ANATOMY OF THE ORANGE CRUSH: TEN YEARS IN THE MAKING

Brad Lavigne

It has been called an overnight success a decade in the making. The historical political realignment of federal politics by Jack Layton and the New Democratic Party was in fact an ambitious and methodical strategy to modernize Canada’s social democratic party into a viable contender for government. Brad Lavigne, the 2011 campaign manager, NDP senior strategist and longtime Jack Layton adviser, provides an insider’s account of the anatomy of the Orange Crush.

Un succès instantané, certes, mais précédé d’une décennie de préparation. C’est ainsi qu’on a qualifié l’exploit de Jack Layton et du NPD, qui ont opéré un réalignement historique de la vie politique canadienne grâce à leur stratégie de modernisation ambitieuse et méthodique en vue de faire du parti social-démocrate un aspirant crédible à la direction du pays. Directeur de la campagne 2011, stratège en chef du NPD et longtemps conseiller de Jack Layton, Brad Lavigne décortique les tenants et aboutissants de la « vague orange ».

t only took a few minutes. I stepped out of the makeshift It was an outcome that very few outside Jack Layton’s cir- war room in our election-night operations at the cle believed was possible and one that even fewer predicted. I Intercontinental Hotel in downtown Toronto to make a few short calls to congratulate newly elected New Democratic o how did it happen? Was it an accident? Was Jack Party (NDP) Members of Parliament from Atlantic Canada. S Layton — and the 2011 NDP campaign — simply the By the time I returned from the adjoining room, the benefactor of lacklustre performances from the Liberals and team had taped a bunch of flip-chart paper to the walls with the Bloc Québécois? Or was it something more? the names of dozens and dozens of Quebec ridings scribbled To understand how the “Orange Crush” on May 2, on them. We knew what the opinion polls showed and 2011, came to be, you have to go back to the beginning — what it felt like from street level, but with no ground game to the dining room table at Jack and his wife Olivia’s in the province, we just didn’t know if the flood of seats we Toronto home in the spring of 2002. knew was possible would actually materialize. That’s where a group would meet to map out the game Just to be sure, I asked if the names on the wall repre- plan to win the NDP leadership, professionalize the opera- sented ridings under legal disputes. “No. These are the rid- tions of the party and expand its support to create a viable ings we’ve won — so far,” a colleague said. “Holy shit,” I alternative to form government. The effort would affection- said. “This thing is real.” ately become known as “the project” by those of us around It was the beginning of a long and historic night, with the table. breakthroughs from St. John’s to Newton, BC. Jack would often quote Tommy Douglas, “dream no lit- In the GTA, the Greater Toronto Area, we had broken tle dreams.” Considering the state of the party 10 years ago, through with new seats in both the west and east ends, for the project was, indeed, no little dream. a total of nine Toronto-area seats — our best ever in In the spring of 2002, the NDP was the fourth party in Canada’s largest city. the House of Commons. In its most recent election, the And in Quebec, we had broken through with over 40 party had won 13 seats with 8.5 percent of the vote, about percent of the vote and 59 seats. We won the former seats of half of the NDP’s historical average. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Louis St-Laurent, Brian Mulroney, Jean The years leading up to these disappointing results were Chrétien and Paul Martin. We beat Bloc Québécois leader even bleaker. In the 1993 election, the party under the lead- Gilles Duceppe in Laurier-St.Marie by 5,400 votes. ership of Audrey McLaughlin received 6 percent of the vote

