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Cassell's History of the Boer War, 1899-1902

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Cassell's History of the Boer War, 1899-1902 507 CHAPTER XXXIX. THE RETREAT. O far, in these pages, no comment has the defence ot the summit had been taken S been made on the wisdom or un­ regularly in hand, entrenchments laid out, wisdom of any of the proceedings which gun emplacements prepared, the dead re­ led to the evacuation of Spion Kop at moved, the wounded collected, and, in fact, Colonel Thorneycroft’s order. the whole place brought under regular There was a great conflict of opinion, military command, and careful arrange­ not only amongst all members of the ments made for the supply of water and public, but amongst the commanders in food to the scattered fighting line, the hills South Africa, as to the wisdom of the step would have been held, I am sure. taken by Colonel Thorneycroft when he “ But no arrangements were made. ordered his men to evacuate Spion Kop General Coke appears to have been or­ on the night of 24th January. The facts dered away just as he would have been seemed to be that there was practically no useful, and no one succeeded him ; those communication between Sir Charles Warren on the top were ignorant of the fact that AngloBoerWar.com at the bottom of the hill and Thorneycroft guns were coming up, and generally there on the summit. Warren was making some was a want of organisation and system sort of preparation to send guns up to the that acted most unfavourably on the top of the hill at night, but of this inten­ defence.” tion he had in no way informed Colonel It is probable that Lord Roberts hit Thorneycroft. He was also making pre­ upon the explanation of the muddle when parations to send up supplies of food and he wrote in his despatch, commenting on water, as well as ammunition, all three or the despatch of Sir Redvers Buller :—u It which were quite as necessary as artillery. is to be regretted that Sir Charles Warren For the men at the summit had been did not himself visit Spion Kop during the fighting for seventeen hours without bite afternoon or evening, knowing as he did or sup ; and although British infantry, so that the state of affairs there was very long as it is actively engaged, can put up critical, and that the loss of the position with an absence of creature comforts quite would involve the failure of the operations.” as well as most people, yet there are limits It was all very well for Sir Charles to human endurance. , Warren to summon General Coke from Sir Red vers Buller made severe com­ the summit to make a report as to the ments in his official despatch upon the state of affairs there ; but the old saw conduct of the divisional commander. which says if you want anything to be well “ There was,” he said, “ a want of organi­ done do it yourself applies as much to sation and system that acted most un­ warfare as to anything else in human life. favourably on the defence. If at sundown One knows how difficult it is for any one HISTORY OF THE BOER WAR.508 person to make it clear to any other what able to concur with Sir Redvers Buller in the exact state of affairs is when that state thinking that Colonel Thorneycroft exer­ of affairs happens to be something which cised a wise discretion in ordering the can be seen. You may do very many things troops to retire. Even admitting that by deputy ; but you must see for yourself. due preparations had not been made for Had Sir Charles Warren thought it his strengthening the position during the duty to proceed to the top of Spion Kop, night, reorganising the defence, and bring­ he would immediately, with his soldier’s ing up artillery—admitting also that the eye, have taken in the whole circum­ senior officers on the summit of the hill stances of the case. He would have seen might have been more promptly informed not only that the state of affairs there was of the measures taken by Sir Charles critical, but he would have recognised how Warren to support and reinforce them, I critical it was. He would have learned am of opinion that Colonel Thorneycroft’s something of the conformation of the assumption of responsibility and authority ground on the plateau. He would have was wholly inexcusable.” seen whether or no it was possible to plant What Colonel Thorneycroft ought to guns in position on the summit, and if so, have done, according to Lord Roberts, would have been able to give directions as was to send a messenger to General Coke, to the best spot for the construction of or Sir Charles Warren, asking for permis­ emplacements. On any question of for­ sion to retire, or for such other orders tification his opinion and advice would the)* might have to give. Because, said have been invaluable ; for he AngloBoerWar.comhimself was Lord Roberts, the fire of the Boers having an Engineer, and a skilful one to boot. now altogether abated, not to be resumed More than this, there can be no doubt until daylight came, Thorneycroft’s men that his presence would have been useful, could not have incurred any loss during as showing the men who were engaged in the couple of hours it would have taken that desperate struggle that some arrange­ for him to communicate by messenger ments would be made to assist and relieve with his superiors. It should be said here them in holding their hardly won position that the commander-in-chief in South against the tremendous odds of artillery Africa expressed no opinion as to the brought to bear against them. feasibility of holding Spion Kop. Of As to the order given by Colonel course, he could not ; because he did not Thorneycroft to abandon the hill, there know the ground. Sir Charles Warren was a considerable difference of opinion and Sir Redvers Buller were equally in­ as to whether he ought to have done it capable of passing any really valuable or not. Sir Redvers Buller officially ex­ opinion on the wisdom of Thorneycroft’s cused his action. “ Preparations for the action, for they were equally ignorant. second day’s defence should have been It may be assumed that if the position organised during the day, and have been captured by the British on the kop was commenced at nightfall. As this was not tenable at all, then Thorneycroft ought done I think Colonel Thorneycroft exer­ not to have evacuated it. Was it tenable, cised a wise discretion.” On the other even with artillery ? Sir Charles Warren hand, Lord Roberts differed entirely from in his report says that he was making General Buller. “ I regret that I am un­ arrangements for sending guns to the top A QUESTION OF ETIQUETTE. 509 during the night, but there was an almost taken into consideration — something unanimous opinion amongst those who which does not appear in the official had actually been in the position that even despatch, unless, perhaps, it is included if guns had been by superhuman exertions in Sir Redvers Buller’s comprehensive dragged up to the summit, they would phrase, w want of organisation and sys­ immediately have been put out of action tem ”—and that is, that it was most by the Boers. This was owing to the con­ difficult for the officers in command on figuration of the ground. It may safely the summit to obtain any orders at all be assumed of a man of the conspicuous that they could follow. A messenger personal courage of Thorneycroft, a man would be sent to headquarters, and there who sought danger rather than avoided it, would probably return two people, or that he would not have abandoned a perhaps more, with answers to the message position deemed by his commanders of —giving directions generally different and strategical importance if he had thought frequently quite contradictory. It was it could be held at all. lamentable, it was more than lamentable, There was a story told of him which that gallant fellows should be sent to storm illustrates the nature of the man. A a steep and high mountain and left to hold certain major in a Line regiment com­ it when the task was almost impossible, plained to him that the men of Thorney- and that their difficulties should have been croft’s Horse did not salute him (the increased tenfold by the incompetence of major) every time they met him. “ Not the persons who ought to have been able salute you, eh ? Why, they don’tAngloBoerWar.com salute to render them every assistance. me. But they’re the devils to fight ! ” said On the morning of the 25th January Thorneycroft. Sir Redvers Buller posted from Spearman’s What ought to have been done, un­ Camp to Trichardt’s Drift. When he doubtedly, was for the troops who had arrived—for the purpose of arranging a clung to their position so tenaciously all day plan of action with Warren—he was met to deliver a bayonet attack in the dark, and by the news, “ Spion Kop was abandoned so make themselves masters of the whole in the night.” Buller could hardly believe top of the mountain. But Thorneycroft his ears. Still more incredulous did he had no real idea of the facts of the case. grow when he was told that Thorneycroft He did not know but that if he secured the had abandoned it without orders. And top he might not find his position as bad then Sir Redvers Buller took over the as ever ; for he would still have been command of Warren’s force.
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