INSURGENCY, COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THE CHALLENGE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN IRAQ
By
Ronald M. Miller, CD
B.A., Carleton University, 1995
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
In
HUMAN SECURITY AND PEACEBUILDING
We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard
______Ann Livingston, PhD, Project Sponsor Director of Research and Development, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre
______David Last, PhD, Academic Supervisor Assistant Registrar Royal Military College of Canada
______Paz G. Buttedahl, PhD Academic Lead, MA Human Security and Peacebuilding
______Gregory Cran, PhD Director, School of Peace and Conflict Management
ROYAL ROADS UNIVERSITY January 2006
© Ronald M. Miller, 2006
Security Sector Reform 2
Abstract
Success in transforming failed and failing states into stable democratic nations is predicated not only on the legitimacy of the undertaking, but also on the creation of a secure environment to facilitate the reconstruction, democratization and nation building effort. The development of legitimate, capable, and rights-respecting indigenous security forces, through a Security
Sector Reform (SSR) process, is an important component of the broader reconstruction and nation building agenda. In Iraq, the ongoing insurgency war has impaired the SSR process and stymied progress in other areas of reconstruction. Based on academic research, personal observations, and interviews, the author examines the effect of insurgency war on the reconstruction of Iraq’s security forces. He concludes that America’s preoccupation with defeating the insurgency has; distorted the SSR process, undermined the credibility and legitimacy of the US Coalition, and fostered a sectarianism within Iraqi Security Force units that now threatens to plunge Iraq into civil war.
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Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed in this thesis reflect those of the author and should in no way be construed as representing the official positions of either the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) or the Government of Canada.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to acknowledge two people who assisted and inspired me in the preparation of this paper. First, to Allen Kanerva for his advice, friendship, and hospitality during the dark days of violence that engulfed Baghdad in the fall of 2004. I would also like to acknowledge Vatche Arslanian, a friend and colleague who while working with the Red
Cross in Baghdad in April 2003 became one of the tens of thousands of innocent civilians killed by the war in Iraq. His commitment to humanitarianism has been an inspiration.
Dedication
I would like to dedicate this work to my wife Micky for her love, patience, sacrifice and encouragement during this often-arduous journey of enlightenment. Security Sector Reform 5
TABLE OF CONTENTS
======
Abstract ...... Page 2
Disclaimer...... Page 3
Acknowledgements and Dedication...... Page 4
Table of Contents...... Page 5
List of Abbreviations...... Page 9
Introduction...... Page 11
CHAPTER ONE
Rationale...... Page 13
Study Question...... Page 14
Sources...... Page 14
Academic Sources...... Page 14
Media Sources...... Page 19
Personal Experience...... Page 20
Methods...... Page 20
Data Collection...... Page 21
Participant Selection...... Page 21
Conduct of the Interviews...... Page 22
Data Analysis...... Page 23
CHAPTER TWO
Nation Building and Post Conflict Reconstruction...... Page 24 Security Sector Reform 6
Nation Building...... Page 24
Post Conflict Reconstruction...... Page 26
Security Sector Reform...... Page 28
Human Security...... Page 28
What is Security Sector Reform?...... Page 29
Organizing the Security Sector...... Page 31
Training the Security Sector...... Page 33
Security Sector Governance...... Page 35
CHAPTER THREE
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency...... … Page 37
Insurgency...... Page 37
Counterinsurgency...... Page 38
Insurgent tactics...... Page 39
The SWORD Model...... Page 40
The Iraqi Insurgency...... Page 42
The Strategic Centres of Gravity...... Page 42
Western “Crusade” versus Muslim “Jihad” in Iraq...... Page 46
“National” versus “Liberation” Insurgency in Iraq...... Page 49
Assessing the Iraqi Insurgency...... Page 50
The Uniqueness of the Iraq’s Insurgency...... Page 52
US Counterinsurgency Operations in Iraq...... Page 53
Security and Popular Support...... Page 56 Security Sector Reform 7
CHAPTER FOUR
Planning for Post War Iraq...... Page 59
Errors of Omission...... Page 59
Errors of Commission...... Page 63
Insurgency War and the SSR Process...... Page 65
Evolution of the ISF Structure...... Page 65
Logistics and Cost Implications...... Page 70
Infiltration of ISF Units...... Page 72
Demobilizing the Ethno-Religious Militias...... Page 73
Terminating the Contracts of Private Security Companies...... Page 74
Organization, Training and Governance of the ISF...... Page 75
Organizational Differentiation within the ISF...... Page 75
Training the ISF...... Page 77
Training the Governance Component of the ISF…………………..…...... Page 80
The NATO Training Mission in Iraq...... …...... Page 82
Governance of the ISF…………………...... …...... Page 84
CHAPTER FIVE
Summary of Main Conclusions...... Page 87
Crisis of Legitimacy…………………………………………………………... Page 87
Impact of Time, Cost and Public Support....………………………………….. Page 88
Impact of Counterinsurgency Operations on SSR……………..………..…….. Page 89
Descent into Civil War……………………………………………..………….. Page 90
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A Prescription for Success in Iraq...... Page 91
US National Security Strategy for Victory in Iraq………………….….…….. Page 91
Iraqi Civil Military Assessment…………………………………………..…... Page 92
Making it Right in Iraq…………………………………………………..…… Page 94
REFERENCES...... Page 96
NOTES...... Page 110
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery……………………………………. BCPR
Center for Strategic and International Studies…………………………………. CSIS
Coalition Provisional Authority………………………………………………... CPA
Congressional Research Service……………………………………………….. CRS
Demobilization Disarmament and Reintegration…………………………….... DDR
Department of Defense………………………………………………………… DoD
Department for International Development………………………………….... DFID
Government Accounting Office………………………………………………. GAO
International Republican Institute…………………………………………….. IRI
Iraq Civil Defense Corps……………………………………………………… ICDC
Iraq Reconstruction Management Organization………………………………. IRMO
Iraqi Police Service……………………………………………………………. IPS
Iraqi Security Forces…………………………………………………………... ISF
Iraqi Training Education and Doctrine Center………………………………... TEDC
Ministry of Defense…………………………………………………………… MOD
Ministry of Interior……………………………………………………………. MOI
Multi-National Corps………………………………………………………….. MNC
Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq………………...... … MNSTCI
NATO Training Implementation Mission – Iraq…………………………..….. NTIM-I
North Atlantic Treaty Organization……………………………………….….. NATO
New Partnership for African Development…………………………….…….. NEPAD
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Post Conflict Reconstruction………………………………………………….. PCR
Programme and Contracting Office………………………………………..…. PCO
Security Sector Reform……………………………………………………..… SSR
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq……………………….… SCIRI
United Nations Development Programme……………………………………. UNDP
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights……………………… UNHCHR
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Introduction
The political, ethnic, and religious extremism inherent in failed and failing states has spawned a host of trans-national threats from international terrorism to global organized crime
(Fukuyama, 2004). Transforming these states into stable democratic nations, therefore, is one of the most important security challenges of our time (Bush, 2005). Indeed, the US-led interventions into both Afghanistan and Iraq, and the subsequent programmes of reconstruction, democratization, and nation building, are indicative of a more proactive and pre-emptive approach to international peace and security adopted by the US in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
However, reconstruction, democratization, and nation building, is a complex, multifaceted, and long-term endeavour, the success or failure of which, is often predicated not only on the legitimacy of the undertaking, but also on the ability of the intervention forces to establish a secure and stable environment (Abramowitz and Hurlburt, 2004). A Centre for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report on Post Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) contends that,
...if security needs are not met, both the peace in a given country and the
intervention intended to promote it are doomed to fail. . . .legitimacy in the
eyes of [the] citizens of fragile states often has as much to do with ending the
violence and delivering concrete goods as it does with the formalities of [the]
democratic process (2003, pp. 7-8 &18).
In Iraq, the US-led intervention continues to suffer from a “crisis of legitimacy” at the international and local level. At the international level, the failure to secure a UN mandate
Security Sector Reform 12 diminished the legitimacy of, and international support for the undertaking (Abramowitz and
Hurlburt, 2004). At the local level, the failure to stabilize Iraq in the post combat phase undermined the credibility of the Coalition forces and created the conditions for an insurgency to take root. As a result, Coalition forces are now view as occupiers rather than liberators, and their continued presence is both a source of support for the insurgency and a de- legitimizing factor for the new Iraqi Government. This crisis of legitimacy has resulted in an urgent effort to organize and train indigenous security forces capable of independent counterinsurgency operations. In fact, the requirement to put an “Iraqi face” on the counterinsurgency campaign has become the lynchpin upon which the coalition’s exit strategy is based.1 Security Sector Reform (SSR), however, goes beyond merely building capacity within the armed elements of a nation’s security forces. It also includes strengthening the state’s legitimate monopoly on the use of force through programmes aimed at democratic governance and oversight.
This thesis examines the effect of Iraq’s insurgency war on the SSR process. It begins with an explanation of the rationale, study question, sources, and methods for the research. It then defines and explains the conceptual relationships between nation building, PCR, and
SSR with particular emphasis on the organization, training and governance of the Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF). Insurgency and counterinsurgency war is then examined to understand the context within which Iraq’s SSR process is being conducted. This is followed by an examination of the impact of the ongoing insurgency and counterinsurgency campaign on the organization, training, and governance structures for the ISF. The paper finishes with a summary of the main conclusions and presents a prescription for success in Iraq.
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CHAPTER ONE
Rationale
The importance of SSR as a precondition for democratic transformation, poverty reduction, and sustainable development is not new. A host of international interventions into failed and failing states such as Haiti, Bosnia, and Sierra Leone in the 1990s demonstrated the necessity for a more holistic approach to security assistance and generated a debate within the development community on the role of SSR within the broader context of PCR and nation building. Nevertheless, the concept of SSR is still relatively new. Its first public introduction did not occur until 1998 in a speech by Clare Short, the Minister for the UK Department For
International Development (DFID). Accordingly, academics and practitioners are still struggling with the development of best practices for SSR, particularly in non-permissive environments.
Recent experience in both Afghanistan and Iraq has demonstrated that the threat environment in the failed and failing states of the 21st Century is characterized by a polymorphous2 mix of conventional warfare, insurgency and counter-insurgency warfare, terrorism and organized crime all manifesting themselves simultaneously within the same conflict zone (Coker, 2005). As a result, the SSR process is often adversely affected by the more immediate requirements of the counterinsurgency campaign. This is most apparent in
Iraq where the virulent and widespread insurgency war has had a detrimental effect on the organization, training, and governance mechanisms for the ISF.
Understanding the effects of insurgency war on the reconstruction and reform of indigenous security forces is important to the SSR debate. A number of organizations and
Security Sector Reform 14 agencies, such as the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the US
State Department are investing significant resources to develop new concepts and best practices for PCR and SSR operations in the non-permission threat environments of the 21st
Century. Research in this field will aid in that process.
Study Question
This thesis seeks to answer the question – How has the ongoing insurgency and counterinsurgency war in Iraq affected the SSR process, particularly in relation to the organization, training and democratic governance of the ISF?
Sources
Academic Sources
Given the close relationship and overlap of activities associated with the concepts of nation building, PCR, and SSR, the author consulted academic sources related to all three concepts. Sources related to nation-building included articles by Dobbins, England,
Fukuyama, and Hippler. Dobbins (2003) traced American nation building efforts from Japan and Germany to Afghanistan and Iraq, and emphasized the need for long-term commitment, unity of effort, and legitimate indigenous security forces operating with a rule of law framework. Fukuyama (2004) distinguished between the long-term process of nation building and the shorter-term process of state building, and argued that nation building should become a central focus of American foreign policy to counter the threat posed by failed and failing states. England (1970) also differentiated between the short-term process of creating the institutions of state and the long-term process of integrating diverse populations into a single
Security Sector Reform 15 nation state. Finally, Hippler (2002) offered a useful description of the history, processes, and challenges associated with nation building and the social integration of societies.
What these documents reveal is that successful nation building is a complex long-term process of social integration that goes beyond merely creating the institutions of state and conducting elections. To be legitimate, the institutions of state must also be viewed by the domestic population as socially integrated for successful nation building to occur. In this regard the collective works of Ali (2003), Barber (1992), and Huntington (1993) provide insights into the challenges of applying Western concepts of liberal democracy, social-cultural integration, and nation building to traditional non-Western societies. MacMillan’s (2001) book “Paris 1919”, and Crane and Terrill’s (2003) article on PCR in Iraq provide useful historical background to Iraq and its fractious ethnic makeup.
A number of articles, journals, and monographs were consulted to gain an understanding of the tasks and linkages between PCR and the state building/nation building process, particularly as they apply to Iraq. The CSIS PCR task framework (2002) and an associated CSIS document titled “Play to Win” (2003) were reviewed, along with the New
Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) PCR policy framework (2005). All three documents provide a catalogue of specific tasks and policy guidance for PCR and highlight unity of effort, long-term commitment, and legitimate indigenous security institutions as critical preconditions for successful PCR. Augmenting these more generic PCR frameworks were research papers specifically related to PCR in Iraq. These included a CSIS document by
Barton and Crocker (2003) that highlighted the gaps in US pre-war planning for post-war Iraq
Security Sector Reform 16 and a follow-on CSIS document by Barton and Crocker (2004) that examined the early failures of the PCR process from the Iraqi perspective.
Research related to SSR included, United Nations Development (UNDP) Reports
(1994 & 2002) that outlined the concept of human security and established the need for SSR in developing nations. The article titled “Human Security or Hot Air” (Paris, 2001) offered a divergent view of human security. Other research sources related to SSR included the
German Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) Institute, the
Netherlands Clingendael Institute, DFID, and a report by the UN Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (2002). Articles from these sources include Ball’s (2004, March) policy framework for SSR developed for the UK’s DFID; Wolf’s (2000) article on SSR in developing countries that provides an excellent explanation of the process and challenges of
SSR; and a checklist of questions related to SSR in the Clingendael Institute’s “Stability
Assessment Framework: Designing Integrated Responses for Security, Governance and
Development” (2005).
Additional sources related to SSR were drawn from the Geneva Centre for the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the Berghof Research Center for
Constructive Conflict Management Handbook for Conflict Transformation. These sources included works by Hanggi (2003) who addressed the issue of Security Sector Governance, along with articles by Ball, Caparini, Nathan, and Wulf in the Berghof SSR handbook (2004) that provided superb descriptions of the process and requirements related to the organization, training, and governance of security forces. Finally, a UN High Commissioner for Human
Security Sector Reform 17
Rights (2002) declaration provided the linkage between security sector governance and respect for Human Rights.
Key sources related to the challenges and complexities of SSR in non-permissive security environments such as Iraq, included an article by Manwaring and Fishel (1992) that outlined an analysis model developed by the US Army Small Wars Operational Research
Directorate (SWORD) for predicting the success or failure of counterinsurgency operations.
Manwaring and Fishel identified the struggle for legitimacy as the center of gravity for both an insurgency and counterinsurgency campaign. Another key source was a recent article by
Metz and Millen (2004) that provided an outstanding explanation of insurgency and counterinsurgency operations. They argue that the liberation nature of 21st Century insurgency war requires different approaches from those adopted during the insurgencies of the 20th Century. A more recent article by Manwaring (2004) analyzed the key aspects of the counterinsurgency campaigns from Argentina, Peru, and Italy, and noted that insurgency war is a highly complex form of political war. Much of his article focused on the need to address the political underpinnings of the insurgency.
To gain a classical view of insurgency from the insurgent perspective, Mao Tse-
Tung’s “ On Guerrilla War”(Griffith, 1961), and T.E Lawrence’s “Seven Pillars of Wisdom”
(Thomas, 2004) were consulted, along with the writings of the Chinese military philosopher
Sun Tsu (Galvin, 2003). All three emphasized the importance of time, cost, and public support to the successful prosecution of insurgency war. The writings of the German military philosopher Carl Von Clausewitz were consulted to understand the concept of “Center’s of
Gravity” as it relates to insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare. It is interesting to note
Security Sector Reform 18 that Clausewitz emphasized the importance of public opinion in the success or failure of popular uprisings. Finally, the US Army (2004) and US Marine Corps (2004) doctrine manuals on counterinsurgency warfare were consulted to determine what doctrinal changes were made as a result of lessons learned in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Surprisingly, both doctrine manuals are still wed to the 20th Century concepts of Communist and populist- nationalist insurgencies.
