The Rae NDP government facilitated more ENGO involvement in forest policy, including the appointment of individuals representing ENGO interests to government advisory committees. Consequently, forest policy outcomes such as the CFSA were different than previous legislation. For example, the Ontario Cabinet approved its Policy Framework for Sustainable Forestry as Ontario’s strategic forest policy in response to the recommendations by the Forest Policy Panel’s 1993 report, “Diversity: Forests, People and Communities: A Comprehensive Forest Policy Framework for Ontario”. The three members of the Forest Policy Panel, Dr. Peter Duinker, Dr. Margaret Wanlin, and Tom Clark (who worked for Forests for Tomorrow), were advocating forest policy change, and their recommendations were influential with the government and its decision to develop the CFSA (E 5).

Some of the expectations of the broader ENGO community were fulfilled with the 1994 passage of the Environmental Bill of Rights (EBR), and the creation of the office of Environmental Commissioner, which were initiatives developed by Ruth Greer and Bud Wildman, who were the Ministers of Environment during that time. There was a “commonality of thinking” in the EBR and the CFSA and they have endured for two decades: “these …Acts have a…concept of public involvement and public accountability and transparency that runs through both, it was the times and it was the thinking…with very little change in both cases” (G 12). The ideas and activity of transnational ENGOs, such as the World Wildlife Fund (UK) and at the international level, the US National Resources Defense Council, likely also influenced Ontario’s SFM policy. They were credited with promoting emerging forest policy norms concerning sustainability, biodiversity, and ecosystem management in meetings with BC and federal government officials leading up to the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, and subsequently, the signing of the Convention on Biological Diversity at Rio. These ENGOs were attempting to reframe forest policies in terms of new norms of biodiversity and ecosystem management in British Columbia at the same time that Ontario was working on similar issues at the Timber Class EA hearing and the CFSA (Cashore & Vertinsky, 2000).

6.2.2. (iii) Forest policy with ecological objectives. The concepts of biodiversity conservation and preventing further loss of biodiversity in forest management planning were first discussed at the Timber Class EA hearing, then embodied in the purpose of the CFSA and more recently, given more specific legislative force in the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the Far North Act. Similar to the Rae era, the McGuinty government and senior staff also had the authority and the resources to ‘break up’ the forest policy network. This research found that the ESA and the Far North legislation were characterized as another step along the path of paradigm change. From an ENGO perspective there was an evolutionary policy link between the forest policy changes of the 1990s and the 2000s: “The CFSA being in place makes implementing the ESA a lot more possible than if we had the old approach to timber management up there; they would have been …incompatible pieces of legislation I think, and now they are actually fairly compatible for the people in charge of resource management” (E 2). The new idea advocated by ENGOs in the ESA was to incorporate an “overall benefit standard” that exceeded the requirements in the CFSA forest management manuals to minimize adverse risks. Ontario Nature testified that one of the standard’s objectives was aimed at reversing the destruction of caribou habitat by logging (Endangered Species Act, 2007 Ontario Nature). This difference was explained by the OMNR to signify more than “no net loss or exchange of like-for-like” but instead that a permitted forest management operation or any development was “meant to improve the relative standing

97 of a species” (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2012a). The forest industry had objections to the proposed legislation, including the “broad definition” of “habitat” that was subject to “arbitrary interpretation” and predicted significant loss of harvest volumes and jobs (Ontario, 2007b). From the forest industry’s perspective, the overall benefit requirement was unachievable and could be used by environmental organizations to stall or prevent development (I 19). From the ENGO perspective, without this requirement, damage to the habitat of threatened woodland caribou in the southern boreal would be allowed to continue. The 2010 Far North Act, initiated by ENGOs and developed with the objective of protecting large areas from development, was further evidence of a shift in forest policy towards more ecological objectives. The issue of extending the northern boundary of the area of the undertaking north of 50 degrees latitude was debated briefly at the Timber Class EA hearings but it was the prospect of multi- billion dollar investment in the “Ring of Fire” mining potential that brought the issue of potential development in the Far North to the fore (G 12). ENGOs have been advocating for protection of intact forests in the northern Boreal forest since 2000 and have associated it with being part of the solution to global climate change and the conservation of woodland caribou (Boreal Leadership Council, 2003) (Hummel & Ray, 2008). Monte Hummel, a forester and President Emeritus of WWF Canada, made a presentation on the subject of sustainable land; his concluding remark to the audience was that whatever the results of processes underway, the non- negotiable position of the WWF was that 50 per cent of the northern Canadian boreal should be preserved (Natural Resources Canda, 2006). This demonstrated recognition that ecocentric values, in this case deep ecology’s caution that the destruction of nature is irreparable, were central to the mission of this environmental organization. In addition to the Far North Act, another outcome associated with the boreal campaign, and an influence on Ontario’s forest policy network, was the 2010 Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement (CBFA). The purpose of the CFBA was to defer timber harvesting in caribou habitat for three years until plans could be developed for the recovery of caribou and improvement of forestry company practices (CBFA Steering Committee, 2010). The CFBA is discussed in Chapter 7.

6.2.3. Economic change.

6.2.3. (i) Opportunities for ENGOs to bring solutions to government. While government spending cuts and downsizing have diverted the focus of the OMNR bureaucrats, and the recession has depleted the ranks of the Ontario forest industry, as reported earlier, ENGOs have experienced growth in human and financial capacity. Theoretically, the concept of policy entrepreneurs was defined to be skillful policy actors who could seize opportunities for pushing their

98 agendas by ‘coupling’ solutions with problems (Kingdon, 2007). The ENGOs involved in Ontario forest policy had become well positioned to undertake this activity. In contrast to the growing influence of the ENGO community, the Ontario forest industry recession was associated with a decline in the power of the resource sector to protect their traditional areas of interest. Specifically, the flight of new people with new ideas was acute, where “many of the younger, smarter and more progressive people that were brought on …1995 to 2005 have all disappeared …because of bankruptcy and mill closure, the economic catastrophe that has hit the forest industry” (E 2). Consequently, ENGOs saw themselves being positioned to fill the policy void formed by the loss of capacity in government and the forest industry because there is no longer the expectation that government can solve complicated land use debates or public policy debates as it did 20 years ago. As one participant noted, “If you can solve problems that government has, they are interested, they are faced with a barrage of problems every day, just conflicting interests and if you can resolve big portions of that for them and bring packaged solutions to them, they will be interested, if you cannot, they are not. I do not see a lot of vision nor do I see the leadership from government” (E 4). This same interviewee observed that it was the ENGOs who had the initiative and took on the leadership, absent in government, to work successfully with the forest industry in providing solutions to government. The examples given were the Living Legacy (although government was acknowledged to have helped broker the agreement between industry and ENGOs), the Canadian Boreal Initiative, the Endangered Species Act and the Far North Act. “Politicians were convinced they could solve a number of their problems because normally warring parties were now getting along and they were not being always asked to referee but we would bring bundled solutions to them and this reflected a tectonic shift between the conservation community and industry” (E 4). Government budget cuts and a shrinking civil service have also caused the OMNR to look at involving non-governmental organizations in their science programs, thereby providing further opportunities for ENGOs to build capacity and public exposure. One government participant predicts the OMNR will hire more ENGOs to do the work on problems such as invasive species control, and use citizen scientist approaches for monitoring activities such as volunteers do for the Breeding Bird Atlas (G 14). The success of transferring more responsibilities to the ENGOs will depend on the OMNR providing funding for this work. The OMNR’s increasing reliance on “science partnerships” has strengthened the influence of the ENGO policy network actors. For example, the Wilderness Society became an important policy actor in the protection of caribou habitat in the boreal. The OMNR contracted with the Wilderness Society for

99 caribou tracking and for Ontario Forest Research Institute monitoring. The point was made that consultants such as the Wilderness Society need to have the credibility and the proper qualifications to have their work peer reviewed, and be good communicators in the public arena (G 14). From one ENGO viewpoint, working to find solutions with the government and the forest industry was productive environmental problem solving, and preferable to seeking revenge on an industry. An example given of the latter was the mercury contamination of the English Wabigoon River system by Reed Paper, and other owners of the pulp and paper mill over many years: “…aren’t we in the business of trying to find a solution and move forward on this as opposed to just being vengeful? A lot of the environmental community has to figure out what is your measurement of success here. I like to see tangible results where the environment is better off because of what we are doing and people are better off” (E 4). This attitude of conciliation is not shared by the Grassy Narrows First Nation, which experienced the mercury contamination. As mentioned earlier, since 2002, they have been boycotting the OMNR’s attempts to implement the Whiskey Jack forest management plan on their traditional lands for reasons including concerns that the proposed clearcut logging would further erode their Aboriginal and treaty rights and elevate mercury levels in fish (Chiefs of Ontario, 2014).

6.2.3. (ii) Financial stress on the forestry sector. As discussed in Chapter 2, a series of global and structural economic, market, and financial events reduced the size of the Ontario forest industry and triggered a restructuring that continues into 2014. This economic context was significant to changes in the network. In addition to negative impacts on northern communities and company bankruptcies, the industry recession caused financial stress on the broader forest sector and the network policy actors that are supporters and partners of the forest industry. These include the Canadian Council of Forest Ministers, whose profile has almost disappeared; the Canadian Forest Service’s Model Forest program that was practically eliminated in 2010; the end of funding to the Sustainable Forest Management Network; and the 2013 merger of the Canadian Forestry Association and the Canadian Institute of Forestry. The downsizing of the OMNR’s science program, resulting from the 2012 budget cutbacks, suggests more network change in the future.

6.2.3. (iii) Turmoil at the OMNR. The budget cuts beginning in 1995 with the Harris Government and continuing into 2014, as described in Chapter 2, have required the OMNR to adapt and to change, with consequences for the bureaucracy’s role in the forest policy network. Provincial revenues from the once rich forest industry have diminished to the point that, for some, it was not worth continuing to defend the status quo of the OMNR’s historical support to the Ontario forest products industry. One reason for the OMNR’s

100 reluctance to change its relationship with the forest industry was because officials were given no “incentive for creative public policy;” rather, they worked under “slash and burn” fiscal constraints that gave them a “Balkanized view of the world” (G16). OMNR has been in a constant state of downsizing for 20 years. The same government participant told a story of a new deputy minister, who at that time, called his managers together to tell them: “Look to the guy on your right, look to the guy on your left. Within 10 years one of you will be gone, within 20 years, two or three of you will be gone”. He said, “I hope you are ready for the ride because you are going to spend the rest of your career managing downsizing” (G 16). The observation here is that OMNR was badly positioned to find a new model of service design and delivery, because the bureaucrats had spent their careers managing downsizing; ultimately such a work environment was unlikely to promote creative public policy. The impacts of the ongoing budget cutbacks on the Ministries of both Natural Resources and Environment were unsettling for the continuity of leadership, the lack of funding to meet the mandates of the organizations, and the pressure on individuals to react to crises without the benefit of planning. The retirement of an aging workforce and the institutional memory loss associated with this process were likely other factors to be considered. A government participant captured the uncertainty that has become the norm: “…how many times have they shuffled chairs over there… and restructured again? …..it is masked by the chaos in the government ministries and the dominant inadequacy of their resourcing has caused…..a fog of war... it is like troops on the battlefront are taking casualties and they have to constantly reorganize themselves in order to maintain themselves against the onslaught” (G 12). Associated with ongoing spending cuts and the conflicting political signals, the turmoil at the OMNR has been described as representing an institution going through culture change, but stuck between the old and the new. One aspect of the new culture was characterized as the OMNR defining itself to be “keepers of the consultation” and to be “arriving at solutions in a timely manner” as opposed to the past where they were seen as being the “experts in everything” and being overly concerned with enforcing rules (G 16). In either case, the perception of participants was that the OMNR was losing its status within government at Queen’s Park: “whether it was a series of ministers, of spending decisions, political influence, maybe that was the start of the exodus of senior competent staff, all of the above ….I guess their place on the ladder was starting to slip” (G 6).

6.2.3. (iv) Aboriginal peoples’ expectations disappointed by forest policy.

Forest policy is situated squarely in the middle of the broader constitutional, political and legal disputes about treaty and Aboriginal rights (Tindall, et al., 2103). Research on Aboriginal policy agencies

101 concluded that resource ministries, such as the OMNR, were associated with “pressured pluralist provincial-aboriginal policy networks” in which state capacity was relatively low (i.e., OMNR could not easily impose solutions and must seek agreement). There was advocacy by many Aboriginal Peoples and conflict over objectives (Malloy, 2001b). The Timber Class EA, while criticized for the panel’s refusal to decide on treaty and aboriginal rights, raised high expectations that the economic benefits of forestry, by way of licensing and jobs, would begin to flow to northern aboriginal communities. The Rae government developed a Statement of Political Relationship which was perceived by Aboriginal Peoples to promise recognition of self-government. Bud Wildman, his Minister of Aboriginal Affairs, was a “great supporter” of First Nations, Metis, and Aboriginals on fishing and land claims. However, the First Nations initiatives of the Rae government were ignored by the succeeding Harris government. The tension between First Nations and ENGOs, dating from the Living Legacy negotiations, escalated with the Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement (CBFA) and the Far North legislation. Twenty five years later, with the exception of a few promising examples such as the White Feather, Pikangukum, Miitigoog, Nigganni and Constance Lake developments (Ontario Professional Foresters Association, 2014), little has been achieved economically from forestry. The economic downturn of the forest industry was another, more recent factor in fewer opportunities being available for First Nations, Metis, and Indigenous communities. Their involvement in the provincial wood supply competition speaks to the fact that First Nations, Metis, and Aboriginal face the same risks as other forestry businesses, even if the challenges to entry are overcome. First Nations, and many others, looked at the feasibility of building a pellet mill when the potential for biomass demand was beginning to look promising. They perceived unfairness, however, in the OMNR selection process in which First Nations’ participation was sought but Aboriginal Peoples were subjected to the same rules as Tembec and other large forest product companies, which had many more resources to compete. As it turned out, ironically, they avoided becoming involved in a potentially money losing pellet business: “it was a token process and in the end we were lucky that it was so complicated and cumbersome because the natural gas market went down and the whole market for wood pellets went away and we did not end up with a white elephant ourselves… had the MNR moved faster in that process we might be broke today” (F 23). First Nations were justified in their “high” expectation of jobs and economic benefits following the Timber Class EA decision. Term and condition 77 of the approval, and its later reiteration as condition 34 in a further review by the Environmental Assessment Board, are legally binding on the OMNR. It requires the OMNR district managers to negotiate with First Nations to receive benefits from FMP, including jobs and income associated with bush and mill operations, wood supply for First Nations

102 sawmills, third party licenses and training in forestry operations. These expectations have long gone unfulfilled. First Nations perceived the OMNR and industry to be “dragging their feet” and when OMNR issued “glowing annual reports” about what they had done for each FMU, First Nations were dubious because “ there were this many jobs before the EA”(F 22). First Nations made submissions on their rights issues but the Timber Class EA hearing panel (p. 350-352) decided that it was beyond their jurisdiction to decide. First Nations were also opposed to the CFSA for the same reason: it did not address Aboriginal and treaty rights. The failures of the Timber Class EA and the CFSA were a “huge disappointment” and “that theme, that failure to recognize Aboriginal and treaty rights and find a way to incorporate them into a legislation continues to be the issue among First Nations in Ontario”(F22). From the government’s perspective, a variety of factors have delayed the elusive solution for First Nations to share in the economic benefits of forestry. They include leaving industry to deal with First Nations on resource development projects, economic recession, and unsuccessful negotiations. Nonetheless, efforts have been made to increase First Nations participation: “There is lots of material that has been drafted and shared and alternatives put forward, and lots of thinking has been done on all fronts both inside government and locally as well, but nothing has been able to really break through that” (G 14). While the economic crisis and restructuring of the forest industry posed a problem in one respect, it also presented opportunities for First Nations and aboriginal communities, who had wanted to hold licences for a long time. In the Kenora area the closure of the Abitibi mill and its licence on the Whiskey Jack Forest benefitted the Miitigoog General Partner Inc. development, a situation which was also associated with the Grassy Narrows conflict and the province being “desperate to find a good news story there.” Similarly, the Red Rock First Nation, and three other First Nations, took over the licence for the Lake Nipigon Forest Management Unit when the former licence-holder, Buchanan Forest Products, went bankrupt: “I think for First Nations it was a door opening and they were ready… and stepped into the breach, we will take over this forest licence even if it does not look that great economically right now, but then looking at the longer term” (F 22). First Nations communities in the Boreal have also been pursuing their own goals. For example, beginning in 1996 the Whitefeather Forest Initiative of the Pikangikum First Nation was one of the first to develop community based land use planning and resource stewardship strategies. Under its Northern Boreal Initiative, the OMNR provided funding for this work, and in 2000 committed to granting commercial forest management tenure to the First Nation. The first FMP was approved for 2009 (Pikangikum First Nation, 1996-present day).

103

6.2.4. Knowledge changes The technological advances in data management, Geographic Information System (GIS) mapping of forest resources and computer modeling of disturbance regimes, and economic and wood supply analyses were becoming available to all forest policy actors in the 1990s (Kohm & Franklin, 1997). WWF, however, was seen to be the only ENGO in Canada in the 1990s, “that had the technical capability to generate the studies and sit down with the company foresters and actually do all the GIS work and who had the cultural proclivity to sit down and work these things out; that is not true anymore” (E 4). The improved technical capability of ENGOs since then to work with forest data on landscape analysis, for example, and to challenge the information used by government planners and the forest industry, was a factor in fortifying their position in the network (as reported by G 12, E 4, E 5). ENGOs were described to have become almost more driven by technology than by policy. As one industry participant reported: today ENGOs are technically skilled in information management, in planning and modelling and have “tremendous ability to judge or to question decisions and modeling assumptions” by the forest industry and government” (I 17). In contrast to the ENGOs’ increasing knowledge base, the OMNR and the forest industry appear to be withdrawing from investments in science, technology, and research (Ontario Ministry of Finance, 2012). Among other examples, the 2013 closure of the Forest Ecosystem Science Co-operative of forest industry and government partners indicated that funding is scarce. The situation in 2014 is different from the OMNR’s forest science program during the Rae government when “there was so much money” being invested in the FMP guidelines, which were a “ huge and controversial undertaking” that was “cranked out at an absolutely mind numbing clip, and it was being implemented no sooner than it got out” (G 13).

6. 3. Changes in the Relationship between the Forest Policy Network and Other Related Networks Seen through the dialectical policy network model perspective, the Ontario forest policy network can be conceived as being one among other related networks, such as those formed around the interests of the United States environmental community or forest industry or the Canadian federal government. However, unless the network relationships and their specific influences on Ontario forest policy can be identified over time, the theoretical framework would not be useful in the policy analysis. The concept of related networks would also require clarifying the level of analysis (W Coleman & Skogstad, 1990). For this research, the level of analysis was on the meso or sectoral level, which was defined to be the activities of the broader Ontario forest sector, including the forest industry and other policy actors, and the decisions made by Ontario politicians and the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources. In network theory, the development of a meso level of analysis is seen as being productive in capturing both the micro level

104 activities such as the behavior of individuals and the macro level activities of states, such as federalism and international relations (W Coleman & Skogstad, 1990). The argument in this research is that no effective Ontario forest policy network could exist that did not include the state actor (the OMNR), because of Canada’s public ownership of Crown land forests and the assignment of provincial responsibility for them, reaffirmed by Section 92(a) of the Constitution Act, 1982 (M. Hessing, M. Howlett, & T. Summerville, 2005a). The important power relationships are those that each network member had with the Ontario government and the OMNR. In recent years, ENGOs have challenged the exclusive role of OMNR in the Ontario forest policy network by way of initiatives to negotiate agreements such as the CBFA with the forest industry, and by going to government afterward with the solution for their approval. One industry participant expressed concern about the influence on legislation by non-state policy actors such as ENGOs: “The government of Ontario is elected and, therefore, accountable to the public of Ontario…by handing over any authority to non-elected groups, you are basically removing a level of accountability that…will generate debate, but in a democratic society how can you have people making decisions that do not have any accountability whatsoever?” (I 19). The concept of policy making shared between the state and non-state actors was discussed in the policy network literature as a concern by the public about the legitimacy of being governed through policy networks (Skogstad, 2003) but more often in reference to economic policy actors than other non-state actors such as ENGOs. A related network factor was the role of the federal government in the Ontario policy network.46 Canada was described as a “forestry superpower” in the 1990s for its contribution, discussed in Chapter 2.2, in developing sustainable forest management and the Criteria and Indicators (C&I) used to measure forest sustainability (B. Cashore, 2001). Since then, the federal government, represented by the Department of Natural Resources Canada (NRCan), and its agency, the Canadian Forest Service, has been downsizing its forestry mandate within Canada and internationally, and cutting forestry funding to the provinces since the 1990s (G 16). Contrast this with the Mulroney Conservative government, where a separate Department of Forestry existed (1990-1993) with an “extremely active international agenda” involving the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the negotiation

46 The performance of the federal government, which was environmentally active in the 1990s, before budget cuts to reduce deficits, was described as an “environmental straggler” by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and a survey for the David Suzuki Foundation concluded that Canada ranked 24th in 2010 among the developed countries environmental performance ranking (MacDowell, 2012). The Harper government further alienated some ENGOs by changes made to an omnibus budget bill in 2012 that allowed cabinet ministers to scope environmental assessments for resource projects (McCarthy, 2012).

105 of international forestry legally binding agreements between governments (G16). The legacy of Canadian involvement in global forest issues remains a powerful force in attracting international students to study forestry in Canadian universities and in building Canada’s reputation as a leading forestry nation, but it has been tarnished by the lack of funding and Canada’s position on issues such as climate change. The Canadian Council of Forest Ministers was also active in the 1990s with SFM initiatives and national forest strategies but has become less so. One reason suggested for its withdrawal is that Ontario was very involved with the Council but in recent years, with budget cutbacks, it has withdrawn from a leadership role (G 14). A high profile issue affecting the Ontario forest policy network is the federal government’s management of the softwood lumber file; these agreements have been criticized for working against Ontario’s interests to the advantage of other provinces such as New Brunswick (G 13). The OMNR has invested considerable resources in the softwood lumber negotiations but one industry participant criticized the OMNR for using the softwood lumber agreement as an excuse to avoid solving some of the other significant problems facing the Ontario forest industry (I 21).47 The involvement of the federal government in the Ontario forest policy network might also have increased the access for ENGOs to policymakers. A factor related to the success of ENGOs in promoting ecological forest policy might have been the opportunities offered by Canada’s federal system of government for “venue shopping” (Montpetit, 2002). In other words, if an Ontario government were unreceptive to ENGO proposals, environmental groups could look for a more receptive political venue by pursuing their case in Ottawa. This was done successfully during the 1990s with Canada’s active international engagement with forestry. The American environmental community has influenced Canadian provincial forest policy networks. In the early 1990s, following the spotted owl campaign in the US Pacific Northwest, American

47 The list of decisions for the various arbitrations under the Softwood Lumber Agreement suggests the potentially complex impacts on Ontario forest policy associated with this protracted political and commercial dispute between Canada and the United States: 7941 – Adjustment Factor Arbitration - March 3, 2008-LCIA Tribunal decides in favour of Option A provinces, and no further proceedings are required.-LCIA Tribunal decides against Option B, and proceedings related to remedy are required. 7941 – Adjustment Factor Arbitration – February 23, 2009-LCIA Tribunal determines that a 10% penalty tax is to be collected on exports from Option B provinces 91312 – Alternative Relief for 7941 Decision – Sept 21, 2009-LCIA Tribunal rejects Canada’s proposed alternative remedy for the 7941 decision 81010 – Programs Arbitration – January 20, 2011-LCIA Tribunal determines that a penalty tax of 2.6% is to be collected on exports from Quebec, and a 0.1% penalty tax is to be collected on exports from Ontario 111790 – BC Grade 4 Arbitration – July 18, 2012-LCIA Tribunal decides in Canada’s favour, no remedy required 81010B – Programs Arbitration Penalty Taxes in 2 Year Extension – March 21, 2014-LCIA Tribunal decides in Canada’s favour, penalty taxes do not extend into the 2 year extension period (source: email, OMNR, 2014).

106 philanthropic foundations, at the urging of US ENGOs, began supporting British Columbia ENGOs active in forest policy through an organization called BC Wild (Bernstein & Cashore, 2000). By 2011, ENGOs were being criticized by some in the media for accepting donations from US foundations such as the Pew Foundation (Corcoran, 2013; P Foster, 2011 April 23; Krause). As mentioned above, issues concerning the public legitimacy of the state sharing governance with non-state actors has been examined by researchers (Skogstad, 2003). Specifically, the issue of ENGOs “penetrating” policy networks and raising “domestic concerns over violations of popular sovereignty” (the idea that government authority ultimately derives from the people being governed), was discussed as a barrier to the influence of American ENGOs over the domestic policy making process (Bernstein & Cashore, 2000 p. 83). By 2012, ENGOs such as the Suzuki Foundation were complaining that supporters of the oil industry and the federal government were attacking ENGOs funding sources and their spending on advocacy, thereby causing a “chilling” effect on the public statements of all ENGOs (McCarthy & Moore, 2012). The Model of Dialectical Policy Networks stresses the analysis of the broad range of agency and structural factors affecting network relationships and policy change, and for the forest sector this involves the international context. Therefore, the model was helpful in widening the analysis to consider the influence exerted by “related networks” external to the Ontario forest policy network. Specifically, the United States foundations’ performance requirements were credited with motivating Canadian environmental organizations to improve their planning and strategy development (E 4). Ontario’s forest policy initiatives, however, were described in the interviews as being “home grown” and not influenced significantly by national or US events, despite the success that ENGOs have achieved in conducting international fundraising and public relations campaigns. ENGOs reported that the direction of ecological forest policy learning was originating in Ontario and not the United States. One ENGO participant described how Canadian conservationists were more successful than their American counterparts: “I cannot think of anything that has happened in the US that we have looked at and said we should import that into the Canadian scene when it comes to forest policy and forests. It is all the other way; I mean they are rather aghast at what we had been able to accomplish up here” (E 4). This individual’s perception suggests big changes from the days of the Timber Class EA hearings where the ENGO’s Forest for Tomorrow (FFT) coalition relied heavily on U.S. research and American expert witnesses. Chris Maser, a landscape ecologist then with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and Zane G. Smith, a retired US Forest Service Manager, were retained by FFT to testify at the hearings because their experience with forest management was considered to be ecologically advanced to those of experts in Ontario (E 1). It could be argued that American ENGOs, including funders such as the Pew Foundation, form a separate network, but it was useful to analyze them as policy actors in the Ontario ecological forest policy network. Their involvement provided insight into the capacity for growth of ENGOs operating in

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Ontario, which in turn has assisted them in gaining membership and power in the forest policy network. To have undertaken an analysis of national policy networks, Canadian ENGOs and US ENGOs, and attempted to develop the connection between them in detail is beyond the scope of this research. Criticisms have been raised about the usefulness of policy networks today in face of globalization which is changing the “realities of government” (Skogstad, 2008). In the 1990s two global events began influencing Ontario forest policy and the forest policy network: market certification and the Canadian Boreal Initiative (CBI). Market certification was discussed in Chapter 2 and is described in this chapter as a strategy employed by ENGOs to break into the traditional government-forest industry network, although the argument might be made that it was also part of a global ENGO network. Both were examples of ENGO-initiated collaboration with industry that extended beyond Ontario but had significant repercussions on provincial forest policy. The Canadian Boreal Initiative was a major “policy driver” behind the Far North legislation: it was acknowledged that the ENGOs had the resources to initiate creative collaboration with the forest industry and that ENGOs had presented the CBI as a solution to government for managing the boreal forest (E 2, E 4, G 14). A spate of environmental legislation was enacted in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s (Nevitte & Kanji, 1995), and in Canada similar legislation followed from the 1970s to the 1990s. In the United States, the legislation that has been key to forest policy includes: the US National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (requiring cost benefit and environmental assessments of federally financed activities), the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (preserving species through government policy with unexpected effects such as the northern spotted owl), and the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (setting standards for management of national forests) (Kohm & Franklin, 1997). In Ontario, the timeline for similar legislation was the 1975 Environmental Assessment Act, the Endangered Species Act of 2007 (building on the Canadian federal legislation of the 1970s), and the Crown Forest Sustainability Act of 1994. The US Forest Service bureaucrats reported that the implementation of ecosystem management and adaptive management has “become mired in court battles” (Kohm & Franklin, 1997; Steen, 2004), a situation that has largely been avoided in the Canadian context (Valiante, 2009). Learning between countries, such as Canada’s historical emulation of U.S. legislation, was described to be “jurisdictional copying” (Bennett & Howlett, 1992), and might have been associated with strategic learning within the Ontario forest policy network. The Ontario forest industry also faced global markets and economic challenges that influenced the Ontario forest policy network. Whereas the influence of the ENGOs in the United States appears to have been positive for Ontario ENGOs, perhaps the same cannot be said for the Ontario forest industry. The large forest product companies still operating in Ontario are now mostly the subsidiaries of US

108 companies or US controlled, and they bring different perspectives that are not always supportive of Ontario’s sustainable forest management planning regime: “These American owners are looking at their assets in Canada and saying, why do we have these forestry departments?” (I 20). The concern being expressed here is that American companies operating in Canada are solely interested in “producing products.” They do not want to be in the “forestry business” and do not understand the SFM policy regime in Ontario and the legal responsibilities of the forest industry. The complex relationship between the Canadian and US forest industries was highlighted when some companies in American lumber-producing states brought international and domestic scrutiny to British Columbia’s forest policies. This scrutiny was similar to the effects of pressure exerted by ENGOs on BC forest policy makers, but for different motivations related to attempts to obtain the competitive edge over Canadian provinces on cross border softwood lumber disputes. Research comparing BC’s forestry protection rules to US jurisdictions suggested that BC’s rules on maximum clearcutting sizes, streamside buffer zone rules, and protected areas were stricter than their American critics (B. Cashore, 2001). The performance of the OFIA was perceived to be less effective than that of the national industry association, the Forest Products Association of Canada, whose former president was credited by ENGOs with bringing the industry into modern times (Forest Products Association of Canada, 2009). FPAC was perceived to have “done a very good job of drawing the dialogue together” at the national level among governments and ENGOs (I 18). Whether FPAC would have pursued the hard-nosed tactics of the OFIA in opposing the ESA and the Far North legislation is a moot question; their national mandate did not require them to do so but their member companies, some of which were are also members of the OFIA, decided on those tactics and strategies. In summary, the Ontario forest industry could be viewed as being part of much larger Canadian, US, and global policy networks. For the purposes of this research, however, the value of the model was its utility in understanding how these influences have mostly weakened the position of the Ontario forest industry in the policy network with successive Ontario governments and the OMNR.

6.4. The Interaction of the Exogenous/Contextual factors and the Endogenous/Network Factors

The exogenous and endogenous factors that were identified from the NVivo analysis of the interviews are reported in Appendix 11. These factors are the major findings of this research and they are discussed elsewhere in the dissertation. The major exogenous changes to which the forest policy network has had to adapt over the study period include: the election of governments, left-leaning, liberal, and conservative, with different political mandates; and the once powerful Ontario forest industry, which was transformed by economic crisis into a smaller and less politically influential entity. The major

109 endogenous factors identified in the analysis were related to the successful growth in the capacity and influence of ENGOs, and experience of the state actor at the centre of the network, the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, in reacting to decades of spending cuts. Within the model, these exogenous drivers of forest policy need to be understood in the context of their overlap and interaction with the endogenous factors. In this study, for example, SFM certification was examined as an endogenous factor associated with ENGOS in the Ontario forest policy network because it was mainly the actions of ENGO policy actors that initially led to the creation of these initiatives. On the other hand, the primarily ENGO led market reform could be characterized as an exogenous network driver for government. Similarly, the forest industry could be characterized as a “casualty” of global economic and market change, factors which were beyond its control and which would have altered its position in the network. The forest industry, however, might have exacerbated its problems with poorly designed strategies, which are characterized in this research as endogenous factors. Toke and Marsh stated in the dialectical policy network model that: “All such exogenous change is mediated through the understanding of agents and interpreted in the context of the structures, rules/norms and interpersonal relationships within the network. So, it is important to re-emphasize that any simple distinction between endogenous and exogenous factors is misleading” (Toke & Marsh, 2003 p. 233). In analyzing Ontario forest policy change over several decades, this dissertation reports that much changed in the political, social and environmental contexts. These changes have required the members of the forest policy network to react and to learn to adapt to changing circumstances as well as initiating change from within the network. In examining the potential for network theory to address societal structural constraints, Toke and Marsh argued that “it is clear that it is economic, and to a lesser extent professional, interests that dominate the networks” (Toke & Marsh, 2003 p. 244). The type of economic loss experienced by the Ontario forest products industry was not the economic inequality anticipated by Toke and Marsh, although the exclusion of the First Nations, Aboriginal, and Metis in the network qualifies as such. This research has documented changes beginning in the Ontario forest policy network in 1988; however, the ongoing restructuring of the forest industry since 2004 needs to be acknowledged as a “major perturbation” in the network (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Marsh and Smith (2003) observed that “changing economic circumstances” (the Thatcher years in their study of British agricultural policy) “resulted in conflicts of interest which split the community, thus allowing the imposition of rapid and radical reform” by the UK government. A similar argument could be made for the Ontario forest policy network where the economic problems of the forest industry and their ineffective strategies and tactics have exacerbated conflict within the policy network. The forest

110 industry’s dissatisfaction with the Ontario government’s response to its failing mills during the recession, coupled with the OFIA’s strong opposition to the ESA and the Far North legislation, contributed to a rocky relationship with the government and might have influenced the OMNR’s decision to pursue tenure modernization legislation. The Ontario Forest Tenure Modernization Act is discussed in Chapter 7. Toke and Marsh argue that “...it is not possible to establish which is the most important of these contexts (socio-economic or political)…because the agents involved have differing interpretations of these contexts…the environmentalists have an interest in ascribing influence to themselves, whereas the (industry) have an interest in downplaying their influence” (Toke & Marsh, 2003 p. 246). In the case of Ontario forest policy, it could be argued that the industry recession was the major “context” or singular exogenous factor that accounts for policy change. This dissertation suggests otherwise. Even if the forest industry had remained financially strong over the study period, it was observed that the ENGOS became more professional, better funded and politically successful and it was their ideas and advocacy that led to more ecological forest policy. It was the ENGOs that first initiated market certification and market boycotts that changed the marketplace for the forest industry and then initiated collaboration with the forest industry; all this began in the 1990s when the Ontario industry was still profitable and a decade before its unprecedented economic crisis. In Toke and Marsh’s study, it was concluded that “there is an association between network change and the changing parameters of public opinion” (Toke & Marsh, 2003 p. 244). This could be relevant to the Ontario forest policy network; opinion surveys discussed in Chapter 2 suggest that the public prefers forest conservation and forest preservation over the forest industry and commercial exploitation of forests. There is also evidence that ENGOs have been successful with media campaigns48 to support the McGuinty government’s legislation on endangered species (Ivey Foundation, 2007) and the Far North legislation (E 4). In contrast, successful examples of influencing public opinion are not associated with the forest industry, foresters or Aboriginal Peoples. Toke and Marsh observe that network participants are “groups (that) are themselves collections of agents who can disagree” (Toke & Marsh, 2003 p. 242). This is a relevant consideration in the Ontario forest policy network where it was observed earlier that one factor identified in the success of ENGOs is they often spoke with one voice, despite individual ENGOs pursuing different mandates and local versus national or global perspectives (G 14, E 5). In contrast, forest industry dissension within the OFIA harmed the latter’s network influence. Tembec withdrew from the OFIA over disagreements about industry opposition to the endangered species legislation (Tembec, 2008). In fact, it was one of the

48 Research has also been done on the role of the Canadian mass media in the environmental concerns of the public during the 1960s-1970s and the results suggest that the media were successful in ‘legitimizing the environment as a major political issue’ (Parlour & Schatzow, 1978).

