Summary Points from Meet the CEO Series Meeting Held on October 11, 2011
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A FAILURE of INITIATIVE Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina U.S. House of Representatives 4 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina Union Calendar No. 00 109th Congress Report 2nd Session 000-000 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina Report by the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoacess.gov/congress/index.html February 15, 2006. — Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed U. S. GOVERNMEN T PRINTING OFFICE Keeping America Informed I www.gpo.gov WASHINGTON 2 0 0 6 23950 PDF For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COVER PHOTO: FEMA, BACKGROUND PHOTO: NASA SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA TOM DAVIS, (VA) Chairman HAROLD ROGERS (KY) CHRISTOPHER SHAYS (CT) HENRY BONILLA (TX) STEVE BUYER (IN) SUE MYRICK (NC) MAC THORNBERRY (TX) KAY GRANGER (TX) CHARLES W. “CHIP” PICKERING (MS) BILL SHUSTER (PA) JEFF MILLER (FL) Members who participated at the invitation of the Select Committee CHARLIE MELANCON (LA) GENE TAYLOR (MS) WILLIAM J. -
Hurricane Katrina, Volume One, Emergency Response
MCEER Special Report Series Engineering and Organizational Issues Before, During and After Hurricane Katrina Hospital Decision Making in the Wake of Katrina: The Case of New Orleans Lucy A. Arendt School of Business University of Wisconsin – Green Bay Daniel B. Hess Department of Urban and Regional Planning University at Buffalo, State University of New York Volume 1 January 2006 MCEER-06-SP01 Red Jacket Quadrangle Tel: (716) 645-3391; Fax: (716) 645-3399; Email: [email protected] World Wide Web: http://mceer.buffalo.edu 1 2 Foreword On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall with sustained winds estimated at 125 mph, unprecedented storm surges approaching 30 feet and winds extending 125 miles from its center. It resulted in over 1,300 lives lost, and caused major flooding and damage that spanned more than 200 miles along the Gulf Coast of the United States. The extensive damage to the built environment far exceeded the expected damage for a storm of this size. Based on measured wind speeds and the Saffir-Simpson scale, Hurricane Katrina reached Category 5 strength while in the Gulf of Mexico, but quickly dissipated to a Category 3 storm before landfall. Although the wind speeds were substantially reduced before striking land, the storm surge apparently maintained the momentum associated with a Category 5 storm and is likely responsible for the majority of damage. It should be noted that early estimates ranked Hurricane Katrina as a Category 4 storm at landfall; the National Hurricane Center downgraded this ranking after revising wind speeds in December 2005. Hurricane Katrina caused significant damage to engineered infrastructure including levees, commercial and public buildings, roads and bridges, utility distribution systems for electric power and water, waste water collection facilities, and vital communication networks. -
Medical Care
MEDICAL CARE Medical care and evacuations effectively treated a massive and overwhelming evacuee population. Federalized teams of medical fi rst responders suffered from a lack of advance were deployed to the affected region to provide assistance. preparations, inadequate Millions of dollars worth of medical supplies and assets communications, and diffi culties were consumed. Some Department of Health and Human coordinating efforts Services (HHS) assets, like the Federal Medical Shelters, had never been used or tested prior to Katrina but were deployed and were, for the most part, considered effective. Summary Despite diffi culties, the medical assistance and response to Hurricane Katrina was a success. Thousands Public health preparedness and medical of lives were saved because of the hard work and enduring assistance are critical components to any disaster efforts of public health offi cials and medical volunteers. response plan Poor planning and preparedness, however, were also too big a part of the story, resulting in delays and shortages of Hurricane Katrina tested the nation’s planning and resources, and loss of life in the region. preparedness for a major public health threat and This chapter outlines what medical personnel and highlighted the importance of strong cooperation supplies were pre-positioned, and deployed post-landfall, and partnerships among health agencies at all levels to the affected area and how those assets were utilized. of government. The threat of any type of disaster It explains the plans in place prior to Hurricane Katrina emphasizes the need for planning and practice. Public for health care facilities and shelters. The fi ndings in this health preparedness and medical assistance are critical chapter conclude several defi ciencies in public health and components to any disaster response plan — the faster medical response plans exist at all levels of government the health community responds, the more quickly control and within medical care facilities. -
Devastation in Katrina's Wake
PRIORITY TRAFFIC Devastation in Katrina’s Wake An initial report on the EMS response to one of the worst natural disasters in U.S. history THE BIG PICTURE without electricity or standard phone serv- bodies added to the already biohazardous mong thousands of apocalyptic images ice for weeks. mess. The heralded French Quarter was Astill surfacing in the wake of Hurricane At first, New Orleans sustained similar spared major flooding, but the rest of the Katrina, one in particular illustrates the al- wind damage but did not flood. Then aging city (largely areas that tourists rarely see truistic EMS response: A lone ambulance, levees began to fail. but EMS crews know well) was inaccessi- taking a hazardous chance, fords through “They’ve been telling us for years and ble to rescuers without boats. floodwaters toward a stranded community. years that this [was] going to happen,” Coast Guard helicopters immediately Ignoring naysaying officials unfamiliar with says Ken Bouvier, a native of New Orleans began hoisting stranded residents, one by the area and its residents, David Hussey, an and president of the National Association one, from the roofs of their swamped EMT-B with Acadian Ambulance Service, of EMTs. “We’d dodged the big storms. homes. But air rescuers were over- found a back way into St. Bernard Parish, We’d gotten lucky before, but now our whelmed: Thousands of residents had La. More rescuers followed his lead, bring- time had come.” lacked the means to leave New Orleans ing aid to one of many stricken areas Within hours, nearly 80% of the city fa- prior to Katrina’s landfall.