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Topics in Economic History Ran Abramitzky Bergen, August 2019
TOPICS IN ECONOMIC HISTORY RAN ABRAMITZKY BERGEN, AUGUST 2019 Instructor: Professor Ran Abramitzky, [email protected], Stanford University. Class time and location: TBD Course Description: Topics in Economic History: covers topics in Economic History from the Middle Ages to the twentieth century (but does not cover detailed economic history of particular European countries). Topics include competing hypotheses in explaining long term trends in economic growth and cross-country differences in long-term economic growth; the diffusion of knowledge; the formation, function, and persistence of institutions and organizations; the role of institutions and organizations (for example, apprenticeship, partnerships, cooperatives, social networks, share cropping, and communes) as solutions to contractual problems; the causes and consequences of income inequality; the economics of migration; the changing economic role of the family. The course will highlight the use of economic theory in guiding hypothesis testing, as well as the construction of new datasets and the execution of empirical analysis. A main goal of the course is to involve students in research, from identifying and posing interesting research questions in economic history and in other applied economic fields, to presenting these ideas. The course will give opportunity for students to give a 15-minutes presentation of a recent job market paper in economic history. If you are interested to present, please email me with your choice of a paper from the list of recent job market papers below. Papers will be assigned based on a first comes first served basis, so pick your paper early. You are not expected to read in advance of class, but you will benefit more from the class if you read in advance some papers from the reading list. -
Intellectual Property Rights and the Evergreening of Pharmaceuticals
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Boscheck, Ralf Article — Published Version Intellectual property rights and the evergreening of pharmaceuticals Intereconomics Suggested Citation: Boscheck, Ralf (2015) : Intellectual property rights and the evergreening of pharmaceuticals, Intereconomics, ISSN 1613-964X, Springer, Heidelberg, Vol. 50, Iss. 4, pp. 221-226, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10272-015-0546-y This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/172664 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu DOI: 10.1007/s10272-015-0546-y Intellectual Property Ralf Boscheck Intellectual Property Rights and the Evergreening of Pharmaceuticals Escalating healthcare expenditures and the need to ensure access to affordable medicine in both emerging and emerged economies are fuelling calls to contain the so-called evergreening practices of drug producers around the world. -
Overcoming Intellectual Property Monopolies in the COVID-19 Pandemic
MSF Briefing Document July 2020 Overcoming intellectual property monopolies in the COVID-19 pandemic Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) is responding to the global COVID-19 pandemic, providing treatment and care for people with COVID-19, protecting people living in vulnerable conditions, and ensuring uninterrupted essential health services for people suffering from other diseases.1 Having universal access to existing and future tools for treatment, diagnosis and prevention is critical. MSF has repeatedly witnessed how exclusive rights and monopolies granted to pharmaceutical corporations, resulting in high prices and blocking generic competition, have had a negative impact on our medical actions in different countries.2 For example, in the past, high prices for patented medicines have undermined the capacity of countries to provide access to treatment for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), hepatitis C and cancer to all patients who need them. However, the impact of intellectual property (IP) monopolies is not limited to drugs. The availability of more affordable pneumococcal conjugate vaccine and human papillomavirus vaccine in low- and middle-income countries has been delayed due to unmerited patents on key technologies blocking follow-on producers.3 Intellectual property monopolies in the COVID-19 pandemic While several of the drugs being trialled as COVID-19 treatments are now off patent, patented drugs and experimental drugs are also being trialled, and some of which are under patent protection in many developing countries.4 With control over the market as a result of patents or other exclusive rights, pharmaceutical companies could determine how global production and supply chain are organised, who ultimately has access, who can produce medicines and where they can be supplied. -
Evergreening" Metaphor in Intellectual Property Scholarship
