DOCSLIB.ORG

The Battle of Savo Island

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Battle of Savo Island The Battle of Savo Island Author: 6th grader, 11 year old USS Chicago (in foregroud) mauvering off Tulagi on August 9 1942. 80-G-K-386 Naval History & Heritage Command. 1 The Guadalcanal Campaign, codenamed Operation Watchtower, was a military campaign during World War 2. The first American offensive of the war was triggered by reports in early 1942 that the Japanese were building an airfield on Guadalcanal island. If they succeeded, Japanese planes based on the airfield would be able to disrupt the supply line from America to Australia, so the allies decided to invade Guadalcanal. However, the first naval battle of the campaign, the Battle of Savo Island, was a stunning defeat for the allies. This was mainly due to the ignorance, incompedentnes, and unpreparedness of the allies. On August 7 1942, the invasion started, with American marines storming ashore on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanambogo. This was the first American offensive of the war. The invasion, codenamed Operation Watchtower, was supported by a fleet of more than 80 warships, including the carriers of Task Force 61, the Saratoga, Enterprise, Wasp, and Hornet. At the start of the campaign, Japanese strength on Guadalcanal was 2,800 personnel, with 2,200 being forced laborers; and on Tulagi were 900 Japanese naval troops. Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanambogo were assaulted by about 7,000 Allied personel, and Tulagi was quickly taken on August 8th, while the latter two were taken a day later. Guadalcanal was invaded by 11,000 marines, and the airfield was soon taken. The Japanese abandoned the facility but not the island. USS Saratoga at Pearl Harbor on June 6 1942. The commander of the allied 80-G-10121 courtesy of the Naval History & Heritage Command. expeditionary forces and TF 61, Vice Admiral Frank Fletcher, was concerned about the possibility of losing his carriers, which were low on fuel. Thus he ordered his carriers to withdraw from the Solomon Island area on the evening of August 8, despite heavy criticism that leaving the invasion transports without carrier support would have left them vulnerable to both surface and air attack. The Imperial Japanese Navy’s (IJN) responded by sending a force consisting of the heavy cruisers Chokai, Aoba, Furutaka, Kako, Kinugasa, the light cruisers Tenryū, Yūbari, and the destroyer Yūnagi, under the command of Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa. The IJN were experts in night fighting, and Mikawa hoped to strategically exploit this advantage by engaging the Americans on the night of August 8 to 9. The torpedoes they carried, type 93 “Long Lance,” were extremely deadly and far superior to any allied torpedo. It could bring a 1000 pound warhead as far as 40,400 meters. The Japanese force was sighted in the St George Channel on the morning of August 8 by the submarine USS S-38, which itself was too close to fire torpedoes. The reports were considered vague and were ignored. At 10:20 and 11:10 the force was again sighted by two Royal Australian Air Force Hudson aircraft. The first 2 Hudson erroneously reported the force as “three cruisers, three destroyers, and two seaplane tenders.” When they failed to receive acknowledgement of their report, the crew returned to base to report the sighting at 12:42. The second Hudson falsely reported the force as “two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and one unknown type.” The second Hudson’s radio also failed, but it finished its patrol and landed back at base at 15:00. For reasons unknown, these reports were only sent to the Allied fleet at 18:45 and 21:30. Mikawa had launched 4 floatplanes from his cruisers earlier and the floatplanes reported two groups of allied ships off Guadalcanal and Tulagi. Mikawa sailed down the New Georgia Sound USS Ralph Tabot circa August 7-8 escorting the Operation Watchtower invasion (also Known as “the Slot”) completely convoy. HMAS Australia is dimily visible in the far right. USMC 61603 courtesy of the Naval History & Heritage Command. undetected towards these two islands. Meanwhile British Vice Admiral Victor Crutchley decided to split the force under his command into three smaller forces to cover the allied transports unloading in the area between Guadalcanal and Florida island. A southern force consisting