The Political Economy of the State

Provisional Syllabus: Spring 2016 Professor: Mark Koyama E-mail: mark [email protected] Office Hrs: Wednesday 4.30–6.00 pm or by appointment. Carow Hall. Fairfax Campus;

This is a new reading intensive class for PhD students interested in political economy. It is an 895 class. I am running this class in Spring 2015 instead of my Analytical Narratives class. The aim is to generate novel insights and research questions in political economy. This class is highly focused—we study the rise, emergence and behavior of states from an analytical point of view—in order to do better positive political economy. Additionally, this class will be interdisciplinary we will read texts from political philosophy, history, political science, and sociology as well as economics. It will be reading intensive and seminar based. I will expect you to contribute to and help shape the discussion. The end result of the class should be a paper on the broad subject of this class: the political economy of the state. I expect you to write a paper that addresses the readings and themes of the class. I will have to approve every paper topic. In addition to the paper there will be paper summaries and presentations expected of you. I will add to and amend this reading list before class begins.

1 Assessment

• Three short paper ideas. These should be ideas for a paper. No more than 1.5 pages each. 20%

• A reseatch paper. Between 15-30 pages long including references. PDF format. 50%

• A research presentation. 15-20 mins. long and overall class participatiopn. 30%

This course is designed for PhD students. It is ideally suited for students interested in the following topics: economic history, public choice, public economics, development economics, institutional economics. However, it could help generate ideas and topics for students working in the history of economic thought, Smithitan economics, and experimental economics. This course focuses on papers and topics that you are unliekly to have read for other classes. The ide a is that by reading outside of one’s field will be a productive way of generating novel research ideas.

2 Readings

My aim is to provide readings from my own lecture notes each week. These notes will structrue our discussion.

1 2.1 Background 1: Introduction

Main Readings • Koyama, notes Chapter 1. Background Readings To motivate our course of study we begin by considering the problem of political order. This is the main focus of my notes on the topic. As background and to provide contrast we briefly touch on other approaches such as the standard approach to public economics as represented by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980). This classic text is representative of the public finance tradition that is remains dominant in modern economics. As a point of contrast, we compare it with a recent textbook in political economy Besley and Persson (2009).

• Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson, Property rights, taxation, and policy, American Economic Review 2009 Chapter 1

• Daron Acemoglu, Constitutions, Politics, and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini’s The Economic Effects of Constitutions, Journal of Economic Literature December 2005

• Philip T. Hoffman, What Do States Do? Politics and Economic History, The Journal of Economic History 75 6 2015a

We will also touch on Daron Acemoglu, Institutions, Factor Prices, and Taxation: Virtues of Strong States?, American Economic Review 100, Nr. 2 May 2010 (which is a critical comment on Besley and Persson, Property rights, taxation, and policy). Assigned Readings • No assigned reading

2: The Origins of Human Cooperation

Main Readings • Koyama, notes Chapter 2. Background Readings

• Andrea Matranga, Climate-Driven Technical Change: Seasonality and the In- vention of Agriculture 2015

• Samuel Bowles, Microeconomics, behaviour, institutions, and evolution Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005 Chapter

• Michihiro Kandori, Social Norms and Community Enforcement, Review of Economic Studies 59, Nr. 1 January 1992

2 • Ernst Fehr and Simon Gachter, Altruistic punishment in humans, Nature 415, Nr. 6868 01 2002

• Herbert Gintis, The evolution of private property, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 64, Nr. 1 September 2007

• Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Social Capital and Community Governance, Economic Journal 112, Nr. 483 November 2002

• Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Cooperation., in: L. Blume and S. Durlauf, editors, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics New York: Macmillan, 2008

Assigned Readings

• Samuel Bowles, Warriors, Levelers and the Role of Conflict in the Evolution of Social Behavior, Science 336 2012

4: Sociological, Historical, and Economic Accounts of the Emergence of a State Normative welfare economics treats the state as exogenous. Work in the tradition of public choice and modern political economy make the state endogenous. This week’s seminar asks: how did the state emerge? How should the state be analyzed? What role does the state play in enforcing contracts and providing law and order? Under what conditions will the state be predatory and under what conditions will it provide public goods? How does this research link in with the economics of anarchy? How does it relate to work in public choice? We begin by studying some of the classic works in the field.