Sources related to the ongoing insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and their impact on the PCR and SSR process included research papers produced by the
Congressional Research Service of the US Library of Congress, reports by the US
Government Accounting Office (GAO), statements to congressional committees on the status of the Iraqi insurgency, and US government progress reports on ISF development. These were augmented with research papers, conference reports, and articles from the RAND
Corporation, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, the Council on Foreign
Relations, the Brookings Institute, the UK Royal United Services Institute, and the US
Institute for Peace. All provided useful and varied insights into the ongoing insurgency and its impact on the PCR and SSR processes.
Public opinion polls related to Iraqi attitudes towards the US-led Coalition and progress towards establishing a secure and stable environment in Iraq included an excellent article by Telhami on Arab public opinion and their prisms of pain. Others included a PEW
Research Centre poll (2005) that showed a decline in US public support for the war in Iraq, and three Iraqi public opinion polls conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI)
(September 2004, April 2005, and September 2005). All three IRI polls indicated a fairly
Security Sector Reform 19 consistent level of animosity toward the US Coalition’s presence in Iraq, and a growing concern for the lack of security. These attitudes were then correlated to Maslow’s theory of hierarchical needs to gain an understanding of Iraq’s domestic support for the insurgency. Of particular interest is an article by Conetta titled “Vicious Circle: The Dynamics of Occupation and Resistance in Iraq” (2005). By correlating US counterinsurgency tactics to Iraqi public opinion and the rise in insurgent attacks, Conetta presents a rather compelling argument that the US occupation is actually fueling the insurgency. British Army Brigadier Aylwin-Foster
(2005) supports this conclusion in his scathing criticism of the US Army’s counterinsurgency operations in Iraq.
Sources related to the impact of the insurgency on the SSR process include Fallows’
(2004) article “Blind into Baghdad” and O’Hanlon’s “ Iraq without a Plan”. Both articles provide a fascinating exposé of the failings of US pre-war planning that ultimately led to the current security dilemma in Iraq. Other sources included articles by Salmoni (2004) and
Sharp (2005) who describe the challenges of SSR and the growing sectarianism within the ranks of the ISF. This conclusion is supported by Cordesman’s (2005) testimony to a US
House Committee on the reform of Iraq’s security forces from an Iraqi perspective. The websites of both the Multi-National Security Transition Command Iraq, and the NATO
Training Mission Iraq were consulted for information related to the organization of the ISF and the total number of Iraqis that have undergone training.
Media Sources
The ongoing insurgency and counterinsurgency war in Iraq continues to impact on the
SSR process for the ISF. Accordingly, the author relied on a variety of both Western and
Security Sector Reform 20
Arabic media sources to aid in linking the academic research for this thesis to the current reality on the ground in Iraq.
Personal Experience
Augmenting the academic research for this thesis is the author’s first-hand knowledge and experience gained while serving with the NATO Training Implementation Mission in Iraq
(NTIM-I) from September to December 2004. While in Iraq the author worked closely with
SSR specialists from the Iraq Reconstruction Management Organization3 (IRMO) who provided mentorship to the senior civilian and military staff within the Iraqi Ministry of
Defense. In addition, the author worked collaboratively with international military officers in the planning, logistics, and training branches of both the Multi-national Security Transition
Command in Iraq (MNSTC-I) and the NTIM-I.
As a member of the NTIM-I mission, the author was intimately involved with the training and equipping of the ISF, and attended high-level meetings with the senior Iraqi leadership in both the Ministries of Defense and Interior. The author also traveled to
Northern Iraq and met with senior Kurdish military officers to assess the quality of training for Kurdish and Arabic officers recently inducted into the Iraqi Army. This extensive access to those individuals working at the heart of the reconstruction effort for the ISF provided the author with significant first-hand knowledge of the SSR process, particularly as it pertained to the organization, training and governance of the ISF. Despite this unfettered access to documents, briefings, and people, only open source and non-classified information was used in the preparation of this thesis.
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Methods
Given that the author lived the experience of SSR under fire with his research subjects, an active interview technique was adopted as the qualitative research methodology for this thesis. The active interview technique places the researcher as an involved participant in the construction of meaning process, and the respondent as a narrator of experiential knowledge.
In this “storytelling” interview process, the researcher starts the interview with an open ended question and then guides and activates narrative production through a spontaneous process of questions, suggestions, and positions designed to elicit narrative answers from the respondent.
The researcher then deconstructs the respondents “story” to derive meaning and provide a
“window on the world” within which the respondents live (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995).
Data Collection
For the purpose of this thesis, interviews were conducted with individuals working in the planning, logistics, and training components of the MNSTC-I and NTIM-I organizations.
In addition, interviews were conducted with individuals working within the SSR component of IRMO and with personnel working within the Programme and Contracting Office (PCO) that oversaw the contracting and financial management of the broader reconstruction effort in
Iraq. Other more informal and impromptu discussions were conducted with senior Iraqis working within the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior, as well as local Iraqis working as interpreters or labourers with the MNSTC-I and NTIM-I organizations. In the interests of security, the identities of the Iraqis interviewed for this thesis will remain anonymous.
Interviews were also conducted with people working within the various internationally based
“Private Security Companies” in Iraq.
Security Sector Reform 22
Participant Selection
The logic process for selecting participants varied. Some participants were selected by the author due to their position and potential to provide insights into the challenges of SSR in non-permissive security environments. These included for example, Lieutenant General
Patraeus, the commander of MNSTC-I and Major General Hilderink, the commander of the
NTIM-I mission in Iraq. Others were selected based on information provided in the course of an interview. For example, a respondent might suggest that the researcher speak with another more knowledgeable individual on a particular aspect of the SSR process. In other cases, participants were selected based on their ethnic origin or position within the organizational structure. For instance, senior-level US participants were generally upbeat and positive about the SSR process in Iraq and their responses guarded, almost scripted to a US “party line”.
Conversely, participants from other nationalities or those who occupied positions further down in the organizational structure tended to be more forthright in their assessments and responses to the interview questions. These more “formal” interviews were normally structured with an opening question and a general topic agenda as opposed to a strict procedural directive with a fixed set of questions. Other interviews were impromptu
“discussions of opportunity” with individuals of interest to the research topic. Often, these were chance meetings over lunch or conducted while huddled in a bomb shelter during the frequent mortar and rocket attacks against the heavily guarded “Green Zone” in Baghdad.
Conduct of the Interviews
Each respondent who participated in the more formal interview process was asked to describe how the insurgency war in Iraq was affecting the PCR and SSR processes. During
Security Sector Reform 23 the interview, the researcher would guide the interview toward specific areas related to the organization, training, and governance structures for the ISF. Impromptu discussions were somewhat less structured and focused more on the individual stories of those working in the areas of PCR and SSR. The results of these interviews and discussions provided the researcher with a wealth of ethnographic and experiential knowledge related to the challenges of implementing SSR in the midst of a widespread and virulent insurgency war.
Data Analysis
Most interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. When interviews could not be recorded, pertinent notes were taken during the interview process. Notes were also taken following impromptu discussions to serve as a basis for analysis. Once the interviews were completed, the author deconstructed the respondents “story” and cross-referenced their versions of reality to those of the other respondents, and to the reality on the ground. What the author discovered was a wide gap between rhetoric and reality – between the “official” version of events propagated by the US Departments of State and Defense, and the stark reality on the ground as it pertained to progress in the PCR and SSR process. This disparity provided the additional information to support further academic research to verify and corroborate data collected during the interviews.
Security Sector Reform 24
CHAPTER TWO
Nation Building and Post Conflict Reconstruction
Nation Building
Based on the assumption that successful development and stability are linked to political participation and democracy, nation building primarily focuses on the socio-political and socio-economic processes of integrating people and societies into nation states to create a base for democratic development. A common cultural identity and unifying ideology based on language, religion, ethnicity, and history play pivotal roles in successful nation building.
Stable nation states require not only a legitimate political construct and a state apparatus capable of managing the affairs of the state, but also a legal system and common socio- economic base upon which to build and maintain socio-political unity and identity within the state. A territorial boundary and an effective security sector that holds the monopoly on the use of force are equally important elements of a fully functioning nation state (England, 1970
& Hippler, 2002).
Historically, nation building has been a complex endeavour, often spanning generations, and characterized by extended periods of relative stability punctuated by periods of social upheaval, rebellion, and civil war. Even the histories of many of the more developed countries of the world reveal this same ebb and flow pattern of nation building and development (Hippler, 2002). In a recent RAND study comparing American nation building efforts from Germany and Japan to Afghanistan and Iraq it was determined that “There is no quick fix to nation-building. . . .that although staying long does not guarantee success, leaving early assures failure. . . .[and that] higher force levels for longer time periods promotes
Security Sector Reform 25 successful nation-building”(Dobbins, 2003, pp.17, 23-24). International intervention for the purpose of nation building therefore, requires careful planning, a secure environment, and a long-term commitment to the process if success is to be achieved. This is particularly true in states such as Iraq, where a national identity upon which to forge a nation has never reality existed.
Spawned from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, Iraq was more a creation of Franco-British rivalry over oil than any altruistic goal to create a viable nation state. As MacMillan contends,
In 1919 there was no Iraqi people - history, religion, geography pulled the
people apart, not together. . . .Putting together the three Ottoman provinces
and expecting to create a nation was, in European terms, like hoping to have
Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs make one country (2001, p. 397).
Crane and Terrill reinforce this view of the fractious nature of Iraq’s ethno-religious makeup.
They write,
[Iraq]...was formed by the British out of the former Ottoman Turkish vilayets
of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul following World War I. Previously, these
provinces were directly ruled from Istanbul, often having little interaction
with each other. Nor were each of the vilayets pleased to be included in the
new state. The population of the Kurdish-dominated vilayet of Mosul
considered its inclusion in the new state as a betrayal of great power promises
of Kurdish independence in the Treaty of Sevres. Leaders of the Shi’ite
province of Basra rightly suspected that their own interests would be
Security Sector Reform 26
subordinated to the less numerous but more politically powerful Sunni
Muslims in Baghdad. . . .The establishment of democracy or even some sort
of rough pluralism in Iraq, where it has never really existed previously, will be
a staggering challenge...in a post-Saddam era (2003, pp. 20-21 & 23).
A common theme in the history of Western Civilization has been the tendency to create the conditions for the next war in the aftermath of the current one, and Iraq may be no exception. Given the imperialist intrigue and social insensitivities through which the State of
Iraq was first created, it is perhaps justified that the various ethno-religious factions view contemporary Western attempts at nation building with trepidation and distrust. Indeed, the deep-seated ambitions for ethno-religious self-determination within Iraq will continue to militate against the formation of a cohesive and democratic nation state, and may ultimately lead to a political partitioning of the country through violent civil war.
Post Conflict Reconstruction
PCR seeks to re-establish the underlying conditions that facilitate nation building in states emerging from conflict through a broad range of reform activities in the political, social, economic, and security sectors of society. Recent efforts to identify and operationalize the activities associated with PCR include, the CSIS task framework (2002). It provides a comprehensive breakdown of reconstruction tasks that are clustered around four main issues or “pillars” identified as; security, justice and reconciliation, social and economic well being, and governance and participation. The framework organizes the tasks within each pillar along a continuum from violent conflict to normalization, grouped in three phases defined as initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability. Normalization is defined as
Security Sector Reform 27 being achieved when governance, economic activity, and internal/external relations occur within accepted norms without the need for outside intervention (2002, p. 2).
A more recent framework is the “African Post Conflict Reconstruction Policy
Framework” produced by NEPAD. This later framework includes similar tasks, clustered around the same four-pillars of reconstruction and grouped in three phases identified as the emergency, transitional, and developmental. A major departure from the CSIS framework is the inclusion of a fifth category specifically related to coordination and management of the reconstruction process. In addition, the NEPAD framework goes beyond merely identifying the specific tasks associated with PCR by providing policy guidance for a country level strategic framework that coordinates and synchronizes the security, political, humanitarian, and development aspects of the PCR effort (2005).
Although both frameworks offer a useful catalogue of potential tasks associated with
PCR, each assumes that the reconstruction effort will occur within a relatively benign security environment. Moreover, while both frameworks include tasks related to reform of the security sector, they do not fully recognize the broader implications of the security sector on governance, development, and the rule of law. A by-product of the international community’s
PCR experiences of the 1990s and more recently in Afghanistan and Iraq is the realization that a new paradigm for operating in non-permissive security environments is required that incorporates the security assistance, and development doctrines under a single conceptual framework. That conceptual framework has become known as “SSR”, which encompasses a multidisciplinary process of reforms that is separate, yet germane to the overall PCR, development, and nation building agendas.
Security Sector Reform 28
Security Sector Reform
Human Security
Before delving into the challenges of SSR in non-permissive environments one must first examine the more contemporary notion of human security articulated by the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its 1994 Human Development Report. The human security paradigm rejects the state centric notion of security as the need to protect one’s territory and national interests from external aggression or threats, in favour of the security needs of the ordinary people within the state. The report contends that human security first means “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression...And second...protection from...disruptions in the patterns of daily life” (1994, p.23). The paradigm was further refined by nations such as Canada who defined “human security” as freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, safety, or lives including; safety from physical threats, the protection of civilians in conflicts, a guarantee of fundamental human rights and the rule of law, good governance, social equity, the achievement of an acceptable quality of life, and finally sustainable development (Paris, 2001, pp. 90-91).
This more “human” centric security paradigm is reflected not only in the specific tasks identified within the CSIS and NEPAD frameworks, but also within a number of other frameworks specifically related to SSR such as those produced by the Netherlands
Clingendael institute (2005), the UK DFID (2004), and the UN Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) report on “Justice and Security Sector Reform” (2002). A common theme in all of these documents is recognition of the link between reform of the state security architecture and its democratic governance on one hand, and progress in PCR, nation
Security Sector Reform 29 building, and human development on the other. In addition, each document highlights the need for a more holistic and strategic approach to the SSR process.
What is Security Sector Reform?
The main premise of SSR is that a democratically-run, accountable, transparent, cost effective, efficient, equitable, and rights-respecting security sector reduces the risk of conflict, and facilitates successful resolution of problems in the governance and economic development realms that often lie at the heart of societal instability. The overall objective of
SSR is to transform the components of a country’s security architecture in such a way as to ensure that they are managed and operated consistent with the generally accepted norms of democracy, good governance, and the rule of law (Wulf, 2005).
However, much of the underlying theory and doctrine for the concept are still in their developmental stages. For instance, defining what elements and actors constitute the security sector of a country has yet to be agreed upon. The principle point of contention is that defining the security sector too narrowly on reform of the uniformed components of the military and police, often leads to inadequate programmes that fail to address the corollary issues of civilian control, transparency, and rule of law. Conversely, defining the security sector too broadly to include all aspects of human security (HIV/AIDS, environmental issues etc) leads to an unfocussed programme that fails to address the key reform requirements of the security apparatus for the country (Wulf, 2004). A German Deutsche Gesellschaft für
Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) research paper defines the scope of the security sector as,
...the armed forces, paramilitary units, the police and gendarmerie, and the
intelligence services...[as well as] the civil authorities mandated to control and
Security Sector Reform 30
oversee those agencies...it [also] includes the judicial and penal systems, as
well as civil society in general, which also plays a significant role in
democratic control. Security sector reform is part of a governance reform
programme (Wulf, 2000, p. 15).
The scope of the security sector is further refined in the UNDP Human Development
Report (2002) which recognized the need for a broader interpretation of the scope of the security sector, particularly in failed states where non-statutory security forces such as guerrilla armies, private security companies and political party militias may play a supporting or detrimental role in the SSR process. The UNDP report divides the security sector into five categories of actors that include; organizations authorized to use force, civil management and oversight bodies, justice and law enforcement institutions, non-statutory security forces, and non-statutory civil society groups. The report also puts forward an expanded list of security forces to include secret services, coast guards, border guards, custom authorities, civil defence forces, national guards, presidential guards, and militias (2002, p. 87). The level of involvement of these actors varies from conflict to conflict; for example as Hanggi contends,
“...the greater the involvement of non-statutory security forces [guerrilla armies, private security companies and political party militias] ...the lesser that by non-statutory civil society actors [and] the poorer the governance of the security sector in question” (2003, pp.10-11).