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and nine seats. The NDP lost party sta- It was an optimistic and hopeful Paul Martin had just been tus in the House of Commons. campaign, which included making crowned as the leader of the Liberal And when Alexa McDonough, the case to build in Quebec. Jack Party in November 2003. Some com- who replaced McLaughlin in 1995, for- would say we couldn’t call ourselves a mentators looked at his organiza- mally announced her resignation as truly national party if Quebec wasn’t tional and financial strength and his leader on June 4, 2002, the ground a part of it. The campaign played to personal popularity, and mused didn’t feel much more fertile for New the aspirations of New Democrats, of openly that he would wipe the NDP Democrats, with a caucus of only 14. what we could be. and its new leader right off the map. The party faced significant organi- With a one-member-one-vote Then, in December 2003, the zational and financial challenges. The leadership contest, the strategy to win Canadian Alliance and the Progres- cramped federal office on Albert Street was simple: sell a lot of memberships sive Conservative Party voted to merge, ending the split in And in Quebec, we had broken through with over 40 percent the small-c conservative of the vote and 59 seats. We won the former seats of Sir vote and bringing together greater organizational and Wilfrid Laurier, Louis St-Laurent, Brian Mulroney, Jean Chrétien financial capacities. and Paul Martin. We beat Bloc Québécois leader Gilles A month later, a new Duceppe in Laurier-St. Marie by 5,400 votes. law came into effect that essentially banned all cor- had a dedicated, but small team, and before the cut-off. For that, we turned porate and union financing of politi- with annual revenue of less than $3 to the talented network of people with cal parties. Since 1961, we had million, the federal party was reliant whom Jack and Olivia worked in counted on labour for about a quarter on the better-resourced and better- Toronto. of our campaign financing and we organized provincial sections of the Beyond their home base, we relied on unions to guarantee our party to undertake its federal cam- tapped his numerous contacts from his campaign loans. As of January 1, paigning. time as president of the Federation of 2004, this was no more, and in the Within the grassroots of the party, Canadian Municipalities, as well as lead-up to the June campaign we there was a full-blown existential crisis former activists from the student and were still retooling our fundraising underway. At the policy convention in environmental movements. These efforts. the fall of 2001, 40 percent of the del- organizers were talented and knew Despite these challenges, we egates voted to disband the party in how to win, but many getting focused on the immediate task at favour of an ill-defined, far left-wing involved in the federal NDP for the hand: raise Jack’s profile and get the party. first time. NDP in the game. Jack toured tireless- The bottom line? By 2002, the With this superior organizational ly, including in Quebec. Our media party was in deep trouble. The leader- clout, Jack was elected party leader on and communications strategies were ship race to replace Alexa was a make- the first ballot on January 25, 2003. sharper and punchier. or-break opportunity to get the party Step one of the project was complete. Our goal was to get the party to 20 on a fundamentally different path. Jack was now leader of a broke percent in popular support by the time Jack Layton, the media-savvy city party, dead last in the polls and writ- the election was called. We hit our tar- councillor from Toronto, personified ten off by the Parliamentary Press get one month before the election in a what the party needed at the time. Gallery. We knew that the rest of the May Compas poll. We were heading He was urban, bilingual and experi- project would not come about into the campaign with twice the sup- enced in both elections and gover- overnight. If we were to be success- port we had in 2000. nance as a long-standing elected ful, we would have to work hard, Encouraging poll numbers suggest- member of Canada’s largest munici- learn from our past mistakes and ed that we could win in ridings all over pal government. never lose focus. the country. We spread our limited Layton’s leadership campaign We would have to play the long resources and our hopes accordingly. offered a simple and concise message: game. On June 28, 2004, the NDP more members, more votes and more received 2.1 million votes and nearly seats would mean more clout in n addition to internal obstacles, we doubled its overall share of the nation- Parliament to build the Canada we want. I were facing significant external al vote with 16 percent. However, Being the conscience of the nation and challenges heading into the 2004 cam- despite this strong growth in votes, the hoping other parties in power would paign. By then, I had moved from party gained only 5 seats for a total of adopt our policies wasn’t good enough. Toronto to serve as director of commu- 19. Olivia lost her battle against a Jack wanted the levers of power. nications for the NDP. Liberal incumbent in Toronto.