111 companies identified to have maintained positive relationships with the government and ENGOs and consequently to have kept its influence in the forest policy network in contrast to the OFIA (G 14). The example of Tembec’s participation as a business leader in adapting to changing interactions the Ontario forest policy network is discussed in Chapter 7.2.6.

6.5 Conclusions

Evidence of network change is found in the membership size and composition of the new Ontario ecological forest policy network as shown in Table 6.1. The industrial forest policy community that existed before 1988 was a stable, cohesive “subgovernment” of policymakers with political, bureaucratic, industry and professional interests. By 2014, the pro-forest industry community was replaced by a more loosely connected and conflicted issues network with many ENGO policy actors. Excluded from this new network are Aboriginal Peoples, labour unions and, to a large extent, northern Ontario economic interests. The shift towards an ecological forest policy network was identified through the Dialectical Policy Network Model and the interviews. The following factors emerged to explain this shift:

1. Resources of the policy actors. The resources of the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, the forest industry and the Ontario Professional Foresters Association diminished substantially compared to the resources and capacity of the ENGOs which have been substantially enhanced.

The NVivo analysis of the interviews (Appendix 11) identified the global recession and subsequent downsizing of the Ontario forest industry, into a smaller, less politically influential policy actor, to be a major factor in network change. This trend, however, began 10 years earlier during the passage of the Crown Forest Sustainability Act, 1994 when the forest industry opposed the Rae government’s speedy implementation of Sustainable Forest Management. This observation relates to the insight from the Dialectical Policy Network Model that simple distinctions cannot be made between the interaction of contextual and network factors.

2. Relationship between the network and its political, ideological, and knowledge context has affected the structure of the network. Six Ontario governments were in office over the 25 year study period and none championed the forest industry. Urbanization was reported to be one reason that the forestry sector has lost political and social influence against the preferences of Southern Ontario.

ENGOs were successful in replacing the old dominant discourse, about the forest industry and economic benefits, with the new environmental discourse that began promoting Sustainable Forest Management and has moved towards more ecological objectives focused on endangered species and protected areas. This dissertation has made a theoretical contribution by confirming the importance of new policy ideas in

112 generating network change by tracing the evolution of the ecological discourse that became persuasive in the Ontario forest policy network.

ENGOs were successful in initiating collaborations with politicians and the forest industry and improving their technical capability. These strategies have expanded the political influence of the environmental community in the network.

Some of the ENGO success in penetrating the Ontario network might be associated with funding assistance from US foundations but it was reported that the Canadian environmental community is the source of innovative and ambitious forest conservation ideas.

One criticism of policy network theory is that not enough attention has been paid to the contextual factors (Skogstad, 2008). This dissertation has contributed to understanding the broader political, ideological and economic structures and contexts of the Ontario forest policy network including industry recession, government downsizing and elections, and changing ideas and values about forests.

Another criticism of policy networks is that they do not explain very much because as Skogstad put it most research involves studying networks that are “capturing a patterned power relationship at one point in time.” This dissertation has followed Ontario forest policy change for 25 years and it provides some evidence that network interactions can explain changes in the dynamics of power relationships over time.

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Chapter 7: How Policy Network Change Explains Paradigm Change

7.0. Introduction This chapter examines how the Ontario forest policy network changes explain the paradigm change that has occurred in Ontario’s forest policy since 1988. As reported earlier, in this research, the argument is that the pre-1988 integrated, stable and exclusive policy community of industry, foresters, and government managed to control forest policy changes leading into the Timber Class EA hearings. The research revealed that a pivot occurred at this point; the ENGOs then began to insert themselves as a larger presence in the network, and the forest industry’s influence began to erode. Ontario premiers and the OMNR began making decisions that reflected the ecological objectives of the ENGOs. First Nations, Aboriginal, and Metis have been largely excluded from participating effectively in the network. The Ontario Professional Foresters Association was described by a government participant as being ineffective in forest policy network interactions since the 2000s (G 14). Marsh and Smith observed in their work on UK agricultural reform that the network actors made a “strategic calculation” about accepting reform. By doing so they exerted some control over the reform process; without the policy community such a response would have been impossible (Marsh & Smith, 2000c p. 19). This research suggests that the Ontario forest industry made a similar strategic calculation in supporting the OMNR during the Timber Class EA hearings, but the unity of the industry, both among its member companies and with the OMNR, subsequently began to fray during the CFSA, the Living Legacy/Forest Accord, the ESA, the Far North legislation, and tenure modernization. The model identified a third interactive relationship: between the policy network and policy outcomes. Marsh and Smith argue that “Policy outcomes feed back into the community and, subsequently, affect the next set of outcomes” (Marsh & Smith, 2000c p. 19). In this research, interview participants have confirmed this feedback loop or dialectical dimension among various forest policy events since 1988. The evidence is provided below. The model postulates that policy outcomes are experiences that affect the structure of the network and the political and socio-economic context in which the network operates, and that the network members change their strategies and tactics in response to previous policy outcomes. It is the ENGOs who have been most successful since 1988 in learning how to increase their power in the network by means of growing their capacity in experienced, professional people and money, and in learning how to effect changes in forest policy. The concept of strategic actor learning is fundamental to the Dialectical Model of Policy Networks: the learning process that a policy actor experiences affects its skill in bargaining and, consequently, in network interaction and influence over policy outcomes (Marsh & Smith, 2000a).

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Social learning theory could be applied in the case of Ontario forest policy network agents. Hall described it to be “part of normal public policy making in which decision-makers attempt to understand why certain initiatives may have succeeded while others failed” (Hall, 1993). In contrast to the government’s adoption of the ecological forest policy goals, which were advocated by the ENGOs, the forest industry, Aboriginal Peoples, and foresters do not appear to have learned readily that the new shift in forest policy, arising from paradigm change, is desirable.

7.1. Tenure Modernization: Philosophical Change The research on paradigm change has raised questions about the level or “depth” of the change, whether it be policy (which changes most quickly), programmatic or philosophical. Scholars have also suggested that the “cognitive ideas justifying the policy and program may change more quickly than their normative philosophical legitimization” (Schmidt, 2011 p. 43). Sabatier and Jenkins defined ‘deep core ideas’ to be those involved in paradigm change and asserted that they are harder to change and longer lasting than policy or programmatic beliefs (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). The tenure system was identified to be the defining dimension of the policy core belief structure of the dominant government/industry advocacy coalitions in Ontario and British Columbia (Wellstead, et al., 2006). OMNR’s tenure modernization initiative, which resulted in 2011 in the passage of An Act to enact the Ontario Forest Tenure Modernization Act, 2011 and to amend the Crown Forest Sustainability Act, 1994, could be viewed as further evidence suggesting that changes in Ontario forest policy were at the philosophical level of challenging the historical privileges of the forest industry. For this dissertation, it was relevant that the OMNR itself decided to initiate significant changes to licensing timber to industry when the forest industry was in economic crisis, rather than providing more financial support to rescue the industry’s failing mills (G 11). Specifically, the tenure reforms pursued by government were perceived by the large forest product companies to be going against their interests and they opposed the reform process. Tenure reform represents a paradigm policy change that is described theoretically as philosophical change but the motivations for the OMNR to pursue reform modernization also have economic, market access, community and resource sustainability and political dimensions. The important role that consultants serve in the forest policy network through their ideas, facilitation and influence is evident in tenure reform legislation. Their recommendations were incorporated into the OMNR’s proposals and they were among the few parties in support of the legislation at the legislative committee hearings. The views of the forest industry were not, for the most part, represented in the government’s first proposal. The existing forest product companies opposed most of the government’s proposals and then organized a lobby of northern Ontario mayors though the Northwestern Ontario Municipal Association, as

115 well as participating in an industry-government working group to deal with the industry’s objections. The forest industry’s campaign against tenure modernization was effective; in January 2011 the government announced that it was backing down from its original proposal and would instead create only two LFMC pilot models (and in 2014 OMNR Minister Mauro announced that there would be only one LFMC model). The one Local Forest Crown Corporation, Nawiinginokiima (NFMC), located in northwestern Ontario and formed from five SFLs, began operating in 2013. The chair of the NFMC observed a fundamental change: contractors and harvesters would be dealing directly with the staff and the board for approval to harvest rather than with the OMNR (Levay, 2013). Expanding the concept to other forest management units would depend on the findings of a multi-stakeholder committee, including First Nations, Aboriginal, and Metis, but excluding ENGOs.49 The OMNR established the committee for the purpose of overseeing the implementation of the LFMC and the Enhanced Sustainable Forest Licenses (ESFLs), a parallel effort is underway to move existing single SFL holders towards ESFLs. The committee will then compare and evaluate the success of the two models after the five year test period (Intersol, 2012). Several conclusions, using the theoretical lens of policy network theory, can be drawn from this policy learning exercise. The first is the experience of the forest industry crisis. The OMNR bureaucrats became convinced that the old tenure model was broken and needed modernizing, and they found an ally in an activist, northern Minister, who pursued developing this legislation through two ministries. The Ontario forest industry, however, was not to be underestimated; despite its weakened position in the policy network, it fought back politically by developing alliances with some northern municipalities and it bargained successfully with the government to modify the reforms. The ENGOs were represented by only a few voices, a function perhaps of the political framing of the issue as being highly technical and the purview of northern Ontario communities (E 9), but ENGO views were able to influence the policy debate through the participation of consultants, and they were aligned with those of the OMNR and in opposition to the forest industry.

7.2. Shifts in the Interactions of Network Actors The summary information presented in Chapter 5, Table 5.4.1 suggests that paradigm change, as postulated by policy network theory, occurred amidst shifts in the interactions among network actors in particular, in their fluctuating positions of support or opposition to Ontario government legislation over

49 The reason given for excluding ENGOs was that one of the primary roles of forest tenure is to provide a governance structure that would facilitate deriving benefits from the forest and it was determined that ENGOs would not bring a perspective that would not already be represented by First Nations, Metis, local communities and the OMNR. The benefits that can be derived from the forest are determined through the FMP process (and other processes) and ENGOs are represented there (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2014d).

116 the study period. These changes represented the views and actions of the network actors and members. The politicians and the OMNR experienced shifts in their relationships with all network members, most notably the ENGOs and the forest industry. In contrast to the forest industry’s support of the OMNR, the ENGOs opposed the Timber Class EA throughout the hearings. Some ENGOs, particularly those in northern Ontario (E 5), were consulted about the development of the CFSA, and there was ENGO support for the legislation. Some in the forest industry opposed the CFSA and the OFIA publicly fought with the McGuinty government against the ESA and the Far North legislation, both of which were advocated by the ENGOs. First Nations, Aboriginal, and Metis network actors have mostly been in opposition to government on forest policy since 1988. Aboriginal Peoples opposed OMNR’s Timber Management Class EA, and while they gave some limited support for the Rae NDP government’s initiatives in the CFSA, they opposed the ESA and the Far North Act. In the case of the Far North Act, there were a few Aboriginal communities that supported it, such as the Cat Lake First Nation, Slate Falls First Nation and Fort Albany First Nation, but most were opposed. The Ontario Professional Foresters Association publicly supported the government at the Timber Class EA, where it persuaded the hearing panel to support the self-regulation of the profession. It also participated in the hearings for the CFSA. The OPFA has been quiet publicly in recent years on the government’s forest policy initiatives. However, it has met with the Minister of Natural Resources periodically to provide advice on forest policy without taking an advocacy position; an approach described by one professional forester as having served the Association “well in dealing with the rest of the bureaucracy” (E 8). Members of the OPFA have been divided, however, over their mandate; there have been resolutions at the members’ annual meetings to push the OPFA into advocating more publicly for its members and for forest policy changes. What follows is a discussion of where changes in the relationships of the network have impacted paradigm change in forest policy. These include the successful strategies of ENGOs in persuading government to expand protected areas, in convincing government and the forest industry to support market certification and in initiating collaborations with government and industry. The rise of ENGO influence occurred over the same time period that the forest industry was losing its influence with government.

7.2.1. ENGOs’ success in expanding protected areas. Political leadership has been more important than political ideology in the ability of ENGOs to persuade Ontario governments to make important conservation decisions. Since 1988, Ontario Premiers from different political parties/ideologies have supported the ecological objectives of forest policy and none has made the Ontario forest industry a government priority. The ESA and Far North legislation of

117 the McGuinty government built on this political legacy, which has been described as the “one-off” political process of conservation gains in which each Premier was persuaded by ENGOs to create and leave behind his own park” (E 4). This pattern is evident in the Rae government’s decision to create Wabakimi Provincial Wilderness Park, the second largest in Ontario, as well as in the Harris government’s creation of the Ontario Living Legacy, and the Oak Ridges Moraine Foundation in southern Ontario. Mike Harris is described as being committed to his conservation achievements. “I am told that Mike Harris says of the things, all of those star wars with teachers and the nurses… the things that he remembers is changing the map of the province of Ontario…all those new parks and protected areas, that is what he is going to go to the grave feeling made being Premier worthwhile” (E 4). The concept of conservation legacies also appealed to Dalton McGuinty, who was persuaded by ENGOs to add more protected areas than any other Ontario government. The Far North legislation protected more than 225,000 square kilometers, and the Ontario Greenbelt, which was established in 2005, protected 1.8 million acres of farmland in southern Ontario (Greenbelt Foundation, 2015). The Endangered Species Act also had the effect of extending protected areas in northern and southern Ontario. Algonquin Park has been offered as a case of being both a protected area with acceptable park management, and an example of a working relationship between its smaller-scale local forest industry and environmentalists (G 16). Algonquin was designated as a provincial park in 1893, although logging has been carried out there since the 1830s; the OMNR calls it the crown jewel of Ontario’s provincial park system. In the 1930s, the first game surveys, making wildlife management more scientific, were conducted by park superintendent Frank A. McDougall, a legendary forester who served as deputy minister of the Department of Lands and Forests from 1941-1966. Algonquin Forest was also used for experimenting with tree marking for selective harvesting in the 1960s, which became a silvicultural method that was favoured over clear cutting by environmentalists (G 13). The Algonquin Forest Authority was recommended as the standard of excellence for sustainable tenure regimes being contemplated for northern Ontario (Williams, et al., 2010). In 2013, the OMNR responded to the advocacy of environmentalists to increase the amount of protected land in Algonquin Provincial Park, the only provincial park where logging is still permitted, by 96,000 hectares to about 264,450 hectares or about 35 per cent of Algonquin Park’s 763,459 hectares. David Orazietti, then Minister of Natural Resources, stated the rationale for amending the management plan to be “helping to ensure a balance between conservation and forest management” (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2013b). The increase in protected land, while substantially less than the 241,032 hectares initially recommended by the Wildlands League/Friends of Algonquin Park, is nonetheless a conservation win (Mills, 2012 ). The Ontario Environmental Commissioner subsequently called for the

118 termination of all logging operations in the Park in order to protect its ecological integrity (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2014). From the ENGO perspective, the growth of parks and protected areas in Ontario has been successful: “From the mid -1980s until now, the advocates for parks and protected areas have been very effective. Part of the agenda with reference to protected areas, they started at 10%, it is now up to I think 18% and in the case of the Far North Act, 50% was the goal and it is in the legislation” ( E 6). The forest industry has opposed the increase in lands taken out of timber production through these ambitious conservation campaigns, and has also complained of even more land set aside for reasons of forest management guides. For example, in the Abitibi River forest management plan (2012-2022), some long term projections of wood supply estimates showed losses in merchantable timber of 20 per cent to 60 per cent, mostly to protect caribou habitat (I 19) (Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement, 2014; Environmental Registry, January 2013). The forest industry has advocated unsuccessfully for Ontario governments to legislate or otherwise “guarantee” an annual timber production target of 26 million cubic metres of wood to be available to industry. It is noted that the 26 million production target was never approved by Cabinet in policy or legislation (G 13). The industry characterized security of its wood supply as a fundamental tenet of its business; it called for the “permanent protection” of the annual 26 million cubic metres for industry as a means of “bringing back the balance that has been so lacking in the development of recent public policy” (The Working Forest, 2011). The forest industry’s access to Crown timber supply is a contentious and ever present issue for forest policy (Nicks, 2010). It was debated at the public hearings for the Timber Class EA, the CFSA, the ESA, and the Far North legislation. Some worry that if the forest industry recovers and demand for fibre increases, the industry will have a “dramatically constrained working land base” owing to forest management guides for landscape management and the protection of wildlife habitat (G 11).

7.2.2. ENGOs: Market certification/market boycotts. From the ENGO perspective, the voluntary market certification process initiated by the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) (Cashore & Vertinsky, 2000; B. Cashore, 2001; B. Cashore, 2002) was identified to be “the sustained driver of change, fear of boycotts, the reality of boycotts” and consequently it was through market certification that “the environmental community had changed the game because then they actually had some power and that of course is always transformative” (E 4, E 2). Industry acknowledges that “certification has been a major influence of how we do things and I think it has largely been a positive influence for companies to develop environmental management systems that can pass the scrutiny of third party auditors” (I 17).

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The Forest Stewardship Council, which was considered by ENGOs to be “the gold bar” standard and superior to subsequent Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) certification processes, held its inaugural meeting in Toronto in 1994. The meeting was co-chaired with an industry forester and marked the beginning of the pivotal role of the market certification in forest sustainability (E 4). The history of the FSC and other certification processes such as the Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI) and the Canadian Standards Association (CSA) was discussed in Chapter 3. From the ENGO perspective, market certification has been associated with changes in the power relationships in the network between ENGOs and the forest industry and the government. The forest industry has been motivated to co-operate with the conservation community in response to the negative incentive of the “fear and the reality of boycotts”, coupled with the positive incentive for having a competitive advantage in the market if certification is obtained. This shift in network relations between ENGOs and the forest industry, however, “has resulted in an interesting sort of privatization of the debate, where government is increasingly not a dominant player” (E 2.) The ENGOs also learned through their experiences at the Timber Class EA and the CFSA that the “entrenched players” in government and the forest industry were “huge limiters” to the type of policy change being pursued by ENGOs. Consequently, ENGOs learned that the political system and the forest policy network, as it was structured, could not be relied upon and if ENGOs “wanted some of the fundamental changes in land use that we are looking for, we would have to go outside of the existing structures because of those established power relationships, the OFIA, big companies, captive politicians in northern Ontario” (E 2). Bypassing established power relationships was one of the main challenges identified in the policy network literature where “policy monopolies were described as structures that limited access to favoured insiders” (Jordan & Maloney, 1997 p. 569). ENGOs consequently forged new relationships with the forest industry as one means of obtaining access to the Ontario forest policy network. Governments were also required to respond to political pressure from ENGOs and their evolving relations with forest industry. Government understood the potential effectiveness of boycotts and campaigns against Ontario’s forest products industry: “…(ENGOs) can shut it down, all they need is a major campaign and you are done and Home Depot is not buying your lumber anymore, so there is really no choice” but for government to act (G15). From the government’s perspective, it was necessary to negotiate between the ENGOs’ objective of providing for caribou habitat by making “the whole Far North a park” and the forest industry’s intransigent position expressed as “I should be able to cut every tree that I can find.” The position that government sought was “to have a balanced view, and so it would not be the personalities of the people or even the title of the group, it would be the balance of the position…there had to some middle road” (G 15).

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The Ontario forest industry responded positively to the threat of international boycotts and market campaigns against its products and to the potential for market gain by companies who were successful in achieving certification. Approximately 75 per cent (26.2 million hectares) of Ontario Crown Land forests are certified under one of three voluntary SFM certification schemes endorsed by the Ontario government, and Ontario has the largest amount of contiguous FSC certified forest land in the world, almost 16 million hectares (Certification Canada, 2013; Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2014i; Pawson, 2015). Questions have been raised about certification’s market advantages for products (Normandin, 2011) but the industry has complied because as one industry participant explained, it is now “the cost of doing business” (I 17). Debate has also emerged over the benefits of the perceived “greener” and more stringent standards of FSC certification versus the alternative schemes such as SFI. In 2011, the Forests and European Union Resource Network (FERN), a creation of the World Rainforest Movement, withdrew its membership from FSC because they oppose FSC’s acceptance of carbon offset standards. FERN acknowledged, however, that FSC remains the most robust of the forest certification processes (FERN Forests and European Union Network, 2011).

7.2.3. Collaboration between ENGOs and the forest industry. The interviews suggest that the attitudes of the forest industry and ENGOs towards one another did change during the study period and that these shifts in attitude provided opportunity for further interactions and ENGO-industry collaboration. As discussed above, market certification is one area in which the ENGOs and the Ontario forest industry are now collaborating. Such collaboration might have been less common in the United States where it was reported that consensual approaches were impeded by national environmental bureaucrats that saw industry as their “natural enemy” (Bressers & O'Toole, 1998 p. 232). ENGO participants asserted that changes in the forest policy network came from their “intellectual capital”. ENGOs have been initiators and leaders of forest conservation collaborations with the forest industry. However, such collaborations have excluded Aboriginal Peoples and other stakeholders and, more recently, all governments from the Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement. Coming out of the Timber Class EA, some ENGOs saw the CFSA as an accomplishment of the Rae NDP government and its northern caucus to make significant changes to forest industry practices by implementing SFM. This was taking place at roughly the same time as ENGO-led market certification was making progress with the Ontario forest industry. The relationships were well-established between ENGOs and some of the forest industry with the Living Legacy/Forest Accord processes of the 1990s, and they subsequently evolved into processes such as the Canadian Boreal Forest Initiative (2004) and its 2007 Framework Agreement (Boreal Leadership Council, 2003; Canadian Boreal Institute, 2005), and

121 the 2010 Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement between ENGOs and the industry (Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement, 2014; CBFA Steering Committee, 2010) , a successful culmination of conservation and environmental policies and legislation. All these initiatives signaled a change in network relations between ENGOs and the forest industry, which in turn influenced government legislation. The ENGO collaboration with industry on the Living Legacy had unanticipated benefits and far reaching effects on developing the forest policy network that included Tembec and Domtar seeking FSC certification. The ENGOs and the forest industry were exposed directly and personally to one another’s views and aspirations, as they had been at the Timber Class EA hearings: “That grew out of us getting to know each other and the temperature really being lowered and there being a new spirit of collaboration and cooperation across the conservation community and the forest sector in particular” (E 4). As reported in Chapter 5, not all ENGOs were impressed with the Lands for Life/Living Legacy process, perceiving it as a land use planning failure. The first complaint was that the public sessions were limited “by the mean spiritedness of government at that time” and they involved “groups of men who traveled following the round table, repeating the same threats and accusations and arguments at the microphone, room after room” (E 3). The second criticism concerned the tactics of the “large conservation groups (unidentified by participant) …who entered into private negotiations and then at the end of all that we got the broad brush land use strategy, and the process never went to the second stage” (E 3). The Crown Land Use Atlas, eventually released by the OMNR in 2004, was seen to be a poor substitute for a review of district land use planning. The same ENGO participant described what is operating today as “a very helter-skelter opportunity for a piecemeal revision to land use in forest management planning.” From the ENGO perspective, the contingency of having the “right” policy agents working together has resulted in the emergence in Ontario of a new ethic and new attitudes about collaboration: “... if it is populated with the wrong people, you can take a perfect structure and it will go off the rails. If you have people that do not trust each other, you can never build enough feedback loops to account for human differences so I think that is the spark” (E 4). The motivation to pursue more collaboration with the forest industry through the CBFA was described to be an idea conceived by the ENGOs and to be implemented by them through long negotiations with the forest industry: “It was Steve Kellogg and Tzeporah Berman who had lunch in Vancouver in October of 2009 or 2008 because it took almost two years to negotiate that agreement. They were the two generals that sat down and said why don’t we change the paradigm here and ….Richard Brooks to a lesser extent, Green Peace, with the spirit of the Canadian Boreal Framework there could be a more explicit agreement knit together by the lead players, the Boreal industry players, and the environmental community to check your guns at the

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door, and do something different… and Avrim (Lazar of FPAC) really did continue to lead the troops on his side” (E 4). The Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement (CBFA) between ENGOs and the forest industry is among the strongest examples of the new approach where some of those who were “foes” since the early days of Temagami are now working together. It also represents a new intensity in the conflict among Ontario forest policy network actors. Greenpeace withdrew from the CBFA in protest over Resolute’s logging practices involving the company’s Rainforest Alliance auditors’ findings that Resolute had failed to comply with the FSC’s National Boreal Standard (P. Foster, 2013 January 18). Resolute responded with a $7 million lawsuit (Marotte, 2013 June 3) against Greenpeace Canada alleging that Greenpeace violated the Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement by defaming Resolute and interfering with the company’s economic relations with its customers such as Best Buy (Cadan, 2014; Corcoran, 2014; Greenpeace Canada, 2014c). The dispute between Greenpeace and Resolute triggered the Ontario government to then introduce Bill 83, Protection of Public Participation Act (Ontario, 2013) to protect ENGOs and other public interest groups against SLAPPs (i.e., Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation) by corporations (Greenpeace Canada, 2014b).50 Despite the Resolute-Greenpeace dispute, other ENGOs and forest companies remained committed to the CBFA process (Jang, 2013 April 18). The Dialectical Policy Network model postulates a rising level of conflict among network members as the network evolves from the pre-1988 government- industry dominated policy community into a policy network reflecting ecological objectives. The CBFA can be seen as a test case theoretically for the durability of the Ontario forest policy network changes.

7.2.4. ENGOs collaborate with all governments. The interviews suggest that ENGOs have been swift and creative strategic learners in pursuing forest policy change and interpreting changes in the broader political and social context. ENGOs were self-described policy translators and ENGOs have learned to work with all governments regardless of their political ideology. All study participants attributed changes in the forest policy network to the ENGOs’ success in growing their expertise and financial capacity and in becoming politically sophisticated and successful in their relations with government. Although the environmental movement has traditionally been associated with the “Left” and the NDP, over the last ten years, ENGOs adopted strategies to engage with governments of all political stripes in order ‘to get things done’ and to accomplish their ecological agenda. In order to do this, says

50 Bill 83 was introduced in June 2013 and referred to the Standing Committee on Social Policy in April 2014. It died on the Order Paper with the election call in May. As of December 1, 2014, the so-called Anti-SLAPP legislation was being reintroduced into the Ontario Legislature.

123 one ENGO member, they were required to be “detached from our own personal political affiliations in dealing with government” and “finding what it is that a particular government is willing to do on the environment file and figuring out a way to do that, regardless of where they are coming from, what their motivation is, … a focus on getting things done and move away from being a critic and a watchdog and much more of a focus on we really want to win” (E 2). Collaboration between the ENGOs and the Ontario government, particularly the OMNR, grew over time. Some credit was given to “the forums that sprouted up as a result of the Crown Forest Sustainability Act and the Timber Class EA for providing an opportunity for people to sit down on an extremely regular basis… the trust was not at a very high level in 1993… by 2002, people were working together in a much more collegial way” (G 13). The achievement of the Canadian Boreal Initiative was suggested as one reason for the lessening of confrontation between ENGOs and government: it “made the environmentalists realize there is more to be gained by sitting down with people of fair mind and willingness to discuss things and figure out how to implement things that are in our joint interest” (G 13). One government participant (G 11) described the diverse tactics of influential organizations in the Ontario environmental community whereby some ENGOs protest forest policy decisions while others work with the government: “…they have sort of a virtual organization where they can put the pit bulls out there and mount a campaign so you could get an Earthroots saying pretty controversial things and, at times, Forest Ethics, for example, but then you could have a well-respected organization like a World Wild Life Fund or Nature Conservancy of Canada or some of the others do equally well.” When ENGOs assert that they are “policy translators” for what the public want in forest policy, this is a claim that cannot be made by the forest industry, except in a few cases such as their success in limiting the number of new LFMC tenure models to one with the support of northern Ontario municipalities, nor the First Nations, Metis, or Aboriginal communities. Professional foresters have a duty under the Professional Foresters Act to uphold the public interest but they have taken a more restricted interpretation of their legislative mandate than have the ENGOs of their mission. From the government perspective, engaging in forest policy problem solving processes with ENGOS was considered endless because the environmental community is never satisfied. As a government participant reported, one success was not enough for ENGOs: “They just get on to the next thing. Their appetite is insatiable so we always joke about that … they claim victory for a couple of days and then they are knocking on the door

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next week and now we want this… it is a continuing saga... I think for them, it gave them more confidence, with each success they grow confidence, the esteem of the organization grows, their fund raising ability grows, so it strengthens the group each victory as they can claim victories” (G 15). From the ENGO perspective, working with Ontario government bureaucrats has been problematic. First, civil servants are perceived to be cautious and while “messaging” around policy change is important to ENGOs, it has been “highly controlled”, beginning with the Harris government and “the bureaucracy has maintained those controls through subsequent governments” (E 3). Second, while the ENGOs have access to Queen’s Park, their influence with the government, especially bureaucrats, is sometimes limited by their own actions: “Because they equally misbehave…they just cannot help themselves, they’ve got to always have a bold headline and then they end up disenfranchising the bureaucrats” (I 21).

7.2.5. ENGOs influence new policy instruments. The strategies employed by the “Save Our Species” Coalition of ENGOS (SOS) to achieve passage of the endangered species legislation desired by the ENGO community further demonstrate the impacts of the forest policy network on paradigm policy change (Ivey Foundation, 2007). ENGOs successfully advocated for the replacement of established government consultation processes, which privileged traditional industry and other stakeholders, with a scientific group that would determine the recovery plans for endangered species without consultation. The use of formalized external advisory panels by the McGuinty government marked a change in policy tools. One interviewee observed that the government’s reliance on these new expert advisors yielded different results, describing the final legislation as “ looking and feeling differently” than if had been developed within the bureaucracy but also reflecting “more of what the people of Ontario want.” He also noted, however, that the Endangered Species Act is as an example where “maybe that process did not get it right” (G 14). The Committee on the Status of Species at Risk in Ontario (COSSARO) existed before 2007, but the ESA gave it legal recognition and specific responsibilities. COSSARO is an independent committee of scientific and traditional Aboriginal knowledge experts that decide which species are at risk. The forest industry objected to COSSARO’s independence, which it characterized to be undemocratic, but lost this fight when the ESA was passed (I 19). The implementation of the ESA, as predicted by the forest industry and other critics, has been complicated. Originally intended to be implemented in northern Ontario under the provisions of the CFSA (E 2, G 15), ESA was instead a decision to use a “regulatory stick instead of a carrot approach. It further alienated the forest industry, particularly small companies operating in the Great Lakes-St.

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Lawrence forest” (E 5). The blame for poor implementation of the ESA was laid on bad management by a top-down OMNR (E 5). The forest industry protested all along at what they perceived to be unfair treatment in light of a blanket exemption for southern Ontario agriculture sector.51 The argument that the ESA was not needed for management of Crown lands in northern Ontario had two aspects. The first was that 80 per cent of endangered species are located in southern Ontario, where biodiversity is under threat with tree cover at less than ten per cent in some regions (G 11). The second part of the argument was that FMP had been in place for over a decade and is successful in protecting fish and wildlife. From the forest industry perspective, the protection of northern woodland caribou habitat was perceived to be one of the major ENGO motivations driving the ESA (I 19). The government listened to complaints about the ESA, and a Species At Risk (SAR) Program Advisory Committee made up of 19 members, including some traditional stakeholders, was formed with the mandate to provide the government with consensus based recommendations to improve the implementation of the ESA associated with concerns about public education and the social-economic aspects (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2008). The controversy surrounding the Caribou Conservation Plan, especially in northern Ontario, where it was seen as “cutting off valuable economic resources for many communities” (Grech, 2010), heightened criticisms about the ESA. The departure of Premier McGuinty in 2012 and the new Wynne government’s interest in winning back the support of northerners, which had been strained by the ESA and the Far North legislation, were other factors in consideration. ENGOs reacted negatively when the Ontario government introduced the March 2012 Omnibus Budget Bill. It included ESA amendments that were subsequently removed, evidence for ENGOs of government “backtracking” on its commitments (E 7). In July 2013, the government achieved a similar result by granting a five year exemption through Ontario Regulation 176/13 for major industries such as forestry, energy transmission and pipelines, mining, transit, and waste management. According to ENGOs, the purpose of the exemption was to delay their compliance. The reason given by the Ontario government was to provide more time for various industry sectors to prepare for implementation of the ESA. Ecojustice lawyers, on behalf of Ontario Nature and the Wildlands League, sued the Ontario government in Divisional Court for “gutting” the ESA (Ontario Nature, 2013, September 10). The Ontario Environmental Commissioner joined the government’s critics by releasing a special report, Laying Siege to the Last Line of Defence: A Review of Ontario’s Weakened Protections for Species at Risk (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2013 November 6).

