FHSMUN Tampa Bay 3 SECURITY COUNCIL THE SITUATION IN THE Author: Brian D. Sutliff “What has become increasingly clear with each successive crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR) is that, despite being such a low priority for the international community, it is, in fact, the crossroads of regional and international conflict and gamesmanship.”1 Introduction The instability and violence in the Central African Republic (CAR), resulting from internal rivalries, a lack of effective state institutions, and frequent foreign military interventions, both from regional neighbors such as Chad and Sudan, pose a grave threat to prospects for prolonged peace and development throughout the Great Lakes region of Central Africa as well as in Cameroon, Chad, and Sudan. Currently ranked the third most fragile state in the annual Foreign Policy/Fund for Peace “Fragile States Index,”2 the Central African Republic (CAR) is a country whose security situation is of the utmost concern for the Security Council, particularly because of the potential for regional spillover. Delegates to the Security Council need to assess whether the current mandate and force structure of the current peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic (CAR) as well as the most appropriate and effective steps to resolve the current conflict and prevent future conflicts. Historical Context The Central African Republic’s tumultuous political history serves as a cautionary signpost for domestic political actors as well as the wider international community. French colonial rule from 1890-1960 created an extractive model of politics as well as a predominant French role in security issues. The establishment and implementation of predatory rule, including raiding the national treasury, began shortly after independence but it accelerated enormously under President, and later Emperor, Jean-Bedel Bokassa. Referring to Bokassa’s coronation, on the anniversary of his hero Napoleon Bonaparte’s 1804 coronation as the French Emperor, Stephen W. Smith notes that “Prime Minister Ange-Felix Patassé zealously…splurged the

1 Louisa Lombard & Tatiana Carayannis, “Making Sense of CAR: An Introduction” from Making Sense of the Central African Republic Zed Books 2015 Loc. 356. 2 Foreign Policy & Fund for Peace, “Fragile States Index 2015” 2015. Found at: http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2015 equivalent of the CAR’s annual budget on the great day, 4 December 1977.”3 France provided sustained and significant financial and military aid during Bokassa’s reign until Bokassa’s exhausted his utility for the French government. After the infamous Ngaragba Massacre of protesting students in , France withdrew its support from Bokassa and launched a military intervention in that overthrew Bokassa and restored his predecessor, David Dacko, to power. “Independent in principle but in reality dependent on France for everything, Dacko’s ex/new regime needed ever more foreign aid and troops to survive.”4 Dacko would subsequently win a very close election against former Prime Minister Patassé but he would almost immediately relinquish power to the army chief of staff, General André Kolingba, who would rule for 12 years and would use his presidential authority and power to enrich and protect his Yakoma ethnic group that represents less than 5% of the CAR population. The Central African Republic’s first and free election in September 1993 brought Patassé to power but 3 separate army mutinies in 1996 would create further tensions and lead to another French military intervention. Even though France would temporarily increase its military contingent in the Central African Republic from 1,400 to 2,300 soldiers, France sought to extricate itself from the chaotic, embarrassing and violent politics of the CAR by closing its military bases in Central African Republic and turning over security functions wherever possible to neighboring states and the UN. By 2001, conflicts between President Patassé and army chief of staff General François Bozizé would culminate in the expulsion of Bozizé and his subsequent exile in Chad. On the one-year anniversary of his expulsion from the Central African Republic, Bozizé launched a raid on that “knocked the bottom out of relations between CAR and Chad.”5 Within a few months, Bozizé, “with only a handful of CAR officers and mostly Chadian troops,”6 and with Patassé out of the country at a summit of Central African countries, captured Bangui and installed himself as president, albeit only through the strength of Chadian military forces who would immediately plunder much of Bangui. While Chadian soldiers undertook the most prominent roles during this particular stage of internal and regional turmoil but many other regional powers have intervened in various capacities over the past 13 years. Scale of the Problem The International Crisis Group (ICG) notes that “the 2013 crisis made matters worse. The many atrocities committed by the Seleka and anti-balaka militias caused a humanitarian disaster, provoked fierce community tensions and systematic targeting of Muslims in Bangui and the west of the country and destroyed an already declining economy.”7 Chronic violence throughout Central Africa and the surrounding countries is a both a cause and effect of the problems in the Central African Republic (CAR). Neighboring countries often view military interventions in the