Despite a significant amount of academic and policy development work related to
SSR, the development of a task framework specifically associated with SSR in non- permissive security environments is still in its infancy. For example, the Netherlands
Clingendael Institute has only recently produced a comprehensive “Stability Assessment
Security Sector Reform 31
Framework for Designing Integrated Responses for Security, Governance and Development”
(2005). Another attempt to develop a task framework specifically related to SSR was produced by Nicole Ball for the UK’s DFID (2004). The DFID framework outlines specific reform tasks and recommendations grouped around categories such as, political, psychosocial, normative, institutional, societal, economic, and geopolitical. The recommended tasks however, tend to be oriented more at the policy rather than the practical level. Nevertheless, when combined with the CSIS and NEPAD task frameworks, a comprehensive listing of practical tasks and guidance associated with SSR can be ascertained. The only challenge is to determine how these SSR tasks can be accomplished within the non-permissive threat environments of the 21st Century. Given the rather broad nature of the SSR environment, this research will examine only those tasks associated with reform of the military and police forces, with specific emphasis on their organization, training, and governance.
Organizing the Security Sector
A large part of the SSR process often involves creating national level security architectures, and either reforming existing security forces or creating new forces that can carrying out their security function in an effective, professional, and democratically accountable manner consistent with the internal and external threats to the country. The process of determining the appropriate size, structure, and form of a nation’s security forces normally begins with an assessment of the global, regional, and national security threats. This is followed by the development of a national security strategy that provides the policy guidance for dealing with these threats, which drives the creation of a national security plan that outlines the detailed tasks associated with implementation of the national security
Security Sector Reform 32 strategy. However, as Nathan asserts, implementing a national security strategy in countries emerging from conflict can become overwhelming, particularly when the reform necessitates a complete “reorientation of a country’s defence posture, doctrine, operations, force design and structure, military training and education, institutional culture, human resource policies...defence expenditure, procurement and exports, and civil military relations”(2004, p.
2). She goes on to explain that the complexity of the reform process in countries emerging from conflict or authoritarian rule is often exacerbated by,
...a lack of vision, expertise and resources...[a] tendency to view security in an
authoritarian, militarist and secretive fashion, [a] resistance to reform from
politicians and/or security officers, [a] manipulation by foreign powers and
neighboring states and the ongoing politicization of the security services
(2004, p. 2).
Another potentially troublesome organizational process in countries emerging from conflict is the requirement to demobilize, disarm and reintegrate (DDR) ex-combatants and militia members into mainstream society or, in some cases, to incorporate them into the newly reformed security forces. In either case, a well-structured process to vet individuals for past human rights abuses, particularly for those recruited or transferred into the newly established security forces will be a critical requirement for building public confidence.
A key organizational principle for the development of effective and accountable security forces is the need for an institutional separation and clearly defined differentiation of tasks for the various military, police, border guard and other security forces. As Wulf suggests, “An institutional overlap between domestic public security and external defence
Security Sector Reform 33 increases the danger of intervention by the military in domestic affairs...[and may] become an excuse for militarized police forces or a major internal role for the armed forces” (2004, p.5).
This assertion is echoed in the UNDP’s 2002 Human Development Report that states,
“Mixing the functions and firepower of the police with those of the military risks ‘overkill’ and unnecessary violence...It also raises the prospect of politicians turning the police into an instrument of arbitrary power...”(2002, p. 93). Nathan shares this view when she writes, “In fragile democracies where the political sector is weak and the security sector is strong, politicians might rely on the overt or tacit support of the security sector services to maintain their tenuous hold on power”(2004, p. 4).
Therefore, it is critically important that the SSR process does not, in effect, create the conditions for the security forces to become co-opted by political and ethno-religious interest groups, or used by the military leadership to seize political power. In this regard, non- statutory security forces, guerrillas, private security companies and political party militias must be disarmed, demobilized, and either integrated into the newly formed security forces or, re-integrated back into mainstream society. Only then can the duly constituted national security forces effectively exercise their monopoly on the use of force within the state.
Training the Security Sector
Training the security sector in countries emerging from conflict often involves a balancing act between the internal, regional, and global security threats on the one hand, and on the other, the need for national security forces that are modern, well trained, and appropriate to the level of threat. Invariably, there is a tendency, particularly in developing countries; to sacrifice the economic and human development needs of the population in favour
Security Sector Reform 34 of overly large and expensive security forces that lack an appropriate accountability, transparency, and civilian oversight mechanism. This was most apparent during the Cold War where as Ball contends, the “security assistance” or “military diplomacy” programmes of the
Super Powers,
...took the form of training and supply[ing] equipment designed to enhance the
operational capacity of security bodies with no concern for democratic
governance or rule of law. . . .The result was tolerance of politicized security
bodies, war as a means of resolving disputes, flagrant disregard for the rule of
law...serious human rights abuses...and high security budgets...(2004, p. 2).
Although this situation improved somewhat during the 1990s with the international interventions into Bosnia, Kosovo and Sierra Leone, where there was a somewhat equal focus on operational capacity, governance and human rights, the hyper-securitized climate of
America’s war on terrorism has once again subordinated human rights concerns to the requirements of improving military and internal security capacities (Caparini, 2004, pp. 3 &
8-9).
SSR training therefore, needs to focus not only on modernization and capacity building of the armed forces and the police, but also in the areas of democratic accountability, human rights, international humanitarian law, use of force, rules of engagement, ethnic sensitivity, gender issues, community policing, military and police codes of conduct, police and intelligence conduct, and the rule of law (Hanggi, 2005, p.18). International experience in the Balkans, Africa, Haiti and Latin America has demonstrated that a lack of sufficient training for the security forces in these areas often resulted in horrific abuses of human rights,
Security Sector Reform 35 involving indiscriminant and excessive use of force including, extra judicial killings, and an almost total disregard for the rule of law. As Nathan explains, “the expectation that [the] police [and the military] respect human rights is unrealistic if they have not been trained in techniques other than the use of force” (2004, p. 4).
Notwithstanding this training requirement, there are a number of obstacles that militate against the international community’s efforts to effectively train indigenous security forces. They are, among others, the lack of functioning military and police academies, language barriers, poor literacy rates among the indigenous security forces, and a lack of expert trainers within the international community’s intervention forces. In addition, the complexity of the computerized technology inherent in modern police and military weapon systems, along with the techniques and procedures designed to support them, tend to prolong operational-level training programmes leaving little time for anything other than basic familiarization training in the other areas.
Training for the governance and oversight structures include programmes on security sector management such as; procurement, budget management, policy development, human resource management, intelligence, and a host of other courses aimed at enhancing the civilian oversight capacity. Too much of a focus on capacity building for the armed forces without due regard to the creation and training of a civilian governance and oversight mechanism is a recipe for divided loyalties and the politicization of the security forces.
Security Sector Governance
Governance of the security sector refers to the organization and management of those institutions that exercise the state’s monopoly on the use of force. The UNDP Human
Security Sector Reform 36
Development Report (2002, p. 87) defines the governance and oversight component of the security sector as encompassing the executive branch and their national security advisory bodies, the legislative branch and their special committees, the ministries of defence, interior, and foreign affairs, customs and finance bodies, and civil society organizations such as civilian review boards and public complaint commissions. However, the mere existence of these structures does not guarantee good governance. Good governance requires five key attributes that a UN Human Rights Commission resolution identifies as transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation, and responsiveness to the people (UNHCHR,
2000/64). Of particular importance to good governance is transparency of public institutions and the policy making process, along with the mechanism to call individuals and institutions to account for their decisions and actions. This presupposes participation by an informed public through intermediary institutions or representatives. The governance challenge therefore, is to develop an effective civilian governance and oversight capability, operating within a rule of law framework with a clearly defined division of professional responsibility between the military and their civilian oversight. This involves enhancing the governance and oversight capacity of legislators and duly appointed bureaucrats through training and mentorship by independent experts in security issues, as well as public reviews of security expenditures, and civil society capacity building on security sector issues (Hanggi, 2004, p.
18). The extent to which good governance occurs within a state’s security architecture ultimately determines the level of democratic control and stability of the state.
Security Sector Reform 37
CHAPTER THREE
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency
If security is the “sin qua non” of PCR – and SSR is the foundation upon which success in the other pillars of reconstruction is based – what effect has the ongoing insurgency and counterinsurgency war had on the SSR process in Iraq? To understand its impact one must first examine the relevant literature on insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare as it relates to Iraq.
Insurgency
Even a cursory review of the Oxford dictionary reveals a variety of terms related to an armed struggle against a constituted authority, including nomenclature that categorizes the protagonists and their methodology of action. An insurgency or insurrection is defined as “an act or instance of revolt against a civil authority or an established government”(Merriam-
Webster’s, 2005). Other related terms include; guerrilla war, civil war, revolutionary war, popular uprising, resistance movement or independence movement. While all of these terms refer to an armed and violent opposition to a constituted authority, government, or foreign occupation, there are nuances to their actual usage. For example, guerrilla war or asymmetric war generally refers to the type of unconventional tactics employed by the insurgents and the lop-sided nature of the conflict. A conflict may escalate into a civil war if competing parties from the same country engage in organized warfare against each other in an effort to gain control of state power as in the American Civil War. A conflict may be classified as a revolution if it involves an organized revolutionary government seeking major societal restructuring as in the Bolshevik and Chinese Revolutions. Finally, a conflict may be deemed
Security Sector Reform 38 a popular uprising, resistance or independence movement if it involves clandestine organizations struggling for national liberation from foreign occupation and rule as in the
Mujahedeen resistance to the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan (Merriam-Webster’s, 2005).
Terminology related to those people actually engaged in armed struggle against a constituted authority or government include; insurgent, militant, rebel, terrorist, resistance fighter and freedom fighter. Conventions for the use of these terms appear to lie within the realm of the perceived legitimacy of their respective cause. For example, Western media outlets use the terms insurgent, militant, rebel, and terrorist in a pejorative sense to classify specific groups within the Iraqi insurgency. On the other hand, Arabic media outlets such as
Al Jazeera, Al Arabiyya, and Abu Dhabi television use terms such as resistance fighter and freedom fighter almost interchangeable when referring to Iraqi and foreign Jihadists engaged in armed struggle against the US-led Coalition. These differing media perspectives lend credence to the oft-used axiom ‘One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’.4 For the purpose of this thesis the term insurgency will be used to describe the ongoing conflict in
Iraq; insurgent when referring to those Iraqis and foreign fighters engaged in armed conflict against the US-led Coalition; and guerrilla warfare to describe the tactics employed by the insurgents.
Counterinsurgency
Counterinsurgency is the act of combating an insurgency through a combination of policing, conventional military operations, propaganda, and targeted assassinations.
Counterinsurgency operations go beyond the mere application of force to include political, judicial, economic, psychological, and civic action designed to maintain the popular support
Security Sector Reform 39 and legitimacy of the constituted authority in an effort to defeat the insurgency (Merriam-
Webster’s, 2005). Essentially, insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns form opposite sides of the same coin with each adapting to the tactics and strategies of the other. Given this dyadic link, it is difficult to consider either in isolation from the other. Accordingly, this thesis will address both insurgency and counterinsurgency simultaneously.
Insurgent tactics
A common aspect of all insurgencies is the use of unconventional or guerrilla warfare tactics, including terrorism, by small groups or cells operating under a loose and ambiguous leadership. Guerrilla warfare as a tactic has historically been most effective against an unpopular foreign regime since it relies heavily on the support of the indigenous population for success. Insurgents using guerrilla warfare tactics attempt to exploit the asymmetry inherent in the conflict by employing hit and run tactics against an opponent’s weakness. As
Mao Tze-tung wrote in his book “On Guerrilla Warfare”,
Guerrilla strategy must be...adjusted to the enemy situation, the terrain the
existing lines of communication, the relative strengths, the weather and the
situation of the people. . . .avoid the solid, attack the hollow. . . .withdraw
when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary;
pursue him when he withdraws. . . .the enemy’s rear, flanks, and other
vulnerable spots are his vital points, and there he must be harassed, attacked,
dispersed, exhausted and annihilated (Griffith, 2000, p. 46).
Insurgents, therefore, seek to avoid decisive engagement, increase their material support, and gain popular endorsement from the indigenous population. They often use
Security Sector Reform 40 jungles, mountains, urban, and rural terrain to mask their operations and conceal their logistical support bases. They seek to disrupt public security in an effort to undermine confidence in the government’s ability to maintain a secure and stable environment and provide for its population. Accordingly, many of their attacks are focused on those elements of infrastructure that will have the greatest impact on the basic human needs of the population. This is particularly true for modern urban societies that depend heavily on the state infrastructure for support. Primary infrastructure targets include; power generation plants, water filtration and pumping stations, food distribution centres, fuel distribution centres, sewage treatment plants, and transportation assets (Metz and Millen, 2004).
Insurgents also use crime and coercion to undermine public security and generate funding for the insurgency through activities such as hostage taking, extortion, hijackings, and theft. Attacks and intimidation against the national security apparatus are also conducted to keep the government off balance and force it into a reactionary posture. The aim is to entice the state security forces into causing significant collateral damage by over-reacting in their use of force, or by adopting measures that overly impinge on the individual rights and freedoms of the local population (Metz and Millen, 2004).
The SWORD Model
Anticipating an upsurge in the incidence of insurgency following the end of the Cold
War, the US Department of Defense (DoD) created the Small Wars Operational Research
Directorate (SWORD) under the US Army to develop the principles, doctrine, strategy, and tactics required for the successful prosecution of counterinsurgency warfare. A product of the
SWORD work was the formulation of an analytical model for predicting the outcome of
Security Sector Reform 41 insurgency and counterinsurgency wars. The model is comprised of 72 independent variables organized around seven main “dimensions” that are considered characteristic of insurgency war. When the SWORD model was applied against 43 post World War II insurgencies, it successfully predicted their outcomes 88% of the time, and performed 20% better than the next best model. The SWORD model identified military actions of the intervening power, external support to insurgents, supporting actions of the Western intervening power, and host government legitimacy as the four key dimensions that exerted a long-term influence on the outcome of the insurgencies studied. Short-term dimensions that influenced the outcomes included actions against subversion, host country military actions, and unity of effort
(Manwaring and Fishel, 1995).
While all of these dimensions are significant, legitimacy is identified as the most important dimension leading to the success or failure of an insurgency or counterinsurgency campaign. Manwaring and Fishel argue that a “failure of the intervening Power to reinforce the Host Government’s…legitimacy probably dooms the counterinsurgency to failure” (1995, p. 286). The factors that lay at the heart of the struggle for legitimacy in Iraq include; the extent to which the rule of law is applied, the amount of government corruption and extra- legal violence that occurs, the degree of participation by foreign intervention forces in the counterinsurgency campaign, the extent of collateral damage and abusive tactics by international and domestic counterinsurgency forces, the level of political participation by marginalized elements within society, and finally the extent of international support to and unity of effort for the intervention (Manwaring and Fishel, 1995). This thesis will use these
Security Sector Reform 42 elements as a basis for analyzing the relative level of legitimacy of the US Coalition’s counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq.
The Iraqi Insurgency
The Strategic Centres of Gravity
Although Manwaring and Fishel identified legitimacy as a key centre of gravity for counterinsurgency campaigns, there are three strategic centres of gravity that also impact on the success or failure of an insurgency or counterinsurgency campaign. They are time, cost, and popular support. The 19th Century military philosopher Carl Von Clausewitz defined
“centres of gravity” as the centripetal point or points of an enemies’ system for waging war that if attacked would cause the entire system to collapse. Clausewitz advocated a war of attrition where the destruction of an opponent’s military forces or their means to wage war was the primary goal and where conflict termination occurred when one or both sides agreed that the costs of continuing the conflict exceeded the benefit. He also identified public opinion as a key centre of gravity in popular uprisings (Echevarria, 2003).
The Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu, whose writings on “The Art of War” date back to the 5th Century BC recognized the importance of time and cost to the conduct of successful military campaigns when he wrote,
There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged war. . . .the
proximity of an army causes prices to go up and high prices cause the people’s
substance to be drained away. . . .In war, then, let your great object be victory
not lengthy campaigns (Galvin, 2003).
Security Sector Reform 43
Sun Tzu also recognized that attacking an opponent’s legitimacy could undermine an adversary’s political and popular will. Therefore, transforming the conflict into a struggle for legitimacy rather than a focus on the application of military violence is the quintessential art of insurgency war.