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e learned a lot from that cam- we thought we had a run a big-league Gomery Commission’s probe of the W paign. campaign. The results were a hard sponsorship scandal, had already In addition to spreading too thinly kick to the groin. And it was exactly promised an election in early 2006, so our limited ground resources, our what we needed. We made a lot of our team was in place. platform was too unfocused and too mistakes and we committed to learn Brian Topp, who was the director of costly. We had eight commitments and from each of them. the war room in the 2004 campaign, each had subpoints. Jack would later But as we debriefed from the 2004 was appointed campaign director and admit he couldn’t remember the points campaign, we also identified three rea- Sue Milling as deputy director. Virtually off the top of his head. The campaign, sons to be optimistic for the next one. all of the players were in place again run by committee, was focused more In addition to increasing our vote and this would be our second federal on satisfying internal interests than count by a million, we came in second campaign together in a year and a half. appealing to voters. in 51 ridings. We also lost 10 seats by And our lack of preparation for fewer than 1,000 votes, giving us target ur mistakes from 2004 were fresh the last-minute appeal by the Liberal areas for growth in the next campaign. O in our minds and we were hungry Party, calling on all non-Conservative We also had an immediate oppor- to get a few more things right this time. voters, especially New Democrats, to tunity. For the first time since 1979, Under Topp’s leadership, some vote Liberal, proved to be brutal. Canada had a minority Parliament. And necessary changes were made to the Paul Martin stood in a parking lot while we did not have a clear balance of campaign, notably a clear and respect- rally in my hometown of Coquitlam, power, we did have an opportunity to ed chain of command within the BC, and told people that by voting steer the direction of Parliament. organization. He also placed a premi- NDP, you’d be helping to elect the If we initiated positive results in um on ensurring the leader stayed on Conservatives. This was not only des- Parliament, our MPs would not only script, our platform did not distract perate, but also untrue in many rid- be fulfilling their duties as parliamen- from the central message as it did in ings, especially in western Canada, tarians, but we would have something 2004, and the ground-game resources where it was a two-way fight between in the next campaign that very few would be stubbornly allocated to cam- us and the Conservatives. opposition parties ever have — a track paigns within close reach of winning. But enough voters listened to Mar- record of accomplishments. This last point would come to tin. And in ridings where the NDP was either leading Layton’s leadership campaign offered a simple and concise or in second place behind a message: more members, more votes, and more seats would Conservative, people aban- mean more clout in Parliament to build the Canada we want. doned the NDP and voted Being the conscience of the nation and hoping other parties for the third-place Liberal candidate, ensuring more in power would adopt our policies wasn’t good enough. Jack Conservatives got elected. wanted the levers of power. This was the latest incarnation of something that had When Parliament fell on November define our resource-allocation strategy confounded the NDP since before its 28, 2005, kick-starting a 55-day cam- with most ridings benefiting from the founding: appeals to get NDP support- paign, we had already made significant advertising, promotion materials and ers to vote Liberal in an effort to stop strides in branding the NDP as the party tour events (“big air”), with riding Conservatives improperly labelled as that gets results for families. Jack’s expe- assistance very prudently allotted “strategic voting.” rience at City Hall, where adversaries (“tight ground”). But even with these Around 3:00 a.m. on election strike deals to get things done, proved controllable variables addressed, we night, long after the speeches were vital to accomplish this task. still had the enormous task of tackling done, I remember watching the final But Jack not only redirected $4.6 the issue of strategic voting. results coming in from very tight races billion in corporate tax cuts in the If there was one question that I in BC. During the evening, we had as 2005 budget to invest in transit, social faced most often as director of com- many as 26 seats in which we had won housing, post-secondary education, munications for the 2004 and 2006 or were leading. Every few minutes, the environment and foreign aid, the election campaigns, it was this: How another NDP seat would move over to strategic move (dubbed by the media are you going to stop so-called strate- the Conservative column. I thought if as the first-ever “NDP budget”) also set gic voting? It was frustrating, compli- I shut the TV off maybe our slide up a nice contrast between the priori- cated and kept us up at night. We were would stop. It did — at 19. ties of the NDP and the Liberals. determined to find a way to beat it. Winning only 19 seats was devas- And we were ready. Martin and his We needed to attack the Liberals tating. Despite some rookie miscues, team, taking a beating over the hard to make it unpalatable for our