Main Readings

• Koyama, notes Chapter 3.

Background Readings

• Franz Oppenheim, The State 1922

• Robert L. Carneiro, A Theory of the Origin of the State, Science 169, Nr. 3947 1970

• Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957

• Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History New York, U.S.A: Norton, 1981 Chapter 3

• Robert C. Allen, Agriculture and the Origins of the State in Ancient Egypt, Explorations in Economic History 34, Nr. 2 April 1997

• Boaz Moselle and Benjamin Polak, A Model of a Predatory State, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 17, Nr. 1 2001*

3 • Matthew Baker, Erwin Bulte and Jacob Weisdorf, The origins of governments: from anarchy to hierarchy, Journal of Institutional Economics 6, Nr. 02 June 2010*

• Gregory K. Dow and Clyde G. Reed, The Origins of Inequality: Insiders, Out- siders, Elites, and Commoners, Journal of Political Economy 121, Nr. 3 2013

Assigned Readings

• DalBo15

6: The Natural State This week we consider whether or not North, Wallis and Weingast(NWW) provider a richer theory of the state than the authors considered last week. What do the authors mean by the natural state? How does the coalition of violence specialists they describe hold itself together? How does it become a state? How can the NWW framework be taken up by other economists and economic historians? This literature also raises some wider questions. Is it useful to consider the state as a unitary actor? Or should the state be viewed as a coalition of interests. Can the NWW framework be operalizationed? Hough and Grier have a new book which develops a framework that is similar too and inspired by NWW. We will study how they approach the problem of state formation and the rise of an effective state in medieval England and Spain.

Main Readings

• Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis and Barry R. Weingast, Violence and Social Orders: a conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009 Chapters 1 and 2

• Jerry F. Hough and Robin Grier, The Long Process of Development: Build- ing Markets and States in Pre-Industrial England, Spain, and their Colonies Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015 Chapters 1 and 2

For an attempt to operationalize the NWW framework see Bram van Besouw, Erik Ansink and Bas van Bavel, The economics of the the limited access order 2015. Assigned Readings

• TBA

Part 2: History 6: City States and Economic Growth

Main Readings

• Koyama, notes Chapter 4 and 5.

Background Readings

4 • Henri Pirenne, Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe London: Rout- ledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1936

• Avner Greif, Self-Enforcing Political Systems and Economic Growth: Late Me- dieval Genoa Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998, chap. 1

• David Stasavage, Was Weber Right? The Role of Urban Autonomy in Europe’s Rise, American Political Science Review 108 5 2014

• Diego Puga and Daniel Trefler, International Trade and Institutional Change: Me- dieval Venice’s Response to Globalization*, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 2014

• S. R. Epstein, Freedom and Growth, the rise of states and markets in Europe, 1300–1700 London: Routledge, 2000

Assigned Readings

• Diego Puga and Daniel Trefler, International Trade and Institutional Change: Me- dieval Venice’s Response to Globalization*, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 2014

7: Fiscal Sociology and the Rise of the Tax State Early medieval states were domain states. Rulers did not have the right to collect permanent taxation. Instead they were expected to ‘live off their own’. What is the difference between a domain state and a tax state? How did European state transition from being domain states to tax states.

Main Readings

• Koyama, notes Chapter 7.

Background Readings

• Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Crisis of the Tax State 1918

• Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990 Oxford: Blackwell, 1990

• Thomas Ertman, Birth of Leviathan Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997

• Mark Dincecco, Fiscal Centralization, Limited Government, and Public Revenues in Europe, 1650-1913, Journal of Economic History 69, Nr. 1 2009

• Kivanc Karaman and Sevket Pamuk, Different Paths to the Modern State in Europe: The Interaction between Warfare, Economic Structure and Political Regime, American Political Science Review 107, Nr. 3 2013