Other more contemporary commentators on the importance of time, cost and public support include T.E. Lawrence5 who warned of the dangers of applying conventional tactics to fight insurgency wars. He stated that...“war upon rebellion is messy and slow like eating soup with a knife” (Thomas, 2004). The Chinese revolutionary Dang Xuan Khu best described the strategic importance of time to an insurgency when he stated, “To protract the war is the key to victory. We shall weary and discourage them in such a way that, strong as they are, they will become weak and meet defeat.” Ho Chi Minh reiterated this axiom during the Vietnam War when he stated, “Time is the condition to be won to defeat the enemy”
(Ignatius, 2005, p. A15).
The longer insurgent violence continues, the greater the financial, material, and human cost to the host government and its foreign supporters. Hence, the primary strategic goal of an insurgency is to gain power or win concessions from the government by protracting the conflict and increasing its associated costs beyond what the government and its supporters are willing to bear. Insurgency forces have used this strategy successfully for centuries, the contemporary examples of which include the Viet Cong versus the US in Vietnam and the
Mujahedeen against the Soviets in Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, success would not be possible without the popular support of the indigenous population. As Mao Tse-tung argued, “guerrilla warfare basically derives from
Security Sector Reform 44 the masses and is supported by them, [hence] it can neither exist nor flourish if it is separated from their sympathies and cooperation” (Griffith, 2000, p. 44). He went on to assert that the population is “likened to water and the...[guerrilla] to the fish who inhabits it...(Mao Tse-tung,
2000, pp 92-93).
Time, cost, and popular support are also important centres of gravity in successful counterinsurgency campaigns. As Metz and Millen explain, “Successful counterinsurgency takes many years, often a decade or more” (2004, p. vii). This assertion is reinforced by
Manwaring’s examination of the Peronist Montonero, Shining Path, and Red Brigade insurgencies in Argentina, Peru, and Italy, all of which were protracted, unpopular and costly to the host governments (2004). Therefore, an important objective of the counterinsurgency campaign is to limit the time and costs required to end the conflict by undermining the insurgent’s unifying ideology and weakening their moral and material support to the point where a negotiated settlement is possible. This can be achieved only through programmes aimed at maintaining a secure environment and resolving the underlying causes of social discontent. In other words, by draining the sea in which the guerrilla fish swims.
In the case of Iraq, however, time and cost have already begun to take their toll on popular support and international resolve. Almost two and a half years after President George
W. Bush proclaimed an end to major combat, the insurgency persists virtually unabated and the number of Coalition and Iraqi civilian casualties (dead and wounded) continues to mount at an alarming rate.6 In addition, the level of insecurity, particularly in Baghdad and the
Sunni heartland, has had a detrimental effect on progress in the other pillars of reconstruction.
For example, a Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report estimated that private security
Security Sector Reform 45 costs now account for up to 25% of the funding for reconstruction projects, which has resulted in a reduction in the number and scope of projects undertaken (2005, p. 11). In September
2004, $1.8 billion of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) earmarked for water and sewage projects were diverted to security-related tasks bringing the FY 2004 budget for SSR to $5 billion. The FY 2005 congressional appropriation added an additional $5.7 billion to that total (CRS, 2005, p. 13). Yet, despite an investment of almost $11 billion and over two and a half years of effort to the SSR process, the security situation remains precarious and the
Pentagon estimates that only one Iraqi army battalion is able to conduct operations against the insurgency without significant US military assistance (Casey, 2005) 7.
The lack of progress in establishing a secure and stable environment in Iraq has had a negative impact on popular support within the US, the International Community, and most importantly, within Iraq. US domestic support for the war in Iraq is at an all time low. A
PEW Research Centre Survey released in June 2005 indicated that an increasing number of
Americans (46%) believe that US troops should be withdrawn immediately from Iraq (2005, p. 2). Moreover, this deterioration of public support for the war in Iraq has spawned an increasingly bipartisan effort within Congress to establish a timeline for the withdrawal of US forces.
International support has also waned. A joint report prepared in 2004 by the Institutes for Policy Studies and Foreign Policy Focus noted that eight countries that initially supported the invasion of Iraq have since withdrawn their forces and one, Costa Rica has demanded to be removed all together from the list of Coalition countries (Bennis et al, 2004). Of the 49 countries that originally supported the Coalition invasion in 2003, now only 26 countries
Security Sector Reform 46 actively participate and that number will decline further in 2006 with up to six additional nations withdrawing their forces from Iraq (Global Security, 2005). These events do not bode well for the prospects of long-term commitment to, or the success of, the SSR and PCR effort is Iraq.
Popular support of the indigenous population is a critical centre of gravity for both the insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns. A comprehensive CSIS survey published in
2004 demonstrated that Iraqi public opinion was uniformly negative toward the Coalition’s efforts in all four pillars of reconstruction, but most notably in terms of establishing a secure and stable environment (2004, p. 28). Although a more recent survey conducted by the IRI indicates some improvement in Iraqi public opinion toward the US Coalition, there remains a sectarian component to Iraqi nationalism that continues to sustain the insurgency and stymie
Coalition efforts to win hearts and minds (2005, September).
Western “Crusade” versus Muslim “Jihad” in Iraq
The insurgency wars of the 20th Century have been generally defined as either populist-nationalist or Marxist-Maoist in nature involving a political-psychological as well as a military dimension. As Manwaring argues,
...an insurgency is a political war in support of a goal in which the power to
allocate is at stake. Even those revolutionary movements that are not
explicitly political - such as radical Islam - ultimately must seize political
power in order to implement the changes they demand. . . .[Thus] armed
organizations attempting to gain political control of the state. . . .are engaged
in a highly complex political act - political war (2004, p. 2).
Security Sector Reform 47
However, the insurgency wars of the 21st Century can no longer be defined in such narrow
Cold War political terms. The onset of ethno-social and ethno-religious conflict in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 fundamentally changed the motivations behind the insurgency wars of the 21st Century, particularly in Iraq.
The social, political, and economic integration of the world brought about by the forces of globalization have exerted pressure on traditional societies to abandon their tribal roots and conform to Western standards of socio-political and socio-cultural behaviour
(Johnson, 2005). The result has been a clash of civilizations between the West and the Arab
Islamic world. As Telhami explains, the conflict in the Middle East has produced a “Prism of
Pain” through which Arabs view Western attempts at democratization and nation building in
Iraq as a conspiracy to “Westernize” and undermine Islamic culture and religion (Telhami,
2005) 8. Similarly, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 have produced a “Prism of Pain” through which Americans view the Islamic world with suspicion and disdain. Both of these solitudes have conspired to polarize the world along ethno-social and ethno-religious lines lending credence to the views expressed in Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations”, Barber’s “Jihad versus McWorld”, and more recently, Ali’s “Clash of Fundamentalisms”.
The ongoing conflicts in both Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated that the insurgency wars of the 21st Century are no longer purely political as Manwaring suggests, but rather constitute struggles against the centrifugal effects of globalization and the encroachment of Western cultural norms on traditional tribal societies. As Barber points out,
The aim of many of these small-scale wars is to redraw boundaries, to
implode states and resecure parochial identities: to escape McWorld’s dully-
Security Sector Reform 48
insistent imperatives. The mood is that of Jihad: war not as an instrument of
policy [or politics] but as an emblem of identity, an expression of community,
an end in itself (1992, p.8).
In essence, culture war rather than political war, where the driving motivation is survival of an ethno-social and ethno-religious way of life that often represents the antithesis of Western notions of liberal democracy, economics, and culture. The undeniable presence of
Al Qaeda terrorist organizations and Islamic based foreign fighters attacking the reconstruction and nation building efforts of the US-led Coalition in both Afghanistan and
Iraq is testament to the Western “Crusade” versus Muslim “Jihad” nature of ethno-social and ethno-religious insurgencies. As Tuck asserts in his article “Conflict Termination in Iraq”,
Even if this struggle does not necessarily constitute a “clash of civilizations”,
Iraq is clearly seen by many anti-Western forces as one battleground in a
much larger war. In many respects, the very presence of Western forces in
Iraq acts as a catalyst for conflict and de-legitimizes those local individuals
and structures that cooperate with the Coalition (2004, p. 19).
The virulent and intransigent nature of 21st Century ethno-social and ethno-religious based insurgency war defies resolution using the theoretical tools and lessons from the past.
Fresh ideas, policy, and doctrine are required to address the challenges of this new conflict environment. As Metz and Millen contend, “To simply extrapolate the ideas, strategies, doctrine, and operational concepts from several decades ago and apply them to 21st Century insurgency is a recipe for ineffectiveness” (2004, p. 1)
Security Sector Reform 49
“National” versus “Liberation” Insurgency in Iraq
Metz and Millen go beyond the purely political to categorize contemporary insurgency war as either a “national” insurgency involving a popular uprising against a corrupt and largely illegitimate government, or a “liberation” insurgency that seeks to free the nation from the control of an illegitimate foreign occupier. In fact, elements of both may manifest themselves at different times during the course of an insurgency dependant on the political and military dynamics at the national, regional, and international level at any given time
(2004).
In a national insurgency, the chief protagonists are the insurgents and ruling government with each adopting strategies and tactics designed to gain and maintain support from the indigenous population. The insurgents attempt to build on pre-existing socio- political and socio-economic inequities to fuel discontent, inspire resistance, and recruit supporters. An effective propaganda machine that utilizes contemporary media, as well as non-traditional patterns of communication is an essential tool in propagating discontent.9
Utilizing non-traditional patterns of communication is particularly effective in Islamic societies where Hashim explains, “The Friday sermons have been a traditional way of channeling political and social discontent in Muslim societies” (2004, para 11). The process of fomenting discontent is further enhanced by the development of a unifying ideology that popularizes the perception that the insurgents offer a better alternative to that of the governing regime (Metz and Millen, 2004).
In a liberation insurgency, the insurgent leadership employ a much more powerful tool for mobilizing popular support. Exploiting the indigenous population’s inherent xenophobia,
Security Sector Reform 50 the insurgents portray the conflict as a struggle against foreign occupation and rule. Race, culture, and particularly, religious differences become the chief mechanisms for propagating discontent. Insurgent propaganda continually cites outsiders as the root cause for the ills that befall the local population and expose the ruling government as puppets of the foreign power.
As a result, countering the unifying ideology of a liberation insurgency is difficult, if not impossible, particularly for foreign military troops. The longer foreign troops remain in a country gripped by a liberation insurgency the more they become part of the problem and a source of support for the insurgency. Thus, many insurgent groups attempt, at least initially, to cast themselves as liberation insurgencies in an effort to capitalize on the socio-cultural differences between the indigenous population and foreign intervention forces (Metz and
Millen, 2004).
Assessing the Iraqi Insurgency
Although there may be a multi-layered nationalist component at the core of the conflict in Iraq, the ongoing insurgency appears to follow the more contemporary notion of a liberation insurgency. Insurgent propaganda and Middle East media outlets continue to portray the conflict in Iraq as a religious “Jihad” not only against foreign occupation, but also against the imposition of Western-based liberal democracy and its socio-cultural precepts.
Indeed, the bloody fighting in 2004 between US forces and Moqtada Al Sadr’s Shia Militia demonstrated that anti-Coalition and anti-Western sentiment extended beyond a disgruntled
Sunni minority. As Hashim points out, “the [Iraqi] insurgency has benefited tremendously from the fusion of nationalist and Islamic sentiments. . . .in this context the statement by an
Security Sector Reform 51 insurgent leader that ‘the most prominent resistance is the Islamic resistance’ should not be doubted” (2004, para 15).
Iraqi society remains staunchly committed to its tribal and religious roots, thus, the insurgent focus on race, ethnicity, culture, and most importantly religion, as the basis for their unifying ideology makes it difficult for the US-led Coalition to counter even with the most skilled of information campaigns. The primary motivation for the insurgency in Iraq, at least in the short-term, is centered on the ethno-religious imperative to drive out the Western infidels. That is not to say however, that the long-term nationalist ambitions of the Sunnis,
Kurds, and Shias are not percolating just beneath the surface of the insurgency. But, as
Hashim quotes one insurgent leader, “We first want to expel the infidel invaders before anything else” (2004, para 6). Hence, the dilemma for the US-led Coalition is that while PCR and SSR requires a long-term commitment, the longer they stay the more they become a source of support for the insurgency. Yet, departing Iraq before establishing suitable security architectures merely increases the likelihood of ethnic conflict and its resultant impact on regional security. Therefore, as Metz and Millen assert, the solution to the dilemma and the focus of the counterinsurgency campaign should be geared toward,
...shifting the perception of the insurgency from one of liberation to a national
one. This will include augmenting the legitimacy of the local government and
security forces by distancing them from the United States. The more the local
government and security forces are seen as proxies or subordinates of the
United States, the more difficult it will be for them to establish legitimacy
(2004, p. 21).
Security Sector Reform 52
However, the recent focus of insurgent attacks aimed at disrupting and undermining the reconstruction of the ISF provides several important insights into the insurgent strategy.
First, the insurgents understand that creation of an effective ISF is the “Achilles Heel” of the
US strategy in Iraq. Second, the insurgents recognize that an insecure environment will undermine the reconstruction effort and, ultimately, result in the defeat of US intentions in the
Middle East. Third, it demonstrates that the insurgents appreciate the importance of maintaining the perception of the insurgency as one of liberation from foreign rule. Hence, their efforts to keep US forces visibly engaged in conducting the majority of internal security operations in Iraq. Finally, it shows that the insurgents recognize that time is their most powerful weapon, and that US public opinion will not support an open-ended commitment to rebuilding Iraq, particularly when the cost in American money and lives is so dear.
Therefore, it can be expected that the Iraqi insurgents will continue their relentless attacks and intimidation of the ISF for the foreseeable future.
The Uniqueness of the Iraq’s Insurgency
What makes the Iraqi insurgency unique is that it has not evolved in a manner consistent with the popular theories of 20th Century insurgency warfare. For example, Mao
Tse-tung described insurgency war as generally following three main stages, latent and insipient insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and finally, war of movement stage (Griffith, 1961, pp. 20-22). Similarly, the US Marine Corps manual MCWP 3-33.5 titled “Counter
Insurgency Operations” describes the three main stages of insurgency war as passive, active and counter offensive (2004, pp.11-14). Yet, in the case of Iraq, there was no staged evolution. Indeed, one could argue that a post conflict Iraq never really existed and the
Security Sector Reform 53 defeat of Saddam’s conventional forces was merely a precursor to the main event, a protracted insurgency war. As Tuck contends,
...the perceived hiatus between the success of conventional operations and the
emergence of terrorism and insurgency as a threat did not, in reality, exist.
Violence was a feature of Iraq from the moment ‘victory’ was declared. We
simply chose to label it as ‘criminality’ and ascribe its origins to the broken
remnants of Ba’athism and to the inevitable disorder associated with a
transition to peace (2004, p.18)
Moreover, the Iraqi insurgency does not reflect the normal organizational constructs of
20th Century insurgencies. As Coker points out,
...the [Iraq] insurgency has no center of gravity. The insurgents appear to
have no clear leadership - no ambition to seize and actually hold territory. . .
.neither do they have a unifying ideology [at least in the traditional sense] or
an identifiable organization. The insurgency is taking place in an ambiguous
and constantly shifting environment with constellations of cells gravitating to
one another from time to time to carry out armed attacks, trade weapons and
engage in joint training, and then disperse, often never to cooperate again
(2005, para 10).
US Counterinsurgency Operations in Iraq
It was not until late 2004, however, that the Pentagon and to a certain extent the US
State Department fully acknowledged the liberation character of the Iraqi insurgency and dilemma it created for their counterinsurgency operations. For instance, despite being
Security Sector Reform 54 rewritten to reflect the lessons learned from the Iraq insurgency, the US Army doctrine manual on counterinsurgency operations continues to define insurgency as a protracted politico-military struggle with control of state power as its central issue (2004, p. 11). This institutionalized focus on politics as the primary motivator for the insurgency blinded both the
US State Department and DoD to the realities on the ground. As Cordesman contends, the
US State Department and DoD employed,
denial as a method of counterinsurgency warfare. . . .[Were] slow to react to
the growth of the insurgency in Iraq, to admit it was largely domestic in
character, and to admit it had significant popular support. For all of 2003, and
most of the first half of 2004, it referred to the attackers as terrorists, kept
issuing statements that they could not number more than 5,000 and claimed
they were a mixture of outsider elements and diehard former regime loyalists
(FRLs). It largely ignored the warning provided by Iraqi opinion polls, and
claimed that its political economic and security efforts were either successful
or would soon become so. In short it failed to honestly assess the fact on the
ground in a manner reminiscent of Vietnam (2004, pp.1-2).