3 Stephen W. Smith, “CAR’s History: The Past of a Tense Present” from Making Sense of the Central African Republic Loc. 804. 4 Stephen W. Smith, “CAR’s History: The Past of a Tense Present” Loc. 833. 5 Stephen W. Smith, “CAR’s History: The Past of a Tense Present” Loc. 946. 6 Stephen W. Smith, “CAR’s History: The Past of a Tense Present” Loc. 960. 7 International Crisis Group (ICG), “The Central African Crisis: From Predation to Stabilisation” Crisis Group Africa Report No. 219 June 17, 2014 p. 2. Central African Republic (CAR) as relatively lower cost foreign policy gambits. Nathaniel Olin notes that “participating in regional peacekeeping missions temporarily improved the image of many of CAR’s neighbours in the eyes of the international community, but it also allowed them to extend their influence into CAR, and to play kingmaker when the opportunity presented itself.”8 The horrific violence currently associated with Boko Haram and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and previously connected to the Darfur conflict have served as conduits for Cameroon, Chad, , and Sudan, amongst others, to destabilize the Central African Republic (CAR) and surrounding countries as well as to seek greater regional power. Opportunities for plunder and resource extraction also serve as powerful incentives for the Central African Republic’s neighbors to intervene militarily. Armed conflict, political instability, and violence are not new developments in the Central African Republic (CAR) but the current instability and violence are of paramount concern to the region and the greater international community. Refugees pouring into Cameroon, Chad, and Sudan are moving into other conflict situations, including into the continuing crisis involving Boko Haram. In his May 14, 2015 report to the Security Council, UN Secretary- General Ban Ki-moon noted that “more than 2.7 million people in the country, representing almost two thirds of the population, need humanitarian assistance.” Furthermore, there were over 435,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) within the Central African Republic and over 450,000 refugees in neighboring countries.9 Concerns about widespread anti-Muslim violence10 in the Central African Republic (CAR) must be evaluated clearly and promptly as the UN and the wide international community cannot afford to serve as seemingly idle and helpless bystanders during another instance of sectarian bloodletting in Central Africa. Additionally, “different peacekeeping contingents [have been] accused of taking sides or playing favourites – Muslim populations accused the French of siding with the anti-Muslim militias, while Chadian soldiers reportedly fired into a crowd of Christians, killing twenty-four and injuring over a hundred civilians (and subsequently withdrawing its peacekeepers).”11 While the actions and motivations of the Central African Republic’s neighbors must be closely monitored, it is equally imperative that France act responsibly in the current security environment as well as going forward. French support for, and later withdrawal of support from, governing authorities in Bangui has often been instrumental in the success or collapse of various Central African Republic governments. France’s efforts to maintain a prominent military presence in its former colonies and throughout West and Central Africa may clash with the policy prescriptions favored in Bangui, as well as in other national capitals. Many analysts, including the International Crisis Group (ICG), emphasize the predations of the ruling elites in the CAR, behaviors that have eviscerated the institutions of the state. The

8 Nathaniel Olin, “Pathologies of Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in CAR” from Making Sense of the Central African Republic Zed Books London 2015 Loc. 3948. 9 Quotation and statistics found at: Ban Ki-moon, “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa” S/2015/339 May 14, 2015 p. 6. 10 BBC News, “Central African Republic: ‘Massive scale ethnic cleansing’” March 19, 2014. 11 Nathaniel Olin, “Pathologies of Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in CAR” from Making Sense of the Central African Republic Zed Books London 2015 Loc. 4243. International Crisis Group (ICG) notes that “cars owned by NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], the UN and private companies were stolen and sold in neighbouring countries on such a scale that the Seleka coup seemed more like a car theft operation than the result of political struggle.”12 With the current allegations about Seleka, as well as the history of egregious embezzlement and previous predation by elected officials and bureaucrats, international donors have intensified their focus on combating governmental corruption. While withholding funds that might be siphoned off in corrupt schemes may be morally preferable, and legally required, for international donors, the CAR’s governing authorities may become even more prone to corruption and embezzlement as a result, at least in the short term. In many of the recent peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic (CAR), international peacekeepers have enjoyed their greatest successes in limiting violence in the national capital, Bangui, but have often been far less successful in reducing violence outside of the capital, particularly in rural areas. Concentrating efforts in Bangui is quite a predictable strategy for many reasons, including that peacekeeping efforts, as opposed to peacemaking efforts, rely on the acceptance of the national governing authorities. Given the Central African Republic’s geographic location, though, this emphasis on stabilizing Bangui is not particularly likely to quell problems in the north and east of the country, including conflicts with Chadian, South Sudanese, and Sudanese populations and security forces. UN System Actions The UN System and its international partners have intervened in the Central African Republic (CAR) in significant, but often not sustained, humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. While the UN System needs to be understandably wary of the serious potential for peacekeeping missions to last for many more years, even decades, than originally anticipated, in the case of the Central African Republic, the UN, and its international partners, including specific member states, has far too often sought to wind down humanitarian and peacekeeping missions as quickly as possible. Referring to the self-imposed deadline of withdrawing the MINURCA peacekeepers in 1998, Nathaniel Olin argues that “this arbitrary deadline signaled the urgency on the part of the UN to withdraw its mission as quickly as possible, despite the very real possibility of elections destabilizing the tenuous equilibrium CAR had reached.”13 Delegates to the Security Council need to remain cognizant of the consequences of potentially conflicting demands for timeliness and comprehensive settlements. The current UN peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), was authorized by the Security Council in April 2014 and has operating for the past 18 months. As of June 30, 2015, approximately 10,800 military and police personnel from 47 countries (out of a currently authorized force structure of 12,875 military and police personnel) were deployed in