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supporters to switch to the Liberals in Milling, maintained its activities, as I During this time, our focus group the final days, as they did in 2004. joined Jack on the Hill to serve as his testing suggested that while Bloc and The sponsorship scandal was help- communications director and oversee Liberal voters in Quebec had reason to ful. This question of ethical governance the communications efforts of the like our party and our leader, they provided Jack and the NDP with an leader and the caucus. weren’t ready to give the New opportunity to fight back against That’s when we set our sights on Democrats a chance. When asked to strategic voting — by going on the Quebec. describe the NDP, one woman said the offence against the Liberals with a One of Jack’s major commitments party resembled an ant — always greater emphasis than ever before. during the 2003 leadership campaign working hard, plugging away doing But we couldn’t go too far. Here, was to invest in Quebec as part of our good work, but small and easily Topp and other campaign veterans rebuilding efforts. This plan was not stepped on. recalled the lesson from Ed Broadbent without controversy with some mem- Quebec voters told us they would in 1988, namely never predict the bers, who saw the party lose its consider voting for us only if we met demise of the Liberals. In attempting footholds in the 1990s in many of our two conditions: shed your reputation to strike the right balance, Topp sug- areas of traditional strength, namely as Les centralisateurs and prove we gested a successful message used by BC, Saskatchewan and Ontario. could attract high-calibre candidates Liberal leader Ross Thatcher to PC vot- Many activists argued we needed who could win. ers in the 1964 Saskatchewan election to focus our limited resources in these to defeat CCF Premier Woodrow areas rather than in a province where e took major steps in address- Lloyd: “Lend us your vote.” we barely registered. But Jack and oth- W ing these two challenges in The offer was not marriage, but a ers, including myself, argued that September 2006, when we made a date. If you weren’t satisfied, strategic choice to hold our you could go back to the Party faithful and the next tier of party’s policy convention in Liberals in the next election NDP supporters would look to us Quebec City. The party adopted campaign. once they saw we were growing an official policy of asymmetri- Despite the snickers from cal federalism and other some in the Parliamentary Press into a national party with a strong Quebec-friendly policies con- Gallery, the message struck the Quebec presence. And unlike other tained in the Sherbrooke right chord with Liberal voters places in Canada, Quebec had a Declaration. Jack also success- and penetrated in enough places. voting culture where it could fully courted former Quebec We were beginning to reverse the Liberal cabinet minister Tom effect of strategic voting, and it collectively decide to move in one Mulcair to deliver a rousing got thousands of former Liberal direction — and make big change keynote speech. voters into the habit of voting happen. During this building peri- New Democrat. od in Quebec, critics said that In the 2006 election, the NDP picked organizing in Quebec was an integral we would never win in the province, up an additional 400,000 votes for a total part of rebuilding in the heartlands. and certainly not in a riding like of 2.5 million. And while the percentage Party faithful and the next tier of Outremont, where on September 17, of the popular vote only increased from NDP supporters would look to us once 2007, Tom captured the riding in a by- 16 to 17.5 percent, we won 29 seats, up they saw we were growing into a election with 48 percent of the vote. from 19. Due to the “tight ground” strat- national party with a strong Quebec Jack showed Quebecers the NDP could egy, we won the seats that we had lost by presence. And unlike other places in attract credible candidates — and win. less than 1,000 votes in 2004. We fin- Canada, Quebec had a voting culture The project seemed to be on sure ished in second place in 53 seats. where it could collectively decide to footing and progress was being made In many respects, the 2006 cam- move in one direction — and make big modernizing the Party’s operations. paign was our mulligan, our do-over. change happen. But we hadn’t cracked in the polls and The task before us was monumental. we still had only 30 seats. We had a iven the state of the Liberal Party In the 2000 election, we received long way to go. G following its loss in 2006, Jack 1.8 percent of the Quebec vote. In As we prepared for the coming elec- took advantage of the wide berth to 2004, the party received 4.6 percent tion, the next decisions about how best attack and oppose the Harper minority and 7.5 percent in 2006. We saw to keep the forward momentum would government without the threat of steady growth with some higher- be difficult. After Jack’s five years as sending the country back to the polls. profile candidates running in these leader and two campaigns under his Meanwhile, the campaign team, later campaigns, but we were far from belt, we decided it was time for him to under the leadership of Topp and breaking through. be a little less timid and more audacious.

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NDP Photo Jack Layton in a relaxed moment with his campaign director, Brad Lavigne, who would become his principal secretary in the Opposition Leader’s office. While the NDP’s 2011 breakthrough may have occurred in one election night, Lavigne writes the Orange Crush was ten years in the making.

