PY2903 Matters of Life and Death Outline 2018-19

University of St Andrews DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

PY2903 Matters of Life and Death (2018-9)

Credits: 20 Semester: 2

Module Description and Aims:

How should we think about moral problems concerning life and death? Choices about whose life to save, and whom to allow to die, must be made all the time, in the health service and elsewhere. How should these choices be made? Some actions that aim at good ends will endanger lives. Are such actions permissible? This module, rather than focusing on specific ‘moral problems’ (such as euthanasia, abortion, etc), deals with general questions concerning life and death, such as: Is death bad? Would it be good to be immortal? Would it necessarily be a bad thing if humans became extinct? In virtue of what is life good? On what principles should one choose between lives, when the choice is forced? Should we care about the lives of people who will exist in the future, long after we are dead? What is it that makes killing bad, and is there a morally significant difference between killing and letting die, or between intending someone’s death and merely foreseeing it?

By the end of this module, students should have gained a good critical understanding of the complexities of these questions, and the various approaches that have been taken in answering them. Students will be able to analyse and evaluate critical discussion of these issues in recent and contemporary literature; to formulate and articulate their own views on these issues, and provide a rational defence of these views in written work and in discussion.

Module Coordinator: Dr Lisa Jones (lj14)

Lecturers: Dr Lisa Jones and Dr Marvin Backes (mb302)

Lecture time: Wednesdays, 6:30-9:30

Venue: G6 St Katherine’s West

Assessment: Critical Analysis of Seminar Readings (20%) Two Essays (each worth 40%)

1 Schedule of Topics

The course will treat the following topics in the order laid out. Specific seminar topics and readings are listed below.

Weeks Date Topic Lecturer 1 30 Jan Death 1 Lisa 2 6 Feb Death 2 Lisa 3 13 Feb Immortality Marvin 4 20 Feb Extinction Marvin 5 27 Feb Well-being 1 Marvin 6 6 March Well-being 2 Marvin 7 13 March Choosing between lives (1) Marvin Break – 18-31 March 8 3 April Choosing between lives (2) Marvin 9 10 April Future People Marvin 10 17 April What makes killing wrong? Marvin 11 24 April Killing and letting die Marvin 12 1 May Doctrine of double effect Marvin 13 8 May Review Marvin

Recommended texts

Most of the seminar readings are available electronically, on Moodle or via the library. Where class readings are not easily available, these will be supplied by the lecturers.

In general, and in addition to a number of journal articles, the following texts will be useful, and students who wish to do some supplementary reading are encouraged to look at these (many are accessible as e-books):

Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (London: Penguin, 1977) [ML] James Griffin, Well-Being: its meaning, measurement and moral importance (Oxford: OUP, 1986) [ebook; ML] Roger Crisp & Brad Hooker (eds), Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin (Oxford: OUP, 2000) [ML] Shelley Kagan, The Limits of Morality (Oxford: OUP, 1989) [ebook; ML] Shelly Kagan, Normative Ethics, (Boulder: Westview, 1998) [ML] F. M. Kamm, Morality, Mortality Vol. I (New York: OUP, 1993) [ebook; ML] F. M. Kamm, Morality, Mortality Vol. II (New York: OUP, 2001) [ebook; ML]

2 Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing (Oxford: OUP, 2002) [ebook; ML] Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: OUP, 1984) [ebook; ML]

ML = main library

Further information

For all information relating to departmental teaching and learning policy, including details of marking criteria and procedures, please consult the Philosophy Undergraduate Handbook, available in hard copy from the main philosophy office, or online (see link on Moodle).

Weekly Schedule

Below is the schedule of topics and readings, arranged by week. Those readings marked * are required readings for that week’s class. Other listed readings relate to the topics for that week, and should be covered in your own time. Required readings are available electronically, on Moodle or through the library.

Week 1:

Is death a harm, and if so, how? • *Epicurus, “Letter to Menoeceus” (class handout/on Moodle) • *Thomas Nagel, “Death”, in his Mortal Questions (Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 1-10 (library e-book; link on Moodle) • *Fred Feldman, “Some Puzzles About the Evil of Death” Philosophical Review 100:2 (1991), pp. 205-227 • Neil Feit, “The Time of Death’s Misfortune” Noûs 36:3 (2002), pp. 359-383 • Shaun Nichols, Nina Strogminger, Arun Rai, and Jay Garfield, “Death and the Self” in Cognitive Science: A Multidisciplinary Journal (2018).