51 Research on the Ontario agriculture sector suggests that farming interests have been able to avoid stringent, environmental regulations for reasons of a strong provincial policy network (Montpetit, 2002).

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7.2.6. Forest industry “lost its voice” with government. Policy theory suggests that civil servants can act as policy advocates for client groups such as the forest industry (Jordan & Maloney, 1997). However, as pointed out earlier, no Ontario government since 1988 has had the reputation of being a champion of the forest industry or making the forest industry a priority. Ministers of Natural Resources in the 1970s and into the 1980s were still supporters of the forest industry. They included Leo Bernier (1972-1977), the first minister following the reorganization of the Department of Lands and Forests into the modern OMNR, and Frank Miller (1977-78) and Alan Pope (1981-1985). These politicians were northern Ontarians who represented the thinking of their time: they perceived supplying Crown timber to the pulp and paper and saw mills to be an important responsibility. Few OMNR Ministers or Deputies since then have been identified to be advocates of the forest industry. Three of the McGuinty government’s southern Ontario Ministers of Natural Resources were described as being “too far out of their element” and lacking “enough ability to know when the bureaucrats were…(obfuscating)…and keeping them under control.” This failure was mostly attributed to their lack of northern Ontario experience (E 5). Exceptions might include Chris Hodgson, Minister of Natural Resources with the Harris government who subsequently became Executive Director of the Ontario Mining Association, and David Lindsay, who was associated with the Harris government, served as Deputy Minister of OMNR in the McGuinty government and left to become the President of the Forest Products Association of Canada. Interestingly, an industry representative traces the government’s negative view of the forest industry to the Harris Conservative Government, despite the Premier’s northern ties, and not to the Rae NDP Government, and perceives the relationship as growing “significantly worse” since then. From his perspective, the Harris Cabinet was “focused on dismantling things”, on trying to appease the environmental concerns, and in the process “making the north a sacrificial lamb” (I 17). The forest industry publicly supported the OMNR during the Timber Class EA hearings when the two worked together “to make sure they came up with witness statements that were compatible” (E 1). The forest industry initiated the process of drafting agreed terms and conditions for the approval of the ENGOs and other parties to the hearings. It also proposed the creation of an Independent Forest Audit (IFA) in forest management planning. Moreover, it collaborated with the OMNR and was a fulltime party in support of the OMNR’s proposal during the Timber Class EA and did so when the industry was still profitable. The leadership of the OFIA during the Timber Class EA and into the CFSA was praised by an ENGO participant (P 22) who observed that despite the “cozier” relationship that existed between industry and government then, the OFIA operated on the basis of knowledge and not on politics as it does today.

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Industry opposition emerged during the CFSA. The OFIA opposed it because of concerns about the definition of sustainability and the hurdles involved in complying with it (Crown Forest Sustainbility Act, S.O. 1994, c. 25, 1994). For other forest companies, the CFSA was positive. As one industry participant acknowledged, the role of industry was improved from their historical role as “loggers” to becoming “forest managers”. Industry opposition grew strident during the McGuinty government because, as one industry participant described it, “there was so much to complain about” (I 17). During the global economic downturn that began in 2007-2008, the McGuinty Government’s perception was that technology companies such as Blackberry and wind and solar energy projects were the industries of the future, as compared to forestry which was in the old mode of “hewers of wood and drawers of water” and a “sunset industry” unable to attract investment. As reported earlier, the McGuinty Government had invested more than $1 billion dollars to stimulate the forest industry but it did not recover. The lessons learned by the government were that the industry’s problems were numerous and “they all collided at one time.” They were also associated with global markets: “I think it is recognition that those forces are beyond the control of anyone in Ontario to significantly change in the short term, to use public funds to generate greater wealth in the medium term,...I do not think it is so much a conscious moving away from the forest industry but more of a conscious effort to look elsewhere to make strategic investments to turn around the province…” (G 14). This insight into the government thinking at the time suggests that support for the forest industry was cautious and there were questions about whether forestry merited public investment, given uncertainty around its future prospects. The Forest Products Association of Canada was critical of Canadian governments for subsidizing the auto manufacturers while refusing to do so for the forest industry (Canada Press, 2009). In any event, the McGuinty Government did not do what the policy network literature suggested might be expected for a Canadian province (competing with other provinces): to subsidize the forest industry, and to relax environmental restrictions for the purpose of preserving and creating jobs and competing with other jurisdictions (Montpetit, 2002 p. 4). The government-industry relationship came under more pressure with the implementation of sustainable forest management under the CFSA. At first well-funded by the Rae NDP government, many of the costs were then “downloaded” by OMNR onto the forest industry during the spending cuts by the Harris government (E 3). Following the Harris government’s “new business relationship”, some forestry companies such as Buchanan and Grant Lumber resisted these changes, while other companies decided to work with government and the ENGOs (G 13). The Timber Class EA decision and the CFSA required the Ontario forest industry to change its practices in compliance with sustainable forest management. Forest industry complaints that the SFM

128 regulation was burdensome and costly have mostly fallen on deaf ears but there is no evidence that such costs have contributed significantly to the economic decline of the industry. As reported earlier, an advisory committee on competitiveness found that the Ontario forest industry was the highest cost producer; however, the costs of energy and transportation/roads in northern Ontario were the chief cost factors (Millard, 2005). Another complaint of the forest industry has been the “mindset” that OMNR bureaucrats developed under the SFM regulations, seen as an impediment to new investment in Ontario mills. The “mindset” was characterized as OMNR moving too slowly, being rule bound and unsympathetic to industry’s requirements (I 21). This situation should have involved strategic learning by the OMNR and the forest industry; it is arguably less about ecological forest policy and more about the need to attract investment in the Ontario forest products industry. The passage of the 2007 endangered species legislation was opposed publicly by the forest industry. The industry’s position was that it was not against protecting endangered species but that the legislation, an election promise to the ENGOs made good by the McGuinty government, had been written by the ENGOs. As such, it was, in effect, an attempt to change land use policy rather than focusing solely on recovery plans for endangered species (I 19). The forest industry complained about not being consulted. (Nor were all ENGOs consulted about the ESA (E 6). This failure to consult industry could be construed as another sign of network flux and policy change. The political battle within the network over the ESA was also fought at the Ontario Biodiversity Council (Biodiversity Council, 2011) , with the OFIA resigning from the Council in 2013. In contrast to the government’s positive perceptions of ENGOs, which were associated with personal relationships and the strategies adopted by network members, antagonistic relations developed between the McGuinty government and the forest industry over the ESA and the Far North Act. These shifts in network interactions were associated with the strategies of the forest industry having lost its “good standing with government” because of its “shrill” opposition to the legislative changes (G 11, G 20). Some individual forest product companies charted a different course than the OFIA; Tembec and Domtar were identified by interviewees to be “progressive thinking” companies whose CEOs in the 1990s, Frank Dottori and Raymond Royer, had worked collaboratively with ENGOs to produce the Living Legacy and Forest Accord, and who were subsequently early supporters of SFM certification, the Canadian Boreal Initiative and the Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement. At the time of the Living Legacy- Forest Accord, they were viewed by their peers to have been “turncoats…people who had abandoned the economic viability of the industry, they had given in to the environmentalists” (G 13). Beyond the evidence of corporate leadership, there is no other evidence of why Tembec and Domtar succeeded in

129 making the transition while other companies did not. From the perspective of policy networks and policy change theory, they could be viewed to have been strategic in being willing to change their attitudes and adapt to new rules (Hall, 1993). Individual companies, such as Tembec, continue to be seen to be “good corporate citizens” by the Ontario government, even during the pressures of the industry crisis (G 11, G 14). The forest industry crisis provides examples of differences in strategic actor learning between ENGOs and the forest industry. One of the most prominent examples of strategic learning is the fundamental conflict between timber supply and protected areas. For ENGOs, the recession was “an ideal time to do a land grab and put more in protected areas or simply not manage for forests” (I 20). ENGOs questioned the validity of industry complaints about larger protected areas associated with the ESA and the Far North Act, and even the need for management of Crown land forests, when industry harvesting levels were so low. At the same time, the forest industry was ignoring its current low wood use and making optimistic predictions, unpersuasive with government, that the industry would rebound and would need growth areas. This viewpoint was characterized by a government observer as one held by people “wearing rose coloured glasses” who continued with the unrealistic expectation of a return to the “boom days” when “every stick of wood” would be needed by a growing industry (G14). Whereas ENGOs saw the recession as an opportunity to advocate for an expansion of protected areas, the forest industry continued to advocate for historical timber production levels that could not be supported by prospects of future growth. While ENGOs claim to have learned to take solutions to the government, the forest industry criticized the McGuinty Government over the ESA and Far North legislation, working publicly to defeat it in the 2011 election and subsequently opposing all tenure reforms. The Ontario forest industry appeared to be unable to face the challenge of re-establishing its relationship with the government and non-state network members. The new reality is that: “there has been a very clear maturing in the environmental community, they are much smarter, they are much more engaged, and able to place their interests in key political locations in the Premier’s office” (G 11). ENGOs learned to become more political and engaged with politicians in contrast to the diminishing relationship of the Ontario forest industry with politicians and government. ENGOs are buying tables at political fundraisers, not the forest industry; politicians want to be seen at ENGO events and the forest industry is not a presence anymore (E 2). This observation suggests that the Ontario forest industry was not devoting resources to public lobbying as it had done in the past. In addition to the political ascendancy of ENGOs in the Ontario forest policy network, the forest industry has faced other challenges that have diminished its role and influence in the forestry policy network. Theoretically, the observation has been made that scientists representing interests such as

130 industry can lose their key resource of ‘public legitimacy, as the public can become skeptical of impartial scientists’ (Toke & Marsh, 2003 p. 242). The OFIA attempted to refute the impartiality of scientific advisory panels advocated by ENGOs for endangered species such as caribou, and the legitimacy of the Far North planning process. However, as a government participant (G 11) pointed out, which voice is the public likely to find more credible: scientists or the forest industry? The McGuinty government made another change in its interaction with the forest policy network: ministers of Natural Resources began bringing their own political advisors onto their staffs rather than relying on the experienced, career civil servants at OMNR, as had been the tradition in the minister’s office. This change in advice had a negative impact for the forest industry. It was left to bargain and negotiate with political advisors who knew little about FMP and who changed roles frequently (I 18). The political success of the ENGOs in working directly with Premier McGuinty’s office and in bypassing the bureaucrats was problematic for the forest industry because it impaired the ability of the OMNR to control network access and the forest policy agenda. From the ENGO perspective, dealing with the senior political levels of government was the preferred approach: “the bureaucracy is often, I think, rightly identified as the slow wheel in the machine, a slow cog… generally the dynamic is that we speak with the political people and the political people will say well this is going to be a problem for my department” (E 4). An ongoing challenge facing the Ontario forest industry is the tension that OMNR is always confronting between its mandate to supply timber and its mandate to protect forests, with the latter having taken precedence with the McGuinty Government. The practical evidence of this tension was identified as the “diminishment of the district forester”, a once powerful position that was focused on “making sure that the mill gets enough wood this week” (I 18.) The inherent conflict in OMNR’s mandate was expressed in political terms: “…the people of Ontario require the Minister of Natural Resources to ensure that those natural resources of the province are perpetuated…and it is a dichotomy at least around the cabinet table where you argue for the disposition of timber for manufacturing that could be accused as being deleterious to ensuring that the natural resources are perpetuated…” (I 18). The perception that the OMNR is unresponsive to the problems and needs of the forest industry is persistent. The President of the Thunder Bay Chamber of Commerce recommended in 2012 that the responsibility for wood fibre allocation be taken away from the Ministry of Natural Resources and moved to the Ministry of Northern Development and Mines. He said it was a mistake when the Forest Branch was transferred to MNDM in 2009 because the “corporate culture went unchanged” and OMNR’s pursuit

131 of tenure modernization was “testament” to its same unhelpful behaviour towards the business community (Ontario Forest Tenure Modernization Act, S.O., 2011, c. 10 2011.). The foregoing discussion describes the loss of power in the policy network by the forest industry in terms of what the interviews revealed: a growing rift between government and the industry beginning with the passage of the CFSA, a succession of ministers and deputies at OMNR who were out of touch with the forest industry and the concerns of northern Ontario and a slow moving, rule bound bureaucracy, the political perception of the forest industry during the recession as having an uncertain future, and public opposition by the industry to the ESA and the Far North Act. The ascendancy of ENGOs in the Ontario forest policy network was also identified by the interviews to be associated with the loss of forest industry influence in the network. An interesting analytical question is whether it also needs to be demonstrated that Ontario forest policy change affected the economic interests of the forest industry in order to argue that the industry’s power in the network has declined? Macdonald’s work on the political power of business with respect to environmental politics suggests if there is no evidence that SFM regulation, for example, required the industry to internalize some of its environmental costs, then the question can be asked if the industry was successful in the “strategy that has always worked: elite-level, closed-door discussion” with the Ontario government in order to negotiate “the least adverse effect on their search for profit” (Macdonald, 2007). The increased costs to the Ontario forest industry associated with its compliance to SFM are discussed in Chapter 2.2 and the pressures on wood supply availability are discussed in Chapter 7.1. It would be productive to explore both these topics in more detail in future research. In this dissertation, it is recognized that industry and economics hold a privileged position in the forest policy network but not to the exclusion of other network actors and issues.

7.3. Shifts in attitudes and values towards ecological sustainability. For paradigm policy change to occur, demonstrable changes in the attitudes and values of the network and “their relationships of action” would theoretically be required (Raab, 2001). Evidence of such shifts was reported by interview participants and discussed above in connection to changes in the ideas of network agents, and the resulting changes in forest policy. It was also related to the shifts in the power relationships among the network agents, with respect to collaborations among ENGOs and the forest industry. A summary of some of major shifts in attitudes and values follows. The situation facing the Ontario government and its forest policy in the 1980s had four steps: first, there was “undeniably an awakening of environmentalism in Ontario”; second, the public came to believe it should have broader input into environmental decisions that affected “our” natural resources; third, “no politician could stand in the way” of this consensus; and, fourth, environmental policy reforms ensued. These reforms set the stage for the Timber Class EA, which was the “groundwork” for the CFSA (G 11).

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The rise of environmental ideas in Ontario was similar to environmental situations occurring throughout North America. Ontario governments’ thinking about forest policy was influenced, for example, by the environmental movement in the United States, environmental activism over the spotted owl on the west coast of the US, and British Columbia practices such as clear cuts on mountain sides, water pollution, landfill toxins such as the Love Canal in the US, and damage caused through oil spills. Ontarians saw these events “on the news and TV and not having full awareness of what was going on in Ontario, [began] asking questions about what does that mean in their own backyard” (G 14). The event that activated environmental interest in forests and the growth of ENGOs in Ontario was, as discussed earlier, controversy over clear cutting to build the Red Squirrel Road in Temagami. It “…triggered the strong engagement of grassroots people… and famous or well-known faces participating, and then of course politicians joining in. So I think all that led to an increased groundswell of environmental interest and people asking questions about their resources” (G 14). Network members value forests differently and in ways that are more complex than the dichotomous industrial forestry versus wilderness preservation debate (Wellington, Greenbaum, & Cragg, 1997 p. 242). A comparison of the two viewpoints expressed by interview participants, the technical, scientific, and aesthetic perspectives of the forester consultant and the philosophical, ethical, and political perspectives of the ENGOs, illustrates complex ideological distinctions among network members and the different perceptions of forests. In contrast to the physicality and forest regeneration phenomenon that excites the forester, the environmentalist is preoccupied with ideas and the progress of environmental thinking in society. As one forester consultant put it: “You are going to have to put in a lot of drudgery but somewhere… there is going to be this one little gem and that is what keeps me going… I was in Owen Sound and I saw this red pine stand with a huge, a complete cedar forest growing up underneath it. It was the most amazing thing …the idea of the red pine was to stabilize the soils and allow it to be the nurse crop for the next one, but I have never seen a whole cedar forest coming in and it is 20 feet tall underneath these great big red pine trees, and it is such a great picture for restoration ecology but anyway that is what keeps me going…” (E 5). In contrast, an environmentalist reflected: “They essentially came up with a line that everyone is an environmentalist, now all we need to do is consolidate gains, to which I responded just wait till the next economic downturn…. these things wax and wane and …the Globe and Mail a couple of weeks ago yet again sounded the death knell for environmentalism but the fatal flaw in that line of reasoning….is whether or not you salute the efforts of the environmental movement in

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the broad sweep or in its component parts, the fact of the matter is the underlying reality for its existence persists, we have environmental problems that are abounding, are ever present and some of which currently appear to be threatening the status of life on this planet as we know it” (E 7).

7.3.1. ENGOs and industry. The interviews suggest that a change in attitudes and values toward the adoption of environmental and ecological ethics by the forest industry may be occurring. The improvement of relationships among some ENGOs and forest industry network members was also identified as a factor in this network shift. The environmental movement of the 1960s operated in a confrontational policy context and experimented with different strategies and tactics. In those days there were no government ministries or legislation for the environment. ENGOs pursued one strategy: “We basically declared war on governments and industry, our motto was sue … …and it was very adversarial” (E 4). Since then much has changed with environmental organizations. Most notably “…there has been a huge shift in confidence on the part of the NGO community whereby rather than sit around and complain about lack of action by government, we simply said this is too important to leave up to government. We are going to grab this torch and do it ourselves” (E 4). In 1985 Ducks Unlimited launched a 15-year $1.5 billion North American water fowl management plan. This was given as an early example demonstrating how ENGOs have taken the leadership in initiating ambitious conservation projects. There is evidence that the attitudes held by industry and ENGOs about one another have changed since the disputatious state of the relations between government and the forest industry on the one side, and ENGOs opposing them, at the Timber Class EA hearing. This description illustrates the point that ENGO-industry collaboration was not anticipated: “…the entrenched sides, the government guys, and the forest industry, they were set in their places, it was like World War 1, they could not move because of their financial commitments and their policy commitments. I dislike using military metaphors, but it was one that the industry used, even afterwards they referred to it as a war… I am not going to say they lost it but despite the fact that they claimed a victory…in fact everything that was put forth by Forests For Tomorrow has come into being” (E 5). The testimonial of an industry participant with many years of experience in the forest industry describes the changes he experienced in his own perceptions of the contribution of ENGOs. He now holds respect for their work: In the early days he thought ENGOs such as CPAWS, Earthroots, the Sierra Club “were irresponsible in their manner and their rhetoric” but now concludes that their tactics were

134 necessary to generate public attention and some of these ENGOs have “become very responsible and very correctly targeted voices for what makes good sense in the management of natural resources” (I 18). A witness to the dramatic change of attitude of the two industry leaders from Tembec and Domtar during the Living Legacy/Ontario Forest Accord negotiations with ENGOs described their new way of thinking about the future and the reaction of their peers: “this is the wave of the future, we have got to learn to conduct our activities in concert with environmental realities and instead of fighting it, we are going to lead the way” (G 13). Similarly, from one industry perspective, a change in ideas or world views was beginning to occur in the negotiations within the Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement: “… the reality is industry does not need every tree and the ENGOs cannot save every caribou. It is not about saving every single caribou, it is about saving the population and making sure that they move from threatened back to thriving” (I 21). Profound change was also reported in the conservation community’s attitudes towards, and perceptions of, the forest industry: “The conservation community is saying let’s get rid of the war in the woods and lets work together. It is not a sin to want a job; it is not a sin to cut a tree. We can get more accomplished for the forest working together” (E 4). As discussed earlier, the conflict between Resolute and Greenpeace within the CBFA, is evidence that not all forest industry and ENGOs in the Ontario forest policy network are moving towards shared objectives.

7.3.2 Foresters. ENGOS have observed a change in the attitude of foresters from past years, one which was associated with being captured by the forest industry and mostly representing forest industry interests. Foresters once identified themselves as being “businessmen” whose job was narrowly focused on “we need wood at a certain cost, we need big wood cheap, that was the mission statement for many of these industry foresters” (E 5). Foresters worked for government and business, many of them were Registered Professional Foresters, and consequently, forest policy was being led by business people. The situation, however, has changed: “by most definitions of forestry nowadays, most foresters would have a more balanced view” (E 5). What was being taught in forestry schools had been changing since the 1980s, according to an ENGO participant who described his experiences as a Faculty of Forestry student at the University of Toronto. The forest industry was perceived to be rigid and resisting pressure to incorporate non-timber values into forest management until it was legislated to do so. In the ENGO participant’s experience: “These new values are actually what we were being taught in the Faculty of Forestry, you were being told that you are a socio-economic critter, and not just a forest manager… I would argue it is not exactly antithetical to your education as a forester to be concerned about these broader social values” (E 4). Forestry schools were seen as being at the beginning of the change and educating the new generation of

135 foresters to accept a broader view of their scope of practice.

7.3.3. Government. A significant shift in the attitudes of OMNR district managers was identified following the implementation of the CFSA and the resulting sustainable forest management regime. Before the CFSA, the MNR districts were characterized as being “individual little fiefdoms” and they saw their role as doing “the bidding of the forest companies” while ignoring the public. A new way of thinking and behaving was observed following the implementation of SFM: “…that is what just turned the world upside down…. it really was the major first sort of benchmark in the progress towards sustainable forestry …. it really did change the culture of the MNR to a great extent because they were basically foresters and they ran the forest and they did it the way they wanted to before 1994… it made a huge change throughout the Ministry” (G 15). Changes in attitudes and values were made in reaction to being under pressure to do so from politicians and the public. The OMNR was an old institution, the oldest bureaucracy in the Ontario government, and for 150 years it had one conception of forests: they were “standing revenue that you will dedicate for industrial growth and building cities and towns and industrial infrastructure and tax revenue” (E 2). In the 1990s a new SFM vision of forests as complex ecosystems was instituted by politicians who were listening to the demands of the public. Over a relatively short period of time, the OMNR was expected to deliver the new forest policy and this pressure continues today: “I think now you can look back and see how difficult it would have been…. how that tension would have been between political people expressing the increasing will of the public overall to see change, and a bureaucracy that was steeped in tradition and very resistant culturally, and for other reasons, to making those changes, so it would have been very hard” (E 2). The forest industry’s economic crisis caused some provincial and national politicians to develop negative attitudes towards the forest industry. The reactions of governments to mills closing and large layoffs were that the forest industry had “ruled the roost for too long” and “government would not be hoodwinked again “(G 16). If such attitudes on the part of governments are persistent, the forest industry faces large obstacles in the future as it repositions itself in the forest policy network: “Abitibi became a symbol of how far the social contract had eroded ….closing mills and trying to get out of pension deals…I think it irreparably damaged the relationship between politicians, between community residents, between former employees and the company…I think there is a general view that we are not going to give up all of our ...natural endowment for a job again in the future. We want alternatives, I think that was

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driving a lot of the political courage around revamping the tenure system both in Ontario and Quebec…I am sure around Cabinet they were saying ‘get these (guys) out, we want new players, let us figure out a way to do that” (G 16). A change in the tactics of ENGOs was perceived to have changed the attitude of the OMNR beginning in the 1990s. Some individuals in ENGOs were described as becoming more prepared to listen and to be better team players. As a result, the OMNR was seen as becoming more responsive to ENGOS because “you are going to win a lot more battles if you become less strident and if you become a rational advocate rather than an irrational person insisting on impossible situations” (G 13). One civil servant described the dialogue with other network actors as a two-way street in which some of the parties started to share a point of view. The OMNR was listening to ENGOs and sharing some of their views but some in the ENGO community, such as the conservation organizations, were more persuasive than others in changing attitudes among OMNR bureaucrats: “What are we going to accomplish, a guy like me trying to have a dialogue with a campaign mounted by Earthroots, really it is not going to do much except perhaps inflate the debate. Having a dialogue with somebody like Tim Gray and the Canadian Boreal initiative, those are likely to be more productive, I do not think I am influencing Earthroots and they are not influencing me” ( G11). In summary, the ENGOs’ strategies of collaborating with government and presenting solutions for government policymakers may have increased government’s receptiveness to the influence of ENGOs in the Ontario forest policy network.

7.4 Conclusions

Chapter 7 discusses factors related to the third research question: why has Ontario forest policy changed? In summary, shifts in the policy network, notably new ideas and new policy actors, explain the outcome of paradigm policy change. This long term research on Ontario forest policy confirms the policy network hypothesis that changes in policy outcomes can be accounted for by changes in the network. The major shifts identified in the interactions of network policy actors are: The Ontario Forest Tenure Modernization Act, 2011 represents a philosophical change associated with paradigm policy change. The legislation, initiated by the OMNR when the forest industry was in recession, was strongly opposed by the industry. The Act is aimed at replacing the long standing rules governing industry’s access to wood supply. The OMNR’s public battle with the forest industry exemplifies the conflict associated with the process of dismantling the belief structure of the old policy community.

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ENGOs were highly successful in persuading Ontario governments to expand protected spaces. Algonquin Park, described as a showcase for Sustainable Forest Management, serves as an example of the retreating influence of the forest industry and the concept of multiple management objectives. ENGOs are campaigning successfully to eliminate logging in the Park. ENGO led market reform, coupled with boycott campaigns, began with the creation of the Forest Stewardship Council’s Sustainable Forest Management certification process. Third party SFM certification was identified as an important means for ENGOs to bypass the old power relationship between government and the forest industry. Since then, government and industry have supported certification processes and they are now considered to be part of normal business practice. The record of ENGOs initiating successful collaborations with some in the forest industry includes the Lands for Life/Living Legacy/Forest Accord processes of the 1990s, the Canadian Boreal Forest Initiative and agreements beginning in 2004 and most recently, the Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement, 2010. These initiatives have excluded Aboriginal Peoples, consequently causing tension between ENGOs and First Nations. ENGOs also initiated successful collaborations with government. For example, ENGOs persuaded the McGuinty government to develop new endangered species legislation that relied on an independent committee of scientists instead of the old network approach of consulting with affected stakeholders and bringing political and economic concerns to bear on the designation and recovery strategies for species at risk. Over the same period of time, the forest industry was experiencing failure in its historically successful advocacy with government. The reasons for this include: premiers and senior OMNR officials either developed negative views of the forest industry or did not give priority to the industry; industry perceptions that government should have done more to support it during the recession; the downloading of forest management costs to industry; environmental legislation that limited the land available for industry operations; and unproductive tactics by the Ontario Forest Industries Association that led to public battles with the government and ENGOs. Paradigm policy change requires changes in the attitudes and values of the network and evidence of these were provided in the interviews. Interview participants attributed shifts in attitudes and values to these factors: the progress of environmental ideas throughout society; the adoption of less confrontational and more collaborative tactics by ENGOs, reflecting their greater confidence in affecting policy change and the leadership by some ENGOs and some individuals in the forest industry; changes in the education of foresters towards forest conservation and biodiversity values; and a cultural change within the OMNR involving more receptivity towards ENGO viewpoints.

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Chapter 8: Summary and Observations

8.0. Introduction This chapter assesses the merits of the dialectical policy network model in understanding Ontario forest policy change. Specifically, it examines the efficacy of the model in relation to uncovering the fundamental paradigm changes that characterized Ontario forest policy since 1988. This research has made theoretical advances using policy network concepts in areas that previous work has identified as essential to explore. These include the examination of policy change as well as policy implementation, the identification of multiple network members, and the tracing of their ideas, actions and network relations over 25 years (Bressers & O'Toole, 1998; Skogstad, 2008).

8.1. Ontario Forest Policy Network Change

Toke and Marsh (Toke & Marsh, 2003 p. 249) argue that “much of the added value which the dialectical approach brings to the theory of policy networks lies in its ability to explain network transformation (or conversely, network stability).” This study provides support for their claim, showing that the dialectical approach is useful in understanding broad changes to the Ontario forest policy network: the elevation of ENGO interests over those of the forest industry, foresters, and Aboriginal Peoples. The transformation from an Ontario forest policy “community” dominated by industry interests in 1988 into a forest policy issues network, which privileges ecological interests, was traced through the interactive relationships between network structure and agents, network and context, and network and outcomes. These factors were identified in policy network theory (Marsh & Smith, 2000c) and articulated as research variables in the dialectical policy network model (Toke & Marsh, 2003) (Appendix 6). The tensions and conflicts experienced in the Ontario forest policy network were associated with paradigm change and adjustments over time in order to accommodate the new ENGO interests (Toke & Marsh, 2003). The major interest groups have remained in place for decades but their influence has shifted as new forest policies were developed in reaction to the ideas and actions of the network actors. The decision of ENGOs to participate as full-time parties, with the assistance of limited intervenor funding, in opposition to OMNR at the Timber Class EA hearings led to a coalition of ENGO interests. Many of these same ENGOs and individuals have continued to be active in the forest policy network to the present time, but new ENGO agents also emerged over the study period, such as the Ivey Foundation, United States philanthropic foundations, and the Environmental Defence. The Timber Class EA was described earlier to have been a four year graduate seminar for ENGOs interested in forest policy. One lesson they learned was that traditional consultation was not the answer because “the power was not in the room…the power was a direct phone call from the head of the industry

139 association to the Minister” (E 2). ENGOs overcame the traditional forest policy community by inserting their interests in the power relationship between the OMNR and the industry. The market mechanisms of sustainability certification, coupled with market campaigns against unsustainable forest company practices and products, helped the ENGOs bypass the historical government-forest industry relationship. The forest industry acknowledged that certification has become a normal business practice in the Ontario forest industry. ENGO participants asserted that changes in the forest policy network came from the intellectual capital of ENGOs, which have been initiators and leaders of forest conservation collaborations with the forest industry. Such collaborations, however, have excluded First Nations, Metis, and Aboriginal, and other stakeholders and more recently, even government. The examples of industry collaborations reported by the ENGOs began with the Living Legacy /Forest Accord processes. Coming out of the Timber Class EA, some ENGOs saw the CFSA as an accomplishment of the Rae government which was taking place at roughly the same time as ENGO-led market certification was making progress with the Ontario forest industry. These relationships expanded into the Canadian Boreal Forest Initiative and the Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement; they foundered on the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the Far North legislation but resulted in a culmination of environmental forest policies and legislation. One challenge to the ENGO-forest industry collaboration is the ENGOs’ growing divergent interests in forest policy compared to the past when they spoke as one voice on most issues. The ENGO community comprises groups with different motivations, aims and strategies, including northern versus southern Ontario perspectives, conservation or “greener” ideology, more activist orientation, and “richer” versus “poorer” organizations depending on size and funding success. As discussed earlier, the literature on policy networks describes stable policy communities to be those where the interests of government and business are closely connected and they share in policy development. The Ontario forest industry has been described as having significant influence historically over government decisions about forest policy, but this study shows the industry began experiencing the erosion of its power to influence government. This was seen in events leading up to the passage of the ESA in 2007. The industry-government relationship disintegrated to the point where industry lost the “basic support” of the government and was “persona non grata.” The value of the dialectical approach is that it requires the analysis of feedback effects of the multiple endogenous and exogenous factors and changing contexts. The interesting question is whether the decline of the forest industry was the single most important economic factor in network change. The answer is that it is not a development sufficient in itself to explain the changes in the network and in forest policy; the latter began twenty five years earlier when the forest industry was profitable. Nor can it be argued that the influence of the environmental movement fully explains the network changes. The

140 application of the model has required consideration of many factors in addition to industry recession. Two other economic factors are also important: OMNR budget constraints and ENGO success in fundraising and capacity building. The interactions of the forest industry with the network involved an unprecedented industry recession, and downsizing, occurring at the same time as the ENGO influence on forest policy was peaking with a receptive Ontario government. The OFIA chose ineffective strategies and tactics to interact with politicians and bureaucrats, further alienating government support and perhaps even triggering a round of OMNR-initiated tenure modernization that the industry opposed. Much of this antagonism was attributed to the forest industry’s “shrill” opposition to ecological forest policy changes. Another factor in the conflict was the industry’s declining economic and political base in northern Ontario, the latter associated with urbanization. Policy network theory postulates that actor “learning” is difficult when forced by changes in the power relationships. Looking to policy network theory, more effective strategies for the forest industry than those devised by the OFIA included adaptation to the new reality of changing network norms and ideology, more cautious steps in proceeding on a “trial-and-error” basis, and understanding the difficulty of reversing the course of its traditional relationship with the OMNR. In the case of the transformation of British agricultural policy in the 1980s and 1990s, from a closed policy community to the decision to join the European Community and, consequently a more permeable network, the economic actors within the network “made a strategic calculation that they had to accept reform. In doing so they were able, to some extent, to control the reform process” (Marsh & Smith, 2000b). “Politics as social learning” and “politics as a struggle for power” have been described as the “often intertwined” processes of the formation of public policy (Hall, 1993). In the case of forest policy change, the OFIA lost the power struggle to hold on to an old policy paradigm that had lost credibility with the government. The OMNR was able to resist industry pressure and push ahead with ecological forest policy reforms. Marsh and Smith argued that “policy outcomes are the product of the interaction between agents and structures, not merely the sum of the effect of structures and agents” (Marsh & Smith, 2000c). The situation of First Nations, Metis, and Aboriginals in the Ontario forest policy network suggests that this is a useful theoretical distinction; their exclusion from the network is discussed earlier in Chapter 5. A benefit of policy network theory is that it raises the question of who is left out of the network. The dialectical policy approach, however, does not provide much guidance in determining network exclusions of interest. For example, some in government were influenced by ENGOs such as the Wildlands League and the World Wildlife Fund, but not by Earthroots and Greenpeace, which were perceived to be more “radical” (G11).” On the other hand, both Earthroots and Greenpeace were active in the ENGO coalition that advocated for the ESA, and Greenpeace was a signatory to the CBFA, although it

141 has since withdrawn as a result of its current dispute with Resolute Forest Products. Therefore, Earthroots and Greenpeace are identified as network members. The ideas and activities of national ENGOs such as the Nature Conservancy of Canada and Ducks Unlimited would be expected to have influence on the Ontario forest policy network, and they have been involved in Boreal initiatives, but these organizations were not involved in public hearings on issues affecting Ontario’s Crown land forests and, therefore, were not identified to be active network members. Their interests, however, are represented in the network and it could be argued that their national and provincial conservation achievements impacted implicitly on the overall paradigm shift. The structure of the old policy community excluded not only certain groups but also certain policy items from the agenda and the same could also be said for the new policy network as defined in the dialectical policy model (Toke & Marsh, 2003). For example, the discussion of economic benefits for northern Ontario, the labour unions, and Aboriginal Peoples appears to attract lower political priority than ecological gains in the ESA and the Far North Act. First Nations, Metis, and Aboriginals’ network experience is not easily described. It is in some aspects one of isolation in Ontario. Aboriginal Peoples define their interests to be treaty and aboriginal rights but these rights have been seen by the government as being separate from forest policy involving other network actors. For example, the Timber Class EA required OMNR to develop a separate “consultation” process with First Nations, Metis, and Aboriginals but this has not produced the expected benefits. The First Nations, Metis, and Aboriginal peoples themselves asked for government-to- government relationships and formalized consultation before participating in discussions of forest policy. How can these be accounted for in the forest policy network? ENGOs have been driving a dominant discourse or narrative on forest conservation and ecological values, which First Nations, Metis, and Indigenous communities perceive as excluding them. It is surprising that Aboriginal Peoples did not work more closely with ENGOs given the former’s understanding of interconnected ecosystems. Aboriginal Peoples perceive that ENGOs have deliberately excluded them from industry collaborations in order to achieve their own conservation objectives and for political reasons. Consequently, it has been the interactions of all network actors and structures that have resulted in the unique network position of First Nations, Metis, and Aboriginal interests. Are Aboriginal Peoples outsiders or within the network? Is the First Nations, Metis, and Aboriginal narrative of treaty and aboriginal rights a structural constraint to their network influence or their most effective resource for inserting themselves into the network? Does the network analysis highlight the government’s responsibility to uphold such rights? Do ENGOs bear a particular responsibility to assist the participation of Aboriginal Peoples as effective network members?

