I Pandora9sWar: The Multi-Dimensional Nature of the Yugoslav Conflicts Slobodan Drakulic

This paper is an attempt to define the an ethnic society governed by an eth- cupied two small areas of in general nature of armed conflicts in the nic state guided by the political doc- 1991, and it took a while before they former Yugoslavia. First, is there a sin- trine of ethnocracy. pulled out (Tudjman, 36). In Bosnia gle, and then perhaps polycentric At the end of the eighties, Yugosla- and Herzegovina, a vicious war took Yugoslav war, or several successive or via was loose even by the confederal place between the Croat and Muslim concurrent wars? Second, is that war, standards, and it entered the nineties armed forces in 1993-94. By the time it or those wars, civil, international, eth- as a disorderly society and a disar- was stopped by a resolute diplomatic nic, religious, or something else-a rayed state. That looseness of Yugosla- intervention of the belligerents' inter- combination of two, three, or all four of via opened sufficient space for national patrons, Croat forces were the above characteristics? Third, why autochthonous movements and ten- defeated in Central Bosnia, and Mus- did the war break out? And fourth, dencies to develop in the federal re- lim forces in the old regional capital of who was right and who was wrong in publics, and at once reduced the Herzegovina, , were reduced to waging it? degree to which anything, including an enclave between the Croat forces to The answer to the first question de- war, could be Yugoslav in nature or in the west, and Serb forces in the east. termines the answer to the second one. scope. Beneath the dividing lines marked by If there is only one war in the former The series of armed conflicts in the ethnicity and religion, the Croatian Yugoslavia, then it should be viewed former Yugoslavia could not be de- Council of Defense militia (the as a polycentric armed conflict. That fined as a Yugoslav civil war. There Bosnian-Herzegovinian ' premise leads to the conclusion that we simply was not enough Yugoslavia- armed force) ambushed and killed are dealing with a Yugoslav civil war in terms of both state and the people- members of the Croatian Defense fought between several antagonists, for a Yugoslav civil war. The only Forces (the party militia of the extreme and assuming different forms in di- Yugoslav state institution left in place nationalist ). verse parts of that multicultural was the moribund Yugoslav People's On the Muslim side, a civil war still country. Army, and the only people ready to goes on between the (Muslim)Army of Such interpretation establishes the fight for Yugoslavia were the Serbs of and the (Mus- interconnectedness of the successive Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, lim) People's Defense Force of the au- armed conflicts in three out of six backed by the Serb nationalists of tonomous province of Western former Yugoslav republics. It high- Serbia. Bosnia-led by Fikret Abdic, based in lights the conflict as war of all against Yugoslav federal army soon was the provincial capital of Kladusa, and one-predominantly Croat, Muslim reduced to one of the Serb armies in the the government in accuses and Slovene against the mostly Serb former Yugoslavia, composed mostly the Serbs of backing the West Bosnian forces. At the same time, it reduces the of the Croatian, and Bosnia-Herzego- Muslim rebels. significance of local, autochthonous vinian Serbs (Kruselj, 32). By the Since ethnic lines are not the only factors, picturing them as derivatives Spring of 1992 it was entirely replaced lines of division, the number of mili- of the Yugoslav federal politics. It even by the local Serb armies, whose politi- tary formations exceeds the number of maintains an illusion that Yugoslavia cal leaderships neither could nor majbr ethnic groups everywhere ex- may still exist somehow-perhaps as a would fight for Yugoslavia. They had cept in , where only two po- commonwealth of battlefields. to chose between fighting for a Greater litical subjects and two armed forces The Yugoslav republics were dis- Serbia, or for their separate statelettes. involved in the war: Slovenian and tinct and even partially separate ethnic They immediately opted for the first Yugoslav states and armed forces. In societies and states even before the goal. Serbian leaders could not dare to stark contrast to that; there