Jack was used to governing during fourth party with polls showing sup- By 2008, the party’s fundraising his long tenure at Toronto’s City Hall. port in the teens? But if people were capacities had improved dramatically Brian Topp came from the Premier’s ever going to see Jack as a potential under the leadership of the party’s Office in Saskatchewan, and I got my prime minister, we had better get director of development, Drew start in electoral politics in the BC gov- around to pitching that idea as part of Anderson. And while we were still far ernment, serving as adviser to the pre- a leader-centred tour and Jack-focused behind the Conservatives, we were mier, the minister of advanced messaging. more than competitive with the education and the minister of finance. On the first day of the 2008 cam- Liberal Party’s fundraising. The idea that we were in this to govern paign, Jack stood on the Quebec banks Like the internal debate over Jack’s was natural to us. of the Ottawa River with Parliament explicit pitch to become prime minis- But there were very few issues that Hill as the backdrop and kicked it off ter, the campaign team laboured over were as hotly debated by members of with the statement “Today, the Prime the decision to spend $18 million on the party and caucus. They’d say: Minister has quit his job. And I intend the campaign. “Don’t say you’re running for prime to apply for it.” The stakes were high and we took minister, it’s not credible.” Jack would Jack then got on his campaign the future financial viability of the respond: “I’m not in this just to raise plane and went straight to Stephen party very seriously. If we borrowed good points, I’m in this to win.” Harper’s riding, marking the beginning significantly and failed to do well in of a campaign in which the NDP, for the campaign, we risked putting the e understood the risk in saying the first time ever, would spend the financial future of the party in peril. W something that could be dis- legal maximum and match the But I thought, “If not now, then missed outright: Jack making a pitch Conservatives and Liberals dollar-for- when?” We had 30 seats, including in to be prime minister as leader of the dollar. Quebec. We also had a popular leader

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and a united party that was ready for were also funding a targeted growth Alberta and Quebec, and in rural, urban the next campaign. We were also up plan with a very specific list of beach- and ethnic communities. Our vote and against a very vulnerable Liberal leader head seats with ground-game resources caucus were now national. and the economy was headed for a and leader’s tour visits. We had also built up Jack’s profile downturn, with people increasingly This included ridings like St. and popularity, and transformed the worried about issues on which we had John’s East, Edmonton Strathcona party brand and identity to one that credibility. We decided to go for it. and Welland. In Quebec, it meant five was leader-focused. We also had to identify whom we trips to Montreal and other visits to Internally, the party had the were actually running against. This was places like Gatineau, where we had means to match the Conservatives and always a challenge for New Democrats. hopes for a handful of ridings with Liberals on financing and in other tac- tical areas. We also had a I thought, “If not now, then when?” We had 30 seats, including core campaign team that in Quebec. We also had a popular leader and a united party had now worked together that was ready for the next campaign. We were also up against in three election campaigns a very vulnerable Liberal leader and the economy was headed in just five years. In the election post- for a downturn, with people increasingly worried about issues mortem, the campaign on which we had credibility. We decided to go for it. team assessed virtually every aspect of what needed In the West, we compete against strong candidates like Françoise to be done if we were to end the incre- Conservatives and battle Liberals in Boivin in Gatineau and Anne Lagacé mental gains and make the break- Ontario and Atlantic Canada. And with Dowson in Westmount-Ville Marie in through. We saw the path through a foothold in Quebec with Mulcair, we Montreal. Those wins would then be Quebec, understanding a turn in the identified a few Bloc Québécois and used as toeholds to expand in forth- province would be noticed beyond its Liberal seats to target. coming campaigns. borders, especially among progressive We came under sharp criticism in In the end, we picked up 7 seats for voters in Ontario and BC. 2004 and 2006 for going after the a total of 37. But our percentage of the To get there, we needed a better Liberals harder than Stephen Harper. popular vote increased by only 0.7 per- message, connecting with a bigger We did so for strategic reasons. We cent and we actually drew 75,000 fewer audience, and delivered by a stronger needed to differentiate ourselves from votes than our 2006 campaign. campaign machine. Martin’s Liberals and push back We were very disappointed with against strategic voting. the results. We ran a technically excel- e started with the machinery of lent campaign and spent $18 million, W the party, to which I had y 2008, we were in a much different but still garnered only 18.2 percent of returned following the 2008 campaign B place. Liberal Leader Stéphane Dion the vote, won 37 seats and placed to serve as national director and cam- had been badly hurt by his lacklustre fourth. paign director. The frequency of feder- performance, his organizational incom- al campaigns under successive petence and the successful charge by the he incremental path that we were minority Parliaments created the Conservatives that he was “not a leader.” T on had served us well. But it opportunity for swift and deep If we were running to replace Harper as would no longer be good enough to changes to the federal party’s organiza- prime minister, then he should be our invest millions of dollars to secure tional capacity, and we took it. focus. After all, it’s his job we want. another 10 or so seats. Our running We overhauled the party’s organi- We decided to ignore the Liberal game had got us up the field, but if we zation department under the leader- Leader as much as possible. But we were to get into the end zone it was ship of Nathan Rotman, dismantling would also take opportunities to distin- time we started throwing the ball. an archaic structure that tied federal guish Layton from the other non-Harper Although we weren’t where we organizing to the structures — and pri- leaders. We used “Strong Leader” as our wanted to be, we had made important orities — of the provincial parties. This branding statement to describe Layton gains after three elections under Jack’s allowed us to hire organizers in the in direct contrast to Dion. leadership. regions dedicated exclusively to the We also narrowed the scope of our We had reassembled our traditional federal effort. The new structure also platform to go along with our tighter vote that we had lost throughout the gave us unlimited and unfettered campaign message. The way we allo- 1990s and could now count on 18 per- access to the membership, allowing for cated our resources was equally cent as our “base.” We had the second- more aggressive fundraising. focused. We invested to ensure the largest caucus in our party’s history We also fixed the glaring inade- reelection of our incumbents, but we with beachheads in all regions, notably quacies with our candidate selection

