A LOOK TO THE FUTURE: RUSSIA’S INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER
TEEMU KILPELÄINEN, STEPHEN MURPHY, JOSH POWERS, MICHAEL WELCH
Teemu Kilpeläinen on majuri ja palvelee Ilmavoimien Esikunnan Operatiivisella osastolla Ilmavoimien ilmatorjuntapäällikkönä. Stephen Murphy on everstiluutnantti ja palvelee USA:n Joint Spectrum Center’issä. Josh Powers on komentajakapteeni ja palvelee USA:n Joint Staff’ssä. Michael Welch on majuri ja palvelee USAFRICOM’issa.
Tiivistelmä
Terrorismin vastainen toiminta ja Kauko mational, Military and Economic (DIME)). idän kasvanut merkitys ovat korostuneet Yhdysvalloissa Venäjän toimia pidetään pää Yhdysvaltojen harjoittamassa politiikassa sääntöisesti pyrkimyksenä palauttaa entinen kuluneen vuosikymmenen aikana. Samal suurvalta-asema takaisin. Tätä ei pidetä to la asevoimien operatiivinen ja strateginen dennäköisenä, koska Venäjällä on arvioiden ajattelu on siirtynyt pois perinteisestä kyl mukaan monenlaisia ja jopa ylitsepääsemät män sodan ajan uhkamallista. Venäjän poli tömiä haasteita voitettavanaan muun muas tiikan muutokset ja aktiivinen sotilaallinen sa talouden saralla. On todennäköistä, että toiminta muun muassa Ukrainassa ovat vas Venäjä säilyy tulevaisuudessa yrityksistään ta viime aikoina havahduttaneet amerikka huolimatta ainoastaan alueellisena voima laiset arvioimaan Venäjän pyrkimyksiä aivan tekijänä. uudessa valossa. Artikkeli on majuri Teemu Kilpeläisen Tässä artikkelissa arvioidaan pääosin johtaman työryhmän laatima opinnäytetyö amerikkalaisiin lähteisiin perustuen Venäjän Yhdysvaltain Joint Forces Staff Collegessa kansallisia toimintamahdollisuuksia ja -kyky (JFSC) alkukesällä 2015. Työn ohjaajana oli jä diplomatian, informaation, asevoimien ja Commander Michael Bissell (US Navy). talouden näkökulmista (Diplomatic, Infor
20 Introduction national power at the highest levels of strategic guidance, e.g., the Presidential The collapse of the Soviet Union ushered National Security Strategy. By analyzing in a new era of hope and possibility. The Russia’s current and recent employment West won the ideological battle contained of their DIME powers this paper will in the Cold War and democracy and speculate on Russia’s future. Russia’s capitalism seemed poised to sweep across strategic success will depend, to a great Russia and Eastern Europe. The era extent, on whether Russian leadership would bring a new sense of commitment decides to increase their integration into to freedom and open societies. Old the international system and mitigate enemies would now meet on the world the threat of future armed conflict. At stage as equal partners in the cause of this point, Russia does not seem eager freedom, with one providing a cautionary to integrate into an international system tale about the woes of oppressive on the West’s terms. Ironically, fully government. The reality, however, of the integrating into this system could spell a post Soviet space has been anything but return to superpower status. As a result, hopeful. Russian integration into a world Russia will likely have to settle for the based on European ideas and on the more modest role of a leading regional West’s terms has been problematic. Russia power in Eurasia. continues to struggle with its post Soviet Union identity and President Putin’s Diplomacy motives continue to confound the West. H.L. Menkin1 noted that “For every Russia’s diplomatic strategy is shaped complex problem there is an answer that by how it views the outside world and is clear, simple, and wrong” (Menkin). is heavily reliant on one man, Vladimir While it is difficult to predict the future, Putin. To truly understand Putin and especially on the complex and grand his motives one must understand the scale of geo-political relationships, it conditions inside Russia after the collapse is not impossible. Studying facts and of the Soviet Union that led to his rise to professional speculation about Russia’s power as well as how he used the other present can help in predicting the ways instruments of national power to secure they may use their elements of national and maintain his power base. power. The instruments of national power During Boris Yeltsin’s presidency, are Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Russia enacted a series of economic and Economic (DIME). DIME is the reforms designed to introduce free market method used to describe the tool set of concepts, diversify the economy, and
1 H.L. Menkin was an American satirist, critic, philosopher, and writer known for his commentaries on society and culture.