were three outbreak of the war. The only excep- accept invitations from their western major political subjects and about a tion was Bosnia and Herzegovina, that cousins to annex their lands to Serbia, dozen armed forces involved in the miniature Yugoslavia which encapsu- because of the severe opposition of the war in Croatia: the Republic of Croatia, lates the very core of the contradictions mainly Western foreign powers. Republic of Serb Krajina and Yugoslav that ripped Yugoslavia apart--ethnic- The image of Serbs fighting the rest Federation, with their assorted armed ity based upon religion that produces of the former Yugoslavs tends to over- forces and militias (Gow, 18). The shadow the existence of a number of number of major political subjects rose Slobodan Drakulic is a PhD candidate in the other conflicts that happened within to six in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Re- Department of Sociology, University of the heterogeneous anti-Serb camp. In public of Croatia and the Croat Repub- Toronto. one such episode Slovenian troops oc- lic of Herceg-Bosna; Republic of

Refuge, Vol. 14, No. 3 (June-July 1994) 5 Bosnia and Herzegovina (Izetbegovic) ciety would end up being an ethnic In May of 1991, Croatian government and the autonomous province of West- war. Similarly, every would-be ethnic made its final move before the act of ern Bosnia (Abdic); Republic of Srpska war fought between opposing ethnici- secession, calling a referendum. More (Serb Bosnia andHerzegovina) and the ties based on religions would end up than 93 percent of all Croatians who Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Ser- being religious war-at least to some cast their ballot, voted for their repub- bia and Montenegro). The number of degree."^ summarize briefly: first, lic's sovereignty and independence armed forces went down, indicating the armed conflicts in Yugoslavia do from Yugoslavia (Separovic, 115-17).6 certain stabilization of various state not constitute a single Yugoslav civil Seven percent more than the ethnically authorities on the ground. Five armed war; second, those wars are a complex far more homogenous Slovenians had forces confront each other in Bosnia mixture of ethnic, religious, civil, and cast in December 1990. and Herzegovina: two Croat, two international armed struggles. Far On February 29 and March 1,1992, Muslim and one Serb.' from being a specie of Clausewitz's "some sixty-eight percent of all eligi- War in Slovenia is therefore the clos- kind of war as continuation of politics ble voters voted in favour of independ- est to being a civil war-an ethnic-civil by other means, they are a series of ence," (Fogelquist, 26), at a plebiscite war, the Slovenian war of secession chaotic martial ruptures-Pandora's suggested by the European Commu- from Yugoslavia. Religious hues were wars. nity and called by the Croat-Muslim present but not prominent. Slovenia Why did these wars break out? The coalition's leadership. Most Serbs ab- claimed that it was invaded by the first and most obvious reason is that stained, obviously. If their numbers Yugoslav People's Army.= The the moribund nature of the Yugoslav were to be subtracted from the total, Croatian war is a mixture of the regime of the time-product of dec- virtually all adult Croats and Muslims Croatian war of secession from Yugo- ades of ethnic squabbles and divisions voted for secession. Taken on their slavia, and Serb war of secession from that began in the late sixties. Those eth- own, virtually all Serbs voted against Croatia: it thus started as a Yugoslav nic squabbles and divisions in turn secession. civil war, but ended as Croatian. As it promoted internal ethnic homogeniza- Finally, on March 1, 1992, "in the was fought among ethnic societies tion. This process was particularly in- referendum in Montenegro, the major- governed by ethnic states and inspired tensified after the death of the late ity of the people came out for a union of by an ideology of ethnocracy, that war Yugoslav President Tito, in 1980. By Montenegro and Serbia" (Djuretic, took the form of an ethnic war. And as 1990, all ethnic groups were virtually 445). The cycle of ethnic homogeniza- the embattled ethnicities are entwined transformed into separate political- tion was thus completed? As the pas- with religion in those parts (Smith, 27), military camps and coalitions of such sions ran high for years