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“To Speak out Is Dangerous” WATCH the Criminalization of Peaceful Expression in Thailand

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“To Speak out Is Dangerous” WATCH the Criminalization of Peaceful Expression in Thailand HUMAN RIGHTS “To Speak Out is Dangerous” WATCH The Criminalization of Peaceful Expression in Thailand To Speak Out is Dangerous Criminalization of Peaceful Expression in Thailand Copyright © 2019 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 978-1-6231-37724 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch defends the rights of people worldwide. We scrupulously investigate abuses, expose the facts widely, and pressure those with power to respect rights and secure justice. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org OCTOBER 2019 ISBN: 978-1-6231-37724 To Speak Out is Dangerous Criminalization of Peaceful Expression in Thailand Summary ......................................................................................................................... 1 Prosecution of Critics of the Coup and the Military ................................................................... 3 Prosecution of Opposition Politicians ..................................................................................... 4 Prosecution of Pro-Democracy Activists................................................................................... 5 Prosecutions for Lèse-Majesté ................................................................................................6 Fear and Self-Censorship........................................................................................................ 7 Key Recommendations ..................................................................................................... 9 To the Prime Minister and Government of Thailand .................................................................. 9 Methodology.................................................................................................................. 10 I. Background ................................................................................................................. 12 Thailand Under Thaksin Shinawatra ...................................................................................... 12 The 2006 Coup .................................................................................................................... 13 Protests and Violence .......................................................................................................... 15 State of Emergency .............................................................................................................. 16 Election of Yingluck Shinawatra ............................................................................................ 17 II. Declaration of Martial Law, the Coup, and Elections ..................................................... 19 Restrictions on Speech and Assembly ................................................................................... 20 Interim Constitution ............................................................................................................. 21 Lifting of Martial Law and Enforcement of HNCPO 3/2015 ....................................................... 21 Referendum on a New Constitution ....................................................................................... 22 Elections ............................................................................................................................. 23 III. Laws Criminalizing Expression, Association, and Assembly ......................................... 27 Laws Restricting Peaceful Speech ......................................................................................... 27 Sedition ........................................................................................................................ 27 Computer-Related Crime Act ........................................................................................... 28 Sections 326 to 333 of the Criminal Code: Defamation ..................................................... 28 Constitutional Referendum Act ....................................................................................... 29 Lèse-Majesté ................................................................................................................. 30 Contempt of Court.......................................................................................................... 31 Laws Restricting Peaceful Assembly ...................................................................................... 32 HNCPO Order 3/2015 ..................................................................................................... 32 Public Assembly Act 2015 ............................................................................................... 33 IV. Arbitrary Arrest and Secret Detention ......................................................................... 34 Attitude Adjustment: Pravit Rojanaphruk............................................................................... 35 Attitude Adjustment: Pichai Naripthaphan ............................................................................ 37 V. Criminal Cases Against Peaceful Critics of the Thai Authorities..................................... 39 Prosecution of Critics of the NCPO ........................................................................................ 39 Sombat Boongamanong ................................................................................................. 39 Pravit Rojanaphruk ........................................................................................................ 42 Prosecution for “March for Justice” ................................................................................. 45 Prosecution for Satirical Facebook Page.......................................................................... 49 Prosecution for Satirical Questionnaire ........................................................................... 52 Prosecution of Critics of the Military ...................................................................................... 53 Prosecution of Torture Victim for Allegations of Torture by the Military .............................. 53 Prosecution for Seeking Justice for Torture ...................................................................... 54 Prosecution of Human Rights Defenders for Allegations of Torture ................................... 55 Prosecution for Allegations of Corruption ........................................................................ 56 Prosecution for Academic Conference ............................................................................. 57 Prosecution of Opposition Politicians ................................................................................... 59 Sunisa Lertpakawat ....................................................................................................... 59 Pichai Naripthaphan ...................................................................................................... 61 Prosecution for Pheu Thai Press Conference .................................................................... 61 Watana Muangsook ....................................................................................................... 63 Prosecution of Members of Future Forward Party ............................................................. 67 Prosecution of Pro-Democracy Activists, Human Rights Defenders .......................................... 70 Prosecutions for Criticism of the Draft Constitution.......................................................... 70 Prosecution of “We Want Elections” Protesters ............................................................... 74 Prosecution of Lawyer Representing Activists .................................................................. 84 Prosecution for Protest Outside Courthouse .................................................................... 90 Prosecution for Calling for Justice for Slain Protesters ...................................................... 91 Prosecution for Criticism of the Royal Family (Lèse-Majesté) .................................................. 91 Prosecution of Jatupat “Pai” Boonphatthararaksa ........................................................... 94 Patnaree Chankij ........................................................................................................... 97 Sulak Sivaraksa .............................................................................................................99 Prawet Prapanukul ....................................................................................................... 100 VI. International and Domestic Legal Standards ............................................................. 102 Constitution of Thailand ..................................................................................................... 105 VII. Analysis of Thai Laws under International Standards ................................................107 Section 116 of the Criminal Code: Sedition .......................................................................... 107 Recommendation to the
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