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The Assessment of Bureaucratic Corruption Control in South Korea

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The Assessment of Bureaucratic Corruption Control in South Korea The Assessment of Bureaucratic Corruption Control in South Korea: The Importance of Political Will in Government's Anti-Corruption Efforts By Kim, Sung-Hwan A Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Politics F acuIty of Social Sciences University of Sheffield U.K. April 2008 SUMMARY The Assessment of Bureaucratic Corruption Control in South Korea: The Importance of Pol itical Wi I I in Government's Anti-Corruption Efforts by Sung-Hwan Kim. Despite various efforts at corruption control, corruption is a common phenomena in most countries. To explain the rampancy of corruption and its control, scholars concentrated various efforts on studying the causes of corruption and control strategies, along with the functions of corruption. Korea has the same difficulties because of corruption as other countries, but research was not enough and Korean scholars studied mainly fragmented aspects, such as its causes and measures such as strong punishment and adoption of corruption control agencies, etc. However, this research focuses on the concept that the effectiveness of a certain policy depends on how strongly the government pushes it forward, which can be called 'political will'. In other words, this research stresses that political will in the process of corruption control policies is the most important variable for the success of corruption control whatever the measures adopted. This research hypothesises that the failure of corruption control in Korea is related to the insufficiency of political will. This research defined political will as the commitment of governmental actors to undertake actions with seriousness to control corruption and to sustain those actions over time. To assess political will, this research set up two key factors, (undertaking actions seriously and sustainability), and five indicators. In addition, a framework was suggested to analyse the results of assessment by indicators. The corruption control efforts from the First Republic to the Eighth Republic of Korea were analysed for an assessment of each of the Korean Government's corruption control efforts. The results of the assessment were as expected. This research confirmed that political will should be strong in order that corruption control becomes successful, and the political will model works significantly in the analysis of corruption control efforts. .. 11 TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Figures V1l1 List of Tables V1l1 Chapter 1: Introduction ----------------------------- 1 1.1 Purpose of Research ---------------------------------------------- 1 1.1.1 Introduction 1.1.2 Limitations of the Studies of Korean Corruption 1.1.3 Purpose and Significance of This Study 1.2 Definition of Terms ---------------------------------------------- 12 1.3 Controlling Corruption ------------------------------------------ 18 1.3.1 Approaches for Corruption Control ------------------------------------------------ 18 a) Corruption Control by Institutionalisation b) Corruption Control by Punishment c) Corruption Control by Cultural Change d) Conclusion 1.3.2 Causes of policy failure and political will ---------------------------------------- 24 a) Human Causes b) Structural causes c) Circumstantial causes d) Conclusion - Political will as another cause 1.3.3 Political Will in Corruption Control ----------------------------------------------- 27 111 1.4 Framework of Analysis ----------------------------------------- 31 a) Degree of Seriousness on the Initial Stages b) The Target Rank and Credibility of Sanctions c) Long-Term Strategy d) Frequency of Efforts e) Mobilisation of Support 1.5 Methodology ----------------------------------------------------- 41 1.6 Organisation of the Thesis ------------------------------------- 44 Chapter 2: Circumstances of Korean republics and the Extent of and Trends in corruption of Korea ----------------- 47 2.1 Circumstances of previous Korean republics --------------- 48 2.1.1 The newly established republic and reconstruction period (1948-1961) 2.1.2 Park's authoritarian regime and Economic growth (1961- 1979) 2.1.3 Two General successors' regime (1979-1992) 2.1.4 First Civilian President, Kim Young-Sam's regime (1992-1997) 2.1.5 First Former Opposite Leader, Kim Dae-Jung's regime (1998-2002) 2.2 Extent of and Trends in bureaucratic corruption of Korea -- 74 2.2.1 Types of bureaucratic corruption in the Korean law and code of conduct 2.2.2 The extent of and Trends in bureaucratic corruption of Korea . IV Chapter 3: The relationship of corruption to several dynamic elements in Korea, such as culture, politics and the economy --------------------------------- 85 3.1 The relationship between corruption and culture