before, the their war became an ethno-religious camps. The level of the political con- assorted Yugoslav political-military war.3 sensus within them was expressed in camps and coalitions were ready to War in Bosnia and Herzegovina the series of plebiscites, referenda, clash. Pandora's box was brimming started as the joint Croat-Muslim war elections, and the population census. with wars. of secession from Yugoslavia, coun- Ethnic sought to At that point in time, there was no tered by the Serb war of secession from pre-empt the Croat secession from major ethnic group left in Yugoslavia Bosnia and Herzegovina. An addi- Yugoslavia with their own separation which was not politically homog- tional momentum was the Croat war from Croatia. At their plebiscite in enized around an ideological political of secession from Bosnia and Herze- August 1990, the results were as fol- consensus already established by the govina-opposed by the Muslim lows: "for autonomy 567,127; against ethno-nationalist Communists, and forces. Western Muslim war of seces- 114; 46 ballots were spoiled (Bisic, 63). hardened by the new political elites sion from Kladusa came as a final Croatian Serb consensus around the that conquered the state power in stroke on this chaotic martial canvass. issue of separation from Croatia, if 1990.8All those elites were leaning to- Ironically, the almost surrealistic re- Croatia were to separates from Yugo- wards pronounced ethno-nationalist bellion against the state that is no more, slavia, was the highest of all ethnic ho- stands that were about to throw the actually provides the only possible di- mogenizations at the time. country into war. mension of a truly civil war in the Slovenian government proclaimed All that was needed by the begin- whole conflict. Namely, that Mr. independence from Yugoslavia fol- ning of the nineties, was someone to Abdic's faction politically disagrees lowing a popular plebiscite on the is- merely touch upon someone else's sore with the pro-Islamic faction of Mr. sue, where 86 percent of voters psychohistoric spot, and things would Izetbegovic, in spite of their common supported the idea of an independent take the course towards confrontation. ethnic identity; all other sides in the Slovenian state in December of 1990 No such thing happened in Yugosla- Yugoslav conflicts politically disagree (Nakarada, 136).By that time, homog- via. Nobody touched anybody's sore because of their ethnic differences." enization of the ethnic Slovene public spot: they trampled upon them when- A civil war waged between differ- opinion as anti8erb and anti-Yugo- ever and wherever they could, with ent ethnic groups in a multi-ethnic so- slav had reached the point of no return. both feet stuck into military boots.

6 Refuge, Vol. 14, No. 3 (June-July 1994) Take for example the phonogram of Gypsies and Jews (mostly), and Serbs. since August of 1990. According to the a secret meeting held on July 23,1990, This was one of the particularly sore local ethnic Serb sources, it all started of the President of Croatia, Franjo spots of both Serbs and Croats, repeat- on "August 17,1990 [at the Northern Tudjman and his advisor, Slaven edly entered by Mr. Tudjman in his ca- Dalmatian municipality of] Benko- Letica, with the leader of Croatian pacity of a revisionist historian of the vac," after the "Ministry of Internal Serbs of the time, Jovan Raskovic. At World War I1 horrors (Babic, 79).9 Affairs of Croatia sent its special troops one point, Raskovic says: "I have also Croat propagandists retorted by to prevent the plebiscite," due to be pleaded to you to mention the means of books like the one edited by held within two days. "Serbs re- sovereignty of the Serb national being. Boze Covic and titled The Origins of the sponded by erecting barricades," and That is not a state sovereignty of any Great-Serbian Aggression, proving that the "war for Krajina started" (Bisic, kind, when you say that sovereignty of Serb intellectuals and politicians had 63)?l Another Serb source from Bel- the Serb national being is being aimed to attack Croatia ever since 1844 grade states that "the 'Serb uprising' in recognized .. . ." President Tudjman re- (Covic, IZvori).l0 the Knin Krajina12practically started," sponded: "Those are legal formula- In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija as a "response to a night attack of the tions." His advisor Letica added: "That Iztbegovic's was special^"^ against the militia14 station cannot be improvised. Croatia is the published in 1990 (two odd decades in Benkovac" (Nakarada, 135). national state of the Croats" (Letica, after having been written), subtitled The ethnic Croat sources reported 154), (Raskovic, 312). "A Programme for the Islamization of the same event very differently. Well known Croat writer Dubravko Jelcic Why did these wars break out? The first and most obvious reason wrote in his diary that "military planes is that the moribund nature of the Yugoslav regime of the time-- intercepted the official helicopters of the Ministry of Interior of Croatia, forc- product of decades of ethnic squabbles and divisions ing them to return to theirbase," which that legan in the late sixties. is how "an open attack on Croatia started." (Jelcic, 254-55). Another The issue at stake was definition of Muslims and the Muslim Peoples" Croat wrGer maintained that the the state of Croatia in the new Consti- (Izetbegovic, 3). I am not sure that Mr. ,Serbo-Croat standoff in the area of tution that was then being prepared. Izetbegovic's political theology could Knin was "planned in the Serbian ideo- Croat ruling party wanted to define it have impressed very many largely logical centres;" local Serbs, "encour- in Letica's terms. Most Croatian Serbs religiously indifferent Bosnian Mus- aged by two MIGs in the sky and insisted that they should be mentioned lims. I do know that its publishing was meetings of support in Serbia, actually as a co-sovereign people of Croatia. successfully used for the Serb ethnic declared war on Croatia" (Cuic, 9). Letica's blunt definition of Croatia mobilization against the Islamic That was a fact confirmed by the did not enter the Constitution (Consti- fundamentalist revival of Alija other side in the conflict as well. On tution, 31), but it entered the corpus of Izetbegovic, promoted by the Serbian August 17,1990, the President of Knin the casus belli. About a month earlier, media. municipality, Milan Babic, proclaimed Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic of- Slovenian media churned their own the state of war on the local radio. The fered his contribution to the brewing "flowers of political and intellectual last President of YugoslaJia and war: "Serbia should let it be clearly evil," like everybody else. One of the Croatian separatist Stipe Mesic known that it takes its present admin- protagonists of the Slovene new social cracked a joke about this incident, say- istrative borders only in connection movements, Tomaz Mastnak, an- ing that "Mr. Babic must be a big joker with a federally constituted Yugosla- nounced:" I see no solution and have when he thinks that President of a via," and "in case that such a Yugosla- ceased looking for one," (Mastnak, 48) municipality can proclaim the state of via is not wanted, the issue of Serbia's in a situation where Yugoslavia was war." Dubravko Jelcic who preserved borders is an open question" (Cavoski, split into "two opposing models of so- Mr. Mesic's pun for posterity, com- 136-37). What was not accomplished cial and political development . .. one mented about his own reaction to the by the politicians had been achieved Slovenian and the other Serbian" joke: "I laughed from my heart and by the propagandist intellectuals. In (Mastnak, 46). The period of 1989-91 immediately felt the power of humour: the first half of 1991, before the Slov- could be defined as one protracted what has once been ridiculed, cannot enian and Croatian declarations of in- psychosocial preparation for war--on be serious, let alone lofty, any more" dependence, Petar Dzadzic published all sides without exceptions. (Jelcic, 255). the third expanded edition of his book The remaining question is the one of On the contrary, something can be The New Ustasha State?, relating Franjo right and wrong involved in these deadly serious, regardless of how Tudjman to the Nazi Croat Fiihrer in wars. By late June 1991, when war much it may have been ridiculed by its 1941-45, Ante Pavelic, responsible for erupted in Slovenia, a low-level war- opponents. Mr. Babic's declaration of the deaths of hundreds of thousands of fare was already going on in Croatia war may have been pathetic, but the