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The First Nations, Metis, and Indigenous communities were involved in the Timber Class EA and were disappointed its potential was not realized. Some Aboriginal Peoples participated in the Canadian Boreal Initiative, however, most were opposed to the ESA and the Far North legislation. Government and ENGO participants noted that First Nations, Metis, and Aboriginals were important to Far North development, but nonetheless they were excluded from the last stages of the Far North Act negotiations. First Nation participants reported that Aboriginal Peoples perceive being alienated by ENGOs from the Ontario forest policy network; exclusion of First Nations, Metis, and Aboriginals is a problem for the Ontario forest policy network. Is it the trigger for the next stage of rapid paradigm change in forest policy? The priority of treaty and aboriginal rights for Aboriginal Peoples could overshadow their interest in ecologically-based forest policy changes but this analysis is not meant to imply that they are not equally committed to biodiversity conservation and other ecological forest policy objectives (Lee & Kant, 2006). These and other ecological concepts have been influenced by, and are associated with, the beliefs and historical practices of Aboriginal Peoples (Blackstock, 2013; D. McGregor, 1997; McKenzie, 2002). As discussed in Chapter 3, the “Canadian typology” of policy networks is less widely referenced now than the Marsh and Rhodes schema, but for this analysis, it is a useful way of considering the network role of the state actor, the OMNR, and it might have some advantages over clarifying the issue of network membership. Canadian political scientists have identified eight policy network prototypes built on the structural resources of the network actors and the power relationships with the state (W Coleman & Skogstad, 1990). Using this concept, the Ontario forest policy network would be defined differently to include a “policy community comprising the attentive public” (of all agents with an interest in forest policy) and, importantly, an “inner’’ sub-government of fewer interests but active in policy design and implementation. Using this typology, it might be argued that Ontario forest policy was, and remains, a pluralist network with OMNR in charge, for the time being. The forest industry, foresters, and ENGOs have been members of the inner “sub-government” with OMNR, but such has not happened for First Nations, Metis, and Aboriginal interests. Exploring this typology further, and given the evidence of OMNR’s tight grip on forest policy, it would be difficult to argue that the network in 1988 was a clientele pluralist network in which the forest industry was in the driver’s seat, although industry influence cannot be denied. The third type of power relationship of relevance to the Ontario forest policy sector was defined to be a corporatist network in which there was a more equitable balance between state and economic actors. If the 1988 Ontario policy network could be described to be closer to a corporatist model, such is not the case today where it appears to be the ENGOs influencing forest policy and less so the forest industry.

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For all network analysis, it is important to identify and acknowledge the effect on the network of the “contingency of relationships” among network members: in this study political actors made a difference. An activist Minister of the Environment was a key factor in forcing the compliance of the OMNR into the environmental assessment process in the 1980s, an event that triggered forest policy change for decades to follow. The Ministry of the Environment has not exerted such influence on the forest policy network since then. Three premiers of Ontario were politically well situated and inclined to force paradigm changes in forest policy. Premier Bob Rae and his caucus of northerners, especially Natural Resources Deputy Bud Wildman, were instrumental in developing and implementing sustainable forest management before the OMNR bureaucrats were ready for it. Premier Mike Harris was sympathetic to the conservationist appeal for more parks and protected areas and less so to the forest industry and the OMNR, which never recovered from the ongoing budget cuts that began with the “Common Sense Revolution.” Premier Dalton McGuinty and his staff were persuaded by the ENGOs to push hard on environmental legislation that forced ecological reforms on forest policy. Criticisms of policy network theory are that it “adds little explanatory power”, in some instances putting too much weight on the attributes of actors rather than where it should be, i.e. on the features of networks (Skogstad, 2008) and for not laying out descriptive and causal inferences that can be tested (Dowding, 2001). This dissertation suggests that forest policy making and outcomes in Ontario both changed, and were affected by, network transformation. In 1988, the forest policy network began to move away from what was theoretically described as “an integrated, stable, and exclusive policy community” of industry, foresters and government. By 2012, it had transformed into the other end of their continuum: an ecological issues network of “loosely connected, multiple and often conflict-ridden members” (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992). The conclusions emerging from this analysis that might be useful for future research in policy network theory are: 1. Growth in capacity (i.e., creative ideas, technical expertise, professional development, fundraising) led to successful ENGO influence on government and the policy network. The Ontario policy network is associated with building a stronger legislative and regulatory policy platform for ecological forest policy. Policy network theory could be advanced by exploring the following question: how could the network operate to maintain its continuing ecological influence on forest policy? 2. An economically distressed industry could lose its network influence. This appears to be the case with the Ontario forest products industry but as the analysis suggests, the reasons go beyond economics and are also associated with historical, political, social and cultural shifts. Policy network theory would benefit from research on the question of how or even whether it is possible for an industry to re-position itself to re-emerge as an important network member.

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This dissertation does not downplay the importance to the province of socio-economic interests associated with the forest industry, including the northern Ontario economy, the remote communities of First Nations, Metis and Aboriginal Peoples that need employment, labour unions and exports, all of which have been adversely impacted by the recession. Can these interests be re-positioned in the ecological forest policy network? 3. Professions such as foresters could be adversely affected if they are too closely associated with industry members of the network. In the case of Ontario forest policy, foresters were associated historically with the forest industry, their largest employer. Since the 1990s, the decline in membership and forestry school enrolment has paralleled some aspects of the political, social, and economic decline of the forest industry. The profession was also associated with the “business mandate” of the Ministry of Natural Resources. Increasingly, foresters are turning to consulting, to working with ENGOs and non-profits, municipalities and urban and private land forests. The experience of professional foresters in this research raises questions about the future role of technical and scientific professions in ecological issues networks. The forestry profession and post-secondary education are struggling to understand and to adjust to ecological forest policy and their transformation may be important to consolidating ecological gains. 4. The state actor could be required to reassess the culture of its organization and to redefine its relationship with the industry (i.e., the old network) and also the new network actors. In the case of the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, the successful strategies and tactics of ENGOs, the forest industry recession and government spending cutbacks, all combined to increase pressure on the bureaucracy to share policy-making space. A question left unanswered is how state actors, during network transformation into an ecological issues network, fulfil their old and new legislated responsibilities when their budgets are reduced. 5. Important entities such as Aboriginal Peoples could remain isolated “outside” the Ontario forest policy network unless they choose to participate also in broader network objectives rather than solely pursuing their treaty and aboriginal rights in a government to government relationship. The observation that Aboriginal Peoples might have more success in inserting themselves into forest policy making is not intended to address or criticize the pursuit of important treaty and Aboriginal rights. It would be difficult to argue that First Nations, Metis, and Indigenous communities do not have an essential role to play in the Ontario forest policy network. The interesting question theoretically is how Aboriginal Peoples operate effectively within and outside of established policy networks. How do they achieve their interests in forest management as well as their treaty and aboriginal rights? Using the dialectical policy network model, this research is inconclusive as to whether Aboriginal Peoples operate as network actors outside the “issues” network or on the periphery. First Nations report

145 that they have been unable to influence Ontario forest policy. They have achieved neither their treaty and aboriginal rights nor significant economic benefits from forest policy. Their ability, however, to delay forest industry operations on their lands, through road blockades and other protests, gives them power that cannot be ignored by the state actors and the forest industry (Chiefs of Ontario, 2014; Dale, 2013). Their seeming exclusion is a failure of the ecological forest policy network and will likely lead to pressure for future network change. These questions are future directions for research. They emerge from this dissertation as potentially offering worthwhile contributions to the state of knowledge.

8.2. Ontario Forest Policy: Paradigm Change Achieved

Public policy change has been characterized as being incremental policymaking (Lindblom, 1977) or ‘path dependent’ on what came before it (Pierson, 2000a) or a product of “the continuation of past policies and practices….piecemeal policy change is the stuff of normal policy” (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). Ontario’s forest policy evolution is better understood as resulting from “shocks” to the system as found in Hall’s paradigm change approach where “learning about policy goals occurs only in special circumstances associated with shifts in policy paradigms or changes in the dominant set of policy ideas which shape discourse” (Hall, 1993). Similarly, Sabatier’s theory of policy change caused by major perturbations concerning the knowledge and participation of scientists and technical experts in policy networks also partially explains Ontario forest policy change. The rapid development and implementation of sustainable forest management by the activist, pro-Northern Ontario Rae government represented a process of cumulative change that adds up to paradigm change from forest policy centred on the industry’s requirements; the groundwork had been laid by the debate over the scientific concepts at the Timber Class EA hearings. Forest policy experienced another rapid shift towards ecological values with the McGuinty government. This paradigm change was associated with the government’s close relationship with ENGOs, and the influence of the ideas of the environmental community on the ESA and the Far North legislation. The 25 year study shows periods of both rapid and gradual policy change that resulted in increasingly ecological forest policy outcomes. Associated with paradigm policy change is the question of its durability or longevity. Theoretically, the future of the new policy paradigm was described as needing evidence of “action along the normative pathway that legitimated new values that government could not easily abandon” (Bernstein & Cashore, 2000 p. 91). A related question has also been asked: how to distinguish significant policy shifts from incremental tactical adjustments (Lertzman, et al., 1996)? In addressing whether the advances in Ontario’s ecological forest policy are predicted to be maintained and built upon, or to lose ground, it is

146 instructive to look at the CFSA. This sustainable forestry legislation, which has remained essentially unchanged for 20 years, has been sufficiently flexible in its enabling provisions to accommodate increased ecological requirements and tenure modernization. There are, however, indications of a backlash to the ESA and the Far North Act. As discussed in Chapter 7, the Wynne government’s decision to give the forest industry, among others, a five year exemption to comply with the ESA might be interpreted as an indication of friction in the government- ENGO relationship. This development, coupled with the departure of Premier McGuinty in January 2012, suggests new pressures on the network could be emerging. Other pressures directed at the ecological forest policy network and its persistence include the ongoing opposition to tenure modernization and the new Local Forest Management Corporation model being tested. Additional pressures involve the obstacles that will inevitably be encountered in implementing the new ecosystem landscape guides; and ENGOs, such as the WWF, have moved their focus away from forests into development of the Arctic, for example. It may be that the Far North Act represented a peak of influence for the environmental community and that the “environmental pendulum” will be swinging back to more pragmatic, economic development considerations. The extent and duration of the ENGOs’ influence on ecological forest policy is uncertain. The analysis of policy network change in British Columbia’s forest policy, which was focused on wilderness advocacy, concluded that B.C. environmentalists’ efforts “to elbow into the policy community and the sub-government zone of that community” were unsuccessful and while they “ had significantly altered policy-making dynamics…what environmentalists could hope to accomplish was, from the outset, circumscribed by the legacy of the liquidation-conversion policy adopted decades before the generations of environmentalists featured in this account began to question the path chosen” (Wilson, 1998). This study began where Wilson’s ended, and even given the differences between Ontario and British Columbia’s forest economies, his conclusions are not descriptive of the Ontario experience today. This research suggests that ENGOs are associated with paradigm change in the Ontario forest policy network, and have successfully influenced the incorporation of ecological objectives in Ontario forest policy.

8.3. Recommendations for Forest Management Planning

Contemplating changes to the increasingly ecologically sustainable forest management planning process in Ontario was not the focus of this research, but key informants for this study, most of who are or were participating in forest management, identified a number of issues of relevance to forest management planning. Ontario’s experience can be an instructive case study for other jurisdictions making the transition to an ecological forest policy.

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8.3.1 Evolution of professional foresters. This research revealed that foresters were perceived to be important actors historically in developing and implementing forest policy and, consequently operating as key network actors. Since the 1990s, foresters have been required by legislation to be involved in policymaking but this dissertation shows that their influence in the Ontario forest policy network has declined. The forester’s profession appears to be evolving but little theoretical attention has been invested in his/her new role and status as a network policy actor. The Ontario Professional Foresters Association was criticized for its ineffective influence on forest policy. It does meet with the Minister of Natural Resources to provide advice but has been hesitant to take public positions because its members represent all sides of a forest policy conflict: government, the forest industry, ENGOs, and Aboriginal Peoples. There is evidence that foresters have been slow to change as a result of their network experience, however, it appears that they are beginning to explore new strategies and tactics, as discussed in Chapter 2. Foresters within the Ontario forest policy network might act as policy network mediators, either in the sense of Sabatier’s policy broker moving between advocacy coalitions or Kingdon’s policy entrepreneurs who “couple” policy problems and solutions. That is, they could be useful translators between contending interests inside and outside policy networks.

8.3.2 Relevancy of FMP institutions. Public participation for Northern Ontario residents through the Local Citizen Committees and open houses during the FMP process were experimented with during Forest Management Agreements in the 1980s. Public participation has been required since the Timber Class EA decision and the CFSA, but the effectiveness of the process has been questioned. The change from a five year to ten year planning process, arising from the nine year review of the Timber Class EA was seen as the erosion of public participation rights because the strategic objectives are now set a decade in advance, but the public does not become interested in or aware of this until closer to plan approval when operational details became available, by then, it is almost too late to influence change. The erosion of public participation rights, coupled with examples of where local activists have been unsuccessful in obtaining the FMP changes they sought or bump-ups from the Ministry of the Environment, have resulted in “political fatigue and political frustration” that is predicted to boil up in the future just as Temagami did in the past (E 3). For the time being, some ENGOs are withdrawing and putting their efforts into energy and mining projects where they could make a difference. The larger ENGOs have been mostly engaged on the scale of the Far North Canadian Boreal forest and impacts on climate change, on extensive caribou habitat protection and on endangered species in southern and northern Ontario. It is predicted that they will eventually turn their attention on the southern Boreal where most forest management occurs (E 4).

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There are several concerns that remain when it comes to public participation. Questions were raised about the effectiveness of the Provincial Forest Policy Committee, which advises the Minister of Natural Resources, but has no public profile. There were complaints about too few informal forums for discussing contentious forest policy issues. Another concern is that FMP is seen to be a regulatory requirement that must be complied with quickly and that long term visions about what the forest might look like, and innovations to its management, are not encouraged. The recommendation is to examine the mentality of industry and government to cut costs at the expense of the forest resource; the discussion of best practices should not be avoided for cost implications and the objective should be to manage the forest for high productivity.

8.3.3. Integrated land use planning. The OMNR has historically used forest management planning for some, but not all, resources management in Northern Ontario. The exclusion of some resources is based on the reasoning that it would be too complicated, and now unaffordable, to manage moose herds or fisheries as intensively, for example, as is done for forests. The view was that privatizing public land would result in more money being invested in resource management (I 21). However, that option is not politically feasible. Quebec is experimenting with a “ZEC” (zones d’exploitation controlée) approach in which resource managers, often from non-profit organizations, are responsible for all activities and resources in their zones. The approach is based on the belief that more revenue should be generated from Crown land forests through new management approaches involving government or private managers. Ontario governments have learned that public land use planning processes are expensive and conflict-ridden, but the pressures to do more land use planning continue. The results of land use planning have been mostly negative for the forest industry: the Living Legacy-Forest Accord provisions signified that 88 per cent of the area of the undertaking was available for the forest industry but this area has been reduced by land withdrawals to protect non-timber values under ecosystem landscape planning and other initiatives such as the CBFA. The Far North Act could set the bar higher at 50 per cent of protected areas for the area of the undertaking. The view that northern Ontario is “turning into one big park” is unreasonable today, but it might reflect the reality that the Ontario forest industry will need to operate under reduced flexibility and opportunity. The recommendation is for the experiments in the new Ontario tenure model to examine maximizing benefits from all Crown Land development for local communities and combining all resources planning under FMP, similar to the Quebec model and what is done on private forest lands in Canada and the United States.

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8.3.4. A New vision for the forest industry. A lack of leadership in the Ontario forest industry during the forest industry crisis and the long period of restructuring is a factor in the declining importance of the industry. Some attribute the lack of leadership to the fact that many of the head offices of forest companies have moved from Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver to the United States. This change in business location has made the industry corporate, distant, and removed from provincial politics. The strategy and tactics of the Ontario Forest Industry Association (OFIA) have further diminished the political influence of the industry. Even so, the pressures experienced by the provincial association during an unprecedented industry crisis would have made longer term strategic planning difficult. The forest industry and the Ontario government face more challenges to test their network relations. Industry will need government to provide the regulatory and investment framework to facilitate a transformation from commodity based to a value added industry capable of manufacturing products such as bio-chemicals and bio-energy (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2010; Forest Products Association of Canada, 2011; Lattimore, Smith, Titus, Stupak, & Egnell, 2013). Biomass applications look promising but ENGOs are not prepared to accept the unregulated harvesting of valuable forests for chipping and burning. The industry will need to be innovative and collaborative in order to adjust to the reality of the shrinking operational land base in Ontario’s Crown land forests. This research suggests the inevitability of smaller amounts of Crown Land available for timber operations in Ontario in the future. The OFIA continues to advocate for timber supply allocations (26 million cubic metres annually) that have been in discussion for decades yet the industry has never exceeded its annual allowable cut. There has been no evidence of a wood supply shortage for the industry, except for the barriers raised by licence holders, and the event of the forest industry crisis does not support the argument that wood demand will skyrocket in the near term. There must be a more credible strategy than for the industry to argue that it needs to keep its foot in the door to protect its future interests, a strategy that has not worked in Ontario. The onus is on the OMNR to understand the tenure security needed by the forest industry to obtain the financing required to maintain and expand their operations. Under tenure modernization, with either LFMCs or Enhanced Sustainable Forest Licenses ( ESFLs), the situation for forest product companies is that they will receive wood supply from a forest management entity; this is no different, in theory, than ‘buying wood at the mill gate’, which is how most companies in the United States operate (I 20). The tenure modernization experiments should be designed to include examination of this question, particularly for existing companies going through the tenure transition. The Ontario government, however, does not want to find itself in the litigious situation of guaranteeing wood volumes to the forest industry, as occurred in British Columbia.

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8.3.5. Federal government partnership is not working. Ottawa has not seen itself as having any responsibilities for provincial forest policy. Until its budget cuts in the 1990s, however, the federal government exercised influence on forest policy through programs to support the Forest Management Agreements and major road expansion and silviculture. It then supported SFM research and the Model Forests and international forestry initiatives and organizations. Since the forest industry crisis, some funding has gone to assist the industry’s efforts to move into the “bio-economy” market. Ontario has been the loser in the softwood lumber agreements with the United States compared to producers such as J.D. Irving’s in New Brunswick, which have gained increased access to United States markets. Foreign Affairs Canada will be preparing for another round of negotiations but there is neither an expectation that forestry experts will be listened to nor that Ontario’s interests will be seriously considered. Another irritant between Ontario and the federal government with respect to forest policy has been the worsening conditions of remote First Nations communities in Northern Ontario. The OMNR sees limited potential in advancing its relationships with First Nations on forest policy issues so long as poverty and the social problems intensify. The OMNR laid more of the blame on Ottawa for this situation but accepted some responsibility for not solving the problems either. The federal government has invested in research to help transform the forest industry and to expand protected area programs, for example, those of Ducks Unlimited and the Nature Conservancy of Canada and should continue to do so. While education is not a federal responsibility, the federal government should also consider investing in the institutional infrastructure for ecological forest policy in Ontario, a policy direction that is also likely occurring in the other provinces. This would involve support for forestry and other natural resource programs and research at Lakehead University, the University of Toronto and the community colleges to help them re-position themselves in the new forest policy paradigm.

8.3.6. Learning from other jurisdictions. The role of a Chief Forester in an ecological forest policy regime might be worth examining again. British Columbia has a Chief Forester who works within the Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations. Kenneth Armson served in this capacity from 1986-89 in Ontario and reported to the Minister of Natural Resources. To avoid the position being a political lightning rod- the role of a chief forester has been seen to serve mostly the interests of the forest industry- the role of the Chief Forester would need to be redefined. The United States Forest Service has begun actively managing forests again in areas where they were stopped from doing so for decades by environmental opposition and litigation. The forest fire

151 hazards in California in recent years could be seen as an example of opportunities for conducting forest management that improves the wildlife habitat, while increasing the amount of timber that is available for sale and restoring the economic viability of some of the surrounding communities. This positive development contrasts with the situation in Ontario where forest managers were, from a forest industry perspective, “continuously being told what you cannot do and that somehow you are bad” (I19). The recommendation emerging from this dissertation is that changes occurring in the education, regulation and practice of licensed foresters, and perhaps other forestry professionals, are preparing them to serve in the position of Ontario’s Chief Ecological Forester. The Chief Ecological Forester should be an independent agent who reports to the Legislative Assembly of Ontario. Another observation was made that the energy sector could learn a lesson from Ontario’s forest sector about the types of collaboration required in order to work through conflict and find solutions over issues such as pipelines and the oil tar sands (E 4). The forest industry experienced the “war in the woods” 30 years ago, and since then it has learned to work more productively with ENGOs and somewhat with Aboriginal Peoples. In fact, some extreme views in the business press have criticized the forest industry for “giving in” to the environmental community’s “greenmail” (P. Foster, 2013). If the evolution of the Ontario forest policy network has led to the forest industry adopting more ecological practices and progressive views about sustainability, this experience has not been communicated to urban Canada.

8.3.7. Regenerating the forest policy network. It was observed that people prominent in the forest policy network, with the OMNR, ENGOs, and the forest industry, are aging and little effort is being made to hand on their knowledge and contacts to the next generation. Given the experience with the forest industry crisis, it may be that young people with new ideas and skills will be required to understand global markets and their impact on small forestry communities in Northern Ontario. There is an argument to be made that funding ENGO involvement in the Ontario forest policy network could be used in part to bring in younger people for the purpose of keeping the pathways of communication and feedback, which have been built over 25 years, in place for as long as needed. These relationships have contributed to ecological forest policy advances and should be available for the new network members. There is also a need to bring young Aboriginal Peoples into the network. Collaboration among network members is a desirable value that has assisted forest policy reforms in Ontario, which is not to say that militancy is not also part of the network mix. There have been few cases documenting the success of environmental influences on public policy change. One reason for doing this case study was the anticipation that it could shed light on the phenomenon of forest policy change in the direction of more ecological values in Canada and elsewhere.

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The Ontario network experience, in which ENGOs have positively influenced the practices of the forest industry, is something to be shared with the next generation, even if they decide to reject it. A recommendation made earlier is repeated here: the federal and Ontario governments should consider investing in the institutional infrastructure for ecological forest policy in Ontario colleges and universities. Aboriginal Peoples are a large population in northwestern Ontario and governments, therefore, should do more to encourage Aboriginal students and could establish scholarships in forestry and other natural resource schools to prepare them for careers (G 15).

8.3.8. Advancing the interests of Aboriginal peoples. The conversation of how Ontario’s forest policy can bring benefits to First Nations, Metis, and Aboriginal communities has stalled; it has become more difficult to talk about because the problems have been framed as being intractable. How does forest policy begin to solve problems associated with poverty, disease, historical injustices, prejudice and discrimination, ineffective bureaucratic administration and ineffective public expenditure, deadlocked politics and missed opportunities? The approach taken at the Timber Class EA was to ignore the political context and concentrate instead on strategies to provide economic benefits to remote communities as soon as possible. Twenty five years later, this approach can be judged to have failed. The Environmental Assessment Board Panel was persuaded by legal opinions from the Ontario government that the treaty and aboriginal rights were constitutional issues but the courts’ decisions since then have made no difference in Northern Ontario. First Nations continue to complain of the failure of the Ontario government to recognize aboriginal and treaty rights and to find a way to incorporate them into legislation. Initiatives and developments that have offered promise include tenure modernization, where Aboriginal Peoples can learn the governance tools that they will require to move into managerial and ownership positions. The Northern Ontario Sustainable Communities Partnership was focused on building relationships between local communities and First Nations on the basis of treaty relationships, and it, or similar initiatives, could foster conversations on what Ontario will look like when First Nations governments assume a larger role. The recommendation emerging from this dissertation is that the success of Aboriginal Peoples in taking over some licences from bankrupt companies, as discussed earlier in Chapter 8.2.3, suggests that the fastest route to sharing in the economic benefits of forestry is for them to own the forestry businesses.

8.3.9. Government’s responsibility for sustaining Crown Land forests. With the accumulation of years of spending cutbacks, the question needs to be asked: is government fulfilling its legislative responsibilities for forest management? The related question is whether the OMNR is withdrawing from the management of Crown Land forests? The mandate of the OMNR, to sustain Crown Land forests “perpetually”, has always faced the challenge of politicians, who

153 only pay attention to the long term if it is salient for their short term electoral prospects. It was beyond the scope of this dissertation to do more than identify public investment in Crown Lands as a factor associated with the dynamics of the Ontario forest policy network and constraints on the state actor, the OMNR. The spending cuts to OMNR’s budget, beginning in 1995, have affected the forest policy network in at least three ways: OMNR has faced continuous pressures to change; governments have turned to ENGOs to find solutions that were previously OMNR’s policy domain; and funding for sustainable forest and ecological management continues to be threatened by ongoing cuts. With the passage of the CFSA and the funding given to OMNR by the Rae government for implementing sustainable forest management, the Forest Branch of the OMNR experienced a “golden age” of intense forest policy activity and planning that stopped with the election of the Harris government. The subsequent budget cuts are reported to have prevented the Timber Class EA and the CFSA from being fully implemented. The downloading of FMP responsibilities to industry, such as more silvicultural work, road building and GIS surveys, proved to be a failed experiment, particularly during the industry crisis, and the government has resumed paying for these activities. What other FM responsibilities would the OMNR contemplate reassuming? Central to forest sustainability are the Forestry Renewal Trust and the Forestry Futures Trusts, which were threatened when the stumpage payments that financed their forest regeneration activities dried up as a result of mill closures. This is an example of the important role that the forest industry plays in sustainable forest management and ecological forest policy. An industry participant (I 21) asked the question, in the absence of a profitable forest industry, who pays for sustainability? As reported earlier, the capacity of ENGOs has grown at the same time as that of the OMNR and the forest industry has been shrinking. ENGOs have reported success in bringing “bundled solutions” to government that have the endorsement of ENGOs and the forest industry (E 4). This approach might be helpful in enhancing the OMNR’s dwindling resources; the concept will be tested if the CBFA is successful and an agreement is brought to the government for ratification. It is recommended that the policy actors in the Ontario forest policy network examine the well- documented history of reluctant Ontario governments failing to invest adequately in Crown Lands for forest conservation and forest management (Kuhlberg, 2009). The purpose of this initiative would be to challenge the political indifference to public investment in Crown Lands, which is predicted to continue as the Greater Toronto Area electorate becomes even less aware of northern Ontario and its forests.

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Appendices

Appendix 1. Sources for Diverse, Multi-Disciplinary Forest Policy Literature

The literature on forest policy was found in three separate silos represented by the disciplines of forestry, political science and environmental studies. The disciplines of economics and geography are associated with all three. Each discipline is concerned with related but different aspects of forests. Forest issues are diverse and each discipline has a unique point of view. For example, to foresters, clear cutting is an acceptable silvicultural method for harvesting particular stand types, but it is often opposed by non- timber interests who view it as wasteful and destructive to the forest ecosystem. The literature on forest policy has become multidisciplinary; it has moved away from being defined as the traditional bailiwick of foresters and forestry and it is the conclusion of this dissertation that there has been a call for researchers to engage with the literature of more than one discipline to understand forest policy change. The political science literature focused on the central role of government and politics in forest policy. In Canadian Forest Policy: Adapting to Change, Howlett asked why there was a “dearth of policy literature devoted to exploring the industry within Canada” and answered his question by observing that the complexity of policy making in the forest sector was daunting to researchers. In Talk and Log: Wilderness Politics in British Columbia, 1965-1996, Jeremy Wilson argued that the notion of policy outcomes being determined by who controls the resources is too limited; he preferred a political science explanation such as Nordlinger’s view that ‘what public officials do, where they sit, whom they interact with, and what they see and know’ are important influences on forest policy (p. 16). Political scientists with an interest in forestry have investigated the global perspectives of international trade and have made contributions to the literature through research on sustainable forest management certification (Cashore, 2000, 2002). The forestry literature often defines forest policy narrowly, primarily as being economic and utilitarian and the role of government and social and political conflict are often acknowledged but not explored in depth. Forest policy has been described as comprising a “social bargaining process” which “regulates conflicts of interest” between forest management and non-timber users (Krott, 2005). The focus of forest policy literature has often been on economic analyses of forest resources (Adamowicz et al 1996) and definitions of forest policy that minimized the political processes (Fraser, 2002).

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Figure A1. Illustration of Forest Policy Silos with Issues of Interest to the Disciplines

Forestry literature is Environmental Political science concerned with literature is concerned literature is concerned Tenure/wood supply, with Conservation, with Jobs, Investment, Silviculture, Certification, Clearcuts, Preservation, Urbanization, Industry

First Nations, Métis, Parks, Wilderness, recession, North-South Aboriginal peoples, Climate change, conflict, Far North Crown Land, Biodiversity, Endangered development, US Sustainability, Bioenergy, spaces and species, Softwood lumber Professions, Markets, environmental agreements, public FMP, Forest science. philosophy, ethics and opinion, political disputes, values, the boreal, and government pesticides, social license administration. to operate.

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Appendix 2. OMNR Statistics on Forest Industry Recession

Table A2.1. Provincial Layoffs & New Jobs Summary by Region June 2002 - April 30, 2013 (Actual and Announced)

Northeast Northwest Southern Total Sawmill Sector - Permanent -1,117 -1,506 -254 -2,877 Sawmill Sector - Temporary -33 -11 -87 -131 Sawmill Sector - Indefinite -1,090 -701 -63 -1,854 Sawmill Sector - Jobs Created 273 12 5 290 Pulp & Paper Sector - Permanent -1,380 -4,821 -1,595 -7,796 Pulp & Paper Sector - Temporary 0 -110 0 -110 Pulp & Paper Sector - Indefinite -264 -464 -328 -1,056 Pulp & Paper Sector - Jobs Created 320 870 100 1,290 Board Sector - Permanent -440 -433 -543 -1,416 Board Sector - Temporary -100 0 0 -100 Board Sector - Indefinite -938 -120 -316 -1,374 Board Sector - Jobs Created 130 140 14 284 Value-Added - Permanent -22 -111 -113 -246 Value-Added - Temporary -56 -60 0 -116 Value-Added - Indefinite 0 -14 0 -14 Value-Added - Jobs Created 59 70 0 129 Total Layoffs -5,440 -8,351 -3,299 -17,090

Total Permanent Layoffs 1 -2,959 -6,871 -2,505 -12,335 Total Indefinite Layoffs -2,292 -1,299 -707 -4,298 Total Temporary Layoffs -189 -181 -87 -457 Total New Jobs Created 782 1,092 119 1,993 Net Job Loss -4,658 -7,259 -3,180 -15,097 1 Permanent layoffs are net of new jobs created if permanently closed mills have been purchased and restarted

Source of data is business activity reports produced by OMNR staff.