5 Schumpeter (1918) developed the terminology domain state and tax state which have subsequently become very influential in fiscal sociology. The most important and lengthy historical works you need to grapple with are Tilly (1990) and Ertman (1997). Tilly develops a distinguish between a capital-intensive path of state development and a coercion intensive path of state development. Ertman (1997) goes into great historical detail on the rise of the state in the early modern period. Dincecco and Pamuk provide data on the size and scale of fiscal states in the early modern period. We will also consult the literature on the military revolution and its consequences:

• Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: military innovation and the rise of the West, 1500–1800 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988

• Nicola Gennaioli and Hans-Joachim Voth, State Capacity and Military Conflict, Review of Economic Studies 2015

How did these state raise taxes? In general many premodern states relied on private tax collection or tax farming:

• Noel D. Johnson, Banking on the King: The Evolution of the Royal Revenue Farms in Old Regime France, The Journal of Economic History 66, Nr. 04 December 2006

• Noel D. Johnson and Mark Koyama, Tax Farming and the Origins of State Capacity in England and France, Explorations in Economic History 51, Nr. 1 2014

Assigned Reading

• TBA

8: Emergence of the Fiscal-Military State in Britain Last week we studied the emergence of tax states in Europe during the early modern period. This week we will focus on the rise of what John Brewer called the ‘fiscal-military state’ in Hanoverian Britain. Some questions: What does Brewer mean by a fiscal-military state? What explains the dramatic rise in fiscal capacity in Britain after 1688? Did the fiscal-military state crowd-out private investment and retard economic growth or was it a beneficial stimulus to growth as some historian claim? Why was Britain able to build fiscal capacity to a greater extent than other European states such as France?

Main Readings

• Koyama, notes Chapter 7.

• Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market- Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11, Nr. 1 April 1995

• John Brewer, The Sinews of Power Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1988 Chapters 1–4

6 • John Brewer and Eckhart Hellmuth, Rethinking Leviathan: The Eighteenth- Century State in Britain and Germany Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999

• Peter Vries, State, Economy, and the Great Divergence: Great Britain and China, 1680s–1850s London: Bloomsbury, 2015 Relevant Chapters

• Patrick K. O’Brien, The nature and historical evolution of an exceptional fiscal state and its possible significance for the precocious commercialization and industrialization of the British economy from Cromwell to Nelson, The Economic History Review 2011

• Jaume Ventura and Hans-Joachim Voth, Debt into Growth: How Sovereign Debt Accelerated the First Industrial Revolution May 2015

We will again draw on the literature on the military revolution inlcuidng the following new book: Philip T. Hoffman, Why Did Europe Conquer the World? Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 2015b. Assigned Readings

• TBA

9: Pathologies of Tax States The seminar this week studies the pathologies associated with the tax states that first arose in western Europe and the spread to other parts of the world. Political scientist James C. Scott has written perhaps the best critical account of the rise of modern states.

Main Readings

• J.C. Scott, Seeing like a state: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, The Institution for Social and Policy St Series Yale University Press, 1999

Assigned Readings

• TBA

10: The State and War States made war. And war made states. This famous phrase was coined by Tilly (1985). Azar Gat’s book on the history of warfare is essential reading here. We will relate this text to some more recent attempts by economists to model warfare.

Main Readings

• Charles Tilly, Warmaking and Statemaking as Organized Crime, in: Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, editors, Bringing the State Back In Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985*

• Azar Gat, War in Human Civilization Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006

7 • Nicola Gennaioli and Hans-Joachim Voth, State Capacity and Military Conflict, Review of Economic Studies 2015

• Philip T. Hoffman, Why Did Europe Conquer the World? Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 2015b

11: State Formation in the Great Divergence This week we consider the origins of the first modern state in China. Fukuyama (2011) outlines the rise of the Chinese state in the 3rd century BCE. However, the Chinese state did not follow the same path of development to the state in Europe. By the Qing dynasty, recent work by economic historians have demonstrated that the Chinese state lacked state capacity. The main historical reference here is Vries (2015). This provides an extremely detailed comparison of the fiscal state in Britain and China during the long eighteenth century.

• Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order London: Profile Books Ltd., 2011 Chapters 6–9

• Tuan-Hwee Sng, Size and Dynastic Decline: The Principal-Agent Problem in Late Imperial China 1700-1850, Explorations in Economic History Forthcoming 2014

• Tuan-Hwee Sng and Chiaki Moriguchi, Asia’s little divergence: State capacity in China and Japan before 1850, Journal of Economic Growth Forthcoming 2014 Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and R Bin Wong, Before and Beyond Divergence Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011

• Chiu Yu Ko, Mark Koyama and Tuan-Hwee Sng, Unified China; Divided Europe January 2014

• Peter Vries, State, Economy, and the Great Divergence: Great Britain and China, 1680s–1850s London: Bloomsbury, 2015

State capacity in other parts of the world We have focused on the rise of tax states in western Europe and east Asia. What about state development in other parts of the world? Fiscal capacity was low in Latin America.

• Jerry F. Hough and Robin Grier, The Long Process of Development: Build- ing Markets and States in Pre-Industrial England, Spain, and their Colonies Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015 Chapters 3–6

• R. Grafe, Distant Tyranny: Markets, Power, and Backwardness in Spain, 1650- 1800, Princeton Economic History of the Western World Princeton University Press, 2012 Chapter 1

State capacity is low in Africa. There is a literature exploring why this is the case:

• Robert H. Bates, When Things Fell Apart, State Failure in Late-Century Africa Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008

8 • Nicola Gennaioli and Ilia Rainer, The modern impact of precolonial centralization in Africa, Journal of Economic Growth 12, Nr. 3 September 2007 • Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou, PreColonial Ethnic Institutions and Contemporary African Development, Econometrica 81, Nr. 1 01 2013 • Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou, National Institutions and Subna- tional Development in Africa, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 129, Nr. 1 2014 Assigned Readings • TBA

12: Deep Determinants, the State & Modern Economic Growth How do Besley and Persson explain the origin of state capacity? What role does war play in their account? What is the relationship between legal and fiscal capacity.

Main Readings • Enrico Spolaore and Romain Wacziarg, How Deep Are the Roots of Economic Development?, Journal of Economic Literature 51, Nr. 2 June 2013 • ?, ∗ Valerie Bockstette, Areendam Chanda and Louis Putterman, States and Markets: The Advantage of an Early Start, Journal of Economic Growth 7, Nr. 4 December 2002 ∗ Areendam Chanda and Louis Putterman, Early Starts, Reversals and Catch-up in the Process of Economic Development, Scandinavian Jour- nal of Economics 109, Nr. 2 06 2007 ∗ Oana Borcan, Ola Olsson and Louis Putterman, State History and Economic Development: Evidence from Six Millennia, Working Papers 2014-8 Brown University, Department of Economics, 2014 ∗ Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson, Pillars of Prosperity Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2011 ∗ Mark Dincecco and Gabriel Katz, State Capacity and Long-Run Per- formance, MPRA Paper 38299 University Library of Munich, Germany, April 2012 ∗ Sascha O. Becker et al., The Empire Is Dead, Long Live the Empire! Long-Run Persistence of Trust and Corruption in the Bureaucracy, Economic Journal Forthcoming 2014 ∗ Noel D. Johnson, Taxes, National Identity, and Nation Building: Evi- dence from France November 2014 ∗ Noel D. Johnson and Mark Koyama, States and Economic Growth: Capacity and Constraints October 2015 Assigned Readings ∗ ?,