21 develop the private sector. Yeltsin elected became the foundation of his political to forgo a phased attempt at establishing strategy. As things got better on the home a free market economy. The attempted front, Putin began to wonder how to reforms were aggressive in light of expand his vision globally. The question Russia’s historical dependence on a state facing Putin became, “How do I balance a controlled economy. The results were vision where the rule of law does not truly uncontrolled inflation, devaluation of the exist against avoiding provoking the West ruble, and the rise of an extremely wealthy (Frum)?” oligarchy. The marked rise in domestic The answer to this question is, instability led to increased government ultimately, Putin didn’t need to balance control and questions from the West his vision at all. In 2008, Russia about whether post Soviet Russia was invaded Georgia and began a long term willing to join the post Cold War world. occupation of breakaway republics, South Additionally, Russia attempted to join Ossetia and Abkhazia. Putin wondered, the World Trade Organization and G8 “Would the West tolerate a greater power as way to develop closer ties to the West. carving up smaller nations (Frum)?” The Russia believed the West unfairly and answer, sadly, was yes. Russia ultimately unnecessarily contested its membership did not face significant punishment from by withholding access in exchange for the West. Sanctions imposed by the domestic reform. From the Russian point Bush administration were lifted shortly of view, the West treated Russia with thereafter by the Obama administration. great skepticism and never fully accepted Putin’s main takeaway was that or all their membership on the world stage. In of the West’s grand talk the strong still addition, economic reforms imposed ultimately dictate to the weak (Zongyou). on the Western model led to domestic In light of this important lesson, instability, an economic downturn and Putin’s diplomatic vision is built on a loss of face on the international stage three pillars, security (primarily through (Zongyou). As a result, Russia remained annexing vulnerable territory), a Eurasian content to distance itself from the West Union and a Russo-Orthodox identity and reestablish regional dominance as an (McKew). Putin’s vision is oversimplified entree to superpower status. by attempting to boil it down to Vladimir Putin rose to power amidst recapturing Soviet glory. Putin states, this instability and skepticism. His first “We are not talking about recreating the presidency focused on reestablishing USSR in one form or another. It would be domestic security. He began by naive to try to restore or copy that which improving the standard of living and remains in the past, but close integration continued to expand his power by based on new values and a political and promoting nationalism and, where that economic foundation is imperative failed, through intimidation (Frum). (Elder).” His vision is more accurately His popularity soared in Russia and this described as Russian exceptionalism.
22 Putin adds, “We received a big legacy Putin’s vision is not without from the Soviet Union – infrastructure, weakness and contradiction. As Maxim current industrial specialization, and a Trudolyubov stated in the New York common linguistic, scientific and cultural Times, “Mr. Putin has succeeded in space. To use this resource together for (ending internal disarray), but his our development is in our common agenda has been achieved through interest (Elder).” negative measures . . . making the press With true acceptance and access to the compliant, Parliament acquiescent, the West not available on anything other than courts obeisant and business neutralized terms dictated by the United States and as a political actor (Trudolyubov).” He her European allies, Putin formulated a further adds, “Can a leader whose more pragmatic approach around his actions are so negative at home become a idea of exceptionalism. This consists of successful player in international politics a regional focus highlighted by closer (Trudolyubov)?” The episode in Ukraine ties to the east and mending fences with and the Crimea provides the best example old partners (Xinhua). Putin’s approach for the contradictions in the renewed could be quite attractive to ex-Soviet Russian regional approach. If Russia’s goal states and others looking to expand is to promote nationalism by annexing opportunity, but frustrated by the bar territory then Russia should continue to for entry imposed by the West. Annexing pressure Ukraine to abandon its claims the Crimea not only provided a security to the Crimea. Russian or freedom fighter barrier to the West and ensures access deaths against the Ukrainian military to the Black Sea for the Black Sea Fleet, could also weaken nationalist viewpoints it also dramatically increased Putin’s in annexed territories. If Russia’s goal is popularity at home. Putin’s vision for to establish a Eurasian Union then it a Eurasian Union is gaining traction should work to bring Ukraine into the with former Soviet republics - Belarus, fold - not only as a counter-balance to the Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan Russian viewpoint, but also because of its and Armenia (McKew). “We propose a economic power (Trudolyubov). These model of powerful, supranational union, contradictions will prevent Russia from capable of becoming one of the poles of effectively executing Putin’s grand vision the modern world (Elder).” Additionally, and potentially provide opportunities for Putin’s emphasis on a shared Russian Western success. Orthodox heritage provides potential entrance into markets in Serbia, Greece Information and Cyprus. Arguably, the most compelling aspect of Putin’s vision is his Russian President Vladimir Putin uses rejection of European ideology, a “it’s ok the information instrument of national to be what you are” membership criteria power effectively within the Russian (McKew). borders, and, to some degree targets some