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Table A2.2. Mill Closures by Province 2003-2012

Total Job % of Total Total Province Loss Job Loss Closures BC 13,585 29% 89 AB 1,582 3% 18 SK 1,586 3% 9 MB 497 1% 2 ON 11,663 25% 69 QC 12,616 27% 98 NB 2,714 6% 17 NF 1,223 3% 5 NS 1,520 3% 5 PEI 36 0% 1 Total 46,986 100% 313

Source: OMNR

Table A2.3. Number of Primary Mills by Mill Type

Mill Type1 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122 Bio-Products 2 2 1 Composite Solids & Panels 6 5 5 4 3 3 3 3 3 Pulp, Paper & Paperboard 15 14 11 9 10 8 8 7 7 Sawmill 43 40 37 30 24 20 23 21 19 Veneer Mill 4 4 4 3 2 2 2 1 1 Fuelwood Total3 68 63 57 46 41 35 37 32 30 1 Fiscal year from April 1 to March 31 2 Fiscal year 2012 data no complete (retrieved on February 22, 2013) 3 Summary includes facilities that received greater than 25,000 cubic metres of Crown wood per year (Merchantable & Unmerchantable)

Source of data is business activity reports produced by OMNR staff.

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Table A2.4. Forest Management Revenue, 1997-2012

Invoice Total Minimum Residual Forestry Resource Forest Total Administration Renewal Conversion Year Volume1 Stumpage Stumpage Futures Investory Management Revenue1 1995/1996 13,649 $16,720 $58,433 $133 $65,562 $140,847 1996/1997 24,461 35,220 117,869 188 117,242 183 145 270,847 1997/1998 24,992 65,076 102,618 82 100,949 9,822 7,724 286,270 1998/1999 21,054 58,011 99,023 75 76,513 9,702 6,485 249,809 1999/2000 21,415 65,945 84,758 45 76,112 9,823 803 237,487 2000/2001 26,604 77,948 33,404 48 84,587 11,411 1 207,401 2001/2002 17,787 52,571 21,485 39 51,996 8,022 0 134,113 2002/2003 27,187 82,863 13,989 40 87,001 12,697 0 196,590 2003/2004 22,481 67,048 25,965 4 72,019 10,581 175,617 2004/2005 22,429 69,064 44,648 10 74,851 11,065 199,637 2005/2006 24,451 10,441 21,005 3 80,719 11,633 123,800 2006/2007 19,830 58,148 2,094 21 57,447 8,961 5,966 132,638 2007/2008 16,049 37,808 214 15 46,546 7,089 13,288 104,960 2008/2009 14,304 30,161 107 23 43,531 6,205 10,183 90,210 2009/2010 10,800 15,906 156 3 32,519 4,652 13,358 66,594 2010/2011 12,761 25,048 607 10 40,605 5,563 10,550 82,384 2011/2012 10,705 21,789 208 16 34,980 4,720 9,898 556 72,166

1 In CDN thousands Source: OMNR

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Appendix 3. Chronology of Ontario’s Forest Policy, December 2014

Ontario-based National and International Factors

Unregulated Era 1763-1841- “The Age of Waste”-settlement, 1763-Royal Proclamation in which the British clearing for agriculture, square timber government recognized the presence of First exports (population of Ontario 1763-1824- Nations people and committed the Crown to 150,000 and 450,000 by 1838) negotiating treaties with them before the land was 1781-1929-records of Indian treaties and opened for non-Aboriginal settlement purchases of land 1783-1797-United Empire Loyalists settle in Ontario 1791-British Parliament passes the Constitutional Act, dividing the old province of Quebec into Upper and Lower Canada

Revenue From Timber Era 1827-First Commissioner of Crown Lands and Surveyor General of Woods and Forests for Upper Canada(Peter Robinson)-record keeping begins 1837-Rebellion in Upper Canada by reformers lead by William Lyon Mackenzie calling for responsible government and an end to the rule of the “family compact” 1837-Public Lands Act-attempt to deal with faults of the older system of free land grants to privileged persons 1839-Lord Durham’s Report on the Affairs of British North America (condemns the lands system and calls for the Union of

177

Ontario-based National and International Factors

Upper and Lower Canada and the introduction of responsible government into the workings of the local parliamentary system) 1839-House of Assembly in Toronto appoints two Joint committees of Executive and Legislative Council to investigate Receiver General’s Department and Lands offices. 1849-Select Committee Inquiry into the timber trade 1849-The Crown Timber Act (An Act for the Sale and Better Management of Timber Upon Public Lands) 1851- The Crown Timber Act amended to provide for area charges 1855-Select Committee on Management of Public Lands (decisions re opening the Ottawa-Huron tract for settlement) 1857- Civil Service Act (permanent civil servant-deputy minister concept-separation of political and administrative functions) 1857-Fisheries Act-(first practical piece of 1850’s-reciprocity treaty between Canada conservation legislation passed and enforced and the United States-saw log industry expands in Upper Canada-no government revenue from fisheries as compared to timber) 1894-first pulpwood contract signed between the Province and the Sault Ste. Marie Company (by 1900 $2.5 million invested in construction and 900 workers employed in pulp and paper plants) 1859-Charles Darwin’s Origin of the Species is

178

Ontario-based National and International Factors

1864-Select Committee established to look at published-new approach to science of biology rapid destruction of forests and its prevention and concept of conservation but report was never published because of political upheaval of Confederation 1868-Free Grant and Homesteads Act to allow Ontario government to appropriate lands not valuable for timber or minerals in order to make free land grants to settlers in 1867-Confederation of Canada (1867 northern Ontario Constitution Act) granting jurisdiction over most 1871-1889-Manitoba boundary dispute- lands and resources, including forests, to mostly over timber resources provincial governments 1872-largest timber auction to date in Ontario-5,031 square miles of timber land on north shore of Lake Huron-more than $500,000 to the provincial treasury-accounts for one-half the total of all timber sales 1881-Canadian Pacific Railway was completed between 1867-1908 between Winnipeg and the Lakehead and to 1878-Fire Act-the first Forest Fire Montreal in 1885 Prevention legislation 1883-Ontario Tree Planting Act (to develop forestry in the settled areas of southern Ontario) 1885-Fisheries Act 1890-Royal Commission on Game and Fish alerted public to the destruction of animals and birds 1882-American Forestry Congress met in 1893- Algonquin Park created for Cincinnati and Montreal-awakening of public conservation and recreation (Royal interest in forestry and conservation reforms Commission on Forest Reservation and National Park) 1897-Ontario Government decision that all

179

Ontario-based National and International Factors saw logs cut on Crown lands must be sawn in Canada 1898- Royal Commission on Forest Protection in Ontario-early concepts of sustainable yield and scientific forest management-chaired by W.W. Rathbun (a prominent lumberman) 1898-The Forest Reserves Act (setting aside 1898-Dr. Bernhard Fernow established North “such portions of the public domain that may America’s first professional forestry school at be deemed advisable for the purpose of Cornell University future timber supplies”)

Conservation Era 1900-discovery of the Clay Belt (New Ontario) and more grants to encourage settlers 1904 - Dr. Judson Clark appointed the first Provincial Forester 1905-Crown Lands Department transformed 1899-Department of the Interior’s Dominion into the Department of Lands and Mines Forestry Branch (precursor of the Canadian (Forests added to title in 1913) wider scope Forest Service) established by the federal on natural resources generally and not land government and timber alone) 1907-Faculty of Forestry established at the 1900-Canadian Forestry Association founded to University of Toronto with Dr. Bernhard promote conservation and tree planting Fernow as its first dean 1908-Report on the Reforestation of Waste 1905-United States Forest Service created as a Lands in Southern Ontario government department with Chief Forester 1908- founding of first provincial nursery, Gifford Pinchot for the purpose of managing St. Williams Forestry Station in Norfolk publicly owned forests County

180

Ontario-based National and International Factors

1906-First Canadian National Forest Congress, 1912-Northern Development Branch created held in Montreal within the Department of Lands and Forests to advance settlement of Northern Ontario 1908-founding of the Canadian Institute of 1917-E.J. Zavitz appointed second Forestry Provincial Forester (regarded as ‘father’ of 1909-North American Conservation Conference reforestation in Ontario) held in Washington with representatives from 1917-Forest Fires and Prevention Act (in Canada, Newfoundland and Mexico response to 1916 Matheson fire-224 dead, 1910-federal government passed the Destructive destroyed 7 towns and villages) Insect and Pest Act (division of function-feds 1920-1922- The Timber Commission into would concentrate on quarantine aspect and timber and pulp contracts and the research-provinces would test and apply control administration of the Department of Lands methods as a regular part of forest management) and Forests. Commissioners Justice W.R. 1913-elimination of the United States tariff on Riddell and F.R. Latchford. Commonly newsprint and pulp referred to as the Riddell-Latchford report 1913-Canadian Pulp and Paper Association 1920 – the first major aerial forest inventory, established in Montreal the James Bay Forest Survey begun; published report 1923 1920-in response to a budworm epidemic in the Lake Temiscaming area, aircraft began to play a vital role in the reconnaissance, detection and mapping of insect epidemics in Ontario 1922-establishment of northern provincial nurseries at Orono and Midhurst 1922-First Agreement Forest established, the Hendrie Tract in Simcoe County Forest 1923- The Report of the James Bay Forest Survey of 1922 published. This was the first major forest inventory to be made using

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Ontario-based National and International Factors aircraft. 1924-Angus Tree Seed Plant founded 1924-Ontario Provincial Air Service 1924-Royal Commission on Pulpwood (founded for fire spotting and land and timber surveys and mercy flights) 1924-The Mills Licensing Act 1929-1939-The Great Depression-Department’s 1927-Provincial Parks Act (gave the Minister revenue from timber fell from record high $4 the right to withdraw timber from cutting for million in 1930 to $1million in 1933 (compared the purpose of watershed protection, to Department expenditures of just under $2 beautification of the park, fire protection, million in 1933) game preserves and shelters, or any other purpose deemed advisable.) 1927-The Forestry Act sets aside land for forestry purposes including establishing more tree nurseries 1929-Provincial Forests Act (extending earlier forest reserves legislation) 1929-Pulpwood Conservation Act (required all pulp and paper companies to supply government with complete information about their holdings and to plan their future management on a sustained yield basis 1930-Natural Resources Transfer Agreement (the 1930-The Forest Resources of Ontario federal government transferred ownership and published (first province wide survey of control of Crown land to the prairie provinces) forest resources based on 12 years of survey programs) 1931-Federation of Ontario Naturalists established 1936-Forest Resources Regulation Act (objective was described as helping forest

182

Ontario-based National and International Factors industries recover and getting men back to work) 1939-first National Wildlife Conference 1939-41-Report of the Select Committee on the Administration of the Department of Lands and Forests (investigated all matters pertaining to the administration, licensing, sale, supervision and conservation of natural 1930s-Canadian Nature Federation formed, oldest resources by the Department of Lands and national Canadian conservation organization Forests) 1939-first National Wildlife Conference 1941-reorganization of the Lands and Forests Department-land administration was merged with timber and forest protection services under the direction of the district forester- free land grant system ended except for Veterans Land Grants which ended in 1961- made it easier to sell cottage lots 1941-formation of the Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters (local hunting and fishing clubs that sprang up late in the nineteenth century)

1943-1945-The first Crown management units were established in Kirkwood and then in Petawawa and Englehart

1945-research agreements between Ontario and the federal government to establish Forest Insect Lab at Sault Ste. Marie and Laboratory of Forest Pathology at Maple

183

Ontario-based National and International Factors

1946-new Forest Ranger School at Dorset to train field personnel 1946-1951-Forest Resources Inventory (FRI) carried out 1946-Department of Game and Fisheries (originally established in 1914) became a division of the Department of Lands and Forests 1946-Conservation Authorities Act (originally concerned with flooding, soil erosion and water pollution) and the establishment of the first one-Ganaraska Region Authority 1947-Kennedy Royal Commission on Forestry 1947-Forest Management Act-companies required to submit management plans containing information on timber inventory, access roads, stand improvement operations and maps for approval by the Minister of 1949-Canada Forestry Act-to promote Lands and Forests cooperation between the federal government, 1949-Ontario Forestry Association was provincial governments and industry in the established conservation of Canada’s forests-led to Sustained Yield Era agreements and funding for protection of forests 1950- Ontario Legislature’s Select against fires, insects and disease, forest Committee on Conservation (recognized inventories and reforestation, construction of need for land use planning for all natural forest access roads, stand improvement resources and multiple land uses) operations 1952-Francis Kortright founded the Conservation Council of Ontario 1953-Crown Timber Act –agreements

184

Ontario-based National and International Factors negotiated with companies were replaced by licences issued by Order in Council, valid for a maximum of twenty one years and with standardized conditions, also imposed penalties on operators using wasteful practices 1954-First White Paper put before the Ontario Legislature entitled Suggestions for a Programme of Renewable Resources Development (predicted shortages of some species such as spruce and pine and suggested preventive measures such as improved silvicutural methods such as reforestation, readjust allowable cuts, shift to other species by sawmillers, higher utilization of hardwoods) 1956- land zoning committees were established by Order in Council to provide planning for recreational lands 1957- Ontario Professional Foresters’ Association established 1958-Provincial Parks Act transferred provincial parks to the Department of Lands and Forests 1958-Land Use Planning Section was established-each district required to submit a land use plan 1959-Ontario Legislature passed a Wilderness Area Act to allow government to 1958-the North American Forest Commission set aside tracts of land as wilderness (NAFC) was created by the Food and Agriculture reservations for research and education , Organization of the United Nations (FAO) to

185

Ontario-based National and International Factors protection of flora and fauna, development of provide a policy and technical forum for Canada, historical, aesthetic, scientific and Mexico and the United States to discuss and recreational values. address regional forest issues

1959-Canadian Wood Council formed to promote 1961-Resources for Tomorrow-federal industry’s products in the USA provincial conference to discuss renewable resources 1960-Diefenbaker government created a federal 1962-Agreement between federal and Department of Forestry (was merged with Dept. Ontario governments concerning the of Rural Development, Dept of Fisheries, Dept. contributions of the Department of Lands of the Environment and then separately again and Forests to the welfare and development with Mulroney’s 1988 campaign pledge) of the Indians of Northern Ontario and Provincial Indian Advisory Committee of the Government of Ontario 1960-Great Lakes Treaty signed between Canada 1962-designation of Killarney Recreation and the United States involved Department of Reserve to experiment with development of Lands and Forests assisting with fisheries multiple land use planning research 1966-An Act to provide for the Extension and Improvement of Privately-Owned 1960-USA Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act Woodlands 1964-USA Wilderness Act 1972 - Department of Lands and Forests 1969-USA National Environmental Policy Act became the Ministry of Natural Resources with a fundamental change to the administration of Crown lands and Crown forests. 1973-the Calder case which the Nisga lost but ‘the Supreme Court made news by accepting the 1970-Ontario Economic Council releases a Nisga’s argument that they had exercised full report on ‘A Forest Policy for Ontario’ control over the areas before the first Europeans arrived, thereby implicitly recognizing the nature 1972 - Cabinet approved the Forest and extent of Aboriginal governance’ (Hessing et

186

Ontario-based National and International Factors

Production Policy which established a al quoting Ken Coates, p 81) Crown land forest production level of 25.8 million cubic metres and all the associated activities (inventory, management planning, harvest levels, site preparation, regeneration, tending and data collection) necessary to reach and support that level of production. This established a significant and relatively stable level of funding for forest management in Ontario.

1975-The Environmental Assessment Act

1976- “Forest Management in Ontario” report written by K.A. Armson recommended that forest companies assume responsibility for planning and integrating harvesting and regeneration 1976-USA National Forest Management Act 1976-USA Resources Planning Assessment Act 1976-Ontario appointed the first minister responsible for Native Affairs and created the Office of Indian Land Claims

1978 - Forest Management Subsidiary Agreement between Canada and Ontario on construction of forest access roads and bridges, the development of silvicultural camps in remote areas, the expansion of forest nurseries, soil and site surveys and R & D projects.

187

Ontario-based National and International Factors

1979- Crown Timber Act amended by Bill 1979-1985-The Pulp and Paper Modernization 77. This provided for the Government and Grants Program (fed-prov cost sharing) individual forest companies to enter into 20 year “Forest Management Agreements” (FMA’s), replacing Order –in- Council licenses

1980- First FMA signed with Abitibi-Price Inc. for the Iroquois Falls Forest.

1983 - FMSA was replaced by the Canada- Ontario Forest research Agreement (COFRDA) managed through OMNR and the Canadian Forest Service (CFS). It was for $150 million over five years for the same 1981-2001-U.S. launches four trade actions kinds of forestry activities. Both FMSA and alleging provincial subsidies on Canada’s exports COFRDA were significant contributors to of softwood lumber. forestry funding in Ontario on both Crown and private lands. 1982- The Constitution Act was enacted. Under Section 35, Treaty and aboriginal rights became 1985-The Ontario Royal Commission on the constitutionally protected Northern Environment, Final Report and Recommendations (the Fahlgren Report) was And Section 92A (1.b) of the Constitution Act published. confirmed the provinces’ jurisdiction over lands and resources and the powers of provincial 1986-Prof. Kenneth A. Armson appointed legislatures “to make laws in relation to the Provincial Forester (in1979 had begun development, conservation and management of serving as Chief Forester and then Executive non-renewable natural resources and forestry Co-ordinator of forestry program for resources in the province, including laws in OMNR) relation to primary production therefrom.”

188

Ontario-based National and International Factors

1986 – Baskerville Report - focused on the 1983-Canadian Forest Industries Council created adequacy of Ontario's Forest Production to help industry deal with trade and resource Policy Implementation Schedule. MNR issues and establish a national forest industry data developed a 16-point action plan to address base these findings. One of these action items required the development of a new Forest 1985- the Guerin case ,”The Court’s decision Production Policy -- "taking into account the represented a major advance for First Nations, for supply capability of Ontario's forests and the it acknowledged that, under Canadian law, all demands of industry". Aboriginal groups had legal rights, as yet unspecified, on both official reserve land and traditional territories.” (Hessing et. Al. quoting Sustainable Forest Management Era Ken Coates, p 81) 1988-1994 – Environmental Assessment 1985-inaugural meeting of the Canadian Council Board public hearings began in 1988 on the of Forest Ministers, Victoria, September MNR’s application for approval of its 1985-1990- Federal –Provincial Resource Timber Class Environmental Assessment on Development Agreements Crown Land and the Board’s decision to 1986-National Forestry Congress followed by the approve was released in April 1994 drafting of a national forest sector strategy 1988-1989-MNR’s timber Policy Production 1986-US Canada Softwood Lumber Agreement- Project established to review 1972 forest US industry withdraws complaint and Canada production policy imposes a 15% tax on softwood lumber exports to the US 1989-Bob Rae, then leader of the Ontario 1986-International Tropical Timber Organization New Democratic Party, was arrested with 15 was established under the auspices of the United others at the Temagami Wilderness Society Nations to address deforestation and development anti-logging blockade. of tropical timber resources, and it was associated with concept of sustainable forestry certification , 1990-Ontario Native Affairs Secretariat can be traced back to 1976 negotiations for enlarged and renamed (created earlier from International Tropical Timber Agreement combining Ontario Native Affairs Directorate and Office of Indian Resource

189

Ontario-based National and International Factors

Policy (i.e., concerned with land claims) 1987-BC introduces higher stumpage fees and tax is withdrawn for their exports. 1990 Peter H. Pearse Report ‘ Renewing Ontario’s Forest Policy’ was submitted to 1987- The Brundtland Report “Our Common OMNR Future” United Nations World Commission on 1990 MNR Old Growth Conservation Environment and Development Project involved deferring timber harvesting and was established in response to concerns 1989-Environics Research conducts first about harvesting of old white pine in the comprehensive national survey of public opinion Temagami area in the late 1980s on forestry matters (poll of 2,500 Canadians- results favour environment over industry)

1991-introduction of the Sustainable 1990- the Sparrow case, ‘The Supreme Court Forestry Initiative to apply the concepts of ruling came down decisively on the side of the sustainable development to the management First Nation…the Court ruled that Aboriginal and of Ontario’s Crown land forests treaty rights could evolve over time and should be 1991-Directions ‘90s was the first of MNR’s interpreted in a generous and liberal corporate strategic policy frameworks manner…Federal authorities could intervene in First Nations fisheries for reasons of conservation 1992-1996-phasing out and then closure of and resources management, but they had first to provincial nurseries and the Ministry of demonstrate that they were justified in doing so.’ Natural Resources private land extension (Hessing et al quoting Ken Coates, p 82) services, including tree planting. Private land ceases to be a core business of Ontario 1990- The Helsinki Process is established to government in 1996. develop general guidelines for the sustainable management of forests in Europe

1992 - Report on the status of Forest 1990-House of Commons Subcommittee advises that “if Canada is ever going to practice Regeneration – The Ontario Independent sustainable development successfully, it must Forest Audit Committee (the Hearnden report) begin in the forests” (Standing Committee on Fisheries and Forestry, 1990)

190

Ontario-based National and International Factors

1990- Canadian Council of Forest Ministers 1993-Passage of the Ontario Environmental (CCFM) was created to sponsor a National Forum Bill of Rights (EBR), S.O. 1993, c. 28, and it on Sustainable Development and Forest established the office of Environmental Management Commissioner 1993-Forest Industry Action Group released 1992-March- in preparation for the Earth Summit, report Ontario Forest Products Industry, the CCFM sponsor the development and release Hard Choices, Bright Prospects: a Report of a 5-year National Forest Strategy for Canada, and Recommendations from Labour, Sustainable Forests: A Canadian Commitment Industry and Government to the OMNR identifying Sustainable Forest Management as a national priority. Canada’s National Forest 1993-On April 6, Ontario Cabinet approves Accord is endorsed by federal and provincial Policy Framework for Sustainable Forestry governments and forestry-related organizations (recommended by the Ontario Forest Policy 1992-June-United Nations Conference on Panel’s 1993 report “Diversity: Forests, Environment and Development (known as the People and Communities: A Comprehensive Earth Summit) is held in Rio de Janeiro Forest Policy Framework for Ontario.” 1992-Canada sponsored a seminar in Montreal to 1994- The report by Robert Carmen develop a definition of Sustainable Forest “Achieving Sustainability: A New Ontario Management (SFM) Government/Forest Industry Business 1992-innaugaral meeting of Forest Stewardship Relationship” recommended revising the Council was held in Toronto stumpage system, establishing the Trust Funds, changing tenure arrangements and 1993-‘War of the Woods’ in BC where 800 anti- compensation for withdrawals, setting logging, environmentalist protesters arrested at silvicultural standards and performance Clayoquot Sound measures and establishing a new approach to 1993-National Roundtable on the Environment compliance monitoring. and the Economy Act, one of the new participatory processes that flourished across

Canada in the 1980s 1994-Trees Ontario Foundation incorporated as a tree planting partnership between the 1993-major reorganizing and downsizing of the

191

Ontario-based National and International Factors

Ministry of Natural Resources and the federal government’s Canadian Forest Service Ontario Forestry Association

1994-The Crown Forest Sustainability Act (CFSA) came into effect April 1, 1995

1995 - Scaling Manual released through Ontario Regulation 92/95 under Ontario Regulation 167/96 of the Crown Forest Sustainability Act.

1995 - Forest Operations and Silviculture Manual released through Ontario Regulation 92/95 under Ontario Regulation 167/96 of the Crown Forest Sustainability Act

1995-Ontario Stewardship Program founded by the Ministry of Natural Resources to encourage greater landowner and community involvement in resource management

1995-MNR released a Conservation Strategy for Old Growth Red and White Pine Ecosystems in response to the Old Growth Forest Policy Committee’s recommendations 1995-The Montreal Process, a Canada-led 1995-Ipperwash blockade and police endeavour to develop seven internationally shooting of Aboriginal activist Dudley acceptable criteria and 67 indicators-15 George countries (containing the world’s non-European temperate and boreal forests) sign the Santiago

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Ontario-based National and International Factors

1996 - Forest Management Transition Team Declaration in Chile “6 Pack” Final Report and Recommendations

1996 - Forest Management Planning Manual released through Ontario Regulation 452/96 under Ontario Regulation 167/96 of the Crown Forest Sustainability Act.

1996-MNR initiated the Independent Forest audit program

1996 - Ontario Government approved OMNR’s Forest Management Business Plan and a transition plan for changing the new MNR/forestry industry business relationship. The business plan directed how MNR would manage Ontario’s forests with a 60 per cent reduction in staffing in support of Ontario Government downsizing to address the provincial debt and deficit. The transition plan dealt with mechanisms for maintaining forest industry competitiveness during the phase-in of the new business arrangements. 1996-Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples issued its final reports 1996 - A Forest Compliance Strategy released - it guided forest policy development; provided direction for compliance; and, described how compliance will be achieved

193

Ontario-based National and International Factors

1997-Forest Ecosystem Science Co- operative formed with government, industry and colleges and universities to develop science partnerships in support of SFM and to network forest practitioners, predecessor was the Boreal Ecosystem Science Co-op at Lakehead University

1995-MNR released a Conservation Strategy for Old Growth Red and White Pine Ecosystems in response to the Old Growth Forest Policy Committee’s recommendations

1997-Ontario government launched the 1997-the Delgamuukw case ‘Courts indicated that Lands for Life round tables, a planning Aboriginal oral testimony and oral tradition process for public consultation to advise merited consideration in assessing cases…The government on the strategic use of Crown Court ruled that First Nations’ rights to the land land in northern and central Ontario are protected under Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982…they ruled that First Nations could not 1998-Wildlands League applied for judicial simply assert Aboriginal title to a particular review of forest management plans and the resource or territory, Rather, they had to prove Ontario Division Court (upheld by the they had exclusive use and occupancy, and Ontario Court of Appeal) found that MNR perhaps, continual use and occupancy.’ (Hessing had breached some conditions of the Timber et al quoting Ken Coates, p 83) Management Class Environmental approval (and violated the CFSA) by not having a timely, comprehensive plan in place in some areas

1998- by April all forest management plans

194

Ontario-based National and International Factors scheduled for renewal had to meet the full requirements of the Forest Management Planning Manual 1998-Forest Resource Assessment Policy replaced 1972 Forest Production Policy 1998-Report of the Lands for Life Round Tables-public consultation to advise government on the strategic use of Crown land in northern and central Ontario

1998 - Red Tape Reduction Bill 25 consolidated relevant provisions of private land forestry legislation into a new Forestry 1998-National Forest Accord renewed to 2003 Act

1999-The Ontario Forest Accord- a Foundation for Progress was an agreement signed by the forest industry, ENGOs and MNR with 31 provisions to create a Living Legacy of 378 new parks and protected areas (2.4 million hectares), to protect wood 1998-Kyoto Agreement on climate change and supply and resource based industry jobs and global warming a board to oversee the implementation of the Accord. The ENGO signatories included the Partnership for Public Lands with the Wildlands League, World Wildlife Fund, 1999-the Sparrow case,’ The Supreme Court of then Federation of Ontario Naturalists and Canada ruled that the eighteenth- century treaties Nature Conservancy of Canada. between the British and the First Nations covered 1999-2003-Ontario Living Legacy Trust the commercial use of resources. The right to use provided $30 million for improvements to resources –in this case, eels-was not unlimited. forest management including enhanced First Nations could earn a moderate income (not

195

Ontario-based National and International Factors science capacity defined) and were obliged to operate within the 1999-MNR issued interim technical note on framework of federal government rules. The “Defining a Clearcut” decision made it clear that the Supreme Court 1999-Forest Renewal Trust became primary judges believed that the right to fish extended source (i.e., 86.6%) of renewal funding on beyond eels to other ocean resources and hunting. Crown lands The court also held that maintaining the integrity 1999-Canadian Ecology Centre formed in of the treaty was of paramount importance in Mattawa as training centre for forest industry ensuring that Canada honoured its legal and education centre for schools and obligations to First Nations.’ (Hessing et al ecotourism quoting Ken Coates, p 83)

2000-Passage of the Professional Foresters Act, S.O. 2000, c 18 , which gave powers of self-regulation and licensing of Registered Professional Foresters by the Ontario Professional Foresters Association 2000-MNR’s 34 guidelines were amalgamated into six: landscape, stand, site, silvicultural, tourism and recreation, cultural and heritage 2001- first State of the Forest Report submitted to the Ontario Legislature 2001-Ontario’s sustainable forest management Criteria, Elements and Indicators (C&I) were finalized, after a process that began in 1995 with Canadian Council of Forestry Ministers, and they are reported in the State of the Forest Report

2001-Environmental Commissioner of Ontario issued “A Special Report to the

196

Ontario-based National and International Factors

Legislative Assembly of Ontario: Broken Promises: MNR’s Failure to Safeguard Environmental Rights” 2001-OMNR published “ Forest Management Guide for Natural Disturbance Pattern Emulation”

2002-all new forest management plans implemented but first full provincial report of forecasted and actual spending on tending and renewal operations was not available until 2007 2002-Room to Grow: Final Report of the Ontario Forest Accord Advisory Board was 2001-U.S. announced preliminary countervailing submitted to MNR, recommended limited duties of 19.3% on the value of the lumber based expansion of parks and protected areas while on U.S. calculations of below market timber ensuring a healthy forest industry pricing in Canadian provinces.

2003- Ontario Ministry of the Environment issued a Declaration Order to extend the Timber Class Environmental Assessment (as required by Terms and Conditions 112-114) 2003-the Old Growth Policy for Ontario’s Crown Forests was finalized and it included a technical report on Old Growth Forest Definitions 2003-Canadian Boreal Initiative was announced

197

Ontario-based National and International Factors

2004-Council on Forest Sector Competitiveness established to advise on strengthening Ontario’s forest industry (Interim report in March 2005 and final report in May 2005) 2003-the Boreal Forest Conservation Framework was signed by conservation organizations, First 2004-Forest Management Planning Manual Nations and some forest companies. It called for changes included extending plans from five setting aside at least 50 per cent of the boreal to 10 years. region in protected areas and using ecosystem- 2004-Provincial Wood Supply Strategy was based SFM on the remaining land base. finalized and it replaced MNR’s 2003 Regional Wood Supply Strategies

2005- MNR published Ontario’s Biodiversity Strategy and the Ontario Biodiversity Council was formed 2005-MNR announced the enhancement of Ontario’s Forest Resource Inventory and 2003-2008-National Forest Strategy Coalition resumed full responsibility for it produced A Sustainable Forest: The Canadian 2005-Bill 133 passed to amend the Commitment, the National Forest Strategy for Environmental Protection Act and Ontario 2003-2008. This is the fourth strategy by the Water Resources Act to create the authority Canadian Council of Forestry Ministers since to impose environmental penalties 1987-1992. 2005-OMNR created a new Forest Sector Competitiveness Secretariat within its Forests Division, to implement $1billion committed by the government in response to the recommendations of the Minister’s Council on Forest Sector Competitiveness 2005-Bill 133 passed to amend the

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Ontario-based National and International Factors

Environmental Protection Act and Ontario Water Resources Act to create the authority to impose environmental penalties

2006 - OMNR completed the Process

Streamlining Task Force Report which recommended streamlining and efficiencies across the forests program notably through revisions to the Forest Management Planning and Forest Information Manuals and in the forest compliance program.

2006-second State of the Forest Report published

2006-Forest Sector Prosperity Fund announced by the Ontario government would invest more than $1 billion over five years to 2005-Mikisew Cree v. Canada (reiterated that the help make Ontario’s forest industry more Crown has a duty to consult and accommodate competitive First Nations when making land and resource 2006-MNR signed a Collaborative Action decisions Plan with Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and subsequently involved the Canadian innovation and investment in new products Standards Association (CSA) and

Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI) in 2006-another agreement in the Canada-US improving SFM certification softwood lumber trade dispute that limited 2007-Endangered Species Act passed final Canadian lumber exports, and Canada lost in reading in the Ontario legislature international tribunal arbitrations in 2008, 2009, 2007-Office of the Environmental and 2011. Commissioner of Ontario released a Special

Report to the Legislative Assembly of

Ontario, “Doing Less with Less: How 2007-FPInnovations, a national government-

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Ontario-based National and International Factors shortfalls in budget, staffing and in-house industry non-profit institute was created through expertise are hampering the effectiveness of the merger of three forest sector research MOE and MNR” institutes FERIC, Fortinek and Paprican, as was the Canadian Wood Fibre Centre of NRCan 2008- Premier McGuinty announced that federal government to promote forest sector Ontario would permanently protect a minimum 225,000 square kms (at least 50%) of Ontario’s far north Boreal region. 2008-Ontario passed the Lake Simcoe Protection Act, Bill 99 2008-MNR released Draft Forest Management Guide for Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Landscapes and Forest Management Guide for Conserving Biodiversity at the Stand and Site Scales. Finalized in 2010. 2008-United Nations ratified the International 2008-Announcement of joint Ontario- Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People Federal funding for Invasive Species Centre to be created in Sault Ste. Marie

2009-Green Energy and Green Economy Act, Bill 150 2009-in March the Far North Planning Advisory Council reported its Consensus Advice to the Ontario Minister of Natural Resources 2009-MNR submitted Five-Year Environmental Assessment Report on Forest Management to Ministry of the Environment as required by the Declaration order 71 2009-Forest Management Planning Manual

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Ontario-based National and International Factors changes included incorporating species at risk. 2009-Reorganization of OMNR-transfer of forestry business and economic functions to Ministry Northern Development, Mines with the science and ecology functions remaining in MNR 2009-the Minister of Northern Development, Mines and Forestry released a discussion paper, ‘Ontario’s Forests: Ontario’s Future: A Proposed Framework to Modernize Ontario’s Forest Tenure and Pricing System” for public comment 2009-OMNDMF announced the launch of a Provincial Wood Supply Competitive Process for about10 million cubic metres 2009-Climate Change Summit held in Copenhagen, one result was the 2010 launch of 2010-Bill 191, the Far North Act passed the REDD Partnership (i.e., Reduced Emissions final reading in Ontario’s legislature from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) 2010-The Ontario Lumber Manufacturers involving 58 nations with the objective of cutting Association was dissolved by its members tropical deforestation in developing countries by due to the industry’s economic recession 50 per cent by 2020, $4.5 billion was initially 2010-announcement of the ‘Canadian Boreal committed by Britain, Norway and other Forest Agreement: A foundation for the bio- countries economy’ between environmental organizations and forest company members of the Forest Products Association of Canada (FPAC). Ontario government was not a signatory 2011-passage of Bill 151, An Act to enact the Ontario Forest Tenure Modernization

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Ontario-based National and International Factors

Act, 2011 and to amend the Crown Forest Sustainability Act, 1994 2011-Ministries of Infrastructure and Northern Development, Mines and Forestry released Places to Grow: A Growth Plan for Northern Ontario 2011-transfer of forestry business and economic functions back to OMNR from MNDMF 2011-the Ontario Biodiversity Council published Ontario’s Biodiversity Strategy, described to be the guiding framework for conservation of Ontario’s biodiversity for the next decade.