98 OPTIONS POLITIQUES JUIN-JUILLET 2012 Anatomy of the Orange Crush: Ten years in the making and vetting process. At the very first jobs and pension crisis, and life was we would oppose. This would seem opportunity after the 2008 campaign, becoming less and less affordable. reasonable. Jack took direct action to ensure that The next election was an opportu- Although we were ready to go, Jack’s all applicants who sought to become nity to seize on this sentiment. At the health also played a role in the decision. nominees were first screened and then heart of what was wrong with Ottawa After battling prostate cancer and recov- approved by party headquarters. In the were the very players who were ering from hip surgery with the help of end, more than two dozen applicants responsible for the deterioration. In crutches, Jack had two additional people were rejected. other words, the status quo was to whom he was going to listen: his doc- In the fall of 2010, we turned to responsible for the dysfunction. tors and Olivia. Both gave him the green messaging. That work began with an This positioning allowed us to light to run an election campaign if nec- aggressive research strategy to identi- answer the question of who we were essary. And after seeing a budget that fy the next tier of New Democrat running against in the campaign. If we didn’t come close to meeting the NDP’s voter. For the first time ever, the over- could successfully make the case that asks, Jack and the caucus took the first whelming majority of our research the Conservatives, the Liberals and the opportunity to vote nonconfidence (a dollars went to speaking to people Bloc were the reason Ottawa was bro- contempt-of-Parliament motion) in the who had never voted New Democrat ken, we could paint them as the prob- Harper government. in their life. lem and us as the solution. We put a clear question to And with Jack’s track record of he fact that the budget did not Viewpoints Research, our polling firm: reaching across the aisle to get T meet the needs we set out also If we have 18 percent of the vote now, results — the 2005 “NDP Budget,” played into our campaign message. who are the ones to get us to 25 to 30 the 2008 coalition negotiations with We boiled it down to a tight message percent? We wanted to find out as the Liberals and the 2009 agreement that would serve as our ballot ques- much as possible about them. What with the Conservatives to extend tion, short enough to fit into a 140- things did they share in common with Employment Insurance — there was character tweet (or less): Ottawa’s our re-assembled base? What things no one else as credible on the issue broken. Fix it. This allowed us to chan- were different? of trying to make Ottawa work. nel frustration and anger at Ottawa for We found that our next tier of But there were, of course, limits to whatever was on people’s mind. We voter was slightly older and slightly this approach. Unlike other leaders, could sympathize with their plight, better off financially than our base; Jack was not a push-over, and it took at point to a broken Ottawa and encour- lived in medium-sized cities; were as likely to be We overhauled the party’s organization department under the male as female; and were leadership of Nathan Rotman, dismantling an archaic structure members of the sandwich generation concerned about that tied federal organizing to the structures — and priorities their children’s future and — of the provincial parties. This allowed us to hire organizers their aging parents. in the regions dedicated exclusively to the federal effort. This next tier of NDP voter shared three key things in com- least two parties to make Parliament age them to use their vote for the NDP mon with our base: they had a deep work. When it came to the 2011 budg- as a step to fix it. mistrust of Harper; they did not like et, in the months leading up to it, we This also informed the way we Michael Ignatieff, even though they laid out realistic “asks” that we pro- crafted our platform into micro-target- were primarily Liberals; and they liked moted extensively to ensure the ed and easy-to-understand policies. Jack. Conservatives, the media and the pub- The Conservatives were the masters of More than anything, these folks lic knew where our bottom line was. the simple, achievable promise, so we were looking for someone in Ottawa At the same time, we made it clear wanted to contrast, for example, their they could trust. With Jack scoring that we were organizationally ready for job creation plan (unconditional cor- well personally, the common denomi- an election. That way, our decision as porate tax cuts for big business) with nators of leadership and trust fit in to whether to support or oppose the our own better plan (directed tax relief well with our leader-focused branding budget was based not on fear of going or a small-business tax cut). of the party. into an election, but on the merits of This approach to the platform They also saw Parliament, mired the budget. And because we had clear- inoculated us against the tag of being in partisan sniping, as a distant and ly defined asks, our decision would be the party of multibillion-dollar initia- dysfunctional entity that wasn’t get- easily justifiable to the voters: if the tives. These achievable, fiscally pru- ting things done for them, even as NDP asks were in the budget, we dent promises, meaningful in the daily health care was suffering, there was a would support, but if they were not, lives of people, would also make for