of the Australian cruisers HMAS Australia, HMAS Canberra, the American cruiser USS Chicago, and the destroyers USS Bagley, and USS Patterson. This group patrolled the area between Lunga Point and Savo island. A northern group was made up of the cruisers USS Vincennes, USS Astoria, USS Quincy, and destroyers USS Helm and USS Wilson. The Northern group conducted a box shaped patrol between the Tulagi anchorage and Savo island. The final eastern group consisting of the HMAS Hobart, USS San Juan, and two destroyers were to patrol between Florida island and Guadalcanal. Crutchly placed two radar equipped destroyers, USS Blue and USS Ralph Tabot west of Savo island. At this time the allied forces were not aware of the limitations and advantages of radar, which then was a new piece The Postioning of the allied forcecs before the Battle of Savo Island. U.S. Navy / Public Domain of technology. Captain Bode of the Chicago was under the false impression that his radar would give away his position. He only allowed one sweep from his fire control radar every half an hour. The last sweep before the engagement was too early to detect the Japanese forces. As will be shown later, this would turn out to be a crucial mistake. 3 In the evening, the commander of the allied amphibious forces, Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner called a conference to discuss the schedule of the invasion. Crutchley was to attend the conference and he left the southern group in HMAS Australia. This placed Captain Bode of the Chicago in command of the southern group. At the conference Turner, Crutchley, and Major General Alexander Archer Vandegrift who was the marine commander at Guadalcanal, discussed the report of the Japanese force that included the misidentified “seaplane tenders”. They decided that it wouldn’t be a threat because seaplane tenders were not supposed to engage in surface actions. As the Japanese force neared the Guadalcanal area, Mikawa ordered three floatplanes to be launched for a final reconnaissance sweep. Several allied ships sighted or heard the planes, but none of them thought it as a threat, and the planes were not reported to Tuner of Crutchley. The formation approached in a 3km column led by Chokai. Between 00:44 and 00:54 on August 9 Japanese lookouts spotted the Blue 9km away. Minutes later the Japanese force sighted the Ralph Tabot. A few minutes after that, Japanese lookouts spotted Bode’s southern force. At 1:38, the Japanese began launching salvos of torpedoes The Japanese cruiser Chokai firing her main battery during exercises in 1933. at the southern force. At the NH 73024 courtesy of the Naval History & Heritage Command. same time, lookouts on the Chokai spotted the allied northern force. At 1:43, the Patterson spotted a ship, most likely the Kinugasa, and sent a warning by signal lamp and radio. The Patterson went to full speed and began to fire star shells to illuminate the Japanese column. At the same time the Japanese float planes overhead dropped flares over Canberra and Chicago. Captain Frank Getting of the Canberra immediately ordered full speed ahead, a reversal of an initial turn to port, and for her guns to engage any visible targets. Less than a minute later Chokai and Furutaka opened fire at Canberra, joined a moment later by Aoba and Kako. Within 3 minutes, Canberra was savaged by a concentrated barrage of more than 30 Japanese shells, killing Captain Getting and other senior officers. At once Canberra’s boilers were destroyed, killing all power and light on the ship. During the engagement, the Chicago never fired its main battery. A torpedo from Kako struck the Chicago’s starboard side, a second torpedo hit but failed to explode, and a shell struck the mainmast. The secondary five inch batteries managed to hit the Tenryū, killing 23 men, but the darkness hid larger targets. Chicago continued to steam west for 40 minutes, but most importantly, Captain Bode neglected to inform Crutchley or any other allied ship in the area about Mikawa’s force. This act of incompedentnes would be a massive mistake. 