2011 OMNR produced Our Sustainable Future: A Call to Action, a strategic policy document that gave overall direction for future core activities and programs 2012-Bill 52, Ontario Forest Industry Revitalization Act introduced as a private members bill, Standing Committee on Regulations and Private Members Bills, May 30, 2012 to allow wood construction of buildings higher than six stories. 2012-2012-Strong Action for Ontario Act (Budget measures) : An Act to implement Budget measures and to enact and amend various Acts caused OMNR to cut $65 2010-announcement of the ‘Canadian Boreal million in spending by 2015, and the Forest Agreement: A foundation for the bio- legislation included amendments to the ESA economy’ between environmental organizations

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Ontario-based National and International Factors in March, that were subsequently removed in and forest company members of the Forest June, and other changes to the Public Lands Products Association of Canada (FPAC). Ontario and Fish and wildlife Conservation acts government is not a signatory. 2012-Nawiinginokima Forest Management Corporation was set up, the first under the Ontario Forest Tenure Modernization Act

2013-in May, Ontario Regulation 176/13 under the Endangered Species Act of 2007 gave a five year exemption to forestry and other activities

2013-OMNR increased the amount of protected land in Algonquin Provincial Park, the only provincial park where logging is permitted, by 96,000 ha. 2013-Ecojustice, Ontario Nature and Wildlands League sued the Province to reverse ESA exemptions

2014-in July OMNR issued the Draft Forest

Management Guide for Boreal Landscapes

2014- Ontario government introduced Bill

83, Protection of Public Participation Act,

2014 to protect ENGOs and other public interest groups against SLAPPs (i.e.,

Strategic Litigation Against Public 2012-Greepeace Canada released report, Boreal Participation), for example, the $7-million Alarm: An Action Plan for Endangered Forests in lawsuit brought by Resolute Forest Products Canada calling for greater than 50 per cent land against Greenpeace Canada concerning conservation for protection of biodiversity and

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Ontario-based National and International Factors

Resolute’s alleged violations of the Canadian wildlife habitat Boreal Forest Agreement 2014-the OMNR added forestry to its name to become the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry 2014-Environmental Commissioner of Ontario recommended a ban on logging in Algonquin Park to protect its ecological integrity

2013-federal government ended the National Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy

2014-Federal government accepted the decision of the National Energy Board review panel to allow Enbridge to build the Northern Gateway Pipeline, from the Alberta oil sands to the British Columbia coast, over the protests of First Nations and ENGOs

Selected Sources:

Armson, Kenneth. A. 2001. Ontario Forests: A Historical Perspective. Fitzhenry & Whiteside, Toronto. 233 pp.

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Barrett. H. 2008. They Had a Dream: A History of the St. Williams Forestry Station. Port Rowan/South Walsingham Heritage Association 191 pages

Gillis, R.P. and Roach, T.R. Lost Initiatives: Canada’s forest industries, forest policy and forest conservation. Greenwood Press, Forest History Society, New York, 1986

Hessing, M., Howlett, M. and Summerville, T. Canadian Natural Resource and Environmental Policy: Political Economy and Public Policy. UBC Press, Vancouver, 2005 369 pages

Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General. Royal Commission on the Northern Environment. Final Report and Recommendations . J.EJ. Fahlgren, Commissioner (Toronto, June 1985)

Kuhlberg, Mark. One Hundred Rings and Counting: Forestry Education and Forestry in Toronto and Canada, 1907-2007 University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 334 pages

Lambert, R.S. and Pross.P. 1967. Renewing Nature’s Wealth. Ontario Department of Lands and Forests. Toronto.630 pp.

Ministry of Natural Resources. Government of Ontario. State of the Forest Report 2001 Queen’s Printer, January 2002, Toronto. 162 pages.

Ministry of Natural Resources. Government of Ontario. State of the Forest Report 2006 . Queen’s Printer, July, 2007, Toronto. 772 pages

Wellstead, Adam. “The (Post) Staples Economy and the (Post) Staples State in Historical Perspective” Canada’s Resource Economy in Transition, eds. M. Howlett and K. Brownsey (Edmond-Montgomery, Toronto. 2008) (p.10-34)

Mockler, P. and Robichaud, P. The Canadian Forest Sector: A Future Based on Innovation. Final Report of the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. July 2011. Ottawa. 157 pages.

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Appendix 4. Information Concerning the Development of the

Ontario Forest Policy Spectrum of Change

The dates of the terms served by the governments shown on the Ontario Forest Policy Spectrum are: Peterson (June 1985-Oct 1990), Rae (Oct 1990-June 1995), Harris (June 1995-April 2002), Eves (April 2002-Oct 2003), McGuinty (Oct 2003-January, 2012), Wynne (2012-present.)

The numbers on the Ontario Forest Policy Spectrum correspond to the policy events shown in the following list:

1. 1988-1994 – Environmental Assessment Board public hearings began in 1988 on the MNR’s application for approval of its Timber Class Environmental Assessment on Crown Land and the Board’s decision to approve was released in April 1994. (Category: Timber supply)

2. 1990 MNR Old Growth Conservation Project involved deferring timber harvesting and was established in response to concerns about harvesting of old white pine in the Temagami area in the late 1980s. (Category: Timber supply)

3. 1993-Passage of the Ontario Environmental Bill of Rights (EBR), S.O. 1993, c. 28, and it established the office of Environmental Commissioner. (Category- Ecological objectives)

4. 1994-Ontario Cabinet approves Policy Framework for Sustainable Forestry (recommended by the Ontario Forest Policy Panel’s 1993 report Diversity: Forests, People and Communities: A Comprehensive Forest Policy Framework for Ontario. (Category: Sustainable Forest Management)

5. 1994-Passage of the Crown Forest Sustainability Act (CFSA), S.O. 1994, c. 25, which came into effect April 1, 1995. (Category: Sustainable Forest Management)

6) 1996 MNR initiated the Independent Forest Audit program. (Category: Sustainable Forest Management)

7) 1998-Forest Resource Assessment Policy replaced 1972 Forest Production Policy (Category: Sustainable Forest Management)

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8) 1999-The Ontario Forest Accord- a Foundation for Progress was an agreement signed by the forest industry, ENGOs and MNR with 31 provisions to create a Living Legacy of 378 new parks and protected areas (2.4 million hectares), to protect wood supply and resource based industry jobs and a board to oversee the implementation of the Accord. The ENGO signatories included the Partnership for Public Lands with the Wildlands League, World Wildlife Fund, then Federation of Ontario Naturalists and Nature Conservancy of Canada. (Category: Sustainable Forest Management)

9) 1999-Forest Renewal Trust became primary source (i.e., 86.6%) of renewal funding on Crown lands. (Category: Sustainable Forest Management)

10) 2000-Passage of the Professional Foresters Act, S.O. 2000, c 18, which gave powers of self- regulation and licensing of Registered Professional Foresters by the Ontario Professional Foresters Association. (Category: Sustainable Forest Management)

11) 2001- first State of the Forest Report to the Ontario Legislature and finalization of criteria and indicator framework for Ontario’s sustainable forest management. (Category: Sustainable Forest Management)

12) 2001-Environmental Commissioner of Ontario issued A Special Report to the Legislative Assembly of Ontario: Broken Promises: MNR’s Failure to Safeguard Environmental Rights” (Category: Ecological objectives)

13) 2001-OMNR published “Forest Management Guide for Natural Disturbance Pattern Emulation” (Category: Sustainable Forest Management)

14) 2003-the Old Growth Policy for Ontario’s Crown Forests was finalized and it included a technical report on Old Growth Forest Definitions (Category- Ecological objectives)

15) 2003-Canadian Boreal Initiative announced (Category- Ecological objectives)

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17) 2004-Council on Forest Sector Competitiveness established to advise on strengthening Ontario’s forest industry (Interim report in March 2005 and final report in May 2005) (Category: Sustainable Forest Management)

18) 2005- MNR published Ontario’s Biodiversity Strategy and the Ontario Biodiversity Council was formed (Category- Ecological objectives)

19) 2006-MNR signed a Collaborative Action Plan with Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) (Category- Ecological objectives)

20) 2007-Endangered Species Act passed final reading in the Ontario legislature (Category- Ecological objectives)

21) 2007-Office of the Environmental Commissioner of Ontario released a Special Report to the Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Doing Less with Less: How shortfalls in budget, staffing and in-house expertise are hampering the effectiveness of MOE and MNR. (Category: Sustainable Forest Management)

22) 2008-MNR released Draft Forest Management Guide for Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Landscapes and Forest Management Guide for Conserving Biodiversity at the Stand and Site Scales. Finalized in 2010. (Category- Ecological objectives)

23) 2009-Following Premier Dalton’s 2008 announcement that Ontario will permanently protect a minimum 225,000 square kilometres (at least 50%) of Ontario’s far north Boreal region, the Far North Planning Advisory Council reports its Consensus Advice to the Ontario Minister of Natural. (Category- Ecological objectives)

25) 2010-Bill 191, the Far North Act passed final reading in Ontario’s legislature (Category- Ecological objectives)

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26) 2011-passage of Bill 151, An Act to enact the Ontario Forest Tenure Modernization Act, 2011 and to amend the Crown Forest Sustainability Act, 1994 (Category: Sustainable Forest Management)

27) 2012-Strong Action for Ontario Act (Budget measures): An Act to implement Budget measures and to enact and amend various Acts caused OMNR to cut $65 million in spending by 2015, and the legislation included amendments to the ESA in March, that were subsequently removed in June, and other changes to the Public Lands Act and Fish and Wildlife Conservation acts. (Category: Sustainable Forest Management)

28) 2013-in May, Ontario Regulation 176/13 under the Endangered Species Act of 2007 gave a five year exemption to forestry and other activities. (Category: Sustainable Forest Management)

29) 2013-OMNR increased the amount of protected land in Algonquin Provincial Park, the only provincial park where logging is permitted, by 96,000 hectares. (Category- Ecological objectives)

30) 2014-in July OMNR issued the Forest Management Guide for Boreal Landscapes (Category- Ecological objectives)

31) 2014- Ontario government introduced Bill 83, Protection of Public Participation Act, 2014 to protect ENGOs and other public interest groups against SLAPPs (i.e., Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation), for example, the $7-million lawsuit brought by Resolute Forest Products against Greenpeace Canada concerning Resolute’s alleged violations of the Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement (Category- Ecological objectives)

32) 2014-the OMNR added forestry to its name to become the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry. (Category: Sustainable Forest Management)

Summary Results of the Analysis of Forest Policy Events that Were Used in Determining Whether the Event Had the Purpose of Timber Supply, Sustainable Forest Management or Ecological Objectives as Shown on the Ontario Forest Policy Spectrum

As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, significant forest policy events were identified from the Forest Policy Chronology. Forest policy events for the study period 1988-2014 were then analyzed and assigned

209 to one of three categories. The assignment to a category was determined by analyzing the goal, purpose or objectives of the event as expressed in the written policy document or legislation and the results of this analysis are summarized here. Researching the stated goals, purpose or objectives of the policy events and legislation was conducted on electronic databases for the Ontario government as well as other sources that are indicated. This research was conducted before August 2014 at which time the Ontario government centralized its web pages. OMNR migrated its electronic files from mnr.gov.on.ca to ontario.ca and did not provide links so attempts were made to find new links where possible.

1) 1988-Environmental Assessment Board public hearings began in 1988 on the MNR’s application for approval of its Timber Class Environmental Assessment on Crown Land and the Board’s decision to approve was released in April 1994. “The purpose of the undertaking is to provide a continuous and predictable supply of wood for Ontario’s forest products industry.” sources: (Timber Class EA, p. 53) and http://www.web2.mnr.gov.on.ca/mnr/forests/timberea/decision_pdfs/intro.pdf Category: Timber Supply

2) 1990- MNR’s Old Growth Forest Policy Project involved deferring timber harvesting and was established in response to public concerns about harvesting of old white and red pine in the Temagami area in the late 1980s. Sources: OMNR, Old Growth Policy, 2003 p 1. and Old Growth Policy Advisory Committee. 1994. Conserving Ontario's Old Growth Forest Ecosystems. Queen's Printer for Ontario, Queen's Park, Toronto, Ontario. 90 pp. https://dr6j45jk9xcmk.cloudfront.net/documents/2830/policy-oldgrowth-eng-aoda.pdf. Category: Timber Supply

3) 1993-Passage of the Ontario Environmental Bill of Rights (EBR), S.O. 1993, c. 28, and it established the office of Environmental Commissioner

“Preamble: The people of Ontario recognize the inherent value of the natural environment. The people of Ontario have a right to a healthful environment. The people of Ontario have as a common goal the protection, conservation and restoration of the natural environment for the benefit of present and future generations. While the government has the primary responsibility for achieving this goal, the people should have means to ensure that it is achieved in an effective, timely, open and fair manner.”

Source: www.e-laws.gov.on.ca Category: (Ecological Objectives)

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4) 1994- April 6-Ontario Cabinet approved Policy Framework for Sustainable Forestry as Ontario’s strategic forest policy in response to the recommendations by the Forest Policy Panel’s 1993 report “Diversity: Forests, People and Communities: A Comprehensive Forest Policy Framework for Ontario.” Sources: Ontario Government, Policy Framework for Sustainable Forests, 1994, p. 1 “Our goal is to ensure the long term health of our forest ecosystems for the benefit of the local and global environments, while enabling present and future generations to meet their material and social needs.” Duinker, P., M. Wanlin,T. Clark, and F. Miron. 1992. Diversity: Forests, People, Communities. The final report of the Forest Policy Panel, Summer 1993. http://www.tomclark.ca/about-tom/diversity-forests-people-communities Category: Sustainable Forest Management

5) 1994- Passage of the Crown Forest Sustainability Act (CFSA), S.O. 1994, c. 25, which came into effect April 1, 1995. “Purposes 1. The purposes of this Act are to provide for the sustainability of Crown forests and, in accordance with that objective, to manage Crown forests to meet social, economic and environmental needs of present and future generations. 1994, c. 25, s. 1…. Principles (3) The Forest Management Planning Manual shall provide for determinations of the sustainability of Crown forests in a manner consistent with the following principles: 1. Large, healthy, diverse and productive Crown forests and their associated ecological processes and biological diversity should be conserved. 2. The long term health and vigour of Crown forests should be provided for by using forest practices that, within the limits of silvicultural requirements, emulate natural disturbances and landscape patterns while minimizing adverse effects on plant life, animal life, water, soil, air and social and economic values, including recreational values and heritage values. 1994, c. 25, s. 2 (3).” Sources: (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2009) Category: Sustainable Forest Management

6) 1996 MNR initiated the Independent Forest Audit program “The purpose of the independent forest audit is to assess: • compliance with the Crown Forest Sustainability Act, • compliance with the Forest Management Planning process, • a comparison of planned versus actual forest management activities,

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• the effectiveness of forest management activities in achieving audit criteria and management objectives, and where applicable, a licensee’s compliance with the terms and conditions of the Sustainable forest licence.” • Sources: https://www.ontario.ca/environment-and-energy/independent-forest-audits

Category: Sustainable Forest Management

7) 1998-Forest Resource Assessment Policy replaced 1972 Forest Production Policy “The Forest Resource Assessment Policy (FRAP) contributes to the achievement of Ontario's forest sustainability goal, principles and objectives set out in the Policy Framework for Sustainable Forests (MNR 1994), the Crown Forest Sustainability Act (1994), the Environmental Assessment Act (R.S.O. 1990) and the Environmental Bill of Rights (R.S.O. 1993). The five- year update to FRAP is in response to Condition 105 of the Reasons for Decision and Decision: Class Environmental Assessment by the Ministry of Natural Resources for Timber Management on Crown Lands in Ontario as approved by the Environmental Assessment Board on April 5, 1994.” (p iii) “The Forest Resource Assessment Policy (FRAP) provides provincial direction for the preparation and use of assessments of Ontario's Crown forest resources -- locally, regionally, and provincially. Forest resource assessments play an important role in realizing Ontario's commitment to sustainable forest management. This commitment is described in the Policy Framework for Sustainable Forests (MNR 1994) and the Crown Forest Sustainability Act (1994).” (p iv) Sources: https://www.ontario.ca/environment-and-energy/forest-resource-assessment-policy Category: Sustainable Forest Management

8) 1999 ‘The Ontario Forest Accord-A Foundation for Progress’ was an agreement signed by the forest industry, ENGOs and MNR with 31 provisions to create a Living Legacy of 378 new parks and protected areas (2.4 million hectares), to protect wood supply and resource based industry jobs and a Board to oversee implementation of the Accord. “Commitments by members of the Forest Industry, the Partnership for Public Lands (as represented by the World Wildlife Fund, the Federation of Ontario Naturalists and the Wildlands League) and the Ministry of Natural Resources: The following commitments have been identified as elements of a mutually acceptable approach to the establishment of parks and protected areas in the Lands for Life planning area, while also considering the needs of the forest industry. The commitments reflect a consensus among the parties. There are a few commitments that only apply to one or two parties and

212 these are clearly identified. The commitments related to forestry are based on two fundamental premises: Unless otherwise agreed to the satisfaction of the parties, there would be no net increase in the cost of wood delivered to the mill and there would be no long term reduction in the supply of fibre necessary for processing on both a planning area and region basis, as a result of the establishment of new parks and protected areas; and the measures that are outlined, if fully implemented, will contribute to addressing the requirements of the first premise. The provisions of this Accord support the completion of a representative system of parks and protected areas encompassing 12% of the Lands for Life planning area complemented by a mechanism for limited expansion to address significant gaps in representation on a mutually agreed upon basis. All parties acknowledge that the accord is written with the understanding that treaty and aboriginal rights must be respected and honoured. The parties also acknowledge that the land use decisions are without prejudice to land claims recognized by Ontario and Canada. “

Source: http://www.ontario.ca/environment-and-energy/mnr-provincial-parks-and-conservation-reserves- under-living-legacy-strategy Category: Sustainable Forest Management

9) 1999-Forest Renewal Trust becomes primary source (i.e., 86.6%) of renewal funding “The Forest Renewal and the Forestry Futures Trusts were established with the passing of the Crown Forest Sustainability Act in 1994. Both Trusts are significant parts of the Ontario's forest management program. The purpose of the Forest Renewal Trust is to provide for long term, sustainable funding of eligible silviculture work carried out on Crown lands in the province where forest resources have been harvested. Companies who have entered into sustainable forest licenses with the government make payments into the Trust based on assessed forest renewal charges. Each cubic metre of wood harvested in the province is subject to this renewal charge. When it is time to regenerate the forest that has been harvested, the sustainable forest licence holder (SFL) carries out the necessary renewal work and then submits invoices to the Forest Renewal Trust to be reimbursed for this renewal work. Examples of the forest renewal activities that are funded by this Trust are: Seed collection and processing • seedling production and planting • site preparation and tending • free-to-grow surveys and; • modified harvesting that promotes natural renewal A Forest Renewal Trust Advisory Committee meets regularly to provide the Minister advice with

213 respect to administration and the operation of the Trust.” Sources: https://www.ontario.ca/environment-and-energy/forest-renewal-trust-and-forestry-futures-trust http://www.forestryfutures.ca/ Category: Sustainable Forest Management

10) 2000- Passage of the Professional Foresters Act, S.O. 2000, c 18 , which gave powers of self- regulation and licensing of Registered Professional Foresters by the Ontario Professional Foresters Association

“5. (1) The principal object of the Association is to regulate the practice of professional forestry and to govern its members in accordance with this Act, the regulations and the by-laws in order that the public interest may be served and protected. 2000, c 18, s. 5 (1). (2) For the purpose of carrying out its principal object, the Association has the following additional objects: 1. To promote and increase the knowledge, skill and proficiency of its members in all things relating to forestry. 2. To establish, maintain and develop standards of knowledge and skill for members. 3. To establish, maintain, develop and enforce standards of qualification and standards of practice for the practice of professional forestry. 4. To issue, renew, amend, suspend, cancel, revoke and reinstate certificates of qualification and registration. 5. To establish, maintain, develop and enforce standards of professional ethics for members. 6. To receive and investigate complaints and allegations against members and to deal with issues regarding discipline, incapacity and unskilled practice. 7. To promote public awareness of the role of the Association and to communicate with the public on behalf of its members. 8. To provide vocational guidance to persons wishing to enter the forestry profession. 9. To perform any other duties and exercise any other powers as are imposed or conferred upon the Association under any Act. 10. To perform such additional functions relating to the practice of professional forestry that the Council considers desirable and that do not conflict with the intent or purpose of this Act, the regulations, or the by-laws. “ Source: http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_00p18_e.htm#BK6

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Category: Sustainable Forest Management

11) 2001- First State of the Forest Report was submitted to the Ontario legislature “Ontario's mission is to manage our natural resources in an ecologically sustainable way, to ensure that these resources are available for the enjoyment and use of future generations. In support of this mission, Ontario now reports comprehensively on the state of Ontario’s forest resources every 5 years. Ontario’s first State of the Forest Report, 2001 provides detailed information on Ontario’s forests for the 5-year period 1995/96 to 1999/2000.This 300+ page report includes an overview of Ontario’s forests regions, its managed forests, and Ontario’s industrial wood supply. The legal and policy requirements for state of the forest reporting in Ontario are described. The provincial, national and international context for state of the forest reporting and the evaluation of forest sustainability, using criteria and indicators of sustainable forest management, is outlined. The State of the Forest Report, 2001 describes Ontario’s forests and forest management, using criteria and indicators of sustainable forestry. Sixty four Ontario-specific, environmental, social, and economic indicators are described and applied in an Ontario context, using the key forest values that Ontarians wish to sustain and enhance for their forests.” Source:http://www.mnr.gov.on.ca/en/Business/Forests/2ColumnSubPage/STEL02_179272.html http://www.ontario.ca/environment-and-energy/state-ontarios-forests Category: Sustainable Forest Management

12) 2001- June 21-Environmental Commissioner of Ontario issues “A Special Report to the Legislative Assembly of Ontario: Broken Promises: MNR’s Failure to Safeguard Environmental Rights” “Ontario’s Environmental Bill of Rights (EBR) was established to protect the right of Ontarians to a healthful environment and to promote public participation in environmental decision-making. The EBR explicitly states that the Ontario government has the primary responsibility for achieving these goals. My mandate as Environmental Commissioner of Ontario is to review how provincial ministries carry out the requirements of the EBR and to report to the Legislative Assembly annually. The EBR also enables me to issue a special report at any time on matters that, in my view, should not wait until the release of my annual report. This is my second special report since I assumed my duties as Environmental Commissioner on February 1, 2000. I am reporting that the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) is thwarting public participation and public scrutiny of environmental decision-making by effectively blocking the final steps in a legal process set out in the EBR. I see the need to issue this special report to respond publicly to the long string of broken promises that MNR has made to my office since 1995, each time asserting that the ministry would very shortly be complying with the EBR by “classifying its

215 instruments” – in other words, opening its instruments to public comment and review. Other Ontario ministries classified their instruments years ago. The Ministry of the Environment (MOE) completed this process as early as 1994. MNR’s persistent failure to do the same is not only a breach of the letter and spirit of the EBR, it also frustrates the rights of the public. The practical effect of MNR’s failure to classify its instruments is that the public cannot use the EBR as it was intended. Over the past five years, our office has been contacted by many Ontario residents with concerns about instruments administered by MNR. Many express shock and disappointment when they learn that MNR’s instruments are still not subject to the public comment, review and appeal rights of the EBR. Conclusion: Despite working on its instrument classification process for more than five years, MNR has not yet fulfilled its EBR obligation to finalize a regulation classifying environmentally significant instruments under the various Acts it administers. O. Reg. 73/94 under the EBR requires the ministry to develop an instrument proposal within a reasonable time after April 1, 1996. The ministry has circulated two proposals for an instrument classification regulation, the first issued in March 1997, and the second issued in November, 1997, with a comment period ending in January 1998. For the last three and a half years, MNR has not communicated with the public about its intentions on this matter. MNR’s delay in completing its instrument classification regulation is unreasonable and unacceptable. The ministry should finalize and publish its classification regulation in the Ontario Gazette before September 1, 2001.” Sources: http://www.eco.on.ca/uploads/Reports%20- %20special/2001%20Broken%20Promises/sp04%20broken%20promises.pdf Category: Ecological objectives

13) 2001-MNR published “Forest Management Guide for Natural Disturbance Pattern Emulation” “This Forest Management Guide for Natural Disturbance Pattern Emulation describes a process to provide for a range of sizes of harvest areas, which better simulate the disturbance pattern produced naturally on the landscape. The Forest Management Guide for Natural Disturbance Pattern Emulation provides direction to forest managers on emulating natural fire disturbance patterns and events at the landscape and stand level during planning and implementation of forest harvest and renewal prescriptions. It is designed to change the pattern of forest harvesting at the landscape and stand level, to make forest management activities better simulate the way fire disturbs the forest. In so doing, it is more likely that the ecological functions associated with the natural disturbance pattern will be maintained. The Guide describes a process to provide for a range of sizes of harvest areas, which better simulate the disturbance pattern produced naturally on the landscape. The guide also provides direction on retaining residual trees in harvest areas and addresses operational definitions for clearcuts.”

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Source: https://dr6j45jk9xcmk.cloudfront.net/documents/2801/guide-natural- disturbance.pdf?__utma=1.383250985.1412286681.1416954471.1416962761.12&__utmb=1.4.10.14169 62761&__utmc=1&__utmx=- &__utmz=1.1416939880.7.4.utmcsr=tomclark.ca|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmcct=/publication s&__utmv=1.mnr|1=tag_visitor_type=external=1&__utmk=101692417 Category: Sustainable Forest Management

14) 2003-the Old Growth Policy for Ontario’s Crown Forests is finalized and technical report on Old Growth Forest Definitions “The purpose of the old growth policy is to direct how MNR will ensure that old growth conditions and values are present in Ontario’s Crown forests in order to conserve biological diversity at levels that maintain or restore ecological processes, while allowing for sustainable development now and in the future.” Source: OMNR, Old Growth, p iv. “The old growth policy includes a conservation strategy that describes how MNR will provide for the conservation of old growth across Ontario's forest landscapes (eco-regions). This strategy also describes how the old growth policy should fit with MNR policy directions and legal authority for natural heritage protection and forest management planning on Crown lands as well as a number of existing and recently regulated protected areas.” Sources: (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2003) Category: Ecological objectives

15) 2003-Canadian Boreal Initiative announced “Mandate: The Canadian Boreal Initiative (CBI) is a national convener for conservation in Canada’s Boreal Forest. We are working across sectors to advance the balanced vision of the Boreal Forest Conservation Framework. The goals of the Boreal Forest Conservation Framework include: • Maintaining the health of the Boreal Forest; • Protecting sustainable commercial interests and ensuring long-term economic benefits for Northern communities; Respecting the lands, rights and ways of life of First Nations; • Getting the most environmental, social and economic benefit from the least raw material, cost and impact on the workforce; and • Combining scientific knowledge, traditional knowledge and local perspectives to protect natural and cultural values.

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CBI is committed to working with conservation groups, First Nations, resource companies and industries, governments and scientists to achieve: • A network of large interconnected protected areas and conservation zones over at least half of Canada’s Boreal Forest; and The use of leading-edge sustainable development practices in remaining areas.” Source: http://www.borealcanada.ca/about-mandate-e.php Category: Ecological objectives

16) 2003 National Forest Strategy (2003-2008) Sustainable Forests: A Canadian Commitment. This is the fifth strategy by the Canadian Council of Forestry Ministers since 1987-1992 and MNR is a signatory. “The Canadian Commitment is a result of consensus building, public engagement, independent evaluations, and expanding partnerships. The Strategy provides an overarching national vision and framework for action across the country in areas of ecosystem management, community resilience and capacity-building, rights and participation of Aboriginal peoples, forest industry products and market access, science and innovation for competitiveness, urban forestry and public outreach, private woodland contributions, and reporting and accountability. The National Forest Strategy Coalition (NFSC) oversees the implementation of the National Forest Strategy and its companion the third Canada Forest Accord. The Accord is a policy statement that complements the Strategy by showcasing the diversity of governmental and non-governmental signatories in a way that strengthens national consensus, reaffirms collective commitment to work together and visibly demonstrates Canada’s commitment to a sustainable forest. Source: http://www.ccfm.org/english/coreproducts-nscf.asp Category: Sustainable Forest Management

17) 2004-Council on Forest Sector Competitiveness established to advise government on strengthening Ontario’s depressed forest industry “The Minister’s Council on Forest Sector Competitiveness, made up of representatives from industry, labour, municipal government, independent experts, representatives from First Nations and environmental groups was appointed in November 2004. The Minister’s Council was asked to produce a set of recommendations for presentation to the Minister. The Council’s Report is intended to serve as a guide for the government of Ontario and MNR in particular, in its dealings with the forest sector to ensure sound public policy. The government of

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Ontario needs to develop strategies and tactics to address the serious challenges confronting the forest sector today and in the coming years. At the same time, the future of the industry is also largely dependent upon the industry itself and its workers. The key to a successful strategy will be a shared recognition of what needs to be done and a shared responsibility for acting on those needs. The council met on five occasions during the first four months of 2005. The Report with recommendations was presented to the Minister of Natural Resources on May 27, 2005.” http://www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/budget/estimates/2006-07/volume1/mnr_770.html Category: Sustainable Forest Management

18) 2005- MNR published Ontario’s Biodiversity Strategy and the Ontario Biodiversity Council was formed “Ontario's Biodiversity strategy belongs to the people of Ontario, their children and grandchildren.” “1.2 This strategy is not about nature versus people. It is about living sustainably and respecting nature. Ontario’s natural assets can be viewed as a bank account. The challenge of sustainable living and sustainable development is for us to find ways of living off nature’s interest without depleting nature’s capital. If we deplete or disrupt our natural capital to the point where it is no longer self-renewing or it is simply gone and cannot be recovered, we risk Ontario’s future economic and social viability, as well as our health and quality of life. This strategy sets out a plan in which all Ontarians, communities and sectors of society can and must play an important role. Its vision is about sharing responsibility for conserving Ontario’s biodiversity. As we pursue this vision, the significant growth that is forecast for Ontario (i.e. four million additional people by 2030) needs to be planned in a responsible manner. We need to ensure that Ontario’s biodiversity is conserved as our population grows. The strategy, after briefly describing Ontario’s four major ecological regions, presents a vision for the future and the strategy’s goals and principles. It then outlines the threats we face and the opportunities we have in Ontario, before moving on to a series of strategic directions, supported by a number of recommended actions. The strategy concludes with a discussion about implementation.” Source: http://ontariobiodiversitycouncil.ca/files/2012/03/OBS_2005.pdf Category: Ecological objectives

19) 2006- MNR signed a Collaborative Action Plan with Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) “In 2006, FSC Canada and OMNR releases a Collaborative Action Plan that would collaboratively and separately explore ways to improve access to FSC certification on public lands in Ontario. This included reducing redundancies in audit requirements; reviewing existing FSC certification to identify

219 governmental barriers to certification and to work collaboratively in removing barriers (OMNR, 2006). This may have built upon the previous gap analysis work that had been initiated at the time of the first FSC OMNR announcement in 2001, but did not encounter the same level of opposition as it was not an attempt to unilaterally certify all of OMNR’s public forests. As the same Tembec representative said in a subsequent interview, ”OMNR went from being wary of FSC treading on their policy turf to being very supportive, collaborating and contributing data, citing OMNR’s contribution to reviewing a protected area gap analysis in support of Tembec’s Gordon Cosens certification, a task which would have previously fallen to Tembec (personal communication, Chris McDonnell, Tembec, August 31, 2007.)” https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/17844/1/Wood_Peter_J_200906_PhD_thesis.pdf Category: Ecological objectives

20) 2007-Endangered Species Act passes final reading in the Ontario legislature Preamble “Biological diversity is among the great treasures of our planet. It has ecological, social, economic, cultural and intrinsic value. Biological diversity makes many essential contributions to human life, including foods, clothing and medicines, and is an important part of sustainable social and economic development. Unfortunately, throughout the world, species of animals, plants and other organisms are being lost forever at an alarming rate. The loss of these species is most often due to human activities, especially activities that damage the habitats of these species. Global action is required. The United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity takes note of the precautionary principle, which, as described in the Convention, states that, where there is a threat of significant reduction or loss of biological diversity, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to avoid or minimize such a threat. In Ontario, our native species are a vital component of our precious natural heritage. The people of Ontario wish to do their part in protecting species that are at risk, with appropriate regard to social, economic and cultural considerations. The present generation of Ontarians should protect species at risk for future generations. Therefore, Her Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Ontario, enacts as follows: 1. The purposes of this Act are: 1. To identify species at risk based on the best available scientific information, including information obtained from community knowledge and aboriginal traditional knowledge. 2. To protect species that are at risk and their habitats, and to promote the recovery of species that are at risk.

