6/*5&%45"5&4*/45*565&0'1&"$& XXXVTJQPSH 41&$*"- REPORT 1200 1UI4USFFU/8t8BTIJOHUPO %$ttGBY ABOUT THE REPORT Elizabeth F. Thompson Elizabeth F. Thompson, associate professor of history at the University of Virginia, was a Jennings Randolph fellow at USIP in 2007–08. This report, drawn from her forthcoming book, Seeking Justice in the Middle East, builds bridges between two worlds that have remained separate in recent years: academic +VTUJDF*OUFSSVQUFE history of the Middle East and foreign policymaking in the region. The author thanks USIP for its support, Meagan Bridges for her research assistance, and commentators on previous )JTUPSJDBM1FSTQFDUJWFTPO1SPNPUJOH%FNPDSBDZ drafts: Nathan Brown, David Edelstein, Melvyn Leffler, Jeff Legro, William Quandt, Abdul-Karim Rafeq, Barbara Slavin, Bob Vitalis, David Waldner, and audiences at the History JOUIF.JEEMF&BTU Department at Catholic University of America, the Institute for Middle East Studies at George Washington University, the Women’s Foreign Policy Group, and the Woodrow Wilson Center, all in Washington, D.C. 4VNNBSZ t Foreign affairs experts routinely use historical analogy to develop and justify policy. However, as professional historians have long noted, attractive analogies often lead to bad policies. Officials regularly choose analogies that neglect or distort the his- torical case they aim to illuminate. Nonetheless, history can be used effectively in international relations. t To do so, practitioners must first recognize the difference between historical analogy ªCZUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT*OTUJUVUFPG1FBDF and precedent. Historical precedent, drawn from the past of the region in question, "MMSJHIUTSFTFSWFE is a safer guide to policy than historical analogy, which is based on comparisons to events in other regions. Because historical precedent is a self-limiting form of anal- ogy restricted to a certain place, people, and time, it provides a better indication of how a certain society understands and responds to a given situation. t The recent U.S. intervention in Iraq highlights the misuses of history: American lead- ers employed analogies to World War II to justify the invasion and to predict success in establishing a democratic regime after. These analogies proved to be a poor guide to nation building in the short term. In the long term, they have deeply aggravated SPECIAL REPORT 225 JUNE 2009 U.S. relations with Iraqis and the rest of the Arab world. t A more effective use of history would have been to refer to the precedent of World War I, a crucial moment when American policy could have supported indigenous Arab CONTENTS constitutional democracy—but, fatefully, did not. The Fallacy of Analogy: World War II as Americans’ t For the new administration, the Arabs’ experience of “justice interrupted” after World “Good War” 2 War I can still be a useful touchstone for promoting democracy in the region.1 This The Power of Precedent: Arabs’ Memory precedent alerts us that foreign intervention can spark a deep-seated and negative of World War I 3 political reaction in the postcolonial Arab world and that reform in Arab politics must Justice Interrupted: Arabs’ Response to Occupation 4 begin with respect for national sovereignty. It also reminds us that constitutional- Conclusion: The Use of Historical Precedent ism and the desire to participate in the community of international law are enduring in U.S. Policy 7 values in Arab politics. ABOUT THE INSTITUTE 5IF'BMMBDZPG"OBMPHZ8PSME8BS**BT"NFSJDBOTi(PPE8BSw The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan institution established and funded by During the last half-century, the most popular analogy Americans have used to justify Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve war has been World War II. For Americans, it was a just war against an evil enemy that violent conflicts, promote post-conflict peacebuilding, concluded honorably with the benevolent postwar reconstruction of Japan and Ger- and increase conflict management tools, capacity, and many. In efforts to repeat the “Good War,” policymakers made analogies to World War intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by II to plan and justify wars in Korea and Vietnam, even though these comparisons were 2 empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, not appropriate. as well as by its direct involvement in conflict zones Regarding Iraq, President George W. Bush first deployed an analogy to World War II in around the globe. his January 29, 2002, State of the Union address. He and his speechwriters deliberately used the term “axis of evil” when describing the link between terrorism and nuclear BOARD OF DIRECTORS weapons in order to invoke the Axis powers.3 In March 2003, on the eve of the Iraq