The stark contrast between the US State Department and DoD’s assessment of the size of the insurgency and reality on the ground became most apparent in a January 2005 press interview provided by the Iraqi intelligence service director, General Mohammed Abdullah
Shahwani who estimated that the number of hard-core Iraqi insurgents had grown to at least
40,000 supported by up to 200,000 sympathizers (Parker, 2005). Indeed, it wasn’t until late
Security Sector Reform 55
October 2004 that the US military revised its estimate of the size of the Iraqi insurgency to
20,000.
If the size of the insurgency was downplayed for most of 2004, the size and capability of the ISF to counter the insurgent threat was routinely overstated. As Salmoni asserts,
...widely differing statements about the numbers of Iraqi recruits, trainees, and
personnel [that were] actively serving...emerged from a variety of official and
unofficial sources. Such statements--often motivated by political goals--
routinely confused different categories, such as Iraqis arriving at recruiting
stations who may never actually enlist; those receiving wages in spite of rarely
showing up to train or patrol; Iraqis in training but not service-ready; Iraqis
serving without undergoing training of any sort; Iraqis in service with minimal
“transitional” training; and finally, fully-trained, regularly serving members of
the Iraqi Security Forces (2004, pp 11-12).
Given the run-up to the US presidential election on the 2nd of November 2004, it is probable that the true number of the Iraqi insurgents was downplayed, and the size and capability of the fledgling ISF embellished in an effort to mitigate the political impact on the
US elections. Regardless of whether a result of poor intelligence analysis or political expediency, this failure to identify and react appropriately to the growing insurgency in Iraq provided the insurgents with the much-needed space required to consolidate their material and popular support and to recruit new fighters for their cause. As a result, it is now unlikely that the US Coalition will be able to completely defeat the Iraqi insurgency.
Security Sector Reform 56
Security and Popular Support
The ambiguity of the Iraqi insurgency makes it almost impossible for foreign intervention forces to either collect reliable intelligence or acquire an accurate picture of the insurgency and its leadership. As a result, foreign intervention forces are often powerless to establish the secure environment necessary to gain the support and confidence of the indigenous population. Moreover, the indiscriminate use of firepower and the resultant collateral damage caused by Coalition counterinsurgency operations frequently contributes to the overall sense of insecurity by the Iraqi population. This is an important point; for if nothing else, the histories of insurgency and counterinsurgency wars throughout the centuries have demonstrated a clear link between the maintenance of a secure and stable environment on the one hand, support of the indigenous population on the other, and overall success of the counterinsurgency operation. Ultimately, it is the popular support of the indigenous population that determines the success or failure of either the insurgency or counterinsurgency campaign. And this popular support is often predicated not on any ideological motivation or socio-political end state, but rather on the basic human needs and instincts for survival of the indigenous population. As Maslow contends in his theory on the hierarchy of human motivation,
...the attempt to seek safety and stability in the world are seen in. . . .the
tendency to have some religion or world philosophy that organizes the
universe and the men in it into some sort of satisfactorily coherent,
meaningful whole. . . .[Where] the need for safety is. . . .[the] dominant
Security Sector Reform 57
motivator. . . .[that] finds specific expression in...[the] search for a protector,
or a stronger person on whom...[to] depend (1943, pp.379-380).
Hoffman reinforces this view by asserting that,
It is a truism of counterinsurgency that a population will give its allegiance to
the side that will best protect it. . . .[therefore], the highest imperative of the
insurgent is to deprive the population of...[its] sense of security. . . .by
demonstrating the authorities’ inability to. . . .protect and defend them. . . .the
insurgent banks on the hope that the disruption caused to daily life and
commerce by security force operations countermeasures will further alienate
the population from the authorities and create an impression of the security
forces as oppressors rather then protectors (2004, pp.15-16).
As violence escalates over time, the population begins to blame the government for its inability to maintain security and begins to cooperate with, or acquiesce to, the insurgents in their midst. Alternatively, they may form their own protection forces to meet the basic security needs of their ethno-social or ethno-religious groups. In Iraq, for instance, this search for a protector has manifested itself in the form of tribal and religious self-protection forces such as the Shiite Badr Brigade, Muqtada al Sadr’s Madhi Militia, and Kurdish Peshmerga.
Even the Sunni Ansar Al Islam and Ansar Al Sunnah Militias that form the bulk of the insurgency could be viewed as a “self-protection” force representing the interests of the Sunni minority. As a result, Iraqi society has become more rather than less polarized, further undermining both the security situation and reconstruction effort. In a recent poll of Iraqi public opinion conducted by the IRI, almost 60% of respondents selected either ethnic or
Security Sector Reform 58 religious tension as one of the three concerns most affecting their daily lives (2005,
September).
Therefore, the rapid establishment of a credible and ethnically integrated national security organization is critical to the longer-term security prospects in Iraq. However this will take time, and given the liberation nature of the insurgency, it is time that the Coalition forces cannot afford to expend, at least not without further alienating the population and adding fuel to the fires of insurgency and civil war in Iraq.
Security Sector Reform 59
CHAPTER FOUR
Planning for Post War Iraq
There were two critical failings in the planning for post-war Iraq that ultimately set the stage for the current security dilemma. The first was a failure to deploy sufficient troops to secure Iraq immediately following the collapse of Saddam’s regime. The second was a decision by the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Ambassador Paul Bremer to disband the Iraqi Army.
Errors of Omission
It has been over two and a half years since the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the US National Security Council has just now issued its “National Strategy for Victory in
Iraq”(2005). Sun Tsu wrote “that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory” (Galvin, 2003). History will undoubtedly be a harsh critic not only of the Bush
Administration’s justification for war, but also for its failure to adequately plan for the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq after the fall of Saddam’s regime. Indeed, a large part of that planning should have addressed the critical requirement for security in the immediate aftermath of the war as a pre-cursor to successful PCR. However, in the run up to the invasion the US Administration’s focus was on regime change and the defeat of Saddam’s conventional forces in Iraq. All other considerations were deemed secondary, particularly if they were perceived as a liability to the Bush Administration’s political justification for war
(Fallows, 2004, pp.52-74).
Security Sector Reform 60
That is not to say that planning for the now infamous Phase IV occupation of Iraq was not taking place. Indeed, there were a number of inter-agency working groups established by the Pentagon under the rubric of the “Future of Iraq Project” that were mandated to plan for the post conflict occupation and reconstruction of Iraq. Other working groups, such as the US
Army War College under the auspices of CSIS produced a comprehensive paper outlining the anticipated tasks for Coalition military forces to support the reconstruction effort (Crane and
Terrill, 2003). Another was the independent working group co-sponsored by the Council on
Foreign Relations and the James Baker Institute for Public Policy that produced a report outlining the “Guiding Principles for US Post Conflict Policy in Iraq” (Djerejian and Wisner,
2003). However, as Fallows contends “the US occupation of Iraq is a debacle not because the government did no planning but because a vast amount of expert planning was willfully ignored by the people in charge” (2004, p.53).
A key factor that militated against the effective planning for security of post war Iraq was that the political masters in Washington had become lulled into a false sense of optimism by exiled Iraqi opposition figures such as Ahmed Chalabi who asserted that the Iraqi people would treat American forces as liberators. This optimism was reflected in the comments by
Vice President Cheney who proclaimed that Iraqis would be dancing in the streets and greeting Coalition forces with flowers; or Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld’s contention that only a small US Coalition force would be required to maintain order in a post-war Iraq; or
Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz’s prediction that Iraqi oil could be used to fund the reconstruction effort (O’Hanlon, 2003).
Security Sector Reform 61
Clearly, Washington’s political proponents for invading Iraq were hoping and planning for the best, and they demanded the same from the military planners in the Pentagon.
Dissenting opinions were quickly purged from the planning process, which was evident in the case of US Army General Shinseki who, at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing in
February 2003, testified that several hundred thousand US troops might be needed to secure and occupy post war Iraq. Shinseki’s estimate was later substantiated by a RAND study of past experiences in PCR and nation building that demonstrated a ratio of 20 security personnel per 1000 inhabitants was required to maintain order in post conflict societies. For
Iraq with a population of 25 million, that meant at least 500,000 troops and police would be required to maintain security in the immediate aftermath of the fighting (Quinlivan, 2003).
Nevertheless, Shinseki’s estimate was publicly denounced as “wildly off the mark” and his subsequent input into the planning for Iraq was marginalized (Schmitt, 2003).
In the end, only 200,000 US Coalition ground forces actually invaded Iraq, as compared to over 800,000 Coalition forces during the 1991 Persian Gulf War (Persian Gulf
War, 2005). Although 200,000 ground troops proved more than enough to depose Saddam, the resulting security vacuum caused by the almost total collapse of the Iraqi military and police security architecture was catastrophic. Baghdad and indeed most major cities descended into chaos, with looting, rapes and revenge killings. The US Coalition troops were undermanned and virtually powerless to effectively intervene to bring order to the chaos. In short, the Pentagon had simply not planned for what would come next. As O’Hanlon argues,
Lest there be any doubt about the absence of a plan, one need only consult the
Third Infantry Division's after-action report, which reads: ‘Higher
Security Sector Reform 62
headquarters did not provide the Third Infantry Division...with a plan for
Phase IV. As a result, Third Infantry Division transitioned into Phase IV in the
absence of guidance’. A broader Department of Defense report on the war
similarly observed that ‘late formation of Department of Defense [Phase IV]
organizations limited time available for the development of detailed plans and
pre-deployment coordination’ (2005, p.36).
Within three weeks of the fall of Saddam’s regime, the public institutions and vital infrastructure that survived the war, had been gutted and destroyed by looters. The widespread pillaging also destroyed or rendered inoperable most of the barracks, infrastructure, and major combat equipment belonging to Saddam’s former security forces.
The notable exceptions were Baghdad’s Oil Ministry and most of the oil infrastructure that was secured by US and Coalition forces as part of the invasion plan (Fallows, 2004). This prolonged period of anarchy produced a number of outcomes that continue to undermine the security and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. One predictable outcome was the loss of credibility and legitimacy of the US Coalition forces in the eyes of the Iraqi people. As Crane and Terrill warned in their CSIS report,
...the United States should not expect that occupation forces will be protected
by a bottomless well of gratitude [for deposing Saddam]. Most Iraqis will
assume that the United States has intervened in their country for its own
political purposes and not to liberate them from oppression. . . .[Indeed]...the
Iraqi population already appears to distrust U.S. motives for an invasion,
Security Sector Reform 63
assuming such an act would be initiated primarily to help Israel’s strategic
situation and to dominate Iraqi oil (Feb, 2003, p. 35).
Another outcome of the anarchy was a rise in the number of armed militia organizations formed to provide protection for their respective ethno-religious communities.
The continued existence of these militia organizations de-legitimizes the Iraqi Government’s monopoly on the use of force, undermines efforts to create a truly national ISF, and provides an organizational basis for the future Balkanization of Iraq by political opportunists seeking to consolidate their hold on power.
Finally, the lack of sufficient Coalition forces to provide security on Saddam’s vast stockpiles of weapons and ammunition scattered throughout the country, or to secure Iraq’s borders provided the various insurgent and militia organizations with the logistical resources and external support required to pursue their respective ethno-religious end states. The US
Army SWORD model identifies legitimacy and external support to the insurgents as two of the most important dimensions affecting successful outcomes in counterinsurgency campaigns. The fact that both of these were undermined from the very start does not bode well for US Coalition success in Iraq.
Errors of Commission
Numerous studies produced by the “Future of Iraq Project”, US Army War College, and other think tanks warned against a wholesale dissolution of the Iraqi Army. Most analysts opted instead for a selective purge of Ba’athists and war criminals from the leadership of the ISF (Fallows, 2004). A US Army War College study argued that,
Security Sector Reform 64
To tear apart the [Iraqi] Army in the war’s aftermath could lead to the
destruction of one of the only forces for unity within the society. Breaking up
large elements of the army also raises the possibility that demobilized soldiers
could affiliate with ethnic or tribal militias (Crane and Terrill, 2003, p. 32).
However in May 2003, less than two weeks after taking over as head of the CPA, and despite the warnings put forth by the “Future of Iraq Project”, Ambassador Paul Bremer disbanded the Iraqi Army in its entirety. Bremer would later defend his decision characterizing it as the most important resolution of his tenure. He argued that by reassuring the Shia and Kurds that real changes would be made, it convinced them not to secede and ultimately avoided civil war in Iraq (Sharp, 2005, p. 3). Others such as Douglas Feith argued that the Iraqi Army was poorly trained, poorly equipped, and had, in effect disbanded itself, making it easier to construct new Iraqi Army units from the ground up rather than reconstitute existing units (Fallows, 2004, p. 74).
Nevertheless, disbanding the ISF at the very moment when they were needed most to maintain security in the immediate aftermath of the fighting was probably the most damaging decision for the long-term security situation in Iraq. As Fallows contends,
If failure to stop the looting was a major sin of omission, sending the Iraqi
soldiers home was...a catastrophic error of commission. The case against
wholesale dissolution of the army rather than a selective purge at the top was
that it created an instant enemy class: hundreds of thousands of men who still
had their weapons but no longer a pay check or a place to go each day (2004,
p. 74).
Security Sector Reform 65
These errors of omission and commission, ultimately, conspired to not only undermine the overall security situation in Iraq, but also to prolong and complicate the SSR process. The fact that Iraq’s Minister of Defence recently invited former officers from Saddam’s Army to join the ISF is testament to the difficulties of trying to reconstitute Iraq’s security forces in the absence of a properly trained and experienced Iraqi military leadership (Hendawi, 2005).
Insurgency War and the SSR Process
The ongoing insurgency war in Iraq and its resultant insecurity continues to have a significant and detrimental effect on Iraq’s SSR process. This section will explain the impact the insurgency war has had on the SSR process for the ISF.
Evolution of the ISF Structure
One of the most evident effects of the insurgency has been the hurried, chaotic, and constantly shifting plan for the organization and composition of the ISF. A key component of effective SSR is the development of a National Security Strategy and Plan that guides the process of determining the appropriate size, structure, and form of a nation’s security forces.
However, the CPA produced no such a plan for post conflict Iraq, which resulted in an SSR process that was ad hoc, uncoordinated, reactionary, and based on the faulty assumption of a benign security environment. The CPA intent, at least initially, was to create a relatively small ISF that was defensive in nature, democratically accountable, and no longer a threat to the region. Accordingly, the plan called for an Iraqi Police Service (IPS) of 85000 to 95,000 personnel based on the existing police forces and structured under the authority of the
Ministry of the Interior (MOI). The MOI also would have under its organizational structure a number of company-sized police Special Weapons Assault Teams (SWAT) and a separate
Security Sector Reform 66 police counter-insurgency force. These latter forces would be under the operational control of the Multi-National Corps (MNC). In addition, the MOI would control the border police, customs police, and civilian customs service, along with the facilities protection services. The facilities protection services numbered upwards of 70,000 personnel and were essentially security guards recruited on a local tribal basis to protect strategic infrastructure such as oil pipelines etc (Salmoni, 2004, p. 12).
The Iraqi Army structured under the Ministry of Defence (MOD) was intended to be much smaller, comprising 25000 to 30,000 personnel, organized in three divisions totaling 27 battalions. Up to nine of these battalions were designated as the Iraqi National Task Force and a further two battalions were trained as an Iraqi Special Operations Force to combat terrorists and anti-Coalition forces within Iraq. Under the CPA, the role of the Iraqi Army was specifically directed toward protecting territorial integrity. Most of the Army units were sector defence forces made up of poorly trained and equipped basic infantry foot soldiers that lacked the requisite logistical and transportation resources to operate more than a few kilometers from their home bases. In essence, the Iraqi Army became nothing more than a token force under the CPA. The fledgling Iraqi Air Force and Coastal Defence Forces were equally limited in their size, structure, and capability (Salmoni, 2004, p. 12).