4 Meanwhile, Mikawa’s force continued steaming, rounding Savo island on a counterclockwise course, heading towards the allied northern force. As the Japanese ships headed on their way, the Tenryū, Yūbari, and the Furutaka took a more westward course. This way, the northern force would be enveloped and attacked from two sides. While Mikawa’s ships were combating the southern force, the three cruisers of the northern force were tracing a box shaped patrol pattern 5 miles aside, with the Vincennes leading the Quincy, with the Astoria at the rear. The ships were cruising at a leisurely 10 knots and all three captains were asleep. The crews of the ships were at “condition II”, meaning that half the crew was on duty while the other half rested. Crewmen of all three cruisers all either heard the warning from Patterson or saw the flares from the engagement with the southern force, but it took time to go to general quarters from condition II. At 1:40, Japanese cruisers began firing torpedoes at the northern force. At 1:50, the Japanese force lit the Americans up with their searchlights and opened fire. The Astoria had gone to general quarters at 1:49, and at 1:52, the main battery director sighted the japanese cruisers and opened fire.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • SEMAPHORE SEA POWER CENTRE - AUSTRALIA ISSUE 4, 2012 SHIPS NAMED CANBERRA in the Annals of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), Two of 25 January 1929
    SEMAPHORE SEA POWER CENTRE - AUSTRALIA ISSUE 4, 2012 SHIPS NAMED CANBERRA In the annals of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), two of 25 January 1929. She then ‘showed the flag’ at Bunbury, its warships have proudly carried the name of Australia’s Albany, Adelaide and Melbourne, finally arriving in her capital city – Canberra. On 17 February 2011, a third ship, home port of Sydney on 16 February. In each port large the first of two new amphibious ships (LHD) built for the crowds gathered to see the RAN’s latest cruiser with its RAN, was launched in Spain. She is currently forecast to impressive main armament of eight, 8-inch guns. enter service in 2014 following her official commissioning as HMAS Canberra (III). With this in mind, it is timely to For the next ten years Canberra operated on the review the history of the Canberras, examine their Australian Station. Together with Australia she shared the contribution to Australian maritime security and highlight role of flagship of the RAN Squadron and the two formed the unique bonds forged between these ships and the the backbone of the RAN during the lean years of the citizens of our nation’s land-locked capital. Great Depression. At that time Canberra made only occasional overseas visits to the nearby Dutch East The name Canberra is derived from the language of the Indies, New Caledonia and Fiji. Ngunnawal people who traditionally occupied the district now recognised as the Australian Capital Territory (ACT). Following the outbreak of hostilities with Nazi Germany in The word means a ‘meeting place’ of either rivers, or of September 1939, Canberra began her wartime career tribes joining together to feast on Bogong moths in conducting patrols and escort duties in home waters mountains to the south of the region.
    [Show full text]
  • Learnpress Page :: PDF Output
    Ensign Worth Bagley BY DAVID WALBERT Ensign Worth Bagley, a native of Raleigh, was the only U.S. Navy officer killed in action during the Spanish-American War. Born in Raleigh in 1874, Bagley graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1895. After serving for two years on the USS Montgomery, Texas, and Maine, he was promoted to ensign on July 1, 1897. In November 1897 he was appointed inspector of the new torpedo boat Winslow. A month later he became the Winslow’s executive officer, or second in command, under Lieutenant J. B. Bernadou. In April 1898, the Winslow was mobilized with the rest of the Atlantic fleet for operations in Cuban waters. On the morning of May 11, the ship went with the Hudson and the Wilmington to force the entrance to the harbor of Cárdenas. She was fired upon by one of several Spanish gunboats, and a battle followed. The Winslow was soon disabled but was Figure 1. Worth Bagley in 1894. hauled out of range of the Spanish guns. Just as the battle ended, Ensign Bagley and four sailors were killed by a shell. Worth Bagley’s brother, David W. Bagley, served in World War I and World War II, retiring in 1947 as an Admiral. Copyright ©2009 LEARN NC. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 2.5 License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/. The original web-based version, with enhanced functionality and related resources, can be found at http://www.learnnc.org/lp/pages/4413.