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 2019 The "Evergreening" Metaphor in Intellectual Property Scholarship Erika Lietzan University of Missouri School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/facpubs Part of the Food and Drug Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons Recommended Citation Erika Lietzan, The "Evergreening" Metaphor in Intellectual Property Scholarship, 53 Akron Law Review 805 (2019). Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/facpubs/984 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. DATE DOWNLOADED: Wed Jan 20 13:42:00 2021 SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline Citations: Bluebook 21st ed. Erika Lietzan, The "Evergreening" Metaphor in Intellectual Property Scholarship, 53 AKRON L. REV. 805 (2019). ALWD 6th ed. Lietzan, E. ., The "evergreening" metaphor in intellectual property scholarship, 53(4) Akron L. Rev. 805 (2019). APA 7th ed. Lietzan, E. (2019). The "evergreening" metaphor in intellectual property scholarship. Akron Law Review, 53(4), 805-872. Chicago 7th ed. Erika Lietzan, "The "Evergreening" Metaphor in Intellectual Property Scholarship," Akron Law Review 53, no. 4 (2019): 805-872 McGill Guide 9th ed. Erika Lietzan, "The "Evergreening" Metaphor in Intellectual Property Scholarship" (2019) 53:4 Akron L Rev 805. AGLC 4th ed. Erika Lietzan, 'The "Evergreening" Metaphor in Intellectual Property Scholarship' (2019) 53(4) Akron Law Review 805. -
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DRUGS-2017/05/02 1 THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION REINING IN PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES Washington, D.C. Tuesday, May 2, 2017 Introduction: LOUISE SHEINER Senior Fellow, Economic Studies Policy Director, Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy The Brookings Institution Paper: Framework for Negotiation in Part D of Medicare MODERATOR: PAUL B. GINSBURG Senior Fellow, Economic Studies Leonard D. Schaeffer Chair in Health Policy Studies Director, Center for Health Policy The Brookings Institution Presenters: RICHARD G. FRANK Margaret T. Morris Professor of Health Economics Department of Health Care Policy Harvard Medical School RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER Frank P. Ramsey Professor of Political Economy Harvard Kennedy School of Government Paper: Can Importation Address High Generic Drug Prices? MODERATOR: PAUL B. GINSBURG Senior Fellow, Economic Studies Leonard D. Schaeffer Chair in Health Policy Studies Director, Center for Health Policy The Brookings Institution Presenters: THOMAS BOLLYKY Senior Fellow for Global Health, Economics and Development Council on Foreign Relations AARON KESSELHEIM Associate Professor of Medicine ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100 Alexandria, VA 22314 Phone (703) 519-7180 Fax (703) 519-7190 DRUGS-2017/05/02 2 Brigham and Women’s Hospital and Harvard Medical School Paper: Removing Barriers to Competition in Pharmaceutical Markets MODERATOR: PAUL B. GINSBURG Senior Fellow, Economic Studies Leonard D. Schaeffer Chair in Health Policy Studies Director, Center for Health Policy The Brookings Institution Presenters: -
Canada's Continuing Support of US Linkage Regulations For
Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review Volume 15 | Issue 1 Article 1 I'm Still Your Baby: Canada's Continuing Support of U.S. Linkage Regulations for Pharmaceuticals Ron A. Bouchard University of Manitoba, Canada Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/iplr Part of the Intellectual Property Commons Repository Citation Ron A. Bouchard, I'm Still Your Baby: Canada's Continuing Support of U.S. Linkage Regulations for Pharmaceuticals, 15 Intellectual Property L. Rev. 71 (2011). Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/iplr/vol15/iss1/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. I’M STILL YOUR BABY: CANADA’S CONTINUING SUPPORT OF U.S. LINKAGE REGULATIONS FOR PHARMACEUTICALS RON A. BOUCHARD∗ ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................... 72 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 73 I. REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES............................................................ 77 A. Study 1 ........................................................................................... 77 B. Study 2 ............................................................................................ 83 C. Study -
A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change AVNER GREIF and DAVID D
American Political Science Review Vol. 98, No. 4 November 2004 A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change AVNER GREIF and DAVID D. LAITIN Stanford University his paper asks (a) why and how institutions change, (b) how an institution persists in a changing environment, and (c) how processes that it unleashes lead to its own demise. The paper shows that T the game-theoretic notion of self-enforcing equilibrium and the historical institutionalist focus on process are both inadequate to answer these questions. Building on a game-theoretic foundation, but responding to the critique of it by historical institutionalists, the paper introduces the concepts of quasi-parameters and self reinforcement. With these concepts, and building on repeated game theory, a dynamic approach to institutions