Wge,Vol. 14, No. 3 (June-July 1994) fact remains that the President of the tance, to say the least, that were used as a human shield of a kind-and thinly inhabited badlands which is the stamped as "strictly confidential" by were killed by the federal forces municipality of Knin, was right: the some anonymous and probably un- (Molinari, SO), their number of ten be- war in former Yugoslavia started on concerned military bureaucrat. ing only somewhat lower than that of August 17,1990 in Benkovac, Croatia; That trial seems to have been the the ethnic Slovenes (Bandi, 202). if one prefers to talk about more than breaking point in the relationship be- Within days, foreign powers inter- one war, than this was the first in the tween the mainstream ethnic Slovene vened, offering mediation and asking series, and it started with Mr. Babic's population and the Yugoslav regime, for the cessation of hostilities. A stand- proclamation of the state of war in and particularly its military authori- off followed, with Slovenian inde- Knin. ties. This is was indicated at the time by pendence being suspended no more That initial stage of the armed con- the Slovene political analyst Darko than the federal control over Slovenia flict is marked by the Croatian seces- Strajn, who asked whether any change evaporated into thin air. On July 1 sion from Yugoslavia, and Serbian at all could be affected within the exist- 1991, the Serbian side was pressured resistance to it, which manifested itself ent framework (Grakalic, 146-48). The by international factors to accept an as the local Serb secession from implication is obvious: if no reform ethnic Croat secessionist, Mr. Stipe Croatia. As two sides in this conflict was possible, the Slovene new social Mesic, as the President of the Yugoslav were indigenous to Croatia, theirs was movements would have to give up federal Presidency. He thus became a civil war. Furthermore, as Croatia their aspirations, or make a dash for the head of the highest instance of state and all participants in the Croatian the political revolution. They opted for power in the country-formally a head conflict at least formally belonged to the latter, backed by their state and of the collective supreme commander Yugoslavia, that war was not ethnic, party apparatus during the Commu- of the Yugoslav People's Army. but civil as well. After the international nist regime. Their struggle was contin- Several days later, an accord be- recognition of Croatia as an independ- ued by the new separatist regime that tween the belligerents was signed at ent state, that war became interna- bore even some clericalist-nationalist the late President Tito's resort at the tional and remained such until the hues. Islands of Brioni (later on renamed by Yugoslav Army's pull-out from its With such sharply antagonistic the Croatian state into Brijuni). The territory. forces dominating their respective ar- war in Slovenia was over-if it ever The Slovene state leadership hence eas of the political spectrum of the happened. What did happen, how- faced a situation where an armed con- former Yugoslavia, war became in- ever, was a series of low-scale clashes flict was already in full motion in creasingly unavoidable. The sparkwas of no tactical significance, not to men- Croatia, involving ethnic Croat-led purposely provided by the Slovenian tion any strategic importance. and dominated forces on one side, and government, and set to the Yugoslav An intensive propaganda war hap- equally ethnic Serb forces on the other. tinderbox by its Ministry of Defense pened instead, with Croatia and Slov- Slovenian leaders watched the federal (Jansa, 155).15 Mr. Jansa's passionate enia on one side, and the federal army as it vacillated between an struggle to start a war in Slovenia met government, Montenegro and Serbia untenable neutrality and growing an equally zealous response from his on the other. Croatian and Slovenian sympathies with the Croatian Serbs by government's opponents in Belgrade. propagandists claimed that their coun- most of its mostly Serb and Monte- Consequently, when the Slovenian tries had suffered an aggression of the negrin, as well as mostly pro-Yugoslav Terfritorial Defence units took Yugo- Yugoslav federal army, while the same federalist Communist professional slav border crossings to Italy, Austria army accused their Slovene antago- military officers. They should have and Hungary by force, federal Prime nists of high treason.19Botharguments had no illusions about the side that Minister Ante Markovic responded by were