    [Show full text]
  • African East-Asian Affairs the China Monitor
    AFRICAN EAST-ASIAN AFFAIRS THE CHINA MONITOR Issue 1 | August 2012 Richard L. Bernal China and Small-Island Developing States Seifudein Adem Imperial Ethiopia’s relations with Maoist China Gérard Van Bracht A survey of Zambian views on Chinese people and their involvement in Zambia Aravind Yelery China’s transition to innovation and IT market Issue 1 AFRICAN August 2012 EAST-ASIAN AFFAIRS Editorial Dear Reader, Welcome to the new look version of African East-Asian Affairs, The China Monitor. As you can see, we have moved towards a generic cover page. While this means that we ‘lose’ the nice cover images, it also illustrates our move towards a more professional and more academic journal-type publication that we aspire to provide with the African East- Asian Affairs. Ultimately, we aspire to develop the journal further to provide a platform for academic discussion on China, its global role and, more specifically, China-African relations from the African continent. China has become a major partner of many African states and therefore its internal developments and policies towards African countries is of major importance. One of the key developments in recent years was the mutual interaction and direct engagement between Africa and China; this is a precondition for mutual understanding. From an African perspective, one can be fascinated by China’s rise or be a critic of Chinese business and other engagement - whatever the perspective, China is and will remain relevant for the African continent. This relationship is not an exclusive engagement, neither for China nor for Africa. There are obviously numerous other interested parties who we also encourage to contribute to our publication.
    [Show full text]
  • Land and Maritime Connectivity Project: Road Component Initial
    Land and Maritime Connectivity Project (RRP SOL 53421-001) Initial Environmental Examination Project No. 53421-001 Status: Draft Date: August 2020 Solomon Islands: Land and Maritime Connectivity Project – Multitranche Financing Facility Road Component Prepared by Ministry of Infrastructure Development This initial environmental examination is a document of the borrower. The views expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the ADB’s Board of Directors, Management, or staff, and may be preliminary in nature. In preparing any country program or strategy, financing any project, or by making any designation of or reference to any particular territory or geographic area in this document, the Asian Development Bank does not intend to make any judgments as to the legal or other status of any territory or area. Solomon Islands: Land and Maritime Connectivity Project Road Component – Initial Environmental Examination Table of Contents Abbreviations iv Executive Summary v 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Background to the Project 1 1.2 Scope of the Environmental Assessment 5 2 Legal and Institutional Framework 6 2.1 Legal and Planning Framework 6 2.1.1 Country safeguard system 6 2.1.2 Other legislation supporting the CSS 7 2.1.3 Procedures for implementing the CSS 9 2.2 National Strategy and Plans 10 2.3 Safeguard Policy Statement 11 3 Description of the Subprojects 12 3.1 Location and Existing Conditions – SP-R1 12 3.1.1 Existing alignment 12 3.1.2 Identified issues and constraints 14 3.2 Location and Existing Conditions – SP-R5 15 3.2.1 Location
    [Show full text]
  • RAN Ships Lost
    CALL THE HANDS OCCASIONAL PAPER 6 Issue No. 6 March 2017 Royal Australian Navy Ships Honour Roll Given the 75th anniversary commemoration events taking place around Australia and overseas in 2017 to honour ships lost in the RAN’s darkest year, 1942 it is timely to reproduce the full list of Royal Australian Navy vessels lost since 1914. The table below was prepared by the Directorate of Strategic and Historical Studies in the RAN’s Sea Power Centre, Canberra lists 31 vessels lost along with a total of 1,736 lives. Vessel (* Denotes Date sunk Casualties Location Comments NAP/CPB ship taken up (Ships lost from trade. Only with ships appearing casualties on the Navy Lists highlighted) as commissioned vessels are included.) HMA Submarine 14-Sep-14 35 Vicinity of Disappeared following a patrol near AE1 Blanche Bay, Cape Gazelle, New Guinea. Thought New Guinea to have struck a coral reef near the mouth of Blanche Bay while submerged. HMA Submarine 30-Apr-15 0 Sea of Scuttled after action against Turkish AE2 Marmara, torpedo boat. All crew became POWs, Turkey four died in captivity. Wreck located in June 1998. HMAS Goorangai* 20-Nov-40 24 Port Phillip Collided with MV Duntroon. No Bay survivors. HMAS Waterhen 30-Jun-41 0 Off Sollum, Damaged by German aircraft 29 June Egypt 1941. Sank early the next morning. HMAS Sydney (II) 19-Nov-41 645 207 km from Sunk with all hands following action Steep Point against HSK Kormoran. Located 16- WA, Indian Mar-08. Ocean HMAS Parramatta 27-Nov-41 138 Approximately Sunk by German submarine.