is offered, one that can account for endogenous change (and stabil- ity) of institutions. Contextual accounts of formal governing institutions in early modern Europe and the informal institution of cleavage structure in the contemporary world provide illustrations of the approach. hy and how do institutions change? How Indeed, the analysis of institutional change from this do institutions persist in a changing environ- perspective has mainly concentrated on the dynam- Wment? and How do processes that they un- ics following environmental changes—–that is, changes leash lead to their own demise? These questions are in parameters exogenous to the institutions under particularly difficult to address when institutions are study. viewed from a game-theoretic perspective in which Development of the game-theoretic perspective on they are considered self-enforcing, and in which all institutions thus requires extending it to studying insti- behavior is generated endogenously.1 In reviewing the tutions as a product of an historical process in which merit of various approaches for studying political insti- institutions endogenously change. -
In Re: Glaxosmithkline Plc Securities Litigation 05-CV-3751
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK __________________________________________ ) In re: GlaxoSmithKline plc Securities ) Civil Action No. 05 CIV. 3751 (LAP) Litigation ) ) DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL __________________________________________) CONSOLIDATED SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. The claims asserted herein arise under §§ 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”) and Rule 10b-5. Jurisdiction is conferred by § 27 of the 1934 Act, and 28 U.S.C. §1331. Venue is proper here pursuant to § 27 of the 1934 Act. GlaxoSmithKline plc and SmithKline Beecham Corporation doing business as GlaxoSmithKline plc (collectively “GSK”) is headquartered in London, England, but conducts business in this District. GSK’s ADRs trade on the New York Stock Exchange headquartered in this District. THE PARTIES 2. Lead Plaintiff Joseph J. Masters (“Plaintiff”) acquired publicly traded securities of GSK during the Class Period and was damaged thereby. 3. Defendant GlaxoSmithKline plc is a public company. GlaxoSmithKline plc’s ADRs trade in an efficient market on the NYSE under the symbol “GSK.” GlaxoSmithKline plc’s ordinary shares trade in an efficient market on the London Stock Exchange. Defendant SmithKline Beecham Corporation is a Delaware corporation, which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of GlaxoSmithKline plc. GlaxoSmithKline plc was created in December 2000 when Glaxo Wellcome merged with SmithKline Beecham. Both GlaxoSmithKline plc and SmithKline Beecham, as well as all of their predecessors, subsidiaries and successors, are referred to herein collectively as “GSK.” 4. Defendant Jean-Pierre Garnier (“Garnier”) was CEO and Chairman of GSK throughout the Class Period. By reason of his position, Garnier had access to material inside information about GSK and was able to control directly or indirectly the acts of GSK and the contents of the representations disseminated during the Class Period by or in the name of GSK. -
Evergreening and Patent Cliff Hangers CRISPR/Cas9 System and Gene
Evergreening and patent cliff CRISPR/Cas9 system and gene Being equitable about hangers editing tools equivalents Ove Granstrand Thomas Hedner and Jean Lyckel John Hornby Page 4 Page 12 Page 24 Second medical use claims Do rules experience culture The patentability of Dosage and scope of protection shock? Regimes Clara Berrisch Lisa West Åkerblom Ester-Maria Elze Page 38 Page 48 Page 60 Safeguarding public health In pursuit of Robinson Crusoe The CJEU clarifies the effects in the wake of hegemonic Kristina Björnerstedt of skinny labelling intellectual property rights and Gunnel Nilsson Sofia Bergenstråhle Katarina Foss-Solbrekk Page 94 and Valter Gran Page 76 Page 98 Editorial Preface “Some industries are different but some are more different than others. The discusses how developing countries’ access to medicines is EDITOR-IN-CHIEF pharmaceutical industry fits the latter category” (Scherer 1996:336). There is impeded by the patent system as well as how flexibilities in really no other industry where the nature of the products, the economics of the international and national legal framework contribute Silvia A. Carretta research and development as well as the market structure and the societal to this end. The article shows that while exceptions to implications of the industry’s strategic decisions are as unique as in the patent rights might not be as effective, they have however pharmaceutical industry. Furthermore, there is no other industry that tests triggered a very interesting development of voluntary the boundaries and effects of intellectual property (IP) rights on a national and licensing, a company-centered initiative providing access international level as the pharmaceutical industry. -
Creditor Rights and Allocative Distortions – Evidence from India