vacuous from the other's point of those same officers would chose in an ordering the federal army to retake view, and, needless to say, both pro- armed conflict in Slovenia. them by force. The army rolled out in tagonists practised an autistic form of One should bear in mind that Slov- its armour-but with a vastly insuffi- political behaviour, utterly oblivious enia was the primary battleground cient infantry of less than two thou- to anything beyond their obsessive between the increasingly ethno-na- sand soldiers-and swept the lightly goals. tionalist and separatist Slovenian new armed Slovene militias aside. Most The fundamentally identical politi- social movements, and the steadfastly border crossings were back under the cal process that led to the war in federalist Yugoslav People Army's of- federal government's control within Croatia, was repeated in Bosnia and ficer corps. Slovenia's Minister of De- days. In the meantime, nine Slovenian Herzegovina. First Serbo-Muslim fence since 1990, Janez Jansa, was one militiamen were killed in the clashes clashes occurred in the town of Foca, of the four people put on tried for trea- (Jansa,5); some scores of federal troops on September 11, 1990, less than a son in 1988, by a military tribunal, after died on the other side (Bandi, 202); month after the first armed standoff in rendering public some military docu- some foreigners were drawn into the Croatia. For as long as the ethnically ments of highly disputable impor- maelstrom by the Slovenian troops- tripartite Presidency, Parliament and

8 Refuge, Val* 14, No. 3 (June-July 1994) government of the republic were in 10. Although terribly slanted, this is a valuable place, the balance of power kept the rourctbook of Serbo-Croat ethnic relations, nonetheless. If we discount the Croatian Defence Forces, situation from a precipitous deteriora- 11. MiliUlrgrcnz, VojmKmjim, Military Frontier tion. Gradual worsening of ethnic rela- which may have no future, especially hav- ing in view that several political and mili- against the Ottoman Empire, demilitarized tions continued nonetheless. tary leaders were already killed by other in 1881 and annexed to Croatia and Slov- The first free elections held in No- Croat forces under questionable circum- enia. Namelv. Croatia was a "triune" kina- stances. dom at thai.time, composed of ~roatra vember of 1990, confirmed the process (North-West), Slovenia (North-East), and of ethno-political homogenization. Such claims were made by all sides, includ- Dalmatia (coastal regions). Dalmatia went ing the Serbs. For the Slovene story see Erombeing a Venetian possession for centu- Electoral results actually looked like an Jansa; Croatian story can be found in Covic; ethnic census data: Muslim Party of ries, through a short French rule during Muslim story is told by Fogelquist; Serb Napoleon I, to being an Austrian territory Democratic Action won 86 seats in the story is in Djuretic; for Yugoslav federal until 1918, when it entered the Kingdom of new Parliament; Serb Democratic story see Kadijevic. These are just examples, the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which in Party 72; Croat Democratic Commu- of course. turn became Yugoslaviain 1929. A good and I will leave alone the international dirnen- fair short history of the Military Frontier can nity 44 (Nakarada, 136). sions of the Ballcan conflicts, because such By April of 1991, predominantly be found in Roksandic. an attempt would require a comparative A medieval toponym refemng to the area assessment of not only Yugoslav (Serbian ethnic Serb region of Bosnian Krajina17 around the municipality of Knin, in North- founded its own Assembly (Parlia- and Montenegrin) role in them, but also the ern Dalmatia, pr&ntli capital of the self- arming of Croatia and Slovenia by Ger- proclaimed Republic of Serb Kraiina. ment (Nakarada, 139). In late October many, Austria and Hungary in 1990191, or of 1991, an Assembly (Parliament) of the recent American adBritish involve- Commando units of the Ministry of Interior ment in the Balkan conflicts on the Muslim of Croatia. the Serb people of Bosnia and Herze- Militia in this instance means the police. govina was founded (Bisic, 66), in side, which is far too complex an issue for the scope of this paper. That "highest state secret" was "known by response to the mid-October Memo- I am taking ethnic difference in the sense of only a