    [Show full text]
  • Seaman 2Nd Class Charles Leon Billups, USN
    Seaman 2nd Class Charles Leon Billups, USN Charles Leon Billups was born in High Rolls, Otero County, NM in 1922, son of Edward and Minnie Billups. He had seven siblings. He was enrolled at NMAMC in the 1940/41 school year. He entered the Navy from California sometime in 1941 and on January 19, 1942 was assigned to the USS Astoria, a heavy cruiser. The Astoria subsequently took part in the Battle of the Coral Sea in early May of 1942. In June of 1942 the Astoria put to sea as part of Admiral Fletchers Task Force 17 aimed at denying the Japanese the island of Midway. During the subsequent Battle of Midway, Admiral Fletcher transferred his flag to the Astoria from the stricken carrier USS Yorktown. After repairs and outfitting in Pearl Harbor, the Astoria put to sea in early August 1942 as part of Task Group 62.3 to cover the Guadalcanal – Tulagi landings and operations. Early on the morning of August 7, 1942 the Astoria entered the waters between Guadalcanal and Florida Islands. On the night of 8/9 August, the Japanese brought a force of heavy cruisers south and intercepted the American ships in the First Battle of Savo Island. Caught by surprise in the nighttime attack, the US Navy lost three heavy cruisers, the Quincy, the Vincennes and the Astoria. During the battle the Astoria took 65 hits. Despite stubborn and courageous efforts the ship sank shortly after noon on August 9, 1942. Seaman 2nd Class Charles Leon Billups and 233 of his fellow shipmates lost their life that night.
    [Show full text]
  • A Historical Assessment of Amphibious Operations from 1941 to the Present
    CRM D0006297.A2/ Final July 2002 Charting the Pathway to OMFTS: A Historical Assessment of Amphibious Operations From 1941 to the Present Carter A. Malkasian 4825 Mark Center Drive • Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1850 Approved for distribution: July 2002 c.. Expedit'onaryyystems & Support Team Integrated Systems and Operations Division This document represents the best opinion of CNA at the time of issue. It does not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of the Navy. Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Specific authority: N0014-00-D-0700. For copies of this document call: CNA Document Control and Distribution Section at 703-824-2123. Copyright 0 2002 The CNA Corporation Contents Summary . 1 Introduction . 5 Methodology . 6 The U.S. Marine Corps’ new concept for forcible entry . 9 What is the purpose of amphibious warfare? . 15 Amphibious warfare and the strategic level of war . 15 Amphibious warfare and the operational level of war . 17 Historical changes in amphibious warfare . 19 Amphibious warfare in World War II . 19 The strategic environment . 19 Operational doctrine development and refinement . 21 World War II assault and area denial tactics. 26 Amphibious warfare during the Cold War . 28 Changes to the strategic context . 29 New operational approaches to amphibious warfare . 33 Cold war assault and area denial tactics . 35 Amphibious warfare, 1983–2002 . 42 Changes in the strategic, operational, and tactical context of warfare. 42 Post-cold war amphibious tactics . 44 Conclusion . 46 Key factors in the success of OMFTS. 49 Operational pause . 49 The causes of operational pause . 49 i Overcoming enemy resistance and the supply buildup.