9 References

Acemoglu, Daron: Constitutions, Politics, and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini’s The Economic Effects of Constitutions, Journal of Economic Literature December 2005, 1025–1048 Acemoglu, Daron: Institutions, Factor Prices, and Taxation: Virtues of Strong States?, American Economic Review 100, Nr. 2 May 2010, 115–19 Allen, Robert C.: Agriculture and the Origins of the State in Ancient Egypt, Explorations in Economic History 34, Nr. 2 April 1997, 135–154 Atkinson, Anthony B. and Stiglitz, Joseph E.: Lectures on Public Economcis Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Universit Press, 1980 Baker, Matthew, Bulte, Erwin and Weisdorf, Jacob: The origins of governments: from anarchy to hierarchy, Journal of Institutional Economics 6, Nr. 02 June 2010, 215–242 Bates, Robert H.: When Things Fell Apart, State Failure in Late-Century Africa Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008 Becker, Sascha O. et al.: The Empire Is Dead, Long Live the Empire! Long-Run Persis- tence of Trust and Corruption in the Bureaucracy, Economic Journal Forthcoming 2014 Besley, Timothy and Persson, Torsten: Property rights, taxation, and policy, American Economic Review 2009, Forthcoming Besley, Timothy and Persson, Torsten: Pillars of Prosperity Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2011 Besouw, Bram van, Ansink, Erik and Bavel, Bas van: The economics of the the limited access order 2015, Working paper Bockstette, Valerie, Chanda, Areendam and Putterman, Louis: States and Markets: The Advantage of an Early Start, Journal of Economic Growth 7, Nr. 4 December 2002, 347–69 Borcan, Oana, Olsson, Ola and Putterman, Louis: State History and Economic Develop- ment: Evidence from Six Millennia, Working Papers 2014-8 Brown University, Department of Economics, 2014 Bowles, Samuel: Microeconomics, behaviour, institutions, and evolution Oxford: Prince- ton University Press, 2005 Bowles, Samuel: Warriors, Levelers and the Role of Conflict in the Evolution of Social Behavior, Science 336 2012, 876–879 Bowles, Samuel and Gintis, Herbert: Social Capital and Community Governance, Eco- nomic Journal 112, Nr. 483 November 2002, 419–436 Bowles, Samuel and Gintis, Herbert: Cooperation., in: Blume, L. and Durlauf, S., editors, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics New York: Macmillan, 2008 Brewer, John: The Sinews of Power Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1988 Brewer, John and Hellmuth, Eckhart: Rethinking Leviathan: The Eighteenth-Century State in Britain and Germany Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, German Historical Institute in London Carneiro, Robert L.: A Theory of the Origin of the State, Science 169, Nr. 3947 1970, 733–738 Chanda, Areendam and Putterman, Louis: Early Starts, Reversals and Catch-up in the Process of Economic Development, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 109, Nr. 2 06 2007, 387–413 Dincecco, Mark: Fiscal Centralization, Limited Government, and Public Revenues in Europe, 1650-1913, Journal of Economic History 69, Nr. 1 2009, 48–103 Dincecco, Mark and Katz, Gabriel: State Capacity and Long-Run Performance, MPRA Paper 38299 University Library of Munich, Germany, April 2012

10 Dow, Gregory K. and Reed, Clyde G.: The Origins of Inequality: Insiders, Outsiders, Elites, and Commoners, Journal of Political Economy 121, Nr. 3 2013, 609 – 641 Epstein, S. R.: Freedom and Growth, the rise of states and markets in Europe, 1300–1700 London: Routledge, 2000 Ertman, Thomas: Birth of Leviathan Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997 Fehr, Ernst and Gachter, Simon: Altruistic punishment in humans, Nature 415, Nr. 6868 01 2002, 137–140 Fukuyama, Francis: The Origins of Political Order London: Profile Books Ltd., 2011 Gat, Azar: War in Human Civilization Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006 Gennaioli, Nicola and Rainer, Ilia: The modern impact of precolonial centralization in Africa, Journal of Economic Growth 12, Nr. 3 September 2007, 185–234 Gennaioli, Nicola and Voth, Hans-Joachim: State Capacity and Military Conflict, Review of Economic Studies 2015, Forthcoming Gintis, Herbert: The evolution of private property, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 64, Nr. 1 September 2007, 1–16 Grafe, R.: Distant Tyranny: Markets, Power, and Backwardness in Spain, 1650-1800, Princeton Economic History of the Western World Princeton University Press, 2012 Greif, Avner: Self-Enforcing Political Systems and Economic Growth: Late Medieval Genoa Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998, chap. 1, 23–64 Hoffman, Philip T.: What Do States Do? Politics and Economic History, The Journal of Economic History 75 6 2015a, 303–332 Hoffman, Philip T.: Why Did Europe Conquer the World? Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 2015b Hough, Jerry F. and Grier, Robin: The Long Process of Development: Building Markets and States in Pre-Industrial England, Spain, and their Colonies Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015 Johnson, Noel D.: Banking on the King: The Evolution of the Royal Revenue Farms in Old Regime France, The Journal of Economic History 66, Nr. 04 December 2006, 963–991 Johnson, Noel D.: Taxes, National Identity, and Nation Building: Evidence from France November 2014 Johnson, Noel D. and Koyama, Mark: Tax Farming and the Origins of State Capacity in England and France, Explorations in Economic History 51, Nr. 1 2014, 1–20 Johnson, Noel D. and Koyama, Mark: States and Economic Growth: Capacity and Constraints October 2015, Mimeo Kandori, Michihiro: Social Norms and Community Enforcement, Review of Economic Studies 59, Nr. 1 January 1992, 63–80 Karaja, Elira: The Rule of Karlowitz: Fiscal Change and Institutional Persistence 2014, Memo Karaman, Kivanc and Pamuk, Sevket: Different Paths to the Modern State in Europe: The Interaction between Warfare, Economic Structure and Political Regime, American Political Science Review 107, Nr. 3 2013, 603–626 Ko, Chiu Yu, Koyama, Mark and Sng, Tuan-Hwee: Unified China; Divided Europe January 2014, memo. Matranga, Andrea: Climate-Driven Technical Change: Seasonality and the Invention of Agriculture 2015, Memo Michalopoulos, Stelios and Papaioannou, Elias: PreColonial Ethnic Institutions and Contemporary African Development, Econometrica 81, Nr. 1 01 2013, 113–152 Michalopoulos, Stelios and Papaioannou, Elias: National Institutions and Subnational Development in Africa, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 129, Nr. 1 2014, 151–213

