April 2013 a Thesis Submitted to Mcgill University in Partial Fulfillment

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April 2013 a Thesis Submitted to Mcgill University in Partial Fulfillment MUSICAL JUDGMENT: AESTHETICS AND JURISPRUDENCE IN PLATO NINA VALIQUETTE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE MCGILL UNIVERSITY, MONTREAL April 2013 A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy © Nina Valiquette, 2013 ABSTRACT This dissertation turns to Plato’s writings on music and the law in order to delimit the relationship between the aesthetic and juridical dimensions of political order, and in particular, to show how these dimensions are manifested in citizens and are constitutive of political judgment. The central claim of my thesis is that for Plato, justice requires an affective attachment that, in turn, requires it be coextensive with a kind of musical beauty. In order for the conditions of justice to obtain, we must not only define justice, we must also desire it as we do the beautiful; this affective requirement is fulfilled by the musical dimension of the law. The ancients understood law and music to share in the same intrinsic properties of order, establishment and restoration; the ambiguity of the word nomos, which could mean both song and law, underscores this worldview according to which ethics and aesthetics are governed by the same principles. In Plato, musical desire works within this framework: music engenders in the soul a pre-rational cognitive recognition of the intrinsic order that constitutes its beauty; musical inspiration, in turn, provides the motive force for active juridical citizenship. Surprisingly little scholarly attention has been paid to Plato’s treatment of music and few scholars treat Plato as committed to the rule of law. I show that Plato’s attention to both music and law throughout the dialogues underscores the political importance of an aesthetic education that is also juridical; the pedagogical function of the law is to cultivate a civic ethos in which citizens are passionately engaged with, inspired by, and take ultimate pleasure in, the principles of justice. i RÉSUMÉ Dans cette dissertation je m'appuie sur les écrits de Platon sur la musique et le droit pour déterminer la relation entre les dimensions esthétique et juridique de l'ordre politique et, plus particulièrement, pour montrer comment ces dimensions se manifestent chez les citoyens et entrent dans le jugement politique. Le postulat central de ma thèse est que, pour Platon, la justice requiert un attachement affectif qui, à son tour, exige qu'elle soit coextensive à une sorte de beauté musicale. Pour que les conditions de justice soient réunies, nous devons non seulement définir la justice mais la désirer, tout comme nous désirons la beauté; la dimension musicale du droit satisfait à cette exigence affective. Pour les anciens, le droit et la musique avaient les mêmes propriétés intrinsèques d'ordre, d'établissement, et de restauration; l'ambiguïté du terme nomos, voulant dire tant chanson que droit, souligne cette vision du monde selon laquelle l'éthique et l'esthétique sont régies par les mêmes principes. Chez Platon, le désir musical agit dans ce cadre: la musique engendre dans l'âme une reconnaissance cognitive pré-rationnelle de l'ordre intrinsèque qui en constitue la beauté; l'inspiration musicale, à son tour, est le moteur de la citoyenneté juridique active. Il est étonnant de constater le peu d'attention consacré dans les travaux d'érudition au traitement de la musique chez Platon et seul un petit nombre d'auteurs voient Platon comme étant engagé à l'égard de la règle de droit. Je montre que l'attention qu'accorde Platon à la musique et à la règle de droit tout au long des dialogues souligne l'importance sur le plan politique d'une éducation à la fois esthétique et juridique; la fonction pédagogique du droit est de promouvoir un éthos civique dans lequel les principes de justice sont pour les citoyens une source d'engagement passionné, d'inspiration et, ultérieurement, de plaisir. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank my supervisor, Arash Abizadeh, for his commitment to me throughout my tenure at McGill. Arash pushed me to grapple with philosophical problems I wanted to avoid, challenged me to be analytically rigorous in my thinking and writing, and insisted that I should trust my intellectual instincts. I am a better scholar for having been his student. I would also like to thank Christina Tarnopolsky, whose work on Plato I take as exemplary for my own. This dissertation has benefitted immeasurably from her intellectual generosity, extensive feedback and insightful comments. I am also extremely grateful for the incisive comments and feedback provided by my examining committee, which, in addition to Arash and Christina, was comprised of Jacob T. Levy, Victor Muniz-Fraticelli, Eric Lewis, Jill Frank and Hudson Meadwell. I would also like to make special mention of the fertile intellectual environment provided by the Research Group on Constitutional Studies (RGCS). Writing a dissertation can be lonely business; as an RGCS fellow I have been part of a vibrant community of scholars and friends. I am grateful for the generous financial support provided throughout my years at McGill by the James McGill Fellowship, the Groupe inter-universitaire en philosophie politique (GRIPP) Fellowship, the McGill Majors Fellowship, the Principal’s Graduate Fellowship, and the Nathan Steinberg Fellowship. I also wish to thank Christopher Manfredi, Juliet Johnson, Richard Schultz and Stuart Soroka for their support while I wrote this thesis. iii This dissertation would not have been possible without the love and support of some extraordinary people. I am deeply grateful to Frederick Davidson, who changed the course of my life, and made the path to this PhD possible, and to my grandparents, Anna and Andrzej Nowakowski, who were alive to see the beginning of all of this and are in my heart here at the end. I am profoundly humbled by the love and support of my mother, Eve Anders, who has shown me throughout my life that dreams and hard-work are great friends. Most importantly, none of this would have been possible without the love, patience, and support of my husband, Luke Moreau, and my little girls, Sienna and Laila. Their love makes my life important. This dissertation is dedicated to Professor Horst Hutter. Ten years ago, I walked into his undergraduate class on Plato. It changed my life. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 1 MUSIC, PHILOSOPHY, POETRY AND LAW .......................................................................... 1 Scholarship On Music and Law in Plato ........................................................................................ 3 Plato and the Rule of Law................................................................................................................. 6 Plato and Music ............................................................................................................................... 10 Plan of the Work ............................................................................................................................. 15 Methodology and Primary Sources ............................................................................................... 20 CHAPTER ONE .................................................................................................................... 22 READING PLATO ............................................................................................................. 22 Plato’s Cosmos ................................................................................................................................ 43 CHAPTER TWO .................................................................................................................... 48 JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PERSUASION ...................................................................... 48 The Apology and the Law Against Impiety (Asebeia) ................................................................... 50 The Legal Speeches ......................................................................................................................... 57 The Euthyphro and Legal ‘Impiety’ ................................................................................................ 70 The Crito and the Law of Law ....................................................................................................... 74 Plato’s Juridical Citizen ................................................................................................................... 86 CHAPTER THREE ................................................................................................................ 90 MUSICAL MIMESIS: PLATO AND THE AESTHETIC QUESTION ......................................... 90 Introducing Musical Mimesis ........................................................................................................ 97 the “New Music” Revolution & Damon of Oa ....................................................................... 101 Musical Mimesis: Assimilation and Reciprocity ........................................................................ 111 Recuperating the Modes ............................................................................................................... 116 CHAPTER FOUR ................................................................................................................ 126 MUSICAL INSPIRATION: HOMER, HESIOD, PLATO AND THE MUSES ...........................
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