    [Show full text]
  • GENERAL PHOTOGRAPHS File Subject Index
    GENERAL PHOTOGRAPHS File Subject Index A (General) Abeokuta: the Alake of Abram, Morris B.: see A (General) Abruzzi: Duke of Absher, Franklin Roosevelt: see A (General) Adams, C.E.: see A (General) Adams, Charles, Dr. D.F., C.E., Laura Franklin Delano, Gladys, Dorothy Adams, Fred: see A (General) Adams, Frederick B. and Mrs. (Eilen W. Delano) Adams, Frederick B., Jr. Adams, William Adult Education Program Advertisements, Sears: see A (General) Advertising: Exhibits re: bill (1944) against false advertising Advertising: Seagram Distilleries Corporation Agresta, Fred Jr.: see A (General) Agriculture Agriculture: Cotton Production: Mexican Cotton Pickers Agriculture: Department of (photos by) Agriculture: Department of: Weather Bureau Agriculture: Dutchess County Agriculture: Farm Training Program Agriculture: Guayule Cultivation Agriculture: Holmes Foundry Company- Farm Plan, 1933 Agriculture: Land Sale Agriculture: Pig Slaughter Agriculture: Soil Conservation Agriculture: Surplus Commodities (Consumers' Guide) Aircraft (2) Aircraft, 1907- 1914 (2) Aircraft: Presidential Aircraft: World War II: see World War II: Aircraft Airmail Akihito, Crown Prince of Japan: Visit to Hyde Park, NY Akin, David Akiyama, Kunia: see A (General) Alabama Alaska Alaska, Matanuska Valley Albemarle Island Albert, Medora: see A (General) Albright, Catherine Isabelle: see A (General) Albright, Edward (Minister to Finland) Albright, Ethel Marie: see A (General) Albright, Joe Emma: see A (General) Alcantara, Heitormelo: see A (General) Alderson, Wrae: see A (General) Aldine, Charles: see A (General) Aldrich, Richard and Mrs. Margaret Chanler Alexander (son of Charles and Belva Alexander): see A (General) Alexander, John H. Alexitch, Vladimir Joseph Alford, Bradford: see A (General) Allen, Mrs. Idella: see A (General) 2 Allen, Mrs. Mary E.: see A (General) Allen, R.C.
    [Show full text]
  • FROM CRADLE to GRAVE? the Place of the Aircraft
    FROM CRADLE TO GRAVE? The Place of the Aircraft Carrier in Australia's post-war Defence Force Subthesis submitted for the degree of MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES at the University College The University of New South Wales Australian Defence Force Academy 1996 by ALLAN DU TOIT ACADEMY LIBRARy UNSW AT ADFA 437104 HMAS Melbourne, 1973. Trackers are parked to port and Skyhawks to starboard Declaration by Candidate I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person nor material which to a substantial extent has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma of a university or other institute of higher learning, except where due acknowledgment is made in the text of the thesis. Allan du Toit Canberra, October 1996 Ill Abstract This subthesis sets out to study the place of the aircraft carrier in Australia's post-war defence force. Few changes in naval warfare have been as all embracing as the role played by the aircraft carrier, which is, without doubt, the most impressive, and at the same time the most controversial, manifestation of sea power. From 1948 until 1983 the aircraft carrier formed a significant component of the Australian Defence Force and the place of an aircraft carrier in defence strategy and the force structure seemed relatively secure. Although cost, especially in comparison to, and in competition with, other major defence projects, was probably the major issue in the demise of the aircraft carrier and an organic fixed-wing naval air capability in the Australian Defence Force, cost alone can obscure the ftindamental reordering of Australia's defence posture and strategic thinking, which significantly contributed to the decision not to replace HMAS Melbourne.