in Korea - 87 3.1.1 Confucianism 3.1.2 Familism 3.1.3 Affectionate humanism 3.1.4 Authoritarian culture 3.1.5 Red-tapism 3-2. The relations between corruption and politics in Korea ---- 99 3.2.1 Historical-Political factors 3.2.2 Cost of political structures 3.2.3 Democratization 3-3. Relations between corruption and economy in Korea ---- 110 3.3.1 Politics-business tie ups 3.3.2 Correlations between corruption and economic growth 3-4. Conclusion ------------------------------------------------------ 123 Chapter 4: Institutionalization of anti-corruption policy in Korea ----------------------- 128 4-1. Institutionalization in the First Republic of Korea ------- 130 v 4-2. Institutionalization in the Second Republic of Korea ----- 131 4-3. Institutionalization in the Third Republic of Korea ------- 133 4-4. Institutionalization in the Fourth Republic of Korea ------ 136 4-5. Institutionalization in the Fifth Republic of Korea -------- 141 4-6. Institutionalization in the Sixth Republic of Korea -------- 146 4-7. Institutionalization in the Seventh Republic of Korea ---- 148 4-8. Institutionalization in the Eighth Republic of Korea ------ 154 4-9. Conclusion ------------------------------------------------------ 158 Chapter 5: Corruption Control under the Lee and Chang regime (1948 - 1961) -- 161 5.1 Corruption Control of the First Republic of Korea (1948-1960) -------------------------------------------------------------- 162 5.1.1. Degree of Seriousness on the Initial Stages 5.1.2 The Target Rank and Credibility of Sanctions 5.1.3 Long-Tenn Strategy 5.1.4 Frequency of Efforts 5.1.5 Mobilisation of Support 5.1.6 Conclusion 5.2 Corruption Control of the Second Republic of Korea (1960- 1961) -------------------------------------------------------------- 170 5.2.1 Degree of Seriousness on the Initial Stages, and Frequency of Efforts 5.2.2 Other Indicators VI Chapter 6: Corruption Control under the Park Regime (1961 - 1979) --------------- 175 6.1 Corruption Control of the Military Junta and Third Republic (1961 - 1971) 175 6.1.1 Degree of Seriousness on the Initial Stages 6.1.2 The Target Rank and Credibility of Sanctions 6.1.3 Long-Term Strategy 6.1.4 Frequency of Efforts 6.1.5 Mobilisation of Support 6.1.6 Conclusion 6.2 Conuption Control ofthe Fourth Republic (1972 - 1979) ---184 6.2.1 Degree of Seriousness on the Initial Stages 6.2.2 The Target Rank and Credibility of Sanctions 6.2.3 Long-Term Strategy 6.2.4 Frequency of Efforts 6.2.5 Mobilisation of Support 6.2.6 Conclusion Chapter 7: Corruption Control under the Chun, Doo- Hwan Regime (1979-1987) 196 7.1 Degree of Seriousness on the Initial Stages 7.2 The Target Rank and Credibility of Sanctions 7.3 Long-Term Strategy 7.4 Frequency of Efforts 7.5 Mobilisation of Support 7.6 Conclusion .. Vll Chapter 8: Corruption Control under the Roh, Tae-Woo Regime (1988-1992) 208 8.1 Degree of Seriousness on the Initial Stages 8.2 The Target Rank and Credibility of Sanctions 8.3 Long-Term Strategy 804 Frequency of Efforts 8.5 Mobilisation of Support 8.6 Conclusion Chapter 9: Corruption Control under the Kim, Young-Sam Regime (1993-1997) --- 222 9.1 Degree of Seriousness on the Initial Stages 9.2 The Target Rank and Credibility of Sanctions 9.3 Long-Term Strategy 9 A Frequency of Efforts 9.5 Mobilisation of Support 9.6 Conclusion Chapter 10: Corruption Control under the Kim, Dae-Jung Regime (1998-2002) ---- 236 10.1 Degree of Seriousness on the Initial Stages 10.2 The Target Rank and Credibility of Sanctions 10.3 Long-Term Strategy 1004 Frequency of Efforts 10.5 Mobilisation of Support 10.6 Conclusion V111 Chapter 11: Conclusion --------------------------- 246 11.1 The political will by indicators 11.2 The Political Will by Republics 11.3 Conclusion Bibliography ---------------------------------------- 265 . IX LIST OF FIGURES Fig. 1.1 Principal-Agent-Client Model 28 Fig. 1.2 Matrix of Two Variables 33 FIg. 2.1 The number of criminal prosecutions of corrupt officials (per 10,000) 76 Fig. 2.2 The number of disciplined government officials for corruption (per 10,000) 79 LIST OF TABLES Table 2.1 The major economic indicators in Kim Dae-Jung's republic 72 Table 2.2 The number of criminal prosecutions of corrupt officials (per 10,000) 77 Table 2.3 The number of government officials disciplined for corruption (per 10,000) 79 Table 2.4 The annual CPI of Korea 82 Table 2.5 The frequency of bribe offer in the executive agencies in Korea 83 (The result of public-opinion poll) Table 2.6 The perception on the seriousness of corruption in Korea 83 (The result of public-opinion poll) Table 3.1 The ten largest business groups in Korea 113 Table 4. 1. The number of institutional improvement (cases) 146 Table 5.1 The Numbers of officials punished by The Commission of Inspection (1951-1954) 163 x Table 5.2 The Numbers of officials punished by The Commission of Assessment (1956-1960)
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