POLICY OPTIONS 99 JUNE-JULY 2012 Brad Lavigne

better policy announcements on the campaign trail. First, though, we had to make sure the media were going to come on our tour, a significant portion of which was fully scripted by the time the writ was dropped. After receiving signals from finan- cially strapped networks and news out- lets that the NDP campaign would be the first casualty in election coverage, we dropped the price to join the leader’s tour. We also went on a full charm offensive. Campaign spokesperson Kathleen Monk and I walked the news bureaus through our whole strategy and explained why they needed to be on our tour: an NDP breakthrough would transform Canadian electoral politics. While very few reporters believed our campaign game plan, our efforts were partially successful: most outlets committed to the first and last weeks. It was a start. The first week of the campaign didn’t go well, despite a carefully planned tour with a thematic as well a geographical flow with a mixture of policy announcements and rallies. The events of the day, scripted for tel- evision with adequate filing time, were to centre on “the shot of the day,” which usually involved Jack interacting with people.

In our first days, the crowds were NDP Photo small and the energy level was low. Jack Layton at the NDP convention in June 2011. Quebecers in particular had warmed to The media were very skeptical of Jack’s the man with the cane and his gallant campaign. ability to run a full campaign and were looking to report any evidence to vali- while Ignatieff and the Liberals were On the eve of debate week, sched- date their assertion. Any inadequacies gaining momentum. It felt as though uled during the third week of the cam- of our tour defined our coverage. his “red door vs. blue door” pitch in the paign, we released our platform. In past During the first three campaigns, opening days of the campaign might campaigns, NDP platforms never really Jack was an energetic and nimble cam- consolidate the non-Conservative vote. helped the campaign, but they’ve cer- paigner. At the beginning of his fourth Both the leader and the senior cam- tainly hurt. We weren’t going to let campaign in 2011, he was still on paign team had been here before and that happen again. We called it “practi- crutches following recent hip surgery there was no reason to get distracted. In cal first steps” and highlighted prudent and he couldn’t keep the hours of the the campaign headquarters, we had a steps to be taken in key areas in the previous campaigns. We wanted to strictly enforced “no drama” rule. first 100 days of taking office. take it slow. The entire campaign, after We began injecting more creativi- Our platform strategy worked. The all, was constructed around him, so we ty and money into the event planning media coverage was either straight up couldn’t risk any injury. while Jack’s health became more sure- or outright positive. With the first It was a rough week. In the Nanos footed. He dropped the crutches for debate only two days away, the timing daily tracking poll at the start of the sec- the cane, and his mobility and energy served us well. Just before the debates, ond week, we were down to 13 percent, levels improved. our downward spiral had reversed and

