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In 199- I Wrote an Article for the Middle East Quarterly Which Has Appeared a Number of Times in Other Periodicals and Has

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In 199- I Wrote an Article for the Middle East Quarterly Which Has Appeared a Number of Times in Other Periodicals and Has WESTERN INFLUENCE ON ARAB MILITARIES: POUNDING SQUARE PEGS INTO ROUND HOLES By Norvell B. DeAtkine* This article is a personal account of U.S. Army Colonel Norvell DeAtkine’s experience in dealing with Arab militaries for over 40 years. Based on observation and study of Arab military establishments, he concludes little of significance has happened to change the deeply embedded character of the Arab military mindset. While there is some evidence that Arab soldiers historically performed better under European officers, there is no evidence that the Western tradition of command ethos outlived the departure of the officers. There is indeed a distinct Arab military tradition and attempts to recreate it in one’s image are not only fruitless, but often counter- productive. In 1999, I wrote an article entitled “Why deploying to the Middle East. The most salient Arabs Lose Wars,” which has appeared a observation I have drawn from my number of times in other periodicals and has observations and study of Arab military had a rather long shelf life on the internet. establishments has been to convince me that Some considered it as stereotypical, but it was little of significance has happened to change derived from my many years of being with or the deeply embedded character of the Arab observing Arab armies, including the civil war military mindset.2 between the Jordanian Arab Army and the From these many conversations and Palestinian Liberation Organization.1 Other discussions, I found little has evolved in the than the Jordanian experience, my store of Arab military culture in the years since I wrote knowledge comes from more than two years the article that would cause me to change the of daily interface with the Egyptian ground conclusions I reached. Moreover, they forces as an Army Attaché and a number of sharpened my belief that there is indeed a temporary duty assignments with Gulf military distinct Arab military tradition and that our establishments, including an assignment to the attempts to recreate it in our image are not British-officered Trucial Oman Scouts before only fruitless, but often counter-productive. the emergence of the United Arab Republic. I When we write articles on how to improve have combined these on-the-ground Arab military effectiveness, to me it smacks of observations and experiences with over 40 condescension and leftover colonialist years of collecting as much information as thinking, however well intended the possible on the military culture and way of life suggestions may be.3 of Arab militaries. The article I wrote focused on conventional As the Middle East Seminar Director for war and the Arab impediments to conducting over 18 years at the John F. Kennedy Special it successfully against Western type forces. Warfare Center and School, I have Yet as the Iraqi insurgent war against the interviewed literally hundreds of my former coalition forces dragged on with continuing U.S. Army Special Operations personnel, violence, an obvious degree of effectiveness reviewing their experiences with various Arab was visible on the part of the Iraqi insurgents,4 military establishments. Since retiring from and it was becoming apparent that the government service, I continued as a demonstrated ineffectiveness of Arab armies consultant working with military personnel in conventional warfare did not apply to the 18 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 2013) Western Influence on Arab Militaries: Pounding Square Pegs into Round Holes parameters of unconventional warfare. The trusted soldiers in their own unit but not those insurgents displayed initiative and in neighboring units. imagination5 in their tactics that were rarely The stark differences between the Arabs’ displayed in their conventional war making. capabilities in conventional and Reviewing the historical record, Arab unconventional war led me to the next step. unconventional war effectiveness in the Thinking about the long history of Western modern era has presented a much more presence and involvement with the militaries positive picture. Through the Arab resistance of the Arab world, and the fact that for the against the Italians, French, and Spanish in most part the Western powers tried to create North Africa as well as the guerrilla warfare an Arab military in their own image, what has against the British in Aden, Iraq, and been the result? More importantly, perhaps, Palestine, the Arabs demonstrated a has the Western military influence been proficiency lacking in their conventional adverse to Arab effectiveness in war in warfare operations.6 general? THE ARAB AS UNCONVENTIONAL CONTINUITY IN THE ARAB MILITARY FIGHTER CULTURE As I examined what in fact made the Reading the passages from the River War by difference between the Arab