23 smaller, disenfranchised countries. An very quickly in the attempt to gain and observation of the sources and means maintain control over information flow through which information reaches and availability. For example, restrictions the proper audiences is necessary to on blogging took effect following the understand how Putin, and Russia, could first round of Russian information laws continue this successful campaign. There being passed in merely four months of are multiple ways in which information Putin’s ascent to power (Laine). These is passed throughout Russia. Official, laws transformed the Russian blogosphere state-run news media is the primary as compared to the West. Moreover, the means by which the Russian government three major national television networks pushes information to the masses. Other were taken under the control of the state sources of information include local, less than a year after Putin was sworn into independent news agencies, unauthorized office (Gessen, 174). Media in Russia sources such as underground radio and is segregated into discrete circles with newspapers, and third-party sources regulations in place to keep media sources which include international press and from interacting and producing a bigger various social media outlets. Focusing picture message. Mass protests of any on the methods through which Russia sort seem unlikely as multiple sources of disseminates information is important information have no means of connection in determining the current and future or interaction large enough to gain strength of the information instrument momentum or escape from the watchful of national power while the credibility of eyes of Russian regulators (Gessen, various media and information sources, as 262). Furthermore, printed media and perceived by the groups involved, is also internet sites are easily manipulated and critical. (JP 2-01.3, III-40) controlled by the Russian government. During the Soviet era the Soviet Overly cautious reporting and self- government used the information censorship are commonplace in Russia, instrument of national power very and critical voices are falling into silence effectively. Two ways they did so were which are the real threats for liberty the total control of terror and total control for the Russian presses (Laine). These of the lie. It is highly unlikely total control overarching information regulations will of terror can be used in Russia today, be beneficial to Putin in the short term however a variant of the total control as he looks to exert some control over the of the lie does show some potential for Russian people. short term gain (Gessen). Specifically, on The information instrument of today’s global stage, whoever controls national power has been effective for the information can dominate the world. Putin on the home front in regards to The Kremlin, under Putin’s tenure has his use of the military instrument of been adjusting information-related laws national power for the land grab of the
24 Crimean peninsula. Putin’s popularity in of the restricting measures as a means of Russia soared above 80 percent as state- information security (Laine). controlled television unleashed tirades Should Russia continue to use the against the West. Public opinion polls information control tactic of the total showed that 90 percent of Russians control of the lie, she will face challenges considered the referendum in Crimea in achieving long term strategic goals. to be the result of the free will of the The Russian citizens might believe Crimean people and western pressure initial reports through state-run media against them. Official results showed for a short period of time but as other that 83 percent of Crimean citizens internal and external information sources turned out to vote and 97 percent voted begin to report, they will discover the in favor of annexation. These were the gaps. Freedom of information is in numbers reported in Russian media, jeopardy in Russia and this is prevalent although the president’s own Council to the international community. This for the Development of Civil Society is very dangerous in that approval in and Human Rights astonishingly Russia does not give the Kremlin, nor declared that the actual numbers were Putin for that matter, carte blanche quite different. The council estimated authority to act outside of the Russian that the voter turnout was closer to 30 borders. Information is very powerful to 50 percent of which only 50 to 60 tool and can be used to great benefit or percent voted in favor of annexation. The adversity as proven by Putin’s information council’s final estimate was around 22.5 dominance campaign within Russia, percent of registered Crimean voters seemingly bringing Russian legitimacy voted in favor of annexation. So while to his military and diplomatic actions. media reports showed 82 percent of However, this control of the media via Crimeans voting for annexation, Putin’s internet firewalls, media regulations, etc., inner circle showed only 22.5 percent takes away from the legitimacy of the voting in favor (Dawisha, 319). Russian government on the international Protests against electoral fraud in May stage which will no doubt cause problems of 2012 resulted in increased restrictions for Russia in the long-term and for her on the Internet and threatened to strategic and international ambitions. completely eliminate freedom of the press which was already largely driven from Military mainstream newspapers and television media (Dawisha, 317). Russian media The military option as a means of appears to be blind to the degrees of national power is well known. Although freedom which have been lost. Some it is usually the biggest instrument of commentary on Russian journalism national power, and unarguably the most from inside Russian politics sees many costly, it is also generally viewed as the