Creditor Rights and Allocative Distortions { Evidence from India Nirupama Kulkarni CAFRAL (Reserve Bank of India) April 5, 2018 Creditor rights and Allocative Distortions I Large literature on creditor rights and impact on credit access I +: Due to higher payoffs (La Porta et. al (1998)). I −: Due to liquidation bias ((Hart and Moore (1994), Vig (2012)). I −: Heterogeneous impact (Lilienfeld-Toal, Mookherjee and Visaria (2012)). I This paper: focuses on the general equilibrium effects of creditor rights. I Delays in creditors' ability to seize defaulters' assets prevents reallocation of resources to their best use. I # creative destruction =) spurious allocation of resources. I \Evergreening" and \zombie" distortions (Caballero et al. (2008)). Do improvements in creditor rights lead to a better allocation of debt (and other resources)? This paper . My setting: Exploit a collateral reform in 2002 in India that made it easier for creditors to seize secured assets. I Step 1: Examine reallocation of debt away from low quality borrowers to high quality borrowers (Partial Equilibrium). I Step 2: Examine whether this is partly driven by the reduction in zombie firms. I Step 3: Examine spillovers on non-zombies due to reduction in zombie distortions (General Equilibrium). I Step 4: Examine productive efficiency at the industry level. Preview of Findings 1. Reallocate secured debt away from \low quality" borrowers: # INR 39 million (75 %). I No similar impact on unsecured borrowing, " in interest rates by 72 bps =) NOT driven by liquidation bias. 2. 59% reduction in secured borrowing due to reduction in zombie lending (\evergreening"). 3. Spillover effects on non-zombies due to reduction in zombie distortions. -
Drug Pricing and Pharmaceutical Patenting Practices
Drug Pricing and Pharmaceutical Patenting Practices February 11, 2020 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R46221 SUMMARY R46221 Drug Pricing and Pharmaceutical Patenting February 11, 2020 Practices Kevin T. Richards, Intellectual property (IP) rights in pharmaceuticals are typically justified as necessary to allow Coordinator manufacturers to recoup their substantial investments in research, development, and regulatory Legislative Attorney approval. IP law provides exclusive rights in a particular invention or product for a certain time period, potentially enabling the rights holder (e.g., a brand-name drug manufacturer) to charge Kevin J. Hickey higher-than-competitive prices. If rights holders are able to charge such prices, they have an Legislative Attorney incentive to lengthen the period of exclusive rights as much as possible. Indeed, some commentators allege that pharmaceutical manufacturers have engaged in patenting practices that unduly extend the period of exclusivity. These critics argue that these patenting practices are used Erin H. Ward to keep drug prices high, without any benefit for consumers or innovation. Criticisms center on Legislative Attorney four such practices: “Evergreening”: So-called patent “evergreening” is the practice of filing for new patents on secondary features of a particular product as earlier patents expire, thereby extending patent exclusivity past the original twenty-year term. Later-filed patents may delay or prevent entry by competitors, thereby allowing the brand-name -
How Do Self-Enforcing Institutions Endogenously Change
CDDRL WORKING PAPERS A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change Avner Greif David Laitin Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law Stanford Institute for International Studies Number 15 19 August 2004 This working paper was produced as part of CDDRL’s ongoing programming on economic and political development in transitional states. Additional working papers appear on CDDRL’s website: http://cddrl.stanford.edu. Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law Stanford Institute for International Studies Stanford University Encina Hall Stanford, CA 94305 Phone: 650-724-7197 Fax: 650-724-2996 http://cddrl.stanford.edu/ About the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) CDDRL was founded by a generous grant from the Bill and Flora Hewlett Foundation in October in 2002 as part of the Stanford Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. The Center supports analytic studies, policy relevant research, training and outreach activities to assist developing countries in the design and implementation of policies to foster growth, democracy, and the rule of law. About the Author Avner Greif is the Bowman Family Professor in the Humanities and Sciences. His research interests include, European economic history: the historical development of economic institutions, their interrelations with political, social and cultural factors and their impact on economic growth. Recent Publications: (1) “Analytic Narratives,” Oxford University Press, 1998; (2) “Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies,” The Journal of Political Economy, (October 1994); (3) “Coordination, Commitment and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Gild” (with Paul Milgrom and Barry Weingast), The Journal of Political Economy, (August 1994).