few people (expandedPresidency [of randum on the Sovereign Bosnia and subjective self-understanding, although I Slovenia], some members of the govern- Herzegovina, adopted by the Croat- am fully aware of their concrete material ment, and the key operative personnel" and historical vacuousness. (Jansa, 155). Muslim majority in the Parliament As both ministers of defense-Slovenian , (Bisic, 65). In November, Serb people The issue of faith and religious sincerity is another matterwhichIcannot pyxsue in this and Yugoslavian-have published their of Bosnia and Herzegovina held a memoirs, one may find it useful to compare paper. plebiscite, expressing their intentionto Let me note that the voting slip for sover- their accounts of the events. See Jansa and remain in Yugoslavia (Nakarada, 146). eignty and independence was blue, and rep- Kadijevic in references. A month later, Government and Presi- resented as a Croatian-Slovenian position; Western Bosnia, with the regional capital of the other voting slip was red, it asked the Banja Luka. dency of Bosnia and Herzegovina de- voter to be for a "single federal country of See Amnesty International and Helsinki cided to seek recognition from the ~u~oslavia"-su~~&tin~union instead of Watch reports on the war crimes in Croatia European Community-as an inde- federation-and it was represented as a Ser- and Bosnia-Herzegovina. About head- pendent state. Serb representatives bian-Montenegrin chopping, see Soldo. were outvotgd again, by the Croat- Here we encounter the much disputed issue of ethnicity of the Montenegrins. It seems to References Muslim coalition (Bisic, 66). me that most of them were leaning towards Then came the Croat-Muslim closer ties with Serbia, ever since the mass Amnesty International. 1992. Bosnia-Herze- backed declaration of independence, uprising against the local Titoist epigones in pvi~msabusesofkrsichumanrights. Lon- 198889 (Strugar, 41). To counterbalance don: Amnesty International, October. - wide international recognition, and Strugarls ~erbnationalistviews, one can Amnesty ~nternational. 1993. Bosnia-Herze- breakup of Bosnia and Herzegovina, consult a Montenegrin independentist like pvina-Ram u dusi-Awound to thesoul. Lon- allin thespring of 19%. What followed Brkovic, for example. , don: Amnesty International, January. was almaelstrom of war, where yester- Montenegro and Serbia went through a dif- Amnesty International: 1993. Bosnia-Herze- ferent process, wherein former Communists govim-Rap and sexual abuse by annedforces. day's allies cut each others' civilians' London: Amnesty International, January. throats or burned them alive in their quite swiftly converted to Serb nationalism in 1987-89. Slobodan Milosevic is certainly the ' Babic, Goran. 1992. Bespuca Franje Tudjmana. homes. most famous example. Expounding anti-na- Zemun: Grafopublik. The lust of war+wason the loose as tionalist political viewpoint as late as Decem- Bandi Federica, Marcello Barzelogna, Franco villainy marched under the ethnic ber 1986 (Milosevic, 126-28), he was a Casseler, Alessandro Ciocchi, Piero Del national-communist leader of Serbia by,the Giudice, eds. 1991. Igiomi dcUa Slmh-25 flags, torturing, slaughtering, rapin& Spring of 1987 (Milosevic, 147-48, for exam- giugndl0 luglio. Trieste: Edizioni e. plundering, wrecking, even head- ple). His Montenegrin counterpart is Momir Bisic, M. 1992. "Hronologija vaznijih dogadjaja hunting.'* All in the name of the Bulatovic, who was pro-Yugoslav in 1989 1987-1992," Pogledi, May 8, pp. 63-66. people, nation, gods, history,-free- (Bulatovic, 37), but ended up clashing with Brkovic, Jevrem. 1990. Lideri, udbasi, generali. Slovene leadershipin 1991, as we can see from : Centar za informacije i publicitet. dom--one vast collective endeavour his letter to the Slovenian President Milan Bulatovic, Momir. 1991. Mmje od igre-vise od inspired by ethnic hatred, and dedi- Kucan (Bulatovic, 21415). ziwta. Novi Sad: Buducnost. cated to the joy of wanton destruction. It was his historical revisionism and nation-, Cavoski, Kosta. 1991. Slobodan protiv slobode. In a way, this Pandora's War is indeed alism that turned Tudjman into a dissident, Beograd: Dosije. beyon&good and evil. It is insane. not his rather nebulous democratic orienta- -. 1991. TheConstitutionojtkRrpublicofCroatin. tion (Babic, 83). Zagr* Sabor Republike Hrvatske.

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