25 last resort in terms of diplomacy. The weapons (Friedman). In September of Russians, however, have begun using their 2014, two Bear bombers flew past to military assets as a primary diplomatic Greenland via Iceland and in November tool in an attempt to assert dominance of the same year, one flight of these on the international stage. The Kremlin bombers with tanker support and fighter is also using the military as a means of escort made it as far south as Northern grabbing land to expand Russian borders. California. The problem with this assertion and The most notable military action by the utilization of military forces is that it Russians in recent times is the annexation comes with a cost. The current economic of Crimea from Ukraine and her support state is exacerbated by the Kremlin’s to the Eastern Ukrainian rebels. In incestuous desire to assert dominance. February 2014, Russian Special Forces After the collapse of the Soviet under the guise of self-defense units and Union in 1991 the Russian military was embedded with rebel fighters, took over relatively quiet and took a back seat as multiple government buildings. Over the a formidable force on the world stage. next few weeks these forces gained control As Russia rebounded from the Soviet of several Ukrainian military and naval collapse, they began to reconstitute bases. A month later, President Vladimir their military forces. In 1999, the Putin signed a treaty to annex Crimea Russians held a theater exercise known as (Macias). The Kremlin is now using ZAPAD-99. This exercise was enormous Crimea as a forward staging base. Russia and included the headquarters and has stated that it will build up her military command structures of five military presence on the Crimean peninsula as a districts, three fleets, and about 50,000 response to NATO and U.S. forces being command and staff personnel. This built up within the region (Agence Presse- exercise modeled a response to NATO France). ‘aggression against Russia and its allies’ Unfortunately for Russia, these mi- (Kip). In 2007, Russian aircraft returned litary courses of action are unsustainab- to some of the Cold War era, long le. Russia’s current military ambitions distance probing flights by deploying the are costly. Russia has been propping up Tu-95 bombers along the United States her military despite a fledgling economy. coastline. These flights soon became Budget data recently published shows more robust with the use of fighter the Russians have already spent over 9% escorts and intelligence gathering aircraft of their quarterly GDP for 2015 which (Quinilivin). In 2008, Russia went to war is more than double what was budgeted with Georgia over South Ossetia, giving (Holodny). Due to Russia’s actions in the more legitimacy to Russia’s new contract Ukraine, and more specifically on the military versus a conscript military while Crimean peninsula, she faces ongoing bolstering confidence in Russia’s ability to Western sanctions limiting her ability to win local wars without the use of nuclear borrow on the international markets. The
26 decline of the ruble and the price of oil several internationally-focus financial are two more stressors on a timid Rus- think-tanks. Estimates on Russia’s sian economy (Adomanis). These are just economic reserves vs their international three examples of the economic strain debt may tempt the Kremlin to increase Russia faces as the Kremlin continues her ruble production to buy foreign currency unsustainable military spending frenzy. --a sure fire way to increase their inflation rate and push economic problems only Economic a slight distance into the future (“The Rouble: The Worst Is Yet to Come”). Russia’s application of military power One indicator of the limitations in the Ukraine sparked an international of Russia’s economic power is their response which included sanctions involvement in the space industry. Space imposed by the United States. US policy analyst Pavel Luzin of Perm State President Obama stated: University2 indicates that Russia has never recovered from the abrupt change [W]e were doing the hard work of impo- in funding felt with the collapse of the sing sanctions along with our allies, as Soviet Union. The economic principles we were reinforcing our presence with that enabled Soviet space and missile frontline states, Mr. Putin’s aggression it programs to thrive during the Cold War was suggested was a masterful display of are gone. The current big-three space strategy and strength. That’s what I heard companies in Russia do not have the from some folks. Well, today, it is Ame- funding to innovate and create new space rica that stands strong and united with systems and most particularly, rockets our allies, while Russia is isolated with its (Bodner). The most expensive aspect of economy in tatters. (Obama) operating is the space domain is getting into orbit and Russia is recycling and However, recent reviews of Russia’s repurposing old Soviet era technology- economy indicate that the sanctions -the inventory will eventually be had little effect and any decline can be depleted. Currently Russia is benefiting attributed to the international price of economically from providing space oil (Matthews). Despite these setbacks transportation for humans two-and-from the Russian stock market has gained the International Space Station (ISS). 20% in 2015 over their past declines When the US Space Transit System (i.e., (Matthews). Contrary opinions are also the space shuttle) program ended in July readily available through the reports of 201,1 the cost of flight for one astronaut
2 Permskiy Gosudarstvennyy Universitet is a Russian University in the city of Perm and was found- ed in 1916 in line with strategies to increase cultural and geopolitical education and understand- ing in the Ural economic region (“Perm State University”).