100 OPTIONS POLITIQUES JUIN-JUILLET 2012 Anatomy of the Orange Crush: Ten years in the making for the first time in the campaign, Jack our campaign in Quebec. The message Liberals in the Nanos tracking poll, as surpassed Ignatieff in the Nanos in these ads worked well with both non-Conservative support broke in Leadership Index. nationalists, who had some contempt our favour. Two days before election This was a positive development. for Ottawa, and federalists, who want- day, the NDP tied the Conservatives But we also knew that if we were going ed more out of Ottawa. We also invest- for first place in the Nanos overnights. to make a breakthrough on May 2, the ed heavily in our ad buy, spending On election night, we won 103 leaders’ debates needed to be a game- over $3 million in Quebec alone, triple seats and came in second in another changer. the amount we spent in 2008. 121 ridings. We got our deposit back in Brian Topp was tasked with leading The extent to which our Quebec all but 2 ridings, by far the highest per- debate preparation. Past debate preps message was resonating became plainly centage of all parties. with Jack were exercises in elaborate obvious at our Montreal rally, held in memorization and complicated policy the Olympia Theatre in the heart of few days after Tom Mulcair was explanations. But recognizing that this Gilles Duceppe’s riding on Easter A elected leader, I had a meeting didn’t work, Topp ditched this format for Saturday, April 23. The energy at the with him in Centre Block. Ten years a more simple approach where Jack and event was electrifying, and the pictures earlier, I had been sitting around Jack the campaign team talked out the overall from the event showed what the polls and Olivia’s dining room table, help- goals and objectives for the debates, then said: the NDP had risen into first place ing to map out the project. A decade got them wired into Jack’s DNA. in Quebec ahead of the Bloc Québécois. later, here we were, sitting in the Office We also studied the debate format We needed to solidify this post- of the Leader of the Official carefully and recognized that we need- Easter weekend momentum with a Opposition, just one floor up from the ed to land our punches in the first 60 strong end-game advertising blitz to Prime Minister’s Office. minutes, anticipating many Canadians reinforce the campaign’s positive and Of all the great things we had been would tune in only for the first part motivating message, and blunt any able to change within the party, we and recognizing reporters would begin possibility of reverse momentum or chatted about the most important crafting their stories by then. strategic voting. accomplishment. For those in the party We practised the delivery of care- The French ad during the last two who didn’t think we could win or did- fully crafted clips. Think, “You’ve weeks of the campaign profiled a frus- n’t want to win, we created a culture of become everything you used to fight trated Bloc voter who was voting for winning. We no longer debate whether against” (to Harper) and “You know, change with the NDP. The ad featured we — or our ideas — are worthy. most Canadians, if they don’t show up the tag line “Travaillons ensemble” and Despite the cynicism and pes- for work, they don’t get a promotion” featured both Jack and Tom. simism that chokes the culture in (to Ignatieff). The English ad featured only Ottawa, Jack was able to defy and con- Jack received very favourable Layton and started with the line found the critics and connect with reviews in the English-language “People will try and tell you that you people and convince them that work- debate. Two days later was the French- have no choice but to vote for more of ing together was worth it to build a language debate, and our one chance the same. But you do have a choice” better Canada. He changed the politi- to make our pitch to all of Quebec. (eviscerating the red door/blue door cal culture, not only for our party, but For many months leading up to the Liberal frame). After listing Jack’s easy- also for our country. 2011 election, we knew the New to-remember family-friendly priorities, You can see it the news coverage Democrats were the second choice the closing lines packed an emotional today: nobody doubts that Tom is taking among most Bloc voters and that Jack punch intended to solidify and moti- on Harper to become Canada’s first New was seen as the best leader and best prime vate our vote: Democrat prime minister. And while ministerial candidate among Quebecers. Together we can do this (we were Jack’s journey was cut far too short, his Our research also told us that Bloc careful not to define what the “this” legacy to us is the belief that the project voters would not respond well if we was, to let the audience project). was not only worthwhile, but also achiev- attacked either the Bloc or their leader, You know where I stand (a reference able. Now it’s up to us to complete it. Gilles Duceppe. They were generally to Ignatieff). happy with how the Bloc was perform- You know I am a fighter (fighting Brad Lavigne was a close adviser to Jack ing, but Quebecers also knew something prostate cancer and recovering from Layton during the last decade of Layton’s had to change, so we focused on how the hip surgery). life, first as a key member of his NDP status quo in Ottawa, and by extension And I won’t stop until the job is done leadership team, then as his communica- the Bloc, was not capable of delivering (Unlike Ignatieff, Jack was in it for the tions director, later as campaign director the goals and aspirations of Quebecers. long haul). in the 2011 election, and finally as prin- The hamster spinning in his wheel On Monday, April 25, one week cipal secretary in the Office of the Leader and the barking dogs became icons of before election day, we passed the of the Opposition.

POLICY OPTIONS 101 JUNE-JULY 2012