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3. To promote stewardship activities to assist in the protection and recovery of species that are at risk. 2007, c. 6, s. 1.” Source: http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_07e06_e.htm#BK3 Category: Ecological objectives

21) 2007-Office of the Environmental Commissioner of Ontario releases a Special Report to the Legislative Assembly of Ontario, “Doing Less with Less: How shortfalls in budget, staffing and in-house expertise are hampering the effectiveness of MOE and MNR” “This special report concerns the lack of capacity at Ontario’s environmental ministries. In the past six months, I have become convinced that the need to rebuild the expertise and resources available to the Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry of Natural Resources has become a matter of urgency for Ontario legislators and the public. I am releasing this report to provide members of the Legislature and the public with my assessment of the problems that have developed during the past 15 years. I hope that the report I am releasing today will help to provide some clarity, and help Ontario policymakers move to the next stage of the debate.” “1.0 Introduction Sound management of Ontario’s environmental resources is critical to safeguarding their ecological sustainability and ensuring our social, economic and environmental well-being. Although other ministries play important roles in this regard, the Ministry of the Environment (MOE) is the primary agent protecting Ontario’s air and water quality and its ecosystems, and the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) is the primary steward of Ontario’s wildlife, forests, wetlands, aquatic life, plants and aggregate resources. As environmental stewards, these ministries must, on an on-going and regular basis: • track the health of Ontario’s natural environment; • identify instances where environmental degradation has occurred or is imminent; • take action to prevent, mitigate or manage existing or imminent degradation or impairment; • develop and implement rules and procedures governing human activities that are sufficient to protect the environment; • conduct investigations to determine whether there is compliance; and • undertake education, enforcement and other activities to promote compliance.” Source: http://www.eco.on.ca/uploads/Reports-special/2007-Less-with- Less/Less%20with%20Less%20report.pdf Category: Sustainable Forest Management

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22) 2008-OMNR released Draft Forest Management Guide for Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Landscapes and Forest Management Guide for Conserving Biodiversity at the Stand and Site Scales. Finalized in 2010. “Objective of the Landscape Guide The objective of the Landscape Guide is to direct forest management activities to maintain or enhance natural landscape structure, composition and patterns that provide for the long term health of forest ecosystems in an efficient and effective manner. For purposes of this guide, ‘landscape’ describes an area covering hundreds of thousands to tens of thousands of square kilometres, roughly equivalent to ecoregions (see section 1.2.3). The Crown Forest Sustainability Act (CFSA) (1994) provides for the sustainability (long- term health) of Crown forests to be managed to meet social, economic and environmental needs of present and future generations. Ontario’s forest management guides are based, in part, on the two CFSA principles that direct Ontario’s forest management planning. The first principle mandates that large, healthy, diverse and productive Crown forests and their associated ecological processes and biological diversity should be conserved. The second principle directs that conservation should be achieved through emulation of natural disturbances and landscape patterns while minimizing adverse effects on forest values. These principles of the CFSA provide the direction for both the development of the Landscape Guide direction and the determination of its effectiveness. Emulation of natural disturbance and landscape patterns through forest management, directs how to conserve biodiversity (as is required under the required under the Declaration Order regarding MNR’s Class Environmental Assessment Approval for Forest Management on Crown Lands in Ontario (EA Condition 39) and is treated as a hypothesis as discussed in section 2.3. The principal comparison for evaluating effectiveness of the Landscape Guide direction is between forests that have developed from natural processes versus those that have arisen through application of the forest management guides. The principal measurement, as mandated by the CFSA, is the conservation of biodiversity and ecological processes. Additional policy background is described later (Section 1.3); however, it is important to describe some key concepts that form the basis for the Landscape Guide.” “The purpose of the Stand and Site Guide is to provide direction on planning and conducting forest operations at the stand and site level (i.e., 10s of square metres to 100s of square kilometres) so that forest biodiversity will be conserved and Ontario’s forests will remain healthy and sustainable .” p. 12 Source: (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2010) https://dr6j45jk9xcmk.cloudfront.net/documents/2785/guide-glsl-landscape-aoda.pdf http://www.ontario.ca/environment-and-energy/forest-management-guide-conserving-biodiversity-stand- and-site-scales-stand-and-site-guide

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23) 2009- Following Premier Dalton’s 2008 announcement that Ontario will permanently protect a minimum 225,000 square kms (at least 50%) of Ontario’s far north Boreal region, the Far North Planning Advisory Council reported its Consensus Advice to the Ontario Minister of Natural Resources Mandate for the Far North Advisory Council (The Council)- Appendix 6 “To provide advice and input to the Minister of Natural Resources which will inform discussions with First Nations and provide content on legislation to govern land use planning in the Far North, including:

• A broad framework on principles and processes for land use planning in Ontario’s Far North which will meet the government’s policy goals of: Protecting more than half of the northern boreal region in an interconnected network of conservation lands; and Balancing social, economic and environmental priorities where: • Priority is given to conserving special ecological systems and functions; • Aboriginal people play a significant role; and • Environmentally sustainable economic development is permitted where it is compatible with special features and species, and there is benefit to aboriginal communities. • Broad scale strategy including policies to address critical matters such as carbon, caribou, all- weather roads and transmission corridors. “ p. 19

Far North Planning Advisory Council Consensus Advice to the Ontario Minister of Natural Resources March, 2009. The Far North Advisory Council (AC) believes that Ontario’s Far North Initiative, announced by the Premier in July, 2008, has the potential to transform this unique region in a number of positive ways that would make it a precedent-setting model for the world: • a) To provide the people who live in the region with an active decision-making role over planning their own future. • b) To establish an internationally significant, connected network of culturally and ecologically important protected lands and waters within a still-intact boreal region of our world, which is experiencing global climate change. • c) To accomplish long-term economic prosperity for northern communities based on the best environmental practices by business, and a new government-to-government resource-benefit sharing regime. This combined end-result of local First Nation agreement to land use plans, ecological integrity, and sustained economic prosperity should be recognized from the outset as the ultimate goal of this initiative, and each step and decision along the way should be measured against the contribution it makes to this

223 larger, shared vision.” p. 3 Source: https://www.ontario.ca/rural-and-north/far-north-land-use-planning-initiative http://wildlandsleague.org/attachments/274245.pdf Category: Ecological objectives

24) 2010-announcement of the ‘Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement: A foundation for the bio- economy’ between environmental organizations and forest company members of the Forest Products Association of Canada (FPAC). Ontario government is not a signatory. “The Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement (CBFA) is about finding a peace between the forest industry and environmental organizations in Canada. It is the world’s largest conservation initiative. Signed May 10, 2010, this unprecedented Agreement ushered in a new era in conservation and resource management. In short, the CBFA strives to set a global precedent for boreal forest conservation and forest sector competitiveness. Current signatories to the CBFA include the Forestry Products Association of Canada (FPAC) and its 19 member companies, and seven leading Canadian environmental non-government organizations. It directly applies to more than 73 million hectares of public forests licensed to FPAC member companies across Canada. The Agreement recognizes that although the responsibility for the future of forestry and conservation in Canada’s boreal forest rests primarily with governments, both industry and environmentalists have a duty to help define that future. The CBFA provides both parties with a plan to work towards a stronger, more competitive forestry industry and a better protected, more sustainably managed boreal forest. It entails a commitment by the environmental groups to stop boycotting the forest companies involved. In return, the companies have suspended logging operations on almost 29 million hectares of boreal forest, which represents virtually all boreal caribou within their operating areas. The suspension of forestry activities gives the signatories an opportunity to work together on a number of initiatives, including developing action plans for the recovery of caribou in specific areas and producing ecosystem-based management guidelines that participating companies can use to improve their forestry practices. The process involves multiple stakeholders, including Aboriginal groups, affected communities, and municipal, provincial and federal governments. Once negotiated, these plans are recommended to provincial and Aboriginal governments to incorporate into formal forestry management plans and other on-going public planning processes. The CBFA is an evergreen agreement that remains in effect until all elements have been implemented. CBFA work is currently ongoing across the country. THE AGREEMENT HAS SIX GOALS: • Implement world-leading sustainable forest management practices. • Accelerate the completion of the protected spaces network for the boreal forest.

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• Fast-track plans to protect boreal forest species at risk, particularly woodland caribou. • Take action on climate change as it relates to forest conservation. • Improve the prosperity of the Canadian forest sector and communities that rely on it. • Promote and publicize the environmental performance of the participating companies.” Source: http://canadianborealforestagreement.com/index.php/en/why-its- important#sthash.RzNXRPbp.dpuf http://www.canadiangeographic.ca/magazine/jf11/boreal_forest_agreement2.asp Category: Ecological objectives

25) 2010-Bill 191, the Far North Act passed final reading in Ontario’s legislature “Purpose of the Act 1. The purpose of this Act is to provide for community based land use planning in the Far North that, (a) sets out a joint planning process between the First Nations and Ontario; (b) supports the environmental, social and economic objectives for land use planning for the peoples of Ontario that are set out in section 5; and (c) is done in a manner that is consistent with the recognition and affirmation of existing Aboriginal and treaty rights in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, including the duty to consult.” Source: http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/bills/bills_detail.do?locale=en&BillID=2205 Category: Ecological objectives

26) 2011-Passage of An Act to enact the Ontario Forest Tenure Modernization Act, 2011 and to amend the Crown Forest Sustainability Act, 1994 “Objects of corporation 5. The following are the objects of an Ontario local forest management corporation: 1. To hold forest resource licences and manage Crown forests in a manner necessary to provide for the sustainability of Crown forests in accordance with the Crown Forest Sustainability Act, 1994 and to promote the sustainability of Crown forests. 2. To provide for economic development opportunities for aboriginal peoples. 3. To manage its affairs to become a self-sustaining business entity and to optimize the value from Crown forest resources while recognizing the importance of local economic development. 4. To market, sell and enable access to a predictable and competitively priced supply of Crown forest resources. 5. To carry out such other objects as may be prescribed by regulation.”

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Source: http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/source/statutes/english/2011/elaws_src_s11010_e.htm Category: Sustainable Forest Management

Source: http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/bills/bills_detail.do?locale=en&Intranet=&BillID=2600 Category: Sustainable Forest Management

28) 2013-in May, Ontario Regulation 176/13 under the Endangered Species Act of 2007 gave a five year exemption to forestry and other activities “Forest operations in Crown forests 22.1 (1) This section applies to a person who conducts forest operations in a Crown forest before July 1, 2018 if the person does so on behalf of the Crown or under the authority of a licence granted under the Crown Forest Sustainability Act, 1994. (2) Subject to subsection (3), clause 9 (1) (a) and subsection 10 (1) of the Act do not apply to a person who, while conducting forest operations described in subsection (1), kills, harms, harasses or takes a member of a species that is listed on the Species at Risk in Ontario List as an endangered or threatened species, or damages or destroys the habitat of such a species, if the person satisfies one of the following conditions: 1. In cases where the applicable forest management plan includes an operational prescription for an area of concern that specifically applies to the species, the person must conduct the forest operations in accordance with the prescription. 2. In cases where the applicable forest management plan does not include an operational prescription for an area of concern that specifically applies to the species, but does include a condition on regular operations that specifically applies to the species, the person must conduct the forest operations in accordance with the condition. 3. In cases where the applicable forest management plan does not include an operational prescription for an area of concern, nor a condition on regular operations, that specifically applies to the species, and where the person, while conducting forest operations, encounters a nest, hibernaculum, den or other feature of the species’ habitat that is established or exists at

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a specific site within the habitat, the person must do all of the following upon encountering the site-specific feature: i. suspend forest operations in the area of the site-specific feature, ii. ensure that an application is made to the Ministry for an inclusion in the applicable forest management plan of an operational prescription for an area of concern, or for a condition on regular operations, with respect to the site-specific feature, and iii. upon the Ministry amending the applicable forest management plan as appropriate, resume forest operations in accordance with the operational prescription or the condition on regular operations, as the case may be.”

Source:http://www.elaws.gov.on.ca/html/source/regs/english/2013/elaws_src_regs_r13176_e.htm Category: Sustainable Forest Management

29) 2013-OMNR increased the amount of protected land in Algonquin Provincial Park, the only provincial park where logging is permitted, by 96,000 ha. “Increased Protection for Algonquin Provincial ParkOntario Government Preserves More Natural Features July 19, 2013 11:00 a.m. Ministry of Natural Resources Ontario is reducing the ecological footprint of logging in Algonquin Provincial Park while still maintaining a healthy forestry sector. The newly amended park management plan increases the amount of protected land within Algonquin Provincial Park by 96,000 hectares – one and a half times the size of the city of Toronto. The newly protected parkland includes: • Almost 70,000 hectares along waterways, giving greater protection to naturally-sustaining Brook trout lakes, beautiful landscapes and backcountry recreation such as backpacking and canoeing • More than 14,000 hectares of zoning to enhance and connect existing wilderness zones • More than 12,000 hectares of nature reserve zones to protect natural wildlife habitats and outstanding landscapes This amendment is part of the government's plan to keep Ontario's parks beautiful and improve wilderness recreation opportunities.” Source: http://news.ontario.ca/mnr/en/2013/07/increased-protection-for-algonquin-provincial-park.html Category: Ecological objectives

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30) 2014-in July MNR finalized the Forest Management Guide for Boreal Landscapes “Description of Policy: In response to recommendations from a number of advisory groups and committees, the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) is updating its set of 36 forest management guides and replacing them with a more effective and efficient suite of five documents. Forest management guides contain the mandatory standards and guidelines, as well as suggested best management practices, that are used by MNR and the forest industry when preparing and implementing forest management plans. The draft Forest Management Guide for Boreal Landscapes (Boreal Landscape Guide) provides direction to planning teams to help them set the broad strategic direction for their forest management plan. The guide describes the natural variability of our forests, based on three perspectives: 1) science-based models that simulate forest fires and other natural disturbances (i.e. what the forest could be like); 2) historical records based on land surveyor’s notes from the late 1800s and early 1900s (i.e. what the forest did look like at one point in time); and 3) areas that have not been managed, such as large parks (i.e. what the natural forest looks like now). The draft guide then compares the current managed forest to the natural range of variation, and requires planning teams to select operations and management alternatives that will maintain that natural range or gradually change the current forest to resemble more closely what would occur naturally. The draft provides specific information on what type of trees and how many of each species would occur naturally, as well as where (i.e. the size and distribution of patches) they would likely occur in the province. This information and direction is provided on a sub-regional basis, and then broken down further for individual forest management units. This version of the draft Boreal Landscape Guide addresses only the boreal forest region of Ontario. A similar document addressing the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence forest region was completed in March 2010 (ER Registry Number 010-5226). If approved, the Boreal Landscape Guide will replace existing landscape level direction for this forest region currently found in the Natural Disturbance Pattern Emulation Guide, the Caribou Guide, the Moose Guide, the White-tailed Deer Guide, the Pileated Woodpecker Guide, and the Marten Guide. If implemented, this new guide will make the forest management planning process more efficient and the direction provided by the guides more accessible, not only to MNR and the forest industry, but also to the public. Equally as important, this proposed new approach for setting strategic level direction in the forest management plans reflects the most recent scientific understanding of managing forest ecosystems, thereby ensuring the conservation of forest biodiversity in the province.” (2013 draft) Source: http://www.ebr.gov.on.ca/ERS-WEB- External/displaynoticecontent.do?noticeId=MTIwMzEy&statusId=MTgwMDU1 https://dr6j45jk9xcmk.cloudfront.net/documents/2783/guide-boreal-landscape-aoda.pdf Category: Ecological objectives

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31) 2014-Ontario government introduced Bill 83, Protection of Public Participation Act., 2014 to protect ENGOs and other public interest groups against SLAPPs (i.e., Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation), for example, the $7-million lawsuit brought by Resolute Forest Products against Greenpeace Canada concerning Resolute’s alleged violations of the Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement. “Purposes 137.1 (1) The purposes of this section and sections 137.2 to 137.5 are, (a) to encourage individuals to express themselves on matters of public interest; (b) to promote broad participation in debates on matters of public interest; (c) to discourage the use of litigation as a means of unduly limiting expression on matters of public interest; and (d) to reduce the risk that participation by the public in debates on matters of public interest will be hampered by fear of legal action.” Bill 83 was introduced in June 2013 and referred to the Standing Committee on Social Policy in April 2014. It died on the Order Paper with the election call in May. As of December 1, 2014, the so-called Anti-SLAPP legislation was being reintroduced into the Ontario Legislature. Source: http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/bills/bills_detail.do?locale=en&BillID=2810 http://www.greenpeace.org/canada/en/recent/130-groups-call-on-Ontario-legislature-to-make-public- advocacy-bill-top-priority/ http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/ontario-bill-to-crack-down-on-slapp-lawsuits-1.2127595 Category: Ecological objectives

32) 2014 MNR adds Forestry to its name “..the new minister of Natural Resources and Forestry, northwestern Ontario MPP Bill Mauro…noted adding the word forestry is not an addition of responsibility, but simply a title change. “Of course, forestry's been in MNR for most of the last significant period of time,” he said. “I think it's just a way for the premier to highlight the importance of forestry, certainly to northerners I think and the fact that as a government, we take it very seriously." Source: http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/sudbury/ontario-ministry-of-natural-resources-adds-forestry-to-its-title- 1.2706127 Category: Sustainable Forest Management

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Appendix 5. Selected Events in the History of Modern Environmentalism and Forests

1959-the Ontario government passed the Wilderness Areas Act, which had been advocated by the Federation of Ontario Naturalists since 1931 but the legislation still allowed natural resources development in wilderness areas larger than 259 hectares

1960-CBC launched The Nature of Things, a television show on environmental issues that became associated in 1979 its host David Suzuki, environmentalist, scientist and broadcaster

1961-Women’s March for Peace in 60 American cities against the resumption of nuclear device testing by the Soviet Union and the United States, considered to be a defining event of modern feminism

1962-Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, her work influenced the banning of DDT (dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane) and is considered to be the book associated with modern environmentalism; she described the ‘rivers of death’ in New Brunswick where aerial pesticides aimed at spruce budworm killed fish.

1962-Thomas Kuhn published The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, introducing the concept of paradigm shift in the development of science

1963-the Nature Conservancy of Canada was founded by the Federation of Ontario Naturalists to protect ecologically significant lands through means such as purchasing them or donations or conservation easements

1964-the United States passed The Wilderness Act designating roadless, wilderness areas for protection

1966-Aldo Leopold published A Sand County Almanac, which influenced naturalist movement with the concept of the land ethic 1967-Lynn White Jr. publishes “Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis” in Science, suggesting that Judeo-Christianity is a cause of ecological crisis

1968-Paul Taylor published Respect for Nature, introducing the concept of biocentrism

1968-Garrett Hardin published The Tragedy of the Commons

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1968-1974-Ontario government stopped commercial logging, in response to wilderness preservation advocacy, in Quetico, Killarney and Lake Superior provincial parks

1969-Paul and Anne Ehrlich publish The Population Bomb

1969-Pollution Probe founded by students and professors at the University of Toronto

1969-Canada banned DDT (dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane)

1969-Pollution on Cleveland’s Cuyahoga River caught fire and media attention

1969-The United States passed the National Environmental Policy Act, requiring environmental impact statements before federal agencies proceeded with any major projects

1970-April 22nd was First Earth Day (associated with second- wave or modern environmentalism)

1970-the Environmental Protection Agency was created as a federal bureaucracy in the United States under the National Environmental Act

1970-the German Green Party was founded and has been in coalitions with the federal and state governments; four ‘pillars’ of ecology, social justice, grassroots democracy and non-violence

1970- Canadian Environmental Law Association (CELA) was established in Toronto as a non-profit, public interest organization to protect the environment and to advocate environmental law reforms

1971-Greenpeace founded in Vancouver by a group of Canadian and American peace activists and since 1976 has become arguably the best known international environmental organization

1971-the federal government established the Department of the Environment, enacted the Clean Air Act

1971-Ontario passed the Environmental Protection Act

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1972-the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment was held in Stockholm, co-chaired by Canadian Maurice Strong, underlined public and political awareness of environmental problems

1972-the Club of Rome published The Limits to Growth, projecting environmental and over population crises by 2050

1972-Canada and the United States signed the International Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement and Canada enacted the Canada Water Act

1972-the United States passed the Clean Air Act

1973-Arne Naess published ‘The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movements’

1973-Richard Routley Sylvan published ‘Is There a Need for a New, an Environmental Ethic?” in Proceedings of the 15th World Congress of Philosophy

1973-Middle Eastern countries (through Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries or OPEC) placed an oil embargo on Western countries that supported Israel during the fourth Arab-Israeli conflict (known at the Yom Kippur war-October 1973 to February 1974)-beginning of “oil scares” with periodic shortages and inflated oil prices in North America and Europe

1973-E. F. Schumacher published Small is Beautiful, the idea that decentralization can be a solution to ecological crisis

1973-federal government passed the Canada Wildlife Act

1974-United Nations held first international conference on population in Bucharest

1974-the United States passed the Endangered Species Act

1974-French writer Francoise d’Eaubonne coined the term ecofeminist

1976-2011-Harrowsmith magazine was published in Camden East, Ontario, it was about living ecologically and with 100,000 subscribers, influenced the Canadian environmental movement

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1976-the federal government amended the National Parks Act to protect Aboriginal fishing and trapping rights, after a century of removing Aboriginal peoples from their homes to make way for parks

1976-the federal government passed the Environmental Contaminants Act

1977-the Mackenzie Valley (Berger)Pipeline Inquiry commissioned by the federal government recommended against approval of oil and gas development, through Yukon and the Mackenzie Valley to Alberta, for reasons of Aboriginal and environmental issues.

1978-Love Canal landfill in Buffalo, New York brought attention to human exposure to toxic, hazardous wastes

1978-Ontario produced two documents, Ontario Provincial Parks Policy and Ontario Provincial Parks Planning and Management Policies, which emphasized the objective of environmental protection and led to the large expansion of the parks in the 1980s

1979-James Lovelock published Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth, which introduced the idea that Earth is a living organism in which symbiosis and not competition is the dominant relationship

1979-Jean-Francois Lyotard published The Postmodern Condition

1979-Earth First was established to carry out direct environmental action, for example sabotaging logging operations by spiking trees, instead of supporting traditional conservation

1979-Three Mile Island nuclear plant accident in Pennsylvania

1980s-1990s-War in the Woods, environmentalists protested logging of old-growth forests in the Walbran and Carmanah Valleys and at Clayoquot Sound in British Columbia

1980s-Temagami Wilderness Association protested clearcutting and First Nations protested land claims in Temagami

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1980-First eco-feminist conference, ‘Women and Life on Earth: A Conference on Eco-Feminism in the Eighties, Amherst

1981-Candian Coalition on acid rain was created

1982-the Assembly of First Nations was formed out of the National Indian Brotherhood

1983-the Green Party of Canada was founded as a federal political party, Elizabeth May, party leader since 2006, became its first elected member of Parliament in 2011

1984-Arne Naess and George Sessions publish ‘Basic Principles of Deep Ecology’ in Ecophilosophy

1984-Ariel Salleh publishes ‘Deeper than Deep Ecology: The Ecofeminist Connection in Environmental Ethics

1985-the Society for Conservation Biology was founded as an international professional organization to promote scientific study and conservation of biological diversity

1985- Bill Devall and George Sessions publish ‘Platform Principles of the Deep Ecology Movement’ in Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered

1986-Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident in the Ukraine

1986-International Tropical Timber Organization was established under the auspices of the United Nations to address deforestation and development of tropical timber resources, and it was associated with concept of sustainable forestry certification , can be traced back to 1976 negotiations for International Tropical Timber Agreement

1987-The Brundtland Report ‘Our Common Future,’ was published following a 1986 meeting of the United Nations’ World Commission on Environment and Development, and it introduced the concept of sustainability: ‘Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.’

1988-the federal government updated its Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA)

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1988-the federal government amended the National Parks Act

1988-Gwaii Haanas National Park Reserve and the 1992 Haida Heritage Site established by the Haida and the British Columbia and federal governments

1988-Free Trade Agreement signed with the United States

1989-Environics Research conducted first comprehensive national survey of public opinion on forestry matters (poll of 2,500 Canadians-results favoured environment over industry)

1989-Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska focused public concern on ecological damage to wildlife and water

1989- Time Magazine named the ‘Endangered Earth as Planet of the Year’

1990-Murray Bookchin publishes The Philosophy of Social Ecology

1990-federal government announced its Green Plan, 5 year, $3 billion action plan, including goal of more sustainable development in the resource sector

1990-Sierra Legal Defence Fund founded in Canada to donate legal services to environmental organizations and individuals , name changed to Ecojustice Canada in 2007

1990-1995-the Ontario government introduced a new policy that permitted traditional hunting and fishing in Algonquin Park, it was opposed by some environmentalists

1991-Ontario government introduced the Sustainable Forestry Initiative

1991-the founding document ‘Principles of Environmental Justice’ was issued at the American People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit

1991-amendments to the Canada-United States Air Quality Act required 50 per cent reductions in acid rain emissions

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1992-United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, the Rio Summit, where Canada played a leading role and many countries endorsed the concept of sustainable development. Canada was the first country to sign the Convention for Biological Diversity at the conference.

1992-William Rees originated Ecological Footprint concept

1992-innaugaral meeting of Forest Stewardship Council in Toronto

1992-Robin Eckersley published Environmentalism and Political Theory

1994-North American Free Trade Agreement signed

1994-the Ontario government passed an Environmental Bill of Rights establishing the office of an Environmental Commissioner and public scrutiny of proposed regulations and legislation with the emphasis on the natural environment

1994-Richard Sylvan and David Bennett publish The Greening of Ethics: From Human Chauvinism to Deep-Green Theory

1995-Paul Abramson and Ronald Inglehart published Value Change in Global Perspective, the thesis that modernization has resulted in ‘post-materialist’ values such as peace, human rights and a clean environment that have emerged since the Second World War (contrasted to the older ‘materialist’ values such as income and job security)

1995-The Montreal Process-Canada-led endeavour to develop seven internationally acceptable criteria and 67 indicators - with the endorsement of15 countries (containing the world’s non-European temperate and boreal forests) that signed the Santiago Declaration

1996-Natural Step Canada formed to accelerate the transition of communities and businesses to a sustainable society based on the Framework for Strategic Sustainable Development designed by Dr. Karl- Henrik Robert

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1997-The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was adopted with the objective of countries reducing greenhouse gas emissions to below 1990 levels by 2012. Canada agreed to ratify the Protocol in 2002 but withdrew in 2011.

1998-David Orton and the Left Biocentrists agree to a Left Biocentrism Primer that accepts Deep Ecology principles but with an anti-industrialist, anti-capitalist political perspective

1999-the battle of Seattle, a protest against the World Trade Organization, which Friends of the Earth described as preventing the overturn of environmental laws by global corporations, among other issues

1999-the Ontario government approved a Living Legacy Land Use Strategy (Lands for Life) and the Ontario Forest Accord which expanded the park system and attempted to provide resource industries with more certainty

1999-the federal government established the territory of Nunavut, with self-government for the Inuit majority

2000-the federal government amended the National Parks Act again, making ecological integrity the first priority, following reports of overuse and development in some parks such as Banff National Park

2001-Alec Ponton introduced the concept of “pherology,” the carrying-capacity of Earth

2002- Pope John Paul the 2nd and the Ecumenical Patriarch His Holiness Bartholomew 1 published the Common Declaration on Environmental Ethics

2002-Edward O. Wilson published The Future of Life, introducing the concept of biophilia

2003-federal government passed a Species at Risk Act

2004-Wildlife Conservation Society Canada (WCS Canada) was established to conserve wildlife and wild lands

2004-Ted Mosquin and Stan Rowe published ‘A Manifesto for Earth’ in Biodiversity

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2005-The Earth Charter Initiative, a global civil society effort that developed in 2000 an Earth Charter consisting of 16 principles, published Toward a Sustainable World: The Earth Charter in Action

2005-the Great Bear Rainforest Agreement was signed by ENGOs, First Nations, logging companies and the BC government to implement a long term sustainable ecosystem plan, allowing some logging and providing alternative employment for loggers

2005-Bill 133 passed to amend the Environmental Protection Act and Ontario Water Resources Act to create the authority to impose environmental penalties

2006-Al Gore published An Inconvenient Truth and narrated a documentary film

2007-Al Gore and the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change won the Nobel Peace Prize

2007-Ontario government passed the Endangered Species Act

2007-Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change issued report on global warming

2010-Ontario government passed the Far North Act

2009-Climate Change Summit held in Copenhagen, one result was the 2010 launch of the REDD Partnership (i.e., Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) involving 58 nations with the objective of cutting tropical deforestation in developing countries by 50 per cent by 2020, $4.5 billion was initially committed by Britain, Norway and other countries

2010-in May announcement of the Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement between FPAC (whose members agreed to defer operations on 29 million hectares of boreal forest) and ENGOs (who agreed to suspend ‘do not buy’ market campaigns against FPAC members)

2011-federal government and the National Energy Board approved the Mackenzie Valley pipeline project involving some Aboriginal communities, with others protesting, and oil and gas companies

2012-Rio+20 Earth Summit on Sustainable Development took place

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2012-federal government passed omnibus Bill C-38, which included restrictions on the scope of public hearings on environmental issues such as energy pipelines

2012-Greepeace Canada released report, Boreal Alarm: An Action Plan for Endangered Forests in Canada calling for greater than 50 per cent land conservation for protection of biodiversity and wildlife habitat

2013-federal government ended the National Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy

2014-Ontario government introduced Bill 83, Protection of Public Participation Act, to protect ENGOs and other public interest groups against SLAPPs (i.e., Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation), for example, the $7-million lawsuit brought by Resolute Forest Products against Greenpeace Canada concerning Resolute’s alleged violations of the Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement.

Selected Sources: Armson, Kenneth. A. 2001. Ontario Forests: A Historical Perspective. Fitzhenry & Whiteside, Toronto. 233 pp.

Curry, Patrick (2006) Ecological Ethics: An Introduction (London, Polity Press)

Hessing, M., Howlett, M. and Summerville, T. Canadian Natural Resource and Environmental Policy: Political Economy and Public Policy, Second Edition, UBC Press, Vancouver and Toronto, 2005

M. Hollis and S. Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations Chapter 1, p 1-91

Lambert, R.S. and Pross.P. 1967. Renewing Nature’s Wealth. Ontario Department of Lands and Forests. Toronto.630 pp.

MacDowell, L. S. An Environmental History of Canada. UBC Press, 2012 339 pages

McLaughlin, Andrew (1995) ‘The Heart of Deep Ecology,’ Sessions: Deep Ecology for the 21st Century, (Shambala)

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McKenzie, Judith I. (2002) Environmental Politics in Canada (Oxford University Press, Toronto)

Nordhaus, Ted and Shellenberger, Michael (2006) Breakthrough: From the Death of Environmentalism to the Politics of Possibility, (Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston)

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Historical information on philosophers and dates of publications, accessed November 2007. Available at http://setis.library.usyd.edu.au/stanford/contents.html

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Appendix 6. Questions generated from the Dialectical Policy Network Model

Who is in the network? What resources do these network members have? To what extent do these resources reflect the structural position of the interests these members represent and/or the skills and abilities of the individuals who represent these interests in the network? Have these individuals changed the structure of the network in an attempt to forward their interests? Has the network structure altered the perceived interests of the network participants?

Questions generated about the dialectical relationship between the network and its political and socio-economic context: How has the network changed over time? How has the political, ideological, economic and knowledge-base context within which the network operates changed over time? How has the relationship between the network and other related networks changed over time? How have members of the network interpreted any changes in the broader political and social context within which the network operates? How have the exogenous/contextual factors and the endogenous/network factors interacted?

Questions generated about the dialectical relationship between the policy network and the policy outcome: Have previous policy outcomes affected the structure of the network? Have previous policy outcomes affected the broader political and socio-economic context within which the network operates? Have the strategy/tactics pursued by members of the network changed as a result of their prior experience in the network? Source: Toke, D. and Marsh, D. 2003 ‘Policy Networks and the GM Crops Issue: Assessing the Utility of a Dialectical Model of Policy Networks’, Public Administration Vol. 81 No. 2, p 231

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Appendix 7. Analysis of Public Hearings, Parties/Network Agents

and their Interests in Forest Policy

Agent Interests in Forest Policy

* Note to reader, the language changed during this research and the term “agent” transformed into “policy actors” in the dissertation as the research progressed.

1. Government regulator - MNR, MOE

2. Interest is Environmental: opposition to traditional forest management practices; non-consumption of forest; non-extractive practices

3. Interest is Indirectly Environmental: members use; non-consumption of forest; non-extractive practices

4. Interest is Forest industry, wood supply and profits

5. Interest is non-forestry industry (5.1 Extractive: farming, mining, hydro, fishing, trapping; 5.2 Non- forestry, non-extractive resource)

6. Interest is Northern Ontario Local Economic Security

7. Interest is Aboriginal and treaty rights

8. Interest is Forest science, Education and Professionalism

9. Politicians

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Figure A2. Forest Policy Outcome: Class EA, 1988

*Note to reader: the opponents of the policy outcome are represented above the figure and the supporters are represented below.

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Class EA List of Interests

Prevailing Interests:

 "Timber was King"  MNR  Ontario Forest Industries Assoc.  Ontario Lumber Manufactures Assoc. Origin of Policy/Idea - Where did it come from?  1975 Environmental Assessment Act  &Advocating from Environmental Orgs. Forest Policy Outcome: Class EA 1988-1004  MNR approved to conduct timber management  First time legally required to protect non-timber resources

Neutral Interests (Government regulator): 1. MNR 2. MOE Interests in Support of Forest Policy: Class EA 1. Forest Industry 2. Non-forest resource industry extractive & non-extractive 3. Northern Ontario Local Economic Security 4. Forest science, Education & Professionalism 5. Politicians Interests Opposed 1. Environmental 2. Indirectly Environmental 3. Aboriginal & treaty rights

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Figure A3. Forest Policy Outcome: CFSA, 1994

*Note to reader: the opponents of the policy outcome are represented above the figure and the supporters are represented below.