J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, invasion, Bush made the analogy even more explicit. He compared Saddam Hussein to %$t(FPSHF&.PPTF(Vice Chairman), Adjunct Professor Hitler and warned against appeasing him: “In this century, when evil men plot chemical, of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, biological and nuclear terror, a policy of appeasement could bring destruction of a kind %$t"OOF)$BIO, Former Scholar in Residence, American never before seen on this earth.”4 6OJWFSTJUZ 8BTIJOHUPO %$t$IFTUFS"$SPDLFS, James R. Bush was not the first to use dramatic language to garner public support. Since the Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign time of Woodrow Wilson, argues political scientist Jeffrey Tulis, presidents have used 4FSWJDF (FPSHFUPXO6OJWFSTJUZ 8BTIJOHUPO %$t*LSBN6 rhetoric to “go over the heads” of Congress and circumvent normal channels of delibera- ,IBO, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, tive policymaking. In the hands of the press, Tulis argues, presidential rhetoric often /FWt,FSSZ,FOOFEZ )VNBO3JHIUT"DUJWJTUt4UFQIFO% takes on a life of its own.5 In Bush’s case, his World War II analogy not only precluded ,SBTOFS Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations consideration of policy alternatives inside his administration but also stoked a media BU4UBOGPSE6OJWFSTJUZt,BUIMFFO.BSUJOF[, Executive Director, frenzy that extended the analogy to other Middle East policy questions. Thomas Fried- 8PSME*OTUJUVUFPO%JTBCJMJUZt+FSFNZ"3BCLJO, Professor of man of the New York Times provided a leading example when he called the terrorist -BX (FPSHF.BTPO6OJWFSTJUZ "SMJOHUPO 7Bt+VEZ7BO3FTU, attacks of September 11, 2001, “the Pearl Harbor of World War III,”6 and the Iraq inva- Executive Vice President, International Republican Institute, sion “the most important liberal, revolutionary U.S. democracy-building project since 8BTIJOHUPO %$t/BODZ;JSLJO, Executive Vice President, the Marshall Plan.”7 For Friedman and others, the analogy also supported comparisons of Leadership Conference on Civil Rights Muslim activists to Nazis, thus justifying a militant policy in the Islamic world. Historians, meanwhile, strongly criticized analogizing World War II to Iraq. John MEMBERS EX OFFICIO Dower, the premier scholar of postwar Japan’s reconstruction, correctly predicted before 3PCFSU.(BUFT %FQBSUNFOUPG%FGFOTFt)JMMBSZ3PEIBN the invasion that Iraq lacked critical elements that had enabled successful nation build- $MJOUPO 4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUFt3JDIBSE)4PMPNPO, President, ing in Germany and Japan.8 But at a time when expansive analogies to the Good War 6OJUFE4UBUFT*OTUJUVUFPG1FBDF OPOWPUJOH t'SBODFT$ captivated the public and media, he was ignored. 8JMTPO, Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps; President, Indeed, in hindsight, the analogy is weak at best. Saddam was no Hitler: he com- National Defense University manded neither a powerful army nor a loyal party machine and had no weapons of mass destruction. While dismantling the Nazi Party and its membership was an important part of postwar political reconstruction in Germany, in Iraq, following the same policy by purging the Baath Party and its members produced an institutional vacuum that nearly ended hopes of establishing democratic rule of law. Six years after the inva- sion, the press and the new administration have finally abandoned the analogy to The views expressed in this report do not necessarily World War II.9 reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, But finding a better analogy is not easy. Valid comparisons between circumstances in which does not advocate specific policy positions. different times and places are extremely difficult to identify and justify, as any political To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, scientist can attest. e-mail: [email protected] Historical precedent, however, is less prone to error. It is drawn directly from people’s historical experience and examines the past of a particular place where people today continue to experience the preceding event’s legacy through institutions, memory, and culture. As a result, precedent is a more certain indicator of how people of a particular region might respond to U.S. policy. Today, in 2009, the new administration could use historical precedent to set Middle East policy on a new track. The most powerful precedent, in the eyes of Iraqis and their Arab neighbors, is World War I, not World War II. At that time, Arabs rallied to President Woodrow Wilson’s promises of liberation and self-determination. After the war, Arabs convened a constitutional congress in a bid to build their own state upon the cinders 2 of the Ottoman Empire. Their representative at the Paris Peace Conference, where they hoped to find support for