11 Moselle, Boaz and Polak, Benjamin: A Model of a Predatory State, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 17, Nr. 1 2001, pp. 1–33 North, Douglass C.: Structure and Change in Economic History New York, U.S.A: Norton, 1981 North, Douglass C., Wallis, John Joseph and Weingast, Barry R.: Violence and Social Or- ders: a conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009 O’Brien, Patrick K.: The nature and historical evolution of an exceptional fiscal state and its possible significance for the precocious commercialization and industrialization of the British economy from Cromwell to Nelson, The Economic History Review 2011 Oppenheim, Franz: The State 1922 Parker, Geoffrey: The Military Revolution: military innovation and the rise of the West, 1500–1800 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988 Pirenne, Henri: Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1936, translated by I. E. Clegg Puga, Diego and Trefler, Daniel: International Trade and Institutional Change: Medieval Venice’s Response to Globalization*, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 2014 Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent and Wong, R Bin: Before and Beyond Divergence Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011 Schumpeter, Joseph A.: The Crisis of the Tax State 1918 Scott, J.C.: Seeing like a state: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, The Institution for Social and Policy St Series Yale University Press, 1999 Sng, Tuan-Hwee: Size and Dynastic Decline: The Principal-Agent Problem in Late Imperial China 1700-1850, Explorations in Economic History Forthcoming 2014 Sng, Tuan-Hwee and Moriguchi, Chiaki: Asia’s little divergence: State capacity in China and Japan before 1850, Journal of Economic Growth Forthcoming 2014 Spolaore, Enrico and Wacziarg, Romain: How Deep Are the Roots of Economic Devel- opment?, Journal of Economic Literature 51, Nr. 2 June 2013, 325–69 Stasavage, David: Was Weber Right? The Role of Urban Autonomy in Europe’s Rise, American Political Science Review 108 5 2014, 337–354 Tilly, Charles: Warmaking and Statemaking as Organized Crime, in: Evans, Peter, Rueschemeyer, Dietrich and Skocpol, Theda, editors, Bringing the State Back In Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985, 169–192 Tilly, Charles: Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990 Oxford: Blackwell, 1990 Ventura, Jaume and Voth, Hans-Joachim: Debt into Growth: How Sovereign Debt Accelerated the First Industrial Revolution May 2015, University of Zurich, Department of Economics Working Paper 194 Vries, Peter: State, Economy, and the Great Divergence: Great Britain and China, 1680s–1850s London: Bloomsbury, 2015 Weingast, Barry R.: The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organi- zation 11, Nr. 1 April 1995, 1–31 Wittfogel, Karl: Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957

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