12 ICG, “The Central African Crisis: From Predation to Stabilisation” June 17, 2014 p. 8. 13 Nathaniel Olin, “Pathologies of Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in CAR” from Making Sense of the Central African Republic Zed Books London 2015 Loc.4046. MINUSCA.14 The mandate for MINUSCA includes the protection of civilians, delivery of humanitarian assistance, implementation of political transition, promotion of human rights, and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants. Delegates to the Security Council need to consider whether or not to extend MINUSCA’s mandate past its current expiration date of , 2016 as well as whether or not to modify the mandate and/or force structure. To be effective, peacekeeping missions, whether specifically through the UN System or its international partners, must be seen as legitimately striving to assist local people. To wit, whenever peacekeeping personnel are accused of misconduct, particularly by local residents and not strictly by previous or current belligerents, the legitimacy of many, if not all, peacekeeping missions will be in question, even if only temporarily. In August 2012, 2 women and 1 girl under the age of 18 accused 3 peacekeepers of rape, leading to investigations into the incidents in question as well as the same day resignation of the chief envoy of the UN to the Central African Republic (CAR), General Babacar Gaye of Senegal.15 Tragically, these were not the first accusations of rape and/or sexual misconduct by UN peacekeepers in the Central African Republic, and frustration over the perceived lack of effective prosecutions and/or punishment for these crimes may imperil the overall effectiveness of peacekeeping in the Central African Republic and beyond. Conclusion The deteriorating security situation in the Central African Republic requires a much greater, and most importantly, more sustained, focus from the international community. The dangers of regional conflagration in the already volatile Great Lakes and surrounding regions of Central Africa are alarming. Furthermore, the warnings about the targeting of specific communities, specifically Muslims, must be comprehensively addressed as the UN System and the international community as a whole must honor their collective commitments to prevent and punish the crime of genocide. Guiding Questions How does the current humanitarian crisis in the Central African Republic affect your country? Has your country accepted any refugees from the Central African Republic? Has your country provided any financial or related assistance to the Central African Republic? How might the Central African Republic’s neighbors most effectively contribute to an end to the violence and armed conflict? How might the UN and relevant regional organizations most effectively contribute to an end to conflict in the Central African Republic and the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement?

14 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), “MINUSCA Facts and Figures” 2015. Found at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusca/facts.shtml 15 Somini Sengupta, “UN Official Resigns Amidst Accusations of Sex Abuse by Peacekeepers” New York Times August 12, 2015. Are the mandate and the current force structures for MINUSCA appropriate and/or sufficient to comprehensively address the security concerns in the Central African Republic? How might the UN System most effectively address and/or prevent future instances of misconduct, including crimes against women and girls, by civilian and peacekeeping personnel?

Resolutions UN Security Council resolution 2217 (S/RES/2217) “The Situation in the Central African Republic” , 2015. UN Security Council resolution 2212 (S/RES/2212) “The Situation in the Central African Republic” March 26, 2015. UN Security Council resolution 2196 (S/RES/2196) “The Situation in the Central African Republic” January 22, 2015. UN Security Council resolution 2181 (S/RES/2181) “The Situation in the Central African Republic” October 21, 2014. UN Security Council resolution 2149 (S/RES/2149) “The Situation in the Central African Republic” , 2014. UN Security Council resolution 2134 (S/RES/2134) “The Situation in the Central African Republic” January 28, 2014. UN Security Council resolution 2127 (S/RES/2127) “The Situation in the Central African Republic” December 5, 2013.

Reports of the Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Central African Republic” (S/2015/576) July 29, 2015. Ban Ki-moon, “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Central African Republic, providing an update to the developments in the CAR since 28 November 2014” (S/2015/227) April 1, 2015. Ban Ki-moon, “Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic submitted pursuant to paragraph 48 of Security Council resolution 2127 (2013) [containing proposal for the new peacekeeping operation]” S/2014/142 March 3, 2014.