In response to the growing insecurity, however, the CPA issued order number 28 in late 2003 authorizing each of the five military divisions within the MNC to organize a temporary Iraqi Civil Defence Corps (ICDC). The stated mission of these ICDC units was to
“complement operations conducted by Coalition military forces in Iraq to counter organized groups and individuals employing violence against the people of Iraq and their national
Security Sector Reform 67 infrastructure” (2003, para 7). Structured as light infantry units with limited mobility and firepower, the ICDC grew rapidly and by April 2004 had an approximate strength of 32,000 soldiers and was more than twice the size of the regular Iraqi Army. As Salmoni contends, “it was important to...portray the ICDC as a leading and successful element in the indigenization of Iraqi government and security, thus demonstrating the Coalition’s sincerity in returning sovereignty to Iraq” (Salmoni, 2004, p. 13). In April 2004, CPA Order 73 formally structured the ICDC under the auspices of the MOD.
Yet, despite the appearance of progress in establishing a bona fide indigenous military and police force for Iraq, the results were far from stellar. Difficulties with logistics, bureaucratic funding arrangements, cultural differences, and a plan that constantly changed in scope, size, and overall delivery, ultimately undermined the initial Coalition attempts at effective SSR. Major General Eaton, the US Commander responsible for training the new
Iraqi military and police forces conceded that a large part of the problem was related to outsourcing the training to US-based civilian contractors. Much of the training that these contractors provided was perfunctory or inappropriate to the requirement, which resulted in a year of lost time toward creating an effective Iraqi Army and Police Force (Calbreath, 2004).
Given the liberation nature of the growing insurgency, it was lost time that the US-led
Coalition could ill afford.
The CPA’s chaotic planning for SSR also is reflected in the uncoordinated and ad hoc manner in which the ICDC forces were created. In most cases, it was left up to the individual
Divisions within the MNC to determine size, structure, training, and equipping of the ICDC forces completely without reference to any national-level strategy or plan. Moreover, under
Security Sector Reform 68 the CPA’s stewardship, very little attention was given to the quality of the units, their leadership, or manpower being recruited. Cordesman contends that,
For virtually the entire existence of the CPA, leadership positions in all of the
forces were more a matter of politics than effectiveness, and inefficiency and
corruption were often ignored. . . .serious efforts to train effective forces only
began in June 2004, and did not really gather serious momentum until
September 2004 (2005, p 6).
The SSR process that took place under the CPA had failed to the point that when sovereignty was handed back to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) in June 2004, the ISF was nothing more than a hodgepodge of poorly organized, trained, and equipped forces that often deserted or fled in the face of the insurgency (Calbreath, 2004).10 This “rush to failure” further undermined the credibility and legitimacy of the fledgling ISF. As Cordesman argues,
...the most serious problem behind the lack of effectiveness of the Iraqi forces
until late 2004 [was]...the result of a failure on the part of the CPA and US
military to anticipate the treat of a major insurgency, and to train and equip
regular military, security, and police forces for this mission (2005, p 4)
To address these and other shortcomings, the US Administration established the
Multinational Security Transition Command Iraq (MNSTC-I) under the command of
Lieutenant General Petraeus in May 2004 (Christoff, 2005). Organized with both a Coalition
Military Assistance Training Team (CMAT) and a Civilian Police Assistance Training Team
(CPAT), its mission is “to assist the Iraqi Government in the development, organization,
Security Sector Reform 69 training, equipping and sustainment of Iraqi Security Forces capable of defeating terrorism and providing a stable environment”(MNSTC-I, 2004).
Almost from the moment the CPA handed over sovereignty to the Iraqis, the focus of the PCR effort in Iraq shifted to the creation of a greatly expanded and more capable ISF.
The size and structure of these forces, however, was not based on any national security strategy or plan for a democratic Iraq, but rather on the urgently evolving requirements of the
US counterinsurgency campaign and the need for a Coalition exit strategy.11 Yet, in countries emerging from conflict with a history of dictatorial regimes success in “formulating and implementing new policy on security and defence...is unlikely...if the reforms are not shaped and embraced by the new government, civil society, and the security institutions”(Nathan,
2004, p 5). The fact that most of the planning and decisions on the size, scope, and structure of the ISF are made by the US Coalition and implemented by MNSTC-I with little or no coordination with the staffs of either the MOD or MOI is not conducive to Iraqi ownership of the SSR process.12 As one senior mentor at the MOD remarked, the US is essentially trying to construct an occupation force to replace US forces, rather than a force that is truly responsive to the Iraqi people.13
The new US plan produced by MNSTC-I for the ISF called for a significant increase in the number of military units from the 27 battalions originally envisioned by the CPA to a total of 113 combat battalions comprised of: 91 infantry battalions, 12 special Iraqi intervention force battalions, five mechanized infantry battalions, four tank battalions, and one special-duty security battalion. These combat units were to be supported by an additional nine motor transportation regiments, three mechanized combat service support battalions, and
Security Sector Reform 70
10 base support units to round out the logistic support requirements for the ISF. The Iraqi
National Guard (ING) formerly the ICDC formed an integral part of the new force structure.
In addition, a small Iraqi Air Force and an Iraqi Coastal Defense Force were established, bringing the military force structure for the MOD to over 98,500 troops.14
The number and type of police forces also changed from the original CPA plan to a force of 135,000 personnel. In addition, these regular police forces would be augmented by an emergency response unit, border enforcement organization, highway patrol organization, bureau of dignitary protection, and a controversial civil intervention force comprised of two special police commando brigades, mechanized police brigade, and nine public order battalions, bringing the total force structure for the MOI to almost 170,000 personnel. As well, the MOI would oversee the training, equipping, and certification of the facilities protection forces numbering some 75,000 personnel.15
Despite this expansion and the progress made to date in the organization and training of the ISF, they are still almost entirely dependent on US armour, firepower, and logistical support for conducting combat operations against insurgent strongholds such as Fallujah,
Sammara, and Ramadi (Cordesman, 2005).
Logistics and Cost Implications
The sizeable increase in the number of units and personnel for the ISF, coupled with the accelerated timeline for “full operating capacity”, produced significant challenges for the
SSR process in Iraq. The increased logistical support requirement and shortened timelines for reconstructing the ISF necessitated an almost complete renegotiation of the logistical support contracts that were previously put in place by the CPA. The Project and Contracting Office
Security Sector Reform 71
(PCO) 16 that was already struggling to meet the logistical support requirements for other reconstruction projects in Iraq was stretched to the breaking point by the increased demand to support the ISF. Added to these problems were the constant insurgent attacks on the main logistical supply routes that caused many of the contracted companies to refuse delivery of the equipment and material beyond the main sea or air port of entry.17 The additional pressure placed on the already stretched in-theatre logistical resources to both move and provide security for the equipment to final destinations often produced lengthy delays in delivery.
In order to expedite the process, many of the standard procedures for outsourcing and monitoring logistics contracts were abbreviated or abandoned. As one senior officer in the
MNSTC-I logistics branch put it, “we reverted to a system of hip pocket logistics” in which the planning priorities were driven not by a proactive and appropriately phased logistical support plan for the ISF, but rather by the need to quickly put an Iraqi face on the counterinsurgency campaign.18 The resultant logistical chaos produced a five-fold increase in the costs associated with reconstructing the ISF.19
Insurgent attacks on the main logistical supply routes created other problems that hampered the organization and training of ISF units. First, these attacks delayed construction or refurbishment of base camps to house the security forces. In some cases, the insurgent attacks were so frequent that civilian contractors hired to provide logistical re-supply to these bases refused to carry out the task. In one instance, a base north of Baghdad went without re- supply of food, water, and fuel for almost a month, resulting in a high incidence of desertion among the newly recruited ISF members.20 Another major problem was the lack of basic equipment such as boots, body armour, helmets, and armoured vehicles.21 Although
Security Sector Reform 72
MNSTC-I had purchased the required equipment for the ISF, the logistics flow into Iraq could not keep pace with the requirement.22 At the same time, US combat units were also demanding priority delivery of upgraded body armour and kevlar plating for their Humvee vehicles. The result was a dual standard between the ISF units and their MNC counterparts.
While the MNC troops remained relatively secure in their armoured Humvee vehicles and full body armour, the Iraqis were packed in the back of open pick up trucks with little or no body armour, making them particularly vulnerable to insurgent attacks (Cordesman, 2005, p 6).
Infiltration of ISF Units
The abbreviated timelines for reconstructing the ISF also had a detrimental impact on the vetting process for new recruits. The vetting process was always little more than “by guess and by God” due to the absence of records and the requisite personnel to conduct background checks (Cordesman, 2005, p 5). However during the “emergency recruiting campaigns” conducted in 2004 to quickly fill the ranks of the newly established ISF units the vetting process was virtually non-existent.23 As a result, insurgents and members of the various ethno-religious factions were able to successfully infiltrate many of the new units.
Even the senior leadership of the MOD, MOI and MNSTC-I acknowledge, “that the Iraqi
Security Force has been deeply penetrated at all levels by hostile agents” (Cordesman, 2005, p
9). This has allowed the insurgents to plan and conduct targeted assassinations against senior
Iraqi military and civilian officials, as well as enter heavily guarded US installations to conduct suicide bombings.24 Moreover, infiltration of various ISF units by ethno-religious elements has tended to co-opt the loyalty of those units to the agendas of their affiliated faction. A corollary effect of this infiltration has been the creation of an atmosphere of
Security Sector Reform 73 distrust between the ISF and the US Coalition forces responsible for their organization, training, and employment.25
Demobilizing the Ethno-Religious Militias
The continued reluctance on the part of the US Coalition to demobilize, disarm, and reintegrate the various ethno-religious militias within Iraq has undermined efforts to create a truly national security force and has set the stage for the future Balkanization of Iraq. The loyalty of militia organizations such as Muqtada Al Sadr’s Mahdi Militia, the Badr Brigade, and the Kurdish Peshmerga is geared not toward the State of Iraq, but rather to their respective ethno-religious and tribal agendas.
Members of the radical Islamic Mahdi Militia and the Badr Brigade have already managed to infiltrate and co-opt units of the military and police organizations in Baghdad and southern Iraq.26 The recent arrest of two British soldiers in Basra by local police operating under the orders of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), along with numerous reports of sectarian killings perpetrated by local police and ISF personnel, lends credence to the claim. In the Sadr City area of Baghdad many of the local police are also members of the Mahdi Militia. Both the Badr Brigade and the Mahdi Militia represent different and opposing factions within the Shiite community that may boil over into a civil war. The fact that these two militia organizations now control the ISF units in their respective geographical areas is a serious cause for concern.
The Kurdish Peshmerga remains a homogeneous group within the ISF and operates exclusively in the autonomous Kurdish regions. Impromptu discussions between the author and senior Kurdish officers clearly demonstrated that their loyalty was to the Kurdish State
Security Sector Reform 74 and not to the State of Iraq. The flag of Kurdistan, rather than the Iraqi national flag, flew over most ISF buildings in the Kurdish north, and there was a discernable distrust and animosity toward their Arabic counterparts.27 Recent political efforts by the Kurds to regain control of Kirkuk and their growing strength and interest in Mozul clearly indicate a slow but steady move by the Kurds toward their own independent state.28 Unless these ethno-religious militia organizations are disbanded, there is little hope for a smooth transition to a truly
National ISF.
Terminating Contracts of Private Security Companies
Another issue that undermines the SSR process in Iraq and militates against the legitimate monopoly on the use of force by the ISF is the large number of private security companies operating in Iraq. The outsourcing of security to these private companies is a direct consequence of the lack of sufficient US Coalition forces to both fight the insurgency and provide the necessary security of vital installations and personnel. As a result, there are now over 60 internationally based private security companies employing an estimated 20,000 personnel in security-related tasks such as close personal protection duties or guards at vital installations within Iraq. What is most disconcerting, is that this small mercenary army made up of former military and special operations police personnel, operate within a legal “gray area” when it comes to the law of armed conflict, international humanitarian law, and the rules of engagement. Moreover, they are contractually immune from prosecution by the Iraqi
Government (Miller, 2005).
The level of training of these private security forces range from very professional to poorly trained adventurers looking to make a quick buck. Many demonstrated a negative
Security Sector Reform 75 attitude toward the Iraqis and often boasted about shooting at Iraqi vehicles that ventured too close to their convoys or failed to yield the right of way.29 There have been a significant number of incidents reported in the press involving the indiscriminant use of force by these private security companies in Iraq. A recent film depicting Western-based private security forces opening fire without provocation on Iraqi vehicles and people made headlines in late
November 2005.
The average Iraqi citizen does not differentiate between foreign, private security personnel and the US Coalition. Hence, the action of these private security forces not only contributes to the sense of insecurity within the Iraqi population, but also undermines the legitimacy of both the US Coalition and the ISF. Terminating the contracts of these private security companies and handing the associated security responsibilities over to the ISF will be an important first step in establishing the Iraqi Government’s legitimacy and monopoly on the use of force.
Organization, Training and Governance of the ISF
Organizational Differentiation within the ISF
A key organizational principle for national security forces is an institutional separation and clear differentiation of tasks for both the military and policing structures within the security forces. Mixing the tasks and firepower of the two increases the danger of the military becoming the dominant actor in domestic security issues on the one hand, or the militarization of police forces on the other. Although the primary responsibility for internal security rest with the national police forces in democratic societies, when a country is gripped in the throes of a widespread insurgency, maintaining public order becomes the overriding factor that often
Security Sector Reform 76 results in the military providing support to local law enforcement organizations.
Nevertheless, it is the police and not the military that assumes the lead role. In Iraq, however, the roles are reversed. The US Coalition, and indeed, the MNSTC-I organization that is tasked with organizing, training, and equipping the ISF is predominately a military organization and hence, there is a tendency for the military to take the lead role for internal security in Iraq.
Another problem that has plagued the SSR process in Iraq is the militarization of the
Iraqi Police. Ambassador Bremer’s decision to disband the Iraqi army left the IPS isolated and vulnerable. Poorly led, trained, and equipped with little more than basic side arms the
IPS became the first line of defence against the insurgents who were highly motivated former military personnel or foreign fighters armed with rocket propelled grenades and military assault rifles. Lacking in firepower and generally without Coalition military backup, many of these police organizations disintegrated in the face of insurgent attacks, leaving the population defenseless against criminal assaults and insurgent reprisals.30
In the later half of 2004, efforts were made to recruit and train special police commando brigades to confront the insurgents. Backed by the Sunni Minister of Interior
Fallah Hassam Al Naqib, a specially trained and equipped police commando brigade was established under the command of General Adnan Thavit. General Thavit was, himself, a
Sunni with family ties to the Minister. He personally recruited the almost 5000 members of the brigade, most of whom were former Republican Guard or Special Forces personnel. Not surprisingly, its members are predominantly Sunni.31 The unit proved to be very capable in operations against the insurgents and, hence, the US Coalition largely ignored its ethno-
Security Sector Reform 77 religious make-up. Following the January 2005 elections and the resultant shuffle of cabinet appointments, another police commando brigade (Wolf Brigade) was established under the direction of Bayan Jabr, the new Minister of Interior, who is a Shia and senior member of
SCIRI. Predictably, perhaps, this 2,000-strong police commando brigade is predominantly
Shia, and is commanded by a Shia General (Abu Walid) who is also a member of SCIRI.
While both brigades are noted for their fierce and ruthless tactics in confronting the insurgency, both have also been implicated in serious human rights violations and sectarian violence (Beehner, 2005). Despite being created to fill a capability gap within the IPS for dealing with the insurgency, the existence of these special police commando brigades now threatens to militarize the police and place personal or ethnic loyalties above loyalties to the state (Perito, 2005). The recent creation of a police mechanized brigade and public order brigades is further evidence of the militarization of the Iraqi police brought about by the ongoing insurgency war. De-militarizing the Iraqi police, and molding the various military and police units into a truly national security force, is critical for the SSR process in Iraq.
Otherwise the forces being established to secure the democratic transition of Iraq may eventually become the instruments of its own demise.
Training the ISF
An important component of successful SSR relates to the training of indigenous security forces. Training must include not only that required to conduct operations, but also on areas related to democratic accountability, human rights, international humanitarian law, use of force, and rules of engagement. Training should also include topics related to ethnic
Security Sector Reform 78 sensitivity, gender issues, community policing, military and police codes of conduct, police and intelligence conduct, and the rule of law.