Week 2:

Is death a harm (cont) • * Plato, “Apology”, pp. 40c5-41c7 • * Alice Van Harten, “Socrates on Life and Death” in The Cambridge Classical Journal (2011), Vol. 57, No. 1, pp. 165-183. • * Frances Kamm, “Rescuing Ivan Ilyich: How we Live and How we Die” in Ethics (2003), Vol. 113, No. 3, pp. 202-233. • Leo Tolstoy, “The Death of Ivan Ilyich” in The Death of Ivan Ilyich and Other Stories (London: Vintage Books, 2010), pp. 39-92.

3 Week 3:

Would it be good to be immortal? Individual immortality • *Bernard Williams, “The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality”, in his Problems of the Self (Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 82-100 (library e-book; link on Moodle) • *Samuel Scheffler, “Fear, Death, and Confidence” in Death and the Afterlife (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 83-113. [Note: this book is on Oxford Scholarship Online; link on Moodle] • Niko Kolodny, “That I Should Die and Others Live” in Death and the Afterlife (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 159-173. • Samuel Scheffler, “Death, Value, and the Afterlife: Responses” in Death and the Afterlife (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 197-207.

Week 4:

Extinction: would it be a bad thing if humans ceased to exist altogether? • * Samuel Scheffler, “The Afterlife (Parts I & II)” in Death and the Afterlife (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 15-83. • Susan Wolf, “The Significance of Doomsday” in Death and the Afterlife (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 113-131. • Samuel Scheffler, "Death, Value, and the Afterlife: Responses” in Death and the Afterlife (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 177-190. • Harry G. Frankfurt, “How the Afterlife Matters” in Death and the Afterlife (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 131-143.

Weeks 5 & 6:

Well-being: Is there a convincing account of what makes life good? • *Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: OUP, 1984), Appendix I: What Makes Someone’s Life Go Best? pp. 493-502 (for week 5 class; link on Moodle) • *Andrew Moore, “Objective Human Goods”, in Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker (eds), Well Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), pp. 75-89 (for week 6 class) • James Griffin, Well-Being, Chs. 1-4 • Shelly Kagan, Normative Ethics, section 2.2

Week 7:

Choosing between Lives (1). Is it always obligatory to choose to save the greatest number? • *John Taurek, “Should the Numbers Count?”, Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (1977), pp. 293-316

4 • *Jens Timmermann, “The Individualist Lottery: how people count, but not their numbers”, Analysis 64 (2004), pp. 106-112 • Derek Parfit, “Innumerate Ethics”, Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 (1978), pp. 285-301 • F. M. Kamm, Morality, Mortality Vol. 1, Chs. 5 and 6 • Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, Ch. 16

Week 8:

Choosing Between Lives (2). What other principles should guide choices between lives? • *Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, Ch. 17 ‘Choices Between People’ • *John Harris, “QALYfying the Value of Life” in Journal of Medical Ethics, (1987), pp. 117-123 • Jeff McMahan, “Justice and Liability in Organ Allocation”, Social Research 74 (2007), pp. 101-124

Week 9:

Future People • *Elizabeth Harman, “Can We Harm and Benefit in Creating?”, Philosophical Perspectives, 18 Ethics (2004): 89-113 • *Jeff McMahan, “Wrongful Life: Paradoxes in the Morality of Causing People to Exist” in J. Coleman and C. Morris (eds.) Rational Commitment and Social Justice (CUP 1998). Also in J. Harris (ed.) Bioethics (OUP 2001). • Gregory Kavka, “The Paradox of Future Individuals”, Philosophy and Public Affairs 11 (1982): 93-112 • Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: OUP, 1984), Ch. 16 • Woodward, J. “The Non-Identity Problem” in Ethics 96 (1986): 804-31 • F.M. Kamm, Morality, Mortality Vol 1 (New York: OUP, 1993), Ch. 2 • Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Chs. 17-19 • Jeff McMahan, “Problems of Population Theory”, Ethics 92 (1981): 96-127 • Jan Narveson, “Utilitarianism and the New Generation”, Mind 76 (1967), pp. 62-72

Week 10:

What makes killing wrong? • Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, Ch. 4 section 4 and Ch. 5 • *Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing (Oxford: OUP, 2002), Ch 3, pp. 189-199 and 232-265 • Peter Singer, Practical Ethics Chs 2 and 4 (Cambridge: CUP 1993)