    [Show full text]
  • Ladies and Gentlemen
    reaching the limits of their search area, ENS Reid and his navigator, ENS Swan decided to push their search a little farther. When he spotted small specks in the distance, he promptly radioed Midway: “Sighted main body. Bearing 262 distance 700.” PBYs could carry a crew of eight or nine and were powered by two Pratt & Whitney R-1830-92 radial air-cooled engines at 1,200 horsepower each. The aircraft was 104 feet wide wing tip to wing tip and 63 feet 10 inches long from nose to tail. Catalinas were patrol planes that were used to spot enemy submarines, ships, and planes, escorted convoys, served as patrol bombers and occasionally made air and sea rescues. Many PBYs were manufactured in San Diego, but Reid’s aircraft was built in Canada. “Strawberry 5” was found in dilapidated condition at an airport in South Africa, but was lovingly restored over a period of six years. It was actually flown back to San Diego halfway across the planet – no small task for a 70-year old aircraft with a top speed of 120 miles per hour. The plane had to meet FAA regulations and was inspected by an FAA official before it could fly into US airspace. Crew of the Strawberry 5 – National Archives Cover Artwork for the Program NOTES FROM THE ARTIST Unlike the action in the Atlantic where German submarines routinely targeted merchant convoys, the Japanese never targeted shipping in the Pacific. The Cover Artwork for the Veterans' Biographies American convoy system in the Pacific was used primarily during invasions where hundreds of merchant marine ships shuttled men, food, guns, This PBY Catalina (VPB-44) was flown by ENS Jack Reid with his ammunition, and other supplies across the Pacific.
    [Show full text]
  • Additional Historic Information the Doolittle Raid (Hornet CV-8) Compiled and Written by Museum Historian Bob Fish
    USS Hornet Sea, Air & Space Museum Additional Historic Information The Doolittle Raid (Hornet CV-8) Compiled and Written by Museum Historian Bob Fish AMERICA STRIKES BACK The Doolittle Raid of April 18, 1942 was the first U.S. air raid to strike the Japanese home islands during WWII. The mission is notable in that it was the only operation in which U.S. Army Air Forces bombers were launched from an aircraft carrier into combat. The raid demonstrated how vulnerable the Japanese home islands were to air attack just four months after their surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. While the damage inflicted was slight, the raid significantly boosted American morale while setting in motion a chain of Japanese military events that were disastrous for their long-term war effort. Planning & Preparation Immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack, President Roosevelt tasked senior U.S. military commanders with finding a suitable response to assuage the public outrage. Unfortunately, it turned out to be a difficult assignment. The Army Air Forces had no bases in Asia close enough to allow their bombers to attack Japan. At the same time, the Navy had no airplanes with the range and munitions capacity to do meaningful damage without risking the few ships left in the Pacific Fleet. In early January of 1942, Captain Francis Low1, a submariner on CNO Admiral Ernest King’s staff, visited Norfolk, VA to review the Navy’s newest aircraft carrier, USS Hornet CV-8. During this visit, he realized that Army medium-range bombers might be successfully launched from an aircraft carrier.
    [Show full text]
  • Issue 46, October 2020
    From the President Welcome to this 46th edition of Call the Hands. As always, we are pleased to present a wide cross section of stories and draw attention to some most interesting audio and video recordings. Don’t miss the links to a short description by Lieutenant Commander Henry Stoker of AE2’s 1915 passage through the Dardanelles strait and the snippets of life in HMAS Australia (II) in 1948. In a similar vein, those with an interest in HMAS Cerberus should not miss the link to aerial footage of the extensive building works undertaken in Cerberus in recent years. In its 100th anniversary year HMAS Cerberus is well equipped for current and future high trainee throughputs. Highlighted are two remarkable people; Able Seaman Moss Berryman the last member of the Operation Jaywick operatives and Surgeon Lieutenant Commander Samuel Stening, a HMAS Perth survivor and POW. Links to their remarkable stories are worthy of attention. Occasional Paper 91 provides detailed insight into strategic and operational level decisions concerning the employment of the Royal Australian Navy and the Royal Navy’s China Fleet and South Atlantic Squadron in pursuit of the German East Asia Squadron during the early months of World War One. It is a story of bungled and poor strategic decision making on the part of the First Sea Lord and Admiralty. The consequences of this disjointed strategy, wasted time and not allowing Admiral Sir George Patey freedom of action in his flagship HMAS Australia, to pursue the German Squadron were significant. Occasional Paper 92 addresses the matter of the award of the first Royal Australian Navy Victoria Cross and other forms of recognition for Ordinary Seaman Edward “Teddy” Sheean.
    [Show full text]