27 went from $8 million to $70.7 million patents awarded since 2000 by the U.S. per seat virtually overnight (Wall). The Patent and Trademark Office. This is contract between NASA and Russia has another indication that Russia’s economy currently been extended through 2018 as is not sustainable for the long duration the US continues to fund and explore its (Dawisha, 315). own human spacelift capabilities through As Russia progresses towards innovative companies such as SpaceX becoming a regional player instead of (Clark). It is this exact type of innovation an international Superpower they should that Russia does not seem to have to look to furthering their expansion capability to foster due to their current through accepting partnerships within economic policy and funding. While their a Eurasian Union. China and the US economy is currently benefiting from our are able to compete internationally, lack of human space lift capability it will (e.g., space exploration), through their be our future capability that cripples the own internal resources and significant advantages they currently exercise. influence within the international Russia’s economic national power is economic community--a model that not singularly reflected by their current Russia can not currently apply to its own space policy. End-of-the-millennium situation. The former USSR contained financial decline prompted reforms in the locations (e.g., Kazakhstan, Latvia) Russia that have helped them weather and resources required to power the subsequent declines and to take better aggressive Soviet space program that advantage in times of prosperity. still provides space lift and vehicles used President Vladimir Putin, however, in present day to transit humans to and has significantly hindered the reforms from the International Space Station that have been so advantageous to the (Zak). Russia could leverage the economic economic progress Russia has enjoyed. power of a Eurasian Union to exploit the Analysts predict that unless those reforms resources available in that region as the are put back into play soon, things will means to gain a foothold in superpower- begin to look dire for the mid-level level economics such as the space industry country as compared with the rest of the (Elder). world (Aslund). Education also plays into the economic Conclusion equation that seems to predict a dark future. While Russia consistently scores If Russia’s desire for a greater role on high in education it remains profoundly the world stage is based on the level of hamstrung by the relative lack of stability within their instruments of technological innovation. Despite their national power then prospects are grim. enormous reserve of talent in applied Russian applications of the instruments and theoretical sciences, they logged only of national power are not sustainable 0.2 percent of the 1.3 million overseas over the long term and will ultimately
28 prevent Russia from reaching a stage of and gas extraction with domestic increase full participation in the international in propaganda. order. Of late, Russian diplomacy has Russian economic power is threatened attempted to take a more pragmatic tack, not only by scientific progress in the but its application has often been at odds world market, but by the problems that with the West. exist internal to their own financial The National Security Strategy systems. The Russian economy relies 2015 identifies Russia as an aggressive heavily on a single-source of income international force (Obama). Russia has which suppresses investment in other countered President Obama’s viewpoint sectors. Oil and gas are the single source by stepping up its information campaign. and has increased from 30 to over 50 The main theme of Russia’s information percent over the past decade. Efforts to war is anti-Americanism, the fight modernize the economy have made little against “fascism” in Ukraine, and a or temporary progress. Further stressing renewal of a sense of Russian greatness, their economy is an aging workforce and the distinctiveness of Russian values. that will put a drag on economic growth Putin wants to be seen as the liberator (Global Trends, 80). Russia’s export of Russian lands and the head of a great revenues, which fluctuate between 25 civilization--morally superior to a gay- and 35 percent, comes from non energy dominated and degraded Western culture sources in primarily military hardware (Dawisha, 318). sales (Dawisha, 322). A decade of high In 2012, Global Trends 2030 oil revenues means that Russia has no Alternative Worlds predicted: sovereign debt which leaves them flexible, even if they are not taking measures on ”Russia could become a very troublesome this advantage (Dawisha, 325). These country, trying to use its military advan- factors together create a situation where tage over its neighbors to intimidate and democratic, political, and economic dominate. This outcome would be most institutions stagnate as income from likely if a Russian leader were facing ri- natural resources provides no incentive sing public discontent over sagging living for the elite to develop new areas of standards and darkening economic pros- economic growth. pects and is looking to rally nationalist Russia’s role in the world during the sentiments by becoming much more as- next two decades will be shaped by the sertive in the Near Abroad.” (Alternative rising challenges it faces at home as well Worlds, 80). as in the global environment. Russia will continue to assert its dominance When Russian troops marched into and look to expand influence regionally Crimea in 2014, Putin had clearly in the hopes that this will force the West decided that he could maintain his power to fully accept them as members of the by coupling the economic reliance on oil international system on terms that are
29 comfortable to Russia. Russia will likely DIME and will remain only a regional continue to face challenges in all the power for the foreseeable future. individual and interrelated aspects of
References:
Adomanis, Mark. “Russia’s Oil Revenue Shrinking Fast.” Forbes. April 6, 2015. Web. 18 May 2015.
30 McKew, Molly & Maniatis, Gregory. “Putin’s Global Ambitions Could Destabilize Europe.” The Washington Post. March 18, 2014. Web. 17 May 2015.
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