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Prevailing Interests CFSA:

 MNR/government redefined priorities of forest policy to be focused on forest sustainability and forest ecosystems, not timber management Origin of Policy/Idea - Where did it come from? *NDP gov't elected in 1991  Policy Framework for Sustainable Forestry 1992-94  Environmental Bill of Rights 1993  Class EA reports in April 1994 Forest Policy Outcome:  CFSA (Crown Forest Sustainability Act), 1994  Change in thrust - forest sustainability and ecosystem priorities, not timber management Interests in Support of CFSA Forest Industry, wood supply, profits (40 agents) Non-forest resource industry (extractive and non-extractive) (8 agents) Local Economic Security (12 agents) Forest Science, Education, and Professionalism (6 agents) Political (3 agents) Neutral Interests *Kent Virgo - on both sides at different times Interests Opposed to CFSA Environmental (15 agents) Aboriginal & treaty rights (4 agents)

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Figure A4. CFSA, 1994 List of Interests

Note to reader: the opponents of the policy outcome are represented above the figure and the supporters are represented below.

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Prevailing Interests: MNR/government redefine priorities of forest policy to be focused on forest sustainability and forest ecosystems, not timber management

Origin of Policy/Idea - Where did it come from? *NDP gov't elected in 1991 *Policy Framework for Sustainable Forestry 1992-94 *Environmental Bill of Rights 1993 *Class EA reports in April 1994

Interests in Support of CFSA 1. Lajambe Forest Products (small sawmill) 2. H. et R. Fabris Industries (small sawmill) 3. Mainville Lumber Co Ltd (small sawmill) 4. Hearst Lumbermen's Association (small sawmill) 5. E.B. Eddy Forest Products Ltd (large pulp & paper) 6. Spruce Falls Inc (large pulp & paper) 7. Abitibi-Price Inc (large pulp & paper) 8. Boise Cascade Canada Ltd (large pulp & paper) 9. Dorion Fibretech Ltd (small sawmill) 10. River Lake Timber Ltd (small sawmill) 11. Wilberforce Veneer (small sawmill) 12. Green Forest Lumber Corp (small sawmill) 13. Marcri Logging Inc (small sawmill) 14. Technologic Timber Ltd (small sawmill) 15. Ontario Forest Industries Association (large pulp & paper) 16. Avenor Inc (large pulp & paper) 17. Sturgeon Timber Ltd (small sawmill) 18. was Macri 19. Brinkman and Associates Reforestation (silvicultural) 20. Grant Forest Products (large sawmill, OSB) 21. Hearst Forest Management Inc (large sawmill) 22. Weldwood of Canada Ltd (large sawmill) 23. Northshore Firewood and Logging (small fuelwood)

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24. IWA Canada, Local 2693 - not on list! 25. Cochrane Forestry Association (silvicultural) 26. Hill's Greenhouses Ltd (silvicultural) 27. Ontario Silvicultural Contractors Association (silvicultural) 28. Peter Duinker (consultant) 29. Gary Bull (consultant) 30. Ron Magee (consultant) 31. Buchanan Forest Products (large sawmill) 32. Ontario Lumber Manufacturers' Association (sawmills) 33. Thunders Woodlands Association (contractors) 34. Firesteel Contractors Ltd (contractors) 35. Atikokan Loggers and Citizens Organization (contractors) 36. Northshore Loggers and Truckers Association (contractors) 37. Iain Angus (consultant) 38. Ronald Garnett (consultant) 39. Broland Enterprises Inc 40. Normick Perron Inc 41. Town of Espanola 42. Espanola and District 43. Chamber of Commerce 44. Mattawa and Area Forestry Committee 45. Town of Kapuskasing 46. Town of Hearst 47. Robin MacIntyre (member of public) 48. Northwestern Ontario Trucking and Logging Association (contractors) 49. Ontario Chamber of Commerce 50. Nord-Aski Frontier Development Inc 51. Community Forest 52. Town of Fort Frances 53. Northern Forest Coalition 54. Township of Ignace 55. Elk Lake Community Forest 56. Minister of Natural Resources Hon. Howard Hampton (NDP) 57. Jack Stokes (Northern MPP)

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58. Lakehead University Members 59. Faculty of Forestry Lakehead University 60. Dr. Connie Nelson, Lakehead, Dean of Research and Graduate Studies 61. Ontario Professional Foresters Association 62. Paul Aird (U of T) 63. Jagdish Nautiyal (U of T) 64. Glen Wood (NDP member Cochrane) NOT ON LIST 65. Jo Anne Fleming (consultant) 66. was Firesteel 67. was Atikokan 68. Northern Ontario Tourist Outfitters Association 69. Structural Board Association

Interests Opposed 1. Clean North (local enviro) 2. Northwatch (local enviro) 3. Aurora Friends of Nature (provincial enviro) 4. Environment North (local enviro) 5. Friends of the Forest (local enviro) 6. Conservation Council of Ontario (provincial enviro) 7. Earthroots (federal enviro) 8. Ad Hoc Committee of the Ontario Wildlife Working Group (provincial enviro) 9. Animal Alliance of Canada; Animal Protection Institute (federal enviro) 10. Wildlands League, Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society 11. Canadian Environmental Law Association 12. Fort Frances Area Tribal Chiefs 13. Kiashke River Native 14. Development Inc 15. Niigaani Enterprises Inc 16. Union of Ontario Indians 17. Federation of Ontario Naturalists (was Northern Ontario Tourist Outfitters Assoc.) 18. Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters 19. Algoma Country Adventures

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Neutral Interests *Kent Virgo: appeared as a member of the public opposed, but earlier expressed support on behalf of Spruce Falls

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Figure A5. Forest Policy Outcome: ESA, 2007

*Note to reader: the opponents of the policy outcome are represented above the figure and the supporters are represented below.

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ESA, 2007 List of Interests

Prevailing Interests:  Ministry of Natural Resources/government is pursuing two seemingly diverse forest policy objectives: 1) Satisfying the policy initiatives of ENGOS, and 2) Responding to the forest industry recession in northern Ontario.

Origin of Policy/Idea  1994-2007 experience with featured species and forest management guides/guideline approach instituted by Class EA and Crown Forest Sustainability;  1999 Ontario's Living Legacy Agreement; coalition of ENGOs Save Our Species (SOS) election promise by McGuinty's Liberal gov't in 2003 to update 1971 legislation;  Canadian Boreal Initiative established in 2003; beginning of forest industry recession in 2004;  2005 Ontario's Biodiversity Strategy, MNR signs Collaborative Action Plan with Forest Stewardship Council in 2006.

Neutral Interests  MNR

Interests in Support  Environmental (10 agents)

Interests Opposed  Forest Industry (6 agents)  Non-forest resource industry extractive & non-extractive (8 agents)  Indirectly Environmental (2 agents)  Northern Ontario Local Economic Security (5 agents)  Forest science, Education & Professionalism (0 agents)  Aboriginal & treaty rights (1 agent)  Politicians (0 agents)

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Figure A6. Detailed List of ESA Interests

*Note to reader: the opponents of the policy outcome are represented above the figure and the supporters are represented below.

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Interests in Support

1. Environmental Defence Dr. Rick Smith

2. Ontario Nature Ms. Wendy Francis

3. Ivey Foundation Mr. Timothy Gray

4. Sierra Legal Defence Fund Mr. Robert Wright

5. Earthroots Mr. Josh Garfinkel

6. ForestEthics Ms. Gillian McEachern

7. David Suzuki Foundation Ms. Rachel Plotkin

8. Wildlife Conservation Society Canada Dr. Justina Ray

9. CPAWS-Wildlands League Ms. Janet Sumner, Ms. Anna Baggio

10. Sierra Club of Canada, Ontario Chapter Mr. Dan McDermott

Interests Opposed

1. Northwestern Ontario Municipal Association Ms. Anne Krassilowsky

2. Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Thunder Bay Mr. Marvin Pupeza

3. Tembec Inc. Mr. John Valley, Mr. Michael Martel, Mr. Chris McDonell

4. Domtar Inc. Ms. Bonny Skene, Dr. Kandyd Szuba

5. Township of Terrace Bay Mr. Michael King

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6. Association of Municipalities of Ontario Mr. Doug Reycraft

7. Township of Schreiber Mr. Pat Halonen

8. Ontario Forestry Coalition Ms. Lynn Peterson

9. Ontario Forest Industries Association Mr. Scott Jackson

10. Buchanan Forest Products Mr. Hartley Multamaki

11. North American Fur Association Ms. Tina Jagros, Mr. Bob McQuay

12. Christian Farmers Federation of Ontario Mr. Henry Stevens

13. Ontario Federation of Agriculture Mr. Paul Mistele

14. Ontario Waterpower Association Mr. Paul Norris

15. Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters Dr. Terry Quinney

16. Credit River Anglers Association Mr. Louis Milo

17. Ontario Mining Association Mr. Chris Hodgson

18. Ontario Fur Managers Federation Mr. Howard Noseworthy, Mr. Stewart Frerotte

19. Ontario Bait Handlers Mr. Bill Davies

20. Toronto Home Builders' Association-Urban Development Institute Mr. Neil Rodgers

21. Nishnawbe Aski Nation Grand Chief Stan Beardy

22. Bowater Canadian Forest Products Inc. Mr. Richard Groves

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Figure A7. Forest Policy Outcome: Far North Act, 2010

*Note to reader: the opponents of the policy outcome are represented above the figure and the supporters are represented below.

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Far North Act List of Interests

Prevailing Interests:

 The McGuinty government is persuaded by environmental organizations to announce a commitment to permanently protect a minimum of 225,000 square kilometres (at least 50%) of Ontario's far north boreal region in advance of land use planning and resources development. Origin of Policy/Idea - Where did it come from?

 International campaign by World Wildlife Fund (& other enviros) to protect the northern boreal and address climate change, and their influence on McGuinty's Liberal gov't →  Canadian Boreal Initiative established in 2003;  2005 Ontario's Biodiversity Strategy;  2007 passage of the Endangered Species Act;  2009 reorganization of MNR so that forest industry function is transferred to MNDMF;  2010 announcement of Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement between enviro organizations and forest company members of the Forest Products Association of Canada (FPAC)

Neutral Interests

 Government Regulator: MNR

Interests in Support

1. Interest: Environmental (6 agents)

Interests Opposed

1. Forest Industry (1 agent) 2. Non-forest resource industry extractive & non-extractive (11 agents) 3. Indirectly Environmental (0 agents) 4. Northern Ontario Local Economic Security (4 agents) 5. Forest science, Education & Professionalism (0 agents) 6. Aboriginal & treaty rights (15 agents)

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7. Politicians (0 agents)

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Figure A8. Detailed List of Far North Act Interests

*Note to reader: the opponents of the policy outcome are represented above the figure and the supporters are represented below.

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Neutral Interests

 MNR Interests in Support 1. World Wildlife Fund Mr. Monte Hummel 2. Ontario Nature (G-864 Ms. Caroline Schultz) 3. Ontario Nature North (Mr. Peter Rosenbluth) 4. CPAWS-Wildlands League 5. Ms. Janet Sumner 6. Ms. Anna Baggio 7. Northwatch (Ms. Brennain Lloyd) 8. Canadian Boreal Initiative (Mr. Larry Innes representing Tembec, Domtar, Alberta-Pacific, World Wildlife Fund, Ducks Unlimited, Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society, & some First Nations) Conditional Support from:

Cat Lake First Nation and Slate Falls First Nation (Mr. Wilfred Wesley & Mr. Steve Winsor) and Fort Albany First Nation (Mr. Chris Metatawabin & Mr. Joseph Sutherland)

Interests Opposed

1. Ontario Forest Industries Association 2. Mr. Scott Jackson 3. Common Voice Northwest (Ms. Gwen Garbutt) 4. Timmins Chamber of Commerce (Rob Galloway) 5. City of Timmins (Mr. Michael Doody) 6. Mr. Steve Kidd 7. Porcupine Prospectors & Developers Association (Mr. Bill MacRae & Mr. Kristan Straub) 8. Mr. Stewart Jackson mining industry 9. Prospectors & Developers Assoc. of Canada (Mr. Jon Baird, Mr. Michael Hardin) 10. Ontario Prospectors Association (Mr. Garry Clark) 11. De Beers Canada (Mr. Jim Gowans & Mr. Tom Ormsby) 12. Northwestern Ontario Prospectors Association (Mr. Dave Hunt)

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13. Boreal Prospectors Association (Mr. Michael Fox) 14. City of Timmins Mining Act Committee (Mr. Robert Calhoun) 15. Ontario Mining Association (Mr. Chris Hodgson) 16. Northwestern Ontario Prospectors Association (Mr. Bjorkman) 17. Ontario Waterpower Association 18. Mr. Paul Norris 19. Coalition of Aboriginal People (Mr. Brad Maggrah) 20. Congress of Aboriginal Peoples (National Chief Kevin Daniels) 21. Sagamok Anishnawbek (Chief Paul Eshkakogan; Mr. Dean Assinewe) 22. Windigo First Nations Council (Mr. Frank McKay) 23. Nishnawbe Aski Nation (Grand Chief Stan Beardy, Mr. Stephen Kudaka) 24. Mr. John Edmond (consultant for aboriginal communities) 25. Chiefs of Ontario (Chief Angus Toulouse) 26. Nishnawbe Aski Nation (NAN) (Mr. Frank Beardy, Chief Andrew Solomon from Fort Albany First Nation, Chief Jonathon Solomon from Kashechewan First Nation, Chief David Babin from Wahgoshig First Nation, Chief Keeter Corston from Chapleau Cree First Nation, Chief George Hunter from the Weenusk First Nation, Chief Randy Kapashesit for MoCreebec Council of the Cree Nation, Gregory Koostachin elder from the east Mushkegowuk territory) 27. Grand Council of Treaty 3 (Grand Chief Diane Kelly) 28. Ojibways of the Pic River First Nation (Ms. Jamie Michano) 29. Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug (Mr. Samuel McKay & Elder Mike Morris) 30. Whitewater Lake First Nation (Chief Arlene Slipperjack) 31. Matawa First Nations (Chief Arthur Moore) 32. Mushkegowuk Council (Grand Chief Stan Louttit) 33. Attawapiskat First Nation (Chief Theresa Hall)

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Appendix 8. Interview Protocol

Informed Forestry Stakeholders, Research Study, Ontario Forest Policy: Network Change 1988-2011

Interviewer Introduction: Before we begin I would like to review a few things with you; Firstly, I want you to be aware that I am tape-recording our interview. The tape is going to be used to make a transcript of our conversation – but your name will never appear on the tape and any-one else’s name or identifying information will be deleted to protect your confidentiality. The individual who is transcribing this tape is a professional and has signed a confidentiality agreement.

If you want to say something to me – but are hesitant to have it recorded – just let me know and I will stop the digital recorder and what you say will not be recorded and will be “off the record.” I will resume the digital taping of our interview after receiving a prompt from you. If you have any questions, please feel free to stop the interview and ask me.

I have received your consent to participate in this interview – so why don’t we begin?

As you know the focus of my research is that I am interested in understanding if a policy shift has occurred…which is why I speaking with you today. I am interested in asking you about [name of forest policy event] and I interested to hear about any involvement you may have had with other forest policies… and I would now like to discuss them with you. Shall we proceed?

1. Tell me about the involvement of your group in the [name the forest policy event]. Why did your organization get involved in the [name of forest policy event]?

2. We’ve talked about your involvement – and now I want to ask you about others’ involvement in the [name of forest policy event]. Who were the people/organizations that were most influential in persuading the government on the [name of forest policy event]?

(NB: after responding to this question, participant is presented with list derived from public hearing record and asked to make deletions/additions).

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3. What was happening in the Ontario government with the politicians and bureaucrats before the [name of the forest policy event]?

4. Did you observe any linkages between the government and the network agents you have identified? Up to now we have discussed people and organizations; can you tell me – did you observe any particular relationships between people and/or organizations and the government that impacted the [name of the policy event]?

5. In your opinion, do you think there were government policies and legislation in the past 20 years that you think paved the way for the [name of forest policy event]?

6. What has been the impact of the [name of the forest policy event] on the government and the people/organizations involved?

7. Did you or your organization change as a result of the [name of the forest policy event]?

8. Did you observe others’ organizations changing as a result of [name of the forest policy event]?

9. Were there events occurring outside Ontario that influenced the [name of the forest policy event]?

10. If you had to categorize the [name of forest policy event], what category would you put it into?  timber management  integrated sustainable forest management  biocentrism

You have answered the last question I would like to ask you. Do you have any questions for me? Is there any other point I did not ask you about – but you think is relevant?

I want to thank you for your participation. I will email you with a link to an electronic copy of my study once I have successfully defended my dissertation.

End of Interview.

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Appendix 9. Interview Participant Information

Table A9. Interview Participant Information

Forest Policy Interview Category Participant * Representation Demographics Duration Trans. Pages Event (s) ** Date ENGO

E1 ENGO, consultant Class EA 30/09/2011 1:10:29 26 Class EA, E2 ENGO biologist CFSA, ESA, 20/10/2011 1:56:50 16 Far North Class EA, community activist, E3 ENGO CFSA, Far 16/02/2012 1:27:06 21 northern Ontario North biologist/forester, E4 ENGO ESA, Far North 06/03/2012 2:31:06 42 conservation org consultant for Class EA, E5 ENGOs, industry, biologist CFSA, ESA, 19/03/2012 2:07:02 39 gov't Far North Class EA, biologist, E6 ENGO CFSA, ESA, 11/04/2012 1:35:48 21 conservation org. Far North activist with several CFSA, ESA, E7 ENGO 24/04/2012 1:06:24 15 environmental orgs Far North E8 professional forester ESA, Far North 07/05/2012 1:17:19 17

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foresters consultant for tenure E9 ENGOs, industry, forest economist 23/05/2012 1:09:10 20 modernization gov't Government OMNR, MOE, Class EA, G10. biologist 25/10/2011 1:20:49 17 Retired CFSA Class EA, G11 OMNR, OMNDM forester CFSA, ESA, 24/11/2011 0:58:37 16 Far North Class EA, Government, G12 biologist CFSA, ESA, 22/02/2012 1:26:23 33 MOE Far North Government, Class EA, G13 forester 10/04/2012 2:14:22 35 retired CFSA Class EA, G14 OMNR forester CFSA, ESA, 11/04/2012 3:04:02 46 Far North Class EA, G15 government CFSA, ESA, 27/04/2012 1:55:34 18 Far North 35 government, Federal gov't G16 forester 07/05/2012 1:55:57 retired perspective

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Industry CFSA, ESA, I 17 industry forester Far North 25/11/2011 0:52:55 15

Class EA, I18 industry forester CFSA, ESA, 13/12/2011 1:30:15 24

I19 industry biologist, forester ESA, Far North 16/03/2012 1:31:15 27 I20 industry forester CFSA, ESA 27/03/2012 1:25:15 24 Class EA, 24 I 21 industry forester CFSA, ESA, 05/04/2012 1:22:09 Far North First Nations First Nations F22 First Nation 15/05/2012 1:11:06 21 perspective First Nations F23 First Nation 28/05/2012 1:02:11 16 perspective * Three requests for interviews were rejected: one ENGO, one government and one industry.

**Participants were recruited for the interviews on the basis of their involvement, experience or knowledge in one or more forest policy events; however, for most if not all, their knowledge extended beyond forest policy events they were directly involved in.

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Appendix 10. Letter of Information and Informed Consent Form

Informed Consent and Letter of Information

April 27, 2012 Research Study Ontario Forest Policy: Network Change, 1988-2011

Principal Investigator: Anne Koven, PhD Candidate Faculty of Forestry, University of Toronto 33 Willcocks Street, Toronto, ON M5S 3B3 [email protected] 416-571-3244

Purpose of the Study: This research examines Ontario’s forest policy through the shifts and changes in forest policy network agents and their ideas. This research will include an examination of transcripts from public hearing processes and interviews with informed network agents.

I am inviting you to take part in this study because your experience would be valuable in building a key- stakeholder understanding of the shifts and changes in Ontario’s forest policy. This understanding will contribute to the knowledge and assist governments and organizations in improving stewardship of Crown land forests as well as assisting organizations such as the forest industry and ENGOs to participate more effectively in forest policy transformation and implementation.

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Procedures involved in the Research: I am asking you to consent to participate in a 10 question, 60-90 minute tape-recorded one-on-one personal or telephone interview. I will conduct the interview on a date, time, and location that is convenient to you.

If you agree to participate, I ask you to read this Letter of Information and the consent form on the last page and email it back to me. I ask that you save the original digital file for your records. This form tells me that you have voluntarily consented and agree to participate in my study.

After receiving your consent form I will email you to schedule your interview date.

I am interested in your experiences, observations and thoughts regarding (one or more of) the Class EA process, the Crown Forest Sustainability Act, the Endangered Species Act, or the Far North Act. The questions that I will ask you will be related to your knowledge of this subject – and if you prefer not to answer a question, I can easily move on to the next.

Examples of the questions I will ask you during the interview include such questions as:

1. Tell me about the involvement of your group in the [name of forest policy event - for example, the Timber Class Environmental Assessment 1988-94]. Why did your organization get involved in the [for example, the Timber Class Environmental Assessment 1988-94]?

5. In your opinion, do you think there were government policies and legislation in the past 20 years that you think paved the way for the [for example, The Crown Forest Sustainability Act, 1994]?

7. Did you or your organization change as a result of the [for example, Endangered Species Act, 2007]?

10. If you had to categorize the [for example, The Far North Act, 2010], what category would you put it into? Timber management or integrated sustainable forest management or biocentrism?

Potential Harms, Risks or Discomforts:

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The risks involved in participating in this study are minimal. The interview is confidential and voluntary. You can skip any question that you’d prefer not to answer and you are completely free to withdraw from the study at any time. Below I describe the steps that I have taken to protect your privacy.

Potential Benefits: While there will be no direct benefit to you, your participation may generally contribute to your professional knowledge base, may assist governments and benefit our communities in improving stewardship and sustainability of Crown land forests, and may assist organizations such as the forest industry and ENGOs to participate more effectively in forest policy transformation and implementation.

Payment or Reimbursement: There will be no payment or reimbursement offered for your participation.

Confidentiality: You are participating in this study confidentially. Your name or any information that would allow you to be identified, such as affiliation or name of your organization, will not be linked to the data you provide during the interview. No one will know that you participated in the interview unless you choose to tell them. The study also involves researching publicly available transcripts of government hearings and while excerpts from submissions made by your organization might be used in the study, there will be no link between the two sources of information, unless you wish to be cited.

I am the only person who will be conducting, digitally recording, and transcribing the interviews. All data collected will be immediately de-identified by use of an assigned pseudonym.

We are often identifiable through the stories we tell, however, every effort will be made to protect your confidentiality and privacy. If I use a quote by you in my dissertation, I will assign it a pseudonym so that you cannot be identified, unless you have signed the optional waiver of confidentiality (on page 4). If there are revealing details in your quote, I will change the details so that they are more general in nature. I will not use your name or any information that would allow you to be identified. If you have signed the waiver of confidentiality because you wish to receive credit for your comments, I am obliged to contact you and share the draft with you and obtain your permission prior to the drafting of the dissertation.

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This study also involves researching publicly available transcripts of government hearings. While excerpts from submissions made by participants’ organizations may be used in the study, there will be no link between the two sources of information, unless he/she wishes to be cited.

If I do not transcribe the digital recording personally, I will hire a professional transcriptionist and will have them sign a confidentiality agreement. Only I will have access to the digital file that contains the cross-reference key of participants’ identifying information and their assigned pseudonyms and as such will protect your identity from the transcriptionist. The information/data you provide will be kept in a locked cabinet, secure password protected computer, and in an encrypted digital file. I am the only individual who will have access to your information or the password to this file. Once the study has been completed, the data will be destroyed by a professional data destruction company after 5 years.

Participation and Withdrawal: Your participation in this study is voluntary. If you feel any personal or professional pressure to participate, only you and I would be aware that I approached you for the study and for this reason you should feel comfortable refusing to participate. If you do not want to answer some of the questions you do not have to, but you can still be in the study. It is your choice to be part of the study or not, and at any time you can decide to stop (withdraw), even after signing the consent form or part-way through the study. All participants have the right to withdraw from the study until the dissertation has been drafted.

There will be no consequences to you if you choose to withdraw.

Information about the Study Results: All participants will be sent an electronic copy of my dissertation once I have successfully completed all requirements for my PhD.

Questions about the Study: If you have questions or require more information about the study itself, please contact:

Anne Koven, PhD Candidate Faculty of Forestry, University of Toronto [email protected] 416-571-3244

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If you have concerns or questions about your rights as a participant or about the way the study is conducted, please contact:

Office of Research Ethics [email protected] or telephone: 416-946-3273

Please see next page for consent form.

CONSENT FORM

Dear Participant: Please keep one copy of the consent form for your records.

I have read the information presented in the information letter about a study being conducted by Anne Koven of the University of Toronto. I have had the opportunity to ask questions about my involvement in this study and to receive additional details I requested. I understand that if I agree to participate in this study, I may withdraw from the study at any time until the dissertation has been drafted. I have been given a copy of this form. I agree to participate in the study.

Name of Participant (Printed): ______

Signature: ______

Date: ______

[OPTIONAL] Waiver of Confidentiality/Permission to be quoted on record (to ensure proper credit)

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In case you are willing to be quoted on record, please sign the waiver of confidentiality as below.

I, ______, permit the researcher in the study described as above, to cite my name in the dissertation, research reports and publications. I have signed this waiver of confidentiality because I wish to receive credit for my comments.

I understand that before the dissertation has been drafted, the researcher is obligated to share the draft with me and take my permission for citing me. I waive the right of confidentiality in context of citations, as I believe that the citation of data generated from my interview will ensure due credit to me and that the minimal risk posed by this waiver is greatly outweighed by societal benefits.

Name of Participant (Printed): ______

Signature: ______

Date: ______

Please email consent form to: [email protected] Thank you.

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Appendix 11. NVivo Results Tables

Table A11.1. Top Eight Emergent Categories from NVivo Codes

Categories Sources References 1. Agents 23 19710 2. Phenomena 23 6341 3. Forest Policy Events 23 3135 4. Findings 23 1865 5. Lessons Learned 23 1603 6. Federal Government 23 120 7. Provincial Differences 21 126 8. Problem Codes 6 7

Table A11.2. Top Emergent Agent Codes from NVivo

Code Sources References Agents 23 19710 1. Government 23 4063 2. ENGOs 23 4061 3. Foresters and Forestry 23 3954 4. Forest Industry 23 3846 5. First Nations/Aboriginal 23 730

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Table A11.3. Top Emergent Government NVivo Codes from Agent Category

Code Sources References Government 23 4176 Government Change 23 728 Government Cuts 22 121 Government and Forestry 18 694 Government and ENGOs 16 907 Government and Industry 12 650 Government and First Nations/Aboriginal 9 165 Government and Political 8 567 Government and Socio-Economic 7 344

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Table A11.4. Top Emergent Sub-Sub Codes for Government from NVivo

Agent Category: ENGOs Sources References Code: 1.1 Government Change 23 728 1.1.1 Politicians Change Forest Policy 1.1.2 Political Decline of Northern Ontario 1.1.3 MNR’s Influence in Government Declines 1.1.4 Forestry’s Influence within MNR Declines 1.1.5 Government Changes Process for Obtaining Public

Participation and Expert Advice Code: 1.2 Government Cuts 22 121 1.2.1 MNR Required to Reassess Values and Mandate 1.2.2 Legacy of Harris Government Spending Cuts 1.2.3 Is Forest Management Planning Affordable 1.2.4 Government Cannot Fulfill Its Responsibilities Code: 1.3 Government and Forestry 18 694 1.3.1 MNR’s Mandate to Balance the Social, Economic and

Environment 1.3.2 Natural Resources Cannot Be Developed Without First

Nations/Aboriginal Communities 1.3.3 Transfer of Forest Management Responsibility to

Industry Has Failed 1.3.4 Forest Science Achievements Code: 1.4 Government and ENGOs 16 907 1.4.1 ENGOs Are More Politically Engaged 1.4.2 Role of Government in New Collaborative

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Table A11.5. Top Emergent ENGO NVivo Codes from Agent Category

Code Sources References ENGOs 23 4063 ENGOs and Forestry 20 534 ENGOs and Government 16 907 ENGOs and Industry 16 484 ENGOs Capacity 13 654 ENGOs and First Nations/Aboriginal 11 164 ENGOs and Political 9 900 ENGOs Socio-Economic 9 420

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Table A11.6. Top Emergent Sub-Sub Codes for ENGOs from NVivo

Agent Category: ENGOs Sources References Code: 2.1 ENGOs and Forestry 20 534 2.1.1 ENGOs Influence Forest Management 2.1.2 Some ENGOs are Giving up on Forest Management 2.1.3 ENGOs Have Divergent Interests in Forest

Management 2.1.4 The Boreal Campaign Code: 2.2 ENGOs and Government 16 907 2.2.1 ENGOs Are More Politically Engaged 2.2.2 ENGOs Have Experienced Bureaucrats as Impediments 2.2.3 ENGOs and Changing Power Relationships 2.2.4 ENGOs View of Government in New Collaborative

Relationship Code: 2.3 ENGOs and Industry 16 484 2.3.1 Market Certification 2.3.2 Evolving Collaborative Relationships 2.3.3 Attitudes of Industry and ENGOs 2.3.4 ENGOs Influence Government Code: 2.4 ENGO Capacity 13 654 2.4.1 Professionalization of ENGOs 2.4.2 ENGO Success in Private Funding 2.4.3 Public Funding is Important 2.4.4 Future of ENGOs

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Table A11.7. Top Emergent Forester and Forestry Codes from Agent Category Code Sources References Foresters and Forestry 23 3954 Future of Forestry 23 1305 Professional Foresters 23 393 Foresters and ENGOs 20 534 Foresters and Government 18 694 Foresters and Socio-Economic 17 207 Foresters and Industry 16 479 Foresters and Political 16 262 Foresters and First Nations/Aboriginal 12 77

Table A11.8. Top Emergent Categories from NVivo Codes for Foresters & Forestry Agent Category: Foresters & Forestry Sources References Code: 3.1 Future of Forestry 23 1305 3.1.1 Emergence of Forest Management Business 3.1.2 Who Will Pay For Forestry? 3.1.3 Intergenerational Change 3.1.4 Changes in Legislation / Regulation Code: 3.2 Professional Foresters 23 393 3.2.1 Evolution of Foresters' Attitudes 3.2.2 Government Does Not Understand Forestry 3.2.3 Industry Does Not Understand Forestry 3.2.4 Challenges for Ontario Professional Foresters' Association

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Table A11.9.Top Emergent Forest Industry NVivo Codes from Agent Category

Sub-code Sources References Forest industry 23 3846 Forest Sector Transformation 23 1383 Forest Industry and ENGOs 16 484 Forest Industry and Forestry 16 479 Forest Dissension within Industry 16 134 Forest Industry and Government 12 650 Forest Industry and Socio-Economic 9 270 Forest Industry and First Nations/Aboriginal 8 72 Forest Industry and Political 7 373

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Table A11.10.Top Emergent Categories from NVivo Codes for Forest Industry Agent Category: Forest Industry Sources References Code: 4.1 Forest Sector Transformation 23 1383 4.1.1 Economic Downturn & Restructuring 4.1.2 Tenure Modernization 4.1.3 Leadership in Forest Industry Code: 4.2 Industry & ENGOs 16 484 4.2.1 Market Certification 4.2.2 Evolving Collaborative Relationships 4.2.3 Attitudes of Industry & ENGOs 4.2.4 ENGOs Influence on Government Code: 4.3 Industry & Forestry 16 479 4.3.1 Mindset of Government 4.3.2 Changing Society Values 4.3.3 Tension between Protected Areas & Wood Supply Code: 4.4 Dissension within Industry 16 134 4.4.1 OFIA does not Represent Industry Anymore 4.4.2 OFIA is not seen as Reasonable & Balanced 4.4.3 Forest Industries are Competitors 4.4.4 Conflict between Forestry Business & Mandates of

Industry

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Table A11.11. Top Emergent First Nations/Aboriginal NVivo Codes from Agent Category

Code Sources References First Nations/Aboriginal 23 730 First Nations and Forestry 12 77 First Nations/Aboriginal and ENGOs 11 164 First Nations/Aboriginal and Government 9 165 First Nations/Aboriginal and Industry 8 72 First Nations/Aboriginal and Political 3 89 First Nations/Aboriginal and Treaty Rights (and court cases) 2 49 First Nations/Aboriginal and Socio-Economic (people and 2 112 communities)

Table A11.12. Top Emergent Categories from NVivo Codes for First Nations/Aboriginal

Agent Category: 5.0 First Nations/Aboriginal Sources References Code: 5.1 First Nations/Aboriginal and Forestry 12 77 5.1.1 Relationship with MNR 5.1.2 Sharing Wood with the Forest Industry 5.1.3 Successful First Nations/Aboriginal Businesses Code: 5.2 First Nations/Aboriginal and ENGOs 11 164 5.2.1 Excluded from Lands for Life/Living Legacy Negotiations 5.2.2 Opposing the Far North Act 5.2.3 ENGO Strategies are More Successful Code: 5.3 First Nations/Aboriginal and Government 9 165 5.3.1 Treaty and Aboriginal Rights 5.3.2 First Nations and Aboriginal Leadership 5.3.3 History with Ontario Governments