insurgent or Winston Churchill on the remaking of the guerilla fighter and the conventional soldier, I Egyptian Army with the infusion of British surfaced a number of factors. Among them training and officers reminded me of our was that the Arab guerilla usually had effort, now dwindling, to remake Saddam’s leadership sharpened by battle as well as army. As Churchill wrote, under the new experience and exuded the confidence that army, “The recruits were treated with justice. motivated others to follow him--as opposed to Their rations were not stolen by officers. The a conventional unit commander most likely men were given leave to visit their villages picked by the regime for political reasons.7 from time to time. When they were sick they Moreover, the Arab guerilla was apt to be with were sent hospital instead of being flogged. In those of his own ethnic group, clan, or tribe-- short, the European system was substituted for once again as opposed to a conventional unit the Oriental.”9 of diverse, urban/rural, tribal, or sectarian Exactly 100 years later, I was observing the differences. The officers almost always came Egyptian army, and I realized, in reality, how from the dominant ethnic group, such as the little things had changed. The officers did not east bank Jordanians versus the Palestinians in steal from their men, but they used them as Jordan, the Sunnis in Iraq versus the Shi’i indentured servants working on their farms soldiery, or the Christian Maronite officers in and cared very little for their rations, which Lebanon. usually consisted of bread, some onions, a The unconventional Arab soldier is fighting little dried fish, beans, tea, and sugar. within his element with people he trusts. In Watching a truck roll into the unit area with admittedly simplistic terms, it boils down to the cargo bed piled high with bread being held the concept of fire and maneuver--the idea that down by soldiers standing or sitting on it, an attacking soldier exposing himself to gives some idea on the care that went with enemy fire can count on those who support their rationing. Moreover soldiers could buy him to provide covering fire, and that his life supplemental food items from a sort of unit- has meaning to his superiors. If there is a lack level Post Exchange in which very often the of trust in officers and one’s fellow soldiers, unit officers would retain the profits.10 I did the willingness to expose oneself to attack is not see soldiers flogged, but I did witness missing.8 My observation was that they soldiers being slapped and pushed around. Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 2013) 19 Norvell B. DeAtkine The Egyptian officers were not barbarians was not the first to overestimate the influence or uncaring brutes. It was and is a way of life of his nation on the Egyptian military culture. inculcated by centuries of living in a specific He made much of the positive effects of the environment. The Egyptian soldier expected French influence on Egyptian society. In nothing more. I once asked an Egyptian commenting on al-Jabarti’s observations, officer why the officers got into their autos Shmuel Moreh cited the profound French and drove off to Cairo on Thursday influence on the Egyptian military in terms of afternoons, leaving their soldiers stranded in modern weaponry and tactics.14 However, it the desert and having to hope they could hitch may have seemed then, by the time of the a ride to Cairo on a passing truck. His answer British attempts to develop a new Egyptian was that to give them a ride or in any way army, little if any French influence remained. assist their way into Cairo would only perplex Today French influence in Egypt is negligible. and confound them. The same concept that As P.J. Vatikiotis noted in his seminal officers have privileges and are fools not to study of the Egyptian army,15 for centuries the take advantage of them is pervasive people of Egypt were generally excluded from throughout the Arab world. For example, in military service. It was not until the reign of the U.S. Army and British Army, traditionally Khedive Muhammad Sa’id that some the officers eat after the last soldier has gone Egyptians obtained officer rank, and not until through the mess line. Not so in the Iraqi 1936 that larger numbers of officers came army11 nor among the Bedouin troops of the from the general Egyptian society. As Israeli Defense Forces,12 and certainly not in Vatikiotis observed, the officer corps of Egypt the Egyptian army I served with. Yet again, as was drawn mostly from the lower middle indicated by the IDF officer training with the class, who had no other hope of achieving a Arab troops, the soldier does not expect better station in life. As the social origins of anything more from the officer. The thought the officer class broadened, their attitude occurs then that if officer and soldier are toward political issues closely coincided with content with the practice, why attempt to Egyptian society in general, including the change it? propensity to blame others for their failures.
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