5 Week 11:

Killing and Letting Die: is the distinction morally significant? Against: • Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (London: Penguin, 1977), Ch. 7 (the library holds multiple copies) • *Shelly Kagan, The Limits of Morality (Oxford: OUP 1989), Ch. 3 • Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism (Oxford: OUP 1994), Ch. 4

Killing and Letting Die: is the distinction morally significant? In favour: • Richard Trammel, “Saving Life and Taking Life”, Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975), pp. 131-137 • *Jeff McMahan, “Killing, Letting Die, and Withdrawing Aid”, Ethics 103 (1993), pp. 250-79 • F. M. Kamm, “Killing and Letting Die: Methodological and Substantive Issues”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (1983), pp. 297-312. • Warren Quinn, “Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing”

Week 12:

Doctrine of Double Effect: Is there a significant moral distinction between intending and foreseeing death? • *[In favour] Warren Quinn, “Actions, Intentions and Consequences: the Doctrine of Double Effect:, Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (1989), pp. 334-51 • *[Against] Shelly Kagan, The Limits of Morality, Ch. 4 • Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere (Oxford: OUP, 1986), Ch. 9 • F. M. Kamm, “Harming Some to Save Others”, Philosophical Studies 57 (1989), pp. 227-60 • Shelly Kagan, Normative Ethics, section 3.5

Week 13:

Review session – details to be decided

6 Assessment

1. Critical Analysis of one of the Seminar Readings: 20% (Do not exceed 1000 words)

Choose one reading from those listed under Week 1 (but not Epicurus’ Letter), critically reconstruct one argument from it, and carefully present a criticism of that argument.

The piece must be submitted electronically via the MMS system by 23:59 on Friday 22 February 2019 (end of Week 4). Marks and feedback will be given within 3 weeks.

2. Two Essays (2500 words each): 40% per essay (Do not exceed 2500 words for each essay)

Advice on writing essays can be found on the Philosophy webpages for current students, and in the Undergraduate Handbook (link on Moodle).

Do ensure you are familiar with the University policy on Academic Misconduct (including plagiarism). Academic misconduct is a serious issue, and is punished accordingly.

The first essay must be submitted electronically via the MMS system by 23:59 on Friday 5 April 2019 (end of Week 8).

The second essay must be submitted electronically via the MMS system by 23:59 on Friday 10 May 2019 (end of Week 13).

Marks and feedback will be returned within 3 weeks.

Essay one: (Topics from Weeks 1-7)

1. Is death a harm? If so, how? If not, why not?

2. Would immortality be a blessing? If so, why? If not, why not?

3. Is the survival of humanity more important to us than our own survival? If so, why? If not, why not?

4. What do you think is the most plausible account of human well- being, and why?

5. When faced with a choice between saving the lives of one group of people or another group of people, is it ever permissible to choose the group with fewer people?

Essay two: (Topics from Weeks 8-13)

1. When allocating scarce medical resources, on what possible basis can we legitimately give some lives preference over others?

2. Does bringing an individual into existence with a good life benefit that person? Argue for your answer.

3. Is the distinction between (i) intending harm, and (ii) merely foreseeing that harm will occur, morally significant? Why, or why not?

4. Is letting someone die as morally bad as killing them, assuming the motives and consequences are the same?

General submission guidance: Instructions for submission of essays, marking criteria, advice on writing philosophy essays and details of penalties for lateness and exceeding word length can all be found in the Philosophy Handbook for Undergraduates. A link to this is on Moodle.

Submission of coursework is electronic, via the MMS system – no paper submissions. Please use double-line spacing.

Coursework is marked anonymously, and submitted work should be identified only by your matriculation number. Do not put your name anywhere on your coursework. On the first page of your coursework, you should include: your matriculation number, the module name and number, your tutor’s name, the title of the essay (i.e. the essay question), and the following statement:

'I hereby declare that the attached piece of written work is my own work and that I have not reproduced, without acknowledgement, the work of another'.

8 You must attach a bibliography of all your sources to each essay; all quotations from and paraphrase of other work must be clearly acknowledged. You should be aware of the University policy on academic misconduct and plagiarism, which is a serious offence and is punished accordingly. http://www.st- andrews.ac.uk/students/rules//academicmisconduct/

The word-lengths specified for each essay include everything except the bibliography (i.e., the word-count includes footnotes, quotes, etc.) You must provide a word-count at the end of every essay. Do not exceed the stated word limit – penalties will apply (see handbook).

Assessed coursework will normally be returned – via MMS – within three weeks of submission.