Training programmes for the ISF, however, have not been consistent with the generally accepted principles for training a democratically accountable and rights-respecting security force operating under a rule of law framework. Instead, the training programmes have been driven by the operational requirement to quickly organize, train, and field a military and police force that is capable of defeating the insurgency. The MNSTC-I mission statement clearly states the focus of the training is to “assist the Iraqi Government in the development...of Iraqi Security Forces capable of defeating terrorism and providing a stable environment” (MNSTC-I, 2004). Other considerations, such as human rights and rule of law are lesser objectives. This single minded focus on training the ISF for internal security operations is reminiscent of the Super Power “military assistance programmes” of the Cold
War that sought to enhance the operational capacity of the security forces without due regard to the requirements of democratic governance, accountability, and the rule of law. As a result, training programmes for the ISF are focused almost exclusively on the basic combat skills necessary for counterinsurgency operations.
Although training courses range from three-weeks to eight-weeks in duration, most military and police security forces are deployed to security-related tasks with significantly less than eight-weeks of preparation. Other training, if any, is normally conducted as on-the- job training by their respective units. Only specialized units such as the Air Force,
Intervention Forces, Police Commando Brigades, and Iraqi Joint Headquarters receive any advanced training in command and control; specialized techniques, tactics and procedures;
Security Sector Reform 79 advanced weapons systems; computer technology; and communications equipment. This latter training is normally quite time consuming and the benefits are not likely to be realized until the end of 2006.
A number of issues militate against other than basic combat skills training for the ISF.
Except for training conducted by already trained Iraqi trainers, or training conducted in adjacent countries such as Jordan, there continues to be a language barrier between the US
Coalition instructors and their students that cause the training time to be extended. In addition, the level of education among many of the basic soldiers and police often necessitates a more “practical approach” to the training. As a result, more advanced classroom training in areas such as international humanitarian law, rules of engagement, human rights, and democratic responsibility, to name a few, are often sidelined by the more immediate requirements to train the ISF in the effective use of force against an evolving insurgent threat.
As Cordesman argues...“Iraqi military, security, and police forces...are constantly being forced to adapt to changes in insurgent and criminal behavior. . . .sometimes in ways that mean training has to be revised on a monthly basis” (2005, p 12).
The abbreviated training timetable and the speed with which minimally trained ISF units are deployed have resulted in a number of instances of serious human rights abuses and so called “friendly fire” incidents against the local population. The ISF and, in particular, the lesser-trained ING are notorious for firing their weapons wildly in every direction when attacked.32 Yet, in many cases, this has been a learned response from their US military counterparts who tend to employ these same reactionary tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Indeed, the number of times that US military forces have been responsible for the deaths of
Security Sector Reform 80 innocent civilians who may have gotten too close to a military convoy or committed some other innocuous error is almost beyond calculation.33
Another problem that has hampered the training of ISF units relates to the attitudes, cultural sensitivities, and professional capabilities of many of the civilian contractors and US military personnel assigned to train Iraqi units. A considerable number of the military personnel that provide training to the Iraqi Forces are US Reservists (weekend soldiers) who are not skilled instructors and are often lacking the requisite professional knowledge to properly train their Iraqi counterparts.34 As Cordesman contends, the Iraqis themselves have
...noted that some of the US and MNC combat forces they work with have
inadequate training for working with foreign forces, rotate too quickly to
acquire and exploit the expertise they need to work with Iraqis in the field,
lack adequate indoctrination into the current strengths and weaknesses of Iraq
forces, and sometimes treat them unfairly and not as partners. . . .Iraqi
officers...expressed concerns that US officers and personnel...[are] often
impatient and over-demanding, and tend to bully the Iraqis they are supposed
to inspire and train (2005, pp. 6 & 11). 35
Training the Governance Component of the ISF
In democratic societies, training of the oversight and governance structures normally includes education and training related to security sector management, procurement, budget management, policy development, human resource management, intelligence, and a host of other programmes aimed at enhancing the oversight capacity of the legislators, bureaucrats
Security Sector Reform 81 and civil society groups associated with the security sector. In Iraq, the process of training the civilian governance and oversight component is much more difficult and time consuming.
During Saddam’s regime, the security sector was tightly managed by a small group of
Saddam loyalists. As a result, those Iraqis with experience in security sector management within the MOD and MOI were purged as part of the de-Baathification process. Hence, the majority of Iraqis currently occupying senior military and civilian management positions lack the fundamental knowledge related to security sector management, procurement, budget management, policy development, human resource management, and national-level training and intelligence processes. Moreover, the looting that occurred after the fall of Saddam’s regime destroyed the senior military and police academies that normally would have conducted this type of training and education. Consequently, most training for the senior military and civilian leadership within either the MOD or MOI takes the form of mentoring by international police and defence policy experts hired by the IRMO or provided as part of the
NATO training mission. These senior mentors provide advice and assistance to their Iraqi counterparts in the day-to-day business of managing the ISF. However, the mentorship- training programme is frequently overtaken by the immediate needs of the counterinsurgency campaign. Decisions on force structure; planning, budget management, procurement, and policy development are often made at the highest-levels and subsequently implemented by
MNSTC-I without reference to the senior Iraqi military and civilian management components of either the MOD or MOI. As one senior mentor commented, it’s difficult to advise and train Iraqis on security sector management when the final product is planned and implemented by the MNSTC-I staff and then handed to the MOD and MOI as a fait accompli.36
Security Sector Reform 82
The NATO Training Mission in Iraq
Recognizing the need for international support in training the ISF, the US sponsored an Iraqi Government request for NATO assistance at the Istanbul summit in June 2004.
Although there was unanimity on the need for NATO to assist in training the ISF, there was substantial disagreement from those nations that opposed the war in Iraq as to whether the training should be conducted inside out outside the country. In the end, NATO agreed to send
300 military troops to assist in training and mentoring the senior Iraqi leadership inside Iraq, and to coordinate training for Iraqi officers and enlisted personnel outside Iraq at NATO training institutions (Monaco, 2004). A subsequent plan called for the deployment of 1,200
NATO combat troops to provide infrastructure and personnel protection for the NATO training mission inside Iraq.
Since its inception, NATO’s training mission has focused on mentoring and advising senior Iraqi military and civilian bureaucrats within the MOD and MOI, and on the development of a national-level training and career development programme for Iraqi military officers and senior enlisted personnel. The NATO training mission also helped establish an
Iraqi Training, Education and Doctrine Centre (TEDC) at AR Rustamiyah that will eventually provide Staff College, War College, and National Securities Studies courses for senior military and civilian personnel within the ISF.37 Officially opened in September 2005, the
TEDC will provide Iraqis with the capability to properly train the governance and oversight component of the ISF within the next two years.
Despite this progress, however, NATO’s involvement amounts to little more than political tokenism to disguise the lingering rift in the NATO Alliance over the Bush
Security Sector Reform 83
Administration’s justification for the war in Iraq. For example, NATO’s contribution to the
SSR process in Iraq since 2004 amounts to less than $300 million, a paltry sum compared to the over $11 billion in direct US contributions.38 Moreover, the extent of the transatlantic rift in the NATO Alliance is evidenced by the unwillingness of its member nations to generate sufficient military forces for either the 300 military trainers or the 1,200 security and protection forces. As of January 2006, NATO had still not deployed the full compliment of
300 military trainers or any of the 1,200 NATO security forces to Iraq. As a result, the NATO
“military” Alliance has been left in the position of having to hire a Private Security Company at some considerable cost to protect its infrastructure and military personnel inside Iraq.
In addition, NATO’s initiatives have done little to provide training for the senior military and civilian staff at the MOD and MOI in security sector management or the principles of democratic governance and oversight of security forces. Senior Iraqi bureaucrats within both the MOD and MOI still do not understand the concept of civilian control of security forces, nor do they posses the necessary security sector management skills to operate effectively.39 The senior staff training provided by NATO or bi-laterally by other countries has been oriented toward operational-level planning and joint command and control of military and police forces in domestic security operations, rather than on security sector management skills or the principles of security sector governance.
This disconnect in training for the governance and oversight component of the Iraq’s security sector is due mainly to a lack of planning and the deteriorating security situation in
Iraq. There was never a bona fide attempt on the part of NATO to conduct a training needs assessment of the knowledge requirements for those Iraqis managing the security sector –
Security Sector Reform 84 there simply wasn’t time. The sense of urgency created by a growing Iraqi insurgency, coupled with US political pressure for NATO to demonstrate progress through “quick wins”, resulted in an ad hoc and off-the-shelf approach to Iraqi training. Hence, much of the out-of- country training of the Iraqi leadership is not tailored to their specific knowledge requirements and often amounts to nothing more than training for the sake of training.40
This is clearly one area where NATO and the US Coalition need to focus more attention. While efforts to create a strong ISF capable for defeating the insurgency is important, these efforts must be balanced with the need to create an equally capable governance structure for the security sector. Otherwise, the potential exists for the ISF to become an instrument of arbitrary power for political and military opportunists.
Governance of the ISF
The five generally accepted principles of good governance are transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation and responsiveness (UNHCHR, 2000/64). Of these, transparency, accountability, and participation are the most critical to the democratic governance of the security sector. Transparency relates to the policy and decision making processes within the security sector. Accountability relates to the mechanisms to call individuals and institutions to account for their decisions and actions. Participation relates to the ability of an informed public to participate in the security sector policy debate through intermediary civil society organizations involved in security sector governance.
However, for the average Iraqi there is very little transparency of the policy development, decision-making, and financial accounting processes within the security sector.
Secured behind the gates of the heavily fortified Green Zone, governance is hidden from view
Security Sector Reform 85 for the average Iraqi citizen. Consequently, their participation in, or awareness of, the policy and decision-making processes related to the security sector is minimal at best. An indication of the lack of Iraqi public participation in the governance process is reflected in three public opinion polls conducted by the IRI (September 2004, April 2005, September 2005). All three polls indicate that almost 70% of Iraqis have little or no public awareness of the constitutional and governance process. Moreover, there are no Iraqi civil society organizations that have been established to provide independent oversight or facilitate Iraqi public participation in the governance of the security sector.
Family or ethnic ties, rather than the professional capabilities of the incumbents, are the deciding factors in the highly politicized process of selecting people for senior appointments. As a result, corruption runs rampant in most Iraqi Government Ministries. A recent report by the US Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) noted that there are 1,500 cases of corruption that are being investigated by the Iraqi Commission on
Public Integrity (CPI), many of which are against senior Iraqi Ministers. Almost one third of those cases relate to the Iraqi MOD (Bowen, 2005). Clearly, the necessary bureaucratic control that is normally associated with democratic governance of the security sector is lacking in Iraq. As Cordesman writes
...Iraq is still in the process of developing an effective Ministry of Defense and
Ministry of Interior and. . . .they estimate that it will take at least all of 2005
and much of 2006, to evolve a stable and more comprehensive overall
structure for handling the “governance” aspects of Iraq’s military, security and
police forces (2005, p. 8).
Security Sector Reform 86
However, the most damning evidence yet of the lack of good governance and oversight of the Iraqi security sector is the recent discovery of secret jails run by the MOI.
Reminiscent of US misdeeds at Abu Ghraib, many of the mostly Sunni prisoners locked within these jails have been found tortured and abused. The Shia Minister of Interior, Bayan
Jabr, initially denied any knowledge of the jails and later defended their existence as a place to hold the most criminal of the terrorists.41 Yet, this discovery, coupled with the large number of allegations of abuse against Sunnis perpetrated by the Shia-dominated Wolf
Brigade, is disturbing new evidence of the growing sectarian divisions within units of the ISF, and the potential for these units to become instruments for sectarian violence and civil war. If the level of democratic control and legitimacy of a state is determined by the extent to which good governance occurs within a state’s security architecture, then the level of democratic control and legitimacy of the government in Iraq is fleeting at best.
Security Sector Reform 87
CHAPTER FIVE
Summary of Main Conclusions
Crisis of Legitimacy
Transforming the failed and failing states of the 21st Century into stable democratic nations requires careful planning, a sufficiently sized intervention force, and a long-term commitment to the nation building process. This is particularly true in countries that are ethnically divided and lack a shared cultural history. However, even with these preconditions met, the success or failure of an international intervention also is dependent upon both the legitimacy of the undertaking, and ability of the intervention forces to establish a secure and stable environment. The US-led Coalition not only failed to plan for the security of post war
Iraq, but also continues to suffer from a crisis of legitimacy that thwarts their efforts to transform the country into a stable democracy.
The US failure to win a broad based international consensus for the war in Iraq undermined the legitimacy of the intervention. As a result, the US has been forced to shoulder the majority of the military and financial costs for the stabilization and reconstruction effort in Iraq. At the local level, a number of factors have had a negative impact on the legitimacy of the US-led intervention. First, the failure to establish a secure environment resulted in a breakdown of law and order, a loss of credibility for the Coalition forces, and a rise in the number of ethno-religious militias. Second, the abuse of Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib, the ongoing abuse of Sunni detainees by Shia security forces at other detention facilities, and the growing extra-judicial violence perpetrated by sectarian elements within the Iraqi military and police has damaged the integrity and legitimacy of the Coalition
Security Sector Reform 88 efforts to train the ISF. Third, the disproportionate use of firepower and abusive counterinsurgency tactics employed by Coalition forces have fueled discontent among the
Iraqi people and caused previously uncommitted citizens to join the insurgent cause. Fourth, the indiscriminant arrest and detention of thousands of Iraqis without due process of law has weakened the legitimacy of the fledgling Iraqi government, particularly in the eyes of the
Sunnis. Finally, the US attempt to impose a Western form of liberal democracy on an ethnically divided and staunchly tribal Iraqi society continues to undermine the legitimacy of the Iraqi Government not only in the eyes of the Iraqi people, but in the Arab world as a whole. A November 2005 meeting of the Arab League in Cairo to promote Iraqi national reconciliation determined that the Iraqi “resistance” to Western influence was acceptable as long as it did not target Iraqi civilians.
These missteps in the prosecution of the counterinsurgency campaign have fostered a growing liberation component within the Iraqi insurgency that now defies resolution by the
US-led Coalition. Indeed, the continued presence of Coalition forces in Iraq is now part of the problem rather than part of the solution, and constitutes both a source of support for the insurgency and a de-legitimizing factor for the Iraqi government.
Impact of Time, Cost and Public Support
Over two and a half years have passed since the fall of Saddam’s regime in Iraq, and despite two elections and a constitutional referendum, the Iraqi insurgency has still not diminished in its intensity. Insurgent bombings, assassinations, torture, and intimidation, as well as criminality and corruption, are a daily feature of life in many parts of Iraq. In addition, the ongoing insurgency war continues to undermine progress in the other pillars of
Security Sector Reform 89 reconstruction. Time is an insurgent weapon, the longer an insurgency continues, the greater the cost in money and lives, and the greater the impact on public support for the intervention.
For the US, the financial cost of the Iraq war will total $251 billion by March 2006 and will likely exceed $300 billion by the end of 2006.42 For the UK, the financial cost of the war is now over $7 billion. The human cost in terms of the number of Coalition forces killed and wounded is now over 20,000. The cost for the Iraqi people is even more dramatic. Their economy, particularly in terms of oil output and electrical generation, has still not reached pre-war levels. Moreover, the number of Iraqis (mostly civilians) killed and wounded is now pegged at well over 100,000. The impact of these costs on the level of public support for the intervention, both within Iraq and within the major troop-contributing nations, has degenerated to the point where a major withdrawal of Coalition military forces will likely take place starting in early 2006. Nevertheless, the exit strategy for US forces still hinges on rapidly creating ISF units that are capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations independent of Coalition military support.
Impact of Counterinsurgency Operations on SSR
This US focus on counterinsurgency as an organizing principle for SSR in Iraq has resulted in an Iraqi security sector that lacks organizational differentiation. The military has taken the lead role in internal security, and the Iraqi police forces have become increasingly militarized. Training courses for Iraqi military and police units have been shortened and focused almost exclusively on the use of force against an evolving insurgent threat. As a result, more advanced classroom training in areas such as, rules of engagement, human rights, democratic governance of the security sector, and accountability, are sidelined by the more
Security Sector Reform 90 immediate requirements to develop operational-level capacity within the ISF. In addition, the abbreviated selection process for recruits has allowed ISF units to be infiltrated and co-opted by the divergent political agendas of the various ethno-religious factions. These rogue elements of the ISF jeopardize the legitimacy of the Iraq government and undermine its ability to counter a descent into civil war. Furthermore, the failure of the US-led Coalition to demobilize, and disarm the various ethno-religious militias has weakened the Iraqi
Government’s monopoly on the use of force and created the basis for the future Balkanization of Iraq.
Descent into Civil War
The transformation of Iraq into a stable democratic nation is still anything but assured.
The December election has been widely condemned as fraudulent by most Sunni and even some Shia communities, which does not bode well for socio-political integration and nation building in Iraq. Moreover, while the political sector within Iraq remains weak, the security sector has becoming increasingly strong and divided along sectarian lines. As a result, the potential for ISF units to be co-opted by ethno-religious factions seeking to consolidate their hold on regional power is a clear and present danger. Indeed, there have already been numerous media reports of growing sectarian violence within Iraq perpetrated by elements of the ISF. The US Coalition, therefore, is in a precarious position. The longer they stay the more they become a source support for the insurgency and a de-legitimizing factor for the Iraq
Government. Yet, an early withdrawal before the ISF are properly organized, trained, and governed by a legitimate national government will undoubtedly be a catalyst for civil war.
Security Sector Reform 91
A Prescription for Success in Iraq
US National Security Strategy for Victory in Iraq
Transforming Iraq into a stable democratic nation will require a change in strategy and a reduced level of political ambition on the part of the US. However, the necessity for a change in strategy has yet to be recognized by the Bush Administration. The recently published “US National Security Strategy for Victory in Iraq” is still couched in terms of total victory over an insurgent and terrorist “enemy” through programmes aimed at strengthening the operational capacity of Iraq’s security sector. All the major components of the strategy are related in one way or other to the defeat of the insurgent and terrorist enemy. For example, on the political front the strategy states “progress in the political process will provide momentum against the insurgency. . . .[and] expose the falsity of enemy propaganda that Iraq is ‘under occupation’ with decisions being made by non-Iraqis” (2005, p.15). On the economic front the strategy states that by rebuilding Iraq’s infrastructure “people will...provide intelligence against the enemy. . . .Efforts in the reconstruction realm have significant implications in the security realm. . . .Economic growth…will be critical to ensuring that Iraq can support and maintain the new security institutions” (2005, p.23).
This single-minded focus on defeat of the insurgent enemy, rather than on addressing the underlying causes of violence continues to undermine the US-led Coalition’s efforts to provide the basic human security needs of the Iraqi population. A recent and contentious article by General Aylwin-Foster (2005), who was the deputy commander of the MNSTC-I in
2004, argues convincingly that the US Army’s counterinsurgency actions are actually fueling the insurgency in Iraq. He contends that while the US Army is a superb conventional war-
Security Sector Reform 92 fighting machine it lacks the training and soft power skills required to succeed in counterinsurgency operations. Clearly, a new strategy is required for success in Iraq.
Regrettably, the US National Security Strategy for Victory in Iraq merely codifies the status quo, and represents a planning effort that is too little too late to turn the tide in Iraq.
Iraqi Civil Military Assessment
The most damning indictment of the failure of Coalition efforts in the PCR, SSR, and nation building process in Iraq is contained in a recent civil military assessment produced by a number of senior Iraqi bureaucrats from the Interim Iraqi Government. The assessment highlights several issues in the political, economic and security sectors that continue to undermine progress towards stability in Iraq.43 In the political realm they cite the following areas of concerns:
(a) No long-term or proactive political plan, (b) negative proliferation of
political parties based on ethnic/racial lines, (c) reluctance of Iraqi elite to
participate due to poor security, (d) weak local government, (e) selection of
personnel to fill key posts based on ethnicity vice competency, (f) ethnic and
tribal considerations are larger than national unity/interest (2005, slide 3).
In the economic realm they cite the following areas of concerns:
(a) Deterioration of economy and services, (b) weak Non-Governmental
Organization (NGO) and International Organization (IO) involvement, (c)
increase in unemployment, (d) reduced standard of living, (e) increased
government corruption, (f) no reliable power grid to sustain industry or the
population, (g) no organization for hygiene and sewage, (h) lack of health
Security Sector Reform 93
services and hospitals, (i) lack of potable water and petroleum, (j) local
industry at a stand-still, (k) no development plan is articulated or known
(2005, slide 2).
In the security realm they cite the following areas of concerns:
(a) NATO and foreign armies are indecisive, always seeking US direction, (b)
interference of neighbouring powers, (c) a weakness in the equipping and
training of the Iraqi Armed Forces, (d) lack of coordination between Iraqi and
Coalition Forces, (e) monopoly of decision making by Coalition Forces
negates partnership, (f) infiltration of security sector by insurgents, (g)
presence of armed militias with no official mandate, (h) lack of clarity in the
Coalition security strategy (2005, slide 4).
The assessment also mentions numerous Coalition practices that run contrary to international law and the realities of Iraqi/Islamic culture. These include, arbitrary arrests, abuse of detainees, lengthy detentions without due process, and the traumatizing effects of forced nighttime entries into the homes of Iraqi families, the majority of whom are innocent of wrongdoing. In addition, the assessment asserts that Coalition forces lack cultural awareness; tend to see everyone as a terrorist, and have failed in their promises to provided security for the Iraqi people (2005, slides 4-8).
In order to resolve the ongoing conflict in Iraq, reverse the decent into civil war, and bring a greater degree of legitimacy to the intervention, the Iraqi assessment asserts that there must be a clearer strategic and political plan for Iraq that includes an exit strategy for
Coalition forces. That Coalition forces must be better trained to show greater respect for local
Security Sector Reform 94 culture, traditions, women, and places of worship to avoid alienation of the local population.
That demobilization and disarmament of the various ethno-religious militias be accomplished through a process of negotiation rather than force. That the treatment and processing of local detainees be conducted in accordance with the generally accepted norms of human rights by a better-trained and capable Iraqi judiciary. And that Iraq’s national government must be independent of outside [US] influence and have a greater respect for democratic principles and human rights (2005, slides 7-8).
Making it Right in Iraq
The Iraqi assessment concludes with several recommendations, the most startling of which is a preference for the European Union to take over much of the PCR, SSR, and nation building efforts in Iraq. The assessment states,
the European Union must have the major assistance role in the re-
development of Iraq, in all fields. . . .[that] the weapons and training of Iraqi
Army and Police must be more robust and the European Union should play a
larger role in this context. . . .[and that] Iraq needs an independent
national…government with real decision making [power] whose development
is more widely assisted by the European Union (2005, slides7-9).
This desire on the part of many senior bureaucrats in the Iraqi government for a more legitimate international organization to take over responsibility for the rebuilding of Iraq is the clearest indication yet of the US Coalition’s crisis of legitimacy.
As for democratic transformation in Iraq, while Saddam’s regime may have been a thorn in the side of American foreign policy in the Middle East, their failed intervention in
Security Sector Reform 95
Iraq now threatens to become a dagger to the heart of US ambitions for democratic transformation in the region as a whole. Whether the Bush Administration is ready to accept reality, relinquish control, and allow Iraqis to chart their own destiny under the guidance of a more legitimate international organization is yet to be seen. More importantly however, is whether a more legitimate international organization is willing to step-in and shoulder the burden of “making it right” in the aftermath of a poorly planned, poorly resourced and largely illegitimate US intervention.
Security Sector Reform 96
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NOTES
1 The US Administration has asserted numerous times that US forces will not leave Iraq until the Iraqis are capable of securing their own country and defeating the insurgency. The rapid creation of ISF forces capable of providing internal security and defeating the insurgent/terrorist “enemy” is a major component of the recently released US National Strategy for Victory in Iraq.
2 Raymond Aron first used polymorphous warfare in discussing the war in Algeria in the 1950s. Cited by Christopher Coker in his RUSI conference paper on “Cusp Operations” (March, 2005).
3 The predecessor of this organization under the CPA was called the Office for Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA).
4 President Reagan first coined the axiom in defending his support of the Contra rebels.
5 T. E. Lawrence who ran the Arab revolt during WWI, published his exploits and philosophy of insurgency warfare in a book titled “The Seven Pillars of Wisdom”.
6 The current Coalition casualty rate is one killed or wounded every 1.25 hours. Calculated from information obtained at http://icasualties.org/oif/. The estimate for the number of Iraqi civilian casualties varies from a low of 39,000 by the Geneva based Graduate Institute for International Studies to a high of over 100,000 based on a report published in the renowned science and health publication “The Lancet” in October 2004.
7 General Casey explained that the huge difference in the number of trained battalions reported compared to the number actually capable of independent operations was due to the fact that the US Coalition had only developed a system of measuring the operational capabilities of Iraqi forces in May 2005.
8 Shibley Telhami coined the term ‘prism of pain’ when referring to Arab and Muslim views of Western attempts at nation building in Iraq.
9 One frustrated civilian contractor who was hired to develop an information campaign to support the
January 2005 elections in Mozul confided to the author that the insurgents could reach more people with 100 flyers and non-traditional patterns of communication that the Coalition could reach using traditional media and psychological operations methodologies. Moreover, when local Iraqis were hired to support the Coalition
Security Sector Reform 111
information campaign by taking advantage of these informal patterns of communication they were often assassinated in the street within days of starting work.
10 In one incident 50% of the first battalion trained by the CPA deserted over poor pay and living conditions. In another, one of the battalions of the newly formed Iraqi Army refused to enter Fallujah during the
April 2004 US-led offensive.
11 The draft outline of the Iraq National Security Strategy was not produced by the IIG until the fall of
2004. As a result, the changes to the organization and structure of the ISF were generated by US military planners based on perceived requirements to defeat the growing Iraqi insurgency rather than on any kind of
National Security Strategy or Plan produced by the IIG.
12 One senior US Army officer who was involved in the development of the 1st Iraqi Mechanized
Brigade confirmed in a December 2004 interview with the author in that the majority of the planning for the
Mechanized Brigade was done by the MNSTC-I staff mainly because the senior Iraqi officers at the MOD did not have the background or professional capabilities to conduct such detailed planning.
13 A senior civilian mentor at the MOD made the comment during a December 2004 interview with the author.
14 Information obtained from the MNSTC-I home page at http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/facts_troops.htm
15 Information obtained from the MNSTC-I home page at http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/facts_troops.htm
16 The PCO was established to monitor and control all contracting and logistical requirements in support of the reconstruction effort in Iraq.
17 A senior member of the PCO organization conceded in a December 2004 interview with the author that insurgent attacks on the logistical supply chain were delaying the supply of weapons, ammunition, equipment and material to support reconstruction of the ISF. The respondent stated that the security requirements for most supply convoys were contracted out to private security companies, a practice that significantly increased the logistical costs associated with reconstruction of the ISF. A US Army officer who
Security Sector Reform 112
worked in the MNSTC-I logistics branch confirmed this assessment during an interview with the author in
December 2004.
18 A senior US Army logistics officer in the MNSTC-I, J4 (Logistics) branch coined the phrase “hip- pocket logistics” when referring to how logistical priorities changed daily due to the immediate needs of the counterinsurgency campaign.
19 A senior US Army logistics officer in the MNSTC-I, J4 (Logistics) branch gave an example of the effect the insurgency was having on the cost of reconstructing the ISF. He stated that a new AK-47 assault rifle could be purchased from the international arms market for as little as $300. However, due to the poor security situation in Iraq, the logistical requirements to put that same AK-47 into the hands of a newly recruited ISF member created a five fold increase in the cost. He stated that the same was true for most supply items destined for the ISF.
20 One senior officer within the MNSTC-I, J3 (Operations) branch recanted the story of how one base went without food, water or fuel for almost a month resulting in an almost 50% desertion rate. When the food finally arrived for those that remained it was tainted causing many to fall ill with food poisoning.
21 ISF units were only provided with civilian pattern pickup trucks.
22 One of the first requests to the NATO mission from the Iraqi MOD was for boots, body armour, and helmets for their soldiers.
23 Many of the MNSTC-I planning documents actually used the term emergency recruiting campaign to highlight the urgency required to stand-up the new Iraqi units.
24 From September to December of 2004, four of the twenty senior Iraqi military officers and civilians who worked with the author were either assassinated or intimidated to the point resignation. As well insurgents were able to conduct successful suicide bomb attacks against the heavily guarded Green Zone and in a crowded
US military dining hall in Mozul.
25 The extent of the infiltration was demonstrated when the MNC attempted to train Iraqi bomb disposal units to deal with the growing number of improvised explosive devices (IED). Soon after the training was complete the MNC began to notice that insurgent IEDs had become more sophisticated and in some cases
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actually contained the same material used to train the Iraqi bomb disposal units. Follow-on training was subsequently curtailed until a more extensive vetting process was completed for these units.
26 November 2005 news reports speak of Shiite dominated police forces in and around Basra displaying large photographs of Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani on the backs of their police vehicles.
27 This represents the author’s own observations when he traveled to the Kurdish military academy in
Zahko in the fall of 2004. During that time he spoke extensively with many of the Kurdish senior officers that ran the academy.
28 Kirkuk has long been known as the Kurdish Jerusalem. In the sometimes heated negotiations for a new constitution the Kurds demanded that Kirkuk be included in an expanded Kurdish enclave that would enjoy substantial “State” rights from a loose federal government in Baghdad.
29 The author spoke to many private security company personnel and shared a room during his tour in
Iraq with a member of a private security company. The attitude of these private security company personnel towards the Iraqis was generally poor.
30 In the fall of 2004, almost the entire police force in Mozul, the third largest city in Iraq, deserted their posts under persistent insurgent attacks. The insurgents summarily executed any police officers that attempted to fight off the insurgent attacks. The insecurity this created in Mozul and other cities throughout Iraq undermined public support for the US-led occupation and contributed to a growing popular support for the insurgency.
31 In a December 2004 interview with the author, a senior mentor in the IRMO specifically assigned to provide oversight and policy assistance to the Minister of Interior for special police commando brigades, expressed his concern that the brigades were being populated by former Republican Guard and Badr Brigade personnel whose loyalties lay not with the State, but rather with the Sunni or Shia Ministers who recruited them.
32 An interpreter working with the author recounted how her brother, an innocent bystander, was wounded by the ISF when they fired wildly in every direction following the explosion of a roadside bomb near their patrol.
33 Impromptu discussions with NATO personnel returning to the “Green Zone” from AR Rustamiyah highlighted how US military troops providing protection to the convoy would often shoot at vehicles that
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ventured too close to the convoy or failed to yield the right of way. In one account a US gunner opened fire on a vehicle containing an Iraqi family that failed to stop quickly enough at an adjoining intersection. The convoy merely sped away and the fate of the family remains in question.
34 The author discussed the details of individual pre-deployment training with a number of US
Reservists serving with MNSTC-I. Many were deployed with as little as one week of pre-deployment training and very little if any of that training was devoted to cultural awareness.
35 In one incident related to the author, two high-ranking Iraqi military officers were forced at gunpoint by a US soldier to pick up garbage for two hours at one of the entrances to the heavily fortified Green Zone.
This occurred despite the officers properly identifying themselves to the US soldiers guarding the gate.
36 A senior mentor within the MOD made the remark during a December 2004 interview with the author. Another senior mentor within the MOD expressed this same concern in a separate interview with the author.
37 The Iraqi government later renamed the TEDC to National Defence University, which now encompasses the Staff College, War College and National Security Studies courses.
38 This figure is compiled from information provided by a CRS report of June 6, 2005 titled Post War
Iraq: Foreign Contributions to Training Peacekeeping and Reconstruction. It also includes information obtained from various NATO websites particularly the NTM-I website http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Missions/NTM-I/Articles/NTMI_A_14_05.htm
39 Comment by a senior mentor within the MOD during a December 2004 interview with the author.
40 For example, some of the out-of-country training courses that have been conducted for senior Iraqi military and civilian personnel have been on subjects such as “NATO Peacekeeping” and other courses that have little bearing on security sector management skills.
41 Iraqi Interior Minister Bayan Jabr also goes by the name Baqir Solagh.
42 Two renowned economists Linda Bilmes and Joseph Stiglitz estimate the direct costs of the Iraq war will reach $500 billion by 2014. They also calculated the indirect and economic costs of the Iraq war as potentially reaching as high as $2 trillion.
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43 While employed with the NATO training mission in Iraq during the fall of 2004, the author actually worked with some of the senior Iraqis who produced the civil military assessment cited in this paper.